

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS IN
RURAL ETHIOPIA**

**THE ROLE OF THE 'GOVERNMENT GO-BETWEENS' IN
CHANGING RURAL ETHIOPIA**

September 2011

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Acknowledgements

Contributions to the thinking and evidence behind this paper have come from many sources. Chief among them are Philippa Bevan, Alula Pankhurst, and the many Ethiopian field researchers who have been engaged in the Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Study since it began in 1994. Funding for the research in the mid-1990s came from the UK Overseas Aid Administration (DFID's predecessor) and in the mid-2000s from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. The 2010 research was funded by the Joint Governance Assessment and Measurement (JGAM) group of Ethiopian development partners and this paper was commissioned by DFID-Ethiopia.

Table of contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Part I: Introduction and conceptual framework | 1 |
| 1. The purpose and approach of the paper | 1 |
| 1.1. The focus and purpose of the paper..... | 1 |
| 1.2. The approach | 2 |
| 1.3. The structure of the paper..... | 3 |
| 1.4. The data | 5 |
| 2. Why are the 'go-betweens' important? | 7 |
| 2.1. Purpose and structure of the section | 7 |
| 2.2. Locating the 'go-betweens' in the research..... | 7 |
| 2.2.1. The go-betweens 'trapped in' the disconnect between 'development models' | 7 |
| 2.2.2. How many models? | 9 |
| 2.2.3. The government go-betweens in the development interface space | 10 |
| 2.2.4. The go-betweens in the web of interventions | 11 |
| 2.3. Conceptualising the role of the go-betweens as change agents | 12 |
| 2.3.1. Complexity-informed conceptualisation of change | 12 |
| 2.3.2. Different kinds of knowledge, and power | 13 |
| 2.3.3. Translation, interpretation or negotiation | 14 |
| 2.3.4. The government go-betweens' power | 15 |
| 2.3.5. Theories of change and complexity | 17 |
| 3. The Ethiopian context | 20 |
| 3.1. Purpose and structure of the section | 20 |
| 3.2. Decentralisation in Ethiopia..... | 20 |
| 3.2.1. Decentralisation 'in principle' (the policy) | 20 |
| 3.2.2. Decentralisation 'in practice' (policy implementation)..... | 21 |
| 3.3. Who are the government 'go-betweens' supposed to be?..... | 22 |
| 3.3.1. Since when are the government go-betweens present and how many are they? | 22 |
| 3.3.2. What types of profile are they expected to have?..... | 24 |
| 3.3.3. What are they supposed to do and how are they supported to do it?..... | 25 |
| 3.3.4. The government human resource management policy framework | 30 |
| Part II: The WIDE 3 Stage 1 findings in the country context | 33 |
| 4. The government go-betweens in rural Ethiopia: Snapshots from six communities | 33 |
| 4.1. Purpose and structure of the section | 33 |
| 4.2. The WIDE 3 Stage 1 communities..... | 33 |
| 4.3. The government go-betweens in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities..... | 33 |
| 4.3.1. Are the government go-betweens from the village in which they work?..... | 34 |
| 4.3.2. The government go-betweens' gender..... | 34 |
| 4.3.3. What is the family status of the go-betweens? | 34 |
| 4.3.4. Recruitment, length of tenure and transfers | 35 |
| 4.3.5. Salary levels..... | 36 |
| 4.3.6. What about job satisfaction? | 36 |
| 4.3.7. Relationships with the community, the kebele leadership and the wereda | 38 |
| 4.3.8. Pre-service and in-service training..... | 38 |
| 4.3.9. Pursuing further education and for what..... | 40 |
| 4.4. Summary and some thoughts..... | 40 |
| 4.4.1. Summary findings..... | 40 |
| 4.4.2. Some thoughts | 41 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 5. The government go-betweens in the different fields of action..... | 43 |
| 5.1. Purpose and structure of the section | 43 |
| 5.2. The government go-betweens in the livelihood field..... | 44 |
| 5.2.1. Who are the go-betweens in the livelihood field? | 44 |
| 5.2.2. What do DAs do and what do they not do? | 45 |
| 5.2.3. How do they do it? | 45 |
| 5.2.4. Perceptions of and factors in the DAs' effectiveness..... | 46 |
| 5.2.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context | 46 |
| 5.3. The government go-betweens in health, nutrition, sanitation | 49 |
| 5.3.1. Who are the go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field? | 49 |
| 5.3.2. What do HEWs do and what do they not do? | 50 |
| 5.3.3. How do they do it? | 50 |
| 5.3.4. Perceptions of and factors in the HEWs' effectiveness..... | 51 |
| 5.3.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context | 51 |
| 5.4. The government go-betweens in education..... | 53 |
| 5.4.1. Who are the go-betweens in the education sector?..... | 54 |
| 5.4.2. What do primary school head teachers and teachers do and not do? | 54 |
| 5.4.3. How do they do it? | 55 |
| 5.4.4. Perceptions of and factors in the school staff effectiveness..... | 55 |
| 5.4.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context | 56 |
| 5.5. The government go-betweens in the field of social re/pro/duction | 57 |
| 5.5.1. Community-government relationships | 57 |
| 5.5.2. 'Community work' practices | 58 |
| 5.5.3. Dissemination of the government development model | 58 |
| 5.5.4. Actively promoted/defended communities' models | 58 |
| 5.5.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context | 59 |
| 5.6. The government go-betweens in the field of community governance | 60 |
| 5.6.1. Who are the government go-betweens in the community governance field? | 60 |
| 5.6.2. What do kebele managers do and not do..... | 60 |
| 5.6.3. Perceptions of effectiveness of the kebele managers | 61 |
| 5.6.4. Key overall insights in the country-wide context | 61 |
| 5.7. Summary and some thoughts | 62 |
| 5.7.1. Commonalities and differences across fields of action | 63 |
| 5.7.2. The web of development interventions..... | 65 |
| 6. The role of the government go-betweens in the communities' change trajectories | 68 |
| 6.1. Purpose and structure of the section | 68 |
| 6.2. The community trajectories and their potential future | 68 |
| 6.3. The increased presence of government go-betweens in the communities | 69 |
| 6.3.1. Increased interactions with the go-betweens as 'others' | 69 |
| 6.3.2. The government go-betweens' role as models..... | 71 |
| 6.3.3. Link with urban life..... | 71 |
| 6.4. The go-betweens in the overall community-government relationship..... | 72 |
| 6.4.1. Community-specific thrust of community-government relationships..... | 72 |
| 6.4.2. Cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity patterns across communities..... | 72 |
| 6.4.3. Cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity across fields of action | 73 |
| 6.5. The go-betweens and community change – Case studies | 74 |
| 6.5.1. Livelihood field: Agricultural diversification in Yetmen | 75 |
| 6.5.2. Health field: Contributing factors to sanitation uptake | 76 |
| 6.5.3. Social re/pro/duction field: Women's rights in Girar | 77 |
| 6.6. Summary and some thoughts | 80 |
| 6.6.1. What may matter for change in rural communities..... | 80 |

| | | |
|--------------------------|--|------------|
| 6.6.2. | Some more thoughts on rural community change and the government go-betweens..... | 81 |
| 7. | The role of the government go-betweens in six rural communities – Summary..... | 83 |
| 7.1. | Purpose and structure of the section | 83 |
| 7.2. | The government go-betweens as ‘human resources’ and individuals | 83 |
| 7.3. | The government go-betweens as service providers and change agents..... | 84 |
| Part III: | Looking into the future | 86 |
| 8. | The GTP: Implications for the government go-betweens | 86 |
| 8.1. | Purpose and structure of the section | 86 |
| 8.2. | The Growth and Transformation Plan: Policy continuity and evolution | 86 |
| 8.3. | Implications for the government go-betweens | 88 |
| 8.3.1. | In the livelihoods field of action | 88 |
| 8.3.2. | In the human re/pro/duction field of action..... | 90 |
| 8.3.3. | In the other fields of action..... | 91 |
| 8.3.4. | The human resource management framework | 91 |
| 8.4. | Speculation – Path dependency | 92 |
| 9. | Learning from outside Ethiopia..... | 94 |
| 9.1. | Purpose and structure of the section | 94 |
| 9.2. | Roles of government go-betweens elsewhere | 94 |
| 9.2.1. | By sector..... | 94 |
| 9.2.2. | Across sector | 97 |
| 9.3. | Effectiveness of government go-betweens elsewhere..... | 98 |
| 9.3.1. | Cases of effectiveness or lack thereof..... | 98 |
| 9.3.2. | What makes a successful or an unsuccessful go-between?..... | 98 |
| 9.4. | Getting the human resource management structures and systems right..... | 102 |
| 10. | A ‘complex change agent support’ role for donors in Ethiopia | 107 |
| 10.1. | Purpose and structure of the section | 107 |
| 10.2. | The ‘take away’ messages for the donors | 107 |
| 10.2.1. | From the WIDE3 Stage 1 evidence | 107 |
| 10.2.2. | From international experiences | 108 |
| 10.3. | The government go-betweens in donors’ model(s) | 108 |
| 10.4. | Donor inputs in policy and strategies for the government go-betweens..... | 110 |
| 10.4.1. | Strategy 1: Building better understanding | 110 |
| 10.4.2. | Strategy 2: Learning further lessons from elsewhere | 111 |
| 10.4.3. | Strategy 3: Using the evidence collaboratively and gradually more deeply | 111 |
| 10.4.4. | Cross-cutting strategy..... | 113 |
| Bibliography..... | | 114 |
| | Conceptual Literature..... | 114 |
| | Ethiopian literature | 114 |
| | International Literature..... | 117 |
| | WIDE3 team papers..... | 120 |
| Annex 1. | The six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities..... | 121 |
| Annex 2. | Who are the go-betweens in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities..... | 124 |
| Annex 3. | Demographic, social and professional profile of the government go-betweens in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities | 132 |

| | | |
|------------------|---|------------|
| Annex 4. | The government go-betweens in the livelihood field | 136 |
| Annex 5. | The government go-betweens in health, nutrition, sanitation | 143 |
| Annex 6. | The government go-betweens in education | 154 |
| Annex 7. | The government go-betweens in the field of social re/pro/duction..... | 162 |
| Annex 8. | The government go-betweens in the field of community governance | 168 |
| Annex 9. | Services and government go-betweens before 2010..... | 176 |
| Annex 10. | Further details from review of international experience | 179 |
| | | |
| Box 1: | Government and donor models in 2010 | 10 |
| Box 2: | Selected insights on the implementation of the GOE decentralisation policy | 22 |
| Box 3: | The DAs' roles, tasks and responsibilities in line with MOARD policy guidance | 26 |
| Box 4: | How are HEWs supposed to change communities' health behaviour | 28 |
| Box 5: | The kebele manager role – MCB 2006 | 29 |
| Box 6: | Slow progress with HRM reforms/strengthening – Mid-2010..... | 31 |
| Box 7: | 'Good governance' advice on HR management issues | 32 |
| Box 8: | The DAs and implementation of the HABP | 49 |
| Box 9: | Local interactions between government and society | 59 |
| Box 10: | A few facts on the kebele managers | 62 |
| Box 11: | Local perceptions of local service quality and local civil servants' ethic..... | 63 |
| Box 12: | Most commonly mentioned synergies and antergies | 65 |
| Box 13: | Government go-betweens since 1995 in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities | 70 |
| Box 14: | Community-government relations..... | 72 |
| Box 15: | Non-cooperation in Girar, complexity in Geblen | 76 |
| Box 16: | Women's economic empowerment in Girar – Not much of a role for the DAs..... | 78 |
| Box 17: | Planned Community-level Changes in the GTP | 87 |
| Box 18: | The (implicit) role of the DAs in the GTP | 88 |
| Box 19: | Role and performance of and support to primary school teachers (ESDP IV) | 90 |
| Box 20: | Role and performance of and support to health extension workers (HSDP IV) | 91 |
| Box 21: | Brazil success story: the role of effective accountability | 100 |
| Box 22: | Advantages and challenges of 'localising' service delivery | 102 |
| Box 23: | Role of supervision and support..... | 105 |
| Box 24: | DAs and the model farmers..... | 140 |
| Box 25: | What people say about the need for curative services..... | 147 |
| Box 26: | Views on the HEWs' effectiveness and factors influencing it | 152 |
| Box 27: | The government go-betweens and community-initiated institutions | 162 |
| Box 28: | Community work – What is done how | 164 |
| Box 29: | Power relation between kebele leader and manager..... | 170 |
| Box 30: | The kebele manager's role in planning, work planning and monitoring..... | 172 |
| Box 31: | Preliminary findings from the worldwide agricultural extension study..... | 180 |
| Box 32: | Assessing teacher quality | 182 |
| | | |
| Table 1: | Government go-betweens interviewed in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 villages..... | 6 |
| Table 2: | Theories of change – Government and donors in Ethiopia..... | 17 |
| Table 3: | Paradigmatic characteristics of two approaches to development/change..... | 18 |
| Table 4: | Expected profiles of the government go-betweens | 25 |
| Table 5: | Profiles of the government go-betweens 'on the ground' | 25 |
| Table 6: | Patterns of cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity at the development interface..... | 73 |
| Table 7: | Patterns at the development interface – By sector | 73 |
| Table 8: | Government go-betweens' origin | 132 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 9: Government go-betweens' family status | 132 |
| Table 10: How long in the job/profession | 133 |
| Table 11: Salary levels | 133 |
| Table 12: Job satisfaction | 134 |
| Table 13: Pursuing further education | 135 |
| Table 14: Health, nutrition and sanitation go-betweens: HEWs and community 'volunteers' | 143 |
| Table 15: Relationship of HEWs with kebele, wereda and health centres | 150 |
| Table 16: The education go-betweens in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities | 154 |
| Table 17: The ways schools functioned in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities | 159 |
| Table 18: The DAs, HEWs and education staff in the community governance field | 168 |
| Table 19: The kebele manager in the community governance field | 169 |
| | |
| Map 1: The Six WIDE3 Stage 1 Sites in 2010 | 5 |
| | |
| Figure 1: Cultural disconnect between development models | 8 |
| Figure 2: Social interactions at the development interface | 9 |
| Figure 3: The web of interventions..... | 12 |
| Figure 4: How many go-betweens..... | 23 |
| Figure 5: Possible Stage 1 community trajectories around 2010..... | 69 |
| Figure 6: Schematic illustration of the range of programmes of health extension workers: | 179 |
| Figure 7: World-wide evidence: Pupil per teacher ratios over time and in 2007 | 181 |

Acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| ABE | Alternative Basic Education |
| ADLI | Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation |
| AGP | Agricultural Growth Programme |
| AgTVET | Agricultural Technical Vocational Education and Training |
| ANC | Ante-Natal Care |
| ARD | Agriculture and Rural Development |
| ATA | Agricultural Transformation Agency |
| ATP | Agricultural Transformation Plan |
| AusAid | Australian Aid (agency) |
| BOARD | Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| BOFED | Bureau of Finance and Economic Development |
| BPR | Business Process Re-engineering |
| CAADP | Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme |
| CAS | Country Assistance Strategy |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisation |
| CEM | Country Economic Memorandum |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CPD | Continuous Professional Development |
| CPI | Consumer Price Index |
| CPR | Contraceptive Prevalence Rate |
| CRC | Citizen Report Card |
| CSC | Community Score Card |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CSRP | Civil Service Reform Programme |
| DA | Development Agent |
| DAG | Development Assistance Group |
| DFID | Department For International Development (UK) |
| DIP | Democratic Institution Programme |
| DLDP | District Level Decentralisation Programme |
| EC | European Commission |
| EFA | Education For All |
| ELCD | Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Database |
| EMIS | Education Management Information System |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| ESDP | Education Sector Development Programme |
| ETB | Ethiopian Birr |
| EU | European Union |
| FFW | Food For Work |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FGM | Female Genital Mutilation |
| FHH | Female-Headed Household |
| FP | Family Planning |
| FSP | Food Security Programme |
| FTAPS | Financial Transparency and Accountability Perception Survey |
| FTC | Farmer Training Centre |
| FTI | Fast Track Initiative |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GEQIP | General Education Quality Improvement Programme |
| GER | Gross Enrolment Ratio |
| GOE | Government Of Ethiopia |
| GSDRC | Governance and Social Development Resource Centre |

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| GTP | Growth and Transformation Plan |
| HAB(P) | Household Asset Building (Programme) |
| HEP | Health Extension Package |
| HEW | Health Extension Worker |
| HH | Household |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| HMIS | Health Management Information System |
| HoF | House of Federation |
| HoPR | House of Peoples' Representatives |
| HP | Health Post |
| HR | Human Resource |
| HRD | Human Resource Development |
| HRM | Human Resource Management |
| HSDP | Health Sector Development Programme |
| HT | Head teacher |
| HTP | Harmful Traditional Practice |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
| IDS | Institute for Development Studies (Sussex University) |
| IFPRI | International Food Policy and Research Institute |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| INGO | International Non Government Organisation |
| IPMS | Improved Productivity and Market Success (programme) |
| IT | Information Technology |
| ITN | Insecticide-Treated Net |
| J-GAM | Joint Governance Assessment and Measurement |
| JRIS | Joint Review and Implementation Support (mission) |
| JRM | Joint Review Mission |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| LG | Local Government |
| LHW | Lady Health Worker |
| LIG | Local Investment Grant |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MCB | Ministry of Capacity Building |
| MCH | Maternal and Child Health |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MLVP | Market-led Livelihoods for Vulnerable Population |
| MOA | Ministry of Agriculture |
| MOARD | Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| MOE | Ministry Of Education |
| MOFED | Ministry Of Finance and Economic Development |
| MOH | Ministry Of Health |
| MOU | Memorandum Of Understanding |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| MSE | Micro and Small Enterprise |
| MTR | Mid-Term Review |
| NER | Net Enrolment Ratio |
| NGO | Non Government Organisation |
| NRM | Natural Resource Management |
| O&M | Operations and Maintenance |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| OFSP | Other Food Security Programme |
| PAD | Project Appraisal Document |
| PADETES | Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System |

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| PASDEP | Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty |
| PBS | Protecting Basic Services (programme) |
| PER | Public Expenditure Review |
| PFM | Public Finance Management |
| PIF | (Ethiopia Agriculture) Policy and Investment Framework |
| PM | Prime Minister |
| PMO | Prime Minister's Office |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| PRS(P) | Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper) |
| PSCAP | Public Sector Capacity-building Programme |
| PSNP | Productive Safety Net Programme |
| PTA | Parent Teacher Association |
| PTR | Pupil-Teacher Ratio |
| RED/FS | Rural Economic Development/Food Security |
| RO | Research Officer |
| SA | Social Accountability |
| SABER | System Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results |
| SBM | School Based Management |
| SDPRP | Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency |
| SMS | Subject Matter Specialist |
| SNNP(R) | Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (Region) |
| SWAp | Sector Wide Approach |
| SWC | Soil and Water Conservation |
| TB | Tuberculosis |
| TBA | Traditional Birth Attendant |
| TOT | Training of Trainers |
| TPLF | Tigrayan People's Liberation Front |
| TVET | Technical and Vocational Education and Training |
| TWG | Technical/Thematic Working Group |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UPE | Universal Primary Education |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VCHW | Volunteer Community Health Worker |
| VSO | Voluntary Service Organisation |
| WA | Women Association or Women Affairs |
| WASH | Water Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WB | World Bank |
| WCBS | Woreda/City Benchmarking Survey |
| WIDE3 | Wellbeing and Ill-being in Development in Ethiopia (round 3) |
| WMS | Welfare Monitoring Survey |
| WSDP | Water Sector Development Programme |
| YA | Youth Association |

Part I: Introduction and conceptual framework

1. The purpose and approach of the paper

1.1. The focus and purpose of the paper

1) This paper focuses on the role of the ‘government go-betweens’ (teachers, extension workers in agriculture and health, kebele managers) in the modernisation of rural communities in Ethiopia. It is one of the outputs of the WIDE3 research transition stage. The paper has two main linked purposes.

2) *First*, it aims to provide an understanding of the profiles and roles of the government go-betweens. The paper describes the implementation of policies and of government and donor-financed programmes by the go-betweens and their engagement with people in rural communities. It explores how effective this has proved to be in different sectors and livelihood and cultural contexts. The paper also focuses on how the government go-betweens as ‘human resources’ are managed. We link our empirical evidence to experiences elsewhere in the country when this is possible, and to broader thinking about policy implementation and how change happens.

3) *Second*, we take a speculative look forward to suggest how the government go-betweens might feature in the ‘growth and transformation’ of Ethiopia planned to occur over the next four years. We link this to a review of the international literature on the role of community level ‘frontline workers’ and identify what lessons might be learned from other experiences.

4) Rural communities in Ethiopia have changed over the past fifteen years. As part of the EPRDF government drive toward ‘development’ there has been a substantial growth in the government ‘presence’ at their level as infrastructure was built, services expanded and personnel deployed. New ‘rules of the game’ were introduced as well (e.g. ethnic federalism which was only starting to be ‘felt’ in 1994/5, decentralisation in 2002/3 which strengthened the power of weredas). While this trend is not unique in developing countries, in some respects it has been quite dramatic in Ethiopia¹.

5) The WIDE3 Stage 1 report documents and explains this change for six ‘exemplar communities’, which at the end of the research round will be expanded to twenty. At the analytic level in Stage 1 we started to identify the ‘control parameters’ which had guided change in the six communities, to assist in the development of a typology of rural communities which will allow these explanations to be used more broadly:

One of the key strengths of the research is the ability to draw on a small number of exemplar communities to feed into wider policymaking and implementation processes, relying on the use of both within- and cross-case comparisons to iteratively derive a typology of communities and an associated typological theory of development processes so that the suggestions emanating from the research can be taken up more widely. We believe that the use of comparisons for typological development and theory building should be of particular interest in Ethiopia, considering the wide diversity of communities and the necessity for policy interventions to be context-specific and adapted to different agro-ecological, socio-economic and political environments and thereby replace the tendency to adopt blanket overall homogenous approaches².

¹ See e.g. Engel, J. And Rose, P. 2011 - Ethiopia as a case of ‘surprise progress’ in the ODI 2011 series of stories mapping progress toward development, at <http://www.developmentprogress.org/global-report>.

² See proposal for WIDE3 Stage 2

6) This paper focuses on one aspect of the change in rural communities namely, the increased presence of workers paid by the government to facilitate the implementation of some of its development policies at the community level, and their role in relation to the change that they are supposed to facilitate and the change found 'on the ground'. We believe that through developing an evidence-based understanding of how things appear to have worked out and why in a number of exemplar rural communities in Ethiopia and supporting this with potential lessons from elsewhere, the WIDE3 stakeholders³ may be in a position to suggest improvements which the Government may buy into.

7) The paper will also feed into the iterative process of typologisation so that by the end of the WIDE3 research we can propose a more complete and multi-relevant typology of rural communities in Ethiopia.

1.2. The approach

8) The paper investigates the question of the profile and role of the government go-betweens in changing rural communities through a multiple-perspective approach, in line with the overall WIDE3 research approach.

9) First, we look at the different policies that the government go-betweens are supposed to help implement and the '**services**' that they are supposed to **provide**, structuring this in the **different 'fields of action'** identified at the outset of the research (livelihoods, human re/pro/duction⁴, social re/pro/duction⁵, community governance, and 'ideas').

10) One commonly heard donor statement about the action of the government of Ethiopia is that the 'top-down' nature of policy implementation processes constrains the effectiveness of policies due to lack of adaptiveness⁶. Whereas on the government side the top-down nature of policy implementation is denied in the government documentation stressing decentralisation and participation⁷ and at high level, such as in a recent interview of the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi:

Unlike other developmental states [...], the approach here is for massive grassroots mobilization. You can't have massive grassroots mobilisation on the basis of a national uniform plan. It has to vary not only from region to region but also from village to village, because the circumstances in each village are unique. So the national plan, the national framework, is just that: a framework on the basis of which every village will have to write its own story, but a story that will add up into the national development programme. [...] The fact that we have a system that accommodates diversity means that every group, every village is able to design its own plan and therefore able to maximize the impact of its assets [...] The decentralization that is essential to federalism has made it possible for people to release their own energies, maximize the impact their own assets in the overall framework of our plan." (Zenawi, M., Dec 2010)

11) In this paper we **explore the 'room for manoeuvre'** that the government go-betweens had in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities in the 'different fields of action' and the different communities, and

³ By this we mean our donor funders (the Joint Governance Assessment and Measurement/JGAM group for Stage 1 and potentially Stage 2, and DFID for the Transition Stage) and the wider WIDE3 'worknet'.

⁴ Human re/pro/duction is a term coined in earlier research work by Bevan and Pankhurst. The field of human production is the making or improvement of people – birth, child-rearing, life-long learning etc; human reproduction is the regular maintenance of people – cooking, washing etc; human reduction is the field where people act to harm other people.

⁵ The use of '/' (and thus, re/pro/duction as in the Stage One research) highlights the possibilities of change (production or reduction) whereas reproduction (be it social or human) implies things staying the same.

⁶ See e.g. the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (2008) and the Country Economic Memorandum (2007).

⁷ See the SDPRP and PASDEP on decentralisation; and the emphasis on participation in e.g. the government 'good governance' package and sector guidance such as the '*Guidelines for Participatory Extension System*' (MOARD 2007).

whether and how this mattered (or not) in shaping the **service delivery outcomes** of the development interventions in these particular fields.

12) Second, we explore the **role of 'change agents'** of the government go-betweens from the perspective of two questions: **'change toward what' and 'change how'**. Indeed the government go-betweens operate in an environment in which different groups of actors have different views about these questions. There are 'cultural contradictions' between the 'development models' of the different groups, and they also have different models about how change (toward 'their' development model) happens (which links back to the 'top down approach' issue just mentioned).

13) In this paper we hypothesise that this **situation of contradictions affects the change agent role** of the government go-betweens in affecting the way they can interact with and influence the **broad change trajectories of rural communities**. But this happens in ways that **need to be empirically studied** rather than 'ex ante' theorised one way or another (e.g. the negative effects of top down planning). This is necessary to account for the uniquely community-specific nature of the *local* models, how deep is the 'disconnect' between the local models and the *external* models that the government go-betweens somehow 'carry' with them and how this impacts the unfolding of the external models.

14) In this paper we unpack some of the models about 'development' and 'how change happens' that may matter for the government go-betweens' action at community level; and we illustrate the kind of implications that the contradictions between models have had on how change happened or not or in unexpected ways, in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 rural communities.

15) Third, we take a **'human resource management' perspective** to look at the government go-betweens' effectiveness. There has been little attention, thus far, in the government and donor documentation on the soundness of the systems and processes managing these critically important 'resources', compared to the focus on efficiency and effectiveness in the use of government financial resources. This comparatively low level attention is striking as by their sheer number, the government go-betweens represent a big chunk of what the government and donors spend at the community level, and they know this⁸. There begins to be more of a realisation that HRM will matter to tackle the new agenda of 'quality services', but this has yet to be translated into a body of evidence of how it might matter and therefore what might need to be done.

16) In this paper we hypothesise that the way the government go-betweens are managed matters in that the **working and life conditions** in which they find themselves are important factors in their level of **motivation**; this in turn, is an important **element in how effective** they may be. We use the data to explore whether our evidence basis supports this hypothesis or not in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities.

17) On this basis we explore what policy implications our findings may have more broadly – at the outset of the implementation of the government Growth and Transformation Plan. To do this we also locate our findings in the broader country context whenever it has been feasible to obtain country-wide secondary source data and information, and we look at international experience as said above.

1.3. The structure of the paper

18) The paper is structured in three parts and ten sections including this introduction. The **first part** of the paper (in three sections) sets out the **context**, outlines the conceptual framework we use in the paper and presents our **hypotheses** when we started to analyse the data. The **second part** (in

⁸ See the numerous aide-memoire of Joint Review and Implementation Support (JRIS) missions of the Protecting Basic Services highlighting the rising burden of the wage bill in wereda budgets.

four sections) presents the **analysis of the data**: it contributes to build the evidence basis that we just mentioned and allows revisiting our hypotheses. The **third** part (in three sections) is the '**look forward**'.

19) In the first part, following this introduction *section 2* outlines the conceptual framework for this paper. The section explains why this investigation of the roles of the government go-betweens is important by looking at how it is located in the WIDE3 research framework. In a second part of the section we outline a conceptual framework based on a growing body of international literature on change in complex systems, to help us to think about the government go-betweens' roles.

20) In *section 3*, we turn to presenting relevant elements of the Ethiopian context. We first focus on decentralisation and explain why and how it is important in understanding the role of the go-betweens and in thinking about the policy implications of our findings. We present who the government go-betweens are supposed to be (government policy intentions, guidance etc. supposed to define their role and expected performance) as well as the government human resource management framework. This section is based on a review of the policy documents that we could find and a number of interviews of officials in the concerned sector ministries, at federal level.

21) In the second part, *section 4* adopts a *human resource management perspective*. Following a brief presentation of the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities it describes the demographic, sociological and professional profiles of the government go-betweens who were found in them, comparing these to the profiles as per the policy, outlined in section 3.

22) This is followed in *section 5* by a '*fields of action*' perspective - an analysis of the activities of the government go-betweens in the different fields of action in which the community agents operate. In this section the focus is on presenting a 'snapshot' of the work experiences of the government go-betweens, as reported in 2010 by different groups of people (wereda officials, kebele officials, community members and the government go-between themselves). These snapshots based on six exemplar communities are compared with country-wide evidence on service delivery from secondary sources where possible.

23) *Section 6* focuses on the changes in the communities in the 1995-2010 period and whether and how the government go-betweens are related to these, i.e. a *perspective looking at their change agent role*. We first outline the trajectories of the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities as documented in the Stage 1 analysis. We document the magnitude of the change brought by the increased presence of government go-betweens at community level. We explore whether the nature of the 'overall relationship' between the community and 'the government' seemed to matter in relation to the government go-betweens' effectiveness. Finally, we analyse in further depth a number of exemplar cases of change, exploring the contribution of the government go-betweens among other change factors, and trying to understand why they may have contributed in those cases and not in others.

24) *Section 7* summarises what we found on the role of the government go-betweens in six exemplar changing rural communities, following the perspectives used in the previous three sections (human resource management, fields of action, and change agent role). In this section we revisit the hypotheses set out earlier in the paper.

25) In the third and last part of the paper, *section 8* reviews the recently outlined policy directions adopted by the Government in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15 and related sectoral documents. We explore the implications of these new directions for the government go-betweens (in terms of new or changed expectations etc.) and we speculate on how these expectations compare to the way things have worked out so far, based on the findings of Part II.

26) *Section 9* presents key highlights and lessons that could be learned from the international literature on the government employees at the community level (generally and in specific countries

or cases) focusing as in Part II on their role and effectiveness in service delivery and as change agents and on the ways they are managed.


27) *Section 10* then concludes by presenting brief ‘take away’ messages for donors in Ethiopia and making a few suggestions, for discussion and further thought, on how they might influence policies and approaches to make the government go-betweens more effective in facilitating complex change in rural communities.

28) The main paper is supported by a set of Annexes (in this volume) and a further layer of evidence bases (in a separate volume).

1.4. The data

29) The paper mainly uses the WIDE3 Stage 1 data made in six communities in 2010 (see map 1, and Annex 1) – based on protocols guiding interviews of wereda officials, kebele officials, community members, and the government go-betweens themselves.

Map 1: The Six WIDE3 Stage 1 Sites in 2010



30) Although the protocol approach is designed to give data which is comparable from one village to the other, research officers (ROs) could not always find all of the respondents identified in the protocols. In relation to the government go-betweens, in module 9 ROs were asked to interview the kebele manager, one/the school headmaster, one teacher, one of the HEWs, and all three DAs. In some villages some of the government go-between posts were vacant. A number of post-holders could not be interviewed as they were absent or not available for various reasons. This is summarised below. Annex 2 presents a profile of all those interviewed in each village.

Table 1: Government go-betweens interviewed in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 villages

| | Geblen | Girar | Korodegaga | Turufe | Dinki | Yetmen |
|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|-----------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Kebele manager | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| School head teacher | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| One teacher | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| One HEW | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| DA crop | No DA crop | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| DA livestock | Yes | Busy, not interviewed | Yes | Busy, not interviewed | No livestock DA/ Vet interviewed | No livestock DA/ Vet interviewed |
| DA NRM | Yes | Yes | Yes | No DA NRM | Left w/out notice during fieldwork, not interviewed | Yes |

31) The paper makes selective use of earlier ELCD data, with a view to getting a sense of history⁹. These earlier rounds were less focused on government policies and government and donor programmes and those in charge of implementing them.

32) The paper also uses secondary sources to place the findings and conclusions in the wider Ethiopian and international policy contexts. It must be noted that in reviewing the Ethiopian literature we found little on the kebele level and staff working at that level¹⁰; sector policies pay scant attention to HRM issues, and/or this is not well documented at federal level; and the civil service management framework is comparatively less well known than e.g. the government financial management systems.

33) We hope that we would be able to revisit this paper at the end of the WIDE3 research round when we have data for all twenty villages. This would offer a more robust basis to explore the role and effectiveness of the government go-betweens in the different types of communities that will have emerged in the course of the three stages. We should stress, however, that the research is focusing mainly on predominantly agriculturalist rural communities.

34) At this stage in particular, the **six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities** were all economies in which **settled farming** has been or has become the main livelihood since decades. The findings and conclusions about the role and effectiveness of the government go-betweens in this type of communities cannot be extrapolated in any way in culturally very different types such as pastoralist communities or communities in the 'extreme peripheries' of the country.

⁹ The Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Database (ELCD) includes survey and protocol data made at various times since 1994. The WIDE3 Stage 1 fieldwork was conducted in 6 communities in 2010 (outputs included a main report, 6 community reports, 3 briefings and one 'eye opener' note). Data from earlier research which is selectively used in this paper is from community profiles drawn in 1995; protocol-based research carried out in 2003; and fieldwork undertaken in three of the villages in 2007.

¹⁰ This includes only scant references and no detail in the successive Wereda City Benchmarking surveys.

2. Why are the 'go-between' important?

2.1. Purpose and structure of the section

35) In this section we explain why this investigation on the role of the government go-between is important by looking at how it is located in the WIDE3 research framework – that is, how this more detailed investigation contributes to deepening the analysis already undertaken in the research outputs. This is the first part (after this introduction). This leads us to think about the government go-between as important 'change agents' in the government plan to 'sustainably develop', 'accelerate poverty reduction', and now 'grow and transform' rural communities in Ethiopia. In a second part of the section we outline a conceptual framework based on a growing body of international literature to help us to think about this role of the government go-between.

2.2. Locating the 'go-between' in the research

36) The term 'go-between' was coined by the WIDE3 team in the course of the Stage 1 analysis to describe the role of extension workers (agriculture and health), teachers and kebele managers, and of kebele officials, in the interactions at the 'development interface space' between the government represented by the wereda, and the community. This paper deepens the Stage 1 analysis in relation to these actors, by exploring the 'cultural disconnect between sector and local models' that was found in the six Stage 1 sites¹¹; and locating the 'go-between' as a particular type of actors in the 'social interactions in the development interface space'.

2.2.1. The go-between 'trapped in' the disconnect between 'development models'

37) In the course of the WIDE3 Stage 1 research we found evidence across the communities that **three ideal type cultural models of 'development'** influence community-level social inter-actions around development interventions: (1) the government model (revolutionary democracy/developmental state), (2) the donor model (a mix of economic neo-liberalism, western-style democracy and human rights, in proportions varying among donors) and (3) the community local model (with variations among communities and different degrees of contestation within them).

38) These models contain some in-commensurate aims and assumptions; in sociological language there are **cultural contradictions**, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. These contradictions may be papered over for periods of time. However at some point, usually they cause problems in the social interactions at the '**development interface space**'. In rural communities in Ethiopia a number of different types of actor play key roles in this space, as illustrated in Figure 2. These are the actors whom we called the 'go-between', who by virtue of their position have to try and negotiate the contradictions but may at times fail to do so.

39) In the course of the WIDE3 Stage 1 analysis we came to categorise the go-between into two groups: the professionals employed by the government, who may or may not be from the community in which they work (mainly, the teachers and head teachers, agriculture development agents, health extension workers, and kebele managers posted in the communities); and the official members of the community that they serve in various capacities, usually farmers, and who are not government employees. In this paper we call these two groups the '**government go-between**' and 'non-government go-between' or '**community go-between**'.

¹¹ We are hypothesising that we will find disconnects in the other sites too.

40) **This paper focuses on the ‘government go-betweens’** – all at the ‘frontline’ of government service delivery and supposed to live their lives with the communities that they serve. It is evident from our data that the ‘non-government’ go-betweens are hugely important as well. However, we sensed that policy-relevant lessons were likely to be quite different for the ‘non-government/ community’ go-betweens and for the ‘government go-betweens’ and that in the time available it was not feasible to cover both types at once, and do justice to each group.

Figure 1: Cultural disconnect between development models





Figure 2: Social interactions at the development interface



41) Given our discovery of the cultural disconnect between government and donor models and community local models, we suggest that development interventions should be seen as **top-down attempts to change** the technological, institutional and ideas landscapes within which community systems are working. But **communities** respond to such changes through a process of 'self-organisation'; there is a **bottom-up contribution** to what happens (Room 2011). The go-betweens are located at the **intersection** of these top-down and bottom-up processes.

42) Some go-betweens might see their role as cushioning any negative external interventions, seeking or promoting beneficial ones or adapting interventions to the local context as required, hence 'filtering' or 'negotiating' the top-down attempts (see more on this in section 2.3). They might as well feel that they ought to promote, defend or strengthen the 'bottom-up' contribution of the community. Yet the WIDE3 Stage 1 analysis showed that in many instances the go-betweens perceive themselves to be 'between two fires' (instructions from the top/wereda on one side – which they may fail to comply with; expectations from the community on the other side – which they may equally fail to meet). In these instances the **space to 'negotiate'** appears to be **very small**, making the cultural **contradictions** between models **unmanageable and generating frustration** on all sides.

43) In this paper we hypothesise that such frustration **negatively affects** the effectiveness of the go-betweens as 'change agents' and in turn, hampers the implementation of policy interventions that are supposed to benefit the communities. Conversely, greater convergence or situations in which the cultural disconnect can be negotiated may generate greater effectiveness. The analysis in Part II explores whether or not this hypothesis is substantiated by the WIDE3 Stage 1 data.

2.2.2. How many models?

44) It is important to note that the government go-betweens have to contend with more than one development model coming from the top, down. To start with, as discussed in the Stage 1 final

report the government and the donor models are not one and the same. Broadly characterising these models as in box 1 below we found areas in which substantial divergences exist. That is, there is cultural disconnect between the government and the donor models. As a result, the top-down attempts at changing communities do not always point in the same direction. This may well further complicate the task of the go-betweens, of negotiating the cultural disconnect between 'external' models and the local community model. In the paper we try to identify instances in which these divergences indeed appear to have affected the role and effectiveness of the go-betweens.

Box 1: Government and donor models in 2010

Government model: Revolutionary democracy is premised on convergence of interests among all groups hence the necessity of a consensus on the 'basics'. Good governance is the way to reach this consensus through persuasion and the use of models (and the role of the 'vanguard party' and its members). Participation of all members of society is critical and best achieved through membership-based associations/organisations that can genuinely represent people. The state has an important role to play in the economic sphere: it is involved in strategic areas and has a duty of protecting producers and consumers. At the current stage of Ethiopia's development small-holder farming has to be the main engine of pro-poor growth. It needs to be reoriented from subsistence to commercialisation. Inward investment in larger-scale commercial agriculture is also desirable as it allows technology transfers if it is well directed. The 'developmental state' is responsible to build physical, human and social capital, as public goods for economic development.

Donor model: Is a mix of three main elements in proportions varying among donors: (i) economic neo-liberalism, in which the government role in the economy is mainly about enabling a strong private sector and market-led forces to play their role; (ii) western-style democracy in which political power goes to those best reflecting the majority's interests; (iii) a human-rights based approach ensuring that everyone (including minorities) see their rights fulfilled, including rights to participation in all spheres of the public life. The 'service delivery state' is accountable for ensuring that all citizens have access to basic services.

The interface between government and donor models: Government and donors converge on the importance of building human capital and broadly on much of the ways to do this (the 'MDG agenda'). There is less agreement over the respective roles of the state, the market, and the choices of 'rational individuals' in the economic sphere. Perspectives on governance and on forms of participation and accountability especially, are most at odds with each other. The government model resonates more with Khan's "social transformation state" (which he promotes), in contrast with the less interventional "service delivery state" of the liberal consensus (Khan, 2004).

45) There is increasing evidence that Regional State Governments develop variants of the main GOE models, and to an extent so do weredas. We plan to study the regional models empirically in the third stage of the WIDE3 research. Thus although we believe that regional models are also important for the government go-betweens we are not yet in a position to explore how. With regard to the wereda level the WIDE3 protocols include a focus on the perspectives of the wereda, which we use in this paper. However, the data is 'light touch' compared to the kebele and community level data and we feel that although wereda models are likely to matter a lot, we cannot do more than providing impressionistic insights on whether and how this has been the case in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 villages.

2.2.3. The government go-betweens in the development interface space

46) The analytical frameworks presented above were elaborated in the course of the WIDE3 Stage 1 analysis, to help us to respond to a number of research questions. In this paper we seek to enrich the analysis responding to three of these questions in particular, that is:

- *"What differences were made to the trajectories and the communities by development interventions and the connections between them between 2003 and 2010?"* (Question 3)

- *“In what ways have recent social interactions, relationships and processes across the community-level development interface affected the implementation and achievements of the various government and donor programmes?”* (Question 4)
- *“What have been the impacts of modernisation as a whole, and recent development interventions in particular, on the lives of the different kinds of people who live in the communities?”* (Question 5)

47) We do this by focusing on the roles and lives of the government go-betweens. First, in government policy the government go-betweens are supposed to have specific roles in both implementing externally-led **development interventions** and providing supposedly locally-asked for **services**. In this paper we describe how they fulfilled this dual role, how this was constrained/ enabled, and what effects their actions did have in relation to the implementation of development interventions in the communities concerned.

48) Second, the government go-betweens are supposed to be important **‘change actors’**, on the one hand **carrying out the top-down external attempts** to change communities and on the other hand **operating within and through the community social interactions, relationships and processes**. Indeed, the whole purpose of deploying them at the community level was to ‘insert’ them in these interactions, relationships and processes. This in turn, was supposed to make them more effective as they would be able to understand and ‘manage’ the community’s bottom-up response (see more in section 2.3 below). In this paper we explore the extent to which they were able to play this role and in particular, what this ‘managing’ meant, how this was constrained/ enabled, and what effects their actions did have on the social interactions, relationships and processes at the community level.

49) Third, one of our hypotheses in this paper was that the link between the research questions might be critical. We hypothesise that the **life and working conditions** that the government go-betweens face might go a long way to explain the way they fulfil their role in implementing development interventions and as ‘change agents’ at the community level. In this paper we therefore explore how the government go-betweens, as one kind of people, were personally affected by modernisation and the development interventions and what implications this had for them and for their role in the community. We describe the kind of life and working conditions that they face and explore the links with their life and work satisfaction, motivation and effectiveness. In the conclusion we return to this hypothesis and assess its adequacy based on the analysis.

2.2.4. The go-betweens in the web of interventions


50) Those designing, implementing and evaluating sector programmes and projects are prone to see them as self-contained. In line with this the government go-betweens are primarily deployed in relation to one specific sector (DAs in relation to agriculture, livestock or NRM; teachers in relation to education; HEWs in relation to health and nutrition). However, the WIDE3 research has showed that when a new field-focused or cross-cutting intervention enters a community, it is affected by, and has consequences for, a pre-existing web of development interventions. And as interventions proceed they have consequences beyond those intended by the intervention designers and implementers. This is illustrated in Figure 3.

51) The paper explores the extent to which in the Stage 1 sites the government go-betweens went beyond the boundaries of ‘their sector’; whether and how they tried **to build synergies and avoid antergies between interventions**; whether and how they faced and dealt with constraints arising from a potential ‘overload’ of interventions from different sectors, all competing for priority, and how this was resolved.

52) It is noteworthy that among the sectors in which important external interventions affect communities there are no go-betweens for infrastructure (which may have implications for roads and

water supply for instance). We bear this in mind in exploring the activities of the government go-betweens and their effects in the Stage 1 communities. The role of the kebele manager is related to governance - according to government policy (see in section 3) by making administration easier and more transparent and handling complaints more effectively the kebele manager contributes to good governance as farmers including kebele leaders can concentrate on improving their livelihoods.

Figure 3: The web of interventions



2.3. Conceptualising the role of the go-betweens as change agents

53) In effect, the analytical frameworks developed in the course of the Stage 1 research imply an important role of ‘change agent’ for the government go-betweens. In this section we propose an approach to think about this role.

2.3.1. Complexity-informed conceptualisation of change

54) We have noted earlier that the government go-betweens as change agents have to contend with several ‘models’ of where change should be heading, coming from the top-down. However, the most fundamental cultural disconnect is between the set of aims and assumptions of the ‘top down’ external models (government and donor) and the ‘bottom up’ reaction of communities organising to selectively accept/reject aspects of the external model(s) fitting/not fitting the local model aims and assumptions. At the heart of this disconnect is a mismatch between how external actors think about change on the one hand, and how change happens in the communities on the other hand.

55) In the WIDE3 research we have begun demonstrating that **change in rural Ethiopia occurs as the outcome of the contingent evolution of communities as open and interconnected complex social systems**, along change trajectories that are influenced by **myriad endogenous and exogenous factors**, of which planned development interventions are only one set. This complexity-informed perspective presents a pretty fundamental challenge to the more usual account of development, in which successful development interventions take communities through a transition from tradition to modernity, from simple community governance forms to sophisticated governance systems fit to a

more complex society, from an agriculture-based economy to an industry-and service-based one etc.¹², and planning is about expediting the transition from one stage to the next in this transition.

56) Since the outset of the WIDE3 research, internationally we have seen a '*widening interest in using a complexity mindset and complexity social science insights in a range of areas of development policy, practice and research*'¹³. We appreciate that donors in Ethiopia, and government to an extent, recognise in their 'discourse' that both change and rural communities in Ethiopia are not 'simple'. But there is a fair way to go from this recognition at the discourse level to evolving a body of practice which fully accounts for complexity.

57) One trap commonly fallen into is the confusion between *complicated* and *complex*. These are not synonymous. The 'Cynefin framework' proposes a four part differentiation of domains (of problems, situations and solutions) as ***simple, complicated, complex and chaotic***. *Simple* and *complicated* are ordered; *complex* and *chaotic* are un-ordered (but they differ from disorder). *Complicated* has multiple but stable and in principle knowable cause-effect relationships; *complex* is a domain in which patterns, emerging through the interaction of many agents and elements, are perceived but not predicted. Therefore, and most importantly for our purpose in this paper, in *simple* and *complicated* domains there can be **best and good practices**. But in *complex* and *chaotic* domains **practices** have to be **adaptive, improvised, and emergent**¹⁴.

58) As recalled above we believe (and this is supported by the WIDE3 Stage 1 initial evidence) that change trajectories of rural communities in Ethiopia are definitely in the *complex* domain¹⁵. There may well be specific interventions belonging to the *simple* and *complicated* domains (e.g. building roads to enhance people's access to markets, the expansion of the mobile phone network improving farmers' access to market information) but many are not (e.g. the health behavioural change expected from the implementation of the health extension programme). Moreover, simple problems and solutions usually have unintended consequences adding complex dimensions (e.g. thieves using mobile phones to steal a car; the young women in Girar using mobile phones to contact migration brokers in Addis whereas they previously had to travel all the way to there first).

59) The question is then: Are the government go-betweens encouraged and equipped to develop sets of practices that are adaptive, improvised, and emergent? This has implications for the **different kinds of knowledge** that may matter to facilitate 'good change', especially in the complex and chaotic domains.

2.3.2. Different kinds of knowledge, and power

60) In his work Chambers highlights the difference between **professional experts**, whose domains of competence are the *simple* and *complicated* as the 'worlds they try to create for themselves are ordered, controllable and predictable', and the practices that many **people living in poverty** have to develop in response to their experience in the *complex* and *chaotic* domains - un-ordered, uncontrollable and unpredictable. This resonates with other perspectives which we found useful to think about the question of the kind of knowledge/competence that the government go-betweens have and how adequate it is.

¹² The Talcott-Parson's pairs

¹³ See Bevan 2011, at <http://mokoro.co.uk/sites/default/files/documents/FinalIssue56.pdf>

¹⁴ Based on the Cynefin framework outlined by Kurtz and Snowden (2003) and Snowden and Boone (2007), see Chambers, R. 2010

¹⁵ The companion paper on the 'differential effects of development interventions and modernisation' tends to support the idea that within communities, change for more vulnerable people and groups is often in the chaotic domain.

61) In his account of how states aim to engineer change Scott (1998) highlights the difference between **'epistemic'** knowledge and **'metis'** knowledge.

- The former is normative knowledge on how things should work, focusing on increasing the 'legibility' of communities to permit action, thus *'bracketing contingency... (and) standardising the subjects of development'* (Scott 1998). It works through a world of *'goals, purposes, outputs, targets, M & E activities and implementation manuals'* like in the sector development programmes or more broadly the government and donor world of *'planned development interventions'* (WIDE3 Stage 1 final report: see top part of Figure 1 above).
- The latter is about knowing how things are working 'here and now'. Metis knowledge is exceptionally difficult to teach apart from engaging in the activity itself. It is qualitative and indispensable to grasp the complexity of a *'mutually interacting system depending from a multitude of factors changing (continuously)'* (Scott 1998). It is the kind of knowledge producing the community level *'locally learned aims and assumptions related to healthcare, learning, agriculture, livestock, and natural resources and connected to local cultural repertoires of ideas (customary, local modern; religious; political; with possible wider and global influences)'* (WIDE3 Stage 1 final report: see bottom part of Figure 1 above).

62) Another way of looking at this is to think about external actors and community actors operating in incommensurably different systems of knowledge, the **'I know'** on the one hand (managerial, 'know that', reason, scientific-technical expertise, developed through individual-psychological learning) and the **'I can'** on the other hand (worker, 'know how', intuition/feel, practice, and developed through cultural-collective learning) (Yanow 2004).

63) Scott, Yanow and others discuss how *'knowledge, power and status are mutually implicating'* (Yanow 2004). More often than not local knowledge (*'very mundane, yet expert understanding of and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience'*) is disparaged, because it is *'associated with an anti-modern traditionalism, with a backward parochialism rather than a forward-looking worldliness'* (Yanow 2004). Turning to change in rural communities in Ethiopia the question then is: **Do government (and donors) genuinely value local knowledge?** Why did GOE deploy government go-betweens at community level? Was this to try and generate local knowledge as the go-betweens would be part of the community's lived experience? Or was it on the contrary a more intrusive way of dismissing local knowledge and replacing it by expert knowledge from outside? In other words, **what role** are the government go-betweens supposed to play?

2.3.3. Translation, interpretation or negotiation

64) The government go-betweens are located right at the heart of the cultural disconnect between top-down external models and the community's model(s). They operate in the development interface space in which this disconnect directly affects people's everyday life, sometimes with dire consequences like when farmers are forced to take packages because expert knowledge has it that this 'should work', whereas local knowledge has experienced numerous times that without regular access to water and veterinary services it may not work and is therefore very risky and may lead to debt.

65) So what can the government go-betweens do? They can try to 'bridge' between the knowledge worlds. Their role would be not about *'sharing' knowledge with those who lack it, but forging links between different knowledge that are possible from different locations'* (Mosse 2005, citing Gupta and Ferguson 1997). They can try to be *'bicultural translators'* (Yanow 2004). Still, what does this mean? In this paper we **distinguish between translation, interpretation/facilitation, and negotiation.**

66) In the **translation** process, as the government go-betweens (are supposed to) know the languages of both the policy/decision-makers and the community they can try to make the language used/ideas proposed by one group intelligible for the other. The intent of a translator is not to transform conceptual meaning; there can be changes **between initial and target cultures** but they should be about equivalences (and not differences) when equality is not possible (Yanow 2004). This is about finding the right words and the right channels to 'teach' – which as we will see, the government go-betweens do a lot.

67) But the government go-betweens are supposed to do more than 'teaching'. They are supposed to 'implement' policies. For this they have to make people leave the world of ideas and do things differently. It is one thing when a woman knows about the benefits of family planning and birth spacing; but policy is actually implemented when she regularly takes the contraceptive pills or injections available. To change people's behaviour the government go-betweens will have to interpret policy – that is, actively transform the two languages (external and local) - to find a way whereby they can act and get people to do what they are supposed to be doing – that is, they have to facilitate local adoption of the external ideas. In the process of **interpretation** of the policy they have to be able to account for the **relationship between ideas and actions** (Mosse 2005).

68) This relationship is complex. One strand of the policy implementation literature proposes that policy models are best seen as instruments of legitimisation and mobilisation, but they do not work well to guide action. '*Good policy is un-implementable; it is metaphor not management*' (Robertson 1984). So, '*... all development programmes work politically through interpretation and the creative capacity of policy to connect economic and historical processes of change to its normative schemes*'. Therefore, '*(F)ailures arise from inadequacy of translation or interpretation: from the inability to recruit local interests, or to connect actions/events to policy*' (Mosse 2005).

69) This is useful but it sounds like if the whole story is about policymakers and their success or otherwise in recruiting local interests, and in connecting policy ('planned development') to evolving local contexts (and the broader modernisation processes at play locally). The WIDE3 research has begun to show that this is only one part of the story of what happens **in the development interface space**, where **actors other than policymakers take centre stage**.

70) Thus, we postulate a **much more active role** for both those who possess metis/ local knowledge and the intermediaries between them and policymakers. In this paper policy implementation is seen as a process of **negotiation**. Both community people and the government go-betweens are self-interested in what comes out of the encounter between epistemic and local knowledge, between top-down attempts to change and the community's self-organising response. The government go-betweens will negotiate, to try and ensure that their acting at the very least does not harm them, and if possible benefits them.

71) In analysing the data we investigate the mix of translation, interpretation and negotiation that the government go-betweens have been using in the WIDE3 six Stage 1 communities, to what effect, and how equipped they were for these different roles.

2.3.4. The government go-betweens' power

72) If knowledge is linked to power and the go-betweens have this potentially important role of bridging between knowledge, are they powerful? The literature is mixed about this.

73) One side (Yanow 2004), the frontline workers are **located at a double periphery**: hierarchical (lower/est level workers) and geographic (interacting with 'non-members' of the organisation; maybe physically remote too), which is not usually associated with power. Moreover, being cross-border workers make them *by 'structural design' a 'category error'*: they belong to neither of the two

worlds, each trying to maintain order on each side of the border, which makes them a dangerous entity. Their peripheral position as translators can be a source of power, *in affording or preventing articulation and exchange among communities of practice*. But more often than not this work of translation is not recognised as such. Those workers develop a “*bounded work culture with little or no hierarchical structure and little possibility of career development... Power... seems to be associated with mastery of the work practice, which can only be demonstrated within the group*” and is not easily measurable by those in the hierarchy who might reward performance.

74) Scott too pictures the workers trying to bridge epistemic and metis knowledge in a rather reactive and self-protecting position. They will, he says, often want to avoid as much as possible having to recognise failures in implementing policy. This would lead them to be on the side of the external agents/the policymakers. But by virtue of their position they are related to the community in many ways (beyond their role in linking the two knowledge worlds), and they cannot afford to upset these relationships too much. Thus they actively **develop sets of ‘non-conforming practices’**, enabling them to show some success and hide other aspects to the hierarchy while maintaining manageable relationships with the community (Scott 1998).

75) In contrast the literature on the ‘*street level bureaucrats*’ (a term coined by Lipsky in 1980)¹⁶ referring to ‘*public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs*’ notes that they ‘*have substantial discretion in the execution of their work*’. This discretion can be inherent in their roles (like for classroom teachers); it can arise from resource constraints such that it is not possible for agents to follow prescribed roles/tasks; finally it is related to the incompleteness of the rules and the failure (or indeed the impossibility) to cover all contingencies.

76) In many cases the cadre of street level bureaucrats becomes quite distinct from the hierarchy of the organisation to which they belong and the relationship is one of antagonism and distrust. This resonates with Yanow’s remark about the ‘peripheral position’ of the frontline workers, though the conclusions of the street level bureaucracy literature are quite different. For this literature, albeit at the periphery the street level bureaucrats do have power as they, by virtue of their number and the wide discretion that they enjoy, are those who **determine how a policy is implemented in practice**.

77) Discretion need not and does not mean arbitrariness. It may lead to more humane solutions and situation-specific adaptation. Moreover, the decisions within the street level bureaucracy are neither totally idiosyncratic nor reflective only of narrow self-interests. Rather, they are made within a framework of tacit rules and procedures embedded in the culture of this cadre of agents and which can be passed across generations through processes of socialisation. Oversight, supervision and control, together with socialisation, recruitment and training and a system of rewards and sanctions, can be additional means to contain the downsides of local discretion.

78) This is linked to the critical issue of how to **promote accountability without undermining** responsiveness and professional judgment of the frontline workers – i.e. their **ability of evolving their own ‘model’** which may better fit the local context. Yanow talks about domains of linguistic expertise and notes that in addition to expertise in their organisation’s ‘language’ and in that of the extra-organisation domain that they reach out to, skilled translators develop their own work practice’s language. And Huising and Silbey (2011) note the effectiveness of ‘frontline workers’ behaving like *sociological citizens*. These are individuals strongly committed to practical rather than perfect outcomes, and to experiment with what might work as they acknowledge the *impossibility of perfect conformity between abstract rules and situated actions while nonetheless managing to keep practice within a band of variations... surrounding regulatory specifications*.

¹⁶ E.g. Piore, J.M. 2011, and Rao, N. 2009

79) In this paper we explore whether the government go-betweens have some form of power in the rural communities in which they work, how they used it and to what effect.

2.3.5. Theories of change and complexity

80) In conceptualising the role of the government go-betweens we also had to address the question of the **theories of change of the actors** on behalf of whom they negotiate, how ‘fit for purpose’ these may be, and what theory of change the **go-betweens** themselves might develop. Theories of change represent the “how” to reach the “what” of the different development models of the different actors. In the WIDE3 inception phase we showed how the theories of change of government and of the donors converge in some respects and diverge in others – this is outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Theories of change – Government and donors in Ethiopia¹⁷

| Theory of change: society changes | Government’s and donors’ position | Theory of empowerment |
|--|--|---|
| Through unintended consequence of aggregate action of individuals seeking to achieve their own happiness | <i>Donors: Yes (neo-liberalism) Government: Must be checked to protect the poor/avoid unacceptable inequalities</i> | Creating an environment enabling all individuals to pursue their life choices |
| Through technological development | <i>Yes for both – but very different ways of thinking about how to operationalise this (e.g. donors unconvinced by government promotion of ICT-based education at the same time as restricted access to information)</i> | Encouraging access to technological progress for all |
| Through transformed beliefs, ideas and values | <i>Yes for both – but differing on how beliefs, ideas and values should be transformed (and toward what)?</i> | Influencing/transforming ideas and values in society |
| Through purposive collective action | <i>Yes for both – but differing about who mobilises who and to do what/ change toward what?</i> | Supporting the mobilisation of poor and marginalised people |
| Society changes through contestation and negotiations between different interest groups | <i>Government: consensus must prevail Yes for donors, and insistence on the ‘devil they know’ (electoral democracy)</i> | Supporting changing power relations and structures |

81) In this paper we go one step further, returning to complexity. As we noted earlier rural communities in Ethiopia are on complex change trajectories, and most people in those communities (and poor people more than others) experience life as complex (and in instances, chaotic) conditions. That is what informs ‘metis’/local knowledge, and people’s actions. There is a growing body of international literature suggesting that in such conditions, **bringing about change requires approaches that (i) recognize the complexity and (ii) allow people/the community to discover and use their own wisdom rooted in local knowledge**. This literature calls for a theory of change that moves away from single methods, blueprints and control, and which embraces, underpins and expresses ideas and practices of reflexivity, continuous learning, value and principle-based improvisation, co-evolution and continuous emergence (Eyben 2004)¹⁸.

82) The term ‘**adaptive pluralism**’ reflects this set of features. Chambers (2010) then contrasts two paradigms of development and change, that of the neo-Newtonian practice and that of adaptive pluralist, as outlined in Table 3 below. He proposes that while there are change areas for which neo-Newtonian practice works fine, adaptive pluralism particularly when rooted in participation, has a stronger practical relevance and is more widely applicable to the many instances in which the change

¹⁷ Source: Author’s adaptation from various papers from Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Institute for Development Studies (IDS), and the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), UK

¹⁸ Eyben, R. 2004

sought is intrinsically complex. In an adaptive pluralist approach, decisionmakers would ensure that the promotion of a particular method builds on local social capital and on previous experiences (Van Mele and Braun 2005)¹⁹.

Table 3: Paradigmatic characteristics of two approaches to development/change

| Paradigm of | Neo-Newtonian practice | Adaptive Pluralism |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| Ontological origins and assumptions | Things, order, linearity | People, the social world, complexity, edge of chaos, emergence, non-linearity |
| Pervasive concepts | Universality, uniformity, stability, equilibrium, controllability, predictability | Local specificity, diversity, dynamism, emergence, uncontrollability, unpredictability |
| Methods, procedures, processes | Standardised, fixed menus, manuals, best/good practices | Pluralist, iterative adaptation, "à la carte" and combinations, fitting practices |
| Embodying and expressing | Comprehensive rules to regulate, conventions, conformity | Parsimonious rules to enable, originality, inventiveness |
| Roles and behaviours | Supervising, auditing, controlling, conforming, complying | Facilitating, coaching, empowering, performing, improvising, co-learning, seeking surprises and messy partnerships |
| Valuing, what is quality | Conventional rigour, best practices, specialisation, standardised regulation; measurement, precision, statistical analysis | Complexity rigour, fitting practices, versatility, adaptive pluralism, eclecticism, relevance, triangulation, successive approximation, surprises, alertness |
| Goals, design and indicators | Planned, preset and fixed | Negotiated, evolving, emergent |

83) In this paper we note that this kind of division of things into two oppositional ideal-type paradigms moves us away from fully recognizing complexity. Moreover pluralism, even adaptive, suggests that one could find the 'right fit' by mixing and matching and adapting elements from different already existing solutions. In our complexity approach there is one meta-paradigm, which is to **start from where the system is at**.

84) A short note on '*positive deviance*'²⁰, which happens when, confronted with an apparently intractable problem, a few people usually with no more resources than anyone else and against all odds, succeed when everyone else is not. These are deviant in a positive direction. The reaction in any hierarchical organisation is then to say "this is best practice, let's do it everywhere", calling on the 'classic diffusion-based approach' with innovation coming from outside and pushed/promoted by a change agency through expert and knowledgeable agents, possibly using charismatic leaders and visible role models to support them. But, the positive deviance movement explains, this does not work if the community is not '*curious about the question*'. If they are then the **role of change agents in an 'inside-out positive deviance' approach** is completely different: it is about identifying the positive deviants/innovators 'from within' the community, enabling the community to learn from its own hidden wisdom and with greater chance of adoption by others as innovators and sharers '*share the same DNA*'. Positive deviance is said to be closely linked to complexity because it is most suitable to address problems enmeshed in complex social systems; which require social and behavioural change and; which entail solutions rife with unforeseeable or unintended consequences.

¹⁹ Van Mele, P. and Braun, A. 2005

²⁰ See <http://aidontheedge.info/2011/02/08/a-qa-on-positive-deviance-innovation-and-complexity/> and http://www.positivedeviance.org/about_pd/index.html

85) What the above thoughts suggest brings us far from the conceptualization of development as belonging to the domain of 'simple' problems (at most, 'complicated'), where best and good practices can be disseminated and replicated (or 'scaled up') as often mentioned in government documentation. Rather, our approach sees the **government go-betweens** as located **between two development models or sets of models** (external and local), and **between a relatively narrow theory of change and the multitude of theories of change** that are at play **in the community** in which they work – as community members are continuously involved in throwing different theories of change at the problems they face and seeing which ones are helpful²¹. The go-betweens are important – as we suggest in the title of this section - because they are **uniquely placed to try and understand where the (community) system is at and what theories of change the community members have and try, and to 'start from there'** to interact with and possibly influence the trajectory of further change. In other words they are uniquely placed to be '**complex change agents**'. In this paper we explore how the government go-betweens deal with this difficult but potentially uniquely powerful (in the sense of 'power with') situation.

²¹ In <http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=5864> Duncan Green stresses the need to learn to recognise and manage a range of theories of change.

3. The Ethiopian context

3.1. Purpose and structure of the section

86) Having set out how we approach conceptually the exploration of the role of the government go-betweens in changing rural communities undertaken in this paper, we turn to presenting relevant elements of the Ethiopian context. We first focus on decentralisation and explain why and how it is important in understanding the role of the go-betweens as well as in thinking about the policy implications of our findings, looking successively at decentralisation as outlined in the government documentation ('in principle'), and what is said about implementation of the policy ('in practice').

87) We then turn to presenting who the government go-betweens are supposed to be – that is, what are the government policy intentions and policy and guidance frameworks which are supposed to define their role. We look at how many they are 'out there in the field' and since when; what kind of profile they are expected to have, and; what they are supposed to do and how they are supposed to be supported to do it. As part of this section we briefly present what we could find about the elements of the government human resource management framework relevant to the community level government go-betweens. This section is based on a review of the policy documents that we could find and a number of interviews of officials in the concerned sector ministries, at federal level.

3.2. Decentralisation in Ethiopia

3.2.1. Decentralisation 'in principle' (the policy)

88) As in many other countries, sub-national levels of government in Ethiopia are (supposed to be) important political, administrative, social and economic actors in the development interface space. In principle their importance has risen with the successive policies of federalism and the establishment of Regional State Governments in 1994/5, and the wereda-level decentralisation policy in 2002/3.

89) Practically, in 2010 the regional and wereda governments were the ones mandated to implement a large number of the national development policies aimed to change rural communities. This entails responsibilities that in principle go well beyond 'acting on behalf' of the federal government. Regional State Governments are autonomous entities and the 1994/5 Constitution gives them extensive regional policy formulation and implementation responsibilities. Since 2002/3 in the four large Regions weredas have budgetary autonomy for a set of service delivery and economic development responsibilities, under the oversight of their respective Regional State Governments.

90) Thus as noted above, the regional and wereda governments may evolve their own development model. The five- and three-year plans that all Regions and weredas are supposed to prepare are tangible signs of this. And as stated by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in December 2010, this does not stop there: under decentralisation *'every village has to write its own story'*.

91) Decentralisation is an important contextual factor in our exploration of the role and effectiveness of the government go-betweens. There are two direct reasons for this. First, as part of their mandate the **wereda governments are the direct managers of all the government go-betweens** which this paper focuses on. Primary school teachers and headmasters, DAs, HEWs and kebele managers are all employees of the wereda governments. Second, for the communities the **wereda represents 'the government' in its most immediate form** and so together with the

community go-betweens, the government go-betweens operate most immediately between the communities and the wereda – far more than with other government levels²².

3.2.2. Decentralisation ‘in practice’ (policy implementation)

92) Using the ‘development interface’ analytical framework of the research, the decentralisation arrangements have in practice created a **‘chain’ of development interface spaces**, from the macro level design of policies, programmes and interventions down to their implementation at community level, through regional and wereda plans and real activities. In these different development interface spaces, different sets of actors differentially powerful negotiate, explicitly (e.g. the Regions were asked to develop their regional plans for the next five years as inputs to the Growth and Transformation Plan) or implicitly (e.g. through the party structures). Thus **each government level is a go-between** between the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ levels in the chain.

93) In turn, this raises the **question** of the extent to which **every level mainly ‘relays messages’ from the top, down, or on the contrary feeds inputs from lower levels into higher level policy processes**. In the government documentation there is a strong emphasis on decentralisation as the way to unleash grassroots energy –thus a ‘model’ in which sub-national levels respond to local priorities with the resources that they manage, and relay local priorities upward for the rest. The extent to which this stands true in practice is an important factor for the questions explored in this paper. If it does stand true then the weredas are responsible for the constraining or enabling nature of the top-down elements that teachers, DAs, HEWs and kebele managers have to negotiate with/against the bottom-up contributions of the community. But if weredas are constrained in the way they define their model then the responsibility lies somewhere else.

94) It is noteworthy that there has not been an authoritative evaluation of the implementation of the decentralisation policy in Ethiopia. The World Bank has recently embarked on a substantial piece of work which is at an early stage. In an early draft version²³, the literature review undertaken to further frame the empirical work highlights the discrepancy between generally more positive technical studies and academic pieces generally dismissing decentralisation as having been unsuccessful or superficial. More fundamentally, the author argues (and we agree), both the technical studies and the academic pieces have looked into the question through the lenses of normative frameworks relying on a series of ‘ideological assumptions’ about citizenship and state-citizen relationship, the relevance of which should not be taken for granted in Ethiopia.

95) A number of insights from the draft are presented below – that we have taken into account in the analysis in this paper.

²² It is important to note that in the ‘grand scheme of things’, the existence of a multi-level government structure in which the sub-national levels are meant to behave not just as deconcentrated arms of the centre is quite new. The extent to which rural communities have incorporated these novelties in the way they perceive ‘the government’ and relate to it is an important topic. It is directly related to the one studied in this paper, but would deserve a study in its own right (which it might be more effective to do once we will have had a chance to carry out the regional level research planned for Stage 3). At present we found some evidence that two ‘models’ coexist and therefore probably interact and make adjustments to each other: on the one hand, the historical model eliding government, party, regime power, all in one word - ‘*mengist*’; on the other hand, a rising recognition of the different levels of government and what they are responsible for and therefore, how they can be used. An example of this is how elders in Turufe appealed to the federal government against the regional decision of moving the Shashemene general hospital, which would have harmed the community.

²³ The author of this paper commented on the draft and is grateful for the permission of mentioning some of its analysis (Vaughan, S. 2011)

Box 2: Selected insights on the implementation of the GOE decentralisation policy

'Strong political capital at the highest level has been invested in, and has driven an exceptionally rapid process of decentralization. In terms of the speed and scope of reform this has been an undisputed advantage'. However, 'it is a widely discussed phenomenon that modernist, developmentally-driven states often fail to engage with local patterns of effective knowledge (what Scott calls metis) in their planning, and that outcomes are often compromised as a result of overly schematic approaches (Scott, 1998). Whether Ethiopia can transcend this common pattern is a key question'. It is proposed that the work planned would study it empirically, focusing on 'understanding the way in which the broad political vision translates into concrete political drivers, and how these impact upon reform in practice'.

The study recognises that historical patterns in (highland, ruling) Ethiopia have been strongly hierarchical and therefore, *'whatever the formal constitutional situation, or the aspirations of policy-makers to the contrary, in practice it has often been the case that local government leaders are less likely to be accountable to their fellow villagers, than to those above them in the system. This tendency goes much deeper into the social fabric than emerging norms for social accountability, transparency, and "good governance" which have begun to be disseminated and discussed only relatively recently'.*

96) At a more technical level, Dom & Lister (2010) identify three factors which to date have compromised the discretion of decentralized local governments in Ethiopia. These are:

- **practical limits to autonomy**, in a context where national and regional targets dictate strategies, and discretion is unclear even in relation to staffing and administrative structures;
- **resource limits**, where these are not commensurate to the tasks at hand, not least because a significant proportion of them are non-discretionary and inflexible; and
- **weak planning and budgeting systems**: wereda 5-year plans are not based on revenue projections and have little or no recourse to capital funding; a minimal and cursory focus only on annual plans means that strategies and directives from above *"undermine each other"*.

97) The WB literature review explains that the problem of compromised discretion is potentially a serious one in terms of citizen engagement. Here we add that it certainly also needs to be taken into account in exploring the constraints faced by the government go-betweens and in thinking of whom to engage with to suggest how these might be addressed.

3.3. Who are the government 'go-betweens' supposed to be?

98) It was not easy to gather information on who the government go-betweens are supposed to be and what they are supposed to do, from policy documents and meetings with officials at the federal level. The Business Process Re-engineering process unfolding in all ministries meant much personnel change. Together with more enduring weaknesses in data and 'institutional memory' systems²⁴ and given our time constraints, this put limits on what could be found²⁵.

3.3.1. Since when are the government go-betweens present and how many are they?

99) **The government go-betweens differ by the 'seniority' of their presence at community level, as 'cadres'**. Teachers and head masters were found in rural areas since the Derg as the government initiated a shift away from the elitist education system that prevailed under the Emperor (although

²⁴ As one of the Research Officers put it: *When comes a new head or process owner there is a process of "desk clearing" – that is, avoiding all files left by your predecessor in that room...*


²⁵ It is likely that the World Bank work on decentralisation mentioned above will include an in-depth study of the motivations and capacities of local civil servants – as one of three to four focal areas of study. This should hopefully deepen the review of the policy framework which it was possible to do for this paper.

the upward enrolment trend was then flattened and even reversed in the final years of the civil war). The other ‘cadres’ have all been deployed at the community level much more recently²⁶.

100) The deployment of diploma-level trained DAs was decided as a policy measure in 2002/3, together with the construction of Farmers’ Training Centres all over the country; the first batch of 23,378 trained DAs came out in 2004/5. The deployment of the HEWs was decided as a policy measure in 2002/3 with a view to rolling out the Health Extension Package; it was piloted in 2003/4 and rolled out in 2004/5 though unevenly across Regions and weredas so that some areas (like Korodegaga) were reached only very recently. The decision to create the kebele manager’s position was one of a host of measures constituting the ‘good governance’ package developed by the government as a response to the clear signal of disaffection that ‘the community’ gave to the EPRDF through the mixed results of the 2005 election. Kebele managers started being deployed in the second half of 2007.

101) Together with the ‘UPE campaign’ started in 2003/4 and intensified in 2004/5 (building on the GOE second Education Sector Development Plan/ESDP) which drove teacher numbers sharply upward, these successive deployments resulted over a five-year period in a **massive increase of the number of government go-betweens found at community level**, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 4: How many go-betweens



Source: MOE for teachers and MOH for HEWs (2004/05 and 2007/08); estimates for all other data.

102) While these were federal policies, the responsibility of recruiting, deploying and paying the community level government go-betweens fell fully on the wereda – with substantial implications as wereda budgets did not increase commensurately. A number of studies and government/donor documents highlight that as a result, **salaries have represented an ever growing proportion of the wereda budgets, leaving little for operating expenses and even less for capital investment**²⁷.

103) On the capital side, the government’s response was a strong message that development could not be a government-only responsibility and the increased mobilisation of community contributions,

²⁶ The 1995 data (see Annex 9) shows that there were DAs under the Derg and in the early years of the EPRDF regime, but (less qualified and) not living at the community level.

²⁷ Study by Poluha on ‘turn over’ of officials at wereda level in Amhara (SIDA 2007); PBS documentation including successive JBARs; Dom & Lister 2010

especially for social service infrastructure construction. NGOs were also encouraged to contribute and did so, though unevenly across areas. Whilst this is not well documented, there is abundant anecdotal evidence of this from all over the four large Regions. In Tigray in 2010 the regional Bureau of Education boasted that all new schools since a few years had been built through community contributions – with weredas and other actors complementing the local efforts. How this combined on the ground with the ‘democratic right’ not to participate supposed to be enshrined in the ‘good governance’ package is also not well documented²⁸.

104) On the recurrent side it was not possible to call on this type of solution, and the result was that wereda offices saw their operating budget cut, sometimes very significantly, at the same time as they were ‘taken to task’ to (i) professionalise the way they functioned – in line with the ‘good governance’ package, and (ii) provide support to/supervise the large numbers of ‘frontline workers’ deployed at the community level.

105) In education and health the effects of these resource allocation trends at the school and health facility levels may be partly mitigated by ‘vertical supply interventions’ – such as the relatively recent supply of drugs and anti-malaria bed nets financed under one of the PBS components and the provision of school block grants under the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP). In the livelihood field the picture is patchier. Extension services have had access to operating means in weredas that have been included in the PSNP/OFSP programmes, in ways that other weredas have not. In non-PSNP weredas the resources available for extension have largely depended on the presence of donor-financed programmes²⁹.

3.3.2. What types of profile are they expected to have?

106) Table 4 summarises the types of profile that the government go-betweens are expected to have. Table 5 summarises the information available on profiles found ‘on the ground’. There are a number of factors which in theory should matter and about which it was not possible to ascertain what the policies or ideal practices are supposed to be³⁰. There also are a number of explicit policy requirements or agreed ideal criteria for which it was not possible to find documentation or data on implementation, at the federal level (see Table 5). The fact that the systems in place (at federal level) do not provide readily available information on these factors is an important finding in itself.

107) This goes hand-in-hand with the fact that even in sectors in which sector development plans have been in place since more than a decade, there is **no ‘human resource strategy’** – overall or for the frontline workers. There probably are **various documents** with human resource management aspects but they are **not consolidated**.

- In health a Human Resource Strategy has been ‘under development’ since two years but is not yet available in spite of continuous pressure from the donor side.
- In agriculture the 2007 ‘Participatory Agricultural Extension System’ document of MOARD is silent on human resource issues.

²⁸ The WB work on decentralisation will also likely include a workstream focusing on the development of a more comprehensive picture of wereda resource flows and revenue generation capacity which would include further exploring the area of community contributions.

²⁹ Like for instance the SIDA Amhara Regional Development Programme which supported to zones in Amhara from xxxx to 2010. The multi-donor Agriculture Growth Programme, supposed to cover a number of ‘high agricultural potential’ weredas, only started in 2010 so had no effect in the period considered in this paper.

³⁰ For instance, it was not possible to ascertain whether the ‘social profile’ of the government go-betweens matters in recruitment processes and if, for instance, they are/should be chosen on the basis of their skills or if they are/should be selected as people with status in the community and able to handle political relations. In the case of the kebele managers ‘stated policy’ in 2007 was that they should have a ‘good behaviour’ (not drinking, no justice case etc.).

Table 4: Expected profiles of the government go-betweens

| | Development Agents | Teachers | Head masters | Health Extension Workers | Kebele Managers |
|--|---|--|---|---|--|
| Pre-service training/ qualification requirements | Diploma holders (3 years post Grade 10) in AgTVET | Since 2008, certificate no longer acceptable; all teachers to be diploma level (Gr10 + 3 years) | Since 2007 (?), school management training | One-year post-Grade 10 training in MOE TVETs with support from regional bureau of health | Ideally, diploma level (no specific specialisation) |
| Other expected characteristics | Three DAs deployed in each kebele, trained in different specialisations: crop, livestock and natural resources management (NRM) | Target PTR 50 GOE promote self-contained and automatic promotion/ continuous assessment policies in Gr 1-4. | Affirmative action encouraged - all deputy head masters should be female Head master does not teach except replacing absent teachers | Female, two in each kebele 18 years' old Ideally, selected by the community in which they will work | Ideally, selected/ proposed by the community in which they will work |

Table 5: Profiles of the government go-betweens 'on the ground'³¹

| | Development Agents | Teachers | Head masters | Health Extension Workers | Kebele Managers |
|--|--|--|--|---|---|
| Pre-service training/ qualification requirements | No up-to-date data on proportion of unqualified DAs | In 2000/1, 96.6% 1 st cycle teachers qualified; 23.8% for 2 nd cycle In 2009/10 1/3 rd qualified teachers (higher requirements); large-scale upgrading ongoing | No doc on proportion of trained head masters | 100% coverage in 5 Regions by 2007 (incl. Amhara, Tigray & SNNPR) By 2009/10 HEW deployment was 103% of the target [but graduation was only 26% of the target] | Regions adapted the standard as it was not possible to find enough qualified candidates |
| Other expected characteristics | No up-to-date data on proportion of kebeles with three DAs | PTR 61 in 2008 ³² Self-contained and automatic promotion policies not assessed | No doc on proportion of female deputy head masters | No updated data on proportion of kebeles with two HEWs No doc on HEWs' community of origin | No doc on kebele managers' community of origin |

3.3.3. What are they supposed to do and how are they supported to do it?

108) In this section we review what was found in policy documents about the government go-betweens' expected roles, tasks and relationships with the community, the wereda and the other go-

³¹ 'No documentation' means that documentation was not found at the federal level, in spite of a number of visits by Ethiopian Research Officers to the ministries concerned.

³² According to MOE 2011 Ethiopia Education Public Expenditure Review; an earlier study (CfBT 2008, STURE) puts it at 59.

betweens; and ‘support systems’³³. It is fair to say that policy documents are thin or vague on many of these matters³⁴.

Development agents

109) Agricultural extension services have existed in one or another form since the 1950s, including the use of strategies such as packages, agro-ecological zonation and ‘quasi-participatory extension approaches’. Following the fall of the Derg the government embarked on an ambitious Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation strategy (ADLI) which has been the main reference in the rural livelihood policy field³⁵.

110) In this period, the government development plans emphasised the **importance of the public agricultural extension services** as a core part of the government investment in agriculture. The decision to drastically strengthen the professional capacity of the extension service providers was taken in the SDPRP period. Prior to 2000 there were 15,000 DAs with nine month training, stationed at wereda level or in selected kebeles. Between 2004 and 2009 a total of 67,007 diploma level DAs graduated from the AgTVET to be posted at kebele level, of which 12% were female.

111) In 2007 MOARD³⁶ issued a guidance document entitled ‘**Participatory Agricultural Extension System**’³⁷, which further specified the whole extension system. Box 3 presents selected highlights from this document, focusing on the community level DAs (roles, tasks and responsibilities).

Box 3: The DAs’ roles, tasks and responsibilities in line with MOARD policy guidance

Extension services are to be **tailored** to the **three main agro-ecological zones**; they should promote diversification and within this, locally appropriate specialisation; focus on the provision of market extension advice enabling **market-oriented production**.

There should be **one FTC in each kebele**; the training should be based on farmers’ interests; FTCs should have workshops and demonstration plots to practice and undertake trial adoption works; they should provide advisory services for investors and the youth engaged in new activities, and special attention should be given to farmers undertaking new activities to improve their income.

The extension service is to be **participatory**, starting from joint work on individual and community plan preparation, and taking into consideration the “*farmers’ knowledge acquired through many years of experience and local skills*”...

“*The approach is implementation of **packages that fit with local circumstances***”. There are two types of package, the more intensive ‘family package’ which entails setting a detailed plan and annual income targets for three years - for selected households, and the lighter ‘minimum package’ without these requirements - ‘available’ to all farmers.

The kebele-wereda level extension system is based on **3 DAs deployed in each kebele** and supervisors based at the wereda, each supervising 3 kebeles/FTCs and their DAs, and one vet and

³³ Such as performance appraisal and career sanctions systems (e.g. the use of targets); start-of-the job training and induction, during-the-job support supposed to be given, by whom and on what budget.

³⁴ This section is based on the SDPRP and the PASDEP as well as the successive HSDPs and ESDPs and the ADLI, PSNP, OFSP and 2009 revised FSP documents of the government. In section 5 we review the findings of studies providing insights on actual practices (as opposed to policies) – comparing these to our findings based on WIDE3 data. In the forward looking part of the paper we then explore the implications of new directions outlined in the most recent policy documents such as the ESDP IV and HSDP IV and the Agricultural Transformation Plan as well as the Growth and Transformation Plan.

³⁵ The 2010/11 Agriculture Transformation Plan (AGP) and Programme Investment Framework (PIF) documentation stresses the new policy directions as a continuation and evolution of the ADLI, not a departure.

³⁶ The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was established as one of a few ‘super-ministries’ in the 2005 government. In the post-2010 election government the Ministry has become Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Rural development is said to be mainstreamed across the relevant sectors.

³⁷ The emphasis on participatory is ours. The PASDEP also made reference to the importance of combining endogenous and exogenous knowledge.

one co-operative worker for these three kebeles. The wereda office is supposed to have a number of Subject Matter Specialists assisting DAs on specialised issues.

DAs should work in team, with a team leader from among the three rotating every two years. They should divide the kebele into three 'districts' and assign one DA to each, working with and through voluntarily formed development groups of 20-30 households. DAs deliver extension services mainly to model farmers, though they also assist when the model farmers share their knowledge.

DAs are responsible to organise and provide '**modular training** programmes' through which farmers will acquire a 'green certificate'; and **package training** programmes focusing on the minimum and family packages.

In addition to training and working with model farmers DAs are expected to organise demonstrations and field visits and farmers' holidays as means for experience sharing, and to make extensive use of different kinds of media.

112) The MOARD document does not specify how model farmers are to be identified. There is also no detail on the relationships between DAs and other frontline workers and with the kebele administration. Responsibilities of federal, regional and wereda structures are outlined but this does **not include any human resource management responsibility/function**. Extension services are to be monitored and evaluated but it is not specified how/by whom. One of our informants (in 2011) noted that since 2008 the extension staff evaluation system had been strengthened, with more community inputs (60% vs. 40% for the supervisor's assessment). Staff are evaluated on the execution of planned activities, the approach, and the community and kebele council's "*subjective evaluation*". This is linked to (limited) opportunities to upgrade one's education level: the top 5% best performing DAs are allowed to upgrade to B.Sc. level.

Health Extension Workers

113) HEWs are the main actors in the implementation of the Household Extension Package programme (HEP), the philosophy of which is that

If the right knowledge and skills are transferred to households they can take responsibility for producing and maintaining their own health

It was decided that all HEWs would be female because

*The women are more open to tell their secrets and problems to a female rather than their male counterparts. The other reason was to create job opportunities for women*³⁸.

114) Health Extension Workers are expected to manage the operation of the health post, conduct home visits (for 75% of their time) and outreach services to promote preventive actions, provide referral services to health centres and follow up on referrals, identify, train and collaborate with Voluntary Community Health Workers (VHCWs) and report to the wereda health office. Their deployment was decided as the MOH adopted the policy of intensifying preventive health services at the community level.

115) At the health post HEWs are supposed to provide a package of 'selective and curative services' comprising of antenatal care, delivery services, immunization, growth monitoring, nutritional advice, family planning, and referral services to the community. If possible health posts are to be located near other public services and institutions (e.g. kebele administration offices) to foster enhanced coordination among government service providers. Box 4 below outlines the main strategies that HEWs are expected to use to change communities' health behaviour.

³⁸ Interview of MoH Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Officer, April 2011

Box 4: How are HEWs supposed to change communities' health behaviour

1. **Teaching** by example during house-to-house visits, e.g. by helping mothers care for newborns, cook nutritious meals, construction of latrines and of disposal pits
2. **Identifying and training model families** selected for their active involvement in other development work and acceptance by the community, and expected to become early adopters of desirable health practices thereby being role models for others (full package training lasting 6 hours/week for 4 months; leading to publicly recognised graduation). One HEW is expected to train up to 180 models in a year.
3. **Setting 'norms'**: e.g. those who do not vaccinate their children may be banned from community conversation as they violate the government objective of reducing maternal and child mortality
4. **Communicating** health messages by involving the community, utilizing Women and Youth Associations, schools and customary organisations such as Iddir, Mahiber, Equb and other public meetings or events.

116) The salary level (ETB 658 at the start of the programme) was calculated on the basis that as HEWs would live with their parents in their community of origin their living costs would be small, and they also did not need hardship allowance.

117) The HEWs are not supposed to have an operating budget as materials and supplies are delivered by the MoH through the wereda health office. They operate under the supervision of the Woreda Health Office and the kebele administration, with technical support from the nearest Health Centre. **The Federal MoH is supposed to develop a career structure** for the HEWs, which to date has **not been done**. The 'human resource strategy' announced in the HSDP IV should also address issues of motivation and incentive packages for all health facilities. Wereda health offices are supposed to provide supportive supervision to HEWs³⁹ and plan and provide in-service training for them. Since 2007 a system of Integrated Refresher Training has been developed: following the TOT cascade model, 9,505 HEWs had been trained by 2010.

Primary school teachers and head masters

118) The ESDP III period (2005/6-2009/10) saw a huge increase in the number of the primary school teachers, which allowed decreasing the average pupil: teacher ratio (PTR) (from 67 in 2003 to 61 in 2008). Qualification requirements were raised (diploma level for both the first and second cycle of primary education) and a large-scale upgrading programme is underway. A practicum programme was introduced in all pre-service teacher training courses. Continuous Professional Development (CPD) was introduced in most schools, based on weekly sessions drawing on school-based, cluster or wereda-level expertise.

119) By 2010 there remained challenges that would be squarely addressed in the ESDP IV, notably, further strengthening teachers' qualifications and leadership and management capacities at all levels, filling gaps in specific subjects, increasing pre-service candidates from disadvantaged groups (including female candidates), strengthening pre-service training and in-service and more attention to be paid to CPD⁴⁰. PTRs remained high compared to the desirable standard of 50. On the other hand, in 2008 the average workload of primary school teachers was said to be quite low and even plainly sub-optimal in several Regions (CfBT 2008 STURE). This indicates room for improvement in teacher deployment.

120) A **number of teacher management measures** are said to be **implemented** (CfBT 2008 STURE):

³⁹ Guidelines and rural Health Extension Programme reference books were prepared in the HSDP III period (to 2009/10).

⁴⁰ This is based on the April 2011 ESDP IV and the MOE Public Expenditure Review (2011).

- The use of regionally adapted ‘pass marks’ for recruiting pre-service training candidates
- The use of lower ‘pass marks’ for female candidates
- Recruitment by teachers’ training colleges with regional education bureaus
- Career path clear – teachers can become school head masters or supervisors
- Some incentive schemes in place: Sponsorship for further upgrading; regular salary increments depending on performance and seniority⁴¹; access to land for housing and/or housing allowance (e.g. in Addis Ababa) (note that there was no data on the scope of these schemes – i.e. how many teachers could be concerned, in total)

Many teachers were also found to pursue further education at their own expenses (distance education, in-service training, and summer training courses or joining higher education institutions). The MOE has recently decided that teachers would have to be certified every five years, which will play as a further incentive for teachers to continue to develop their professional skills.

121) However, as in the other sectors the **human resource management functions** in relation to teachers are **fragmented**⁴². While by policy, the overall management of primary school staff is the responsibility of weredas under Regions’ oversight, there does not appear to be one overall federal set of guidelines or a strategic framework that could guide them – including in dealing with complex issues such as the balance between the expansion of the formal system and the provision of Alternative Basic Education; or the expansion of the network of satellite schools – and the implications of these strategic choices in terms of teacher management⁴³.

Kebele managers

122) With regard to the kebele managers there is no document equivalent to the ESDP, HSDP or ADLI – that is, no official federal level framework outlining their role, functions, responsibilities and tasks. The closest equivalent which is the ‘good governance’ package was never discussed by GOE and donors. Regions have reportedly developed guidance for the deployment of the kebele managers but none of this was available in Addis Ababa. Box 5 below summarises the information available⁴⁴.

Box 5: The kebele manager role – MCB 2006

The kebele administration requires having a full time *secretary* to administer the office. This will help the kebele administration perform better and will have a day to day communication with the woreda and the community as a whole. The *kebele secretary* shall be permanent employee and shall remain in office regularly⁴⁵.

Establishment of kebele service delivery and grievance management structure: There will not be case handling officer and Information desk officer at kebele level. These activities shall be handled

⁴¹ Many primary school teachers had reached a salary of over ETB 1,000 (from ETB 647 when they start teaching).

⁴² A 2008 study on teacher deployment (commissioned by the DAG) recommended the establishment of a Teacher Service Commission that would bring policy and oversight responsibilities for teacher development, recruitment, deployment, remuneration and terms and conditions of service all in one place. This does not appear to have been discussed.

⁴³ The 2008 study does not mention the satellite school system at all. The study notes that different Regions had different understanding of the role of ABE in the near and longer term. In spite of the ABE strategy in place since 2006 there was a lot of variation between Regional practices in managing the ABE system, including in relation to qualification requirements, initial training, and salary conditions of the ABE facilitators. In all Regions the resources (other than facilitators) allocated to ABE were absolutely minimal. The ESDP IV does not give much detail on the ABE system.

⁴⁴ The PSCAP financed many of the investment/one-off activities necessary for the development and the implementation of the package, including the country-wide large-scale consultation meetings at grassroots level and the initial training provided to the kebele managers before their deployment in some Regions. However, this was never discussed in-depth by GOE and the PSCAP donors. Our information is based on an unofficial translation of a document entitled ‘*The issues of good governance at the rural kebeles and weredas*’, of the Ministry of Capacity Building, 2006.

⁴⁵ Elsewhere the document mentions that “*Other options could be considered by the regional cabinet. For instance, it could be possible that the cabinet members may hold the secretarial office turn by turn or the chairperson maybe made permanent instead of the secretary.*” This option does not seem to have been retained anywhere.

by the kebele secretary. Kebele secretaries shall be offered trainings on case handling and other relevant directives and formats. Trainings shall be offered by the woreda capacity building office. The kebele office shall receive cases on regular working hours by making the office open in the presence of the kebele secretary.

123) The **decision to deploy kebele managers** was taken as part of a set of decisions addressing 'issues of good governance for rural kebeles and weredas'⁴⁶. Among others, Regions were advised to prompt weredas to **restructure kebele Cabinets** so that they would comprise of no more than seven members. Four of them, including the kebele (Cabinet) chairman and vice-chairman, would be members of the community elected by popular vote; the other **three** would be **professionals** in the sectors with frontline personnel at the community level: health, education, and agriculture.

124) In addition, the twenty-four **committees** found at the kebele level were to be **reduced to four**: development, education, health, and justice and administration. Committee members would be trained on the work rules and directives. Each committee would be chaired by an elected member of the kebele cabinet. The professional cabinet members would serve as secretaries for each committee related to their profession. In addition an inspection team of nine members of the Council was to be formed to spearhead participatory monitoring – through presentation of the kebele Cabinet's and the inspection team's reports to the community general assembly every six months.

125) A number of points arising from the above are worthy of note:

- The translation of the 2006 MCB document used the word 'secretary' and not 'manager'. In fieldwork conducted in 2007, wereda officials in Tigray also used the word 'secretary' in our discussions in English, whereas in other Regions they used the word 'manager'. However, the Oromia Bureau of Capacity Building indicated that the word 'secretary' might be more adequate. Apparently the word 'manager' has prevailed, although there is very little documentation in English making reference to this post.
- This early document does not mention specifically the position of the kebele secretary/manager vis-à-vis the kebele Cabinet but makes it clear that in contrast with the professionals from the different sectors, the kebele secretary/manager is not a Cabinet member.

3.3.4. The government human resource management policy framework

126) The civil service in Ethiopia is regulated by the Federal and Regional State Governments respectively. It has usually been the case that Regional Civil Service legal and regulatory frameworks closely mirrored the federal one. At federal level a new 'Federal Civil Servants Proclamation' was issued in 2007 (No. 515/2007), providing a **modern framework for the management of the civil service** and **elevating the importance of human resource management**. E.g. government agencies are said to be responsible for issuing detailed guidelines on HR planning, training civil servants (hence planning and budgeting for this), keeping adequate personnel records, and implementing fair and transparent systems of recruitment.

⁴⁶ PSCAP Review Aide-Memoire March 2010: "The package attempts to enhance good governance including participation, consensus building, responsiveness, transparency, accountability, equity and fairness, rule of law, efficiency and effectiveness. The package comprises 10 directives including hardship allowances for public servants; transfer directives for couples working in different places; a directive for service handling and information desks of Woreda and Kebele government institutions; a directive on rural Kebele cabinet structures and systems; a directive for the selection, incentives, composition and processes to build model Kebeles and farmers; directives to decide the salaries of political appointees when they return to their former civil service positions; a rural Woreda and Kebele customer complaint handling directive; a rural Kebele income collection and utilization directive and a rural Kebele committee structures and systems directive etc. In addition, over 16 service delivery formats were developed and disseminated to the Woreda level."

127) A number of human resource management policies, directives and practices were supposed to subsequently be rolled out across government levels, with a view to *'building and maintaining a meritocratic culture in the civil service'*. However, GOE/donor documentation dated mid-2010 stressed that the **progress** in developing human resources management policies and systems was **slow**, which risked undermining other achievements of the Civil Service Reform.

Box 6: Slow progress with HRM reforms/strengthening – Mid-2010

The Result Oriented Performance Appraisal System (ROPAS) was only partially implemented (implemented in Tigray and Amaha but not elsewhere); hence by mid-2010 there was 'relatively minor regional level evidence of an improved incentive environment for civil servants'.

Ongoing work, but significant delays, in developing job evaluation and grading; a performance appraisal system; recruitment, selection, transfer and promotion procedures; human resource planning and personnel management information systems; remuneration systems and conditions of service; a grievance system and procedures; and records management (an increasing number of agencies were reportedly abandoning earlier efforts, not issuing job descriptions, or not appraising staff performance regularly).

Progress on the development and implementation of a medium term pay reform policy and strategy was much slower than initially expected. This was said to result in a systemic problem across the whole civil service, of high staff turnover and 'difficulties in recruiting and retaining a competent (skilled and experienced) and professional work force in the civil service', while the incentive environment and pay for civil servants was becoming increasingly uncompetitive against the market and private sector employers.

128) Thus in mid-2010, PSCAP donors were urging GOE to pay special attention to HRM, clarify responsibility for this component of the reform, uplift the HRM function, structure, staffing and skills in all Ministries, agencies and bureaus, and commission a diagnostic analysis of civil service remuneration and the incentive environment to inform the development and implementation of a medium term pay reform policy and strategy.

129) It is unlikely that much progress would have been done since, with the 2010 election, the disbanding of the Ministry of Capacity Building and a smaller number of donors now continuing to co-finance PSCAP with a view to 'completing the work' (in GOE's terms).

130) There has been **slow progress with pay reform** as well. In December 2010 the WB Country Director stressed that as *'two rounds of public sector pay increases had fallen far short of price increases, by 2009 the real pay level was about 30% lower than in 2001 at the lower grades and by 40% and more at the professional grades'*. In such circumstances it was *'no wonder that many skilled public servants are leaving the government...'* In January 2011 the government decided to raise salaries (through supplementary budgets at regional and federal levels). However, the supplementary envelope did not seem to be commensurate with the continuous increase in living costs that has been a major feature of daily life for the past three years in the country.

131) The government would also have to make some hard choices. If it were to target first (or most) the 'Professional and Scientific Service' grades with a view to retaining scarce qualifications in the civil service (as suggested by the WB Country Director), this would leave out the community level government go-betweens who, as diploma holders at most, are considered as 'sub-professionals'.

132) A number of **other human resource management issues** pertaining to the wereda and kebele levels are **raised in the 'good governance' document**, which provides guidance on how to address them. While it is not certain that this is official policy there is no reason to believe that this advice might have been less influential than the advice related to the deployment of the kebele managers. These HR issues and solutions are summarised in Box 7.

Box 7: 'Good governance' advice on HR management issues

While it is recognized that the regulations for transfer and competition for promotion remain under the wereda administration and woredas have delegated their authority to the regional administration, there must be some degree of flexibility to **allow couples to be in the same wereda** and a regulation pertaining to this effect will be worked out and shall be implemented.

There will soon be an HRD Act that will allow the authorities and civil servants to use further education and training opportunities. Until then, although it has to be understood that the state is no under obligation or that the civil servant has the right, the following arrangements could be **offered to help all to participate in distance learning**: (i) allowing some time during the day and some time (up to a week or two) for examination periods (to be reduced from annual leave); (ii) assign to the individual tasks related to the study.

Other measures are advised including: providing **priority to those who work in difficult environment or hardship areas**, transferring them to better weredas after two-three years of service etc.; discussing disparity in salary among regions with a view to possibly adopt the same scales nationally; providing annual and medical leave in accordance to the state law.

133) At Regional and wereda levels various measures have been implemented in the course of the past few years, which have begun to offer civil servants a chance of seeking redress when they feel aggrieved. Notably, some Regions have established an Ombudsman office in the President Office (e.g. Amhara in 2010).

134) However, these initiatives and more generally the set of GOE policies and practices with regard to human resource management appear to be much less documented than e.g. the GOE public financial management systems.

Part II: The WIDE 3 Stage 1 findings in the country context

4. The government go-betweens in rural Ethiopia: Snapshots from six communities

4.1. Purpose and structure of the section

135) This section introduces to the reader the government go-betweens who lived in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 villages in 2010, describing their profile and the kind of life and working conditions that they faced. In this respect the analysis in this section contributes to responding to the 5th WIDE3 research question, about the impacts of modernisation and of recent development interventions on the lives of the different kinds of people who live in the communities – as the government go-betweens are one of these kinds of people. We also look at the hypothesis formulated earlier, that the way the government go-betweens are managed may influence their effectiveness as it would affect their satisfaction and motivation.

136) The section begins with a very brief description of the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities – the contexts in which the go-betweens live and work (with further detail in Annex 1). It then outlines the sociological, demographic and professional profiles of the government go-betweens in these communities (with further detail in Annex 2 and Annex 3).

4.2. The WIDE 3 Stage 1 communities

137) There are a number of factors that are likely to be important in relation to the attractiveness of a particular community for the government go-betweens posted there, such as the presence or absence of physical infrastructure and human resources in the sectors in which they are supposed to be active, and the overall accessibility/remoteness of the community. Annex 1 presents some detail on these factors for each of the six communities studied in the first stage of the WIDE3 research. These summarised snapshots indicate that access to services and ‘life standards’ differ substantially among the six villages.

138) In the initial WIDE3 typology we categorised the villages in two groups: more integrated (Yetmen, Girar and Turufe) and more remote (Geblen, Korodegaga and Dinki). However within these broad categories, there are significant differences that should be noted:

- Korodegaga is the least remote among the remote villages, and Dinki the most remote
- The other extreme is Turufe, most integrated due to its proximity to Shashemene, with Girar the second most with expanding investment in the nearby wereda town and the Gurage tradition of connection with the outside world, while Yetmen is integrated but not as close to major towns as the other two integrated villages.

139) In the analysis below we relate the findings concerning the government go-betweens to these characteristics of the different communities in which they work, to try to understand which characteristics may matter in the attractiveness or otherwise of particular villages/jobs.

4.3. The government go-betweens in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities

140) This section describes the profiles of the government go-betweens in the six villages. In doing so we focus on a number of aspects that we identified as important through the fieldwork and the literature review:

1. Whether the government go-betweens are from the village in which they work or not
2. The go-betweens' gender
3. Their family status
4. How long they have been in their job and profession
5. Their level of job satisfaction
6. The level of salary they get
7. The type, amount and scope of training that they got
8. Whether they pursue their education and for what motive(s).

141) The evidence basis is summarised in Annex 2 (individual profiles) and in Annex 3 (summary tables). As noted in section 3, at the federal level we found no country-wide data on the profiles of the frontline workers in the different sectors. This suggests that important human resource management issues attract little attention and/or systems to capture these are lacking.

4.3.1. **Are the government go-betweens from the village in which they work?**

142) By policy, kebele managers and HEWs should preferably be from the community in which they work. Our data show that in the six WIDE3 villages this is the case for only half of the kebele managers, and less than half of the HEWs for whom this information was given. For HEWs this may be linked to the difficulty of finding qualified (Grade 10) female candidates in the less integrated villages (Geblen, Dinki and Korodegaga). A **more urban environment may help**: the kebele manager and the HEWs are "**local people**" in Girar, adjacent to the expanding wereda town Imdibir, and in Turufe, well on the way of becoming a suburb of the booming zonal capital Shashemene.

143) DAs and teachers are not supposed to be from the village in which they are found although they might prefer this. Among the DAs, only one DA was "local" in Yetmen – she was an untrained woman who replaced the crop DA who had left. Quite a few DAs are from the same wereda but another kebele, whereas teachers are less often from the same wereda.

4.3.2. **The government go-betweens' gender**

144) The six kebele managers were male. As per the policy all HEWs were female. Among the six head teachers interviewed four were male and two female. Among the thirteen DAs interviewed, nine were male, and four female including one untrained temporary crop DA. **In total, fifteen of the 39 government go-betweens interviewed were "women professionals"**. For seven of them this was **hard to reconcile with their family life**. In contrast, only three of the 24 working men mentioned family-related issues as a major concern. These difficulties may have implications in relation to the potential 'role model' that female go-betweens might represent for the women and girls of the community in which they work.

145) The data shows some evidence that increasing numbers of youth from the communities apply for training opportunities to become teachers, development agents or health extension workers – when they succeed in completing Grade 10. In some families the parents explained that older siblings who had studied and become a government worker were a powerful model for their younger siblings. But the data does not suggest that this 'role model' effect is systematic or widespread or that it would be particularly strong for the women of the communities.

4.3.3. **What is the family status of the go-betweens?**

146) The data shows that in the **less integrated villages all** of those interviewed and for whom this information was recorded were **single or separated**, except two (HT and teacher) in Dinki. Somewhat puzzlingly the go-betweens were also separated in Yetmen, a fairly well integrated site. This seemed due to the fact that their families lived in the significantly more urbanised wereda centre at 17 kms

from Yetmen. In Girar as well the go-betweens' families lived mostly in the more urbanised centre of the wereda (Imdibir) but this is much nearer so that the breadwinner could easily go back to her/his family every day.

147) Among the 39 individuals interviewed twelve were single and another **twelve were separated from their family (spouse and/or children)**, in contrast with what the good governance package recommends. Being separated from their family was raised as an issue by most of them though it seemed to be particularly hard for the women.

4.3.4. Recruitment, length of tenure and transfers

Recruitment

148) **Twelve of the thirty-nine individuals interviewed had done other work or studied in another field** before they were recruited for their current profession. For some these were other jobs for the government, e.g. as contract/ community-paid teacher, 'assistant' (untrained) DA, or under a temporary contract in the administration. Others had had jobs in the private sector. **All six kebele managers had other work experiences** before starting in their current job, including in the private sector: in Geblen the manager wanted indeed to return to the private sector and engage into something lucrative like trade; in Korodegaga he wanted to join teaching as he had since acquired the required diploma. In Turufe the manager had a teaching diploma as well and wanted to complete a BA and move on. In Dinki he had a TVET diploma in electricity and wanted to become an engineer. In Girar and Yetmen their plans were not stated. In contrast, **the HEWs interviewed were all in their first job.**

149) There seems to be a practice of hiring 'assistant DAs', at low salary scale, and our data does not state whether they are paid by the wereda or the community. Teachers may be paid by the community, usually to address a shortage of budget. Sometimes these are people who do not have the required qualifications and usually they have other activities. For others, who are qualified, it seemed to be a strategy whereby as they already provide services and get known they might have priority when the wereda is able to hire additional teachers. Such practices were not reported for the kebele managers and the HEWs.

150) A few of the individuals who had had another job before mentioned that they had **changed** because they wanted to join a '**permanent term**' employment. For instance the kebele manager in Girar is one of those; he left a job as head of finance in the wereda administration office – which was a temporary job as presumably he didn't have the required qualification (he has a TVET Grade 10+2 construction diploma).

151) In relation to oft-heard allegations that one has to be a party member (meaning EPRDF) to get a government job, the data is inconclusive – although it suggests that not all of the government go-betweens are party members. One of the HEWs mentioned that she had stopped attending the kebele Cabinet meetings as she was not a party member – but she still was a HEW.

Length of tenure and transfers

152) The data on tenure length aimed to capture both how long the government go-betweens had been in the profession ('total years in the profession') and how long they had been in the profession in particular community in which they were found ('years in this post'). The tenure length is partly related to the federal policy in the different sectors. DAs may have been in the field for some time and retrained when the new diploma education requirement came into force. The HEWs are a new cadre, gradually deployed since 2005. Kebele managers came after 2007. The requirements for teachers changed several times over the past fifteen years but large-scale programmes enabled them

to upgrade and continue in their profession. Several of the teachers interviewed had undertaken the necessary education upgrade when the requirements had changed.

153) These sector policies were indeed reflected in the differences of lengths of tenure found among the go-betweens interviewed, with the longest tenures among teachers and DAs. The HEWs were deployed more or less at the same time in all six communities, except in Korodegaga where it was much later (2009/10). This was also true for the kebele manager, deployed later in Korodegaga than in the five other villages.

154) **None** of them had been **transferred even those posted in the remote villages** – which again is not in line with the recommendations of the good governance package. In Geblen and Dinki they were serving there since four years; in Geblen one of the two HEWs deployed four years ago had left.

155) **DAs seemed to be the most ‘mobile’**: except in Girar and Turufe, they all were in their current post since less than two years. The data suggest a high frequency of transfers, and arguably, too much so (e.g. in Korodegaga one of the three DAs was in his 3rd job in two years). There is also evidence that some wereda agriculture offices use **transfers in remote areas as a punishment** – thus doing exactly the opposite of what the good governance package recommends. This was the case in all three more remote villages (see below).

156) The data suggests that transfer practices are not entirely transparent but there is no evidence that party members would be systematically favoured. In Yetmen one of the (female) DAs explained that she was not granted the transfer she had requested (to the wereda capital) because her husband was not a party/Cabinet member. On the other hand, there is no indication that the DAs who were punished (in Geblen, Korodegaga and Dinki) were not party members. Other individuals who had requested and not been granted transfers were likely to be party members.

4.3.5. Salary levels

157) The data, quite limited, gives an idea of the salary levels of the government go-betweens in the WIDE3 communities in 2010. This varies between less than ETB 600 for some of the HEWs and kebele managers to just more than ETB 1,850 for the head teacher of Dinki. The head teacher of Geblen should in principle get approximately the same salary as in Dinki but she explained that the wereda has not been able to pay this (she gets ETB 1,650).

158) The kebele managers mentioned the **lack of salary increment** unlike what happens for other professionals - one more practice which does not conform to the good governance package recommendations. **HEWs earn a very low salary** and several of them noted that this was absolutely not commensurate with the workload – which is not surprising considering that they too did not get any increment since they started, four years ago for some. Moreover, the assumption that they would not need a per diem as they would live with their parents clearly does not hold for most of them. One of them said their salary level was “unreasonable”. As shown by the data and other evidence on teachers’ salaries, long serving teachers, with a high workload but maybe not as high as HEWs, can earn more than three times what these young women earn.

4.3.6. What about job satisfaction?

159) In Annex 3 we summarise the extent to which the go-betweens interviewed in the course of the fieldwork expressed satisfaction from their job. We distinguish those who expressed mainly satisfaction/pride, deploring only lack of inputs/inability of “doing better” because of this, from those who expressed some satisfaction but also frustration for one/several reasons, and yet others who were mainly/entirely dissatisfied. We also highlighted those who mentioned high workload (even

though they might be on the whole rather satisfied), and those who mentioned that they wanted to quit the job.

160) **Teachers and head teachers** seem to be **relatively satisfied** with their job. Five of them were mostly satisfied – even though several of them noted that they had a high workload; their main concern was with being able to deliver a better service (education quality, addressing input shortage etc.). One teacher was unhappy because of the low salary and another because teaching was not his initial choice. **Family status was an issue for some.** The head teacher in Geblen, for instance, was unhappy as she was separated from her family; Geblen was also a more hardship post than her previous one and the school was a less conducive environment (teacher shortage etc.). **The teacher in the satellite school of Dinki was unhappy because of her isolation** and the lack of time to go and visit her family. In Korodegaga the main reason for the head teacher's mixed assessment was because he wasn't with his family ("cannot take his kid to school").

161) The **most dissatisfied cadre** seemed to be **the DAs**. Almost all mentioned high workload, even in Korodegaga where they are three as per the policy. Turufe was an exception in this respect: the one DA interviewed explained that the workload was seasonal and fine. In Geblen the big issue on the DAs' mind was the wereda preventing them from continuing further education, so workload was not raised as an issue. For female DAs this high workload and the "hard work" nature of the job push them to want to quit the job. **Five from the 12 DAs interviewed wanted to quit.**

162) Among **HEWs only one wanted to quit**, in Korodegaga. Except one (in Yetmen) they were all finding **some satisfaction** in their job, but there were also various reasons (family, salary, working and living conditions) mitigating this.

163) The **kebele managers had all mixed feelings**. Among the 6 interviewed four wanted to quit. The manager in Dinki did not explicitly say that he **wanted to quit** but he explained that he wanted to become engineer so he would quit, which makes **5 out of 6**.

164) Fourteen individuals (among the 39 interviewed) also explained that they had no leave and/ or were working all days including weekends, leaving no time for social/family life. In some cases working on Saturdays and Sundays was an explicit instruction by the wereda (Korodegaga DAs and kebele manager). The **kebele managers and the HEWs** explicitly point the fact that unlike other professionals there was **no policy of leave, promotion and salary increments**, which was a source of dissatisfaction.

165) Political work/meetings were mentioned as an extra workload by eight persons. This was disliked by the two DAs and the HEW who mentioned this in Girar, where this work was directed by the kebele manager having a "chained connection" with the wereda. In Korodegaga political activities were also reported by the DAs and the HEWs and were connected to the wereda as well; one of the DAs stated that it was not appropriate for professionals to have to focus on political issues. In Yetmen the two DAs concerned resented the fact that the kebele Cabinet meetings (seen as political) took place on Sundays. In Dinki the kebele Cabinet meetings were also seen as political: the HEW had quitted attending them because she was not a party member.

166) **Family-related issues** seem to be more **important for working women** (as noted above, seven of the fifteen working women among the 39 government go-betweens interviewed mentioned family-related issues, vs. only three of the men). **But** many of the women also mentioned a desire to pursue their education thus as for men, **professional ambition** is also a factor in the equation. For instance, all HEWs wanted to upgrade their education (see below).

4.3.7. Relationships with the community, the kebele leadership and the wereda

167) The relationships of the government go-betweens with the community and the kebele leadership are analysed in detail in section 5. With the **wereda** their relationships were **not always easy – which had a direct impact on their motivation**.

168) The most striking case was that of the two DAs interviewed in Geblen, whom wereda officials had forced to stop their education and had transferred to the remote Geblen as a punishment. In addition, the wereda had penalised them through deductions in their remunerations. And as a result of the transfer the one who was married with a young child was separated from his family. In Dinki and Korodegaga too the wereda had used transfers in remote places as punishment: one of the DAs in Korodegaga was replacing another who had been transferred to a more remote kebele to stop him spending time in town; in Dinki all DAs had been changed on ground of non-performance, and one of the previously posted DAs had been transferred to a more remote kebele. The crop DA in Dinki and the NRM DA in Yetmen complained that wereda workers were better paid yet they had a much less hard work.

169) In contrast, the HEW in Geblen was supported by the wereda officials when she clashed with the tabia leader (about the vaccination campaign for which he had reduced the time that she had estimated necessary), even though the tabia leader was generally well-thought of by wereda officials (as the one who made Geblen stand second in the wereda in terms of good governance).

4.3.8. Pre-service and in-service training⁴⁷

170) The non-government go-betweens – members of the community that they **serve – do not get any pre-service training**. These include the Kebele leaders, the community members representing the kebele on the wereda council; the heads of the women's and youth associations and where it is not one of the DAs, the head of the Farmers' Training Centre. In many instances they also have little education – as there were far fewer education opportunities when they were children and young people compared to the situation today. Some of them may get induction training, likely to be one-day or short orientation or introductory training, in their first year in post (e.g. health promoters get trained by the HEWs).

171) In contrast, getting a job as **head teacher, teacher, health extension worker, health centre head or development agent** requires a **specific professional qualification**. Most of the post-holders interviewed in the research had acquired the standard qualifications. A minority of them reached their position through other educational and training paths (e.g. a degree or diploma in a different topic; or years of experience in the particular area/organisation).

172) The **duration of the pre-service training required varies**: the HEWs study one year after Grade 10, whereas DAs and now all primary school teachers have to be diploma holders, which is considerably longer. The requirements to become a kebele manager are less specific but demanding as in principle they should also be diploma holders. However, this policy requirement was adapted to circumstances in most Regions and weredas. As a result, even among only **six kebele managers** there is **quite a variety of academic backgrounds**. Kebele managers might get an induction training in order to prepare them for the particular job that they are recruited for. However, among those interviewed the duration of this induction/preparatory training varied significantly, from a few days to three months.

173) The **majority of respondents**, both community and government go-betweens, had received **some kind of in-service training**. In some functions, all of the respondents received in-service

⁴⁷ This section is supported by the evidence summarised in the Evidence Basis 1.

training in the past few years. This includes the female wereda councillors; the heads of women's association; the DAs; the health workers, health promoters and health centre heads. In education all head teachers interviewed were trained on school management, in line with the policy according to which, since a few years, they do no longer have a full teaching load and instead, concentrates on school management and school-community relationships.

174) However, not all respondents reported receiving in-service training. In a number of functions there was a mix of some post-holders reporting that they received in-service training and others not. This was the case for the kebele leaders; the male wereda councillors (in contrast with their female counterparts all having received some training); the heads of the youth association (in contrast with the women's association heads also all trained); and the teachers.

175) The range of in-service training received varies widely. Across all of the posts, the same post holders report very different training amounts and types of training. Some respondents have frequent training on a variety of topics while others have one-off training experiences. **The DAs, health workers and head teachers reported the largest amount of in-service training.**

176) The in-service training tends to be short courses (commonly 1-15 days in duration) delivered by the wereda authorities, and sometimes but less frequently reported, at the zonal and regional level. Some respondents have received training from NGOs and the Church. E.g. several of the health training courses were delivered by NGOs; however, this pattern has changed over the past few years with more of the health promoter training now done by the HEWs.

177) The training topics tend to be **specific to the function** (e.g. health topics for health workers, agriculture topics for DAs). However, there **also** is training on a **number of cross-cutting issues**. For these there seems to be a 'de facto' **demarcation**, with training on '**community governance**' matters **for male** (training on good governance and administration and management for most of the kebele leaders, all male among those interviewed) and on '**human and social re/pro/duction**' matters **for female** (e.g. women's and child rights, family planning for WA heads and female wereda Councillors).

178) A number of respondents reported receiving party ideology/political orientation training. On the whole they were a minority. The only group for whom more than half of the post-holders had received some training on ideology/political orientation or on 'good governance' was the kebele leadership. Among the other go-betweens, two of the DAs and one of the teachers interviewed also reported party/political orientation training.

179) A small number of the respondents provided additional comments on their training:

- Some wanted to continue training in order to **get better jobs** (see below)
- There did **not** seem to be a **uniform policy with regard to funding**. Some noted that getting no transport allowance or per diem for the training was difficult financially. However, others commented that they did receive incentives or allowances (from the wereda and NGOs)
- Some commented that **training is time-consuming** (and with weekend training and meetings, one teacher has not seen his family that lives a long way away from his school in 2 years)
- Some respondents reported that **wereda officials had made them drop out** of further education that they were paying for themselves and undertaking at weekends, on the basis that it **was or would interfere with their work performance**
- A couple of respondents report being **trained with equipment which they don't have**, making it difficult / **not possible to implement** training.

180) These patterns seemed to result from a **mix of supply and demand factors**. The technical in-service training courses linked to a particular function seemed to be mostly supply-driven – but it is not clear from the data whether they usually would be offered to all post-holders in a wereda (or zone or Region), or more selectively as reward. Similarly, the more generic training courses would

likely target a whole group (e.g. all WA heads in a wereda might get trained on children's rights), but there might also be cases in which an individual who by virtue of her/his position had access to information about training opportunities would push to be on the training. **Getting access to training seemed to be generally valued across the different groups of respondents.**

4.3.9. Pursuing further education and for what

181) **Four of the six kebele managers interviewed wanted to study** and, explicitly or implicitly, this was with a view to **changing job**. This may be linked to their rather varied backgrounds. Also, they did not go for this job as their first choice, and some of them seemed to want to return to their initial ideas for a career (e.g. teaching for the managers in Korodegaga and in Turufe, engineer for the one in Dinki). **One** of them had been **told to stop** studying for a BA in sociology.

182) **All of the HEWs wanted to study** further as well, but **in contrast** with the kebele managers **only one wanted to change** of profession. The others **wanted to continue to work in the health** sector, reflecting a sense of pride/satisfaction of serving the community but wanting to move up the ladder as health professionals. **Similarly most head teachers and teachers** liked their work, and except for those who had not chosen teaching as a profession they wanted to upgrade their education but to **continue in the profession**.

183) The **picture is more mixed for the DAs**. Only three of the 12 interviewed did not mention the desire of pursuing some form of education. Among the 9 who wanted to study, for three of them this was linked to wanting to change job. The two DAs in Geblen were presumably in the same case. This would make five of twelve DAs wanting to do something else.

184) Our data does not allow us to be conclusive about the reasons why there was more of a desire to move away from their profession among the DAs and the kebele managers, contrasting with the HEWs and the teachers who generally wanted to progress further in their profession. One of the factors may well be the higher expectations that DAs and kebele managers would get from their higher level of qualification (Gr10+3 compared to Gr10+1 for the HEWs) – leading them to find life in rural areas more difficult to countenance. In the WIDE3 villages we also found that DAs were subjected to harsher HR practices, and did not get much support from anywhere.

4.4. Summary and some thoughts

4.4.1. Summary findings

185) The following key findings emerge from the 'human resource management' data related to the government go-betweens that were posted in 2010 in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 villages:

- It was **more difficult to staff remoter villages**; a more urban environment was making it more likely that government go-betweens could be from the community when this is desirable according to the policy (HEWs and kebele managers).
- There was a **fairly high proportion of 'women professionals'** among the government go-betweens interviewed, including because **all HEWs** were female as per the policy; however for many their **work conditions** were **difficult to reconcile with family** life and this was a serious issue.
- Almost **one third** of the government go-betweens interviewed were **separated from their nuclear family** due to their posting.
- Getting a permanent job was a motivation for some individuals.
- Kebele managers had the most diversified backgrounds. **DAs** were the **most mobile**, with frequent transfer and **transfer in remote areas used as a punishment**. **HEWs** were **not transferred even after years in remote areas**.

- HEWs with a high workload and tiring extension job did not get salary increments and might earn three times less than teachers with many years of seniority.
- There was no career path, no salary increment policy for the HEWs and the kebele managers. The **HRM framework was underspecified for all cadres**, but a **bit clearer for the teachers**. Leave policy was unclear.
- **Teachers and head teachers** seemed to be **comparatively more satisfied**, and **DAs the least**. **HEWs** expressed **job satisfaction and pride but also discouragement**, due to various issues including un-compensated hardship. All **kebele managers** had **mixed feelings**.
- Most professionals had the required qualification or were in the process of acquiring it.
- The **large majority** of respondents had received some form of **in-service training**, including the community go-betweens. There were specific professional training courses, and also training on crosscutting issues (community governance issues for male, social re/ production issues for female). The range of topics and individual experiences were **extremely varied**.
- A **large majority** of the government go-betweens **wanted to study further**; this was sometime **actively discouraged or even forbidden** if **outside of the wereda sponsored programme**. For the **teachers and HEWs** this was mainly to **continue** in their profession. For most of the **DAs and kebele managers** this was mainly to **leave the profession** for something better.
- In relation to whether party membership matters to be recruited as a government go-betweens and/or if it leads to preferential treatment whilst in the job, the data does not suggest that this would be systematic. A number of other issues appear to matter a lot more in the government go-betweens' own accounts.

4.4.2. Some thoughts

186) We did not find any study or data which would allow comparing these findings to the country-wide situation.

187) With regard to salaries, there is increasing concern over the deterioration of civil servants' 'actual salary level' – an issue which is now often exposed in the media. It is an 'easy target' for the government critics⁴⁸ but as we have seen (section 3) donors are raising the issue as well.

188) A number of practices we found were **clearly not in line with the 'policy'** as it was outlined in section 3 and in particular, with recommendations from the good governance package. This includes:

- The **weak human resource management (HRM) framework**, absence of career path and of policy for leave, salary increments etc.
- **Separations from family** left unaddressed and no compensation for this
- **Preventing people from studying**
- **No compensation for posting in remote areas** and this being used as punishment – instead of trying to make it more attractive through incentives.

189) The **HRM framework**, whilst it is underspecified for all cadres, seemed to be **more conducive for teachers**. Among others:

- This is the most senior frontline 'cadre' and so there is a **well-established framework for the 'basics'**, like salary increments
- More tenuously, this seniority also means that there is **more experience** with 'having people out there', in the system generally

⁴⁸ See for instance <http://www.ethiomediamedia.com/andnen/2620.html> (retrieved on June 21, 2011) – The article claims that 'In 1990/1 a recent graduate was hired with a starting salary of 500 birr which equaled 247.5 US dollars. After 20 years "rapid growth" the same degree holder was hired with a starting salary of 88.2 US dollars'. This is made worse as prices in birrs of basic food items and commodities have risen by 1000 percent and more.

- Linked to this, even if not very strong there seemed to be more of a **corporate feeling** about being a teacher than about being a HEW, a DA or a kebele manager, which is facilitated by the fact that the school is an organization in the way the FTC and health post are not.
- Practically, the combination of large-scale programmes enabling teachers to upgrade to meet the new education requirements, increased attention to systematizing CPD, a work calendar which enables teachers to have time off during the school holidays also makes a difference in that **professional upgrading is more firmly established** as well
- **Transfers** to more attractive schools are **used as rewards** (even if this is not 100% transparent) and not the other way round as for the DAs.

190) This somewhat **better defined and more 'humane' HRM framework and practice** may be **linked** with the finding that **teachers and school headmasters** seemed to be on the whole **more content** than the other cadres, which lends some support to a part of one of the hypotheses we made in this paper.

5. The government go-betweens in the different fields of action

5.1. Purpose and structure of the section

191) This section deepens the analysis of the WIDE3 Stage 1 final report on two of the research questions, that is:

- *“In what ways have recent social interactions, relationships and processes across the community-level development interface affected the implementation and achievements of the various government and donor programmes?”* -
- *“What differences were made to the trajectories and the communities by development interventions and the connections between them between 2003 and 2010?”*

The ‘go-betweens’ are supposed to be important actors in these social interactions, relationships and processes; and to play key roles in implementing development interventions. This section explores whether they were/did, how, how was this constrained/ enabled, and with what effects?

192) We noted earlier that the government go-betweens are primarily deployed in relation to one specific sector in which they **implement development interventions** and **provide services**: the DAs in relation to agriculture, livestock or NRM; the teachers in relation to education; the HEWs in relation to health and nutrition; the kebele managers in relation to administrative matters. In turn, the interventions in a specific sector usually focus primarily on one of the five fields of action which in the WIDE3 research we identified as structuring community members’ agency. In this section we use the ‘**fields of action**’ perspective to explore the role, activities and perceived effectiveness of the different government go-betweens, in the six Stage 1 communities.

193) There are sub-sections on **the livelihood field, the human re/pro/duction field** (subdivided in health and education), **the social re/pro/duction field and the community management field**.⁴⁹ The investigation of the role of the government go-betweens in relation to the ‘field of ideas’ is mainstreamed within each of these sub-sections. Each sub-section below explores commonalities across and differences between the sites, in the actual profiles, activities, ways of carrying out their tasks, and (perceived) effectiveness of the government go-betweens in relation to each of the fields.

194) The WIDE3 research has showed that when a new field-focused or cross-cutting intervention enters a community, it is affected by, and has consequences for, a pre-existing **web of development interventions**. And as interventions proceed they have consequences beyond those intended by the intervention designers and implementers. In each sub-section we therefore identify who the main government go-betweens are and focus mainly on them, but we also discuss the role of the other go-betweens in the particular field and the role of the ‘dedicated go-betweens’ in the other fields. We have tried to distinguish the views of wereda officials, kebele officials, community members and the go-betweens themselves as much as possible⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ *Social re/pro/duction* is achieved through social networks (formed on the basis of neighbourhood, kin, affinal and friendship relationships), social institutions (birth, transitions to adulthood, marriage, divorce, widow(er)hood, death and inheritance, resource sharing and exchanges such as work groups and share-cropping, and social exchanges such as attending funerals and visiting the sick) and social organisations (religious organisations and groups, workgroups and business organisations, community-initiated organisations providing social protection, credit and insurance, and externally-sponsored community-based organizations such as the women and youth associations). In the domain of *community management* four types of structure are important: (1) community structures; (2) locally-specific wider lineage or clan structures, ethnic and/or religious structures, and political structures; (3) kebele structures and (4) wereda structures. Powerful people include local elites, kebele officials, kebele managers, extension agents, and wereda officials.

⁵⁰ In the time allowed it proved unfeasible to also distinguish between different types of people and households within the communities. This paper therefore focuses more on communities as a whole, whereas the paper on differential effects of interventions on different people focuses on intra-community dimensions.

5.2. The government go-betweens in the livelihood field⁵¹

195) This section is concerned by the government go-betweens' role in support to farm, off-farm and non-farm livelihood activities of the communities' members, and to the implementation of government/donor interventions particularly in relation to:

- Land
- Resettlement
- Irrigation
- Water harvesting
- Agricultural extension and packages
- Livestock extension and packages
- Non-farm extension and packages
- Co-operatives
- Government Micro-credit
- Livelihoods & Human Re/pro/duction– Food aid

196) This sections focuses on the DAs (and veterinarians where they are present) but also analyses the role of the other go-betweens in relation to the field of livelihoods. The role of the DAs in the other fields is discussed in the other 'field' sections.

5.2.1. Who are the go-betweens in the livelihood field?

197) The (diploma holder) **Development Agents** were the main go-betweens in this field. The configuration of three DAs per kebele is that which is expected to be in place in all six villages. Whether this is the case in practice varies over time as there is a lot of movement in the cadre of DAs (noted above). Except one, all DAs in the six villages were qualified but there were gaps (three qualified DAs only in Girar and Korodegaga; no crop DA in Geblen; no livestock DA in Dinki; no NRM DA in Turufe; only qualified DA in NRM in Yetmen - an untrained crop DA was acting).

198) There was **no uniformity** in 'wereda policy' regarding the **deployment of other government agents**, including veterinarians. In two remote villages where livestock is important (including because of the OFSP-promoted packages) there was no vet, which was harming community people and in spite of the fact that a clinic had been built since some years. There were varied configurations of other 'livelihoods go-betweens' but these were community members like the development team leaders, or not stationed in the community like the supervisors.

199) The **kebele leadership and structures** had a **prominent role** in the livelihood field in all villages, with some variations (e.g. variably important role of 'development groups'). They lead in a number of livelihood interventions in which the DAs are not or marginally involved e.g. the 'youth package programme' and land allocation and certification issues. **Other government employees** working at kebele/ community level seem to be **relatively little involved** in the livelihood field although in two villages the HEWs and the DAs were working together (sanitation and compost) or promoting complementary activities (diversification of production and nutrition).

200) DAs were somewhat **judge and party**, as they are evaluated by the kebele Cabinet while also sitting on it. This generates a somewhat odd accountability relationship. How this works out in practice seems to depend on personalities, circumstances, and evolutions in the messages/ instructions from the wereda. DAs can be removed following complaints by the community (e.g. Dinki). In one village (Geblen, Tigray) sector performance and employees' work is evaluated by a 'coordinating committee'.

⁵¹ See Annex 4 for an overview of the evidence on which the section is based

5.2.2. What do DAs do and what do they not do?

201) DAs were said not to directly provide credit/inputs any longer ('government credit' for regular inputs was no longer policy in food secure villages) but in practice were still closely associated with this in both food insecure and food secure villages (for OFSP packages in food insecure villages, and credit provided on a selective basis elsewhere).

202) DAs' **workload had expanded/diversified** in the past few years. **Agricultural production** was **emphasised** everywhere, regardless of the production potential (e.g. promoting/forcing fertiliser packages in Geblen in some years). DAs did not always support "what worked" in the area (e.g. chat and eucalyptus in Girar). In some cases the information given about new technologies is not sufficient and farmers using them were harmed because of this.

203) There seemed to be **more context-specific adaptation in livestock production activities** although lack of access to vet services undermined the DA-promoted activities in some of the villages. DAs were involved in **NRM activities** – which had limited success in most cases.

204) In most of the village the **inputs** provided by the DAs were **not meeting most farmers' demands** for a host of reasons, not all under the DAs' control (quotas too high or too small; lack of access to credit; inadapted breeds; lack of certain inputs).

205) DAs were **not involved** in a number of **important livelihood activities** – notably non-farm, women and youth packages, except in Korodegaga where they assisted in e.g. organising the distribution of irrigable land to various groups of landless youth, women and farmers, according to decisions made by the kebele Cabinet and the community; and these groups were working with the DAs to obtain the necessary inputs. This was unrelated to any wereda instruction.

206) DAs were both giving and getting various forms of **training**; they challenged the effectiveness of the training of farmers as they had no means to make it practical.

207) The DAs reported being involved in **political activities** directed by higher levels, in two villages (Girar and Korodegaga). There and in the two Amhara villages where politics was mentioned in the context of the kebele Cabinet meetings they disliked this mix up of politics with developmental and professional activities.

5.2.3. How do they do it?

208) **Changes** were noted in the ways in which DAs work, notably, their presence at community level, and a **focus on teaching and demonstration**. Reportedly, each DA worked as **multi-purpose technical support** in an area of the kebele – i.e. they did not work exclusively as per their specialisation.

209) The way they **organised as a team** and **reported** to the wereda **varied** across villages: the kebele manager compiled sector reports for the wereda but other sector-specific reporting lines continued to coexist with this (DAs reports to and in some villages weekly meetings at the wereda agriculture office). **Reporting** was usually found to be **cumbersome** and there was no evidence that it was of much use at the community level (through e.g. feedback from the wereda).

210) **DAs worked with model farmers** in all six villages. There were only few examples of the use of 'model farmers' to identify and reward 'ex post' genuine examples of what worked locally. The main trend seemed to be for model farmers to act as another top-down mechanism: they are 'selected' as people more able and willing (or having to be willing) to adopt new ideas, ways of doing and technologies or having better land, they get more inputs than others, and DAs (and the wereda) then monitor their performance.

5.2.4. Perceptions of and factors in the DAs' effectiveness

211) Perceptions of DAs' effectiveness or lack thereof **varied from one village to the other** (in Geblen DAs promoted unsuccessful packages – as planned by the wereda; whereas in Yetmen they had been instrumental in promoting successful diversification which had benefited most farmers). Different people **in one community** had **different views** (from not much good, no experience etc. to useful).

212) In all villages, all groups (wereda officials, kebele officials and community members) were aware of **other factors** affecting DAs' effectiveness, like drought, lack of inputs and lack of access to credit. **Lack of inputs of all kinds** (agricultural, administrative, training facilitation) was a source of frustration for the DAs everywhere, intensely so in some villages. FTCs were non-functional due to lack of resources. The use of model farmers was considered to be valuable by wereda officials and DAs but there was little concrete evidence of their 'demonstration effect'.

213) **Human resource management issues** loomed large (overwork, unsatisfactory salary, no clear career path, no access to or preventing from studying, hard life in remote areas) but were largely ignored by wereda officials. 'Solutions' were more often punishment (such as transfer in a remoter kebele, practised in three of the villages) than anything else.

214) Finally, the **community's readiness to be mobilised** was also a factor in how DAs were seen to perform, notably in NRM activities. Meetings, training etc. were generally not considered to be very effective (including by the DAs themselves), notably due to the fact that they were mostly theoretical due to lack of inputs.

5.2.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context

215) The main thrust of what we found is summarised below, and compared to the government policy directions outlined in section 3.

*In the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities there were no examples of DAs evolving their own 'extension model'. The prevailing pattern, quite distant from the policy emphasis on participatory approaches and on taking account of farmers' knowledge (section 3), is one of quite strong **rigidity in what the DAs try to do and promote** (in both high and low potential areas, e.g. Girar and Geblen). There were a few examples of innovative/supportive attitude (e.g. livestock DA in Korodegaga making contact with an NGO to ask for inputs for the farmers).*

*The prevailing rigidity seemed to arise from a combination (in various mixes) of **lack of 'adaptation-oriented', problem-solving skills and confidence** on the DAs side, and **lack of space** for them to exert these skills. In turn, this also raised the question of how much space wereda officials (as next level of go-betweens) have, which was not clear. Packages were not 'locally adapted' in Geblen (with negative consequences as there were very few other options) and Girar (where farmers had access to other locally more successful options). They were successful for some farmers in 'potential' areas (Yetmen, Turufe), and some DA advice seemed to have helped increasing outputs (e.g. sowing in rows in Dinki, Korodegaga and Yetmen).*

DAs did not work with all farmers.** First, practically this does not seem feasible. Second, the 'model' of using 'model farmers' is well entrenched. Third, understandably so, DAs usually favour working with farmers who have some potential. In line with the above, model farmers were not selected because they would represent a 'local model' to be promoted – but because they were likely to be more **willing and able to adopt the external (wereda/DA) model.

*However, for a number of people in the community **the binding constraint may not be lack of access to DA advice.** Strong and experienced farmers may not need them, as the DAs themselves recognise in Yetmen. In other cases the binding constraint was the lack of potential of the options 'on offer' (Geblen) and/or the lack of access to other inputs (agricultural inputs, improved breeds, credit to buy these, land). I.e. constraints were on the supply side but not or not exclusively arising from inadequacy of the DAs. At the DA and FTC level, **lack of inputs** was a major constraint.*

*The 'policy' of community inputs in DA performance appraisal did not seem to be strongly institutionalised. DAs were more likely to express **little job satisfaction**, and on the other side, weredas were more likely to use **punishment measures** than incentive measures.*

216) These findings resonate with those of numerous studies on the extension service. First, studies usually suggest a sharp contrast between the government discourse on participatory extension and emphasis on demand-led advice⁵² and **actual extension practices found to be predominantly top-down.**

217) This was already highlighted in a 2005 two-wereda Tigray-focused study – which noted the quota-based nature of extension services (Mamusha Lemma and Volker Hoffmann 2005). The study also explained that as inputs lacked specificity to local contexts hence farmers and DAs alike were losing confidence in their effectiveness. Moreover, DAs usually failed to recognise opportunities like potentially successful strategies used by some farmers who could do well with some support and which they could in turn promote to other farmers. A 2006 eight-wereda study which captured the transition toward the deployment of the better qualified DAs noted that fulfilling quotas was still the main performance assessment criterion for DAs and it was unlikely that the extension services (from Region to wereda to DAs) might become less top-down (Berhanu Gebremedhin, D. Hoekstra and Azage Tegegne 2006).

218) A few years later a 2009 study focusing on extension and local governance concluded that while packages had become less rigid, the 'menus of options' on offer could not substitute for the micro level adaptation required (Mogues, T. et al 2010). Demand-driven extension remained a challenge: DAs' **incentives** continued to be to **maximize farmers' adoption of standard menus**, and the supervisors were keen to enforce the promotion of packages rather than providing technical backup and coaching. Other recent studies (2009-11)⁵³ highlight **major gaps in 'soft skills'** among DAs and SMSs at FTC and wereda levels, a **dominant 'technology push'** mindset, and lack of exposure to participatory methods and to business and entrepreneurial concepts. DAs consulted in one of these studies identified the following gaps in their skills/abilities: facilitation, integration with other sectors, knowledge on value chains, agri-business, marketing, entrepreneurship, and participatory methods, knowledge management, and practical skills.

219) Another oft-mentioned constraint is the **lack of practical experience** of most extension staff - which is a serious obstacle in them advising experienced farmers. As a result, all of the studies consulted report diverging views among farmers in relation to the experience with the DAs. Some farmers give DAs high marks; others stress their lack of experience. In earlier studies some farmers were said to value the DAs in spite of their limited technical knowledge but as a source of information about the use of modern inputs, and about new cultivation practices⁵⁴.

220) **Lack of inputs and poor support systems** are also a constant theme. DAs have little support from supervisors, and supervision is mainly about checking whether work plans are implemented without trying to understand the constraints that DAs may face (Mamusha Lemma and Volker Hoffmann 2005). The more recent studies highlight the network of FTCs and of better qualified DAs as a strong foundation for the extension service. However, **FTCs are said to be inadequately**

⁵² Government's position of principle is outlined in MOARD 2007 'Guidelines for Participatory Extension System' and the 2009 'Household Asset Building Programme' document.

⁵³ This includes a thorough review of the extension service based on fieldwork in 6 Regions and interviews of over 100 extension personnel (Davis K., Swanson B., and Amudavi D. 2009); several studies preparing for the Agricultural Transformation Plan (2010, 2011); and the 'capacity needs assessment' done for the Agricultural Growth Programme and submitted to MOARD (2010).

⁵⁴ Dercon S., Gilligan O. D., Hoddinott J and Tassew Woldehanna 2008

supported and used. One study notes that most FTCs are non-functional – as indeed seemed to be the case in the WIDE3 villages.

221) **Lack of transportation** is hampering both the DAs and the supervisors and Subject Matter Specialists. SMSs and supervisors (respectively 7,000 and 4,000 country-wide in 2009) have limited resources altogether. Often times they sit in their wereda office and are not even able to support DAs via remote communication. There is no such thing as a centre (e.g. at wereda level) in which DAs could find information and knowledge in the form of books, research papers and computer access with internet to communicate with research centres and/or find market information (Davis K., Swanson B., and Amudavi D. 2009).

222) **Deployment and retention of the DAs** are also regularly mentioned as big issues. In 2006 attrition was found to be relatively high, with DAs and Subject Matter Specialists leaving after having acquired some experience to join better paid jobs in NGOs. The skewed incentive system and lack of inputs and of transportation were said to be some of the reasons for this. This was confirmed in 2009 when it was found that approximately 45,000 DAs were employed whilst 63,000 had been trained in the AgTVET since the outset of the diploma-holder DA scheme.

223) The DA career reportedly offers **some benefits**, including salary increases and scholarship for the top performing DAs. But this was **said not to be sufficient** to offset the disincentives arising from poor accommodation, lack of transparency in hiring practices, lack of a clear career path, lack of basic inputs and low access to resources, low recognition of the DAs' importance, limited opportunities for further education, and on the whole an inadequate incentive structure. **Staffing extension services in remote areas is particularly challenging** (Moges et al 2009). In a number of cases DAs were **transferred** after just a few months, which was **detrimental** to their impact as it prevented them from developing relationships with farmers (Davis et al 2009).

224) **Poor governance and human resource management systems** are also identified as root causes of the lack of effectiveness of the extension services. In 2006 DAs were reportedly involved in many non-professional tasks and even though efforts were under way to stop this, the results were not yet apparent. A 2010 study confirmed that time away from professional tasks was still quite high. A number of studies highlight that DAs have unclear accountability/reporting lines. They are said to be 'muddled' not only due to the top-down nature of the DAs-wereda relationship, but by the fact that DAs were now judges and parties as one of them sat on the kebele Cabinet (Moges et al 2009). In the 2010 AGP capacity assessment DAs complained about given instructions from multiples bosses (kebele administration, wereda office, supervisor, kebele manager, and political administration), with multiple and confused accountability and reporting lines. At the same time, they were seldom accountable to farmers.

225) The government has recently reiterated its commitment to a demand-led approach in the HABP – designed as one of the components in the government Food Security Programme implemented in the 'PSNP weredas', to lift households out of chronic food insecurity. In these weredas the DAs have a '*key role to play in the overall food security and livelihood programme of the Government*'. In line with the design of the HABP, DAs should be able to assist the community and each household in preparing and implementing a business plan that should be '*the outcomes of household decision, not the supply of (package)-driven approach of the past*'.

226) However, confirming the trends highlighted above by mid-2010 there had been limited progress in the implementation of the HABP (IFPRI, IDS and Dadimos 2011)⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ This study, which is one of the outputs of the third PSNP impact assessment, is based on fieldwork undertaken in July-August 2010 hence immediately after the WIDE3 fieldwork.

Box 8: The DAs and implementation of the HABP

Most kebeles in PSNP weredas have a crop DA except in Oromia; in Oromia only 35% of the kebeles have 3 DAs compared to 88% in SNNP, 76% in Tigray and 69% in Amhara – This is the result of a massive effort to make sure DAs are deployed in these weredas

There are few DAs specialists in off-farm income, and it is not clear whether they are located in the kebeles but unlikely

Very few DAs had heard about HABP and those who had, had a shallow understanding of the programme, not understanding the difference with the (package-based) OFSP.

227) More generally, federal level informants reported **slow progress in the reforms required to transform the extension service** as envisaged in the HABP for food insecure areas and in the AGP for potential areas.

5.3. The government go-betweens in health, nutrition, sanitation⁵⁶

228) As the data shows, the go-betweens are very much organised along sector lines. Reflecting this and also the rather different tasks and roles of the main government go-betweens involved in the human re/pro/duction field, in this section we focus on the go-betweens in the health sector; we turn to the education sector next. This section is therefore concerned by the government go-betweens' role in support to human re/pro/duction activities of the communities' members and to the implementation of government/donor interventions particularly in relation to:

- Nutrition
- Family planning
- Pregnancy and childbirth
- Drinking water
- Sanitation
- Preventive health services
- Curative health services

229) This focuses on the role of the Health Extension Workers but also analyses the role of the other go-betweens in relation to health, nutrition and sanitation. The role of the HEWs in the other fields is discussed in the other 'field' sections.

5.3.1. Who are the go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field?

230) **Health Extension Workers** were the main government go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field at the community level. Except in Korodegaga where this was more recent, elsewhere there had been HEWs since **three or four years**. In a number of villages there was only one HEW, notably in Geblen where the other had left due to hardship. All HEWs had been trained. The two Amhara villages also had a nurse at the health post in response to people's dissatisfaction with the basic HEW/HP set-up. In the three remoter villages there was no access to general/ curative health services (other than the limited set that the HEWs/HP offer) in the kebele.

231) Other go-betweens were **community promoters** reporting to the HEWs (except in one village where they were said to report to the wereda). These arrangements succeeded to various community level health schemes in place before the rollout of the HEP (often NGO-/donor-supported). The extent of continuity in personnel varied across villages and there was **some sign of resentment about the new 'power' of HEWs** (recruiting, training and dismissing health promoters who previously were more directly related to higher level authorities).

⁵⁶ See Annex 5 for an overview of the evidence on which this section is based.

232) **Kebele and sub-kebele officials** were involved in health, nutrition and sanitation in all villages, although **less prominently** so than in the livelihood field. Also involved, and significantly more than in the livelihood field, were a number of **community-initiated institutions** (iddirs, clan structures) helping in the promotion of some aspects of the HEP - though this varied among the villages. In some (but not all) villages, **other government go-betweens** were involved in this field for specific activities (e.g. hygiene education at school) or HEWs would assist in other fields (e.g. checking children's school attendance when visiting homes). This seemed weakly institutionalised.

5.3.2. What do HEWs do and what do they not do?

233) HEWs focused on **health preventive services** (including education on communicable diseases, sanitation/ hygiene and nutrition). In relation to sanitation the construction and use of **latrines** was the **main** (but not exclusive) focus. This promotion was met with **varying degrees of receptiveness** across the villages and also among various groups within the villages (in some, the younger generation was more interested).

234) HEWs were involved in **reproductive health** in a major way as well. In relation to family planning the deployment of the HEWs intensified earlier efforts and allowed new contraceptive means to be available and greater proximity of services. In some cases this seemed to have **accelerated** the use of family planning **but not everywhere**, and **other factors were at play** (e.g. in Yetmen some farmers mentioned that they were first assessing their capacity to raise children). There was resistance from some groups/people in most of the villages, sometime quite upsettingly so for the HEWs who were called 'bad names' (e.g. Girar).

235) HEWs also provided **pregnancy/delivery-related services**. However, **only in one village** was the HEW able to provide **attended delivery service at the health post**. Women were said to often be discouraged by the distance and ante-natal care/ pregnancy follow up was still far from generalised; safe/assisted deliveries were even rarer. Yet in some of the villages there was a **sense of progress** as before the health post there was no pregnancy-related service at all.

236) HEWs had a role in **nutrition** but **not in the management of food aid**. HEWs had no role in safe water supply; the absence of clean water was noted as a major obstacle to the HEP in several villages.

237) The **big gap** perceived by communities was the **slow and insufficient progress in access to curative services**. With varying vehemence but in all villages people indicated that the services provided by the HEWs was either not what they were interested in, or fine but not enough ("*why on earth are you here*"). This was recognised as an issue in three weredas - including the two weredas in Amhara which had deployed a nurse at the HP in the WIDE3 villages. There was a trend towards greater responsibilities of the HEWs with regard to specific treatments or tasks and efforts to organise the referral system better. But this was not without its own issues.

5.3.3. How do they do it?

238) '**Teaching people**' seemed to be one major activity of the HEWs. They used various means: door-to-door visits (all villages, reportedly very tiring in scattered villages); community meetings (all villages, mixed effectiveness as in some villages people would not come); health promoters (yet to be started in Korodegaga); working with community institutions (important in the Oromo and Gurage villages); community conversations (NGO-introduced in some villages).

239) Teaching was **for all people** though HEWs also focused on groups of **households to graduate**, with the final goal that all households would graduate. What graduation and certification required and how this was recognised was not standardised across villages. Usually, model households would

be selected as those most likely to be willing to adopt the HEP. There was no sign that graduation achievements influenced the performance assessment of the HEWs.

240) **Kebele/sub-kebele structures** were involved in all villages in **mobilising** the community and **organising and facilitating** meetings, campaigns, and HEWs' door-to-door work. In the Amhara sites kebele officials were also expected to be 'early adopters' of the HEP. There did not seem to be a uniform policy about the role of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and of traditional healers, and the type of relationships that HEWs would be supposed to have with them.

241) HEWs reported to the wereda through the 'cluster coordinating' health centre or just to the HC. The wereda had a supportive role in 3 cases (training, visit, support), not so in one (the HEW complained that supervision was poor and superficial). The dominant picture is of a **quite heavy upward reporting relation** with few opportunities for HEWs to learn, share experience and seek advice from peers or more highly qualified health professionals. Wereda health officials may well realise that this is not ideal but face constraints themselves (e.g. lack of budget and transport).

242) In two villages the HEWs reported being involved in political activities with reporting to the kebele manager or to the wereda level.

5.3.4. Perceptions of and factors in the HEWs' effectiveness

243) Perceptions of the **effectiveness** of the HEWs' teaching were **varied** and different people in any one community had different opinions. A number of **concrete examples** in which the HEWs' deployment had made a **difference** were given (e.g. work with community-initiated institutions, better maternal and child care). But overall there was a perception that **progress was slow**. In two villages the HEWs were directly associated with **disseminating the government model** (about HTPs, women's rights and sanitation).

244) One thread underlying the mixed community perceptions was the concern about **lack of/ slow progress with curative services**. **Lack of inputs** was a source of frustration for the HEWs everywhere, with health posts not having electricity and water even in better-served villages. They also lacked transport, drugs, administrative resources, small equipment etc. **Irregular supply** (e.g. of contraceptives) was also often raised. In a number of villages HEWs wanted more **training**.

245) The **degree of responsiveness** of the community to HEWs' teaching was variable. Officials recognised that some of the reasons for this were well beyond the performance of the particular individuals working in the community (disillusion with lack of progress with curative services) and even beyond the health field (e.g. general attitude toward government in Yetmen and Dinki).

246) Most HEWs interviewed expressed **job satisfaction mixed with discouragement and frustration**. All wanted to study further, and except for one this was with a view to making a career in the health sector. In the remoter villages they stressed the hard conditions (separation from family, high workload with long distances, salary not commensurate with workload).

5.3.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context

*Even more so than the DAs, HEWs have a **strict menu of non-optional things** that households have to do to graduate, with the HEP. In the WIDE3 Stage 1 villages, the HEWs followed closely what they are supposed to do according to the policy, though they were constrained by lack of inputs and insufficient training in some aspects, and mixed receptiveness of people.*

*There were **variations** across and within villages in the extent to which the HEP promoted by the HEWs produced **attitudinal change** in relation to sanitation, hygiene, nutrition and family planning. There seemed to be an **evolution everywhere** though more urbanised sites were more receptive to some of the teaching (e.g. latrines in peri-urban Girar).*

The HEWs have started playing an important role in maternal and child care too, though with variable ability of providing essential services like attended deliveries.

*Two major factors affecting the effectiveness of their work were either the **lack or the irregularity in the provision of inputs** and the **community's unhappiness** with lack of/slow progress on the **curative side**. The former undermines their credibility; the latter is one of the reasons of the communities' mixed receptiveness to the HEWs' teaching.*

*There were trends toward expanding the range of services that HEWs might offer. However, this may not be sustainable and effective without significant improvement in the provision of inputs for the HP and in the professional supervision services. It would also require **addressing human resource issues** such as lack of a clear career path and non-compensated hardship in the remoter villages.*

247) A series of papers issued in the Ethiopian Journal of Health Development in 2007 highlighted lessons from the early years of implementation of the HEP. This covered both training and HEWs' working experiences.

248) With regard to **training** the paper highlighted that:

- Most HEWs were from urban environments (wereda towns) and selected mainly by weredas - so that the important criterion of 'being from the community where one would work' was not adhered to, as indeed was found in the WIDE3 villages
- They had very low average grade points so whilst the pool of potential candidates was very large the profession had not attracted the best ones
- They had not had adequate information on the job when they were recruited; most seemed to consider the training and profession as a stepping stone to becoming a nurse (with a few claiming that they were promised this), which resonates with the HEWs' expectations we found in the WIDE3 villages
- Training facilities were basic and inadequate (lacking water and latrines, libraries and IT facilities); apprenticeship was 'ad hoc'; English as a medium of instruction was problematic; students did not have written materials to take with except their own notes
- Trainees expressed high commitment; attrition was low at about 1% (i.e. most of the young women trained were taking their post).

249) The same series of papers reviews the **work experience** and **profiles** of the first batch of HEWs, who had been working since 2005. This revealed that:

- **Very few were from the communities** where they were working (8%); most were from towns (52%) – as above
- Deployment and work patterns varied as coverage and staffing was not yet complete; HEWs spent most of their time on health education; very little time was used to document issues and on family health and diseases control and prevention
- There were diverging views among HEWs as to whom they were accountable, with little sense of accountability to the kebele administration
- HEWs were not yet formally anchored in the kebele structures, other than seeing kebele officials as means to somewhat enforce implementation of the HEP by the community
- There was much attention to supervision by the wereda office, though HEWs had very little access to information – However, this seemed to be addressed as the same fieldwork indicated that there had been a lot of continuous education activities targeting the first batches (almost all HEWs had attended CE at least once)
- There was **no clear career structure, transfer guidelines and performance appraisal system and criteria** – This was urgently needed, including upgrading paths, evolution of those remaining as HEWs, and potential use of upgrading training as reward

- Most HEWs expressed **job satisfaction** (fulfilling work, independent decision-making) and were said to be satisfied with the salary level and payment timeliness – which by the time of the WIDE3 research seemed to have changed at least with regard to the salary level
- Very few expected to stay in the kebele of their present assignment for more than 2 years
- There was **dissatisfaction with other factors**: lack of a minimum standard of equipment and furniture; lack of safe water supply and of latrines which was both difficult for the HEWs and sending the wrong message to the community – which indeed resonates with what was found in the WIDE3 villages.

250) The WIDE3 data suggests that progress has been made on a number of fronts (e.g. HEWs are more strongly part of the kebele structures) but not on others (e.g. career path). For others yet the pattern is not so clear for others (e.g. use of training as reward, supervision). We found no recent study which would have updated the 2007 papers. Recent government documentation highlights a number of challenges including lack of a career path, poor coordination of training of HEWs by various partners, and delays in construction of HPs and provision of HP kits. The government also recognises that the delay in designing and implementing a comprehensive HRD strategy had resulted in lack of motivation and high turnover of health staff generally.

251) The one 2010 study found, focusing on maternal health care, stresses that expectations that HEWs fill the void in relation to skilled birthing care are unrealistic. First, HEWs have minimal training and virtually no hands-on training; second, they have many other tasks (this has actually expanded over time). HEWs could, nevertheless, critically contribute to better maternal health, by focusing on family planning, promotion of birth preparedness, hygienic delivery in partnership with TBAs, post-natal care, and communication means with a referral centre. Our findings suggest that indeed there remains scope for improvements in these areas, and that HEWs themselves do not feel well equipped for deliveries, even when they have been trained.

252) The third round of the Wereda City Benchmarking Survey (WCBS III) included a specific focus on health⁵⁷. However, this was almost exclusively concerned with curative health aspects. As noted in the *'KII and FGD Report'*, *"it appears that preventative and education services are appreciated where they exist, particularly by women, but are not seen as a core element of a good health service"* – which resonates with our findings. There was nonetheless an appreciation, especially by the younger respondents, of the greater availability of family planning services – but this was not directly linked to the rollout of the HEP.

5.4. The government go-betweens in education⁵⁸

253) This section is concerned by the other dimensions of the human re/pro/duction field. It focuses on the government go-betweens' role in support to human re/pro/duction activities of the communities' members and to the implementation of government/donor interventions particularly in relation to:

- Primary education
- Secondary education
- Government TVET
- Government universities/colleges
- Alternative Basic Education
- Government pre-school education

⁵⁷ The WCBS III gathered demand-side information through (i) a Citizen Report Card survey (over 10,000 citizens across the country); (ii) a number of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informants Interviews (KIIs).

⁵⁸ See Annex 6 for an overview of the evidence on which this section is based.

254) This focuses on the role of the teachers and headmasters but also analyses the role of other government go-betweens in relation to education. The role of the school staff in the other fields is discussed in the other ‘field’ sections.

5.4.1. Who are the go-betweens in the education sector?

255) Government go-betweens in education at village level were mostly **primary school teachers and head teachers**. There were links with higher education level institutions in all six villages – though much less so in some like Korodegaga and Dinki. However in all six villages these institutions were outside of the kebele.

256) The provision of primary education in government schools was in **expansion** in all villages (additional classrooms, satellite schools, taking over ABE centres from NGOs etc.). This put **pressure on the system** and in four out of six villages this resulted in **too few qualified teachers** (budget constraints, combined with difficulty to recruit for the remoter, less attractive schools). **Staffing levels were particularly low in the satellite schools in the more remote villages** (e.g. one teacher in the satellite school in Dinki; in Geblen, teachers from the main school going to teach for some weeks in the satellite schools), where teachers would feel extremely isolated.

257) Schools were dealing with teacher shortfalls mainly by sharing the extra workload among the existing teachers – which resulted in a teaching load reportedly well beyond the norm. In Turufe the kebele administration had recruited teachers locally, paid by community contributions.

258) In all six villages **Parent-Teacher Associations** were in place and their stated role, quite comprehensive, was similar in all villages (involved in school planning and expansion and financial management, resolving problems, evaluating teachers). However, in two remoter villages they did not seem to be very strong. Only in one village was there sign of an education and training kebele board – with unspecified links with the PTA.

259) **Kebele administrations** in all six villages strongly supported the ‘**UPE campaigning**’ (promoting enrolment, fight against absenteeism/dropout, through home visits, mobilisation of iddirs, fines and reporting to the wereda in some cases). However, **teachers were on the frontline** of the UPE campaign, and usually disliked this role. Apart from their role in the UPE campaign in some communities, **other government go-betweens** like HEWS and DAs did not seem to be closely involved with the school or with school staff. In two villages (Korodegaga and Dinki) teachers were involved in other developmental activities but this was not reported elsewhere.

5.4.2. What do primary school head teachers and teachers do and not do?

260) In the **understaffed schools** teachers reported that they had a **heavy teaching load**. In all schools teachers mentioned **many other mostly school-related tasks** in line with policy expectations (door-to-door campaigning, tutorial classes, running/participating in school-related committees and extra-curricular activities, student counselling, reporting, and continuous professional development). Only in one village (Korodegaga) were they also involved in political (and broader developmental mobilisation) activities.

261) **Head teachers** emphasised **management, reporting and relationship tasks** – which resulted from a policy change a few years back when it was decided that they would no longer have a full teaching load. Together with this, schools had reportedly become more autonomous, and head teachers were spending more time **coaching and advising teachers**. In Korodegaga the head teacher explained that as a “*kind of decentralisation of good governance*”, since 1999 whilst she/he was still “*the boss*”, the head teacher had to first show what was to be done.

262) **Reporting** seemed to be a **time-consuming** activity. In distant kebeles with difficult access reporting was not meaningful as it did not reach the wereda timely. Schools in remoter villages also reported weak supervision and generally less access to support, training etc. Teachers in remote satellite schools were particularly disadvantaged as they lacked the professional networking and peer/head teacher support that teachers in the larger schools had access to.

5.4.3. How do they do it?

263) Schools made different choices with regard to operational education policies including self-contained teaching, automatic promotion, full day schooling, and multi-grade teaching. Generally **self-contained teaching and automatic promotion** in the first four grades were **disliked** by both the school staff and parents and staff and were **stopped in several villages** but not all. So, the community's influence over school choices varied across villages, from strong to apparently nil even when both parents and students and school staff disliked the current modality.

264) For both parents and teachers, there were **contradictory incentives**. **Teachers** were balancing concern for **education quality** and the implications for the students and their families, vs. concern with their own **workload**. **Parents** continued to cause absenteeism as they needed children's work while at the same time they expressed concerns that '*children at school are like shepherds*'. On the one hand, they opposed to policies that they perceived as quality-threatening (e.g. automatic promotion) while on the other hand they opposed as well to policies promoted by education authorities to enhance quality (e.g. full day schooling). **Two contradictory positions** in some sense, although **each perfectly logical 'internally'**.

265) Schools were **relatively weakly 'embedded'** in the communities. The life-worlds of working parents did not seem to strongly 'connect' with that of studying children and their teachers. In other words, schools and school staff are not as closely linked to adults' lives as agricultural extension and the DAs in these rural communities.

5.4.4. Perceptions of and factors in the school staff effectiveness

266) All schools benefited from **support from the community** and **kebele administration**, notably in the form of labour and cash. Other forms of non-government support were variable, usually not so important – except for the active and generous Gurage Diaspora in Girar.

267) **Support from weredas/the government** was said to be on an **upward trend** in **three villages**, in various forms, including GEQIP in two schools. However, there remained **many gaps** of all kinds in all schools (from clean water to desks, chairs, blackboards, textbooks etc.), which school staff noted had an impact on education quality. Less remote schools seemed to be better resourced.

268) **Weak supervision** was deplored in two of the **remote schools**, resulting in school staff '*missing on the new things*'.

269) In all villages **teacher evaluation** had become **more participatory**. PTAs, students, the kebele Cabinet or a committee formally evaluated teachers. There were some variations in the systems used but they seemed to be quite formalised in some villages (e.g. forms for students in Geblen, regular students' conferences organised by the kebele administration in Dinki). Teachers did not necessarily like these systems. The **extent** to which these **participatory assessments mattered** was also **not entirely clear**. A number of teachers in several villages reported to be evaluated on number of students passing exams.

5.4.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context

*Primary school head teachers and teachers are **under pressure** due to the **continued rapid expansion of provision**. This expansion arises from a mix of **genuine push** by communities as interest in education is rising everywhere, and **intense 'UPE campaigning'** (which teachers dislike having to do) as parents also have incentives 'the other way round'. The mixes differ across communities and vary over time.*

*School staff and parents are **concerned about education quality**, and point at many gaps in the supply of education inputs – including qualified teachers (with slight and recent improvements in some cases). These **common concerns** bring them together. But **they don't see eye to eye** with regard to how education quality can be reached. Absenteeism continues to be raised as an issue, with parents continuing to cause it as they need children's labour.*

*School staff report a **heavy workload**. They usually **like their job**. There is evidence that continuous professional development activities is on the rise, with an emphasis on school-based modalities, but some schools expressed a sense of lack of support.*

*The way teachers are assessed is reportedly becoming more **participatory**. Discourses stress **collaboration, networking** etc. within the school and between school and community. The data does not allow assessing the effects of these more participatory and collaborative governance systems.*

*The establishment of **small minimally staffed satellite schools** in remote areas may not be sustainable without **more support** provided to these schools and the staff working there. We found no mention of the incentives said to be in place in some cases in section 3.*

270) These findings resonate with those of a number of recent studies focusing on teachers. First, with regard to the **relative satisfaction of teachers** as a professional cadre. A 2008 study (CfBT 2008) found that the majority of primary school teachers interviewed were teaching for 'positive reasons' (and not, as often said, because they had had no other choice), although still as many as 40% of them were not finding teaching a positive experience⁵⁹. Teachers who had had good teachers as role models explained that this had been an important factor in their choice. Attrition in the course of the past one year was found to be low, at less than 2.5%. And consistently across age groups, more than half of the primary school teachers expressed job satisfaction⁶⁰.

271) With regard to **deployment** (first posting, transfers and workload), the system deploying new teachers to their first posts was rated as quite transparent by some teachers but not so by others. **Under-staffing in remote schools was a major issue** and a number of major disincentives were not well addressed (lack of medical facilities and, for women in particular, risks of abuse). Weredas often posted the new graduates in remote areas so that younger teachers were more isolated than their more experienced colleagues. This undermined their morale and cut them off from peer learning opportunities - as was clear in the satellite schools in the WIDE3 villages. Transfer was problematic (requested but not granted) for a majority of teachers.

272) Somewhat puzzlingly, PTR were high and pupil/section ratios even higher, although teachers' average workload was rather low, with only 1/3rd teachers teaching the full workload and more (30 periods per week) – in contrast with the reports by school staff in the WIDE3 villages.

273) With regard to the **support systems** for teachers in posts, in the sample of schools visited there were quite a number of CPD activities, although the study team reckons that as most schools turned out to be cluster centres this was likely to have skewed the picture. Moreover, the **situation was extremely variable**: some schools were supervised twice in a semester, others not once since years;

⁵⁹ The study included meetings with over 1,000 teachers in school-based focus groups and is arguably the largest such undertaking since five years or more.

⁶⁰ This was not the case for secondary school teachers, especially younger ones. The study stresses that for this group the situation was potentially very serious, as they had more easily marketable qualifications.

some schools benefitted from a number of CPD activities, others not a single –like in Dinki among the WIDE3 villages.

274) The **main negative aspects** of the profession were said to be: low salary level, increments and upgrading payments not made in full (as for the head mistress in Geblen), no benefits such as hardship allowance, medical insurance and easy transfer; tiresome work, lack of stimulation; lack of recognition of the profession by the community, wereda officials and the society generally (this did not arise particularly clearly from the WIDE3 data); poor school governance; difficult work and life conditions (overcrowded classes and lack of inputs; housing difficulties; separation from family). Similarly, in a VSO 2010 study part of a multi-country '*Valuing Teachers*' research⁶¹ the three most significant and most-often mentioned causes of demotivation were said to be **inadequate salaries, low respect for and low status of teachers** (including teachers' perception of their inability to influence policies and decisions), and **poor management and leadership** (VSO undated).

275) The 2008 CfBT study stressed the necessity of addressing the issue of staffing in remote schools ('difficult environments') and that special measures should be considered such as access to affordable and appropriate accommodation, protection from harassment, transport subsidies, and access to medical services so that '*they do not feel isolated or marooned there*'. Similarly, the 2010 VSO study recommends (among others) that MOE should develop a programme of non-salary incentives (easier than salary reforms) and a transparent and consistent system and principles for teacher deployment, transfers, upgrading, and performance assessment, with clear criteria and a clear career structure – and monitor the implementation of the system.

5.5. The government go-betweens in the field of social re/pro/duction⁶²

276) This section is concerned with the field of social re/pro/duction. It discusses:

- The government go-betweens' respective role/importance in the community-government interactions, and the use of community-initiated organisations (particularly iddirs) in these interactions and how the government go-betweens relate to this
- The 'community work' practices (distinguishing between community-initiated activities and government-initiated ones) and the role of the government go-betweens in this
- The role of the government go-betweens in relation to how the government model enters the community, including their own role in this and their relations with the models, champions and promoters in the different fields and sectors
- The role of the different government go-betweens in 'implementing the law' in relation to harmful traditional practices.

5.5.1. Community-government relationships

277) The government go-betweens had **little influence on the pre-existing, historical and community-specific patterns of community-government relationships**. They were important in technical terms – including in disseminating the government 'model' (see below). In the 2010 pre-election period which was that of the fieldwork they were also involved in political issues, more explicitly so in some villages than in others and kebele managers being the most 'political'. But at the heart, the key roles in mediating the broad community-government relationship were with the **kebele and sub-kebele leadership**. The **community-initiated institution** could also be influential, in some villages more strongly than in others.

⁶¹ The research covered 415 teachers through focus groups and questionnaires, of which 100 in FGDs – in six Regions including all four large one and Addis Ababa.

⁶² See Annex 7 for an overview of the evidence on which this section is based.

278) In situations of tense relationship the government go-betweens were relegated in the backstage, and even held ‘hostage’ by the bad-tempered nature of the relation (unable to reach targets/mobilise the community).

5.5.2. ‘Community work’ practices

279) There were **various arrangements for ‘community work’**, ranging from free and entirely community-initiated to paid and entirely-government initiated (notably, the PSNP public works or emergency food aid FFW in the food insecure villages). ‘Voluntary’ community work initiated to implement specific government policies was supposed to be practised in all villages (e.g. terracing, NRM in general) – and did happen, though on a seemingly small scale in some villages.

280) The **government go-betweens** had a role with regard to the ‘food security related’ activities in the villages concerned. In all villages they also **suggested activities** to be considered, emanating from policy priorities in their sector. There was some evidence of a form of **competition** among sectors to get activities included, and to decide which would be ‘paid for’. The different categories of ‘community work’ were not neatly demarcated. There was **no standard pattern** across villages as to **what type of works would be done under which type of arrangements**. Decision-making about what would be done and how and mobilising people to do it was quite complex processes; the government go-betweens were just one among many actors involved in these. The kebele Cabinet usually played the main role in deciding about these things.

5.5.3. Dissemination of the government development model

281) The wereda and kebele officials and the government go-betweens themselves thought of the **go-betweens** as an **important mean of disseminating the government development model** – through their presence, their work with models, promoters etc., and their ‘teaching’. Community people perceived them as such as well – stressing especially the ‘teaching’.

282) This ‘change agent’ role was associated **most strongly with the DAs** in two villages (Turufe and Yetmen, integrated, ‘potential areas’) and **the HEWs** in two others (Dinki and Korodegaga, two remoter communities). Interestingly, teachers and head teachers were less seen in a role of change agents. This could be because in all six villages a **privately-held model** seemed to emerge (albeit with various degree of ‘buy in’), in which families would **invest in education** for their children to be able to ‘move on’ toward a different life.

283) There is evidence that the ‘good governance’ approach has not weakened the importance of ‘teaching by those who know’ as one of the main means to bring change, that is, **the main change model continued to be ‘top-down’**. There also continued to be use of **subtle means of enforcing** measures in several villages.

284) The government go-betweens did not seem to represent role models in a direct manner, but there seemed to be a number of indirect ways in which their presence at the community level had an influence on the younger generation. However, this influence was competing with a number of other ‘role models’, also present in all communities – including ‘exit’ strategies like migration.

5.5.4. Actively promoted/defended communities’ models

285) In most communities there were cases of **active or passive resistance or avoidance vis-à-vis specific aspects of the government model**. This ranged from peaceful ‘encounters’ (e.g. opposition to self-contained teaching) and feet-dragging (latrine use) or refusal (e.g. landed farmers refusing that communal land be given to youth groups) to confrontational ones (e.g. threatening to burn down the health post to obtain that a nurse would be deployed) and even violent ones in some

instances (e.g. in Yetmen the community prevented the construction of a new secondary school on communal land and the demonstration turned violent).

286) In some instances this resulted in strong feelings expressed at the government go-betweens (e.g. in relation to family planning by angered husbands in Girar, or teachers reportedly being hated by parents when they press them to send children to school).

287) However generally, **community members seemed to realise that government go-betweens were not decision-makers**. There seemed to be little expectation that the government go-betweens might actually channel the community's preference upward or just stand to pressure from higher levels. Even when as a result of this pressure people were harmed (e.g. in Geblen where OFSP packages enforced on people failed most farmers, and DAs were involved in this), it seemed that they were quite clear about the go-betweens' own lack of power about this. There were only few explicit views that the 'top-down' nature of the process of government model dissemination was faulty.

5.5.5. Key overall insights in the country-wide context

*The dominant impression is that the government go-betweens have a **comparatively small role in the field of social re/pro/duction**, compared to other agents who are more embedded in community and who have, personally or through the institutions that they represent, shaped the nature of the relationship between the community and the government since a long time.*

*It also seems to be the case that the government go-betweens are more like **one-way, top-down channels** and there is little expectation from the communities that they should relay messages the other way round, from the community upward.*

288) We did not find anything specific in the Ethiopian literature on the role of the government frontline workers in relation to the social fabric of the communities in which they work. The most recent Wereda City Benchmarking Survey (WCBS III) sheds light on a number of interaction processes between government and society at sub-wereda level, but says nothing specifically on the role of the go-betweens. Moreover, the cross-jurisdiction nature of the WCBS III reports makes it difficult to compare the WCBS III findings with our community-focused data. Box 9 below summarises a few points of indirect relevance to this paper.

Box 9: Local interactions between government and society

Knowledge of the wereda strategic plan and budget was low (far more information was given on taxation and specific development activities as well as peace and security); in instances FGD participants struggled with the concept that this information might be available to them; however CSOs expressed a clear desire for more information⁶³. The main channels for any information were public/ village meetings or messengers appointed by the kebele. CSOs could also get information through participating in Council meetings.

Two thirds of the FGD participants and CSO KIIs believed that they did not have a say in setting development priorities; this was below a quarter for rural residents, women and the youth. When CSOs were consulted it was often associated with a request for support by the local administration.

In somewhat of a contrast, most people (>80%) said that they were consulted by the wereda authorities – however, there was little feedback indeed as to whether the results of the consultation were used.

Similarly, overall three quarters of the FGD participants believed that they could do something if they were not satisfied with a government service. The main means was to appeal to the higher officials/government authority (as shown in several WIDE3 villages).

⁶³ The typology of CSOs in the WCBS III does not distinguish between the community level but government-initiated CSOs like the women associations and the community-initiated CSOs such as the clan structures, equbs and idirs.

There were substantial variations among Regions. The WCBS III highlights the ‘collaborative relationship’ between government and the community which is said to prevail in Tigray. Oromia and to an extent SNNP are said to lag behind in most respects.

289) This absence of attention to the position of the **government go-betweens** in relation to the communities’ social re/pro/duction processes is indicative of the fact that their **role is mainly conceived as a technical/professional one**. As discussed in section 9 this is not unique to Ethiopia.

5.6. The government go-betweens in the field of community governance⁶⁴

290) This section is concerned by the government go-betweens’ role in relation to:

- Good governance
- Security, policing and justice
- Taxes, other cash and labour
- Government-sponsored Associations⁶⁵.

5.6.1. Who are the government go-betweens in the community governance field?

291) All **sectors** were **represented on the Kebele Cabinet**, which was supposed to facilitate the government go-betweens’ work (giving example, campaigning, mobilising the community). This was variably effective depending on Cabinet members’ commitment and also on the nature of the overall community-government relationship. There was **no evidence** that sitting on the Cabinet gave the government go-betweens far **more say on community governance matters**. To an extent, the government go-betweens’ membership of Cabinet made them judges and parties: the **accountability** relationship between them as service providers and ‘the Cabinet’ as representing the community is **blurred**. In two villages some of the government go-betweens explained they had stopped attending the Cabinet meetings as they were not party members.

292) The **balance of power** between **kebele manager and kebele leader varied** across villages. This depended on personalities, and on the post-holder’s interpretation of his role. In Dinki the manager saw himself as having a role of external ‘check and balance’ on the kebele leadership – though he and the kebele leader also explained that they had to work together. In Girar the kebele leader said he was trying to act as the boss *‘just because he was paid’*. In the other villages there was no apparent problem. However, in all villages the deployment of the kebele manager highlighted a **subtle tension between elected representatives** with low formal qualifications, and the **alleged need for professionalism** to better run the kebele affairs. In most villages it was not clear that on the whole the kebele leader was spending less time on public affairs. The kebele manager was visibly an important political actor in two villages (Girar and Korodegaga).

5.6.2. What do kebele managers do and not do

293) Kebele managers have **four main roles**: they give **administrative services** to people, **handle complaints**, and **facilitate the kebele administration’s functioning and reporting** to the wereda. They mentioned various other tasks, varying from one village to another (e.g. some involvement in tax collection and revenue handling, or the provision of data/information).

⁶⁴ See Annex 8 for an overview of the data on which this section is based.

⁶⁵ The data related to this field cover the activities and roles of the government go-betweens in relation to the political life at the community level. It is important to note that the fieldwork was conducted in the run up to the 2010 elections, during which political activity was no doubt more intense than at other times.

294) Complaints were 'systematically recorded' by the manager. However, the way complaints were then acted upon was not very clear. It seemed to often still involve extensively the kebele leaders or people were referred elsewhere, which they sometimes did not take very well.

295) The **role of the manager** with regard to the **kebele administration functioning/reporting varied** across villages, as well as the extent to which he was expected to channel information downward from the wereda. For instance the manager was in charge of putting the kebele plan together and monitoring its implementation in some villages but in other villages the plan was prepared by other actors. The extent to which the manager was 'controlling' or overseeing the work of the other government go-betweens also differed.

296) So, the **role** of the manager was **still evolving**; it seemed to be more village-specific which may be linked to the less technical and more administrative nature of their role and the fact that GOE is still in the process of defining what the kebele administration should look like.

5.6.3. Perceptions of effectiveness of the kebele managers

297) **Views of the kebele leaders** on the usefulness of the manager were **strongly contrasting** across the six villages, from most useful – in particular in relation to complaint handling and reporting and administrative tidiness - to useless and trying to 'boss' the kebele leader around. There were very **few views from the community**, mainly on the (theoretical?) benefits of the more systematic complaint handling process.

298) **Kebele managers stressed a number of administrative achievements**, some of them insisting on their **importance** in relation to **good governance** (transparency in decision-making as meetings were minuted, personnel files were in order etc.). They reported a **huge workload**, with some explaining that it was hard to strike a balance between reporting and actually doing things. They had less acute complaints about lack of inputs than the other go-betweens. But some of them **complained about the kebele administration** (doing things not per the rules and regulations, prone to nepotism, uneducated, absenteeism at Cabinet meetings). Several of them expressed that they were at times feeling trapped in unpleasant 'harsh' roles (usually dictated by wereda decisions) which could jeopardize their relationship with the community.

5.6.4. Key overall insights in the country-wide context

*The role of the kebele manager and its positioning in the field of community governance (and its links with the other fields/agents) was still **unfolding in all six villages**.*

*The managers carried out a core of **administrative tasks** for the people from the community, similar across all villages and apparently **appreciated** by the kebele leadership.*

*But with regard to their role of facilitation of the kebele administration and as kebele-wereda link, **local power configurations** and combinations of personalities influenced its definition more than formal terms of reference or job description. The deployment of the managers seemed to have prompted a (subdued but nonetheless well present) **debate about the relative importance of representativeness and embedded-ness vs. formal education and 'professionalism' in handling the kebele affairs**. The professionalism of the DAs', HEWs' and teachers' seemed easier to handle; in contrast, the more diffuse and evolving nature of the role of the kebele manager seemed to be perceived as more of a threat to the power of the kebele leadership.*

299) At the federal level, three years in the implementation of this new measure there is very little information from the government about the kebele managers' actual functions, tasks, and

effectiveness. We found no specific study about them⁶⁶ - although they have been mentioned in a few recent studies on other topics. The few facts reported in these studies are summarized below.

Box 10: A few facts on the kebele managers

The 2008 'review of the OFSP' notes that kebele managers were recently appointed to enhance the capacity of the kebeles, though by then only Amhara and Tigray had started to deploy them as part of PSCAP. They were reportedly supposed to assist the kebele Cabinet and to enhance the kebele capacity to plan, implement and monitor development programmes. Importantly, they were expected to 'take the pressure off the DAs', who so far had performed these activities in addition to their regular extension work (MOARD 2008).

At about the same time a PBS Joint Review and Implementation Support mission aide-memoire noted that kebele managers were found in Amhara. They reportedly were playing a key role in coordinating and implementing development projects at grassroots level and also providing administrative support to citizens.

The 2010 'institutional capacity and needs assessment of implementing agencies' commissioned for the AGP notes that the kebele managers often operate in poorly constructed and maintained spaces and lacked communication and transport means – as the kebele cabinet itself. Confusingly, the study counts the manager, secretary of the kebele cabinet, as one of its members. The kebele manager is expected to be the Cabinet secretary, compile the kebele reports, 'manage' the government employees working at the kebele level (though it is not specified how he would do this), manage the resources of the kebele (again no detail is given), accept complaints and direct people to where they should go, and generate the documentation required. Reportedly, in practice often managers lack the skills to perform all these tasks and need support from kebele Cabinet members. DAs report that the kebele manager is one of their multiple bosses.

300) The above suggests that initial expectations were wide-ranging; the managers were expected to play a **developmental role** which **does not tally what we found in the WIDE3 villages**. Our findings are more consistent with the more recent AGP assessment.

301) It is noteworthy that the kebele managers do not appear to be involved in the PSNP/FSP appeal mechanism: the last PSNP assessment reports that these mechanisms are weak and perceived to be ineffective, but does not mention the kebele managers at all (in spite of their role in complaint handling) (IFPRI, IDS and Dadimos 2011). The WCBS III reports that a number of FGD participants highlighted a degree of circularity in complaint handling processes, with kebele and wereda authorities referring people back and forth.

5.7. Summary and some thoughts

302) In this section we summarise the important findings about the government go-betweens' role and effectiveness, highlighting **similarities and differences across the different fields of action**. We also bring together the findings about the **roles of go-betweens across sectors** and therefore, their role (if any) in drawing the **web of interventions** – i.e. the extent to which they identified, used or promoted to good effect the potential synergies and/or prevented undesirable effects of potential antergies between policies in the various fields of action.

303) Before doing this, the box below presents some contextual elements – drawn from the demand-side data of the 3rd round of the Wereda City Benchmarking Survey which was undertaken at the same time as the WIDE3 Stage 1 fieldwork.

⁶⁶ The World Bank work on decentralisation will include a component looking at local civil servants' motivations and capacities, with a particular focus on the kebele managers.

Box 11: Local perceptions of local service quality and local civil servants' ethic

In rural areas, **services** were ranked as follows: education was highest in terms of quality (76%), followed by agriculture (47%), health (35%) then water supply (29%), ahead of other services such as police, justice, road construction etc. Although this does not say anything on people's preferences, it is noteworthy that **sectors in which there were government go-betweens at the community level attracted higher rankings in terms of quality of services** – though it also probably is related to availability of the services (this distinction is not addressed in the WCBS reports).

The survey included questions on people's perceptions of the extent of corruption among different categories of government officials. Corruption was ranked as lowest (9%) among local civil servants that is, professionals working at the kebele level; medium (16% - 19%) among kebele and wereda officials; and high (22%-23%) for the local Police and Courts.

5.7.1. Commonalities and differences across fields of action

304) What was **common** across fields of action in the government go-betweens' role and effectiveness:

- Teaching/convincing, campaigning, **top-down change model**
- **Reliance/dependence on kebele structures** for community mobilization, facilitation of campaigns etc.
- **Reporting** quite cumbersome, **mainly upward** orientated, not always meaningful for various reasons
- **Upward accountability** inevitable, whereas local accountability variable and 'blurred'
- Professionals represented on the kebele Cabinet but without necessarily more power; little influence on the 'fundamentals' in the community-government relationship; on the whole, comparatively **not very significant roles in the social re/pro/duction and community governance fields**
- **Lack of inputs** was a hindrance in all sectors, undermining effectiveness and credibility – though more seriously for the DAs and the HEWs
- Reportedly **high workload**
- There seemed to be **little expectation** that **government go-betweens** could have their **own model**, channel **local priorities** upward, and **stand up to top-down pressure**, against inappropriate interventions.

305) What was **varying** across fields of action:

- **Kebele managers** have **less of a 'change agent' role**, for community members at least⁶⁷.
- As (recognized) **change agents**, **DAs and HEWs** worked **with and through 'relays'** (model farmers/families, health promoters); **educationists** used other forms of 'relays' (e.g. girls' and anti-HIV school clubs), which do not rely in the same way on adult members of the communities
- **HEWs** were **using community-initiated institutions most**
- The **kebele** structures and leaders were **most involved in the livelihood field** – kebele leaders have the main role in livelihood-related interventions in which DAs are usually not or marginally involved (youth and women packages, land certification and allocation)
- There was **more competition for power**, hidden most of the time, between the **kebele managers** and the **kebele leaders**, than with the other cadres with a more specific professional background and field of action

⁶⁷ This is not quite the same for the kebele leadership. The kebele manager is there, implicitly at least, to bring a new way of running the kebele administration.

- There was **comparatively fewer opinions from community members on the teachers and the kebele managers**, and more on the DAs' and HEWs' usefulness and performance – and in this respect there was a wide range of opinions even within one community.

306) The above, triangulated with findings from the previous section 4, prompts a few speculative thoughts (which WIDE3 Stage 2 and Stage 3 fieldwork could allow further investigating).

307) First, on the whole, the interactions between community members, and kebele managers and teachers, seemed to be more trivial than with the DAs and the HEWs. Reasons for this may include the lesser role of change agent of the kebele managers. With regard to **education**, as we noted earlier schooling one's children has become more of a privately-held model. 'Modern education' competes with elements of the local model but an increasing number of parents seemed to think that the external model had valuable elements and so, there could be **negotiation to find ways of accommodating both models** (e.g. continued preference for shifts). Although in this negotiation parents are at present are on a relatively unfamiliar terrain, the relationship between the school staff and the community is more one of **service provision**.

308) In contrast, the **HEWs** interact with community members about a number of culturally sensitive topics; the **DAs** interact with farmers who have learned the hard way about locally inadequate livelihood options; and both the DAs and the HEWs promote an **external model** which includes elements that are not only unfamiliar but also **running against people's practices, beliefs and values**. These interactions are bound to be somehow more confrontational. Indeed when it comes to raising a family, taking care of one's household and farming, these are things that today's adult members of the community have learned how to do without the government go-betweens in the first instance. **So why should they listen to them? Why should the external model, competing with the local model, be better?**

309) This is bound to change over time as the new generations will have heard about e.g. new farming technologies from a much earlier stage in their lives. They will also be more familiar with the world of modern education as more of them will have gone through it for a period of time, so they will be better positioned to throw challenges at the top-down model if it is not satisfactory (this has begun already, with parents concerned about education quality and the lack of post-Grade 10 opportunities). That is, the local model will continue to evolve gradually through time⁶⁸, including through interactions with the external models. But at present, it is not surprising that the **interactions** in the development interface space between adult community members and government go-betweens are **less easy** in the **fields of action in which local and external models are most starkly at odds with each other** hence for which it is **less about service delivery and more about (top-down) change promotion**.

310) *Second*, on the whole there seemed to be **more resources reaching the schools** than there were for the DAs and FTCs, and the HEWs and health posts. The **direst situation** seemed to be that of the **DAs** – who seemed to have very little resources and deplore most the lack of inputs (dysfunctional FTCs etc.). It is striking that **DAs** appeared to **also be the least motivated** among the go-betweens. On the other side one should note the possible link between a slightly better situation in terms of resources, and teachers and head masters' higher professional satisfaction, on the whole.

311) The data also suggests that community members are much aware of this situation and the lack of or irregular supply of needed inputs (from within the sector, or from another sector like the lack of

⁶⁸ In the WIDE3 research we note that people in rural communities have access to a number of cultural repertoires, including a customary local repertoire and a modern local repertoire. Each member of the community draw on the different repertoires in her/his own way and this also depends on the circumstances in which she/he is. These mixes and their variations underpin the evolution of the local model.

clean water for sanitation) clearly undermines the credibility of the government interventions. Moreover, and importantly, people are well aware that this is not the go-betweens' responsibility.

5.7.2. The web of development interventions

312) Ideally the wereda should plan in an integrated manner, but realistically, it is at the kebele and community levels that the **different development interventions** could best be **deliberately drawn into a web**. However, this would require that the frontline workers in the different sectors are given the **space** to do this, and that at the kebele and community level there are **structures and processes** to organize this.

313) The different groups of actors interviewed had ideas about how interventions should complement each other and how some could undermine each other – as summarized in the box below. It should be noted that the responses seemed to be a mix of 'what might be' and actually occurring synergies and antergies.

Box 12: Most commonly mentioned synergies and antergies

Synergies

Education → Health, livelihoods: Children are taught a wide range of subjects that can be brought back home so the family as a whole benefit: hygiene, family planning animal husbandry techniques, agricultural practices, resource management. It is noteworthy that there was no mention of potential synergies in the social re/pro/duction field – e.g. in relation to women's rights.

Health → education, livelihoods: Healthier children can more easily travel distances to go to schools, attend more regularly, and learn better. Healthier adults will be better able to tend their livestock, carry out their agricultural activities, or work on the PSNP. Family planning makes women healthier.

Livelihoods → Education and health: Better livestock and crop production can lead to better nutrition and better health. More broadly, a sustainable livelihood in which the household has a 'surplus' income enables the family to send/keep children to school and afford health care.

NRM → Agriculture, livestock, irrigation (→ health and education as above): Numerous examples were given.

Antergies

Education ↔ Livelihood: Parents may need children's labour and cause absenteeism or even dropout; or the family's livelihood may be harmed as children have little time to help.

Water ↔ Health and sanitation: First, stagnant water (e.g. in household ponds promoted as a livelihood interventions) can provoke malaria. Second, lack of water prevents good hygiene practices. Third, lack of safe drinking water brings ill health and diseases.

Water ↔ Livelihoods: Lack of water combined with drought makes farming fail.

NRM ↔ Crop production ↔ Livestock production: There can be competition between NRM, crop and livestock interventions, for the use of land (zero-grazing vs. free grazing vs. additional land for crop cultivation) and of water.

Food-For-Work/PSNP Public Works ↔ Other livelihood options: Time spent to work for FFW/PSNP for the sake of the short-term benefit is taken away from potentially more profitable options over the longer run.

314) We noted earlier that there were **examples of synergies** reported to occur in practice, and in which the **government go-betweens had a role** – but there were **only a few**:

- In two villages the HEWs and the DAs were working together (sanitation and compost) or promoting complementary activities (diversification of production and nutrition)
- In some (but not all) villages, other government go-betweens were involved in the health field for specific activities (e.g. hygiene education at school); or HEWs would assist in other fields (e.g. checking children's school attendance when visiting homes)

- In some communities, government go-betweens like HEWS and DAs, as kebele Cabinet members, were involved in the UPE campaigning. They otherwise did not seem to be closely involved with the school. In two villages teachers were involved in other developmental activities but this was not reported elsewhere.

315) The above suggests that the **government go-betweens do not have a very significant role in drawing the web of interventions**. This seems to arise from three combined factors:

- The fact that there is **no government go-betweens in important areas** (more broadly, communities have no say on a number of critically important development interventions)
- The **strength of the vertical sectoral links in the definition of priorities** at/for the local levels (downward targets and quotas or 'expectations' associated with the external top-down models; upward reporting) – which limits the responsiveness of the government go-betweens in one sector, to needs emanating from another sector
- The **relative lack of institutionalisation of community/kebele level horizontal processes and systems**.

316) With regard to the first point, there are **no assigned government go-betweens** at the community level for **water and roads**. Other infrastructure developments such as **electricity and mobile phone network coverage** are decided at levels well beyond the community or even wereda level. Yet all these are areas of government activity that community members indicated as very important. The absence of clean water was noted as a major obstacle to implementing the HEP in several villages. The acute lack of any water in Geblen was mentioned by almost everyone as the most critical issue for the community. Roads and electricity were credited with the largest number of synergy effects.

317) With regard to the two other points, there was **no evidence** of a strong practice whereby the kebeles would draw **integrated kebele plans** through **participation** of the whole community. The concept of cross-sectoral integrated planning did not 'come out' spontaneously in the interviews of community members about the various development interventions⁶⁹. The interviews of the kebele leadership and notables and of the government go-betweens present a relatively patchy picture. As noted in the section above, there was variation across villages in the definition of the role of the kebele manager with regard to the kebele planning and monitoring process.

318) This resonates with other fieldwork-based evidence. For instance (Pankhurst et al 2008):

The sectoralised approach to service delivery has led to limited integrated and cross-sectoral planning and implementation at a kebele level. Much of the planning and implementation from wereda to kebele levels is organised on a predominantly sectoral basis. Even where some kebele level integrated planning takes place this is often overlooked due to sectoral planning or has limited local relevance due to limited funds for Kebele level activities.

... More effective engagement of communities, particularly in service delivery, would require a greater transparency and involvement of community representatives in wereda and sub-wereda integrated planning, and inter-community negotiation about prioritisation, phasing and collaboration over development projects.

319) The **structures** which could allow integrated kebele planning **existed in all communities** (kebele Cabinet, committees, sub-kebele structures, development groups⁷⁰). But they usually seemed to be

⁶⁹ There was no protocol specifically about participatory planning and monitoring.

⁷⁰ There was some uncertainty about e.g. whether kebele Councils were functional, and about the strength (and 'commitment') of the various structures.

perceived and to operate **more as yet other means to contribute to disseminating the top-down sectoralised model** (community mobilization, facilitating campaign etc.).

320) Finally, turning to '**community work**' which in principle should be a resource on which the community has more of a say, as noted above there was **some evidence of a form of competition between sectors** to get activities included, and to decide which would be 'paid for'. This may well be **indicative of a more general pattern of competition**, which would also be understandable if the government go-betweens are accountable vertically and for results narrowly confined each in their own sector.

6. The role of the government go-betweens in the communities' change trajectories

6.1. Purpose and structure of the section

321) Following the analysis of the situations as they were found in 2010, this section now looks at the communities' trajectories of change over time, and the role of the government go-betweens in relation to this change.

322) In doing so we had to confront one methodological difficulty. In itself, the expansion of the range of functions that the government fulfilled at the community level was a change. After 2003 in particular, **new functions, new 'cadres' of extension workers and new posts** at community level appeared in the livelihood, health and governance fields, resulting in new or intensified related activities. However, these were only one set of change factors. Others were undoubtedly linked to differences in **personalities** between post-holders in the different villages and over time. We have seen that the HEWs living in the six villages were in place since the rollout of this new function; whereas there was quite a bit of turnover for the other 'cadres' – which our data does not fully document. In both instances we found it very difficult to draw a line between the change effects of the **functions** and those of the **particular individuals** carrying these functions.

323) The way we tried to tackle this difficulty is reflected in the structure of the section. After this introduction, we outline the trajectories of the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities as we documented them in the Stage 1 analysis. This sets the scene to look at the role of the government go-betweens in the change trajectories in a number of complementary ways.

- First, we document the magnitude of the change which the **presence of the government go-betweens** at community level represented in 2010 when compared to 1995.
- We then explore whether the (community-specific) **nature of the 'overall relationship' between the community and 'the government'** (which has sent the go-betweens) seemed to matter (or not) in relation to the government go-betweens' effectiveness (as it might shape the community's overall reaction to the government development model).
- Finally, we analyse in further depth a number of **'exemplar cases' of change**, exploring the **contribution of the government go-betweens** among other change factors, and trying to understand why they may have contributed in those cases and not elsewhere.

6.2. The community trajectories and their potential future

324) Each rural community system in Ethiopia is on a trajectory dependent on its historical path and current context. A key parameter in determining its path is the community-based livelihood system. Accordingly, in the WIDE3 Stage 1 research we divided the six sites into two broad types, the dependent economies and the independent economies⁷¹. We established that there had been considerable economic, social and political change in all six rural communities over the past fifteen years up to 2010.

325) However within these types, we found that we could distinguish between the communities which showed signs of **structural change** and those **reproducing the same structures**. We then categorised the communities according to whether the livelihoods on the whole showed **improvement, stasis or decline**. Figure 5 shows where each of the six communities lies on these two dimensions. This shows that the type of trajectory is unrelated to the type of economy.

⁷¹ Three of the Stage One communities are more remote, drought-prone and have been food aid dependent; the other three have self-supporting or independent economies and are more integrated in the wider economy and society.

326) Speculating on the evidence for each community we suggested that all of the communities continued on much the same course between 1995 and 2003 and beyond to 2008 or so, with minor and cumulative changes which pushed them further from equilibrium but no important changes to the control parameters determining the direction of the community. However, by 2010 internal and external changes in three of the communities had pushed them to states of disequilibrium or 'chaos' (in the language of complexity social science) such that they are very unlikely to remain on their historic trajectories.

Figure 5: Possible Stage 1 community trajectories around 2010

| Community-based livelihoods | Structural Change | Structural Reproduction |
|---|--|---|
| Notable improvement in community-based livelihoods | <i>Turufe</i> – will become a Shashemene suburb fairly soon <i>Korodegaga</i> – (PSNP site) likely to institutionalise a community-wide mixed irrigation system which will reduce dependence on drought-prone rainfed agriculture | <i>Yetmen</i> – economic growth as a result of higher prices for grain sold and use of selected seeds and fertiliser; some irrigated vegetable growing <i>Girar</i> – economic growth as a result of investments in chat and eucalyptus and improved opportunities for Gurage urban migrants |
| Relative stasis in community-based livelihoods | | <i>Dinki</i> – (emergency food aid site) small improvement for some as a result of an increase in use of irrigated land (still a minority) |
| Decline in community-based livelihoods | <i>Geblen</i> – (PSNP site), regular droughts, over 40% female-headed households; recent rapid youth exit | |

327) The communities we believed might be setting off in new directions are Geblen, the PSNP-dependent community in Tigray undergoing rapid youth exit after repeated failure in the core livelihood system; Turufe, the peri-urban site which is poised to become a suburb of Shashemene; and Korodegaga, the drought-prone Arssi Oromo site on the banks of the river Awash which is experimenting quite successfully with a range of institutional modes for organising irrigation.

328) The communities following a course which was in place in 1995 are Yetmen, a tef and wheat exporting community in Gojjam which has grown richer but otherwise not changed much; Girar, a peri-urban Gurage community of whom the same can be said; and Dinki, a drought-prone community near the Afar Region which is richer as a result of some irrigation but still regularly dependent on food aid.

6.3. The increased presence of government go-betweens in the communities

329) There are at least three ways in which the government go-betweens' increased presence meant change in the community – regardless of their activities: (i) their larger number meant that community members had more opportunities to have daily interactions with people who were not farmers or local actors; (ii) their potential role as 'model'; (iii) their link with urban life. These are discussed in turn below.

6.3.1. Increased interactions with the go-betweens as 'others'

330) The first effect of the government go-betweens on the communities' trajectories of change since 1995 is simply related to their **presence at the community level in ever increasing numbers**, driven by the government-initiated expansion of services at that level. In Korodegaga for example, community notables explained that:

- In 1995 there were a few teachers in the Gr1-4 school built in 1990, visits by extension agents and veterinarians from the wereda, and a few community health workers
- In 2004, there were 4 teachers and one DA
- In 2005/6 there were 5 teachers and two DAs
- In 2007 there were 5 teachers, three DAs and one kebele manager
- In 2009 there were 5 teachers, three DAs, one kebele manager and two HEWs.

331) The other villages saw a similar increase - faster in those in which primary school enrolment expanded faster than in Korodegaga (e.g. in Geblen). We do not have data equivalent to that above for Korodegaga. We can get an idea of the change by looking at WIDE service expansion data (see Annex 9). The salient differences with Korodegaga are summarised below.

Box 13: Government go-betweens since 1995 in the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities

Geblen: In 1995, agricultural and women 'local cadres' (visited by DAs) and 'model farmers/women'; no access to vet services for those living in far-away parts of the tabia; TPLF-initiated scheme of local women trained as 'torches of health' but unsuccessful due to lack of resources. In 2003 a health centre had been built 45 min walk from the tabia centre. There was no school in 1995, and a full Gr1-8 primary school and two satellite schools in 2010.

Dinki: MOA nursery (1994) providing daily labour opportunities; no school in Dinki in 1995.

Korodegaga: In 1995 extension workers visited frequently since 1980; private health care relatively near (1995) and better than government (2003); Gr1-4 school built in 1990.

Girar: There were model farmers in 1995; a primary school had been established in 1947, said to be fully supported by the community in 2003 (except presumably for teachers' salaries).

Turufe: Mechanised agriculture in the imperial era; in 1995 extension agents' visits rarer than during Derg, already some off/non-farm activities in nearby towns; Shashemene general hospital established before 1995 and providing general services to Turufe residents; primary schooling well developed in 1995 (Gr1-6) and already 60 unemployed school leavers.

Yetmen: Elementary school in 1995.

332) This meant that community members had **increasingly more opportunities to interact** with people who were '**not like themselves**'. While this was the case everywhere, a number of factors make the detailed pattern vary from one village to another and even within villages and so, the effects of this increased presence are village-specific and likely to be quite complex.

333) *First*, there were variations in the configurations found in each village in 2010. In some instances they were **too few/below the policy standards**. This affected the **more remote** Geblen in particular (too few teachers, only one HEW and no crop DA). However, there seemed to be **difficulties in staffing the extension services everywhere** (so even in Yetmen there was only one qualified DA). As noted earlier teachers were also said to be too few in four of the six villages.

334) There were also **variations in the posts and post-holders found beyond the 'basic set'** which should be present in all villages (teachers, two HEWs, three DAs and one kebele manager). In livelihood and health some other posts were mentioned as filled in some villages; which were not mentioned at all in others; or were mentioned as vacant. It was not always clear whether these posts should have been filled by policy or if they had been established as a local decision.

- **Health:** The cases of the nurses in Dinki and Yetmen health post were clear – This was a wereda decision to calm people's anger with the lack of curative services, and one which does not fit with the MOH policy framework
- **Livelihood:** There was a vet stationed in Hagere Selam, the kebele centre for Dinki, which wereda officials presented as a wereda policy of deploying vets in lowland, livestock-oriented kebeles as a priority; there was also a vet stationed in Yetmen, perhaps because many people

had taken up livestock production activities though this was not explicitly said; in contrast there was no vet stationed in Geblen even though the main packages 'promoted' under the FSP focus on small livestock and vet services were much in demand; there also was no vet in Girar and Turufe but vet services were much more easily accessible from the nearby towns which farmers could call as the kebeles are covered by the mobile phone network.

335) The **presence** of the government go-betweens **also matters differently** in the **more urbanised** environments and in the **more isolated** villages. In the more urbanised villages community members meet regularly educated people and professionals with varied backgrounds. E.g. several banks and NGO offices are established in Imdibir in Girar; in Turufe a number of people, including kebele officials, study in higher education institutions in Shashemene. In contrast in Dinki, arguably the most isolated of all six Stage 1 villages, these kinds of encounter imply travelling to Debre Birhan, a day's trip at best.

336) There is also a level of **internal differentiation**. In the villages where settlements are scattered, people living 'far away' have less exposure to the go-betweens' daily presence and activities. This is clearly the case in Korodegaga (nine villages), Dinki (kebele centre at 2 hours walk) and Geblen (three to four hours walk from some parts of the tabia to reach the centre). The only 'cadre' present outside of the kebele/tabia 'centre' are the teachers posted in satellite schools. As we have seen these teachers do indeed feel badly isolated.

6.3.2. The government go-betweens' role as models

337) Another way in which the presence of the government go-betweens may influence the trajectories of the communities is through a '**role model effect**'.

338) As noted earlier, there are an increasing number of youngsters from the villages who got government jobs as HEWs, DAs and teachers. This was sometimes mentioned in the context of discussions on non-farm employment. Their numbers vary considerably. At the two extremes, just one such case was reported in Korodegaga and in Dinki whereas in Girar kebele authorities said there were 'many' and mentioned that:

- 1997: A significant number of youth took the exam required for training as health extension worker; Many other youth also took entrance exam required to DA. Then, they went to different colleges and trained as DAs.
- 1998: Many youth took exams and passed to attend their training as HEW and DA.
- 2000: Many youth from the community took college entrance exams and went to different teacher training institutes in the country. Some of them went to Hossaena, some others went to Awassa, Dilla, Arbaminch and Butajirra.

339) This may be more an **effect linked to the function and the desire** of educated younger people **to get a job**, than an effect linked to the individuals found in the villages.

6.3.3. Link with urban life

340) The government go-betweens have all been exposed to some form of urban life while they were studying, and a number of them are actually from urban families. Life in rural villages as they are supposed to live it is therefore a challenge.

341) The WIDE3 Stage 1 data shows a trend toward **urbanisation** in all six villages – though starting from different 'baselines' and driven by different sets of factors as well. In Turufe and Girar the proximity of towns was the main factor. Whereas 'petty urbanisation' in Geblen, Hagere Selam (Dinki's kebele) and Korodegaga was driven by a combination of expanding government administration and services and growing landlessness especially in Geblen and Dinki.

342) In **those less integrated villages the government go-betweens contribute to the rising urbanisation in multiple ways**. As many of them are not 'local people' they rent rooms, something which was not known some years back. They are regular clients of the small teashops which flourished in the expanding 'petty urban centres'; they may also call on local people for various other 'paid services' such as housekeeping and cooking.

6.4. The go-betweens in the overall community-government relationship

6.4.1. Community-specific thrust of community-government relationships

343) We have noted earlier that the government go-betweens seemed to have comparatively little influence on the nature of the overall relationship between the government and the community in which they worked. In this section we try to respond to the question 'the other way round' that is, whether the effectiveness of the go-betweens as agents of change is affected by the main thrust of the community-government relationship. The government go-betweens are sent by the government. One could **hypothesise** that a community that has a **more difficult relationship** with the government **might be less receptive** to the go-betweens' 'teaching' – which would translate in lower 'take-up' rates of the measures that they are supposed to promote.

344) The Stage 1 research showed that indeed, communities do differ in the way they relate to government 'on the whole' – as summarised in the box below.

Box 14: Community-government relations

Korodegaga (Oromia): Voted for opposition in 2005. Do not trust this 'government for the Tigreans'. In 2010 there was intensive government mobilisation (meetings, extension workers, targets, some threats). Women apparently support EPRDF (women's rights). Men are formally EPRDF members but unimpressed.

Turufe (Oromia): Relationship with government not particularly close or problematic. The community is able to mobilise against unwanted things (e.g. against loss of access to nearby hospital services, involving iddir).

Yetmen (Amhara): Derg 'bureaucrats' remained influential: initially 'discarded' by EPRDF, co-opted after 2005 (CUD vote). Building on history of rebellion against government, this bolshevik community mobilises against unwanted things from government. Yetmen people are generally selective, and use their 'democratic right' of not participating. The kebele leadership feels 'between two fires'.

Dinki (Amhara): Remote community for a long time relatively 'out of reach'. Local and 'border' dynamics (internal Amhara/Argoba mix, border with Afar Region) matter a lot. Government mobilisation efforts were said to be hindered by people's 'democratic right of non-participation' (post-2005 good governance package). Kebele leadership 'sandwiched between two fires'.

Girar (SNNP, Gurage): Complex relationship following wereda vote for CUD in 2005 and slow return to calm through 'good governance' discussions. Clan structures historically important. Government mobilisation in pre-2010 election period seemed less intrusive than elsewhere (no mention of micro-level 'development/party' structures). People's opinions about government performance vary.

Geblen (Tigray): Long-standing 'reciprocal' link struck during the 'TPLF era'. Some cracks under the surface. Government mobilise via training and propaganda, targets, extension workers, models and awards, threats of removal from PSNP. Community unhappy about forced package taking but kebele leadership under pressure and unwilling to raise issues at wereda level.

6.4.2. Cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity patterns across communities

345) The Stage 1 research also showed that communities do react to government's development model and to specific aspects of it in various ways. Different communities draw on loyalty, voice and exit strategies in different combinations. They develop different patterns of interactions

characterised by **cooperation** around some interventions, **non-cooperation** around others, and **complexity** in yet others, in the development interface space. Table 6 illustrates this – on a selective, not comprehensive basis.

Table 6: Patterns of cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity at the development interface

| | Girar SNNP | Geblen Tigray | Turufe K Oromia | Korodegaga Oromia | Yetmen Amhara | Dinki Amhara |
|---------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Cooperation / acceptance | HEP including latrines | Education | Women's rights | Youth mobilisation package | Agricultural extension and vet. services | Contraception |
| Non cooperation | Drinking water (non cooperation from wereda) | Contraception (lack of interest) | Contraception (many lack interest) | Latrines (lying) | Fight on school siting (active resistance) | Latrines (passive resistance) |
| Complexity | Women's rights | OFSP packages | Drinking water | Irrigation | Good governance package | Food aid |

346) The table shows that interfaces around the same intervention (e.g. family planning, women's rights, latrines) prompt different types of interactions in different communities (e.g. cooperation on contraception in Dinki, non-cooperation in Geblen and Turufe Kecheme), an illustration of complexity at one level. At another level, the detailed stories underneath each case show that cases of cooperation and non-cooperation always entail some complexity as well.

347) One would expect that these community-specific patterns of interactions in the development interface space would be shaped by the broader historical relationship between the government and the community and notably by each community's perception of how fairly or unfairly it was/is treated by the successive governments. Yet as the table shows, this is not straightforward. We do not find total non-cooperation in communities which have a more difficult relationship with the government like Yetmen, or a pattern of full acceptance in those which seem to have on the whole a less problematic relationship like Geblen. **In all villages there were development interventions around which there was relative acceptance and others for which there was non cooperation, and yet others in which a very complex set of interactions was unfolding.**

6.4.3. Cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity across fields of action

348) The WIDE3 Stage 1 research suggests that change has been more notable 'across the board' (that is, in all six villages) in the human re/pro/duction field of action and particularly in education - although detailed patterns vary from one village to the other. In the livelihood field/economic sector, social re/pro/duction field and community governance, change has been more varied across villages both in terms of extent and pattern. Table 7 presents a summary of the patterns of cooperation, non cooperation and complexity in the different fields of action in each village⁷².

Table 7: Patterns at the development interface – By sector

| | Girar SNNP | Geblen Tigray | Turufe K Oromia | Korodegaga Oromia | Yetmen Amhara | Dinki Amhara |
|-------------------|--|---|---|--|--|--------------|
| Livelihood | Complexity/ Non-cooperation - Diversification Cooperation- Women's economic empowerment | Complexity - OFSP packages; youth land-based packages | Cooperation- Diversification Complexity - Youth co-ops | Complexity - Irrigation, food security Cooperation - Youth cooperatives | Cooperation- Diversification Non-cooperation - Youth cooperatives on grazing land | Not striking |

⁷² This is based on an interpretation of the data presented in the Stage 1 final report, Tables 1 to 11.

| | Girar SNNP | Geblen Tigray | Turufe K Oromia | Korodegaga Oromia | Yetmen Amhara | Dinki Amhara |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| Health, nutrition, sanitation | Cooperation - Sanitation Complexity - Family planning | Non-cooperation (lack of interest) - Family planning Grievance – Costs curative services | Not striking | Non cooperation- Latrines Grievance – Lack curative services | Non cooperation - Latrines Cooperation- Family planning Anger – Lack curative services | Complexity – Family planning and sanitation: generational effect? |
| Education | Cooperation mitigated by complexity - Children’s work; servant girls | Cooperation (high interest) - Way out of failing core livelihood | Cooperation - Urbanisation | Complexity toward cooperation - Need for children’s work | Cooperation – Interest in new TVET opportunities | Complexity toward cooperation - Need for children’s work |
| Social re/production | Cooperation - Women’s rights | Not striking | Cooperation - Women’s rights | Cooperation - Women’s rights | Not striking | Not striking, some non-cooperation re: land and other rights from Argobba |
| Governance | Complexity | Cooperation with complexity – Model tabia but enforced OFSP packages | Complexity - Distant relationship with government | Complexity – Selectivity in take-up of government model | Non-cooperation - Democratic right not to participate, selectivity | Non-cooperation - Democratic right not to participate |

349) This shows a rather complex picture as well. *First*, this sector-based perspective confirms that there is **no straightforward pattern of overall rejection or acceptance** ‘across sectors’ for any of the villages: regardless of the **main thrust** of the **relationship** of the village with the government there are interventions for which there was cooperation and others, non-cooperation. Thus for instance, there was cooperation around diversification of livelihoods in Yetmen, which has an overall difficult relationship with the government.

350) *Second*, within one **same field of action/sector** the **same village** can show **cooperation and non-cooperation for different interventions**. Thus for instance, in Yetmen farmers cooperated in the livelihood field around interventions aimed to diversify livelihoods of landed households, but did not when it came to interventions for the landless youth; or, there was some cooperation with regard to family planning, but non-cooperation with regard to latrines.

351) The one sector in which there is a **more cooperative pattern overall** (with cooperation mixed with complexity but not non-cooperation) is **education**. However, this is not so much related to differences in how the government go-betweens behaved. They have had to act in line with the mandatory character of the government UPE model, in the same way as the HEWs for the HEP. The differences arise from elsewhere. *First*, as we noted in section 5 modern education is increasingly integrated in the local models of the communities and families. *Second*, it may also well be the case that teachers and headmasters are more personally convinced by the ‘UPE model’ than the DAs and the HEWs might be by the ‘packages’ that they promote. I.e. the extent to which the **government go-betweens made theirs’ the government model** may matter. *Third*, the extent to which they have some resources to do what they have to do may also matter.

6.5. The go-betweens and community change – Case studies

352) The sections above do not directly address the question of the link between structural change or reproduction and/or effects of specific interventions, and the government go-betweens’ effectiveness.

353) We know (from section 5) that there are both similarities and variations across the villages in what the government go-betweens do and not do and how and in local perceptions of their effectiveness. Systematically exploring how these similarities and variations relate to differences in 'take-up rates' of different interventions across communities would be a massive undertaking, to which in addition our data may not lend itself easily. It would also be complicated by the difficulty in disentangling effects due to functions from those due to individuals.

354) Instead what we do in this section is to explore this question of the **role of the go-betweens in the communities' change trajectories** in a **number of 'exemplar' cases**. The approach taken here is to analyse **exemplars of quite significant change** related to a development intervention or a specific aspect of the government model, identifying the **factors** that appeared to have **led** to this and analysing the **role of go-betweens** in this compared to other factors, and then to **contrast** this with other relevant cases.

6.5.1. **Livelihood field: Agricultural diversification in Yetmen**

355) The **wereda** and the **kebele DAs** have been active in supporting the expansion of **irrigation** (suggesting that farmers should use easily accessible groundwater and pumps, providing pumps on credit and training, helping with repair of pumps). They also promoted **intensification and diversification** and improved productivity techniques (e.g. making the Broad-Bed Maker plough available for farmers and educating them about what to do in the two-crops-per-year programme to plant chickpeas immediately after harvesting barley).

356) Both these change attempts were **quite successful**. In early 2010 there were 25 pumps in Yetmen (from no use of irrigation at all in 2003). The growth of irrigation farming gave landless people daily labour opportunities at good pay rates. Households using irrigation to grow vegetables became richer through selling part of their production and investing in other activities such as breed cows and renting-in more irrigable land. Renting-out (some of) their irrigable land provided income to labour-poor households. Through the two-crop-a-year programme the farmers got more cash, especially from the chickpeas. As a result, young people were able to buy school materials and had better clothes; families could support children at secondary school in towns; there was some improvement in the diet of some households.

357) This success seemed to emanate from a **convergence** between the **wereda's priorities** and its support to the community through **DA advice** and other means, and the **farmers' interests** as 'rational individuals'. The location of Yetmen means that market incentives for individual farmers were clear. The go-betweens supported the farmers in seizing market opportunities offered by the market. Otherwise, farmers in Yetmen are very experienced and would not need DAs, as the DAs themselves know well. Moreover, farmers were not asked to move away from something which worked well (teff production and trade, the local model). They were offered the opportunity to complement these activities and to get a better income from their land.

358) This **convergence of interests** and **complementarity of activities** allowed **trust** to be built and some **cooperation** to emerge, making it quite satisfactory for the go-betweens. It may also have mattered that the donor model (market-led rural economic growth) and the government model (government-led extension) had 'space' to work together due to Yetmen's good economic potential. **Government/donor overlapping models** also **did not threaten the local model** of teff production and trade, leaving it space to evolve at its own pace. The government go-betweens did not have to evolve their own model or to find ways of negotiating diverging expectations.

359) The cases of Girar and Geblen are briefly outlined below as contrasting examples.

Box 15: Non-cooperation in Girar, complexity in Geblen

Girar – For years the wereda, the DAs and NGOs have promoted (irrigated) horticulture and grain crop production to diversify away from the enset-based livelihoods. This has had limited success. The farmers who do well are those growing and selling chat and eucalyptus wood. Poorer farmers find daily labour in nearby Imdibir. The DAs are frustrated as farmers are more interested in these jobs and the richer one are ‘money oriented’ and focus on activities outside of the focus of the extension services.

Market incentives and urbanisation make the **local livelihood model evolve** in ways that **diverge from the government model**. The **DAs**, allying with the wereda and showing little interest in their work, seemed **unable or unwilling to negotiate** the government model and support what successful farmers do. It may also not help that they felt ‘manipulated’ by the kebele manager, an important political link between the wereda and the community. Squeezed between unwilling farmers and the wereda, DAs get even more un-motivated. The **donor model** (of market-led rural economic growth) **fits better with the evolving local model** than the government model, but this **does not help the DAs who are accountable to government**.

Geblen – The **government model** is ‘**food security**’ through **graduating** households from the PSNP into sustainable livelihoods. Since years the approach has been to ‘convince’ households to **take loans to get ‘packages’** deemed suitable for the area (modern honey production, shoat rearing). A number of ‘supporting’ measures have been variably successful. Tabia officials and DAs, responsible to engage as many households as possible in the package programme, are under pressure from the wereda as most often, the ‘quota’ for the tabia is not fully used. To try and reach the quota the go-betweens use various tactics including coercion. While the shoat package is better accepted, many households reportedly were forced to take modern beehives.

Yet the **model does not work**: repeated drought, acute lack of water and lack of vet services made most packages fail, dragging poor households further away from food security. The **DAs officially stick to the view** that the **packages should work but privately recognise that they fail** most people. They have no motivation to try and do differently: they are angry as the wereda transferred them to remote Geblen as sanction for studying outside of the wereda sponsored programme; and after all, the tabia leader himself refused to stand up to the wereda pressure.

More broadly, the **local model** in Geblen is **contested from within** but there is **not a unique alternative model**. A few people believe in the government model (better farming through packages) though they stress that this would require addressing the water issue, better training, and vet services. For many others, the future is in education to move away from farming, or migrating. For others yet, non-farm options should be expanded. But these are costly and/or risky strategies which thus far have attracted little support from the government (lack of TVET opportunities, youth unemployment etc.).

360) So in Girar, the DAs were **not able or willing to create a ‘space’ to negotiate** and work in the interest of the farmers. This made them hardly relevant, which was rather demotivating. Whereas in Geblen, this **‘space’ was less likely to be granted** by the **wereda officials, themselves under pressure** to achieve food security results. In addition the DAs lacked motivation in the first instance. To be fair, **everyone**, including the donors, **seems to be at pain to find a model** for communities like Geblen.

6.5.2. **Health field: Contributing factors to sanitation uptake**

361) We do not have the data to assess whether the increased focus on sanitation and preventive health through the deployment of the Health Extension Workers resulted in better maternal and child health (as was claimed by the HEWs or the wereda officials in a few villages) and generally in better health outcomes in the communities. In terms of more immediate results, we found some evidence of change, notably in the use of latrines which is one of the main elements of the campaign for the implementation of the Health Extension Programme.

362) There were **interesting variations** in the reported/observed **uptake rate in spite of the similarity** across villages in the **menu of methods used** by the HEWs to try and convince people: mostly teaching, some incentives in the form of distribution of water purifying tablets in Korodegaga (but it was temporary) or privileged access to bednets in Yetmen, some coercion in Korodegaga as well, and with the support of the kebele administration and the youth association, mobilisation of labour to assist labour-less households in digging their latrine (in several villages).

363) It is noteworthy that the use of incentives and coercion does not seem to yield lasting results. By and large the **seemingly better uptake rates** in some villages or among some groups in the villages were linked to three main factors:

- **Urbanisation** as in Girar – where the influence of a more urban life style as well as the increasing impracticality of ‘going to the field’ seemed to have played a role – It is not certain that people would have needed the HEWs teaching at all as they could copy what the urban dwellers were doing
- The eruption of **epidemics of Acute Water Diarrhea** in Turufe – The HEWs noted that this had been a major factor in raising people’s acceptance of the use of latrines, but it may be that prior teaching and campaigning had been useful to ‘prepare the ground’
- **Generational effect** with the younger generation more receptive to using latrines and generally modern hygiene and sanitation, like the girls and young women in Dinki – In this case again, it is not clear that the HEW teaching was a major factor compared to the hygiene education which is part of the school curriculum. The recent construction of gender-segregated latrines in the school was a positive factor too.

364) In Korodegaga where people ‘lie’ (digging latrines but not using them) the interruption of the distribution of water purifying tablets acted as a disincentive from continuing. But there was also an underlying lack of interest in the sanitation and prevention teaching as what people want is access to better curative services (the HEP is ‘*not an effective intervention*’). Some people raised the fact that lack of water was making a mockery of better sanitation, as they also said in Girar where the community is unhappy with the wereda inaction with regard to safe water supply.

365) In Yetmen, as in Korodegaga there is a general perception that sanitation and preventive health are not ‘good enough’. People’s refusal to use latrines in Yetmen may also be part of the more generalised rather confrontational attitude of the community vis-à-vis the ‘government model’ - like in the case of the farmer who dug a latrine then destroyed it. As one of the DAs put it, people in Yetmen are interested by the interventions which can have beneficial effects at individual level, but not the rest.

366) The above highlights the **importance of broader contextual factors or factors working in synergy or antergy**, in supporting or on the contrary, undermining the efforts of the government go-betweens in promoting sanitation and preventive health. Among these factors, the synergy with hygiene education in schools does not seem to be as systematically exploited as it might be; intensifying the synergy would cost nothing and could be done at the kebele and wereda levels. It would clearly be desirable to address the issue of lack of (safe) water and this is under the wereda’s mandate, but would require resources that may not be available easily. The third big disincentive which has to do with the slow progress in relation to curative services cannot be addressed without a policy shift at central level.

6.5.3. **Social re/pro/duction field: Women’s rights in Girar**

367) Girar saw a flurry of **developments related to women’s rights**. This broad movement seems to have emanated from the **social re/pro/duction field in response** to the extremely **conservative customary attitude** to women of the Gurage society, but to have branched off with activities in all the other fields of action. Whilst there is no dedicated government go-between at the community

level, a number of government-associated factors combined over the past five to seven years that prompted this. Among others:

- New **regional laws** were issued (family, land) and implemented (land certification)
- **Government-related structures** focusing on gender equality were established or upgraded at wereda and kebele levels (wereda Women's Affairs office as Cabinet member, Women Associations at both levels)
- Strong **donor support** was enlisted (UNICEF in particular)
- **Smart campaign means** were being used (Community Conversations, enlisting opinion leaders e.g. clan leaders, religious leaders, iddirs)
- **Local governance measures** were taken (e.g. banning girls' circumcision with fines and shaming for non-compliance; public recognition of non-circumcised girls as role models).

368) Activity was also stepped up in the other fields of action:

- The **good governance package** reportedly made the kebele administration more gender sensitive; however community members recognise that politics and community management are still largely male issues in Gurage society
- In **education** efforts were deployed to promote girls' enrolment, with affirmative actions, targeted actions of sensitisation of the mothers, and targeted actions of sensitisation against the 'child trafficking practice' of sending young girls after Grade 4 to live and work in urban relatives' homes
- In **health**, family planning was actively promoted as part of the HEP – and whilst this considerably angered some husbands there seemed to be some change; the broader human rights' platform contributed to this
- In the **livelihood** field a targeted 'women package programme' was implemented; this was more successful than the mainstream extension activity focusing on encouraging male farmers to diversify into crop and irrigated vegetable production, for a number of reasons linked to the broader women's rights movement that are outlined below.

Box 16: Women's economic empowerment in Girar – Not much of a role for the DAs

A **women's production cooperative** was established shortly after 2005, linked to the kebele WA, and encouraged by the wereda WA office. The cooperative got land from the kebele and produced teff. With the income the women set up a credit scheme for members and now also for non-members, which helps women in petty trade activities or to overcome household difficulties. There are issues (fairly limited reach, tensions with 'the kebele' around political issues, no institutionalised support from the DAs). But on the whole, this is a **success case**:

In the earlier days of the cooperative, the local people did not believe on their potential. Rather they mocked at them by saying "where are you going to deposit your plenty money?" After they saw the success of the cooperative, those who mocked came to join the cooperative.

The story is one of relatively effective implementation of the **government model** for the 'women package programme'. This took place in the context of the **women's rights movement** entailing a lot of activity and creating a broad-based coalition of support. The movement provided a platform and brought **broader successes** which helped making the idea of a women's cooperative acceptable. The **personality, relatively high education level and strong commitment** of the local founder of the WA and cooperative were also key factors.

In this broadly positive story there was a **conjunction** of wereda prioritisation and support, active mobilisation by a **strong local go-between** in the person of the WA leader, a broader **conductive context**, and some support from the other go-betweens or **at least no active mobilisation** against the cooperative initiative. The result was increased self-confidence of the women concerned, which enabled them to make steps away from the local gender model.

In relation to **women's economic empowerment** the government and donor models worked together to make the local gender model evolve.

369) Together, these factors began to **tackle most issues** hampering **women's rights** as defined in the **'modern' model**: stopping circumcision; ensuring women's access to land, inheritance rights and rights to divorce and to share property; promoting and supporting women's economic and political empowerment, actions against male violence. There have been **changes** on all fronts (younger daughters not circumcised, land certification to two spouses' names, cases of women claiming and getting land from dead husbands or a share in divorce, women's co-op, women joining *equb* credit associations, rapes punished at court).

370) But there also has been **stiff resistance**:

- Some (even women) still believe that circumcision is necessary
- Some husbands fiercely oppose family planning and things like women engaging in co-ops
- The system of customary justice favours males by belittling rape cases
- There also is community pressure e.g. a girl raped and reporting it is said to be like *'broken clay'* – suggesting that co-operation is not generalised
- Men are even said (by a serious informant) to *'die more than women'* because of their anger and women to live longer as they are happy that their rights are respected. The more conservative say: we are victims now. For the more progressive ones, *'this is good but enough for now, more will happen when the times demand'*.

371) That change is resisted by some is not surprising. However, **it is not simply about cooperation from some and non-cooperation from others**, as shown by the attitude of the Cheha clan leader. He is a very influential person in the community. He stopped circumcising his daughters and supported the women cooperative. But he was deeply upset by the new 'justice system' in which disputes between spouses were no longer to be handled by customary elders' mediation. Instead the wereda WA office and women's right activists encouraged women to sue their husbands. A number of disputes ended up in divorce, something which was very rare in the past. He explained that he was *not against women's rights'* but elders should be allowed, as was the custom, to tell spouses about the consequences of divorce on their and their children's lives.

372) The **change process** unleashed **tensions deep in the social fabric of the community**, to which **each individual** responds through **her/his own mix of cooperation and non-cooperation**. The mix adopted by **opinion leaders** like the Cheha clan leader are likely to **matter** in how others evolve over time **more than anything that the government can do directly**.

373) Returning to the role of the government go-betweens, the women rights movement which has the **potential to bring about structural change** in the social re/pro/duction field **did not emanate** from any of their activity. The role of the community institutions was crucial. Other factors were the legacy of strong support by UNICEF and the commitment of wereda officials which amplified the effects of changes in the federal/regional legal framework. A similar pattern was found in Turufe (role of elders, support by NGOs and wereda WA, successful start in implementing new federal and regional laws). Among the government go-betweens those who most clearly contributed were the HEWs. This in turn shows that **even in secondary roles, the government go-betweens can be instrumental**, particularly if they do **work through locally evolving change models**.

374) A **contrasting story** is the generally **mixed reaction** to the wereda model to tackle the issue of **youth landlessness and unemployment**. This is a critical social issue in all six villages. In five of them, the proposition made by the wereda that youth should form groups, be given a plot of communal land and start economic activities such as bee-keeping or tree plantation, was met with resistance, refusal, or feet dragging, even though it was promoted by the kebele leaders. This 'external' change model disregards deep intergenerational issues of control over and access to resources. It is therefore unsurprising that in the five villages where communal land with some potential is a scarce commodity, the model was challenged.

375) The only community in which this idea took off is Korodegaga. Not that all youth groups were successful, but two were: one loading/unloading cooperative, and one cooperative cultivating some land. The main factors which seem to have made a difference were: a quite **robust leadership** from the kebele Cabinet and the Chair in particular, the fact that **land is less scarce** than in the other villages so it was feasible to convince landed farmers to allocate some land to youth, the **inward investment** by landed farmers and outside irrigation investors, which created **economic opportunities** for some activities like the loading/unloading. **DAs** were requested to support and did so. So again, as for the women's right movement in Girar in **Korodegaga the go-betweens had some influence in supporting a locally evolved change process.**

6.6. Summary and some thoughts

6.6.1. What may matter for change in rural communities

376) Bringing together the main findings from the analysis above:

- There is **no straightforward association between change and improvement**. Improvement in the community-based livelihoods can be associated with both structural change and structural reproduction. Among the six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities there was no case of structural change associated with relative stasis. There was also no case of structural reproduction associated with decline, a situation which through time might lead to a community's disappearance; but there was one case of structural change associated with an overall decline in the core community-based livelihoods.
- There is **no straightforward association between the overall thrust of the community's relationship with the government and the type of trajectory** of the community in terms of change/reproduction or in terms of improvement, stasis or decline (e.g. change in Geblen with a relatively 'good' relationship but also in Korodegaga with a more 'selective' relationship; decline in Geblen in spite of 'good' relationship and improvement in Yetmen in spite of 'difficult' relationship).
- Even without 'doing' anything by their **presence the government go-betweens bring change** in that more community members interact more frequently with people who are 'different'; the importance of this as a change factor varies –it is more important in less integrated communities.
- Whatever the thrust of the community-government relationship and the shape of the community trajectory, in **all villages** there were areas in which there was **relative acceptance of the government model, others** in which there was **non cooperation**, and yet **others** in which **complex** sets of interactions were unfolding. Patterns of cooperation, non-cooperation and complexity are village-specific.
- The sector in which there is a **more cooperative pattern overall** is **education**, which we link to **ongoing evolution of the local model** allowing a type of relationship between teachers and communities which is more of service delivery compared to their colleagues in other sectors.
- Factors that seem to **facilitate change** in which **government go-betweens can play a role** include:
 - **Convergence of interests** between the wereda actors bringing the **external model** and the community actors holding the **local model** (e.g. government-promoted agricultural diversification in Yetmen with a tradition of market-oriented crop production), which creates a **space** within which the **go-betweens** can then offer **non-confrontational assistance**;
 - **Complementarity or non-competition** between the local model and the external model (in Yetmen, irrigated garden production complemented teff production), so that the go-

betweens' advice related to the external model is **non-threatening** (also modern education more generally);

- Broader **contextual factors** prompting the **necessity of change** (e.g. urbanisation and sanitation) **or bringing change** with them (e.g. generational effect);
- **Broad change coalitions** within which the **government go-betweens** in one particular sector can successfully 'push' a more specific agenda, if they '**work with the grain**' (i.e. with/ through the locally evolving model) and **ally with the powerful actors** in the change coalition (both individuals and institutions).

6.6.2. **Some more thoughts on rural community change and the government go-betweens**

377) The cultural disconnect between external model and local model is inevitable. What seems to matter is whether there can be **space for negotiation** at the development interface, so that a **set of acceptable practices** can emerge. This resonates with Scott's non-conforming practices but proposes that non-conformity need not be negative. The **factors** which can **help to create space** for negotiation when initially the disconnect is deep (with the external and local models in contradiction or competition) and cooperation difficult are not many:

- **Time**, generational effects, broad modernisation trends (education⁷³, latrines in Dinki)
- **Alliances with powerful local actors** (HEWs and family planning in broader women's rights movement in Girar)
- **Seizing opportunities** offered by the **broader context** (youth loading and unloading co-op in Korodegaga, viable thanks to inward investment in irrigation by other actors).

378) It seems **very difficult** for the **government go-betweens** working at the community level to **create this space**. When they find that there is some space they still need to be **able and/or willing to use it. Not all do**. The HEWs in Girar found some space created by the broad women's rights coalition and used it to push the family planning agenda. The DAs in Girar did not do the same and so did not work with the women cooperative even though the women were actually following the DAs' advice that the male farmers were rejecting.

379) So, on the whole the government go-betweens seem to be resigned to **do a lot of translation** (latrines everywhere, OFSP packages in Geblen). When conditions are more conducive there can be **some interpretation** (youth cooperatives in Korodegaga, livelihood diversification in Yetmen). Except in the **education** sector (shift system continued to facilitate attendance, self-contained teaching and automatic promotion stopped under the communities' pressure) there was **no example of successful negotiation** having led to a set of acceptable practices⁷⁴; and the role of the community level government go-betweens in this example of successful negotiation is likely to have been relatively marginal. The story of the OFSP packages failing people yet the kebele leadership and DAs feeling unable to act is an example of **failure/inability to negotiate**.

380) So, when negotiation is constrained because the top-down model is so prescriptive that it leaves no or too little space for bridging with the *metis* model and prevents the development of less unstable non-conforming (or even acceptable) practices, one key question for the government go-

⁷³ In *The Long Walk to School: International Education Goals in Historical Perspective - Working Paper 37* (2004) Clemens argues (and shows through data) that '*there is a remarkable uniformity of experience in the rates of enrollment increases, a reality from which the various rounds of goals appear entirely detached*'; '*sound economic performance is essential to expanding educational system*' and may do more (through 'pull effects') than any education policy, and; enrolment rises have historically been associated with broad modernization trends all over the world in very different types of context.

⁷⁴ We do not count the example of the nurses deployed in the health posts of Dinki and Yetmen as examples of successful negotiation as this is not a replicable solution in the current policy framework.

betweens is then: what **balance** should they strike **between persuasion and convincing** as the good governance package says they should, **and coercion/enforcement** as they also have to meet the expectations of the wereda?

381) To an extent this **depends on who the government go-betweens are** - How inventive and risk-taking; where their prime loyalty is – something which may evolve over time; how they strike the balance between this loyalty and the fear of sanctions if by being loyal to the community they displease the wereda. Our data suggests that this '*internal conversation*' is rather skewed from the outset⁷⁵. The government go-betweens are **not incentivised to be attentive to anything else than the government model**.

382) Their **position in terms of power** also matters in this respect. We do not mean 'power over', but even to exercise '**power with**' an individual has to have a position allowing this. Yet, the analysis above suggests that the **government go-betweens do not have a lot of power**. In the community they are less powerful than the community go-betweens and than long-standing community institutions. In their own organisation they are at the periphery; the internal relations seem to be mainly top-down 'instructions' in the form of targets, quotas and expectations; and we have seen that sanctions can be harsh. They have few opportunities to gain power through networking with peers. So, they seem to be street bureaucrats with rather little discretion that they could use 'to good effect' (Rao, no date), little space to behave like *sociological citizens* (Huising and Silbey 2011).

383) In the introduction part we highlighted that there were **ideological divergences between government and donor models** and that this might also complicate the tasks of the government go-betweens. This does not appear to be the case. These divergences, which seem so important 'at the centre', **matter a lot less** than the very practical divergences or **contradictions between the external/top-down model** (be it government or donor) **and the local model(s)**. When there is convergence between government and donor models it can help – e.g. donor support helped to build the change coalition for women's rights in Girar, which created space for further change to be negotiated. But there are also instances in which neither the government nor the donors seem able to bring much support to an embattled local model, like in Geblen. There the local government go-betweens, in the system as it stands and with the capacity that they have, can do little else than pushing the top-down model though privately recognising that it does not work.

384) Finally, it should be noted that communities that are '**independent economies**' have a **wider range of options available** for community members to **make the local model evolve**; more integrated communities are exposed to a **wider range of external models**. This is a very different situation than those of dependent and remoter communities. This has **implications for the government go-betweens, which we believe would need to further be thought through**.

⁷⁵ In her exploration of how both structure and agency matter in cultural change, Margaret Archer (the dean of the critical realist movement which inspires much of WIDE3 thinking) introduces the concept of 'internal conversation', which is the continued process of '*reflexive deliberations through which the social agents spell out and order their ultimate concerns in an existential and personal project to which they commit themselves. Social structures and cultural systems exercise their causal powers by structuring the situation of action through constraints and enablements, but to the extent that the activation of those causal powers depends on the existential projects that the actors forge in foro interno ..., actors can be said to actively mediate their own social and cultural conditionings. As a result the reproduction of society becomes an accomplishment of the agents themselves. Actors are thus indeed determined, but only to the extent that they determine themselves.* (<http://www.journaldumauss.net/spip.php?article362>)

7. The role of the government go-betweens in six rural communities – Summary

7.1. Purpose and structure of the section

385) This short section summarises what we found on the role of the government go-betweens in six ‘exemplar’ changing rural communities, before we ‘look forward’ in the third and last part of the paper. The section is structured in two parts. *First*, we look at the question of how the government go-betweens are affected themselves by the change which they are supposed to contribute to, as ‘human resources’ in the government systems, and individuals in the communities (research question 5). *Second*, we look at their role as ‘service providers’ and ‘change agents’ (research questions 3 and 4). In each part we revisit the hypotheses set out earlier in the paper.

7.2. The government go-betweens as ‘human resources’ and individuals

386) From a **human resources management** point of view the government go-betweens posted in rural villages are generally **not in an enviable position**. The evidence from the six WIDE3 Stage 1 rural communities could not be compared to evidence from elsewhere in Ethiopia, but we have no reason to believe that in similar communities the government go-betweens’ position would be much different. As noted earlier the overall HRM framework for the civil service is under-developed so if better HRM practices are found in some places they are unlikely to be systematic.

387) **Some of the basics are not in place** (lack of or unclear career path and no salary increments for the HEWs and kebele managers in particular, unclear leave policy etc.). Those posted in **remote villages** are **worse off** as there is no compensation for their work in more difficult environments, they often are separated from their family, and some of them are very isolated (in particular, single teachers in small satellite schools in remote villages). This kind of situation is worse for women professionals. There is **little evidence of the use of rewards or incentives**, and evidence to the contrary especially for the DAs (e.g. posting in remote areas as punishment, preventing people from studying). The government go-betweens can both be transferred against their will and not transferred even when they would like to, after years of service in remote posts.

388) They generally report a **high workload**, and expanding responsibilities especially for the DAs and the HEWs. **Salaries** may have been fine years ago but as for all civil servants in Ethiopia, the combination of inflation and either no increment or increments too small to compensate makes them **worse off than when they started working**.

389) A **large majority** of them **want to study further**. Among the **DAs** and the **kebele managers** often this is **to change profession** – and the DAs also appear to be the least satisfied among the four ‘cadres’ of government go-betweens. Whereas for the **HEWs and school staff** the goal is usually to upgrade their professional skills and **continue in the sector**. Teachers and headmasters are on the whole more satisfied than the other cadres. The HEWs like their job or find it satisfying, but this is mitigated by discouragement and frustration. There is evidence that the **weredas discourage or even prevent** people from **studying outside of government-organised opportunities**, which apart from relatively disparate short-term training courses, are said to be limited in number.

390) The **teachers and headmasters** appear to be **somewhat better off** than their colleagues in other sectors, with a relatively more satisfactory HRM framework and practices in the education sector. Their seniority as a ‘frontline cadre’ also means that there is more experience in the system with ‘having people out there’, and more of a corporate feeling. These may all be reasons why they are generally the **most satisfied**.

391) Thus, the evidence tends to lend support to the hypothesis that **job satisfaction and motivation is associated with more humane management practice**. It has not been possible to establish whether this is, in turn, related to better performance. First, our data does not lend itself to this. Second, there is evidence that a number of other factors also influence the government go-betweens' performance. Third, one would need to agree in the first instance on how performance is defined – and this to some extent is encapsulated in the issue of how the government go-betweens play their role of service providers and change agents.

7.3. The government go-betweens as service providers and change agents

392) Overall, the government go-betweens are squeezed between 'disconnected' top-down and local models. However, the 'disconnect' evolves through time and in some areas may become lesser (e.g. in education, or about latrines after the AWD epidemics in Turufe or around women's rights in Girar), so that gradually a service delivery relationship can develop. There are also instances where the top-down model(s) does not threaten the local model or can helpfully enrich it so there can be convergence of interests between external and local actors (e.g. agricultural diversification in Yetmen). In these instances the government go-betweens can be effective in supporting change (e.g. DAs in Yetmen, no reported lack of effectiveness of school staff, HEWs promotion of family planning as part of the women's right movement in Girar). Thus indeed, the **intensity of the 'disconnect' directly influences the balance between service provision and change agent** in the government go-betweens' acted and perceived role.

393) Many signs converge to show that in any instance the government go-betweens' spelled out role in the development interface space, and all incentives, tend to make them align with the top-down model ('teaching' identified as main role of DAs and HEWs by the community members, reporting mainly upward, 'blurred' local accountability). In instances where the 'disconnect' is intense there is **not much evidence** that they and the **wereda/government agents value 'local knowledge'** (education is somewhat an exception, see below). On the side of the **community** members there is **little expectation** that the government go-betweens could have their own model, channel local priorities upward, and stand up against inappropriate interventions.

394) Although in general community members seem to realise that the government go-betweens are 'messengers' and not decisionmakers, the **development interface space can be confrontational** in particular for the HEWs and the DAs. It seems to be **least confrontational around education** – thus for teachers and headmasters. We link this to the **ongoing evolution of the local model** in which modern education is increasingly valued by parents and children whilst the top-down model has also been able to somewhat compromise and accommodate 'local knowledge'. From the negotiation a **set of acceptable (for now) practices** have emerged (e.g. continuation of the shift system so children can continue to help at home/ on the farm).

395) However on the whole, the government go-betweens' role is **mostly about translation**. When some broader contextual factors or change coalitions present opportunities and they are able and willing to seize these there may be **elements of interpretation**. Their **role in negotiation** of the 'disconnect' appears to be **limited**; when there is negotiation they may not be involved directly.

396) What the above reflects is that: (i) there is a **tension** between the role of the government go-betweens as **service providers** and as **development intervention implementers/ change agents**; (ii) if/as they are expected to 'implement change' there is another tension between trying to effect **change through 'extension'** (of the external model) vs. trying to **facilitate change in complex systems** (such as rural communities), recognising the value of local knowledge and the necessity of interpretation/negotiation between external and local knowledge; (iii) on balance the government go-betweens in Ethiopia are **'extension agents' more than 'complex change agents'** (this is explicit in

the name of the Health Extension Workers, and implicit in the name of the agriculture Development Agents considering the government change model).

397) There appear to be several reasons to this conservative mix of translation, interpretation and negotiation. *First*, as ‘political actors in their own rights’ (Eaton et al 2010) and as individuals, they are **not powerful within the communities**. We have seen that their role in the social re/pro/duction and community governance fields is not as significant as that of the community go-betweens (kebele leaders and notables) and the community-initiated institutions and organisations in some villages⁷⁶.

398) *Second*, the government go-betweens posted at community level are **also not powerful in their own organisation**. All the incentives for them point towards not trying to negotiate but complying to reach targets, fill quotas and meet expectations set by the wereda administration. In return they get most often little support from the wereda (lack of inputs, no local budget, paucity of opportunities for feedback, peer learning or learning from better qualified colleagues, mixed picture with regard to supervision) – though this varies across sectors (education is a bit better again) and also across villages. In turn this lack of support emanates at least in part from the weredas’ lack of resources and power, constraining their ability of addressing these issues.

399) *Third*, the **skill sets** that the government go-betweens are equipped with are quite narrowly focused on the technical aspects of the top-down model that they are in charge of promoting. The lack of ‘soft skills’, especially for the DAs and the HEWs, is an issue⁷⁷. More fundamentally, we would argue that the frontline workers are all ill-equipped to deal with the inevitably complex situations in which they find themselves: **the change model of the government** (teaching, ‘convincing’ until there is a consensus on the top-down model) **does not prepare them to think about the need or indeed the relevance of negotiating with the local model**.

400) *Fourth*, (cross-sector) kebele participatory planning and prioritisation processes are rather weak so community priorities may not be brought up very strongly – and again, incentives to do this are weak if it happens that these priorities diverge from those of the wereda. In other words, **the bottom-up reaction from the community is left inchoate**, which means that it can be quite **effective reactively, but less so proactively**.

401) This weakness and the strong sectoral upward links also mean that the **government go-betweens do not have much inclination to working as a team** – thus, they miss the possible opportunity of getting more power through allying with each other and in this way being better able to ‘push’ difficult (community) agendas upward. Instead, all joint work is to better push the top-down model onto the community. And there may be some competition between government go-betweens in different sectors, to get priority for activities in ‘their’ sector.

402) Even without ‘doing’ anything by their **presence** the **government go-betweens bring change** in that more community members interact more frequently with people who are ‘different’; it is more important as a change factor in less integrated communities. But the government go-betweens do not, at least not directly, appear to have a role of models. For the educated youngsters in the communities they can see that these are jobs and this matters, but they surely also see the difficulties that the government go-betweens face.

⁷⁶ There is one ‘cadre’ for which this picture needs to be nuanced. As noted earlier the role of the kebele manager is a bit different and so is its position in the community ‘power configuration’. The manager does not have the same role of change agent for the community members. But this position directly threatens the power of the elected and embedded kebele leaders as the managers present themselves as professionals hence better able to run impartially the kebele’s affairs. The extent to which this confrontation openly plays out varies across the villages.

⁷⁷ Whether it also is an issue for the kebele managers depend on the role that they are expected to play with regard to integrated planning, which we have seen is not clear. For teachers too, the issue is slightly different. Since a few years the policy has shifted toward ‘child-centered’ approaches but this has not been evaluated.

Part III: Looking into the future

8. The GTP: Implications for the government go-betweens

8.1. Purpose and structure of the section

403) This section presents a brief analysis of the government policy framework for the next few years – as outlined in the **Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15**. We have also looked at a few major sectoral frameworks – albeit noting that the GTP probably best represents government’s intentions and thinking, uninfluenced or with marginal influence from donors⁷⁸.

404) We look at the GTP for what it says about:

- Policy continuity and shifts in the WIDE3 ‘fields of action’
- GOE’s perspectives in relation to expected roles and performance of the government go-betweens and to the systems supporting them in these roles, and the underlying government change model.

405) In a final part of the section we speculate about the potential/likely implications of these future directions in light of what we found about the role, performance and ‘life’ of the government go-betweens thus far.

8.2. The Growth and Transformation Plan: Policy continuity and evolution

406) The GTP was launched late last year and generally donors have expressed their readiness to support it⁷⁹ – albeit mitigated by concern with the extremely ambitious targets in economic growth and the pace of change foreseen. This is reflected in the following quote from the DAG (in September 2010)⁸⁰:

*The Growth and Transformation Plan sets out an ambitious – some might say heroic - agenda to meet the MDGs and possibly double the size of the economy, all within the next five years... While the headline objectives and priorities for the next five years are clear in the Plan, the plans to achieve them are not as clear... Detailed implementation plans will be needed... and **learning along the way from what works and what doesn’t**. (Emphasis added)*

407) Three of the GTP's seven strategic pillars require **considerable change at community level**⁸¹:

- 'Maintaining agriculture as a major source of economic growth'
- 'Expansion of social development and guaranteeing their quality': this refers to health and education services

⁷⁸ Key sectoral frameworks include the next phases of the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP IV, 2011) and Health Sector Development Programme (HSDP IV, 2011), the ‘Ethiopia Agriculture Policy and Investment Framework’ (PIF, March 2011) and its associated ‘road map’ (April 2011), and the Food Security Programme (2009). These were prepared with donors. Donors had comparatively little input in the GTP (they were consulted in September 2010 on the basis of a well-advanced draft).

⁷⁹ E.g. DFID in their ‘Operational Plan 2011-2015’ (February 2011): ‘*The GTP provides a platform to align UK support with GoE’s ambitions, make it more transformational, and accelerate Ethiopia’s graduation from aid dependency*’.

⁸⁰ Opening remarks on behalf of the Development Assistance Group at the Government of Ethiopia consultation on the GTP, 29 September 2011. Since then the IMF has expressed continuous concern about the government ambition and the implications of its infrastructure development and associated fiscal and budget deficit financing policies. See for instance <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11207.htm> (May 31, 2011).

⁸¹ The other pillars (economic growth, industry, infrastructure development, good governance) are also important for rural communities – but have less direct implications for the roles of the government go-betweens at community level.

- 'Empowering women and youth and ensuring their benefits'.

408) As the extracts from the GTP below show the **go-betweens** (local officials or government professionals) are expected to **play key roles** in achieving these goals, in continuation of their role in the past.

Box 17: Planned Community-level Changes in the GTP

Agricultural, livestock and NRM extension: 'The productivity of most average farmers is two to three times lower than that of best farmers. Scaling up of best practices to bring up the productivity of most average farmers closer to that of best farmers is the first strategic direction to be pursued during the GTP period. To realise this strategic direction, public capacities at all levels, the agricultural extension services system and the skills of development agents will be strengthened'. (GTP: 45).

Health service improvements: 'at community level among other things this will involve Health Extension Workers in providing improved immunisation, family planning and Mother and Child services and helping in the reduction of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. The objective of improving community initiatives, participation and ownership 'encompasses awareness creation and ensuring community participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation and mobilisation required to implement health sector development programmes' (GTP: 94)

Improvements in education: for rural communities such as those studied in WIDE3 Stage 1 the main goals are improving the quality of primary education, providing functional adult literacy classes, and space in primary schools for community driven programmes. 'Scaling up education quality will be encouraged by building communities' sense of ownership of educational quality by initiating integrated community mobilisation, at all levels, using every media'. (GTP: 89).

Empowering women: 'to ensure women's active participation in the country's economic and social development as well as political processes and equal benefits to women from the resultant outcomes' (GTP: 110).

Empowering youth: 'Policy directions for youth focus on enhancing the participation of youth in democratic governance, economic and social initiatives and ensuring youth benefit from the resultant outcomes' (GTP: 111). One target is to '(m)ainstream youth development programmes in other development programmes' (GTP: 112).

409) There is **no drastic change of policy** in the different fields of action in which the government go-betweens operate. However, there are a number of shifts, and the GTP and the sectoral frameworks promise to address issues that hindered policy implementation thus far, or to strengthen systems with the same goal. Notably:

- In agriculture, a shift to production of high value crops, and the commercialisation of small-holder farming continuing to be the major source of agricultural growth (GTP: 23), and ; more attention will be paid to developing a '*transparent, efficient and effective agricultural marketing system*' (GTP: 50)
- In health, '*... measures will be taken to ensure better supply of medical drugs*' (GTP: 26)
- In education, an important priority will be to improve the quality and efficiency of education at all levels. This will be achieved through implementing in all schools the standards and best practices of the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) (GTP: 89)
- The implementation of the Civil Service Reform and Good Governance Package will be strengthened, with a '*major emphasis on building up the capacity of civil service and civil society organisations and establishing a system for citizens' access to information*' (GTP: 27)

410) **Policy targets are as ambitious as ever.** Among others (GTP: 35-37):

- The number of extension service beneficiaries is planned to rise from 5,090 households in 2009/10 to 14,460 households by 2014/15; the number of households participating to the PSNP should decline from 7.1 million to 1.3 million⁸²
- Net enrolment in primary education should reach 100% (from 88% in 2009/10) with full gender parity; and 95% of adult education participation rate
- Primary health coverage should also reach 100% (from 89% in 2009/10); infant and maternal mortality rates are planned to be more than halved, the contraceptive prevalence rate should rise to 66% (from 32) and the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel to 60% (from 25%).

411) A number of developments are foreseen in relation to ‘capacity building’ – including civil service management and ‘good governance’ policies. These include: (i) the generalisation of the use of Balance Score Card to orient the civil service toward developing a ‘*wholly positive attitude towards serving the public*’ and make the civil service accountable for this; (ii) strengthening wereda and local administrations to ensure better public participation and (iii) paying attention to **human resource development**, starting with a ‘*review of the legislative frameworks and establishment of modern HRD systems*’ (GTP: 98) and (iv) the establishment of a ‘*customers’ service delivery charter*’ (GTP: 107).

8.3. Implications for the government go-betweens

412) We have noted earlier that there is a **two-pronged tension, for the government go-betweens, first between their role as service providers and as change agents, and second, in whether they are ‘extension change agents’ or ‘complex change agents’** and that these tensions are not recognised/explicit but that government systems gives little space for negotiation to facilitate complex change. This seems likely to continue to be the prevailing pattern: a number of statements in the GTP point to a continued emphasis on the ‘extension’ role and on the primary function of the government go-betweens being that of ‘translating’ decisions made ‘higher up’ – especially for the DAs and to a lesser extent the HEWs.

8.3.1. In the livelihoods field of action

413) The clearest example is in agriculture and rural development where there seems to be a rather striking **disconnect** between the **overwhelmingly technological focus of the GTP** and the emphasis of numerous studies about e.g. the **necessity of developing DAs’ facilitation and innovation skills**. The box below presents a number of directions outlined in the GTP.

Box 18: The (implicit) role of the DAs in the GTP

There is a **very strong emphasis** on the importance of ‘*scaling up best practices identified to date*’ as the ‘*major implementation strategy*’ (GTP: 49). This means that ‘*agricultural technologies that have proved to be viable and beneficial, when tested by model farmers, will be transferred to other farmers as quickly as possible*’ (GTP: 49). So that by the end of the plan period, ‘*of those farmers who participate in the scaling up programme 90% will record productivity results that meet the model farmer benchmark*’ (GTP: 50).

In moisture deficit areas, thanks to the appropriate efforts made earlier to identify suitable technologies, ‘*during the GTP period the major focus will be to use these tested technologies, where appropriate, more extensively*’. Watershed development interventions, which showed that outstanding results can be obtained, will rapidly rehabilitate the environment (GTP: 51-52).

⁸² The PIF road map includes priority activities to the effect of looking at the period after the current PSNP phase in relation to both social protection for the ‘direct support beneficiaries’, AND ‘*an instrument able to increase the resilience of vulnerable people to shocks most probably through labour intensive public works and household asset building schemes*’ (PIF road map: 9). In contrast with the PIF, negotiated with the RED/FS donor group, the GTP talks about social protection only in relation to elderly people and children.

Safety net beneficiaries involved in the HABP component will be given *'support for business plan preparation, training, technology supply, credit and extension services'* – but at the same time, *'packages of support will that are based on the food security strategy will be formulated'* including *'those that are suitable for moisture deficit areas, such as water harvesting'* (GTP: 53).

With regard to capacity building for the *'implementers'*: *'The DAs will be helped to increase their skills and motivation. Clear procedures for how they can access suitable short and long training will be put in place... This initiative will use the outstanding practices of model farmers via practical training sessions and materials at farmers' training centres'*. *'Simple extension systems'* will be used such as the *'development groups'* and expanding the network of FTCs and making sure they all are operational (GTP: 56).

As in the PASDEP, the GTP continues to treat separately the necessity to pay greater attention to non-/off-farm livelihood options in rural areas on the one hand and the development of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) on the other hand (the latter implicitly much focused on urban areas). The role of the DAs in these non-agricultural endeavours, or how (if not through the DAs) members of the rural communities could access to these options, is not elaborated.

414) The above gives little reason to believe that the 'best practices' that will be scaled up might be identified using for instance the 'positive deviant' approach outlined in section 2. On the contrary there are reasons to believe that DAs in the 'moisture deficit areas' will continue to present 'packages' and that the household-by-household approach which is implied in some of the (more donor-influenced) food security documentation, will have to give way. To be fair, there has never been an appreciation of the workload that would represent a 'truly' demand-driven extension approach in the most difficult areas (like Geblen). This is not discussed in the GTP, nor is it discussed in the recent other agricultural/ rural development policy documents issued by the government.

415) One key policy novelty in the livelihoods field of action is the government decision to **create an Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA)**. The ATA has been created in 2011 as *'a result of two years of extensive diagnostic study ... in a highly-consultative, multi-stakeholder process led by the Ministry of Agriculture with the support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation'* – although there is no mention of it in the GTP. *'Modeled after similar public-sector bodies in Asia (i.e. Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, etc.) that played important roles in the growth of those national economies, the Agency's structure and function is focused on nimble, innovative and results-oriented support to a range of partners in the agricultural sector'* (no author, 2011). The ATA will work through 'existing structures of government, private sector and other non-governmental partners' and will 'focus on a set of high priority initiatives identified by the Council', a very senior level body chaired by the Prime Minister, to which the ATA is accountable.

416) The available documentation mentions that 'research and extension' is likely to be one of the 'high priority areas' that the ATA will focus on, as one of the four strategic pillars of the Ethiopia Agriculture Policy and Investment Framework (PIF). The ATA's efforts are expected to *'create a more market-oriented, agro-ecologically adaptive, financially sustainable and gender-sensitive extension system that meets the needs of smallholder farmers by closely aligning extension services with market opportunities and with cooperatives and research institutes'*. However, there is no further detail at this stage and it is therefore not possible to speculate about the potential implications for the **expected role** of the government go-betweens - who to date, have found themselves very much at the 'periphery' of where decisions on extension priorities and approaches are made. The PIF road map includes a long list of 'tasks' (82), many of which might demand an adaptation and/or expansion of the role of the DAs – but this is not yet specified.

417) In relation to **expected performance** the PIF reiterates the targets mentioned above in terms of extension outreach and graduation of chronically food insecure households. The PIF and the PIF road map also give some details on **how 'support systems' will be strengthened** so that DAs are better able to play their role. Notably:

- Four DAs at kebele level – adding a DA in home economics⁸³
- Investment in research and extension, including ‘transport, DAs housing and transport, FTC equipments etc.’ (PIF road map task 43)
- Priority to the wereda level in reviewing ‘*the main current capacity development (CD) activities, assess capacity gaps and develop a plan for capacity strengthening*’ (task 18)
- Extension Directorate (in MOA) to ‘*make an inventory of mechanisms used to share best practices at regional zonal and wereda levels*’ and support best practice dissemination (task 28 & 29)
- Attention to be paid to ‘significantly raise farming community role in establishing the extension-research agenda and in supervising resource use’ (task 44).

8.3.2. In the human re/pro/duction field of action

418) **Education** - There is little reference to teachers in the GTP except to signal that they will be required to be professionally licensed and that this will assure teachers’ accountability and responsibility for implementation of quality oriented training (GTP: 88). To meet the requirements they will benefit from pre-service, in-service and CPD schemes, special English language training and ‘*application of an assessment tool for an identification of skill gaps*’ (GTP: 90). The GTP also stresses the importance of scaling up the implementation of the GEQIP best practices in every school (GTP: 89). The ESDP IV gives further detail on expected role, performance, and support systems, as summarised below.

Box 19: Role and performance of and support to primary school teachers (ESDP IV)

Possible **role shift** as strong emphasis on necessity to ‘*change the school into a genuine learning environment (such as: quality-focused school supervision, internal school leadership, increased student participation, school-community partnerships)*’

Possible **role expansion** considering the strong focus on Adult and Non-Formal Education including signature of an MOU between MOE and five other ministries; and the emphasis on further developing ‘special needs education’ and strengthening the schools’ role in HIV/AIDS prevention, environment protection, emergency management, nutrition etc.

Performance: The proportion of primary school teachers with diploma will increase from 38.4% in 2009/10 to 94.6% in 2014/15.

Planned support includes: (i) strengthened attention to CPD in all schools; (ii) for pre-service training, strong observation of the criteria to select academically qualified, motivated and ethically fit teacher candidates satisfying gender & regional equity; (iii) salary increase in line with inflation; (iv) greater attention to ensure that all inputs are provided to remote rural schools; (v) development of career structure and teacher licensing and re-licensing system; (vi) upgrading qualification of school leadership and supervisors.

419) **Health** – The continued focus on the role of the HEWs as ‘extension agent’ is explicit in this description of the HEP as ‘*the primary vehicle for preventative health, health promotion, behavioural change communication and basic curative care*’ (GTP: 92). The GTP also foresees that health posts will be staffed and equipped as per standards and there will be new guidelines for referral. There will also be a human resource strategy ‘*focusing on retaining trained professionals*’.

⁸³ Although we understand that this DA is actually based at the wereda level and covers a number of kebeles, in the same way as there is supposed to be a cooperative development agent covering three kebeles.

Box 20: Role and performance of and support to health extension workers (HSDP IV)

Continued/expanded role in relation to maternal and child health, prevention of HIV/AIDS, prevention and treatment of malaria, prevention and assistance to treatment of TB, malnutrition, hygiene and environmental health, and 'building community's ownership'.

Expanded role in water supply safety measures and 'Community-Led Total Sanitation & Hygiene'.

Performance - Ambitious outcome targets (all health services); by 2014/5 all households will be graduated; all kebeles will have a functional health committee involving local leaders and other professionals; use of latrines raising from 31% to 84% and proportion of kebeles 'free of open defecation' from 15% to 80%.

Planned support includes: (i) strengthened Integrated Refresher Training; (ii) strengthened supportive supervision; (iii) curriculum and implementation manual for HEW career development; (iv) strengthened coordination & collaboration of other sectors.

8.3.3. In the other fields of action

420) The GTP makes no reference to potential roles of the DAs, the HEWs and school staff in relation to 'community governance' or 'social re/pro/duction'⁸⁴, with the exception of the health extension programme's provision of family planning services in relation to population. There is also no reference to the kebele manager in the GTP or in any of the sectoral frameworks.

8.3.4. The human resource management framework

421) As noted earlier there is a promise of **developing 'modern HRD systems' in the GTP**. This is a welcome move, which will require a lot of work. HRM-related work is indeed planned in the health sector directly in relation to the HEWs, in education also directly in relation to teachers, and in agriculture focusing on 'CD' for the wereda level. We have not found further detail at the time of writing and notably, as said earlier, no mention of the kebele managers including in relation to HRM.

422) There is also no detail on how this HRM work will be carried out. There surely needs to be work done sectorally, but it would make sense for the different sectors to also coordinate and jointly address the many issues that are common to all government go-betweens deployed at community level across sectors, as identified in Part II – such as the need to define a career path and skill upgrading routes and to develop a transparent and fair framework for their recruitment, deployment and transfer, and remuneration, including due attention to the issue of staffing remoter areas⁸⁵.

423) It is noteworthy that even in its thinking about HRD the government does not elaborate on how it will resolve the **tension between local responsiveness and upward accountability**. As illustrated in this quote: '*An objective of the HRD measures is to enable civil servants to be more responsive to public demands and to implement government policies, strategies and programs in an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable manner*' (GTP: 98), the two sides of the balance are recognised. And whilst there is no explicit indication as to what will matter more in assessing the civil servants' performance in the 'modern HRD systems', we know that the government has begun to act with a view to ensuring that civil servants will be able to implement the GTP policies, strategies and programmes, with large-scale intensive programmes organised to train and mobilise officials at all levels in the first few months after its launch. Thus, one side of the balance is taken care of.

⁸⁴ In the GTP this would be under 'Capacity Building and Good Governance' (chapter 7) and also 'Cross-Cutting Sectors' (chapter 8) including sections on gender, youth, social affairs, and population.

⁸⁵ For instance in health these are more important issues at present at the level of the HEWs than preventing 'brain drain' which affects the cadres with higher qualification levels. There is a risk that if the health HRD strategy is developed exclusively sectorally the 'brain drain' issue will draw most attention, which could leave unaddressed the HEWs' issues.

424) One **potential implication** of the GTP is that according to donors and the IMF the ambitious targets and scaled up financing requirements could result in overheating the economy and **fuelling inflation**. The latter has direct **implications for the government go-betweens** as one group of civil servants whose salaries continue to **decrease in terms of purchasing power**.

8.4. Speculation – Path dependency

425) From the above, the GTP and its associated detailed sectoral frameworks are likely to result in an **expanded role** for all the government go-betweens except the kebele managers for which there is no information. There **may be a ‘role shift’ for teachers**, asked to pay greater attention to leadership and to the relations with the community, although this is **ambiguous** with also an emphasis on scaling up best practice. For **DAs** as well there is **ambiguity**, with a demand-driven discourse juxtaposed to a top-down ‘package’ discourse, often in the next sentence in the same paragraph. It is not clear **for HEWs** but there is no sign of an intention to drastically change the ways in which they are supposed to play their **extension role**.

426) The **performance** expected from the government go-betweens is **invariably high**.

427) There are statements to the effect that **more attention** would be paid to the **‘support systems’** including developing (clearer) career paths (though not for DAs and not known for kebele managers), strengthening training/ capacity development, strengthening supervision, and making more resources/ inputs available.

428) The GTP seems to announce **‘more of the same’ in terms of change model**.

429) At this juncture it is useful to recall that the **‘top-down’ model of the current regime is not new**, having its roots in the way things were done in the Imperial and Derg eras. With greater ambitions for change and faced with a large population of mostly conservative peasants scattered over a large geographical area who have not been under much structural pressure to change, the EPRDF regime, like the Derg, have adopted a ‘Campaign’ approach. This was evident in a range of campaigns in the past⁸⁶ – and more recently those we have found in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities, which the government go-betweens carry out around water harvesting, tree-planting for the millennium, UPE, immunisation and latrine construction⁸⁷.

430) A related point is the government’s **continued emphasis on capacity building** – which attracts a fair amount of attention in the GTP discourse in spite of the disbanding of the Ministry of Capacity Building in the post-2010 election government. Levy & Fukuyama (2010) note that: *‘Institutional state building in Ethiopia has a long indigenous history which continues to inform ongoing enthusiasm for “capacity building”*. This prompts a thought, that indeed the main endeavour of the government in Ethiopia, today in continuation of the previous regimes, is to build its own capacity of driving the country towards development (middle-income status country by 2020-23). The **government go-betweens** are an intrinsic component of this **state-building enterprise**.

431) However, in contrast with the earlier regimes’ discourse, the EPRDF government explicitly highlights in its discourse the need for a strong **‘consensus on the development and governance agendas’** (GTP: 122). This is very clearly not about consensus with the donors or the western world; it is about **a national consensus** - as the Prime Minister Meles stated it several times in the past few

⁸⁶ Including resettlement, villagisation, cooperativisation, as well as conscription under the Derg; some of these including resettlement and villagisation have re-emerged.

⁸⁷ Recently there have been campaigns around Business Process Re-Engineering; and in the last few months on the Millennium Dam.

years⁸⁸. This, and other messages such as that on the necessity of consolidating a '*federal democratic political and economic community*' (e.g. GTP: 105, emphasis added) could be seen as recognition of the necessity of **also 'building a nation'** and that there is more to this than state-building.

432) Whether this could **gradually influence the way the role of the government go-betweens is formulated and implemented** should be **empirically studied**, as we have started doing with the WIDE3 research and this paper in particular. The implementation of the GTP activities through the training and mobilisation of community 'go-betweens', and their subsequent engagement with people in rural communities, offers donors an opportunity to continue to explore the (training and mobilisation) process, how effective it is proving to be in the different sectors and livelihood and cultural contexts, and whether and in what directions it might be changing. Returning to what we said in introduction, it is through further developing an evidence-based understanding of how things are working out that donors might be in a better position to suggest improvements which the Government may buy into.

433) Before proposing a few suggestions to donors as to how they might support the change of the change model (in the last section of the paper) in the next section we look at lessons that might be useful for this, learning from outside Ethiopia.

⁸⁸ In addition to the GTP this is a strong theme in Meles Zenawi's unpublished memo (Zenawi, M., 2006) and in more recent interviews (e.g. Zenawi, M. 2010)

9. Learning from outside Ethiopia

9.1. Purpose and structure of the section

434) To complement the findings from the WIDE empirical evidence, we have undertaken an extensive review of international experience of government go-between programmes. In this review of the wider literature we have applied the lens of the three research questions that this paper focuses on: the go-betweens' role, effectiveness, and the utility of human resource management. We have also interrogated the international literature to identify whether similar issues arise from the development and application of development models as we have found in Ethiopia. Lastly we have searched for useful lessons learned from other countries' experiences with go-betweens.

435) The intent is to provide a brief synthesis of some of the international experience to embed and triangulate our Ethiopia-specific findings in the wider development context. However, one should guard against making sweeping generalisations on this basis. We have had limited time to cover the extensive literature that is available on this subject (which is vast both by country and across the different types of go-betweens). Also, while we have experience in some of the countries we have covered in the review (e.g. Cambodia, Uganda, Tanzania) and some of the fields of action associated with the types of go-betweens (e.g. education, agriculture/food security, and local governance), we are not experts in all. Therefore this short synthesis should be read as a preliminary attempt to identify issues from international experience that resonate with the challenges that Ethiopia is wrestling with, and that raise interesting lessons or points that may deepen our understanding of trends and effects in Ethiopian development policy and experience with go-betweens.

436) This section first presents the **international experience on the roles of government go-betweens** (by sector and across sector); then explores the **effectiveness of go-betweens elsewhere** (cases of effectiveness or lack thereof and success/failure factors); and finally **identifies lessons** learned from international experience with human resource management structures and systems.

9.2. Roles of government go-betweens elsewhere

9.2.1. By sector

437) This section charts the developmental trajectories of the roles of go-betweens in the sectors of agriculture, health, education, and local councils/executive bodies (at the lowest level⁸⁹). Given the need for brevity, this section provides outline vignettes only and references the detailed sources.

438) For **development agents in agriculture extension**, it is apparent that the **experience in Ethiopia** has followed a **general global trend**. From the late nineties, consensus started to grow that the 'top-down' Teaching and Visit (T&V) extension model implemented in Asia and Africa in the late eighties and early nineties was failing (Eicher 2007; Reality Check 2008; World Bank 2007) and aid financing for agriculture (including extension workers) started to decline for a combination of factors. The inherent difficulties in providing agricultural extension through the public sector (arising from the scale and complexity of agricultural production and dependence on broader policy environment) played its part in weakening political commitment and support (Feder et al 2001).

439) Today's international development policy-makers are waking up to the reality that we are living in a world in which not only do *'we produce more food than ever before, and in which the hungry*

⁸⁹ The equivalent to the *kebele* in Ethiopia

have never been as many” (de Schutter 2009⁹⁰), but one in which we face the potentially catastrophic risks that “a future of worsening climate change and increasing resource scarcity holds for hunger” (Oxfam 2011 GROW campaign: Bailey 2011). The call is to “address the question of global hunger not as one of production only, but also as one of marginalization, deepening inequalities, and social injustice” (de Schutter 2009). There is growing awareness of the need to bridge the yawning gap between the needs and potential of the rural sector and resources available for its development.

440) With this context, **agriculture extension is firmly back on the international developmental agenda**: the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report emphasised agricultural extension as an important development intervention for 1) increasing growth potential of the agricultural sector in light of rising demand- and supply- side pressures and 2) promoting sustainable, inclusive, and pro-poor agricultural and hence economic development (World Bank 2007).

441) In action today there are a large number of development agents worldwide, but in most developing countries the farmers-to-agent ratio remains high; it was calculated to be 1,000:1 in 2004 (Andersen and Feder 2004, quoted in Feder et al 2010). A USAID-funded worldwide extension study⁹¹ is attempting to compile robust cross-country comparative data on development agents; from the study’s preliminary findings it appears that Ethiopia has comparatively deployed a large cadre hence has a high ratio of agent-to-farmers⁹². See Annex 10 for more detailed data.

442) **Health extension workers** have become a **widespread phenomenon** around the world, with early examples from over 50 years ago; see accounts of the barefoot doctors in China in the 1950s (e.g. Zhu et al 1989 and Stian 2005). According to an assessment by Lewin et al (2010), the **recent growing focus on the human resource crisis** in health care in many low and middle income countries **has re-energised debates** on the **role that local health go-betweens** may play in extending services to hard-to-reach areas and groups, and complementing the role of health professionals for a range of tasks.

443) There are **numerous terms** for health go-betweens (health lay workers, health village workers, health extension workers etc.), each denoting a different historical, geographical and institutional context. There has been a **proliferation of various designs** of health worker schemes in and across different countries, ranging from large-scale national programmes, to small-scale, community-based initiatives. **Ethiopia is among the most ambitious in scale** (numbers deployed, nationwide coverage, relatively long pre-service training duration, civil service status, formally part of the health care system). An illustrative schematic comparison of health extension worker programmes is shown in Annex 10.

444) Turning to the education sector and **teachers**, with rapid expansion of school facilities over the twentieth century, especially in the second half ((Education For All (EFA) 2005), and focus on the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education, there has been an impressive up-surge in primary pupil enrolment.⁹³ However, the 2011 EFA Monitoring Report finds that alarmingly the number of children out of school is now falling too slowly: “Progress towards universal enrolment has slowed. If current trends continue, there could be more children out of school in 2015 than there are today”. There are also, despite some progress in expanding access in recent years, persistently

⁹⁰ de Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food at the FAO Conference, November 2009 (quoted in Bailey 2011).

⁹¹ Undertaken by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) <http://www.worldwide-extension.org/>

⁹² Ethiopia has a similar number of DAs as Indonesia and a lot more than Bangladesh, which have populations of 230 million and 162 million respectively, compared with Ethiopia’s population of 83 million (Population statistics are for 2009, World Development Indicators, World Bank).

⁹³ From 1999 to 2008, an additional 52 million children enrolled in primary school. The number of children out of school was halved in South and West Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, enrolment ratios rose by one-third despite a large increase in the primary school age population.

high levels of unmet need for secondary education in poorer countries.⁹⁴ At the same time there is a concern that while aid to basic education has doubled since 2002 to US\$4.7 billion, current aid levels fall far short of the US\$16 billion required annually to close the external financing gap in low-income countries, and the impact of the global economic crisis has squeezed a number of less developing countries' education expenditures (*Ibid.*).

445) The 2011 EFA report concludes that **another 1.9 million teachers will be needed by 2015 to achieve universal primary education**, more than half of them in sub-Saharan Africa. The ten countries with the highest primary school pupil to teacher ratio in 2007 were in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Central African Republic at 91, Rwanda at 69, Mozambique at 64. National aggregates hide significant disparities between schools, districts and regions. Further details on pupil to teacher ratios are given in Annex 10.

446) With increasing access and enrolment to education (the 'quantity' side), **attention has turned to the quality of the educational provision**. The 2005 EFA report (which had a thematic focus on quality) found that teacher and teaching quality, broadly defined, have often been identified as the most important organizational factors associated with student achievement, but that they are difficult to measure and monitor. See Annex 10 for further details. Issues faced in trying to raise the quality of teaching include among others: ensuring adequate preparation and training for teaching; dealing with low salary levels; tackling teacher absenteeism (which may have many direct and indirect causes, including low pay, lax professional standards and lack of support and control by education authorities); promoting good-quality teaching in especially difficult circumstances (e.g. conflict and post-conflict situations) (EFA 2005).

447) **Ethiopia follows a general dual trend** of (i) **raising the professional requirements** attached to being a primary school teacher as the whole population gets more educated and concern about education quality increases after a focus on access first (Hedger et al 2010; Cambridge Education et al 2010) and (ii) **diversification of the means of providing education to hard-to-reach** areas and groups once the easy ones have been reached, through feeder schools, alternative primary education forms (usually shorter), mobile education for pastoralist populations etc. (e.g. Carr-Hill et al 2005).

448) Lastly, the international literature review also looked at comparative experiences for equivalents of **kebele managers**. This proved more complicated than for the other types of go-betweens because while there are similar positions to Ethiopia's kebele manager in or serving local-level councils/executive bodies in other countries with deconcentrated administrations, the **type of function, responsibility and seniority** of the positions appear to be **unique by country**, corresponding with the individual development of each country's decentralisation and deconcentration reform processes and structures more generally. It appears there is some link with historical colonial legacy of local government systems, in particular with French ('commune clerk') and British administrative systems.

449) Examples found include: the post of village executive officer in Tanzania who serves as non-voting secretary to the council (Tidemand 2009); the commune clerk in Cambodia whose role is to maintain files, conduct voter and civil registration and assist with other office activities (Thon et al 2008); the clerk to council (and sometimes, a senior committee clerk) in Uganda who acts as accounting officer, secretariat for council meetings and electoral officer) (Mentor Consult 2008).

450) However, in direct contrast with the research available on the other go-between roles, we did **not find much literature** on the role of the kebele manager equivalent, and hardly any comparing the role of local councils/executive bodies across countries. There is a closely related and vast body of literature on decentralisation in diverse national contexts, which covers local officials, and at times

⁹⁴ In 2008 sub-Saharan Africa's gross enrolment rate for secondary school was 34% (EFA 2011).

makes reference to the role of the kebele manager equivalent. Lankina (2008) identifies that a key concern of this field of knowledge has been to identify the factors that drive local accountability and performance. These issues are explored further in the discussion on go-betweens' effectiveness below.

9.2.2. Across sector

451) Go-betweens are in post to deliver a specific service (e.g. agriculture extension, health provision etc.) but at the same time go-betweens can and do play a number of roles that cut across the different sectors. These roles may be designed explicitly as a part of the official go-between role or they may be unintended by central government but nonetheless are an important part of the go-betweens' effect.

452) In poor countries, fragile or post-crisis situations where the central state has poor geographical or social coverage, go-betweens and other local officials may be the only representatives of the public sector that people interact with on a regular, day-to-day basis (a point highlighted by Boex in his 2010 review on localizing the MDGs). **Go-betweens are literally 'the face of the government'** for many people in these countries. As such they **can have substantial power** with the potential to act as agents of social change, including through being role models: *"by promoting gender equality ... or by adopting environmentally sound practices, local officials may be able to set an example and encourage similar social change among their constituents."* (Boex 2010)

453) According to Lehmann and Sanders (2007) in their review of health extension workers, early literature emphasised the role of village health workers (as they were then commonly known) as not only a health care provider but also an advocate for the community and an agent of social change; in early initiatives, village health workers functioned *"as a community mouthpiece to fight against inequities and advocate community rights and needs to government structures: in David Werner's [1981] famous words, the health worker as 'liberator' rather than 'lackey.'"* Lehmann and Sanders locate this experience in its historical context (for example, initiatives introduced in Tanzania and Zimbabwe at times of decolonisation and liberation struggle respectively) that explains the focus on self-reliance, rural development and the eradication of poverty and social inequities. They go on to describe that while **today's concept of health extension workers** continues to focus on their role of community development, their **role as advocates for social change** has been **replaced by a predominantly technical and community management function**, although the **fundamental tension between their roles as extension and change agent remains**.

454) It is also important to note that go-betweens are **"political actors in their own right**, who pursue their own career and institutional interests" (Eaton et al 2010), as well as individuals with similar aspirations (for a family, a healthy life etc.) as those of the members of the communities that they serve, and this will impact on their role and how they undertake it. It seems this is a neglected issue; apparently academic research has not paid much attention to how institutional and individual incentives affect decentralisation (*Ibid.*).

455) Lastly, the roles of go-betweens have been affected by a **trend across the sectors to move from a centralised to a decentralised service**, and then to develop a **more community-based/embedded (or demand-driven) approach**. Swanson and Rajalahti (2010) and Feder et al provide useful summaries of this trend from the perspective of developments in the agriculture extension:

- a. *A move from centralised to decentralised extension:* in the 1990s, in line with wider efforts to decentralise government, many governments transferred to local governments the responsibility for delivering extension and in some cases financing it (*Ibid.*).
- b. *The development of community-based (or demand-driven) extension:* in the purest form the extension service is contracted by the community or is part of the staff of a farmers'

association, and in the more diluted form, farmers' organisations have a say in the design and execution of extension programmes. (Feder et al 2010)

- c. *A change in methods from top-down to informal education and facilitation:* this has involved a shift from a more linear technology transfer model toward a more holistic approach in understanding how and where farmers get their information and technologies. This has implications for the technical, professional, and entrepreneurial skills that extension agents will need to be effective. (Swanson and Rejalahti 2010)

456) This trend is mirrored in growing international consensus of the value of community-based management in the education provision: *"The increasing decentralization in education includes trends toward increasing autonomy, devolving responsibility, and encouraging responsiveness to local needs—all with the objective of raising performance levels."* (Bruns et al 2011). School-based management (SBM) is one increasingly popular form of decentralisation:

"In SBM, responsibility for, and decision-making authority over, school operations is transferred to local agents, which can be a combination of principals, teachers, parents, sometimes students, and other school community members. An increasing number of developing countries are introducing SBM reforms aimed at empowering principals and teachers or strengthening their professional motivation, thereby enhancing their sense of ownership of the school. Many of these reforms have also strengthened parental involvement in the schools, sometimes by means of school councils." (Ibid.)

457) Experience in high-income countries suggests that SBM programs are not a quick fix, and 'local monitoring/contracting' strategies have potential but also risks. The pros and cons experienced with the various approaches to decentralised extension programmes are explored further below.

9.3. Effectiveness of government go-betweens elsewhere

9.3.1. Cases of effectiveness or lack thereof

458) When looking at **effectiveness** a first important point to make is that across the sectors we are looking at, there is a **problematic lack of robust evidence** on results. There is a deficit of interventions with monitoring and evaluation built into the programme design ex ante which makes it difficult to undertake credible ex post assessments of programme outcomes and impacts. In addition the research that is available is often not comparable within a sector because diverse methodological instruments and approaches have been used (e.g. from large n-statistical analyses to in-depth case study techniques).⁹⁵ Lastly, the (medium to long-term) time-lag between inputs and results means that it will take some time to assess the effectiveness of recent innovations.

459) However, while bearing these limitations in mind, the research undertaken does illustrate **success stories and poor performances** that provide **useful insights** into what makes a successful or an unsuccessful go-between. Annex 10 provides a small selection from the cases found through the literature review, showing not only the results found but also the type of results that are reported.

9.3.2. What makes a successful or an unsuccessful go-between?

460) The cases in Annex 10 highlight some of the success drivers for go-between effectiveness. Decades of experience with go-betweens in various sectors in different countries have taught us that there is **no single model that can be applied**; context is everything. In particular this is because to understand what makes a successful go-between, it is **necessary to understand both de jure**

⁹⁵ This finding is highlighted by Lankina 2008 in looking at decentralisation literature on local accountability and performance, but it is also applicable to research into the effectiveness of health workers and development agents.

mandates and authority structures and *de facto*, informal power relations, and bearing in mind that the latter are often deeply embedded and well-hidden from outsiders (Fox in Alsop 2004), and, linked to individual personalities and therefore are context and time-specific. To comprehend this reality that shapes the role and effectiveness of go-betweens, we have adopted a complexity-informed perspective; this approach and the associated literature have been described in section 2.3.

461) Through this approach we have attempted to explore the '*sets of direct and indirect relationships and exchanges (interpersonal, inter-organisational and socio-technical) ... [that] ... transcend institutional domains and links a variety of arenas*'⁹⁶ (Long 2001 in Brown 2000) to try and understand how these impact on the effectiveness go-betweens in the web of development interventions. We have also taken on board the importance of identifying positive deviants or innovators from within a community, that enables the community to learn from its own 'hidden' wisdom, and because it is coming from within the community, with greater chance of adoption by others.⁹⁷ (See longer discussion in paragraph ¶183).

462) Reviewing the international literature has allowed us to identify **factors that contribute to go-betweens' effectiveness** along two axis:

- (a) the **central government and go-between relationship (supply-side factors)**
- (b) the **community and go-between relationship (demand-side factors).**

463) From the **supply-side**, the following success factors are highlighted in the international literature:

- a. Whether **go-between programmes are coherently and sustainably inserted within the wider (national) systems** (e.g. health workers within the health system, teachers within the education system), with the go-betweens explicitly included in strategic planning at country and local level (Bhutta et al 2010). Also, the importance of sustainability being built into the schemes, including through adequate and reliable financing (Swanson and Swamy 2002).
- b. Whether **central government can take on a role of 'new activism'** to support the go-betweens: the '*ironic paradox of decentralisation*' is that strengthening the capacity of local government may actually mean that the government at the centre has to play a stronger role in certain critical respects (Harriss 2000). Tools that the centre can employ include socialisation, recruitment and training, systems of rewards and sanctions (Rao no date) – all components of an effective human resources management system (see further discussion on this below). An example of this is shown in the experience of strengthening service delivery in Ceare, Brazil in the mid-1980s: see Box 21 for further details. Another example is in the education sector: the World Bank 'SABER'⁹⁸ teachers' programme has identified 8 teacher policy areas that affect how well government education systems succeeding in attracting, retaining, and motivating effective teachers; these areas require an active central government role in providing policy direction, management support and appropriate oversight.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ There is a literature on 'network analysis', which has inspired albeit relatively 'loosely' the way we have analysed the WIDE3 Stage 1 data in Part II of this paper.

⁹⁷ For example, "work by Sulaiman, who has written a number of articles on extension in India uses the innovation systems concept to describe the weaknesses in public- or private-sector extension programs and provide suggestions for strengthening the systems (Sulaiman and Holt 2002; Sulaiman and Hall 2002; Sulaiman 2003a; Sulaiman and van den Ban 2003; Sulaiman 2003b)". (Glendenning et al 2010)

⁹⁸ System Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results

⁹⁹ The SABER-identified policy areas are: Requirements for entering and remaining in the teaching profession; Initial teacher preparation; Recruitment and employment; Teacher workloads and autonomy; Professional development; Compensation: salary and non-salary benefits; Retirement rules and benefits; Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality; Teacher representation and voice; School leadership. (World Bank 2011)

- c. The success of this role by central government requires a **responsive centre**: to take advantage of presumed access to local information about needs that local governments (and go-betweens in particular) have, there must be corresponding flow of information to the centre as well as an incentive to use this information (Alderman 2002 in Dethier 2004).
- d. Whether there is an **appropriate accountability balance** that “*promotes accountability without undermining responsiveness and professional judgment of the frontline workers (who undoubtedly enjoy discretion in policy implementation), so that the go-betweens can effect more humane and situation-specific adaptation of general public policy but at the same time guard against arbitrariness and lack of uniformity in policy implementation*” (Rao 2009). This approach is mirrored in the emerging consensus on school performance that both school autonomy and accountability are key enabling factors for mobilizing individual incentives to teach and to learn (Barrera et al 2009). Again the Ceara, Brazil experience is insightful (see Box 21). A clear contrast with the Brazil success story is India’s experience in the early 2000s with its agricultural extension programme:
- “the prevalence of civil service behavioural norms across the hierarchy, including the pursuit at all levels of what may be locally inappropriate targets, the rigid interpretation of norms, leaving local workers little room for manoeuvre, the absence of substantive rewards linked to performance in responding to clients’ needs, frequent transfers, and reluctance to serve in what are perceived to be punishment postings”.* (Sulaiman and Holt 2002)
- e. Whether there is effective **assessment**. There is an interlinked relationship between autonomy, accountability and assessment: In the education sector, there is growing awareness that “*autonomy and accountability do not generate incentives in isolation; they are interlinked with the assessment of teachers and learning at the school, and with teacher quality*” (Banerjee et al 2010). The World Bank SABER programme has developed a School Assessment and Accountability Scale to aid countries to analyse and benchmark their levels of school autonomy, the status of their assessment system, and the accountability of their schools in order to ensure that they have in place the enabling conditions for improved learning.¹⁰⁰ Performance measurement is complex and hard to get right: experience has shown that not all performance measurement systems have proved to be adequate; there can be unintended negative consequences (e.g. selective attention to goals that are measured; interests of citizens taking back seat to centrally-set targets) (Rao 2009).

Box 21: Brazil success story: the role of effective accountability

Context

The performance of the Ceara state government in north-eastern Brazil turned rapidly from bad to good in the mid 1980s. Ceara is part of Brazil’s poorest region where one third of the population lives in absolute poverty. The state government had a clientelistic method of governing resulting in poor quality administration. However in the period 1987-93 the Ceara economy had a 3.4 per cent growth rate. Two cases of good performance from interventions introduced at this time were:

Inputs and outcomes

- *Rural preventative health program.* The program hired 7,300 community health agents, tripling vaccination coverage and reducing the infant death rate by a third.
- *Employment-creating public works construction.* The Department of Social Action gave work to one million unemployed farmers during the 1987 drought. Clientelism was greatly reduced from previous schemes and jobs and relief supplies were delivered more rapidly.

¹⁰⁰ From World Bank website – SABER School Autonomy and Accountability Scale [accessed June 30]: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:22857079~menuPK:282391~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386~isCURL:Y,00.html>

Success factors

This case study has been well-studied by Tendler (1997) and others, who have identified that the success of this experience was due to a three-way dynamic between local government, civil society and an active central (in this case, state) government:

- The government workers' **patterns of work** came to resemble those which are associated with the **most successful private-sector enterprises: flexible**, involving **team-work**, and a client-centred, **problem solving approach** (rather than the delivery of centrally determined 'products').
- **Central government actively supported** the initiatives including through ensuring good **performance carried high prestige**, both within the community and within the civil service (e.g. through prizes for good performance); public screening methods for new recruits; government officials spending extended periods of time with beneficiaries which, in turn, created a situation in which officials were affected by ('embedded in') the opinions and sanctions of community members.
- The **publicity** given to the workers and the celebration of their achievements 1) protected effective workers from colleagues enmeshed in rent-seeking behaviours and 2) became an **instrument for the monitoring of workers' performance**, as it showed the **public** what should be expected of public employees and gave publicity to the complaints made by members of the public about failures of performance.
- **Workers** were able to provide **more customised service** as they had **greater autonomy** and discretion, and workers **looked to perform better** due to the **trust** placed in them by their clients and the scrutiny from the communities in which they worked.
- **Central government actually took some powers away from municipal governments** in order, paradoxically, to strengthen local government. The success of the health sector programme, for example, depended in part upon the fact that the central government took away powers of making appointments of local health workers from mayors, and forbade them from distributing political campaign leaflets - so that they were no longer the more or less dependent clients of local power-holders.
- **Civil society** played an important role in the improvement of governmental performance. But their impact on central government was at least as important as at the local level. The **professional association** of health workers, notably, exercised a very strong influence on the government's health policies.

Sources: Tendler 1997, Harriss 2000, Johnson 2002.

- f. Finally, an appreciation of the heterogeneous nature of 'central government' and the effect that different incentives held by different ministries, departments and agencies, and by different individuals within those structures, may have on implementing any change reform, including activities pertaining to go-betweens. It is common knowledge that **bureaucracies tend to resist reform that changes power structures** e.g. as occurs from devolving civil service to the local governments and to local (or locally-based) go-betweens. For example, in Burkina Faso, despite the adoption of a law that provides the local government discretion to hire, promote and fire staff at all levels of the local government, most of these decisions continue to be taken at the central level of the government and local employees remain subject to the central government regulation due to persisting resistance from civil servants (Work no date).

464) Turning to look at the **demand-side**, or the relationship between the community and the go-between, the key success factors identified through the international literature review highlight the importance of how the go-between programmes attempt to respond to the **common pitfalls associated with decentralising or 'localising' service delivery**. Feder et al (2010) provide a useful contextualised insight into these advantages and challenges (and some recommendations) from the international experiences of community-based/driven extension in the agricultural sector:

Box 22: Advantages and challenges of 'localising' service delivery

- **Classical problem of collective action:** if benefits are non-excludable, farmers have limited incentives to incur transaction costs of participating in the activities related to the establishment and management of the activities. *Donors can provide financial incentives, but donor-funded projects tend to collapse once funding runs out.*
- **Entrenched, top-down, patronising attitudes often characterise all level of governments** that deal with small- and medium-scale farmers. Even when championed at the highest policy level, resistance may occur at various levels of the relevant bureaucracies. *Training can help but may not be sufficient given that farmers and esp. women have little political influence in most developing countries.*
- **Social exclusion and elite capture.** Rural communities and farmers' organisations often dominated by middle-class and relatively wealthy farmers; in particular representation of women is very low. *One strategy is formation of specialised organisations (e.g. groups exclusively for women farmers) or allocation of reserved seats for women.*
- **Background and training of public extension personnel may not be sufficient to address specific and localised issues** likely to be brought up in a demand-driven system. *Large-scale training (at public expense) may be required.*

465) Given the very nature of their tasks, go-between programmes are vulnerable unless owned and embedded in the communities. A key challenge lies in **institutionalising and mobilising community participation** (not relying on it to be a by-product of programmes initiated from the centre). Some points on this from the international literature are:

- a. Of the health extension worker interventions, the most successful in this regard is considered to be the Brazilian Family Health Programme, which integrated the health extension workers in its health services and institutionalised community health committees as part of the municipal health services, making community participation an integral (and not an alternative) part of the state's responsibility for health care delivery. (Lehmann and Sanders 2007)
- b. Studies recommend using village health committees to contribute to participatory selection of community health workers. (Bhutta et al 2010)
- c. In agricultural extension there is awareness that the process through which the information is shared can determine the effectiveness of the information and its use. Setting priorities for information needs in consultation with other users, adding value to the information collected, learning from how the information is used by farmers, and changing the dissemination strategy by stratifying and targeting users will influence the success of the extension approach. (Glendenning 2010)

9.4. Getting the human resource management structures and systems right

466) A review of the drivers behind go-betweens' effectiveness (or lack of) brings out clearly **how important it is to get the human resources management (HRM) structures and systems right**, to ensure go-betweens are effectively set-up, supported and sustained throughout their careers so they can perform their jobs well. Green (2005) puts across the case succinctly for effective civil service management, which is relevant too for go-between management:

"The common failure to address the details of civil service management as an integral part of the decentralization package has significant implications. Civil servants form a crucial link between the delivery of financial resources to the government and the delivery of essential public services to the people (World Bank 2003a). The relationship between decentralization and civil service management is a two-way process. The behavior of civil servants has important consequences for government performance in a decentralized setting. Conversely, decentralization alters both the incentives of and the demands on the civil service. Managing this behavior is critical to realizing the benefits of decentralization. Accordingly, [Green] argues that civil service management—or more broadly human resource management—should be

seen as an essential component in the design of decentralization rather than a separate, stand-alone process.” (Green 2005)

467) For all types of go-betweens and in many different country contexts, **numerous** studies have highlighted the importance of ensuring adequate HRM across the critical dimensions of **recruitment, remuneration, career prospects, training and supervision and support**. However, most primary research does not document a complete description and characteristics of the go-betweens deployed, which impedes understanding exactly how each HRM dimension impacts on the programme outcomes. Also, issues with go-between effectiveness tend to be a result of many inter-linked factors; policy solutions have to consider the whole package of incentives and other factors that affect go-between performance. E.g. the 2011 Education For All Global Monitoring Report concludes that reducing teacher absenteeism *“often requires policy interventions that simultaneously address problems such as low pay, poor conditions and low morale among teachers, while at the same time strengthening school governance and the accountability of teachers to parents”*.

468) Here are some of the experiences found in the international literature for the main HRM dimensions:

Recruitment

- a. All studies on health extension workers say that they should be chosen from the communities they serve and that the communities should have a say in the selection process.
- b. However, while these are accepted *principles* for health and other extension workers, the *practice* often deviates: it can be difficult to find skilled candidates in all (especially remote and very poor) communities; direct and meaningful participation of the selection process is difficult to ensure:

“In the evaluation of the Indian mitanin programme, for example, it was found that as a rule local bureaucrats, village chiefs or other dignitaries held sway over who was selected (SOCHARA, 2005). This is a common experience, as selection is often considered a form of patronage. Gilson et al. found in a study of three countries’ programmes that “CHWs are mostly selected by health personnel rather than the community – even where, as in Botswana, the local institutions through which selection could occur are well known (Gilson et al., 1989)” (Lehmann and Sanders 2007)

Remuneration (concerning pay, benefits and other incentives)

- c. The DFID 2011 systematic review of civil service remuneration focusing on frontline occupations in health (doctors, nurses, mid-level occupations) and in education (teachers), in low- and middle-income countries, has found a striking lack of empirical evidence linking actual pay variation to actual work or service performance, and concludes that without this evidence *“the potential for fixed salary reform to enhance public servant motivation and performance, reduce moonlighting and brain drain, and build local capacity”* cannot be ruled out (Carr et al 2011).
- d. Across the (much smaller number of) studies covered by this literature review, a number of cases were found that cited low pay and lack of other appropriate benefits, incentives and rewards as having a negative impact on go-betweens’ effectiveness. For example:
 - i. a study of leadership in communes in Cambodia recommends that a better pay system would attract more candidates for commune clerk, and would reduce petty corruption among commune councillors. (Thon et al 2008)
 - ii. a study of development agents in the Iran Agricultural Extension Organisation found that the index items most suggesting negative job satisfaction were low salary and unfair promotion policy. (Asadi et al 2008)

- iii. interrogation of the question of whether health extension workers should be volunteers or remunerated by Lehmann and Sanders (2007) concludes that: *“there exists virtually no evidence that volunteerism can be sustained for long periods: as a rule, community health workers are poor and expect and require an income. Although in many programmes they are expected to spend only a small amount of time on their health-related duties, leaving time for other breadwinning activities, community demand often requires full-time performance”*.
- e. Benefits and incentives can include: annual raise; travel allowance; motorbike and fuel and maintenance costs (e.g. as cited in Bhutta et al 2010 review of Pakistan’s Lady Health Workers’ scheme). Incentives are particularly important for encouraging go-betweens to work well in remote areas: *“in remote and margin areas [of India], further difficulties arise. [Agricultural] Extension workers consider remote areas to be ‘punishment postings’, 50 percent of these posts are vacant, and the capabilities of those there are questionable”* (Sulaiman and Holt 2002 in Glendenning 2010). The 2011 Education For All report relays that *“under a pilot project in the Gambia, teachers in the most remote schools were able to increase their basic salary by 40%. A recent survey suggested that the incentives were having the intended effect, with newly qualified teachers showing willingness to work in schools offering these allowances (Pôle de Dakar, 2009)”*.
- f. The approach of community financing has its advocates but the evidence points to failures of community financing schemes for health extension workers, leading to high drop-out rates and the ultimate collapse of programmes:

“The reality is that [community health workers] as a rule and by their very nature provide services in environments where formal health services are inaccessible and people are poor. This also complicates the issue of community financing, which is rarely successful unless institutionalized, as in China. Most of the evidence reflects failures of community financing schemes, leading to high drop-out rates and the ultimate collapse of programmes.” (Lehmann and Sanders 2007)

Career prospects:

- g. There is not much evidence in the literature surveyed on the career support and prospects across the different types of go-betweens, a finding which suggests that it is not commonly provided for in go-between programmes.
- h. An exception is a 2010 review of community health workers by Bhutta et al, which recommends that health extension worker programmes should provide opportunities for career mobility and professional development, such as opportunities for continuing education, professional recognition, and career advancement, either through specific programmatic opportunities or access to educational and training scholarships. The Pakistan Lady Health Worker Programme (LHW) again provides an example:

“Professional advancement and promotions are offered to LHW to learn new skills to advance their career as LHS and later on as Field Program Officer (FPO) on completion of minimum education level (intermediate to become an LHS and Masters in any field to become an FPO) and experience (1 year work experience as LHW to become an LHS and 2 years work experience as LHS to become an FPO) required to reach the next level. Hence, advancement is intended to reward good performance or achievement. There are no paths planned to retirement for LHWs.” (Bhutta et al 2010)

Training:

- i. The most successful training modalities are didactic training with interactive sessions, practicum and field work (*Ibid.*), and over a suitable period of time (i.e. not too short). The

international literature highlights the need for training to develop specific skills associated with informal education and facilitation including how to facilitate discussion and how to coach different stakeholders, shifting from lecturing to empowering (Christoplos 2010). Another common recommendation is for regular refresher courses.

- j. In practice the type and lengths of training provided to different types of go-betweens is very mixed. Development agents tend to be the most skilled with higher-education qualifications, while health extension workers commonly have to undergo a dedicated training course. There is a lack of information on the training provided for the kebele manager equivalents.
- k. Human resource limitations are recognised as a serious constraint for all go-between programmes. A review of agricultural extension (Christoplos 2010) identifies that some countries face dropping average educational level of advisers due to weakened education and training institutions relevant for agricultural and rural development, competition for quality staff from better paid job markets and loss of experienced personnel to HIV/AIDS. Christoplos goes on to advise that “*plans for extension must reflect this human resource crisis and include concerted and sustainable investment strategies to address it*”.
- l. The positive effect that appropriate training (and recruitment) can have is illustrated by the impact of teacher-training programmes in the education sector on educational outcomes including for disadvantaged pupils. The 2011 Education For All report recalls a striking example from a non-governmental organisation in Pakistan:

“... an initiative aimed at strengthening female literacy through improved teacher training has dramatically increased transition rates to secondary school for young girls. The recruitment of female teachers has been a central part of this success story. More broadly, the recruitment and training of female teachers can create a virtuous circle: as more girls get through school, more female teachers become available for the next generation. Recognizing the poor quality of teaching in most public schools, DIL [the NGO Developments in Literacy] has developed its own teacher education centre. Training in student-centred methods is mandatory for all DIL teachers, 96% of whom are female.”

Support and supervision:

- m. Ideally, go-between programmes should have regular and continuous supervision and support and this should be taught to be undertaken in a participatory manner that ensure two-way flow of information (as recommended by Bhutta et al 2010 for health extension workers, but applicable to all types of go-betweens).
- n. Lehmann and Sanders (2007) provide a detailed and useful review of international experience of supervision and support for health extension workers – see Box 23 below.

Box 23: Role of supervision and support

It is **widely acknowledged and emphasized** in the literature that the **success** of CHW programmes hinges on **regular and reliable support and supervision** (Ofosu-Amaah, 1983; Bhattacharyya et al., 2001). It is equally **acknowledged**, however, that **supervision is often among the weakest links** in CHW programmes. Small-scale projects are often successful because they manage to establish effective support and supervisory mechanisms for CHWs, often including a significant amount of supervision and oversight by the community itself. National programmes are rarely able to achieve this consistently, as has been shown in the Zimbabwe experience, for example (Sanders, 1992).

There are a number of reasons for the lack or poor quality of supervision. Gilson et al. (1989) point out that “the cost of supervision has, in particular, been overlooked, although the frequent contact required to support CHWs effectively can generate supervision costs that represent 40% of the cost of one CHW”. But not only has the cost been overlooked: often the need for supervision has been either overlooked or underestimated, or not adequately planned for. Also, who supervisors should be and what their tasks are is often ill-defined. Ofosu-Amaah (1983) mentions cases in which community participation in supervision was successfully

implemented, but this remains the exception; supervision is left mostly to staff (mainly nurses) in the health services. They, however, may not understand the CHWs' or their own role properly and furthermore may resent the additional task (Gilson et al., 1989).

...

Hand in hand with supportive supervision go **other forms of support, in particular logistics and infrastructure support**. Issues such as the reliable provision of transport, drug supplies and equipment have been identified as another weak link in CHW effectiveness. Reasons can again be found in the fact that CHWs as a rule operate on the periphery, both organizationally and geographically. They are the first to lose training opportunities and supervisory visits, but also transport and drug supplies (Gilson et al., 1989). The result is not only that they **cannot do their job properly**, but also that their **standing in communities is undermined**. "Failure to meet the expectations of these populations [with regard to supplies] , will destroy the image or the credibility of the CHW" (Ofosu-Amaah, 1983). If CHWs are used in programmes that have drug treatment at their core, such as TB DOTS or HAART, the situation becomes more critical (Farmer et al., 2001), but most programmes include the need for supply of drugs and/or equipment, including transport (SOCHARA, 2005).

While not abundant, the literature does report success stories in organizing drug and equipment supplies. In Somalia and Burkina Faso, for example, supplies were organized through district or regional dispensaries, and collected and delivered by CHWs (Bentley, 1989; Sauerborn, Nougara & Diesfeld, 1989). In some parts of Senegal, village dispensaries have been established to cater for the drug needs of the populations of very remote villages. The dispensaries are given a 20% rebate on drug purchases and villagers are required to pay for the drugs dispensed to them. (...) In China, the cooperative medical service organization to which community members contribute, entitles them to free drugs (Ofosu-Amaah, 1983).

As a rule, however, forms of infrastructure support remain a weak and unresolved area even in well thought-through and -supported programmes such as the Indian mitanin programme (SOCHARA, 2005). But Gilson et al. (1989) make the important point that "problems of support and supervision are not peculiar to CHW programmes but affect all peripheral health services. They are as true for nurses and other health workers at the primary care level as they are for CHWs". This again raises the need of discussing the logistics of CHW programmes as part of a broader need for strengthening primary level services, particularly in remote areas.

Source: Lehmann and Sanders 2007

10. A 'complex change agent support' role for donors in Ethiopia

10.1. Purpose and structure of the section

469) This final section outlines a few take-away messages for the donors as one of the basis to outline a possible role for them in future, in relation to the government go-betweens. In a second part and as a second basis we look at how donors have thus far thought about the government go-betweens. In the third and final part we briefly present, for discussion and further thought, a set of suggestions about how donors could take on a role of support aimed to empower the government go-betweens as 'complex change agents'.

10.2. The 'take away' messages for the donors

10.2.1. From the WIDE3 Stage 1 evidence

470) The government go-betweens deployed at the community level are in a **unique position**, which could give them a unique opportunity to '**bridge**' the **disconnect** between external and local models, between top-down attempts to change rural communities and bottom-up reactions of the communities shaped by endogeneous change dynamics. Yet in the current change model of the government the government go-betweens are **not empowered to do this**. In a number of ways, of which some can affect them directly as individuals if they 'deviate', they are led to stick to translation of epistemic knowledge and at best, interpretation of the top-down intervention designs. A whole array of factors contributes to this, including their training, the system of values, norms and practices in their organisation, and the incentive system in place (targets etc.) which pushes them to try to '*perfectly conform to abstract rules*' rather than value '*situated action*' (Huising and Silbey 2010).

471) In areas that are not directly clashing with local knowledge (like for the kebele administrative services) or where the local model is evolving and sets of acceptable practices emerge because the community '*is curious about the question*' (like for modern education), the government go-betweens can play more of a role of service providers (kebele managers, teachers and school headmasters). This suggests that **only if/when the community wants the service can agents become service providers**. In areas where the (donor-supported) government efforts to change the rural communities is more starkly at odd with local knowledge, the government go-betweens are **confined to a 'change-by-extension' role and prevented** (in the ways just outlined) **from** adopting approaches **facilitating complex change**.

472) In the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities the 'cadre' of government go-betweens who were generally **more satisfied** were the **teachers and school headmasters**. It is unlikely to be just a coincidence that they are those who (i) enjoyed slightly **more inputs/resources** in schools than their colleagues in the other sectors and; (ii) benefited from a slightly **better defined and more humane HRM framework**; (iii) due to the **lesser disconnect** between external and local models – which had been **negotiated** albeit with teachers and school headmasters not playing the lead role in this – could take on **more of a service provider** than an extension role.

473) In the government change model there is implicit recognition of the particular 'location' of the government go-betweens, i.e. that they are located **between the 'supply side'** in which they (have to) relate to the higher levels of government **and the 'demand side'** in which they (have to) relate to the community. There is **not much recognition** of the **tension** that this creates for them between upward accountability and local responsiveness. There is **even less recognition** of the fact that the government go-betweens are '**political actors in their own right**' and **individuals** with the same aspiration to a 'good life' as anyone on both sides.

474) This goes hand-in-hand with a seemingly generalised **low level of attention** (in practice as opposed to the discourse) **to human resource management issues**. In practical terms, there has been little attention to the day-to-day life and professional work conditions of the government go-betweens – although there are now a number of statements of intention that this will change.

10.2.2. From international experiences

475) The international literature suggests that there is **no blueprint for community level health care service provision and behavioural change promotion**. In agriculture/the livelihood field, there is a movement towards decentralised management, community/demand-driven and adaptive approaches and therefore greater emphasis on the importance of facilitation skills for extension agents, but there have been **few authoritatively positive experiences of agricultural extension**. There is an international trend for **education systems to increasingly focus on quality and hard-to-reach groups** after first successes in raising access, with **implications for teachers**, and a parallel supposedly evidence-based trend towards **greater community involvement in school affairs** to 'make schools work' (Bruns et al 2011). We found **little** about experiences of strengthening **community-level administration**, to which we could compare the role of the kebele managers as it is unfolding in Ethiopia.

476) The **tensions** between **extension and change agent** and between **upward accountability** for policy implementation and **local responsiveness** are **not specific to Ethiopia**; also not specific is the comparatively **little attention** paid to the **frontline workers' own position** in this (as 'political actors' and 'normal individuals').

477) There are factors that seem to be **important for the success** of government go-betweens' programmes. On the 'supply side'

- The government go-betweens' role needs to be **coherently and sustainably integrated** in the wider (national) systems
- There may be a case for the central government to take on a **role of 'new activism'** to **support the government go-betweens**, in particular with regard to all components of an effective human resources management system
- However, this demands a **responsive centre**, asking for and using information from the local levels
- There needs to be an **appropriate accountability balance** that promotes accountability without undermining local responsiveness and professional judgment so that the go-betweens can effect more humane and situation-specific policy adaptation but at the same time guard against arbitrariness and lack of uniformity in policy implementation
- This has implications, in turn, for the design of effective and fair **performance management systems**.

478) The single but complex 'critical factor' on the 'demand side' is **to embed the government go-betweens' role in the local community dynamics**. Linking this to the WIDE3 Stage 1 conceptual framework and the initial evidence that we have analysed in this paper, we suggest that for this embeddedness to go beyond the 'discourse' level and beyond the extension/translation approaches with their limitations, there needs to be **recognition of the value of local knowledge** by actors on the 'supply side' at all levels, so that the government go-betweens feel that they can legitimately recognise it as well and that they are empowered to negotiate between knowledge worlds.

10.3. The government go-betweens in donors' model(s)

479) There is a caveat to this section. Our analysis here is based on our understanding of donor policies and knowledge of their programmes, to end 2010. We have not taken stock of donors'

intentions and of their responses to GTP, which in a number of cases are yet to be fully formed. This paper could, hopefully, feed into the formulation of these responses.

480) In section 2 we have briefly outlined how donor models of development and of change differ from that of GOE. We should note that these differences are not explicit (and we expect that not everyone might be ready to admit to them). Turning more specifically to the focus of this paper, our analysis of the WIDE3 Stage 1 data on the government go-betweens and the thoughts outlined in the previous sections suggest that the following elements in the donor model matter.

481) *First*, donor discourse gives a lot of space to ‘service delivery’ and **service providers**. This has become a more frequently used terminology in ‘joint government/donor documentation’ such as that for the Protecting Basic Services programme and the Wereda City Benchmarking Survey. In that documentation the discourse also focuses on **local accountability (implicitly, for service delivery)** much more prominently than seven or eight years ago at the outset of the SDPRP.

482) *Second*, when looking at how donors have been able to think in terms of **web of development interventions** the **picture is uneven**. On the one hand, the discourse around programmes such as WASH highlights the importance of joint sector work, synergies between specific sectoral interventions etc.; and the (government/donor negotiated) sector policy frameworks analysed in section 8 do make references to links with other sectors etc. On the other hand, our contacts in the donor circles suggest a quite strong ‘silo mentality’ in the large multi-donor programmes¹⁰¹. More fundamentally there has been very little attention in donor-supported programmes to strengthening the local Councils that are mandated to ‘bring all things together’ at the community level (Vaughan 2011, forthcoming draft for the World Bank).

483) *Third*, apart from regularly raising the **issue of the top-down nature of policy implementation** in Ethiopia, donors appear **not to have given much thought** about the implications that this has in relation to the **two-pronged tension** that we identified in this paper, between (i) **service provision** vs. **change agent** role and (ii) ‘**extension change**’ vs. ‘**complex change**’. As a result, this two-pronged tension also has **not been raised in donor discussions with the government**. Questions about ‘what change model’, the value of local knowledge, the links with and implications for the relative power of the different policy actors and the ways in which performance is managed have not been discussed, even though these are all issues over which there is likely to be some divergence between the government and the donors (see Table 2 in section 2).

484) *Fourth*, donors have regularly raised **human resource management issues** but these **efforts are scattered** and not well evidence-grounded as little is known about actual HRM practices, especially at the government go-between level. There is some focus on pay reform – perhaps because this is better documented – but there seems to be much less discussion between the government and the donors about the other elements of the HRM framework and certainly a lot less than there is about service delivery, local accountability for service delivery, and public finance management. The links between PSCAP which supports the government Civil Service Reform and programmes like the PBS and the PSNP are also less strong than between these two programmes and the government PFM systems and reforms¹⁰².

¹⁰¹ For instance, PBS and PSNP are disconnected at both policy and operational levels on the ground that their focus differs, which overlooks the fact that they ‘join’ (clash?) at wereda and community levels. The Food Security Programme (for chronically food insecure areas) and the Agriculture Growth Programme (for high agricultural potential areas) have been developed separately and are being implemented quite separately too – apart from the high level, fairly remote oversight of the RED/FS group.

¹⁰² This is surely in part related to the fact that in many of the donor-financed or –supported programmes, the donor funds are channelled through the government PFM system hence there is a built-in incentive for donors to pay attention to these.

485) *Fifth*, there has been **increasing recognition of some of the factors hampering effective service provision** – in particular, lack of inputs – and donors have prompted and do support interventions that start responding to this in some sectors (e.g. GEQIP in education). But this has not looked beyond and there has **not** been much **thinking about other possible ‘proactive roles’** (as in the example of the Cereza State in Brazil given in section 8 and further discussed below).

486) This suggests that on the whole, there has been to date only marginally more attention to and knowledge/understanding of the role of the government go-betweens and of the conditions in which they are expected to perform this role on the donor side, than there is on the government’s side. And the donor discussions with the government have been confined at a relatively superficial level. We suggest that this should change.

10.4. Donor inputs in policy and strategies for the government go-betweens

487) We suggest that this should change, and that **there is potential for the donors to support the government go-betweens in a ‘complex change agent’ role**. But there is no point in overstating what donors can do: there is evidence that their influence is relatively limited in Ethiopia¹⁰³. This thought has informed the set of reflections we offer here in several ways.

488) *First*, we stress the importance of **continuously building better grounded understanding**. *Second*, we suggest that donors could be useful in **comprehensively documenting lessons** that have been learned from **elsewhere**. *Third*, we suggest that there is value in **acting collaboratively** to address a number of **‘basics’** that are well recognised by the government, as an **entry point** for discussions on potentially **more sensitive matters**¹⁰⁴. *Fourth*, we recommend using **two cross-cutting strategies**: institutionalising successful approaches and consulting those directly concerned – the government go-betweens themselves.

10.4.1. Strategy 1: Building better understanding

489) Much more grounded evidence on and understanding of the government go-betweens’ role, effectiveness and life and work conditions is needed. Practical ways of building this include:

- **Complementing existing programme monitoring tools and approaches** - and possibly also surveys like the WCBS - with a focus on information that relates directly to the government go-betweens’ tasks and the functioning of the ‘support systems’, and not exclusively on outputs (and outcomes) to which many other factors contribute – E.g. in the case of the HEWs this would mean documenting the availability or not of a basic set of inputs in the health post, the time spent in outreach activities vs. at the health post vs. in training or meeting at wereda level vs. in reporting etc.
- Assisting the government to develop and equip Regions and weredas with **human resource information management systems** that will document key elements such as the gender, family status, prior professional background, pre-service training status, in-service training

But it is short-sighted to stop there – especially in the prevailing situation in Ethiopia where a large proportion of the public resources (including donor funds) are well-used only if the government go-betweens that they pay are effective.

¹⁰³ See for instance Furtado, X., and Smith, J. 2007, and Dom, C. 2009 (WIDE3 Stage 1 inception policy review paper).

¹⁰⁴ There is, for instance, an emerging ‘aid effectiveness’ literature suggesting that sector support approaches ought to pay far more attention than has been the case thus far to what is called *‘the missing middle’* – defined as *the process for management of frontline service providers, the actual delivery of services, human resources management, and the accountability for service provision* hence the need to address *‘the incentives faced by front-line providers and their managers’* (Williamson, T. and C. Dom, 2009). Donors in Ethiopia could propose to government to look at in the context of the sectoral development programmes (as some agencies have started doing e.g. AusAid in PNG).

experiences, transfer requests and actual transfers, career path and salary history of the government go-betweens¹⁰⁵.

- Commissioning **specific in-depth studies** on e.g. **in-service training patterns, incentive schemes** etc., preferably cross-sectorally. That is, supporting government in making an inventory of these practices (the same idea as that proposed in the agricultural PIF for the production scaling-up strategy...), as a basis for joint reflection.
- Further supporting the WIDE3 research and similar longitudinal complexity-informed village-level research.

10.4.2. Strategy 2: Learning further lessons from elsewhere

490) Donors could assist in building a database and management system for a **repository of experiences with government go-betweens from other countries**. This could continue to build on the literature that we reviewed for this paper – for instance enriching it with the work on local civil servants which is planned under the ongoing WB-financed study of decentralisation. It would need to be regularly updated as a joint resource for the government and the donors. To be useful there would need to be regularly an analysis of the evidence collected in this way¹⁰⁶.

10.4.3. Strategy 3: Using the evidence collaboratively and gradually more deeply

491) Here we propose that donors should consider how they could **work collaboratively on ‘basics’** recognised as critical by both government and donors, as a way of establishing **trust** as a foundation **for more fundamental discussions**. Accordingly, in this section we move gradually from simpler suggestions (we believe) to more complex ones. Any initiative would draw fully on the empirically-grounded understanding and internationally-informed knowledge obtained through the first and second strategies.

492) Building on government recognition of the **need to provide** ‘all FTCs’ and ‘all health posts’ and all schools with special attention to the ‘remote rural schools’, **with the required basic inputs**, donors could jointly with the government re-design the PBS, WASH, GEQIP, the HABP and PSNP, the AGP and other programmes, to contribute to this.

493) Building on government recognition (especially in education sector) of the **special difficulties in remote areas**, donors could prioritise interventions so that they focus more or first on those. This could be through the development and financing of appropriate incentives for the staff posted there (financial and non-financial such as transport, communication means, accelerated career paths or access to training leaving more free choice to the government go-betweens and/or augmenting the financing for sponsored training courses etc.); putting priority in input distribution – on the grounds that remoter areas have fewer alternatives if inputs are not provided as planned/ expected; and generally paying greater attention to the implications of all interventions for the government go-betweens posted in these areas.

494) As part of this, paying greater **attention** to the government go-betweens’ **family situation**, taking measures to avoid family separation (local housing, allowing more regular visits etc.), as well as paying greater attention to the **specific vulnerabilities of female professionals** (e.g. making kebele officials accountable for this) should be prioritised.

¹⁰⁵ Returning again to the comparison with PFM systems in which there has been a lot more investment...

¹⁰⁶ This could be undertaken as a PSCAP activity or financed by a relevant DAG multi-donor funding source. It could be located in and owned by the ‘capacity building coordinating institute’ foreseen to be established in the GTP (p.100).

495) As part of the first two sets of measures, donors could prioritise financing to complement the government universal rural electrification programme so as to ensure **access to water, and electricity** in all schools, health posts and FTCs where the kebele has been connected – meeting the investment costs when it is required and possibly initially some of the recurrent costs through giving this priority in e.g. the GEQIP school grant etc. Helping the government to rollout a programme of universal kebele-level access to internet-based resources might also be an incentive for the government go-betweens, especially the DAs, HEWs and kebele managers, often young and ‘IT-literate’.

496) Building on the government growing **recognition of the importance of ‘modern HRD systems’**, donors could try and help, more actively than they have done to date, to develop such systems. This would start by developing and rolling out comprehensive information management systems on the government go-betweens (and the civil service as a whole) as outlined above. It would need to go much beyond and systematically address the critical dimensions of recruitment, remuneration, career prospects, training, and supervision and support systems, processes and procedures.

497) Alongside this, donors could try and promote and use in the programmes that they finance or support **accountability systems** that **recognise the complexity of change** in rural communities and which empower the government go-betweens as ‘complex change agents’ and promote the learning/reflexive and team-based approaches that this demands – as in the example of the Cerea State in Brazil. This would include:

- Measures aimed to developing a **sense of pride for joint/team achievements** (which has implications for performance and reward systems) whilst at the same time encouraging the emergence of a **‘corporate’ sense of value** of the go-betweens’ professions – this could build on existing practices of rewarding ‘best performance’, but redesigning (i) what is called best performance and (ii) how this is assessed (both discussed below)
- Measures aimed to developing and initially resourcing **peer-to-peer exchange means** (e.g. as in the weredas having developed a HEWs’ newsletters, web-based resource centres that could be accessed from the kebele – see above, or making the wereda-net being used for telconf of DAs of different weredas etc.).

498) The above requires that donors also become better at strengthening bottom-up mechanisms, among others through highlighting the importance of, and supporting through finances as required the development of more **systematic processes for community assessment of the government go-betweens’ performance** and ensuring that these assessments do matter. There ought to be equal attention to the development or strengthening of appeal and grievance systems for the government go-betweens, that are independent from wereda and community unjustified pressures.

499) More fundamentally these suggestions would require that donors engage in a **discussion with the government about complex change and experiences with complex change facilitation approaches** and about the consideration to be given to reorienting the government go-betweens’ role away from the extension/translation approach to a negotiation approach. This in turn has implications for the type of skills that the government go-betweens should acquire from pre-service training and for the performance appraisal systems – which donors could advise government about and possibly pilot (see strategy 4 below).

500) Building on experiences in cases where the government go-betweens successfully contributed to change, donors could try and:

- Help the government go-betweens to **develop targeted ways of communicating with the younger generations** – building on the generational change effect
- Encourage the government to **legitimise ‘coalition of change’ approaches** in which the government go-betweens try to **work with non-conventional partners**, thus encourage new

partnerships (private sector actors, traders etc. for DAs, especially in potential areas; community-initiated institutions for HEWs) – which to an extent is already the case, but may need to be more clearly based on recognition of the local knowledge of these partners.

10.4.4. **Cross-cutting strategy**

501) We suggest here that donors should across the board, use and encourage the **use of trial and error pilots** and systematically **consult the go-betweens** in all of the suggestions above.

- Use trial and error pilots to find things which seem to work and to find the best ways to spread things which work through different contexts; monitor how the multiplying things are changing the larger system and to see what macro level interventions would accelerate change (like in the negotiation about shift system enabling parents to keep their children at school)
- Explore the perspectives of the government go-betweens and listen to their voices, as a privileged way of better understanding their reality, and a way of beginning to build their self-confidence and sense of power (with). E.g. with the expansion of the mobile phone network coverage it would be relatively simple to regularly organise ‘polls’ among the government go-betweens (ensuring anonymity), through text messages for questions and answers etc.

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¹⁰⁸ The report was accompanied by six annexes including in annex six, community profiles for the six Stage One WIDE communities.

Annex 1. The six WIDE3 Stage 1 communities

Geblen (Saesia Tsaeda Emba Wereda, Tigray Region)

By 2010 a very small town called Mishig was emerging around the tabia administrative centre. Mishig had electricity since 2008 and is connected through a small all-weather road (with daily transport from the neighbouring tabia at 45 minute walk from Mishig) to an important tar road joining the zonal capital to the wereda centre and further, to the regional capital. However, the tabia is spread on a plateau and steep slopes to the Afar Region; access to more than half of the tabia is very difficult. Acute lack of water is a major issue for daily life and all farm activities.

Geblen is a food-deficit site which suffers from recurrent drought and has been included in PSNP/OFSP programmes since 2005. Less than 10% of tabia is farmland; landlessness affects a growing number of young households. The OFSP packages have been badly affected by drought and disease leading many into debt. People engage in daily labour; a few are running small shops, teashops and bars in Mishig (non-farm OFSP packages). There are few local work opportunities; people, especially the younger generation, migrate for variably long periods of time, near or close (including abroad), and with various success.

In 2010 there was one Health Post and one full-cycle and two satellite primary schools in the tabia as well as a health centre and new secondary school in the neighbouring tabia. Over 40% of the households in the tabia are headed by women.

Yetmen (Felege Selam Kebele, Enemay Wereda, Amhara Region)

By 2010 rural Yetmen had become a part of a rural kebele surrounding 'urban Yetmen', a small town with a separate kebele administration, founded around a Swedish-funded school established in the 1960s. Yetmen is along an all-weather road going in one direction to the wereda capital and in the other to another small town and from there to DebreMarkos and Addis Ababa, with transport in both ways. There is good mobile network coverage everywhere.

The site exports most of the tef it grows to Addis Ababa. There has been recent agricultural diversification with increased daily labour opportunities involving irrigation used to grow vegetables, two harvests (barley and chickpeas) from the same land using the Broad Bedmaker plough, and the introduction of breed cattle. Land shortage and population pressure has led to high youth un(der)employment.

There is a Health Centre and private clinic in urban Yetmen and a Health Post in the kebele centre in a neighbouring got. Yetmen town has had a full cycle primary school since the mid-1990s; a secondary school should be built shortly – initial plans for its location on communal land provoked strong resistance.

Dinki (Hagere Selam Kebele, Ankober Wereda, Amhara Region)

By 2010 Dinki had become a part of a rather large 'lowland' kebele (in a mostly highland wereda) with a rugged and hilly topography and small scattered hamlets of a few households. A very small town emerging around the kebele administrative centre 1 to 2 hours walk from Dinki. Two-thirds of the population of the kebele are Argobba Muslims and one third Amhara who are mostly Orthodox

Christians. The community is remote (no all-weather road to the kebele, no transport to closer small town), drought-prone and food-deficit; emergency food aid has been provided every year since 2005.

There have been a recent expansion of the use of irrigation to grow vegetables and fruit which now involves around a third of Dinki's households. Land shortage and population pressure has led to a very large number of (mainly young) landless households.

In 2010 there was a Health Post with nurse at the kebele centre and a Health Centre in the nearest town (10 kms) which had recently been re-equipped. The primary school, at the kebele centre, had recently been expanded to full cycle; there was a satellite school in Dinki, and a secondary school had recently opened in the nearest small town.

Korodegaga (Korodegaga Kebele, Dodota Wereda, Oromia Region)

Korodegaga is a collection of nine villages scattered over a large area. The administrative centre, a legacy of the Derg villagisation, has a few new administrative and service buildings and is located along the Awash river. The villages are almost encircled by the Awash and another perennial river. Access to the wereda centre is through a dirt dry-season road (25 kms) or crossing the Awash river on a manually-hauled raft and walking to find transport at 15 min from there. Korodegaga is remote, but once people reach the nearest all-weather road there is easy access to the large city of Nazareth. The mobile phone network covers the kebele centre and a number of other villages.

The site is drought-prone and food deficit and has been a PSNP/ OFSP site since 2005. The potential for irrigation has been increasingly exploited through various institutional arrangements. This has enriched some farmers and increased daily labour opportunities. Some of the landless youth (a large group) have had access to communal land, others have been organised in variably successful youth cooperatives. New migration (Sudan, Saudi Arabia) had also started recently.

In 2010 there was a Health Post since 2009 and a private clinic in the nearest town (at about 8 kms from the kebele centre). Grade 5 had recently been added to the school.

Turufe (Turufe Wetera Kechema Kebele, Shashemene Wereda, Oromia Region)

By 2010 Turufe was the administrative centre of a larger kebele. The village, densely populated at the centre where there is access to piped water and electricity since 2008, and located on fairly flat terrain, is adjacent to a small town and not far from the 'booming' zonal capital Shashemene (14 kms). The mobile phone network covers the area. The proximity of urban areas (Shashemene in particular) goes a long way to explain what life looks like in Turufe – including better infrastructure and access to a wider range of government and private health and education services.

Turufe is a food secure, surplus producing area, traditionally exporting potatoes and maize to Addis Ababa. Farmers also grow a variety of other crops, all based on rainfed agriculture, and rear livestock. Community members, especially the landless young, commute for daily labour to the towns; some women have migrated to work on flower farms found in the Region. There are also opportunities in trade, informal business, brokering, local transport activities and wage labour.

Girar (Girar na Yeferema Zigba Kebele, Cheha Wereda, Gurage Zone, SNNP Region)

By 2010, after several boundary changes Girar comprised of a number of villages surrounding the fast-urbanising wereda capital, some of which are as urbanised as the town itself. An all weather road

crosses the kebele, with regular public transport to important zonal and regional towns and from there to Addis Ababa. The mobile phone network covers the whole area.

Rural livelihoods are organised around enset cultivation and cattle rearing, and urban migration is a Gurage tradition. Migration by young women to Arab countries is on the increase. Landholdings are very small and there is a growing number of landless youth and young households. There has been some diversification in crop production, but the most profitable opportunities have increasingly been in growing chat and eucalyptus to sell the wood, which made some farmers quite wealthy. People in Girar have access to non-farm daily labour opportunities in Imdibir town. The strong Gurage customary institutions are still very important in people's everyday life.

In 2010 there was a Health Post and a full-cycle primary school in the kebele, a Health Centre and a secondary school in Imdibir town and a Catholic mission hospital within 12 kms.

Annex 2. Who are the go-betweens in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities

| Girar ¹⁰⁹ | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-------|--------|-----------|--|--|
| Kebele leader | In post since before 1995 | 47 | Male | | Well liked and respected including by clan leadership; stayed in his position whilst much post-2005 election reshuffling in other kebeles and in other kebele administration posts in Girar | Likes his job/serving people but high burden, no direct/financial reward, high opportunity costs, little recognition; Bad relationship with kebele manager trying to “boss him around” as he is educated |
| Kebele manager ¹¹⁰ | Two years in current position | 32 | Male | 692 birrs | Born in Girar; grew up in Addis until 10-years; Wife & children live in Girar; Gr10+2 construction diploma; Served 5 years in wereda admin office but temporary contract so moved in as kebele manager when job advertised; also wereda Councillor | Huge workload (but leaves office at 5.30pm); Likes job but unsatisfied with salary; Disagrees with kebele leader and other kebele workers on work processes (not organised, done ‘out of common sense’); ‘Chain connection’ with wereda ¹¹¹ |
| School head teacher | Not asked | 38 | Male | | | Many problems and things lacking in school so would like these resolved; likes seeing students performing well |
| Teacher | In this school since 13 years; total 22 years as a teacher | ? | Male | | Born in AA; Married with children in Girar; 22 years as a teacher, first with certificate (1979) then got diploma in 1999. Was in more remote rural schools before, this one is comparatively better | Not too high workload; Fairly happy for what he’s doing but a feeling he didn’t get his ambition; Would have liked something else than teacher and working in town/AA |
| HEW ¹¹² | Not known | 20/23 | Female | | She’s probably from Girar as she’s also secretary of the YA | |
| HEW | Three years in current position; 1 st job | 24 | Female | | Moved in Girar at 10; Her husband farmer in Girar; Completed Gr10+1 in accounting before opting and being selected for HEW certificate training | Likes her work (inspired to see FP take-up); Workload ok though door-to-door hard work; Extra pressure with electoral campaign; Salary not enough; Denied distance education (started and got wereda warning letter ¹¹³); Wants to continue her education and improve professional competence. |
| DA crop | Three years in post; 13 years as DA | 34 | Male | | From other kebele; Wife and children living in Imdibir; Also FTC Head; Has been serving 13 years as a DA in this kebele, of which 9 years with a certificate before getting | High workload incl. involvement in loan repayment collection and political activities; Bad relation with kebele manager (directing political activity); Frustrated |

¹⁰⁹ There is a livestock DA but he could not be interviewed. The WA leader, a very active woman, is an ex-DA, Gr12+certificate. She was refused the possibility of continuing in 1997 (post-election), she says on political ground (she was a CUD supporter) – though this may also have to do with her lower qualification.

¹¹⁰ Elsewhere it is said that he’s worked a long time as DA; doesn’t appear to be the case from his detailed life account.

¹¹¹ He doesn’t mention it but all other kebele workers explain that he’s the one to direct all political activities in the pre-election period, and instruct them about what they need to do (meetings to organise etc.). DAs don’t have a good relationship with him.

¹¹² She is said to be 20 in some interviews, 23 in others.

¹¹³ Criteria to get wereda-sponsored education (3 people in wereda, not specified whether annual and since when) = high number of health promoters leading to privilege quantity over quality.

| | | | | | | |
|--------|---|----|--------|---------------|--|---|
| | | | | | his diploma; Before this he had worked as a community-paid teacher | as farmers don't take up advice (crops, coffee); Disinterested by DA job, no transportation & per diem, low salary |
| DA NRM | Five years as a DA in current position, 1 st job | 23 | Female | 840 (750 net) | From other kebele; Husband and daughter in Imdibir | Enjoys work and wants to see change in farmers' life, but too much workload and no time for her family (kebele too vast, door-to-door hard work, burden with report writing and political activities); Wants to quit and work in office |

Geblen¹¹⁴

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--|----|--------|---|--|--|
| Tabia leader | Five years | | | | Just moved as YA office leader at wereda level; Demobilised in 1995 (Eritrea war); tabia vice-leader 1995 then leader since 1997; Got Geblen 2 nd best performing tabia re: good governance in wereda | Satisfied with serving people though 90% time working for the public; Frustrated by people's 'backwardness', but privately recognizes challenges |
| Tabia manager | Two years in job | 28 | Male | 801 birrs (& 50/ day per diem wereda trips) | Born in Geblen, single; Haleka (so would become priest when married); Lives with parents; 10+3 Accounting distance education; 6 years work experience as Assistant DA, then short period in Adigrat as medical production worker, left | Happy to serve society but recognition and salary not commensurate to task; Facilities insufficient; Not given chance of education; Six years work and no improvement, wants to engage in something lucrative like trade |
| School head teacher | 13 years in teaching, o/w 4 as HT; Geblen 2002 | 31 | Female | 1,617 (says should be 1,935) | From T/Ziban tabia same wereda; Married but 4 years detached from her husband due to hard work; Children (3, not clear where); TTI graduate then diploma; now about to finish degree Nile college Mekelle, with wereda approval | Many gaps in school, including teachers so high workload (previous was better); Not satisfied with salary; Happy with work but "feels lost" w/out her family; Wants to continue her education and live with her family |
| Teacher | 3 years... | 29 | Male | | From another wereda; Studied/studies Arts; Was school director Geblen now teacher so???. Has a kid living with his mother, visits at weekends | High workload (>30-35 hours norm); Not satisfied because teaching not his ambition (wants to be a great artist) and insufficient salary; Problems with teachers but getting solved |
| HEW | 4 years, 1 st job | 23 | Female | 550 birrs | From wereda centre; Married, one daughter living with her, husband not with her; Gr10+1 then HEW training | Likes her job but workload too high (16 hrs/day incl Sat & Sun), no time to visit her family, and salary not commensurate; Better relationship with tabia leader; Wants to live with her family, get a chance to continue her education. |

¹¹⁴ Only one HEW and no DA crop for the moment. There were two HEWs and three DAs in 2008. Satellite schools seriously lack teachers, teaching a few weeks at a time by teachers from main school. Other "go-betweens": Telephone operator is also FS coordinator, male, 27 years old.

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|---|-------|------|-----------|--|--|
| DA livestock | 5 yrs o/w 14 months coordinator (other tabia); 1.5 year in Geblen | 30/34 | Male | 932 birrs | From other wereda (Atsbi); Married (wife agric extension worker), one 3-year old daughter; Gr10+3 Shire TVET; Transferred to Geblen early 2002 as punishment for having taken distance education | Likes assisting farmers but in disagreement with wereda which abused their rights; Forced to terminate his education, punished through transfer, deduction of 1 month salary and 258 birrs per diem; Wants to continue his education; FTC must be improved |
| DA NRM | 5 years, a few months in Geblen | 29 | Male | | From Mekele, single; Was also transferred in Geblen after Mai Megelta (much better access and potential) as punishment | Salary insufficient; Wants to establish a family and succeed in his work; Believes wereda officials all corrupt/nepotism. |

Dinki¹¹⁵

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--|----------|--------|-----------|---|---|
| Kebele leader | 4 years | Late 30s | M | | Involved in various kebele positions before this | Exciting changes for people; But wants to leave and work to change his family; Gets nothing other than insults including from “salaried wereda people who say what they want” |
| Kebele manager | 4-5 months & before 8 months other kebele | 29 | Male | 695 birrs | Single; From D/Birhan; Gr12, 4 yrs looking for a job; then diploma level 4 in electricity; Applied for vacancy in Dinki as less hard than other kebele | Saving 50-100 birrs/month to study; main issue & (difference with other sectors) is about opportunity to study; Workload is tremendous with very difficult issues; and low salary; Happy with the job and wants to make kebele even better; But wants to become an engineer |
| School head teacher | Two years HT this kebele; in teaching since 1996 | | Female | | From other kebele; married, with her husband; No children; TTC in D/Berhan (3 yrs summer course); Started 1996 contract teacher ABE other kebele then formal teacher 1998 and one year in yet other kebele; Moved in this kebele because better road and market access, water | Heavy workload, two years w/out visiting her family; Shift system but insufficient resources (teachers, classrooms and other); Teachers should not be forced to beg parents to send children to school. No other ambition than for betterment of school |
| Teacher (in satellite) | 7 months after 4 yrs teaching in other wereda | | Female | | Spouse in this kebele, no children; Asked transfer here; Gr12 in D/Birhan, one year typing & computer course then one year Gr1-4 teaching certificate (1997); Worked one year secretarial services, then taught 4 years Gr1-4 in other school before coming here | No leave, very far from family & impossible to visit; Not satisfied at all (work conditions, low children’s interest, insufficient salary) though area is good and people very kind; Dislike satellite system; Wants to improve her education, live in town, have her own |

¹¹⁵ Other “go-between”: community policing officer (male 23); ACSI head centre, also Cabinet member (female 35, WA Head?). There is no livestock DA in the kebele. There is a DA NRM who was not interviewed. There is a nurse at the health post, with some equipment. Sector workers representing their sector on the kebele Cabinet must be party members. The HEW used to be health representative but left as she was not a party member.

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|--|----|--------|--|---|--|
| | | | | | | house and children |
| HEW | Four years, 1 st job | 22 | Female | | From Ankober where her husband lives; Two children with her; Gr10+1 year HEW; | Working at weekends; Happy with her work but dislikes injections (afraid by HIV, she's a mother); Wants to be transferred and live with husband, be a nurse and serve the community. |
| DA Crop | Two years in total, here very few months | 23 | Male | | Other wereda; Single; Gr12 + 3 years Agric TVET (end 1999); This kebele better access and small town at centre; wanted to work in his wereda but no position | Very high workload, no rest/leave except sick; fieldwork day, report writing night till 3.00am; Salary not commensurate, wereda officials much better though less hard work; Inputs lack so work is useless; Nothing meaningful with FTC; Makes him angry; Would like to specialise in irrigation. |
| Veterinarian | A little more than a year, but worked since 1992 as certificate DA | | Female | | Same wereda, other kebele; Single and no children; Started as temporary DA in 1992 in her family's kebele; then 4 years certificate DA in 2 other kebeles; got diploma education 3 yrs; practice 1 year in Aliyu Amba; now in Chibite covering 7 gotts across 2 kebeles | Good to have regular services for farmers but she lacks inputs and equipments; no livestock DA; No real week-end time, farmers come when they need you; Very satisfying job except lack of necessary things; Remuneration is enough; She wants to read books and manuals to improve her knowledge, and also experience sharing is good |

| Yetmen ¹¹⁶ | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|----|------|---------------|---|--|
| Kebele leader | | | Male | | | Work w/out payment; Not understood/ appreciated by community; Community resistance |
| Kebele manager | 4 months on job | | Male | 810 | From wereda centre; Gr10+3 years TTC | Resources fine, workload too (has Fridays and Saturdays for own activities); But dissatisfied as job not related to his training as teacher and also teacher salary a little higher; Denied further education opportunities (even own cost distance) and prevented from applying for other job; Wants to upgrade his education and change job; Dislikes having to implement harsh measures and fear might get in trouble with people |
| School head teacher ¹¹⁷ | 6 years, o/w 4 in Yetmen & 2 | 40 | Male | 1,851 (gross) | From wereda centre; Married & one child, living there (17kms); Gr12 + diploma in Bahr Dar (1993); Was | Works even weekends (1/2 days on report); big workload as two shifts; Family and social life harmed; |

¹¹⁶ There is a kebele cooperative expert (though not clear only for this kebele). But apparently only one professional DA (NRM) as livestock and crop DAs left. There are two HEWs, and the HP used to be a clinic (had better equipment and drugs) but has been transformed into a HP

¹¹⁷ The school staff added in a separate interview that going door to door to get children in school shouldn't be teachers' responsibility.

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|----|--------|------------------|--|---|
| | as HT | | | | nominated by teachers as HT when previous one was demoted and wereda accepted | Satisfied with job; Wants to upgrade his professional skills |
| Teacher (English) | 23 yrs teaching o/w 7 yrs diploma | 40 | Female | 1,692 (gross) | From Debre Markos; Single, no children; TTI D/Birhan then diploma Gonder (1997); Asked/ got transferred to Yetmen 19 years ago from a more remote place; | Taught Gr7-8 but asked to get back to Gr5-6 to strengthen English at these levels first; Likes her job but concerned by low quality; Doesn't want anything different |
| HEW | 4 yrs as HEW, all in Yetmen, 1 st job | 24 | Female | 572 (gross) | From Yetmen; Single, no children; Gr10+1 HEW | Work all days including weekends 8hrs/day and night if delivery, affecting her social life; No water & electricity at HP; Not gratifying when people build then demolish latrine; No annual leave like other civil servants; Wants to continue higher education |
| DA Crop | 8 months, 1 st job | 22 | Female | 500 (un-trained) | From Yetmen; Single, no children; Gr10+? (not clear) completed in 1998; Got post after strong competition (12 DA positions, 3000 people applying!) (but DA NRM explains she's untrained and temporary after previous crop DA left) | No weekend breaks, meetings and other things preventing her to have time with family (for married women extension work causes divorce); Likes irrigation work, dislikes/is bored with meetings, no devt is achieved through meetings; Wants to get a diploma in teaching or accounting, not agriculture |
| DA NRM | 4 years incl 3 in other wereda | 24 | Female | | From other wereda; Husband & 2 daughters live in Bichena; Gr10+3 completed 1997; Left her previous DA work as she couldn't get transferred to live with her husband ¹¹⁸ ; Stayed 9 months w/out job then applied and got this one | Cabinet member so meetings on Sunday; Only trained DA so multiple responsibilities; Absolutely dissatisfied, low payment vs. workload, no time for family, access to education restricted, no hope for transfer; Would quit job immediately if she had any alternative; Compares much higher salary and less work for wereda officials; Should be 3 DAs, transfer regulation facilitating family reunion, and better salary scale |
| Veterinarian | 10 yrs work experience, 6 yrs as DA then 4 yrs diploma veterinarian | | Male | | From other kebele; Married, one baby child, who live in Bichena; Gr12 (1990) + diploma as veterinarian (1999) | Veterinarian work better than DA facing farmers' resistance to packages; Immediate results & farmers interested; But very high demand and low government attention; Satisfied but wishes wereda to give more attention; Dissatisfied with incentive system (low salary, no per diem, restricted transfer/promotion opportunities); wants to upgrade to BA and get other good job |

¹¹⁸ She said because her husband isn't a party member. No data on her husband's profession/job

| Korodegaga | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--|----|--------|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Kebele leader | | 48 | Male | | Quite some changes over past 5 years | |
| Kebele manager | Since 2001 (elsewhere seems to say 1999) | | Male | 801 (after 3 years) | From other wereda; Wife and child in Dera (wereda centre); long & complex education trajectory, finally distance diploma TTC (2001); Worked in private industry & stopped as not compatible with studying; Free service in Koro school so was proposed as kebele manager | Lack of facilities, stationery etc.; People coming any time; Wereda ordering them to work Sat & Sun so no time for family/need to adjust schedule to visit (agreed with kebele leader); Wants to join teaching; manager paid under his education status and other sectors (e.g. teachers); Wants to stick to week days; Wants to improve his education, leave rural life and improve his family's life |
| School head teacher | 4 years, after 1 year as teacher | 25 | Male | | Other wereda; Spouse in Sire, no children; Gr12 (1996) + certificate (1997) + distance diploma (2001); Promoted through community & wereda selection; | Workload ok, but visits spouse only at weekends; Satisfied with job but not salary and started farming with parents; Salary should increase considering inflation; Wants to improve his education, have better salary, and live with wife. |
| Teacher | 5 years in total; o/w 4 years in Korodegaga | | Male | | Other wereda; Spouse & one child in Awash Melkasa; Gr12 + certificate (private student 1997) + distance/summer diploma (ongoing); First served in other more remote kebele but got chance of transfer as vacancies in Koro | Workload high (including party work twice/ month), tight schedule, Sat & Sun busy with reporting & studying so sends money to wife and father; Low salary makes him hate profession; Took CPD as promised would have teaching license but wasn't fulfilled so de-motivated. |
| HEW | End 2000 ¹¹⁹ ; By end 2002 she'll be 2 yrs experience | 19 | Female | 670 gross | Grandparents in Dera, parents in Nazreth, lived in both; Relatives in Koro; Single; Her HEW partner (20 years old) is from another kebele, where her husband and one child live; Gr10+10 months HEW; | Kebele Cabinet member so meets once/month with wereda officials on political issues; Should see 96hhs/month but hot climate, meetings, & lives in Dera so spends time travelling, affecting her work; Some satisfaction but not much; Wants to see better inputs at HP, also better living conditions for HEWs; Wishes to learn in another area and leave her current job. |
| DA Crop | 3 years o/w last year in Koro also FTC Head | | Male | 950 + 20/day when facilitating FFW | From this wereda, wife & children in Dera; Diploma plant sciences 1997; started degree last year but dropped after 1 st semester; Was in other wereda 1998-2000 before Koro; Taught contract teacher 1994-5 | High workload as expanded responsibilities; No time for own work, social/family life; Thinks development work should be separate from politics and DAs should be able to focus on their profession; Can spend one week on meetings which he dislikes; Wants to complete BA and change from current work |
| DA NRM | 4 years, came | 24 | Male | | From other kebele; Diploma NRM 1998 (his father | "Too many bosses and a lot of work"; DAs expected to |

¹¹⁹ HEW deployment started in 2001 in the wereda as a whole

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|--------------|---|--|------|--|---|--|
| | in Koro this year | | | | wanted quick income, he wanted to continue prep secondary); Had started BA economics but forced to drop by wereda; Was FTC head in previous post (no longer here) | spend all days including weekends in community, except Tuesday (reporting to wereda); No resources |
| DA livestock | Two years, Koro 3 rd post, 6 months here | | Male | | Other wereda, not married; Gr10+diploma 1997-99 ¹²⁰ ; Transferred twice since started as DA in 2000, by wereda; last transfer because he replaced a DA who wereda sent to remote kebele as he was spending all his time in town; | Wereda asked work Sat & Sun so can only get to Dera to take salary; Go to other town for leisure to avoid being seen; Helps his brothers & sisters students; High workload + mandatory party work; Satisfied & believes will get chance to study further if works hard; But wants higher salary and would change for one; Wants to be able to save money and leave this job; Educated people shouldn't be forced to live forever in rural area |

| Turufe ¹²¹ | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|------|---|--|--|
| Kebele leader | | 49 | Male | | Ex-teacher and ex-DA; Attends Gr12+3 education private college Shashemene; Lots of change past 2-3 years; Kebele leader dismissed 2 years before for inefficiency, called back a few months ago | Interested working again as DA as salary; |
| Kebele manager | Aug 1999 (previous experience as DA) | 33 | Male | 801 birrs | From Turufe; Married, no children; Lives in Kuyera town; Got social science teaching diploma (1999); Had first one year agric training & served 4 years assistant DA, 2 years in field and 2 years in wereda ARD office (salary 425 birrs); Was selected by community as manager | Also wereda councillor since 2000; Vast role & responsibilities; Work every day incl weekends depending on community; No-one to cover, no leave; No resources; No transport allowance, bought bicycle; Visits family living in kebele, but doesn't engage in social life; Satisfied with work, not with salary; No increment unlike other professions; Too much responsibility; Would leave if got better job; Started sociology degree private Shashemene but was told to stop and wait for fulltime in govt college but disliked this. |
| School head teacher (satellite school) | 4.5 years total o/w HT here past 6 months | 28 | Male | 973 (as HT should be 1,400; hope will happen) | From other wereda; Single, no children; Gr10+3 diploma last year whilst serving as certificate teacher (3 years), studying at weekends; with diploma taught 1 year social sciences in other kebele then applied for | Lots of gaps and he has to be present all the time as he covers for absent teachers; Teaches >10 hours/week due to teacher shortage; Satisfied to have been selected on merit; Would like to see school |

¹²⁰ Mentions political training among training taken, including in 2000 15 days and 10 days on party ideology

¹²¹ There is currently no NRM DA ; the livestock DA was not available for interview

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--|----|--------|--|--|--|
| | | | | | HT vacancy, 1 st result | getting better in various ways, incl getting government-contracted teachers (community-paid teachers have other work to which they give priority); Wants to upgrade his education though worried not much chance |
| Teacher | Three years | 48 | Male | | Other kebele; Spouse & 4 children; Completed Gr12+1 in 1999; He's an ex-military under Derg; Was first hired in 1995 as direct teacher without training; Now has 3 years as teacher, teaches English (!) | Workload fair, has time for family/social life; Not much leisure as farm work; Likes teaching and would like to see school better, and get electricity so school could be used to teach farmers; Wants to pursue education and become HT |
| HEW ¹²² | Started 1999 | | Female | | From Turufe; Single, no children; Gr10 then was elected through kebele for HEW training (1 year); Graduated 1998 | Inadequate resources; People demand drugs; Vast kebele, too much for 2 HEWs; Extremely heavy workload, lack of time for social/family life; Satisfied with job & strong support from health promoters; Proud of helping women she was born from; Wants to be able to give better services; Dislikes wereda officials' lack of ambition; Wants to pursue education & become health officer and at least on-the-job training and educational upgrading as in other professions |
| DA Crop ¹²³ | 4 years experience o/w 1 year as Head DA | | Male | | From other wereda; Married, no children; Graduated Gr10+3 from Ag TVET (1998) | Seasonal work so has time for leisure/social life; Likes his job and Ok with pay; Wants to pursue his education and be better at his job. |

¹²² One of the HEWs interviewed in modules 3 & 4 is 29 years old but not clear whether she is the one interviewed in module 9, as there are two HEWs

¹²³ Not clear whether he's the 35 years-old longest serving or 30-years old DA, both male, who are interviewed in modules 3 & 4.

Annex 3. Demographic, social and professional profile of the government go-betweens in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities

Table 8: Government go-betweens' origin

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| K manager | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes |
| HEW | Yes (2/2) | No (1/1) | No (1/1) | Yes (1) Not know 1 | No (2/2) | Yes (1) Not known 1 |
| DAs | No (2 interv) Not know 1 | No (2/2) | DA No Vet No | Yes temp Trained DA No Vet No | No | No (1/1) |
| HT Teacher | HT born AA Teacher not said | No (3 interviewed) | HT No Teacher No | HT No Teacher No | HT No Teacher No | HT No Teacher No |

Table 9: Government go-betweens' family status

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|---------------------------------|
| K manager | M; children; together | Single | Single | ? | M; child; separated | M; no child; together |
| HEW | M; no child; together | M; child; separated | M; children; separated | Single | Single M; child; separated | Single |
| DAs | M; children; together (2) | M; child; separated Single | Single Single | Single M; children; separated M; children; separated | M; children; separated ? Single | Married; ? ? |
| HT Teacher | HT? Teacher: M; children; together | M; children; separated Child; separated | M; no child; together M; no child; together | M; children; separated Single | M; no child; separated M; children; ? | Single M; children; together |
| | No separation, Imdibir town | All single or separated family life | Except teachers, single or separated | Families tend to live in Bichena (w centre) | Single or separation | Mixed |

Table 10: How long in the job/profession

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| K manager | Two years | Two years | 4 months (8 in other kebele) | 4 months | One year | Three years | All did other jobs before |
| HEW | 3 years, 1 st job | 4 years, 1 st job | 4 years, 1 st job | 4 years, 1 st job | 1.5 year, 1 st job | 3 years, 1 st job | All their 1st job, no transfer |
| DAs | 3/13 5 years, 1 st job | 1.5/5 years 0.5/5 years | 2 months/ 2 years One year/ 10 years | 8 months, 1 st job (untrained) 1/4 years Vet: 4 years/total 10 years | 1/3 years 1 out of 4 years 6 months/2 years (Koro 3 rd post) | 4 years | Except Girar and Turufe and vet in Yetmen, short period, suggests frequent transfers |
| HT Teacher | HT: not said Teacher: 13/ 22 years | HT: 0.5/13 (4 as HT) Teacher: 3 years | HT: 2/6 years Teacher: 7 months/ 5 years | HT: 4 (2 HT)/6 Teacher: 19/23 | HT: 4/5 Teacher: 4/5 | HT: 6 months/ 4.5 years Teacher: 3 years | Some long serving teachers; can become HT after very few years |

Table 11: Salary levels¹²⁴

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| K manager | 692 | 801 | 695 | 810 | 801 | 801 |
| HEW | | 550 | | 572 (gross) | 670 (gross) | |
| DAs | 840 (750 net) (NRM) | 932 | | 500 (untrained) | 950 (& per diem for FFW) | |
| HT Teacher | | 1671 | | 1,851 1,692 (23 years in profession) | | 973 (paid like teacher) |

¹²⁴ The difference between Girar and Dinki and the other four villages in relation to the kebele managers' salary level may be due to the difference between net and gross salary

The table below summarises the extent to which the go-betweens interviewed in the course of the fieldwork expressed satisfaction from their job. The following codes are used:

- (+): expressed mainly satisfaction/pride, deploring only lack of inputs/inability of “doing better” because of this
- (+/-): expressed some satisfaction but also frustration for one/several reasons
- (-): mainly/entirely dissatisfied
- (W): mentioned high workload (even though they might be on the whole rather satisfied)
- (Q): mentioned that they wanted to quit the job.

Table 12: Job satisfaction

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|
| K manager | +/-; W; disagreement; lack of recognition; | +/-; Q; education, salary | +/-; W; education, salary | +/-; W; Q | +/-; W; Q; rural life; joining teaching | +/-; Q; salary | All +/-; half wanting to quit |
| HEW | +/-; salary; education | +/-; W; family, education | +/-; family | -; W | +/-; W; Q; working & living conditions | + though some – as well | Mixed; only one wanting to quit |
| DAs | -; W +/-; W; Q (female) | +/-; education -; salary, education | -; lack of means; W (Vet) +; W | -; W; Q (female) -; W; Q (female) | -; W; Q -; W +/-; W; Q | + | Seven (/12) mostly unsatisfied; 5 wanting to quit; 9 high workload |
| HT Teacher | HT: + Teacher: +/- (teaching not his ambition) | HT: +/-; W; family Teacher: -; teaching not his ambition | HT: +; W Teacher (satellite): -; family, isolation | HT: +; W Teacher: + | HT: +/-; salary, family Teacher: -; low salary | HT: + Teacher: + | Five satisfied; two dissatisfied; none want to quit |

Table 13: Pursuing further education

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe | |
|-------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|---|
| K manager | Not mentioned | Not given chance | Wants, for change (engineer) | Wants, and change | Wants upgrade and quit rural life | Started sociology BA, had to stop | Implicitly all four who wants, is for change |
| HEW | Wants upgrade, warning letter had to stop | Wants upgrade | Wants upgrade (nurse) | Wants upgrade | Wants learn another area | Wants upgrade (health officer) | All, one to change area |
| DAs | Not said | Wants & punished Wants & punished | Wants specialising Vet: wants (self-education) | Wants, other area Not said Vet wants upgrade BA other area | Wants BA & change Not said Wants & hopes thru govt | Wants upgrade | Most, and at least three to do something else (with perhaps also two in Geblen) |
| HT Teacher | Not said Not said | Not said Not said | Not said Teacher wants upgrade | HT wants upgrade Teacher not said | HT wants upgrade Teacher doing it | HT wants upgrade Teacher wants (HT) | |

Annex 4. The government go-betweens in the livelihood field¹²⁵

A3.1) This Annex supports section 5.2 above.

Who are the go-betweens in the livelihood field?

DAs were the main government go-betweens in the livelihood field at the community level
Except one, all DAs in the six villages were qualified but there were gaps (e.g. only one qualified DA in place in one site)
There was no uniformity in 'wereda policies' regarding the deployment of other government agents, including veterinarians
There were varied configurations of other 'livelihoods go-betweens' but these were community members like the development team leaders, or not stationed in the community like the supervisors
The kebele leadership had a prominent role in the livelihood field in all villages
DAs were somewhat judge and party, as they are evaluated by the kebele Cabinet while also sitting on it.

A3.2) The (diploma level) **Development Agents** are the main go-betweens in this field. The configuration of three DAs per kebele is that which is expected to be in place in all six villages. Whether this is the case in practice seems to vary over time as there is a lot of movement in the cadre of DAs (noted above). At the time of the research fieldwork there were three qualified DAs in place only in Girar and Korodegaga. In Geblen there was no crop DA (he had left the profession) and in Dinki no livestock DA (the DAs had been changed recently following the community's complaints about the lack of effectiveness of the previous DAs, that the wereda Councillor from the kebele had relayed at wereda level). In Turufe there was no NRM DA. In Yetmen there was only one qualified DA in NRM; an untrained crop DA was acting.

A3.3) There were **veterinarians**/animal health specialists at the village level in two communities. In Dinki, wereda officials explained that they had privileged lowland kebeles where people traditionally keep a lot of livestock and had requested for the service. However, there was no livestock DA so the vet explained that there was a "gap" in that there was no information on and access to improved breeds (except chicken which proved to be sensitive to diseases and mostly died as she didn't have vaccines and medicine). In Yetmen the deployment of a vet in the community was a timely support as many farmers had taken up various livestock production activities over the past few years.

A3.4) In Geblen and in Korodegaga there was no vet, in spite of a clinic built some time ago in Geblen. One was being built in Korodegaga but there was no information on a specific date at which personnel might be assigned. In both communities the absence of vet services harms people, as livestock taken on credit dies more than might otherwise be the case. In Girar vet services are available in nearby Imdibir and farmers can call them (mobile network); wereda officials also note the preference given to lowland kebeles (which Girar is not) in trying to deploy vets. Artificial insemination was another service not regularly available; this was an issue in Turufe notably.

A3.5) Beyond the basic configuration of 3 DAs and a vet in some cases, **other agents** are involved in the livelihood development interface space between the community and the wereda. However, their nature and role vary from one community to another. Usually if they are government employees they do not live at the community level. E.g. the DA supervisor seems to be quite 'present' in Yetmen but he doesn't live there; there is only scant mention of DA supervisors in all other villages.

¹²⁵ See Evidence Basis 1 for a summary of the data.

A3.6) Other 'livelihood development' agents are usually members of the community. E.g. in Dinki a woman who is also the WA leader and one of the two wereda Councillors for the kebele, is a focal point for ACSI, the regional MFI. In Geblen there is a 'community food security coordinator' (who is also the telephone operator). In Dinki the role of the 'development teams' and 'cells' seem to be particularly important in disseminating the government ideas and reporting on farmers' activities. In Geblen and Korodegaga sub-kebele structures are important in relation to the implementation of the safety net and associated activities (PWs in both, household package especially in Geblen). DAs seem to have a prominent role in selecting PSNP beneficiaries in Korodegaga (and sorting out the many conflicts around this) whereas in Geblen this seems to be primarily an internal community affair.

A3.7) **Other government employees working at kebele/ community level** seem to be relatively little involved in the livelihood field although in Korodegaga the HEW noted that they have common topics with the DAs. E.g. they work together when it comes to nutrition interventions and also there is convergence between the HEWs' teaching about keeping surroundings clean and DAs' teaching about compost preparation. In Geblen the DAs mentioned a committee which coordinates activities across sectors but did not give specific examples of how it was doing this.

A3.8) The **kebele administration** was closely involved and even took the lead role in the livelihood field, notably because it was involved in all the areas in which DAs were not, or not much (e.g. activities around women and youth packages).

A3.9) There is a somewhat odd accountability relationship between the kebele Cabinet and the DAs. On the one hand the DAs are supposed to be accountable to and evaluated by the **kebele Cabinet**; this was reported in all six villages and especially emphasised in Dinki by wereda officials, Yetmen by ex-kebele officials, and Korodegaga by the DAs themselves. On the other hand they also are part of the Cabinet (this was the case in all six villages as well). So, they are somewhat 'judge and party'.

A3.10) How this works out in practice seems to depend on personalities, circumstances, and evolutions in the messages/instructions from the wereda. E.g. in Korodegaga DAs suggested that they were under close scrutiny by the kebele leadership assisted by the manager, including for their professional activities. In Girar the kebele manager seemed to "boss DAs around" too, but especially in relation to political activities. In Dinki kebele leaders were at pain to explain that DAs are on an equal footing and kebele leaders work with them but don't interfere with their professional activities, yet DAs had recently been changed following community's complaints, as noted above. In Geblen sector performance and employees' work is evaluated by the 'coordinating committee' mentioned earlier.

What do DAs do and what do they not do?

DAs no longer directly provided credit/inputs but were still closely associated with this

DAs' workload had expanded/diversified in the past few years; in two villages they were directly involved in political activities directed by higher levels

Agricultural production was emphasised everywhere, regardless of the production potential; DAs did not always support "what worked" in the area

There may have been more context-specific adaptation in livestock production activities

The inputs promoted by the DAs did not always meet farmers' demands for a host of reasons, some of them out of the DAs' reach

Except in one village DAs were not involved in a number of important livelihood activities – non-farm, women and youth packages

DAs were both giving and getting various forms of training; they challenged the effectiveness of the training of farmers as they had no means to make it practical.

A3.11) In several of the communities, DAs are said to **no longer** be directly involved in government-organised **credit/input provision**. In Turufe DAs find this odd as inputs are what farmers want, rather than DAs' advice. In some cases this shift in DAs' activities goes together with the fact that credit from government (or guaranteed by government) for 'regular' inputs such as fertiliser is much less or no longer available, except in relation to food security interventions (e.g. credit was reportedly available but on a selective basis in Korodegaga and in Girar; it was no longer available in Turufe, where it was said to be a real obstacle to scale up successful technologies like improved wheat seeds with a yield twice that of local varieties).

A3.12) However, while they may no longer directly provide credit they are closely associated with the provision of credit in most cases. E.g. in Geblen one of their main roles is the promotion of packages that farmers take on credit, together with tabia officials. In Korodegaga and in Girar they are involved in the selection of those who are eligible for certain inputs taken on credit; and in Girar it is only recently that the collection of loan repayment has been taken over by the kebele manager. In Yetmen the DAs helped farmers to get technologies like pumps on credit, and also provided advice on the establishment and operation of a farmer savings and credit association.

A3.13) DAs usually note that they have a lot more work than used to be the case some years ago. In all six villages they are involved in disseminating and promoting **new ways of doing things and new technologies**.

A3.14) There is a focus on **agricultural production** and in particular, crop production, vegetable/fruit horticulture, and irrigation, hence fertiliser, improved seeds and sometimes pumps (Dinki, Yetmen, Korodegaga) or drip irrigation technology (Geblen). This focus prevails even in communities where these options have limited chance of success (like in Geblen) or where farmers have developed interest (and some have been very successful) in other activities (like daily labour in nearby town, chat and eucalyptus production in Girar). In some cases the information given with the new technology is not sufficient and farmers may be harmed because of this (e.g. hybrid maize seeds in Korodegaga failed because farmers had not been explained how to handle them; in Yetmen one woman also explained that she failed with improved seeds because she had not been given sufficient information about them). There seemed to be a shift towards compost vs. fertiliser, but this seemed to vary across sites.

A3.15) **Livestock production** activities seem to be slightly more tailored to local contexts (e.g. promotion and successful uptake of cattle fattening and dairy production in Yetmen vs. promotion of small ruminants in Geblen). But breeds are not always well adapted or other inputs may be lacking – and so DAs/vets are at times held responsible for things that are not under their control (e.g. the vet in Dinki could not help when improved chicken sensitive to diseases died as she did not have vaccines and medicine). Lack of vet services can undermine the effectiveness of DAs' efforts in promoting new activities (e.g. in Korodegaga and Geblen, although drought is also a major factor, see below). In Korodegaga a federal scheme to introduce hybrid cattle failed, seemingly because it bypassed the wereda and DAs and there was no local supervision and monitoring. At the same time, the livestock DA in Korodegaga is concerned that farmers do not have access to improved breeds – notably because affordability is an issue (see below).

A3.16) More generally there seems to be a series of **contradictions**, notably, between lack of "buy-in" and farmers' "resistance to change" (reported by DAs in e.g. Girar and Yetmen and by wereda officials in Korodegaga) and at the same time, quotas said to be too low or budgets being a constraint to scaling-up, e.g. in Girar for cattle fattening and in Korodegaga for livestock breeds and improved seeds. In Korodegaga there are many allegations of bias and nepotism in the "selection of beneficiaries" for various inputs, linked to how quotas are applied. There is also a contradiction between quotas that are too small/not meeting the demand (in e.g. Girar but also Korodegaga) and quotas that are said to be too high even by the tabia leader, in Geblen.

A3.17) DAs were involved in **NRM activities**. Usually their role is to teach, train, and help organise, but it's the kebele leadership which is said to be directly responsible for 'mobilisation'. For different reasons, as explained below (see 'effectiveness') these activities seemed to have limited success.

A3.18) DAs are generally **not** (or not much) involved in **non-farm livelihood activities** and activities around **women and youth packages**, even when these have to do with agricultural production. E.g. in Girar where the WA organised women in a teff-producing association, the DAs did not have professional links with the WA/the association as such but with individual (model farmer) members. In Turufe more generally DAs themselves explained that landlessness was a major concern and non-farm activities for landless youth should be a priority, yet the government did not engage with this and left it to NGOs. In Geblen wereda officials noted that non-farm activities were critically important and there were efforts to help landless youth, in particular, to develop small and medium enterprises, but this was generally more focused on urban areas. Rural people were not excluded but there was a lack of business development skill and market linkage advice.

A3.19) Korodegaga stands like an exception. Both kebele leaders and the YA leader noted that, whilst this was not connected with the wereda, DAs were involved in e.g. organising the distribution of irrigable land to various groups of landless youth, women and farmers, according to decisions made by the kebele Cabinet and the community; and these groups were working with the DAs in relation to requesting the necessary inputs.

A3.20) While wereda or kebele officials were silent about this, the DAs reported being involved in **political activities** in Girar (in relation to the pre-election activity, and this involved organising meetings under the kebele manager's directives); and in Korodegaga (where they said, party work is mandatory and this involved meetings at both the community and the wereda level). In both Girar and Korodegaga at least some of the DAs openly disliked this mixing up of developmental and political activities. In all six villages one of the DAs is a member of Cabinet as noted above and in some of the villages, in Amhara in particular, the kebele Cabinet is closely linked to the ruling party's local structures.

A3.21) Finally, DAs are involved in **giving training**. However, the effectiveness of training is dubious as they themselves recognise (see below). They also spend time receiving various kinds of **training** (including on party ideology as reported in Korodegaga - total 25 days in two courses). There are large variations in how much and what kind of training the DAs interviewed got.

How do they do it?

Changes were noted in the ways in which DAs work, notably, their presence at community level, and a focus on teaching and demonstration

DAs worked as multi-purpose technical support – i.e. not exclusively as per their specialisation; the way they organised as a team and reported to the wereda varied across villages

Reporting was usually found to be quite cumbersome and there was no evidence that it was of much use at the community level (through e.g. feedback from the wereda)

DAs worked with model farmers in all six villages

There were variations in how much the use of 'model farmers' reflected recognition of what worked locally; on the whole model farmers were selected to demonstrate the relevance of the options coming from the wereda through the DAs

A3.22) **Changes in how DAs work** are reported in several communities but accounts as to what changed differ. In Girar DAs reportedly used to visit from the wereda level and now they live in the community. Whereas in Turufe the change is that DAs used to visit farmers on their land whereas nowadays they focus on **teaching and demonstration**. In the villages like Korodegaga and Geblen where there is a lot of activity around the safety net and associated activities this takes up a lot of the time of the DAs and has implications for the rest of their activities.

A3.23) DAs usually explain that they don't work according to their specialisation but as **multi-purpose technical support** to farmers, each having their own geographic areas in the kebele. In Dinki, somewhat oddly considering that this is what the DAs report as well, wereda officials insisted on the advantages of having specialised DAs – compared to some years ago. The way the DAs organise their work, like whether there is a hierarchical head or not, whether they have coordination meetings among themselves or not, and also reporting modalities, seem to vary a lot. In all six communities one of the DAs is a member of the kebele Cabinet but whereas this seems to be associated with some authority in e.g. Girar, this is not the case in e.g. Dinki.

A3.24) In terms of **reporting**, the kebele manager plays a role of report compilation across sectors, and of link with the wereda. But this does not seem to have replaced other reporting lines – except perhaps in Girar. DAs in Dinki, Geblen, and Korodegaga mention that reports to the wereda are both very frequent (weekly in Dinki, which is both challenging because the development teams and cells that should provide the necessary information do not do so, and not meaningful as reports may fail to reach the wereda due to transportation constraints) and cumbersome (manually prepared, in Geblen; “they want some kind of ideal reports” in Korodegaga). Written reports also coexist with ‘weekly reporting days’ spent at wereda level in Korodegaga. In Yetmen the DA supervisor is an intermediary in the reporting line to the wereda, though the DAs seemed to say they also communicate directly with the wereda.

A3.25) **Model farmers** are the main focus of the DAs in all six communities. The box below presents the views on the use of model farmers across the six villages, in terms of the rationale for the approach, who the model farmers are, what being a model farmer entails for the model farmers and the others, and the extent to which the approach is used to identify locally relevant ‘good practices’.

Box 24: DAs and the model farmers

Rationale: Kebele officials and community members explained that DAs were too few to work with all farmers (Girar, Dinki). In most cases it was also presented as a way of achieving greater effectiveness: model farmers' land was said to be more suitable (larger, in Girar) and/or model farmers were readier to listen/adapt advice and new technologies (e.g. Turufe)

Who they are: In Dinki and Yetmen model farmers were rarely ‘normal farmers’; the kebele and sub-kebele leaders were the ones expected to be ‘models’ for others (even when they did not necessarily believe in the new technology proposed, as they explained in Yetmen). In Geblen loyal party members were expected to be models. In Korodegaga models were said to be rich hard-working farmers.

Advantages or otherwise: Usually being a model farmer implied advantages in one form or another. This ranged from benefiting from the DAs' advice but otherwise having to buy everything else in Turufe, to getting preference in inputs in e.g. Korodegaga (although the DAs explained that they had been told to no longer focus on model farmers in selecting beneficiaries for inputs, presumably as a response to the many allegations of nepotism in input distribution). Model farmers could be rewarded: agricultural implements, certificates and other forms of recognition (e.g. one woman head of household and model farmer in Girar was selected to represent the wereda at a meeting with the Prime Minister).

They often seemed to have ideas of other things that they would have liked to get or be enabled to do as model farmers, like getting cash rewards in Geblen, have access to more land in Girar, and have access in credit for some inputs in Turufe.

In Dinki farmers noted that model farmers having to adopt new technologies may also be harmed as some may fail (e.g. improved chicken died, modern beehives lacked filters, pumps broke down and there was nobody to repair them). In Geblen being a model is a mixed benediction too as household packages are said to fail most people (see below).

A3.26) **Top-down or bottom-up?** Overall, there are only few examples of the use of ‘model farmers’ to identify and reward ‘ex post’ genuine examples of what may work locally. E.g. one young man in Geblen, who became rich through saving some of his income as a salaried grain mill employee to in

turn invest in a grain mill and in various other activities, including agricultural undertakings e.g. taking up DAs' advice on irrigation, was considered as a model.

A3.27) More often such recognition of what really worked for people locally was lacking. E.g. in Girar the kebele leader wondered why farmers doing well with chat were not rewarded. The main trend seemed to be for 'model farmers' to act as another top-down rather than bottom-up mechanism. In this 'model' model farmers are identified somewhat 'ex ante' as people more willing (or having to be willing) to adopt new ideas, ways of doing and technologies, they get more inputs than others, and DAs (and the wereda) then monitor their performance (like in Korodegaga where DAs have to report on performance of model farmers compared to non-model ones).

Perceptions of and factors in the DAs' effectiveness

Perceptions of DAs' effectiveness or lack thereof varied; different people in one community had different views

Usually, all groups (wereda officials, kebele officials and community members) were aware of other factors affecting DAs' effectiveness, like drought and lack of inputs, or lack of access to credit

Lack of inputs was a source of frustration for the DAs everywhere, intensely so in some villages

The use of model farmers was held up as valuable by wereda officials and DAs but there was little concrete evidence of their 'demonstration effect'

Human resource management issues loomed large but were largely ignored by wereda officials, and solutions were more often punishment than anything else.

A3.28) When they assessed the villages' potential, successes and constraints in relation to agricultural development, wereda and kebele officials rarely related this directly to DAs' effectiveness or lack thereof. However, in Geblen they mentioned that DAs lacked **commitment** and this was one of the obstacles to the kebele development. Yet on their side, DAs and also tabia officials highlight that more than DAs' commitment the main challenge is **drought** and that the **package programme** as it is designed, with inflexible credit repayment even when activities fail due to drought, harm people and they cannot bring change under these conditions.

A3.29) At the other extreme of the scale, in Yetmen wereda and kebele officials stressed the **importance** of the DAs in bringing about change such as irrigation, livestock production activities and the two harvest a year technology. This change is said to be beneficial directly for the farmers who implement these things, and indirectly for others like women who can lease better their irrigable land and landless people or poorer farmers who have access to more daily labour opportunities. In Turufe as well, wereda and kebele officials highlight the success of DAs who were able to 'produce' very strong model farmers – very few of them, but being successful on small land plots. However, lack of access to credit was a major constraint on scaling-up these models' experiences as few farmers could afford to pay cash for the inputs (improved wheat seeds, improved breeds).

A3.30) At the community level different people in one community had **different views**. E.g. in Dinki one person said the DAs these days don't do much good whereas another stressed that they are more numerous and better trained, but should get more support to perform better (regular training, assistants at got level, better salaries). Similarly in Turufe some farmers seemed to think that DAs' advice is useful and they too advocated for DAs to have more training, more regular exposure to new technologies, and access to skill upgrading education; whereas others explained that they didn't rely on DAs as they didn't have enough experience and also didn't visit regularly.

A3.31) Model farmers had rather positive opinions about DAs in e.g. Girar, Yetmen and Turufe – all villages with some potential and where being a model farmer may therefore be more of an advantage if it means a concentration of resources (including access to DAs' advice as it has the potential of being useful). But in Geblen (the other extreme of the scale in terms of potential) rich and successful farmers noted that 90-95% of those working with the DAs were harmed as they fail

(largely due to the recurring drought of the past few years) in activities that they undertook on credit. Both the DAs and the tabia leaders recognised this too.

A3.32) The main (or one of the main) issue(s) limiting their effectiveness, according to the DAs, is the **lack of inputs of various kinds**: agricultural inputs, materials, equipments for the farmers themselves (supply and credit issues); lack of stationery, furniture, teaching aids and indeed inputs, for the FTC-based training and in particular, to make these practical; lack of vaccines and medicine for animals, of transportation means etc. One of the DAs in Dinki said he was ashamed of his profession because of this lack of inputs and there was no way he could get farmers to access them. Notably, none of the FTCs was operational and only in one community (Yetmen) was it decided to lease the demonstration land plot to at least generate some revenue. In Geblen tabia leaders joined the DAs to highlight the wereda's lack of attention to the FTC. In Dinki wereda officials themselves recognised that lack of inputs was a huge issue (so did they to some extent in Korodegaga) but they were seemingly (from the DAs' perspective) not doing anything about it, which made one of the DAs extremely frustrated.

A3.33) The DAs' accounts suggest that other constraints on their effectiveness are **human resource management issues** – including overwork, dissatisfaction with the salary, de-motivation as they are prevented from further studying, lack of a clear career path, difficulties of coping with remoteness or mismatch between the DAs' expectations (as 'educated people') and life in rural areas with little by way of amenities and distraction. DAs are mostly young people and when like in Korodegaga they are told that they cannot be seen in town because they have to work on Saturdays and Sundays, they go to another town, until the time they may be caught and punished. It seemed that DAs could not expect much support or sympathy from the wereda officials whereas weredas do 'punish' the DAs in cases of misconduct. Notably, transfers in more remote posts seem to be regularly used and this, across the different Regions (in Geblen in Tigray, Dinki in Amhara, Korodegaga in Oromia).

A3.34) Finally, the **community's readiness to be mobilised** is also a factor in how DAs are seen to perform, notably in NRM activities. Water harvesting was tried but for different reasons failed to be scaled up in all six villages. In Geblen the most prominent NRM activity was the recently introduced zero-grazing programme, but this seemed to be more of a tabia leadership campaign. DAs mentioned that watershed management was hampered by the lack of budget and of a topographical map. Yet in Geblen people do still carry out the voluntary community work campaigns. In contrast, in Dinki the DAs mentioned that people were interested by activities that benefitted themselves individually, but less so in activities like terracing etc. In Yetmen there was also not a lot of interest for NRM activities, linked, like in Dinki, with a strong decline in community's readiness to be mobilised in the post-good governance package era. In Korodegaga the community spent a lot of time in NRM activities through the PSNP PWs but with limited effectiveness as the cattle was destroying what had been done.

A3.35) Meetings, training etc. are generally not considered to be very effective, including by the DAs themselves. One reason as noted above is the lack of inputs which means that trainings are only theoretical and DAs in Dinki noted that this does not interest the farmers. Also, they explained, people would not come for meetings or when they were called to the FTC (even when wereda experts come, in Yetmen). In Geblen the tabia leader noted that training alone is not enough to bring attitudinal change: there are farmers who are made to participate in many training programmes and yet, they don't change. Model farmers were said to be useful by wereda officials and the DAs but this was not substantiated by any concrete example. On their side, non-model farmers were fairly agnostic in Girar (no harm) and in Geblen model farmers themselves are not convinced. In Turufe other farmers were saying that it would be more useful if model farmers were really spending time to disseminate what they had learned to others.

Annex 5. The government go-betweens in health, nutrition, sanitation¹²⁶

A4.1) This Annex supports section 5.3.

Who are the go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field?

HEWs were the main government go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field at the community level

All HEWs had been trained; in two villages there was only one HEW; the two Amhara villages had a nurse at the HP in response to people's dissatisfaction with the basic HEW/HP set-up

In all villages there were other health go-betweens, including community promoters reporting to the HEWs (except in one village where they were said to report to the wereda)

These arrangements succeeded to various community health schemes in place before the rollout of the HEP (often NGO-/donor-supported); the extent of continuity in personnel varied across villages

Kebele and sub-kebele officials were involved in health, nutrition and sanitation in all villages

Also involved (significantly more than in the livelihood field) were a number of locally important institutions (iddirs, clan structures) helping in the promotion of some aspects of the HEP - though with variable intensity among the six villages

A4.2) **Health Extension Workers (HEWs)** were the principal government go-betweens in the health, nutrition and sanitation field. They were first deployed at different dates, reflecting a mix of regional and wereda decisions about the phasing-in of the policy (later deployment in Oromia generally; in Yetmen late deployment decided by wereda to give priority to kebeles without any health services). In Geben there was only one HEW the time of the research fieldwork (there used to be two, in 2007 and 2008). See Table 11 below.

A4.3) In two of the villages, Yetmen and Dinki (both in Amhara) the wereda had also deployed a **nurse** in the health post (HP), an unusual step out of the policy framework. In both cases this had been a response to the community's deep dissatisfaction with the HP/HEW set-up, particularly so because in Yetmen the HP is in fact a downgraded clinic (it used to serve as a clinic with reportedly better equipment and medicines) whereas in Dinki, it was built with community contribution to be a clinic, then the policy changed and it was decided that it would be a HP but the community of Hagera Selam threatened to burn the building if it was providing only preventive services.

Table 14: Health, nutrition and sanitation go-betweens: HEWs and community 'volunteers'

| | Girar | Geben | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st deployed HEWs | Check | 1998, now only 1 HEW | 2 HEWs (1998) and 1 nurse (2000) | 1 HEW? | 2001, 2 HEWs | 2001 |
| Presence of community volunteers (name, number) | 5 volunteers trained in each kebele (wereda officials' report) | 13 promoters, no data on whether HEWs trained hem | "ALM reproductive agents changed" into health promoters (2002), training by wereda & HEWs, shoes & clothes every year | Health promoters existed before HEWs Promoters now report to and work with HEWs; who allegedly dismissed (some?) | Health promoters had been in place before HEWs and were distributing some drugs (notably anti-malaria pills). "New | 10-year strong NGO presence forming promoters' cadre. Since 2001 working with HEWs (3 months training). |
| Origin of this approach | 26 promoters trained for a month by HEW (HEW's | place had some training Seemed to | | | | |

¹²⁶ See Evidence Basis 2 for the data.

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|---|---|
| | report) Volunteer were in place before HEWs but change in set-up i.e. report now to HEWs. Some continuity in 'personnel' | have existed before HEWs as well, and now working with HEWs (monthly programmes) | ALM: no data on what this organisation was, when the ALM scheme had started 'New' govt scheme: promoters under wereda office | previously working promoters (one still distributes contraceptives and pills that she gets from the wereda). Instead, the HEWs selected promoters who "cannot even read" | promoters" (not clear new persons) just been trained in 2002 (7 from Koro, JICA-organised training); had not yet started work with HEWs Allegation: women working with HEWs benefit from food supplement | Promoter says used to have close relation with wereda, HC, TBA but no longer (through HEWs) Concern: as NGO phase out promoters might stop working (losing per diem?). |
|--|---|--|---|--|---|---|

A4.4) In Turufe the general hospital of Shashemene is located in the site. In 2001 the community strongly mobilised against a regional decision of moving it nearer to Shashemene, sending a delegation of elders (whose expenses were covered by the local iddir) to the federal level to protest; the decision was reversed. In Girar and Yetmen, the other two more integrated sites, there is a relatively well established and recently upgraded health centre in the nearby wereda town for Girar, and a newer health centre in the urbanised settlement called 'urban Yetmen' for Yetmen. In Korodegaga, Dinki and Geblen the nearer health centre is not in the kebele. Even in those villages in which the higher level facility is located in the village the health staff did not seem to be involved with the community activities in the same way as the HEWs. The professional relationship between the HEWs and the HC is discussed below.

A4.5) Other go-betweens were from the community. In all six villages there were **health "promoters" or "volunteers"** and this seemed to have preceded the deployment of HEWs, although the origin of this approach and the current configuration varied across villages, as summarised in the Table below. In several villages the introduction of health promoters had been supported by NGOs (Turufe, and probably Dinki). These volunteers/promoters could be men (e.g. in Dinki one of them was a man who had been health volunteer since fifteen years).

A4.6) In most cases new arrangements were put in place when the HEWs were deployed or shortly after, but there were variations across villages as well. In most villages the new cadre of promoters was said to report to the HEWs, and generally to be organised by them. Dinki stood as an exception: wereda officials explained that the promoters had been put under the wereda office because it was feared that they might otherwise not work well. Dinki is also the only village where officials mentioned that the promoters were getting some advantages (that therefore they were controlling). In Turufe health promoters had been introduced first by NGOs, and then had started working with the HEWs but with the NGOs still around. Now NGOs were scheduled to phase-out and there was a fear that the health promoters might stop working – presumably because they would be losing some advantages although this was not said explicitly. The HEW and community members insisted that a solution was needed as the health promoters were the backbone of the HP.

A4.7) The interviews suggested that in terms of personnel there was a degree of continuity in the transition from earlier schemes to the new HEW/HEP-related government scheme, but not always or not full continuity (see example in Yetmen). In a number of villages there were also some signs of

resentment against the new 'power' of HEWs (recruiting, training and dismissing health promoters who previously were more directly related to higher level authorities).

A4.8) In Geblen the **WA leader** was one of the health promoters. In Girar and Turufe the WA leaders were working closely with the HEWs, promoting the Health Extension Programme (HEP) to WA members in Girar and working on Harmful Traditional Practices (HTPs) in Turufe. In Girar a number of other **community-initiated institutions** were said to be involved with some of the HEWs' work (iddirs, equbs, clan leader, religious institutions – against HTPs and messages about sanitation, family planning, prevention and communicable diseases). In Turufe (iddirs, equb) this had been practised for a long time with the support of NGOs. In Girar UNICEF was very active in promoting this type of approach. This did not seem to be as systematic in the other villages.

A4.9) In all six villages the **kebele leadership and manager** and in many villages the **sub-kebele** structures were involved in some ways in the health, nutrition and sanitation field and more specifically in relation with the HEWs' work. How they were involved is further discussed below. The HEWs were represented on the kebele Cabinet in all cases, although in Dinki the HEW interviewed said she had left as she was not party member.

A4.10) In some of the villages other government go-betweens were said to be involved in the health, nutrition and sanitation field for specific activities. In Dinki teachers were said to teach hygiene to kids, and when HEWs go to households' homes they check whether kids are at school. In Korodegaga HEWs said they had common topics with DAs, teaching respectively about keeping surroundings clean and about compost, and were working jointly with them with regard to nutrition activities (selection of beneficiaries for food supplement). In Girar as well there was a link around nutrition: households were taught by the HEWs (and NGOs) about preparation of better balanced and nutritious food using vegetables whilst DAs were promoting horticulture.

A4.11) It is not entirely clear whether these examples of cross-sector collaboration were directed by policy instructions or if they were initiated by the individuals themselves, or responding to decisions by the kebele leadership. There seems to be a mix of all these factors. It also seems that such cross-sector/joint work could be more systematic than what was reported.

What do HEWs do and what do they not do?

HEWs focused on health preventive services

In relation to sanitation the construction and use of latrines was the main (but not exclusive) focus, met with varying degrees of receptiveness

HEWs were involved in reproductive health in a major way as well

In relation to family planning the deployment of the HEWs intensified earlier efforts and allowed new contraceptive means to be available and greater proximity of services

In some cases this seemed to have accelerated the use of FP but not everywhere, and other factors were at play

HEWs also provided pregnancy/delivery-related services; only in one village was the HEW able to provide attended delivery service at the HP

HEWs had a role in nutrition but not in the management of food aid

HEWs had no role in safe water supply; the absence of clean water was noted as a major obstacle to the HEP in several villages

The big gap perceived by communities was that HEWs do not provide the curative services that they want; this was recognised as an issue in three weredas (including the two in which a nurse had been deployed at the HP in these villages)

A4.12) In all six villages HEWs focused on **health preventive services** including education on communicable diseases, sanitation/ hygiene and nutrition (advice on balanced diet generally in e.g. Girar, or focused on children or pregnant women in some other villages).

A4.13) With regard to sanitation, in all six villages the main emphasis was on people constructing and using **latrines**. This had been met with varying degrees of success. In Girar, a more urbanised environment, there seemed to be good acceptance and some households reportedly had gone beyond the HEP basic requirements and built a shower. At the other extreme of the scale, in Korodegaga the HEWs had to use incentives (giving water purifying pills to the households digging a latrine) but also coercion (threat of exclusion from safety net if they didn't) to get people to build them. However as reported by the kebele officials, most people didn't use them and those who did stopped when the provision of purifying tablets stopped. In Geblen experience sharing helped, but the HEW was not yet certain that all households used their latrine. In Dinki the HEWs with the kebele administration visited homes and checked with a stick whether latrines were being used. In Yetmen some people built one latrine then destroyed it, which the HEW was upset by; there too some incentives had been tried (distribution of bed nets to early adopters). In Turufe two AWD epidemics had played a big role in convincing at least some in the community.

A4.14) The HEP includes other sanitation/hygiene components, mentioned to variable extents across the villages. Some of these attracted resistance as well (e.g. improved stove/oven, because they were said not to be practical; separate rooms for animals because of lack of economic capacity). But the big battle was clearly around latrines. Some causes for resistance were mentioned in some villages. Yet, many of the community members interviewed were expressing appreciation of better sanitation and of what they were taught... whilst not specifying whether they were using the advice.

A4.15) The HEWs were also active in the **reproductive health** field. In all six villages they taught about family planning. Some form of FP promotion had been going on in most villages before the HEWs arrived. In Yetmen people said they knew and were using contraceptives since a long time. In Geblen as well FP had been promoted since long ago, starting under the TPLF. In these villages the arrival of the HEWs did not seem to have changed existing trends. In Yetmen the men and women of the community interviewed on the topic said that the trend was upward but a major factor was people's own desire to have fewer children, looking at their economic capacity and pressure on land. Whereas in Geblen, the use of FP was low and remained so, in spite of the more intensive promotion done by the HEWs. In Girar intensive FP promotion was also taking place (75% utilisation rate according to HEW). This was at time quite upsetting for the HEWs, who were harassed by some husbands calling them bad names ("you are drying our race"). But FP promotion was also seen as part of a broader 'women's rights' campaign and to that extent the resistance of some people might have been easier to cope with, as on the whole, there undeniably were changes in women's lives to heartened by.

A4.16) The HEWs also provided various types of contraceptive. Their presence in the community meant that new contraceptive means were available more easily (e.g. the HEW had been trained in placing implants in Geblen). The proximity of the service was appreciated by some community members in some villages (e.g. in Girar people noted that HEWs taught both husbands and wives and even unmarried people; in Dinki the door-to-door service was appreciated). But in Geblen kebele officials noted that the availability of new means and door-to-door FP services did not change the trend of low use (55 women used some contraception in 2009). In Dinki the HEW interviewed noted that the big difference in use had come with free distribution of contraceptives (utilisation rate jumped from 10% to 95%, she said). In Korodegaga the HEW said the provision was irregular - she noted that it wasn't sufficient that government had deployed HEWs and attention was needed for key inputs such as contraceptives to be provided timely.

A4.17) The HEWs also provided **vaccination** services for children and pregnant women. This seemed to be a regular activity and in Dinki they had now better supply as the HP had a fridge, but in

Korodegaga the HEW noted that even this was not quite organised and vaccination was given through ‘one-off’ campaigns. There was some resistance to this too in some villages.

A4.18) The HEWs focused on **pregnancy and delivery care**. The scope of services that they provided varied across villages. The HEW in Geblen had been trained to attend deliveries although she said that she needed training and better skills to deal with complications. The HEWs had recently been trained in Dinki (one month training) where the equipment was there too, and there was also a nurse at the HP. In Girar the HP had the equipment but the HEWs had not yet been trained. Women were said to oftent be discouraged by the distance and ante-natal care/ pregnancy follow up was still far from generalised (60% in Geblen, model kebele, according to the HEW).

A4.19) Safe/assisted deliveries were even rarer (30% in Geblen; but “few” in Dinki, only women whose labour last for more than 24 hours were brought at the HP). Even in villages where higher level facilities were close by like in Turufe, home deliveries continue – although wereda officials said that Turufe was better than other kebeles thanks to the proximity of the hospital. In Yetmen too, most deliveries were at home. There had been some change with the opening of the health centre in urban Yetmen, but the centre was not open all the time and also deliveries that were brought there were often beyond staff’s capacity and had to be referred elsewhere.

A4.20) In some villages the HEWs were said to give special information to pregnant women (pamphlets in Dinki and Yetmen) e.g. about diet and not carrying heavy items. In Turufe kebele officials noted that while the HP could not assist with deliveries as HEWs didn’t have adequate training and were lacking equipment, at least women feeling unwell could go to the HP. In Girar the HEWs also noted that even though the HP was not yet offering delivery services, before it was opened there was no pregnancy-related services at all in the community.

A4.21) **Food aid** from either the safety net or emergency support, and as “food”, did not seem to be part of what HEWs deal with. Food aid, as representing transfers of resources to households, was managed by the kebele administrations and the DAs, and the HEWs did not appear to be involved in the targeting process.

A4.22) In contrast and as part of their role in relation to **nutrition**, they were involved in the distribution of food supplement for malnourished babies, small children and pregnant and lactating women, including in ‘screening out’ and identifying the beneficiaries in Dinki, Geblen, Korodegaga, and for a short period of time in Girar. In her interview the HEW of Korodegaga suggests some link in the targeting of the PSNP and the distribution of nutritional supplements, though she did not give details. In Dinki and Geblen this type of link but was not mentioned.

A4.23) There is no assigned go-between for the supply of **drinking water**. The HEWs or other health workers highlighted that lack of clean water was a big impediment to the sanitation enhancement and 2008). See Table 11 below.

A4.24) In two of the villages, Yetmen and Dinki (both in Amhara) the wereda had also deployed a vehemence people indicated that the services provided by the HEWs was either not what they were interested in, or fine but not enough. This is summarised in Box 25 below.

Box 25: What people say about the need for curative services

Girar – Wereda officials noted that generally the community was disillusioned as they expected curative services. In their views HEWs should be trained to be able to provide some curative services. They and the health centre staff recognised that the referral system wasn’t working well. The HEWs referred patients to the health centre using a standard form, but the health centre was failing to send feedback; so the HEWs were unable to provide the required follow-up. HEWs were feeling disrespected. Interviewed community members explained that once a patient had been diagnosed chronic treatment should be administered at the HP as it was a burden to have to go to the health centre each time.

In **Gebien** the HP was equipped for first aid treatment and the HEW was able to provide these services. Perhaps for this reason, the main issue on people's mind (kebele officials and community members) in relation to curative services was related to exemptions more than their absence. Exemptions were said to have become very complex to get, not in sufficient number, and services were not really provided for free as the health centre staff was forcing exempted patients to buy drugs from private pharmacies even when they had them at the health centre. In addition they were treating the exempted patients badly.

In **Dinki** there is a nurse and some equipment. The HEW explains that when they started working and were explaining to people that they were not treating patients, people were asking "why on earth are you here?" Then the nurse was deployed. But kebele officials noted that for the HP to bring long lasting benefit it has to have better medical personnel, able to treat severe diseases. The nurse's professional knowledge is minimal and service is limited.

In **Yetmen**, the HEW explained that people did not easily accept the teaching on prevention, linking this to the fact that since the outset, they wanted treatment, not prevention. There was a nurse at the HP but no drugs, which didn't help.

In **Korodegaga** kebele officials said that the HEWs/HP was not a successful intervention. In spite of wereda officials' promises of health care, no medical service was given, not even medicine for malaria, no pills, no injections. There was no better service than before. One woman from the community said that having the HEWs didn't change anything. The HEW recognised that this was a major challenge: people wanted curative services, which they couldn't offer.

In **Turufe**, the HEW said that the HP was running below their and people's expectations. Farmers' attitudes toward health education had improved, but they wanted the HEWs to have medicine (headache, malaria and the like). When HEWs explained that they didn't, some farmers were saying "it's better to close the HP as it doesn't given the needed basic service to the community."

A4.25) There was a trend towards greater responsibilities of the HEWs with regard to specific treatments or tasks (e.g. VCT and PCTMT, TB chronic treatment) and efforts to organise the referral system better. But this was not without its own issues. Generally the supply of whatever drugs HPs are supposed to have seemed to be very patchy. As noted above in the case of Girar the referral system wasn't working well. Elsewhere the HEWs were unhappy to have to refer people to places where they knew the service was not good (e.g. in Korodegaga). Or, they implied that people did not trust them or did not listen to them and were not going (e.g. in Dinki).

How do they do it?

'Teaching people' seemed to be one major activity of the HEWs

They used various means: door-to-door visits, community meetings and health promoters; working with community institutions (3); community conversations (NGO-introduced)

Teaching was for all people though HEWs also focused on groups of households to graduate, with the final goal that all households would graduate

There were variations across villages in what graduation and certification required and how they were recognised

Kebele/sub-kebele structures were involved in all villages in mobilising the community and organising and facilitating meetings, campaigns, and HEWs' door-to-door work

In the two Amhara sites they were also expected to be 'early adopters' of the HEP

HEWs reported to weredas through the 'cluster coordinating' health centre or just to the HC

The wereda had a supportive role in 3 cases, not so in one

Generally the reporting seemed to be quite heavy and there were few opportunities for experience sharing or seeking advice from peers or other more qualified professionals

In two villages HEWs reported being involved in political activities with reporting to the manager or to the wereda level

A4.26) A lot of what the HEWs did was **‘teaching people’**. Various means were used to do this, including **door-to-door visits** to households mentioned in all villages, though the data we have doesn’t allow saying whether they spend outdoor the 80% of the time that they are supposed to¹²⁷. In several kebeles distances are large, with steep ups and downs in e.g. Geblen and Dinki. In several villages the HEWs or the kebele officials or community members said that door-to-door service was not practical (Girar) or that it was very tiring (Geblen, Dinki, Korodegaga).

A4.27) The HEWs **worked with health promoters** to relay their teaching and give ‘less professional services’, in all villages except Korodegaga where this had not started yet.

A4.28) In Yetmen the community people interviewed noted that the HEWs were teaching everyone, though people also noted that not everyone was accepting the teaching. In Turufe people contrasted the teaching of HEWs, which everyone could benefit from, with that of the DAs (although the HEW noted that most men say the HP is for women). However, the HEWs seemed to focus dedicated efforts on a small number of households, to **graduate** these. For instance:

- In Geblen the HEW said she was selecting trainees for the HEP and giving them additional lessons
- In Dinki the HEW was working with the cell leaders, first adopters teaching others
- In Yetmen HEWs worked closely with households implementing the HEP; kebele leaders explained that they were the first adopters for sanitation
- In Korodegaga there is very little detail
- In Turufe the HEW explained that she was using model farmers as they have influence over others, and that there was no ‘quota’
- In Girar the HEW mentioned a very recent system of ‘farmers’ plans’: each HH is supposed to develop its plan with DAs on the livelihoods side and HEWs on the health aspects.

A4.29) The HEP teaching was said to take about 90 hours. The goal was that over a certain time all households would have graduated. There were few mentions of specific targets although in Turufe wereda officials said that HEWs were graduating 65-70 households every three months (in practice 148 had graduated in 2000 and 92 in 2001). Graduation was not necessarily awarded or rewarded, and there were variations in what graduation and certification meant. In Dinki graduation was when households had dug a latrine and 750 households had graduated, of which 50 got a certificate as they were ‘first completers’. In Yetmen in contrast, households were said to be graduated after a longer list of things would be done; 290 had graduated since 1999 and had been given a certificate.

A4.30) It was clearer than for the model farmers that the households were selected because they were thought to be likelier to be able and willing to adopt the HEP, then giving intensive training to do so; hence explicitly using a top-down model to behaviour change.

A4.31) There was also a practice of identifying kebeles as models – Girar was zonal-level model for sanitation and 4th wereda-level model for FP and ANC. Geblen and the neighbouring tabia were models with regard to ante-natal care and safe delivery.

A4.32) In contrast with the training of health promoters, there was no evidence that achievements in terms of household graduation influenced the performance assessments of the HEWs.

A4.33) **Community meetings** were also used – especially when the teaching was accompanied by a specific activity like HIV/AIDS testing. But in Yetmen the HEW noted that people didn’t come to meetings, even when these were called by the kebele leader ‘with more influence’. In the villages where there had been NGO activity (UNICEF in Girar, ALM in Dinki, several in Turufe) ‘community

¹²⁷ It is not entirely clear how two HEWs are supposed to do this and at the same time run all the other activities which presumably require that the HP be open most of the opening hours at least

conversations' were also used, especially against HTPs, and to teach about sanitation and FP. There was a trend for HEWs to use existing fora for their teaching, e.g. iddir and equb meetings in Girar and Turufe, religious gatherings in Girar, safety net public works in Geblen. In Girar the HEW explained that they had advocated for a latrine to be built in the (Catholic mission-run) pre-school as this was a strong message. In Turufe there was a kebele-level legal advice/anti-HTP committee.

A4.34) There were various configurations in relation to the involvement of the kebele and sub-kebele leadership and structures, and reporting/professional supervision of the HEWs/HP. This is summarised in the table below, as well as what various people said about effectiveness of the systems in place.

Table 15: Relationship of HEWs with kebele, wereda and health centres

| Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| <p>HEW: K admin facilitate outreach programmes</p> <p>HEW: Work with k manager on political tasks; report weekly to him</p> <p>HEW: K more concerned than W about HP but cannot give what is missing</p> | <p>K leader: K admin involved e.g. screening committee for food supplement, k Cabinet mobilise people e.g. latrine digging and monitor</p> <p>HEW: Good relation, after 1st clash over decision-making in relation to duration of vaccination campaign</p> | <p>K leader: Cabinet & sub-kebeles work together with HEWs as team</p> <p>HEW: k admin help, are model, get reluctant people involved, get Cabinet member to accompany door-to-door – Started after Feb 2001 W expansion strategy training</p> | <p>HEW: Work with k admin and manager to mobilise (meetings for info); even so people don't come</p> <p>K officials: first package adopters; with HEWs to coordinate bed net distribution and water clearing exercise. HEWs also work with sub-kebeles.</p> | <p>K leader: K admin mobilise people</p> <p>HEW: strong link with k admin. Sub-k organise community e.g. vaccination, nutrition</p> <p>HEW: Weekly (/daily) report to manager</p> <p>Ex.: k leaders discipline supplement distribution, manager records beneficiaries</p> | <p>HEW: work as team with k Cabinet but officials not committed, not willing to come to meetings and outreach</p> |
| <p>HEW: W give training; supervisor visits & assist with referral; also HC supervisor</p> <p>HEW: Since 2001 experience sharing W & HC level; report discussed at HC meetings</p> <p>HEW: Report monthly to HC</p> <p>HC head: referral system broken as HC doesn't provide feedback</p> | <p>HEW: W corrupt, not cooperative (refused her distance education and transfer)</p> <p>HEW: No proper W supervision, only meet HEW & visit a few HH</p> <p>HEW: Report monthly to wereda through HC but no strong relation; promoter said now reporting straight to W</p> | <p>HEW: W give multiple priorities to be done within unfeasible time; accuse workers of not working if fail to achieve all so "we give false report"</p> <p>HEW: Week, month, quarter, six-monthly & annual reports to cluster coordinator cc:ed to W. Since this year only to cluster coordinator</p> | <p>HEW: W organise training, not regular; visit & give support, teach community with HEW</p> <p>HEW: Communication usually through HC, and with HC for campaigns, items to take etc;</p> <p>HEW: Reports to W through HC coordinating 3 HPs in cluster. Monthly meeting of cluster. HC also supports by visits to HP</p> <p>HC Head: Supervisor post vacant for 1 year</p> | <p>HEW: Meets at least once/month with W officials for political issues</p> <p>Professional report weekly and monthly to HC</p> | <p>HEW: W officials listen to problems and promise help</p> <p>W experts work with HEWs to teach community, give briefing on arrivals of medicine, share new medical info</p> <p>Good relation with HC (perfect)</p> |

A4.35) Kebele and in some cases sub-kebele structures were involved in all villages in mobilising the community and organising activities although not always successfully (Yetmen) or lacking commitment (Turufe). In Dinki, the multiple forms of involvement of the kebele structures was quite new – following a special training to this effect by the wereda in 2001 ('expansion strategy' – in Amhara there was indeed at some point a very strong push by the Region for weredas to rollout an expansion strategy with notable emphasis on scaling-up good practices etc.). In Dinki and Yetmen (the two Amhara sites) kebele officials (down to cell levels) were also expected to be 'first adopters', like for the agriculture packages.

A4.36) The wereda level was described as rather supportive (training, visits and support) in Girar (though the HEW also said that the kebele was more concerned than the wereda), Yetmen (though the HEW also highlighted that training was not regular) and Turufe. In Geblen the HEW seemed to have little support from either the HC or the wereda, and wereda officials were reportedly not doing properly their supervision job.

A4.37) Reporting was done to both the wereda/HC/cluster coordinator (which is the HC) and the kebele manager in Girar – but the reporting to the manager seemed to be more political, and in Korodegaga – where the HEW said she was meeting wereda officials once a month on political issues. Professional reporting was frequent as weekly in Dinki¹²⁸, monthly elsewhere, and it always involved the HC in a cluster supervision role. But only in Girar and Yetmen where the HC is relatively close did HEWs mention meetings and discussion of the reports in addition to the reporting. In Girar the wereda and the HC organised experience sharing amongst HEWs/HP since 2001 (maybe another approach to the expansion strategy?).

A4.38) The dominant picture is of an upward reporting relationship rather than a two-way link through which the HEWs could feel supported and encouraged in what they are doing, with opportunities to learn, share experience and seek advice from peers or more highly qualified health professionals. Wereda health officials may well realise that this is not ideal (like in Girar) but face constraints themselves, such as lack of budget and transportation means.

A4.39) There did not seem to be a uniform policy about the role of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and of traditional healers, and the type of relationships that HEWs would be supposed to have with them. The relationship with TBA varies from discouraging women to call on them as part of the promotion of professionally-attended deliveries, to training them or working with them as the HP is not equipped anyway. With traditional healers the dominant picture is one in which they are banned by the wereda and/or HEWs actively discourage community people to visit them; in the one village in which the health centre head said that HEWs were supposed to work with traditional healers the HEWs said the opposite.

Perceptions of and factors in the HEWs' effectiveness

Perceptions of the effectiveness of the HEWs' teaching were varied and different people in any one community had different opinions

A number of concrete examples in which the HEWs' deployment had made a difference were given; the areas in which HEWs had had an effect differed across villages

One thread underlying the mixed perceptions about the effectiveness of the HEWs was the concern about lack of/slow progress with curative services

Lack of inputs was a source of frustration for the HEWs everywhere with HP not having electricity and water even in better-served villages

¹²⁸ This is odd: the head teacher in Dinki highlighted that even monthly reporting was meaningless because of the distance and difficult access between the kebele and the wereda.

The degree of responsiveness of the community to HEWs' teaching was variable; officials recognised that some of the reasons for this were out of HEWs' reach

Most HEWs interviewed had some satisfaction with their job though also noted the hard conditions; most wanted to make a career in the health sector.

A4.40) While often the information provided by wereda or kebele officials or community members stopped at describing what HEWs were doing, there were more cases where they also gave an opinion on the effectiveness of the deployment of the HEWs (or lack thereof), compared to the DAs. However, in most cases there was not a consensus and/or no concrete data/evidence and/or the information given by different sources was diverging. One thread underlying the assessment in all six villages is the dissatisfaction of the communities with the lack of progress with curative services. This has been reviewed above; the other cases of appreciations are summarised below.

Box 26: Views on the HEWs' effectiveness and factors influencing it

In **Girar**, a respected clan leader marked his appreciation of the fact that HEWs (and DAs) worked with community-initiated institutions; he also noted that this was giving them a way of working in line with local societal beliefs and value systems. One woman FHH and model farmer said both DAs and HEWs were very important. One man mentioned that the 'teaching' approach was appropriate as most people were illiterate.

In **Geblen**, wereda officials linked the deployment of HEWs to greater awareness of FP, and progress in maternal health care and sanitation, although this all required strengthening (including further training on delivery for HEWs as she herself mentioned).

In **Dinki**, wereda officials and some community members attributed slow progress with FP, sanitation and vaccination to the "rigidity" of Muslims/Argobbas. Community members linked the deployment of HEWs to the dissemination of government model about HTPs, HIV, FP and women's rights. One woman was appreciative of what HEWs were bringing. However generally, these community members interviewed had mixed and diverging views about how effective the teaching was.

In **Yetmen**, wereda officials implicitly recognised the slow progress on many aspects, putting this down to lack of awareness, lack of economic capacity, people's demand for curative services hence disinterest with anything else, and the general difficulty encountered in mobilising people in Yetmen. Kebele officials said that maximum 25% of the community was really practising the teaching on sanitation. Members of the community had radically diverging views on FP and sanitation uptake rates, and on whether any increase was linked to the presence of HEWs or other factors.

In **Korodegaga** wereda officials also linked HEWs to the dissemination of government model, especially against HTPs. For kebele officials the deployment of HEWs was not a successful intervention. They had no other opinion.

In **Turufe**, wereda officials linked the deployment of HEWs with women's rights strengthening (use of health care), improvement in vaccination rate, better child care, and progress with HTPs broadly defined (FGM, sanitation, FP and HIV/AIDS). However with regard to sanitation, the HEW herself mentioned the effect of the AWD epidemics in prompting attitudinal change.

A4.41) There were few opinions on the HEWs as individuals. In Dinki women explained that both HEWs and health workers in government facilities were not treating farmers properly (disregard, pride, arrogance), stating "we want respect first, then service and better medicine". In Yetmen staff from the HC had mixed views, some saying that the HEWs were doing their best under difficult circumstances (and saying that as the community didn't believe in prevention some form of enforcement was needed); others saying they lacked commitment.

A4.42) According to the HEWs one of the main issues limiting their effectiveness was the **lack of inputs of various kinds** including: lack of transportation (Girar, Dinki raised by kebele officials), electricity (Girar, Yetmen), water supply (Girar, Korodegaga, Yetmen, and the one big issue in Geblen where no other "gap" was mentioned), fridge (Girar), resources (Girar, Turufe), drugs (even painkillers or malaria pills, Girar, Korodegaga, Turufe), various equipments (stove, gloves, scissors, furniture –

Korodegaga), stationary (Korodegaga, HEW was providing at own cost). In Korodegaga the shortage of quotas in nutrition interventions and the fact that there were no incentives for HEP graduates were problematic. The lack of emergency assistance was raised as an issue in Dinki and Turufe. In Turufe the HEW also wanted to see more commitment from the kebele officials. HEWs raised the importance of more or refresher training in Turufe, Girar and Geblen. In Turufe the kebele officials, in Girar and Geblen the wereda officials, agreed with this.

A4.43) The second and perhaps largest factor affecting their achievements was the degree of **community's responsiveness to the teaching**, variable from one village to another, across individuals, and across the different packages of the HEP and their other tasks. In turn, this responsiveness is linked to factors well beyond the performance of the particular individuals working in the community (back to the disillusion with the lack of progress with curative services) and even beyond the particular field in which the HEWs are working (e.g. a general reject of the government presence in Yetmen and Dinki except when advantages are clear).

A4.44) The data has little information on **how HEWs were evaluated**. In Girar, the HEW explained that HEWs' performance, which among others is a criterion to select those who will be sponsored for further education, is based on the number of volunteers that they train. This creates a competition for quantity and the quality is not considered. In Geblen, kebele officials mentioned that a kebele-level "stream committee" had been established to coordinate work among sectors and also assess workers' performance, but they didn't give more detail. In Dinki, as for the DAs the community reportedly complained about the nurse (often absent from the HC), the wereda Councillor from the kebele relayed this at wereda level and the nurse was changed.

A4.45) In turn, the implications of good or poor performance are not clear. As noted earlier there is no career path for the HEWs. Under the current system they cannot be promoted to work at e.g. health centre level except if they train as a more highly qualified professional (sponsored or at their own costs). There was no mention of salary increment in case of good performance or on the contrary, salary cut in case of bad performance. Unlike the DAs there was no case of HEWs punished by being redeployed in a more remote kebele. Access to training opportunities sponsored by the wereda may well be the main reward, though this was not stated very clearly.

A4.46) The HEWs' interviews suggest that other constraints on their effectiveness are **human resource management issues**. These were to an extent less prominently than for DAs, as for most of those interviewed, job satisfaction was disputing it to frustration and discouragement. However, the three HEWs interviewed in the less integrated villages were separated from either their spouse or children or both. These were also the villages in which the workload was likely highest considering the distances, and in Geblen the HEW was alone. As she put it, though she was a committed person, the very low salary (between 500 and 600 birrs) is also not commensurate to the workload and the tasks. All six HEWs interviewed wanted to study further, though only one to change of profession.

Annex 6. The government go-betweens in education¹²⁹

A5.1) This Annex support section 5.4.

Who are the go-betweens in the education sector?

*Government go-betweens in education at village level were mostly **primary** school teachers and head teachers, including in one village some locally contracted teachers*

Education expansion put pressure on the system; in four out of six villages this resulted in too few qualified teachers (budget constraints, perhaps also remoteness and difficulties to recruit)

This led to extremely low staffing level in satellite schools in the more remote villages

In all six villages PTA were in place; only in one was there sign of an education and training kebele board – with unspecified links with the PTA

Kebele administrations played a key role in all six villages, mainly focused on strongly supporting the ‘UPE campaigning’ (enrolment, fight against absenteeism/dropout)

However, teachers were on the frontline of the UPE campaigns, and usually disliked this role.

A5.2) Primary schools are supposed to be an integral part of all communities. Higher education levels are considered somewhat differently as they inevitably cater for larger groups of the population. This is indeed the pattern that was found in the six villages.

A5.3) In all of them the government go-betweens in education are the **school staff in public primary schools**, and **satellite schools, alternative basic education centres and public pre-schools** where these exist. In practice, different configurations were found in the villages in terms of coverage of pre-primary/primary/ABE education (see Table 13 below). All six villages also have some form of links with higher education levels. However, this varies a lot in intensity. In Korodegaga and Dinki few children/youth make it to secondary let alone post-Grade 10 levels; in the more integrated villages many more children reach post-Grade 10 levels. Geblen stands as an exception among the ‘remote’ villages in that a significant number of families manage to send their children for higher education. But these education opportunities are all outside of the community. There is no secondary school in any of the six communities. Even when the secondary schools attended by some of the community’s children are close by, these schools are not a part of the community.

A5.4) In addition to primary school staff, in the community there is supposed to be a parent-teacher association (PTA) for each school and a kebele education and training board linking school and community through the kebele administration and notable members of the community. The education sector is represented on the kebele Cabinet by the school director as a member. There may be other education go-betweens linked to non-government provision of education. Finally, in some communities some of the teachers in government schools are locally employed. The different configurations of education go-betweens are outlined in Table 13 below.

Table 16: The education go-betweens in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| Primary | Gr1-8 (recent expansion) | Gr1-8 (recent expansion) | Gr1-8 (recent expansion) | Gr1-8 + one ex-satellite now independent school | Gr1-6 (recently to Gr5-6, want Gr7-8) | Gr1-8 (recent expansion) |
| Satellites ? | Two, recent | One, recent | Four, recent (1-2 teachers in each) | No longer (has become independent) | One, recent ; 2 teachers | One, recently taken over from previous NGO-run ABEC |

¹²⁹ See Annex 5 for an overview of the evidence on which this section is based.

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|---------------|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| Pre-primary ? | Not mentioned; mission KG in nearby wereda town | Gr0 started, main school (no teacher assigned, very few children) | Not clear | Not clear | Not clear | Gr0 in new satellite school; mass drop out (50 enrolled; 30 left) |
| Post-primary? | Gr9-12 nearby wereda town | Gr9-10 nearby tabia, just started; Gr11-12 and TVET in wereda | Gr9-10 nearby small town, just started; no Gr11-12 or TVET in wereda | Gr9-12 and new TVET wereda centre (17kms) | Gr7-8 across river; Gr9-12 wereda centre (across river + 20kms or 20kms track road) | Government, private, mission secondary, TVET, colleges - Shashemene (14kms) |
| PTA? KETB? | PTA: monthly meetings | PTA: helps a lot | PTA: since 1997 makes plan with HT; weak | PTA & ETKB. Same people (parents); ETKB strong link with kebele administration | PTA: called when problem | PTA decides amount & so budget for contract teachers; no ETKB |
| Other | Wereda assigned 3 new teachers when school expanded; School is cluster centre. | 14 teachers including HT. Acute shortage of teachers, esp. satellite schools. Main school teachers going to teach in satellite for some weeks. | Shortage of teachers, esp. satellite schools (one teacher for 4 grades in most schools). In contrast, diploma teachers deployed for Gr7-8 | No complaint about teacher shortage. | HT + 5 teachers Shortage of teachers, one of 5 teachers (main school) absent for months and not replaced. | Shortage of qualified teachers; community recruit and pay additional teachers from community contribution. |

A5.5) In all six villages the provision of primary education services by government had expanded recently or was in the process of being expanded (adding grades to existing schools; opening satellite schools, newly constructed or, in Turufe, transforming an NGO-run ABE centre into a government formal satellite school; upgrading satellite school into an independent school in Yetmen). In four of the six villages this was putting pressure on the system and in particular, the wereda had not been able to recruit and deploy a sufficient number of qualified teachers. In Girar the wereda had done so and teacher shortage was not a concern for the primary school. In Yetmen such concern was also not raised. In Dinki and Geblen teachers had been deployed to staff the new higher grades, but staffing of the satellite schools was absolutely minimal. Whether this was a choice or the result of inability to recruit for these even more remote posts (a remote school in a remote kebele) was not said.

A5.6) **“Teacher shortage”** was usually associated with budget shortage (e.g. in Geblen, while wereda officials noted that education is already the largest claim on the wereda budget). However, in a number of villages there were hints that remoteness was also an issue and suggestions that incentives for teachers would be useful (mentioned by kebele officials in Dinki, and by members of the community in Turufe). Teachers’ interviews clearly show that remoteness is a big issue (e.g. the female head teacher in Geblen “feels lost” without her family; the lonely satellite school teacher in Dinki laments the lack of interaction with other school staff in addition to being unable to go and visit her family). In contrast schools in better connected environments are clearly attractive. Teachers interviewed in Girar and Yetmen highlighted the differences with the more rural schools where they were before. They were happy to have been transferred as it was an easier life (both had many years of service). Both also highlighted the fact that the less remote schools were better resourced.

A5.7) The way schools/communities were dealing with teacher shortages differed. In one only (Turufe, in Oromia) was it explicitly mentioned that additional teachers, recruited by the kebele administration, were paid out of community contributions. One of them was interviewed and although he didn't have the required qualifications, he had some previous teaching experience. He was proud that students liked his English classes (which, as an ex-Derg army lieutenant, he was perhaps better prepared to teach). Other teachers expressed concern that because contract teachers have other activities and don't see teaching as their job, education quality is suffering. In Korodegaga teachers did not mention local recruitment, yet the kebele manager used to give "free service" to the local school before he applied for the manager post. So the issue was perhaps more to one of it being difficult to find someone able to teach and willing to live/come to Korodegaga and/or the budget required (the teachers explained that they tried to rent school land for irrigation to get an income).

A5.8) In the other villages the workload was shared among the teachers present. In Korodegaga main school "self-contained teachers" taught some classes in other grades in addition to handling their assigned grade. Teachers in the main school of Geblen mentioned workload of 55 periods per week, well beyond the 30-35 which should be the norm; sometimes staff went to teach in the satellite schools, creating a gap in the main school; at other times one of the satellite schools was closed. In Dinki teachers in the main school also complained about teaching above the norm. Three of the four satellite schools were staffed with just one teacher in each. She/he taught two grades at a time successively in the mornings and afternoons, a very tiring and lonely task.

A5.9) **Other village-level education go-betweens - PTAs** were said to be in place in all schools for which staff was interviewed. Their role seemed to be quite similar from one school to another. They are supposed to be involved in all aspects of the school management (Yetmen), including:

- School planning with the head teacher and school staff (Girar, Dinki where this was presented as a new, post-good governance package thing)
- Facilitating the teaching/learning process (Girar)
- Resolving school problems (Girar, Korodegaga)
- Deciding about all income-generating activities and community contribution level (Dinki), involved in school income/expenditure (Yetmen, Turufe)
- Participating to school expansion (Girar, money and labour in Geblen)
- Referring cases they cannot handle to kebele administration (Girar)
- Evaluating teachers (Girar, Dinki – on standard forms).

A5.10) The PTA was said to be weak in Dinki. In Korodegaga it also seemed to be weak.

A5.11) In all villages the **kebele administration** played some role in relation to the school although the level and nature of interaction varied. This relation was formalized everywhere through the head teacher being a member of the kebele Cabinet. In Yetmen in addition to this and to the PTA there was an education and training kebele board (ETKB) and the head teacher was proud of having struck a strong relationship between the kebele and the school including through the Board, though he didn't explain what the role of the Board was.

A5.12) Generally kebele administrations were closely involved, directly or like in Girar through a kebele level committee, in the 'UPE campaign' that is, in getting parents to enroll their children and closely following up on absenteeism and dropouts. The administration did this through getting information from the head teacher as she/he is Cabinet member (Dinki, Yetmen), discussions with the parents and 'finding a solution' (Girar), sending Cabinet members or cell leaders, DAs and HEWs with the teachers to parents' houses (Yetmen, Dinki), mobilizing the iddirs in the campaign (Dinki), fines (mentioned by one teacher in Girar whilst in Dinki fines were said to no longer be used), and reporting to the wereda (Girar, Dinki).

A5.13) However, the teachers were bearing most of the brunt of this door-to-door education promotion activity. Those who mentioned it disliked having to do this (Korodegaga, Yetmen, Dinki). They highlighted the difficulties that they face when children are absent for long periods of time then return to school and teachers have to make all what is feasible for the children to pass their exams, notably because they are evaluated on that basis. In Dinki they mentioned that instead of sending teachers to beg parents, the government or an NGO should provide materials for the children as incentives. In Geblen wereda officials noted that school meals had started to be distributed in a few schools, including one of the satellite schools of Geblen, and this made a difference and should be expanded. Parents and teachers in Geblen agreed with this.

A5.14) More broadly the data suggest that teachers seem to be ‘between two fires’. On the one hand, some parents continue to cause their children to be absent (on market days and during harvest times in particular; in Dinki some families send different children on alternate days), thus decreasing their learning time. On the other hand, in all six villages parents were concerned by the quality of education, saying that if children did not have the competence expected from their grades they would fail at one point or another, and jeopardize the investment that the family makes. In Korodegaga for instance, some parents make their children miss school on market days or in relation to irrigation work, yet parents blame the school and teachers for the fact that “*students and shepherds are equal*”. There is of course a chicken-and-egg nature to this issue in that parents could well argue that the reason why they do not invest more fully in educating their children is that the returns are not guaranteed, as quality is poor and employment opportunities limited. In all villages these issues are on people’s minds.

A5.15) Apart from their role in the UPE campaign in some communities, **other government go-betweens** like HEWS and DAs do not seem to be closely involved with the school or with school staff. Kebele managers have a link in that they get school reports either as a channel to the wereda or in copy (e.g. Dinki, Yetmen and Korodegaga). In Dinki and Korodegaga the kebele manager also gets the school plan and compiles it into a general kebele plan. In Korodegaga teachers explained that they also discussed about development with the kebele leader, twice a month; since 2001 teachers were involved in mobilizing the community for any type of works; and they had party work every two weeks. In Dinki the head teacher explained that since 1999 all Cabinet members worked together on all things so other sectors get involved in enrolment promotion as explained above, and also she was involved in other issues of the Cabinet (health, agriculture) – though she didn’t give any specific example of tasks.

What do primary school head teachers and teachers do and not do?

In the understaffed schools teachers reported that they had a heavy teaching load

In all schools teachers mentioned many other mostly school-related tasks; in one community they were involved in political and broader developmental mobilisation activities

Head teacher emphasised management, reporting and relationship tasks

Reporting seemed to be a time-consuming activity; in distant kebeles with difficult access reporting was not meaningful as it did not reach the wereda timely

Teachers in remote satellite schools lacked the ‘professional networking’ and peer/head teacher support which their colleagues in the larger schools have access to

A5.16) As seen above, teachers may have a heavy **teaching load** in the schools affected by teacher shortages. Whether they teach all their hours or not is another matter. In Geblen teachers’ absenteeism is a bigger issue than students’ absenteeism, according to the head teacher. In Korodegaga the kebele administration keep a record of teachers’ time at work. Teachers can ask permissions; the head teacher is supposed to cover for the missing teacher, which in turn can represent a heavy workload as explained in Turufe.

A5.17) Teachers mentioned many **other school-related tasks**, i.e. things that need to be done as per the policy. In addition to the door-to-door campaigning discussed above these included:

- Tutorial classes (to allow absentee students to catch up or mitigate the negative effects of automatic promotion) (Girar, Dinki, Korodegaga)
- Participating/leading various school-related committees (pedagogy in Girar, curriculum in Yetmen, students' competition in Girar, teachers' evaluation committee in Korodegaga)
- Participating/leading various extra-curriculum activities: civic education club (Girar, Dinki), community conversations and anti-HIV club (Yetmen), women's union (Yetmen)
- Counselling students (Girar)
- Continuous Professional Development (e.g. school-based experience sharing where one teacher observes another and comments, Korodegaga)
- Reporting to the head teacher (weekly, Dinki).

A5.18) In Dinki one of the satellite school teachers noted that as she was far away from the main school and alone, she was lacking any type of interactive tasks like mutual observation and discussions with colleagues and the head teacher.

A5.19) In all schools **head teachers** emphasised their **management** role, as well as the **reporting and relationship tasks**. When they mentioned school finances they explained that they were working with the PTA (Turufe, Dinki, Yetmen). In Dinki the head teacher explained that there was a big difference with the past when they were also expected to teach a full load. Since 1997 this was no longer the case; she had got management training; schools had more autonomy to resolve issues at their level; as they had more time and the relevant training head teachers could better handle teacher management, discussing their challenges, encouraging teachers not working well etc. In Korodegaga the head teacher explained that as a "kind of decentralisation of good governance", since 1999 whilst she/he was still "the boss" and instructed teachers, the head teacher had to first show what was to be done. In Girar the head teacher explained that as cluster centre they also were in charge of organising resource/experience sharing events and Q&A programmes.

A5.20) Reporting seemed to be time-consuming. There were no major complaints about the nature of the reports. However, in Geblen the head teacher said that it was a burden as there was no secretary. In Dinki the head teacher explained that due to the difficulty of communicating with the wereda reporting was meaningless as there often was nobody to take the report to the wereda. When they sent reports they might get lost and they were asked to prepare them again.

A5.21) In Korodegaga the wereda was said to send guidelines and feedback on the reports and to organise meetings with all schools. The reports prepared were weekly reports on students' status, two-weekly competition among students, and monthly reports on the school overall activity. In Turufe too, the wereda and schools had regular meetings in addition to the school reporting. For Dinki, the other way round, the school staff often missed key events like training, as the information from the wereda did not reach them on time. Wereda officials acknowledged that this was an issue which led to poor supervision. They explained that this was a general problem and so for instance, Hagere Selam (where Dinki is located) is one of the few kebeles in the wereda which is not supported by the USAID education programme, because of its difficult access. Things were hoped to improve when the mobile network would reach.

How do they do it?

Schools made different choices with regard to operational education policies including self-contained teaching, automatic promotion, full day schooling, and multi-grade teaching

Communities had had diverse levels of influence over school choices, from strong to apparently nil, even when both parents and students and school staff disliked the current modality

For both parents and teachers, there were contradictory incentives

*Teachers were balancing concern for education quality and concern with their own workload
Parents simultaneously opposed to policies that they perceived as quality-threatening (e.g. automatic promotion) and policies promoted by education authorities to enhance quality (e.g. full day schooling); they also continued to cause absenteeism because needing children's work
Schools were relatively weakly 'embedded' in the communities; life-worlds of working parents, and studying children and their teachers, did not seem to strongly 'connect'.*

A5.22) **Schools functioned** in quite diverse ways, and there was a range of opinions with regard to the relevance of a number of **education policies**, including by the school staff itself. This, which has an influence on what teachers do and how they do it, is summarised in the table below.

Table 17: The ways schools functioned in the six WIDE3 Stage One communities

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|--|
| Self-contained applied? | Yes, teachers dislike | Not said | Yes, HT & teachers think negative | Start 1998, stopped 2001. Community expressed dissatisfaction; stopping was good (teachers) | Yes, "applied as a rule", school staff dislikes it | Not said |
| Automatic promotion applied ? | Yes, teachers dislike (not enough CB), HT supports but stresses need for more work by teachers | Not said | Yes, parents don't like it. | Was started and also stopped by community | Not said | Not said |
| Multi-grade applied? | Not said, probably not | Likely in satellite schools | Yes in satellite schools | Not said, unlikely | Not said, likely in satellite school | Not said, probably not as two shifts |
| Shift system? | Not said, "plan to shift to full day schooling" but no date | Full day school for Gr7 & 8 (wereda tried full day for all grades, was refused by community) | Yes, hard to start morning shift on time as children come from far away; high workload for teachers | Two half day shifts | Not said | Two half day shifts; community rejected shift to full day schooling (2000) |

A5.23) Generally the two mainstream policies of **self-contained teaching and automatic promotion** in the first four grades were disliked by both the school staff and parents and students. In Yetmen, these were stopped. In the case of self-contained teaching this was a regional policy decision of letting schools to choose. It seems that either the wereda did not hear about it, or did not pass the information to the school in Dinki, which continues to apply it even though head teacher and teachers think it has negative effects (weak students if they get a weak teacher).

A5.24) For teachers, the implications of these choices are dual, as reflected in the interviews. One of the factors motivating their perspectives is avoiding yet more work. Yet, many appeared to be genuinely concerned by the risks of declining quality and the implications for the students and their families. Clearly, as noted above, parents and students do exert some pressure on the school staff (including, now, through the evaluation system – see below). But as noted above, it's also a pressure going into two opposite directions, with parents against self-contained teaching and automatic promotion on grounds of declining quality, but resisting to full day schooling promoted because it would allow greater quality, on grounds that children's work is needed. Two contradictory positions, in some sense, although each being perfectly 'internally' logical.

A5.25) **The school in the community** – In Girar, the school did not appear to be closely involved in the strong women’s rights/anti-HTP campaign which was said to mobilise a large number of other people and organisations (WA, DAs, HEWs, iddirs, clan leadership and institutions). In Geblen the YA explained that the school head had allowed the tabia youth to use the football pitch and to organise an inter-tabia competition. In Korodegaga teachers were also asked to participate in other developmental mobilisation. In Korodegaga too, the teachers went out of their normal duty to practically ‘find a solution’ to enable six orphans to continue to attend school: they contacted an Ethiopian irrigation investor for assistance, which they obtained, and the man provides the children with the minimum required.

A5.26) The above suggests that on the whole, the relationship between the schools and the communities is not very close. The schools are in a world not directly linked to the day-to-day life-world of most parents. Most farmers, even those who believe in the value of education and have high expectations as was found in most villages, may not believe that they can really do something about the way the school functions, compared to the decisions they make about when they will plough and sow and whether or not they will sell or buy a cattle. This is not dissimilar to what is happening all over the world. In other words, schools and school staff are not as closely linked to adults’ lives as agricultural extension and the DAs in these rural communities.

Perceptions of and factors in the school staff effectiveness

All schools benefited from support from the community and kebele administration, notably in the form of labour and cash

Other forms of non-government support were variable, usually not so important- except for the active and generous Gurage diaspora in Girar

Support from weredas/the government was said to be on an upward trend in three villages, in various forms, including GEQIP in two schools

There remained many gaps of all kinds in all schools, though less remote schools seemed to be better resourced

Weak supervision was deplored in two of the remote schools

PTAs, students and/or the kebele Cabinet formally evaluated teachers; varied configurations and degrees of formalisation; the extent to which these assessments mattered was not clear

Teachers reported to be evaluated on number of students passing exams.

A5.27) In this section we discuss two issues. First, we review how teachers and head teachers gauge the effectiveness of the support that they get from other actors, an important motivational factor which can affect their performance. We then turn to how teachers and head teachers are evaluated and the results of these evaluations.

A5.28) **Support to schools** - All schools mentioned support from the **community and/or the kebele**. Community contributions are raised in Girar, Geblen, Yetmen, Korodegaga and Turufe. It is not clear in Dinki. The community was said to contribute labour in all cases, and additional finances when need be in Girar. In other cases the school was trying to generate an income (in Dinki from grass selling and growing vegetables, in Korodegaga and Turufe from renting school land for irrigation). We do not have data on the significance of this type of income. NGO support did not seem to be important for any of the schools. In Girar, an important source of support for the school expansion was the Gurage diaspora in Addis Ababa.

A5.29) With regard to support from the wereda several schools mentioned some recent (one to two years maximum) and **positive developments**: the wereda was providing them with some funds in cash and no longer (only) materials (Girar, larger budget in Geblen); or, it had provided more items (exercise books, pens, blackboards in 2001 and more books in 1999 in Geblen). The GEQIP grant (distinct from the wereda grant) was mentioned in Girar (having to be focused on education quality)

and in Dinki, by name by the kebele leadership whereas the school staff called it a “federal budget”. They explained that it could be used for the school only as opposed to supporting students in buying stationery, which is one of the concerns of the school staff there.

A5.30) However, there were **many “gaps”** of all kinds in all schools, ranging from clean water point and better sanitation (not found in Girar, Geblen, Turufe) and things like desks, chairs or blackboards (everywhere) to electricity (Girar, Geblen) and computers and a phone line (Girar). In the schools recently expanded the lack of textbooks for the higher grades was felt as a big issue (Girar, Dinki with also lack of lab teaching aids, Korodegaga for Grade 5 and the head teacher said they were providing some at their own costs). Shortage of classrooms or office space was also an issue (in Girar, Dinki, Korodegaga, and Turufe satellite school). The lack of a library was raised in Girar, Yetmen and Korodegaga. The school staff was usually noting that these gaps have implications on the quality of education that they as teachers can provide.

A5.31) In addition, **weak supervision** from the wereda level was noted in Dinki (linked to the difficulties of access, bad road etc.) and Korodegaga (no reason given and a rather angry head teacher saying that they were “missing on the new things”).

A5.32) **School staff evaluation systems and results** - The data on this point is rather elusive, but there are noteworthy points about the systems employed to evaluate teachers.

A5.33) In most schools teacher performance was no longer evaluated exclusively by the head master. In Girar and Dinki the PTA was explicitly mentioned; students were said to also evaluate the teachers in Geblen and Dinki, where the head teachers noted that they provided forms to this effect. Students’ assessment was carried out weekly and monthly in Geblen. In Korodegaga the head teacher also explained that evaluation was carried out by a committee though he did not give details on this committee’s composition and how they did this.

A5.34) In Dinki (which seems to be the community in which the idea of ‘democratic rights’ has been taken furthest in all sorts of direction) since 1997 there were also regular students’ conferences organised by the kebele administration to enable students to express thoughts and any discontent with the school and teachers. The kebele Cabinet also showed that it followed things up closely: when they found out that teachers were asking students to do various chores for them and were punishing them harshly they reported this to the wereda and got this to stop.

A5.35) These more ‘participatory’ evaluation systems were not necessarily liked by teachers. In Geblen the head teacher noted that some teachers had complained. In Dinki some of PTA members were also not in favour of the system, noting that parents might assess negatively a teacher if their child was in conflict with him or her, and that they were not able to appreciate teachers’ performance and give ‘reasonable’ marks. One satellite school teacher explained that it was odd (indeed!) that the PTA would evaluate her whereas she didn’t even know them.

A5.36) The extent to which these systems really matter in how teachers are finally evaluated is not clear. In Dinki it was noted that there were also the evaluations by the students and the school administration anyway so it ‘didn’t matter too much’. Girar the head teacher mentioned that there were additional observations. As noted by the teachers themselves in Korodegaga and Yetmen, they are also assessed on the basis of the number of students that pass.

A5.37) The data that we have does not allow exploring whether there is a sense that teachers and head teachers are perceived to be “doing a good job” or not, generally or by certain groups of people. The protocols did not ask them to assess the performance or otherwise of the school staff, and led them to talk rather about the effectiveness or otherwise of the education policies, and about the relevance of educating children.

Annex 7. The government go-betweens in the field of social re/pro/duction¹³⁰

A6.1) This Annex supports section 5.5.

Community-government relationships

Government go-betweens had little influence on the pre-existing patterns of community-government relationships; they were held hostage when these relationships were tense

The key roles in mediating this relationship were with the kebele and sub-kebele leadership and, in some villages more strongly than in others, the community-initiated institutions

A6.2) In relation to the **thrust of the community-government relationships**, the lead roles were played by the kebele and sub-kebele structures and officials (willingly or unwillingly) on the one hand, and on the other hand by the community-initiated institutions such as the iddirs, Yetmen's Desh, and the clan structures in Girar and to some extent Korodegaga.

A6.3) The data shows that the government go-betweens were important in technical terms – including in the dissemination of the government 'model' of development as discussed below. In the pre-election period during which the fieldwork took place they were also involved in political issues, more explicitly so in some villages (Girar and Korodegaga) than in others. In this respect the kebele manager was perhaps the most 'political' of all the government go-betweens¹³¹. In Girar the kebele leader indeed highlighted that there had been a 'role-change' following the manager's posting. This is discussed in more detail in the next section on community management.

A6.4) But at the heart, the government go-betweens didn't seem to have a huge influence in changing the pre-existing pattern of the government-community relationships, a pattern which was specific to each village and moulded by the historical relationship between the community and 'the government'. For instance in Yetmen, the community-government relationship has been fairly antagonistic ever since the EPRDF took power, and there have been 'flare-ups' regularly. The presence of a larger number of government go-betweens didn't change this one way or another. They didn't appear at all among the main protagonists in the 'flares up' which occurred since their deployment (such as the affair of the secondary school that the wereda had decided to locate on grazing land, prompting a demonstration mobilised by the Dese and which turned violent).

A6.5) The **role of the community-initiated institutions** in the relationship was variable among the villages, as well as the issues around which these institutions were involved. It also seemed able to evolve over time. One common feature was not very significant role of the government go-betweens in the interactions concerned.

Box 27: The government go-betweens and community-initiated institutions

In **Girar** the intensive efforts exerted **against specific HTPs** and in relation to **promoting women's rights** rallied a **broad range of different types of actor**, including the (government) wereda WA office and HEWs, the (community, government-initiated) WA leadership, the (community-initiated) iddirs and equbs, the (Gurage customary) clan structures and institutions (such as the Ye Joka, the Gurage 'law'), and the different faith-based structures and institutions. This coalition of allies was new in that it did not exist at all in 1995 (suggesting social evolution and not mere reproduction). Government go-betweens operated within and used this coalition: as one iddir leader noted this enabled them to disseminate important messages and to 'work coherently with local societal beliefs and value systems'. But they had not been the ones to initiate this. In the specific case of Girar this

¹³⁰ See Evidence Basis for the data.

¹³¹ One can wonder whether this might mean that over time, DAs and other extension workers would actually be able to concentrate more on their professional job, in non-electoral periods at least. (DAs' involvement in non-professional issues has been a long-standing issue of concern of the donors).

coalition seemed to have evolved from UNICEF support to the women's right agenda and a seemingly active WA office at wereda level.

In several villages there were efforts to **involve customary dispute resolution and/or peace or security maintenance institutions** (e.g. wereda level Aba Gada in Turufe, elders' committee in Geblen). Again this was not done at the initiative of the community level government go-betweens but was initiated from the wereda level, relayed by the kebele leadership.

In Yetmen not only DAs, HEWs and teachers did not influence the prevailing government-community relationship much, but they were **held hostage of the bad-tempered nature of it**. As noted by the kebele leadership DAs, HEWs and teachers were regularly in trouble, failing to achieve their technical objectives, due to the community's overall reluctance to being mobilised and their using their democratic right not to participate. This meant that people were 'positive for the developmental packages which could bring benefits to individuals', but not the rest. Initial efforts to overcome the community's resistance through co-opting community-initiated organisations were stopped on order of the wereda when it was found that the Desh were the ones to have mobilised the community against the siting of the secondary school. Wereda officials also alleged that iddirs had become agents of the opposition. In all these tensions, the government go-betweens appeared to be non-actors or relegated in the backstage.

'Community work' practices

There were various arrangements for 'community work', ranging from free and entirely community-initiated to paid and entirely-government initiated (notably, the PSNP public works)

However, categories were not neatly demarcated – There was no standard pattern across villages as to what type of works would be done under which type of arrangements

Decision-making about what would be done and how and mobilising people to do it were quite complex processes; the government go-betweens pushing particular government policies (e.g. NRM, education expansion, water harvesting) were just one among many actors - and the different policies they pushed were in competition with each other in the prioritisation process

A6.6) There seemed to be four categories of 'community work':

- a) Works undertaken as a genuine community initiative;
- b) The 'food security related' FFW works in Geblen, Dinki and Korodegaga (PSNP or government emergency assistance), under which people are 'paid' for their labour (in cash or in food);
- c) Similar FFW activities under NGO-financed schemes – in Geblen
- d) Government-initiated but 'voluntary' community works (e.g. much of the terracing, tree-planting etc. is supposed to be done in this way).

A6.7) The government go-betweens had a role with regard to the 'food security related' activities in the villages concerned. In Korodegaga organising the PSNP public works was taking a fair amount of the DAs' time, and they and the kebele leadership were able to produce a list of works done over the past few years, distinguishing what had been PSNP and what had been 'voluntary' works. DAs also were getting per diem when they were 'facilitating' the PWs (fieldwork done in 2007 suggests that this is a new policy). In Geblen and Dinki it seemed to be less the case that the government go-betweens were spending much of their time on organising community works. However in Geblen this may well have been because of their general lack of motivation.

A6.8) Much of the 'community work' (including PSNP/FFW) arise from government policies. The government go-betweens might therefore 'suggest' activities to be considered (e.g. water and soil conservation activities, water reservoirs, latrines and other homestead arrangements, public latrines), but the kebele leadership is also instrumental in this. Mobilisation usually relies on 'joint work' by the government go-betweens and the kebele/sub-kebele structures and leadership.

A6.9) There is some evidence of a form of competition among sectors to first, get sector activities put on the list of what will be done as community works altogether (as opposed to 'private work' by the household itself to e.g. dig a latrine), and second, decide which of the community works will be 'paid' and which will not and be undertaken as 'voluntary work'. How this is decided is not clear from the data we have. The boundary between the community-initiated activities (a) and the government-initiated but free community work (d) is also not clear cut.

A6.10) As a result there is no uniform pattern, as illustrated below.

Box 28: Community work – What is done how

In Girar **water reservoirs** were done as **community work** (and female-headed households contributed cash instead of labour) even though their nature of 'public goods' was not very clear, except for the one dug in the pre-school compound; in contrast in Geblen digging water reservoirs was a **household 'private' work**.

In a number of villages **groups** were **mobilised** (usually YA members) to **dig latrines for households who did not have the labour force**. This may well have been a **community decision**, but it was likely to have been taken under **some pressure from the wereda and/or the HEWs** in the context of the 'latrine digging' campaign.

In Geblen one of the **satellite schools** was constructed through '**free community work**' whereas the **expansion of the main school** had been 'paid for' under the **PSNP**. It is not known whether this was a community/kebele decision or if it resulted from the wereda rejecting the satellite school construction as non-eligible for PSNP payment. The tabia leader reported that as a result it had been difficult to mobilise people especially as the work was hard, and the quality of the building was also not as good.

The **community** reportedly **initiated** the construction of **inside roads and bridges** in Girar, and of **connecting roads** in Geblen and Dinki. Again, there may have been some wereda prompting as part of a campaign to get all kebeles better connected - in the case of Girar there also were economic incentives as people wanted to be able to transport their eucalyptus wood for sale.

There are cases in which community and wereda **do not see eye to eye**. In Korodegaga the main concern of the community was to expand the main school to Gr6 (which was done with local labour) and they now want to expand to Gr8, which the wereda refused. Instead, the wereda pushed for the construction of a satellite school.

There were **a few cases** of work **fully community-initiated and wholly unrelated to government**, such as the construction of a shelter for an elderly destitute woman in Girar.

A6.11) The kebele Cabinet played the main role in deciding about these things. This means balancing a range of pushes from different sides, notably:

- The community's genuine 'own' priorities,
- Within this, the competition between different groups and/or geographical areas
- The wereda's ideas relayed by the government go-betweens
- Within this, the competition between different sectors
- The kebele leadership's own ideas; some party political priorities (Geblen)

A6.12) The government go-betweens are on the kebele cabinet so they may try to influence priorities there (through as noted earlier there is competition among sectors). In Dinki for instance, the head teacher said that the school indicates its needs in terms of community support, and it is up to the Cabinet to decide. It seemed to have been a similar process leading to school expansion in Girar and Turufe. In all three villages school expansion had to be prioritised over other things. Why and how this was arrived at was not said.

A6.13) In conclusion, whereas in all six villages the government go-betweens did have a role in promoting and organising various types of ‘community works’ they were just ones among many actors each pushing their own agenda through complex decision-making processes.

Dissemination of the government development model

The government go-betweens were seen as important means of disseminating the government development model, by themselves and the wereda and kebele officials

Community people perceived them as such as well: their main activity was said to be ‘teaching’

This was clearest for the DAs and HEWs

There is evidence that the ‘good governance’ approach has not weakened the importance of teaching by those who know as one of the main means to bring change

The government go-betweens did not seem to represent role models in a direct manner, but there seemed to be a number of indirect ways in which their presence at the community level had an influence on the younger generation

However, this influence was in competition with a number of other ‘role models’, also present in all communities – including ‘exit’ strategies like migration.

A6.14) Across the six villages community members identified a range of means through which they were made aware of the government development model – including meetings and training, radio programmes, the kebele leadership etc.

A6.15) De facto, the government go-betweens clearly had an important role in this respect too, through their own presence and the models, promoters, champions that they ‘groomed’, worked with, were involved in selecting, as well as the meetings, teaching, training etc. that they organised, gave or were involved in. This role of ‘change agent’ was most explicitly identified in relation to the DAs in Turufe and Yetmen, and the HEWs in Korodegaga (perhaps because the rollout of the HEP was the newest ‘big push’ in this village where HEWs had only been recently posted). Implicitly, their role was recognised everywhere as their main activity was regularly mentioned as being about ‘teaching’.

A6.16) Interestingly, teachers and head teachers were less seen in a role of change agents. They themselves insisted on their role in preparing the next generation of citizens etc. But in the education field a privately held model was emerging. In all six villages there were parents ‘investing’ in education. They had concerns as to whether this was a good idea (failure, unemployment etc.); but also high expectations about children/youth becoming able to lead another kind of life – very much a privately-undertaken path to something different. This does not mean that there was no longer any ‘teaching’ done and needed to further rollout the government model, like in the livelihoods and health fields. As we have seen the UPE campaigning was still very much a reality. But overall, the government model and the community model had become less far apart.

A6.17) Thus, slightly less so in education but certainly much the case in the livelihoods and health fields, the government development model is ‘taught’, and the government go-betweens are a very important teaching channel. The government model was said to no longer be enforced on people, in Yetmen and Dinki, in particular. Yet even in those villages there continued to be subtle ways of enforcing (e.g. distribution of bed nets favouring early latrine-diggers in Yetmen).

A6.18) On the whole, the data suggest that in spite of the ‘good governance’ discourse the process of disseminating the government model had continued to be mostly top-down. Even in Girar where some prominent community members declared themselves satisfied that ‘good governance had come to be true’, other interviews suggest that there was not much room for manoeuvre in e.g. whether or not one would participate to the (very successful) Gurage telethon, and even how much every individual was to pay.

A6.19) Another way in which the government go-betweens might influence the social re/pro/duction of the communities in which they work is by the mere fact that they ‘embody’ a different type of life. They are paid professionals, they have studied and have acquired ideas and values that are no longer those of the communities from where they come and/or in which they now work. That is, they might be **role models for the younger generation**. This is one of the assumptions underpinning the concern that there should be more women in positions of school head master or deputy head master for instance. There also is an expectation that HEWs might be a role model for the girls and young women of the communities in which they live.

A6.20) Our data does not have much to say about whether people from the community see it this way. The dominant impression is that this might well not work with regard to the DAs: they frequently move; there is no consensus on the fact that their advice is good value, or even needed by the successful farmers. It is harder to say for the other cadres.

A6.21) This does not mean that there is no ‘role model effect’ at all, but it did not seem to be systematic, nor was it direct. In some villages (Korodegaga and Dinki notably) there were parents mentioning the ‘role model’ that an older sibling, who had studied and had got a government job, represented for its younger siblings and other children/youth in the community. There were also reports that there was an increasing number of youth from the community who had gone for training as DAs, HEWs or teachers, in Girar and Geblen for instance. However, in all communities the young generation was also presented other role models – with the government packages at one end of the scale, and stories of successful migration at the other end of the scale.

Actively promoted/defended communities’ models

In most communities there were cases of active or passive resistance or avoidance vis-à-vis specific aspects of the government model

In some instances this resulted in strong feelings expressed at the government go-betweens (e.g. in relation to family planning by angered husbands)

However most often community members seemed to realise that government go-betweens are not decision-makers, and seemed to have little expectation that they might actually channel the community’s preference upward or indeed, stand to pressure from higher levels.

A6.22) There were a number of cases in which the community had mobilised itself to reject particular aspects of the government model. This ranged from peaceful to at times confrontational and even violent encounters. Several of the communities successfully mobilised against education policies such as self-contained teaching, automatic promotion and full-day schooling. They also mobilised against the ‘preventive only’ HEP model in Dinki and Yetmen where the weredas were compelled to deploy a nurse at the health post. In Yetmen and Dinkin again, the landed farmers mobilised against the wereda-promoted schemes whereby communal land would be given to youth groups. This also was received with distinct lack of enthusiasm, and implemented parsimoniously, in Geblen and in Turufe. The most striking example of the government model clashing with the local model was in Yetmen, where the community prevented the construction of a new secondary school on communal land.

A6.23) In many other instances the community’s attitude was not one of outright rejection, but successful feet-dragging or ‘fake compliance’ like with latrines, built but not used in most instances in Korodegaga and with the HEWs unsure of the extent to which they were used in Dinki, Geblen and Yetmen. Family planning is another policy area for which in a number of the villages it seemed common for people to indicate their support ‘in principle’ but actual uptake was uncertain.

A6.24) Turning now to the position and role of the government go-betweens in these ‘clashes’ or cases of ‘quiet resistance’, in a way they are just ‘messengers’ in the process of disseminating the government model. However, as they are ‘around’ in ways that decision-makers are not, it was at

them that community members, at times, expressed their unhappiness or even anger in relation to particular policies.

A6.25) The strongest expressions of this were about the HEWs' inability to provide curative services, and their role in promoting family planning which angered considerably some husbands in Girar. In Korodegaga teachers noted that parents hated them when they were going at their home to try to get the children enrolled or back at school. Elsewhere as well (in Yetmen, Girar and Dinki) teachers expressed considerable dislike of their role in the UPE campaigning, presumably for the same reason, that putting pressure on unwilling parents was a very unpleasant thing to do. In somewhat of a contrast, in Geblen where the food security packages were enforced on people and DAs were involved in this, it seemed that the community was quite clear about the DAs' own lack of power about this. There certainly was anger but it was directed at the community go-betweens and in particular, the kebele leadership which had been unwilling to stand up against the wereda pressure.

A6.26) So people were against some parts of the government model, were able to organise themselves to reject these in some cases, could at times be angry at the government go-betweens (and the other go-betweens) because they were the ones to exert pressure or fail to do something. However, the dominant impression is that people knew that decisions are made 'elsewhere' i.e. they knew that the go-betweens are just messengers of decisions coming from the top, down.

A6.27) There were only few explicit views that the 'top-down' nature of the process of government model dissemination was faulty. One such case was in Dinki, where a cell leader noted

Positions (of responsibility) should be filled by people elected by the community. Nowadays this is not the case; positions are filled by people who are appointed by people who are themselves in a position already. So, they bring the things to be approved by the community. When people give suggestions they are challenged by questions like "where did you see this? How do you know?" This humiliates and discourages people. Unless the government goes deep to analyse the problems and bring changes, there will be no progress.

A6.28) In Geblen too, whilst not directed against the DAs there were strong views against the top-down pressure on households to take packages which were failing for most of them, thus dragging them down instead of helping them to move toward more secure types of livelihood.

A6.29) There was no suggestion that the government go-betweens should perhaps challenge the top-down model or that they should stand up against some of the wereda decisions. There seemed to be little expectation that they might relay the community's priorities to the wereda.

Annex 8. The government go-betweens in the field of community governance¹³²

A7.1) This Annex supports section 5.6

Who are the government go-betweens in the community governance field?

All government go-betweens were represented on the Kebele Cabinet, although there was no specific evidence that this gave them far more say on community governance matters

To an extent, their presence on the Cabinet made them judges and parties: the accountability relationship between them and 'the Cabinet' as representing the community is blurred

The balance of power between kebele manager and kebele leader varied a lot across villages, depending on personalities and on the post-holder's interpretation of his role (including as an external 'check and balance' on the kebele leadership in some villages)

The deployment of the kebele manager highlighted a subtle tension between elected representatives often with low formal qualifications and the alleged need for professionalism to better run the kebele affairs

A7.2) The kebele managers were important government go-betweens in the community governance field in all six villages although their role was variably interpreted. Their deployment was the newest recent change in the field of community governance over the past few years.

A7.3) Earlier (and at various dates), the other go-betweens had become more closely involved in the community governance through having one representative sitting as a member of the kebele Cabinet: the 'senior DA', one education representative who when there is only one school is the head teacher, and the 'senior HEW'. The table below summarises what we know about (i) when the go-betweens became involved in the community governance field and (ii) their role in it, in their own views and in the views of others and notably, the kebele leader.

Table 18: The DAs, HEWs and education staff in the community governance field

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|------------------------------|--|---|--|---|---|---|
| Cabinet appoint. date | 1998 8-member Cabinet | 1996 and 1999 for education; 13-member Cabinet | Not said 10-member Cabinet (incl manager) | 2000/2002 (not clear) 8-member Cabinet | Not said 7-member Cabinet | Not said 5-member Cabinet incl manager – though elsewhere said 7 |
| Role | Extension workers: Not discussed Kebele leader: reduced interaction with sector workers since kebele manager in post. | Extension workers: Not discussed Kebele leader: "Stream Committee" (no detail on link with Cabinet) monitors sector and sector | Extension workers: Cabinet as team since 2001 (wereda training on expansion strategy) Kebele leader: Cabinet works with all sector workers as team. Not on very technical things. | HEW: Kebele leader calls for meetings as he has more influence but even so people don't come. Otherwise role on Cabinet not discussed. Kebele vice: DA, HEW, HT replaced | HT: Since 2001 involved in community mobilization for all activities. HEW monthly report to wereda officials as (kebele) Cabinet member Kebele leader: Cabinet gives directions to | HEW: Cabinet not committed. Manager: Cabinet discusses HEWs' monthly report; HT discusses issues with Cabinet (e.g. children's enrolment). |

¹³² See Evidence Basis for the data.

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|--|-------|-----------------------|--|---|--|--------|
| | | workers' performance. | WA leader: In past few years all workers were changed; not working well, community complained, wereda changed them. | farmers previously responsible for sectors on Cabinet. In this way their concerns are addressed easily. | extension workers and evaluates their activities. DA, HEW & HT members so involved in decision-making on development issues. | |

A7.4) In the four villages in which some of the government go-betweens commented on their position vis-à-vis the kebele Cabinet, their comments were not very specific. As noted earlier, the kebele Cabinet is supposed to facilitate the work of the go-betweens by mobilising the community, giving the example, working jointly with them on campaigns etc. Whether this makes a difference or not is a matter of commitment or lack thereof (Turufe) but also, commitment may not suffice if the overall relationship between the community and the government is confrontational (Yetmen).

A7.5) The other way round, in some (but not all) villages the kebele leadership or the manager indicated that the Cabinet was directing (Korodegaga) or overseeing (Geblen, Turufe) the work of the go-betweens. However, it was only in Dinki that government go-betweens had been changed after complaints by the community relayed by the kebele leadership or other notable people (the WA head). In Korodegaga the interviews of both the kebele leaders and the government go-betweens suggest that there was some unease with the go-betweens being evaluated by the Cabinet at the same time as they sit on it.

Table 19: The kebele manager in the community governance field

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|---|
| Deployment date | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 (but 3 rd or 4 th manager in the job) | 2001 | 2001 (should have been 1999 but late) | 1999 |
| Training for the job | Management training, no duration given | Management training: 15 days Region | Training on planning: 7 days | One day orientation | Not said | One month, further training every 3 months |
| Role | Manager: 'Voiceless' Cabinet member but can give ideas at meetings Supports & works under kebele leader Kebele leader: Manager assigned to organize but 'dictates as boss because he is paid'; reduces leader interaction with wereda | Manager: As organizer, calls meetings & makes evaluation happen. Fulfills professional tasks. (Uneducated) kebele leader responsible for mobilization. Facilitates Cabinet keeping documentation and meetings' minutes, and give remarks and opinion | Manager: Coordinate kebele admin; works together with Chair. Nothing happens in kebele w/out wereda knowing through manager. Not from community so no bias and can check possible biases by kebele officials. 'Manager is like salt, he is in everything'. Kebele leader: | Manager: Participates to Cabinet discussions without vote, not a member. Chairman evaluates his performance but they have to work in collaboration Kebele leader: Does not have vote in decisions, can give ideas. No decision-making power. Chairman | Manager: Doesn't have decision, takes minutes. Cabinet could order manager. Wereda Administrator gives monthly orientation to managers. Kebele official: Cabinet decides, manager writes minutes. But reduced interaction between | Manager: Takes Cabinet minutes Kebele leader: Manager can decide on all issues except financial, if matters don't need chairman. |

| | Girar | Geblen | Dinki | Yetmen | Korodegaga | Turufe |
|--|--|--|---|--|---|--------|
| | DAs and HEWs work under his directions on political matters. Relations with DAs not good. | Kebele leader: Great assistance in governance field as responsible to respond to service seeker's complaints. | Accountable to kebele administration, manager doesn't have voice in Cabinet decisions but reports to wereda DAs, HEWs, HT: role in reporting. | supervises and evaluates manager's performance HT, Vet, DA: Role in reporting. | wereda and kebele leader. DAs, HEWs, HT: Role in reporting & control of workers' time/work. | |

A7.6) The balance of power between kebele leader and manager seemed to vary significantly across the villages. Partly this was shaped by still unfolding changes in the configuration of the kebele-wereda linkages. There were also tensions around the fact that when the manager arrived, the Cabinet members stopped getting the allowances that they used to receive to compensate the time spent on 'public matters'. The idea behind this change was that with a full-time manager, the elected officials wouldn't need to spend as much time on kebele affairs as they used to and so it was all right to stop compensating them. Whether elected officials and especially, the kebele leader, really spent less time on 'public affairs', seemed closely linked to how demanding the wereda was (e.g. in Dinki the workload did not seem to have decreased, notably due to the 'expansion strategy' launched in 2001) and how committed the leader was (e.g. in Girar and Geblen there seemed to have been little change in the workload of the kebele leaders).

A7.7) The issue of being no longer paid was variably important. It is noteworthy that in Dinki, it wasn't against the manager that the kebele leadership was angry, but against the 'well-paid' wereda officials, bossing them around from their far more comfortable offices.

Box 29: Power relation between kebele leader and manager

In **Girar**, the kebele leader was a well-liked and respected, longstanding leader who remained in post whilst many other kebele leaders in other kebeles and other Cabinet members in Girar were replaced in the post-2005 election 'good governance drive' period. He said that he didn't mind working for free and he was happy with the feedback he got from the community, but he was unhappy as his work was not appreciated by officials, and the manager **tried to act as a boss just because he was paid**. There should be payment for Cabinet members. The kebele manager, perhaps to placate the leader with whom he says he clashes at times, said that he wished the chairman and vice-chairman would be paid.

In **Geblen** the issue of payment was not mentioned. Apart from a reference to the fact that the kebele leader was an uneducated person, nothing suggested that the manager was trying to take the upper hand. The kebele leader was a respected ex-fighter elected in this position in 1997, and who was recognised to have elevated Geblen to the 2nd rank in the wereda in terms of governance – although there were allegations of nepotism by the leadership, and cracks under the surface around the issue of enforcement of packages.

In **Dinki** the manager stressed that he and the kebele leader needed to work together, but also **positioned himself as a 'wereda spy'**, explaining that as he was from outside the community he could **check on kebele officials' nepotism**. The kebele leader mentioned that he used to get an allowance before the manager was deployed. However, his main resentment at being not paid now was more against the wereda officials causing him trouble with unrealistic demands, "saying what they want" and being paid yet having a much more comfortable job.

In **Yetmen** the manager was very new in the job. Kebele officials indeed noted that when he came their allowance stopped to be paid, in spite of promises to the contrary. The manager recommended that leaders should be paid some incentives so as to work more effectively, or else should be allowed to leave when they requested. Indeed the vice-chairman explained that as far he was concerned, he thought the sector workers could well manage most of the kebele work and the manager deal with coordination so

that non-paid cabinet members wouldn't need to be involved full-time in the kebele work plan implementation.

In **Korodegaga** the **power struggle and issue around payment didn't seem to be as significant**. The manager was proposed by the kebele leadership to the wereda, which may have helped in striking more harmonious relationships.

In **Turufe** the kebele leader mentioned that he was no longer paid but was more interested in continuing the education programme he had undertaken at a private college in Shashemene and 'benefiting from this'.

A7.8) What explain these variations are probably varying combination of personality-related factors and others arising from how the job of kebele manager was presented to the post-holders and is interpreted on a day-to-day basis. The manager was clearly an important political actor in Girar ("chained connection" to the wereda, directing other government go-betweens in political work). This also seemed to be the case in Korodegaga (monthly orientation of managers by Wereda Administrator) and in Dinki (where he explained that they were reporting on phone every two days to the ANDM on election issues).

A7.9) Linked to these issues in most villages there was a subtle tension between elected representatives, with sometime low formal qualifications, and the alleged need for professionalism hence educated/ appointed people, to run kebele affairs better. This implicit 'debate' was present in various ways:

- In Girar the leader felt 'bossed' around by the manager, paid and educated and on his side, the manager disliked the fact that things in the kebele were run 'just by common sense'
- In Geblen the tabia manager stressed that he was fulfilling tasks requiring professionalism and recommended that some positions related to land management and social court be given to appointed educated people, though in this case this also had to do, allegedly, with a concern of avoiding nepotism
- In Dinki the manager similarly stressed the importance of professionalism – as did the kebele leadership. The manager was of the opinion that in the long run there would be no need for a kebele chair or other officials. He explained that the kebele manager could handle many things on his own if his capacity was increased. Like in Geblen this was linked to the idea that people from outside the community would be better able to give fair services to everyone.
- In Yetmen on the contrary, the DA who is Cabinet member said that the presence of the kebele manager was unnecessary and the community should be led by community members.

What do kebele managers do and not do

Kebele managers have four main roles: they give administrative services to people, handle complaints, and facilitate the kebele administration's functioning and reporting to the wereda

The way complaints were acted upon (as opposed to being 'systematically recorded' by the manager) was not clear; it seemed that it was often still involving extensively the kebele leaders

The role of the manager with regard to the kebele administration functioning/reporting varied across villages (including re: the kebele plan and other go-betweens' activities and reporting)

The role of the manager was still evolving; it seemed to be more village-specific which may be linked to the less technical and more administrative nature of their role and the fact that GOE is still in the process of defining what the kebele administration should look like.

A7.10) The kebele managers seemed to have four broad types of task:

- i) They give **administrative services** to the community members (e.g. ID cards)
- ii) **They receive and handle complaints** about various issues and ensure that these are addressed in a systematic manner – although the exact way these complaints were handled was not clear-cut and seemed to vary somewhat across villages (see more on this below)

- iii) **They facilitate’ the functioning of the kebele administration** and in particular, of the Cabinet (minute-taking, documentation and filing system) – and of some other kebele organizations in some of the villages (e.g. he was also organizing the agenda of the kebele Council in Girar)
- iv) They have a key role in the **kebele reporting to the wereda** (which was much appreciated by the kebele leaders in Dinki in particular).

A7.11) Other tasks were mentioned though these differed across villages. In addition to differences in their role in relation to politics, the following was mentioned:

- In Girar and Korodegaga they were apparently following up extension workers’ work quite closely – with some resentment on the DAs’ side in Girar.
- In Girar the manager was also ‘partly involved in tax collection’.
- In Geblen he and the kebele leader emphasized the manager’s role in ensuring that all money collected was properly receipted
- In Dinki the manager was working with elders and had a plan to work with iddirs, whereas on the contrary in Girar the manager noted that he wasn’t involved with the customary organizations but that the kebele administration, as a lower administrative institution, was working with them (in contrast with him having a “chained connection” with the wereda).
- In Yetmen he seemed to be involved in the implementation of harsh measures decided by the wereda court in cases of e.g. divorces or failure in loan repayment (and he disliked this as he feared this would one day cause him trouble with people).
- In Korodegaga the manager insisted on his role as source of data and information on the kebele for anyone who would need them.
- In Turufe he explained that he was the one to invite (by letter) iddirs to raise funds when the wereda had decided that the kebele had to contribute a given amount for something.

A7.12) In relation to **complaints handling** there was an emphasis in all six villages on the fact that this had become organized, through standardized formats and so people didn’t have to pay other people to write them application letters, and they didn’t have to wait for their case to be handled (meaning, recorded on the relevant form). However, once recorded the case might have to be seen by the Chair when he would be around, and/or the Cabinet (then the Council if the Cabinet couldn’t handle it though this was mentioned only in Dinki); or the plaintiff might be directed to the ‘relevant body’ at wereda level. Which cases were handled how was not said. Whether on the whole this resulted in more efficient services and greater satisfaction of the community and how this was ‘measurable’ is discussed in the next section.

A7.13) With regard to facilitating the functioning of the kebele Cabinet and reporting to the wereda, these tasks seemed to include taking a lead role in producing an **integrated kebele plan**, and **monitoring** how the kebele plan was implemented. However, the content and boundaries of this role were not identical across the villages. As a related point, the extent to which the manager seemed to play a role of channel ‘downwards’ between the wereda and the kebele also varied. This is summarized below.

Box 30: The kebele manager’s role in planning, work planning and monitoring

The manager in **Girar** explained that he was **controlling** the extension workers’ time at work. However, the integrated kebele plan was reportedly prepared by one of the DAs and the head teacher. The manager explained that he got guidance from the wereda, which was approving the election of Cabinet members, forwarding planned activities to be discussed at kebele level, evaluating the kebele’s performance and meeting the manager to discuss.

In **Geblen**, the manager pictured a **comprehensive** role for himself in relation to **integrated planning and implementation supervision**, facilitating and coordinating sector activities, calling for meetings and causing evaluation to happen. He was also responsible of the implementation of proclamations,

directives and instructions (of the wereda) at kebele level and there were meetings every quarter with wereda officials to discuss the kebele performance. It is noteworthy that **these things do not figure in the kebele leader's description of the manager's role.**

In **Dinki** the manager insisted a lot more on his role in **reporting**, as noted earlier somewhat like a spy, and also in relation to **political developments** at the kebele level. He noted that when zonal and wereda officials came they took the manager responsible for anything that went wrong and any sector performing badly.

In **Yetmen** like in Girar the manager mentioned his role in **monitoring** the implementation schedules of the other go-betweens, but this seemed **less 'intrusive'**. The wereda would send feedback on the kebele reports and also, come unexpectedly to evaluate it and give directives.

In **Korodegaga**, there seemed to be some **confusion (or competition)** between manager and Cabinet in relation to **planning, directing and monitoring the extension workers' work** (the kebele leaders stressed this as a prerogative of the Cabinet, though extension workers explained that the kebele manager was quite active in controlling what they were doing). There was also confusion/competition in relation to **interactions with the wereda**. Kebele officials explained that they got guidelines on issues to be done at the kebele level through the chair whilst the manager said that the wereda's guidance was for the chair and the manager, or just the manager depending on the case. The Wereda Administrator himself was giving monthly orientation to all managers.

In **Turufe**, the manager explained that **he prepared the plan** through discussion with the Cabinet members, presented it to the community and adjusted it accordingly. The wereda was closely following up the plan implementation (through fortnightly visits) and in particular the performance of the kebele administration in terms of community mobilization, telling the Cabinet to select new members if there were weaknesses.

A7.14) The above suggests that the role of the kebele manager is still evolving, which is not surprising considering that the deployment of the kebele managers was the latest of the measures taken by the government which intensified its presence at the community level. It also appears that their role is 'moulded' by village-specific circumstances, including the nature of the relation between the community and the wereda, more than might be the case for the other government go-betweens. This may arise from the less technical and more administrative nature of their job – at a stage in which the government is gradually identifying new 'services' that should be part of the array of services that a 'modern' government provides (e.g. complaint handling).

Perceptions of effectiveness of the kebele managers

Views of the kebele leaders on the usefulness of the manager were strongly contrasting across the six villages, from most useful to useless and trying to 'boss' the kebele leader around

There were very few views from the community, mainly on the (theoretical?) benefits of the more systematic complaint handling process

Kebele managers stressed a number of administrative achievements; they reported a huge workload; they had less acute complaints about lack of inputs than the other go-betweens

Some of the managers complained about the kebele administration; several of them expressed that they were at times feeling trapped in unpleasant 'harsh' roles which could jeopardize their relationship with the community.

A7.15) Taking first the **kebele leaders' views** about the managers' role and effectiveness, the picture was quite contrasted. On balance, in Gebelen the kebele officials seemed to perceive the role of the manager as broadly positive. They were appreciative of his role mainly in relation to the administrative and appeal/complaint handling tasks, the latter being very important for the kebele's good governance. In Dinki the balance seemed positive as well, kebele officials seemed to be grateful to have someone who was doing the reporting! Although the YA leader stressed that there was a major problem in keeping managers more than a few months and the previous one was no good. In Girar on the contrary, the kebele leader was at pain to stress that he was still carrying out a heavy

workload. Of course the manager was doing some of what he used to do before, but this was just office work, whilst he (the kebele leader) was left with the huge task of working in each village. The kebele officials did not express strong views one way or another in Yetmen, Korodegaga and Turufe.

A7.16) There were very few views from community members¹³³. In Dinki one person noted that as the manager was appointed by the wereda he could write if he saw anything not right with the kebele officials. And in Turufe people noted that with the kebele manager clients did not wait for settling cases and did no longer have to pay to write letters exposing their case.

A7.17) The managers stressed a number of achievements, much around administrative improvements, and making the link with good governance. For instance the manager in Geblen explained that as decisions of meetings were on minutes there was increased transparency and cases were no longer forgotten. Staff appointment, performance evaluation based on a feedback questionnaire collected from society, all this was recorded. He also stressed that people's time was saved, which was the government intention (time no longer wasted in administrative processes could be used to work hard and develop one's household to reach self-reliance). The same point (time saved) was noted by the managers in Dinki and Turufe. In Dinki the manager noted that he had both significantly reduced the workload of the kebele officials, and allowed this 'backward kebele' to address its very serious reporting gap – which had been recognized by zonal and wereda officials. In Turufe the manager referred to the filing system for documents which had been put in place (like in Geblen).

A7.18) In all villages the managers stressed that they had a considerable workload ('huge' in Girar; no cover, in Turufe; nobody who wouldn't do this job could realize, in Dinki). They also had complaints either about the kebele administration or the wereda.

- In Girar the manager said he sometimes argued with the Chairman because the work was done just by common sense and not as per the rules and regulations
- In Geblen his main concerns were about nepotism and the fact that important issues such as appeals were handled by uneducated people
- In Dinki the manager was finding difficult to have to receive complaints even on the kebele leader, and the fact that tasks were piling one upon the other endlessly. His biggest problem seemed to be how to strike a balance between reporting and doing things. Reporting was very time-consuming and leaving insufficient time for the outreach work needed to make things happen, yet he was penalized by a lower score on his result-based score performance assessment if one single report was late
- In Yetmen the issues had to do with the community's generally difficult attitude (including in relation to taxes) and the slowness of kebele officials in making decisions as they had no incentives.
- In Korodegaga too, the manager's complaints were about Cabinet (absenteeism) and the community's attitude (not accepting when he was directing them to the relevant office, and requesting services at untimely schedule which was disturbing his life).

A7.19) In a number of instances kebele managers reported that they were feeling trapped in unpleasant roles – like in Korodegaga (in cases of violent disputes that they had to handle, as well as problems in the selection of PSNP beneficiaries and with loans not being paid), in Dinki (where the kebele manager stressed that violent disputes about land could be life-threatening) and in Turufe

¹³³ In the module 4 community members were asked questions on the role and effectiveness of DAs and HEWs specifically. There was also a set of questions on 'good governance' but not specifically about the kebele manager. In the responses there were very few mentions of the manager.

(where he said that he disliked having to implement harsh measures decided by the wereda court against some households or spouses in disputes related to divorces).

A7.20) There were rather fewer complaints about lack of resources than expressed by the other go-betweens. Worthy of note, in Dinki the kebele administration had been given a budget for stationery, mainly for the kebele office, social court, and party structures. In Turufe on the contrary the manager explained that he had to buy most stationary items from his pocket. In Korodegaga too the lack of stationary was an issue.

Annex 9. Services and government go-betweens before 2010¹³⁴

Geblen

Since 1992 two agricultural extension agents and one NRM agent served 3 kebeles - with two agricultural cadres and two women development cadres (local people) working with them, and under each cadre, 10 model farmers and women. The extension agents only visited the cadres who in turn visited the model farmers and women. Services were advice on terracing, farming and NRM; and a zonal artificial insemination programme recently started. In 2003 those living far from the tabia centre had reportedly no access to animal health services as agents did not want to go there.

In 1995 the nearest health facilities were a clinic and pharmacy at 22 kms. In 2003 a health centre had been established in Adikelembes (30 min walk from tabia centre) and there was a store with tablets for small diseases although it was not easy for the poor to pay. In 1995 there were community level 'torches of health' – a legacy of the TPLF period when the TPLF health authorities and REST had trained selected peasant women in pre- and post-natal care, delivery services and health education about family planning, nutrition, and communicable diseases. However, the scheme faced difficulties and had little impact. The 'torches' did not have delivery kits, they were not paid, and they did not have health posts where the women seeking the services could go.

The 'torches' promoted family planning but by 1995 there was generally resistance (religion, dislike of foreign substances in bodies). In 2003 family planning was said to be available (no detail was given).

In 1995 the nearest school was found at 12 kms from the tabia centre; just 5% of the boys and 6 girls in the whole community attended school. Apart from trained TBAs and peasants trained as cadres there was no trained person in the village. In 2003 there was a Gr1-4 school and people had started to be concerned by the lack of opportunities for Grade 10 completers or leavers.

In 2003 the wereda-level decentralisation was seen as a mixed blessing, including because it would likely alter the balance of power between the tabia and its TPLF-inherited governance structures (general assembly and elected bodies), and the wereda.

Dinki

In 1995 crops like onions, tomatoes, bananas, papayas etc. were said to have been introduced ten to forty years ago. The MOA had started its activities in 1994, with a nursery where people could work as daily labourers. Extension agents from MOA and an NGO trained 'contact farmers' about different agricultural practices such as fertiliser and improved seeds (which could be obtained on credit from MOA or bought from traders).

In 1995 the nearest clinic was in Aliyu Amba, 2 hours walk from Dinki; there was no doctor or nurse and irregular supply of basic, paid-for drugs. There were traditional practitioners in the village, and some vaccination of women. There was no change in 2003 except for some prevention activity (vaccination, health education), not well accepted.

In 1995 abortion and local means were used to prevent conception or unwanted pregnancies; some people said they used condoms. In 2003 family planning was said not to be available when wanted, but there were views that this was against god.

In 1995 there was a Gr1-6 school in Chibite, the kebele centre at 2 hours walk from Dinki. Just 1% of the boys and no girl from Dinki attended. In 2003 the community had built a Gr1-4 school in a nearer hamlet but many students were dropping out. In 1995 women said literacy and numeracy for girls was not important and would make them walk away from their husband. In 2003 men expressed scepticism about the practicality of teaching about women's rights ("it creates nothing").

¹³⁴ This Annex is based on evidence base 3 of Stage One final report (i.e. impacts of development interventions).

EPRDF political cadres were introduced at the community level in 1993. In 2003 decentralisation was said to have brought things (services, decision-making) nearer to the community. The government go-betweens interviewed (teachers, one nurse, an extension worker) all complained about separation from spouse.

Korodegaga

In 1995 fertiliser was said to be available from MOA, as well as improved seeds (on credit since 1992). Veterinary services had started in 1961 (free, available twice a year, clinic in Awash Melkasa in 1963), although extension workers were often coming too late to vaccinate animals against diseases. Extension workers had started to frequently visit the PA to get feedback on the use of chemical fertiliser, since 1980.

A health clinic in Awash Melkasa had started in 1963 (drugs in store); new clinics had started in Dera and Sodere in 1984. By 1995 two farmers were trained in each PA to teach people on malaria prevention; there had been vaccination for children and pregnant women since 1984; UNICEF had trained 'first aiders' (3 months) who were buying medicines and other items at the nearest Red Cross shop and giving tablets and injections. In 2003 people had contributed to build a "higher clinic in town"; but given transport and drug costs and lack of medicine it was better to go to private clinics. Already in 2003 people pointed that teaching about sanitation (done by wereda officials) was good but not practical as nothing was done to provide water ("I cannot dig water by myself").

In 1995 many people knew about contraceptives but they were not used as it was against god.

In 1995 reportedly most adults in the community could read and write thanks to the 1979 literacy campaign. A Gr1-4 school was built in 1990. By 1995 only one woman had gone as far as Gr7, no other woman had completed elementary (Gr6), no-one had gone to college and apart from the first aider no-one had had any training. In 2003 apart for teachers' salaries all other costs were met fully by the community, suggesting as a teacher put it that the school had been built 'without a plan'.

In 1995 there was visible distrust in the policies of the EPRDF government, said to 'belong only to Tigrayans'. Feelings about decentralisation, in 2003, were mixed.

Girar

In 1995 government was said to provide seedlings and new types of crops that no-one used, and insecticide and pesticide for about 2 years then this stopped, which the community was deploring. There were model farmers. Crossbreeding was not known. The government provided cattle medicine for two years then it also stopped. In 2003 there was no report on extension but credit was available for farm activities at the wereda.

In 1995 people called mainly on self-medication, traditional healers and TBAs. There was a government clinic (few drugs) and drug shop in town, and a mission hospital at 12 kms. There was some vaccination; some people had latrines; the community had requested clean water from govt. There was no change in facilities and still no clean water in 2003, but more preventive activities: immunisation and education on TB, HIV and malaria. Family planning was available but there was irregular supply of contraceptives.

A primary school had been established in 1947 and a high school in the wereda town in 1957. In 1995 they reportedly lacked equipment and materials. In 2003 they were supported by community contributions and NGO but not the government.

Gurage structures and institutions had prominent roles in 1995 (as the PA lost power in the first few years after the fall of the Derg); much less so in 2003 – they were important again in 2010. Most perceptions of decentralisation in 2003 were positive including in relation to women's rights.

Turufe

Mechanised agriculture (tractor) was introduced in 1956 as the imperial government encouraged privatised, market-oriented agriculture in the area, involving mass evictions of local people. Under the Derg MOA helped farmers to build terraces to prevent erosion but this ended in 1992 with the change of government. In 1995 agricultural extension agents seldom visited the PA. MOA had helped stop epidemics of livestock diseases. MOA agents could provide artificial insemination for crossbreeding but people were not interested. Almost all farmers used fertilisers (introduced 1962) and pesticides. Livelihoods were already fairly diversified with non-/off-farm activities (proximity of towns). In 2003 there were DAs providing fertiliser and improved seeds on credit, which was stopped since.

During the Derg era vaccination for pregnant women was provided by MoH workers but this stopped with the EPRDF. In 1995 the Shashemene general hospital provided general health services; there was a mission clinic (6 kms) and a doctor (2 kms). In 2003 vaccination for babies was provided. There was no change in health facilities.

By 1995 with the end of the Derg family planning campaign most people had stopped using it. In 2003 some FP service was provided by NGOs; the demand was increasing as women wanted to have fewer babies and FP was seen as important by the younger generation.

In 1995 primary schooling was well developed (any farmer who could afford was sending 'some children'). There was one Gr1-6 school and a higher school nearby (2-3 kms). There were already 60 unemployed school leavers. In 2003 the regional language policy created difficulties for non-Oromo residents and some were sending their children to study elsewhere.

The Oromo customary 'gada' system had an important role in security, policing and justice in 1995; this was found again in 2010, with a wereda level 'aba gada'. In 2003 decentralisation was seen with mixed views as the (much vaster) kebele had no resources and no personnel to give services to the community.

Yetmen

In 1995 some agricultural extension service was provided; fertiliser (introduced in 1969) was available (private traders). MOA provided vaccination services for cattle every year and there was veterinary service but no cross-breeding. In 2003 there were extension services to educate farmers on methods of cultivation, sowing, fertiliser application, and use of high-yield improved seeds. Improved cattle breeds had been introduced by the extension services.

In 1995 the nearest hospital was 77kms but there was a private clinic and drug vendor in urban Yetmen. In 1995 family planning was not used apart for a few 'prostitutes'. In 2003 it was available.

In 1995 there was an elementary school. In 2003 attention to education was said to be growing, but there was no sign of increased expenditures by the government apart improved salaries. There was shortage of teachers, desks, chairs and textbooks, and high price of stationery and uniforms was an issue for poor families.

Annex 10. Further details from review of international experience

Figure 6: Schematic illustration of the range of programmes of health extension workers:

| WHEN | 1950s | China (1950s) | India (late 1970s, collapsed in a few years in most states) | Brazil (mid-1980s, national 1994) | Ghana, Pakistan (1994) | Ethiopia (2004/5) (with earlier donor and NGO-led schemes) | 2011 |
|-----------|--|--|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|
| SCALE | Small-scale | NGO-supported local schemes – multiple countries | | India – state-wide programmes | | Ethiopia, Brazil, Ghana – nation-wide programmes | national |
| PAY | Unpaid volunteer | India – compensation (in cash/kind) responsibility of communities | | Ethiopia, Ghana, Brazil – monthly salary | | Pakistan – monthly salary and given an annual raise as an incentive | Monthly salary + benefits |
| TRAINING | No training | Nigeria – 6 days training for maternal and neo-natal community health workers | | Pakistan – 3 month training | Ethiopia – 1yr training | Ghana – 18 month training and 6 weeks in methods of outreach | Rigorous training |
| SELECTION | Not from community; no community role in selection | Ethiopia – very few from the community; in theory at kebele level, in practice by woreda | | Brazil – came from and served own communities | | Pakistan – recruited from local communities, esp. in rural areas | From community; community role in selection |
| SERVICES | Specialist | Nigeria: maternal and neo-natal | | Ghana, Pakistan - hygiene, child immunization, basic curative and other basic health issues | | | Generalist |

Note: This is a rough comparison only due to data limitations. Various sources have been used, all undertaken for different purposes; not all provide the same detail and they cover different timeframes.

Sources: Best and Onyenaporo 2010; Bhutta et al 2010; Lehmann and Sanders 2007; Lewin et al 2010; Prasad and Muraleedharan 2007; USAID 2009

Box 31: Preliminary findings from the worldwide agricultural extension study

China: 617,019 extension staff

- Crops = 341,357
- Livestock = 238,775
- Fisheries = 36,887

India: Approx. 100,000 staff

- 60,000 front-line ext. staff
- 5,000 KVK staff
- 35,000 ext/adv staff in livestock, hort., fisheries and forestry

Indonesia: 53,944 ext. staff

- 27,922 permanent staff
- 24,551 with 3-year contracts

Bangladesh:12,918 (crops only; waiting on livestock, fisheries & NGOs)

Japan = 4,584 ext. staff (2008)

Korea:4,588 ext. staff

Cambodia: 1,244 ext. staff

Myanmar:4,534 ext. staff

Philippines:303 at national level

Vietnam:79 at national level

Turkey:5,164 ext. staff


Egypt:7,421 ext. staff

Yemen:1,436 ext. staff

Ethiopia:45,812 ext. staff

Malawi:2,868 ext. staff

Chile:488 ext. staff




(Swanson no date) <http://www.worldwide-extension.org/>:

Pupil to Teacher Ratios by region, 1985-2004

Globally the primary school teacher to pupil ratio¹³⁵ has remained steady at around 30 pupils per teacher in 2004¹³⁶ with all regions on fewer than 30 pupils per teacher except for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. For secondary school, globally there were around 24 pupils per teacher in 2000 and 2004, with Sub-Saharan Africa with the highest ratio over time with 34 in 2000 and 32.7 in 2004.

Figure 7: World-wide evidence: Pupil per teacher ratios over time and in 2007



Ten countries with highest pupil teacher ratios- primary and secondary, 2007

| 10 Countries with the Highest Primary Pupil Teacher Ratios (2007) | | |
|---|--------------------------|------|
| 1 | Central African Republic | 91.1 |
| 2 | Rwanda | 69.3 |
| 3 | Malawi | 66.8 |
| 4 | Mozambique | 64.8 |
| 5 | Chad | 60.4 |
| 6 | Congo, Rep. | 58.5 |
| 7 | Uganda | 57.0 |
| 8 | Tanzania | 53.1 |
| 9 | Burundi | 52.0 |
| 10 | Mali | 51.7 |

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics in EdStats, Aug 2009
Note: Data was not available for 85 countries.

| 10 Countries with the Highest Secondary Pupil Teacher Ratios (2007) | | |
|---|-------------|------|
| 1 | Eritrea | 49.3 |
| 2 | Zambia | 42.6 |
| 3 | Guinea | 38.2 |
| 4 | Mozambique | 36.9 |
| 5 | Mali | 35.6 |
| 6 | Togo | 35.5 |
| 7 | Philippines | 35.1 |
| 8 | Djibouti | 34.0 |
| 9 | Chad | 32.9 |
| 10 | Myanmar | 32.8 |

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics in EdStats, Aug 2009
Note: Data was not available for 127 countries.

(World Bank 2009)

¹³⁵ Statistics from World Bank EdStats <http://go.worldbank.org/ITABCOGIV1>; original source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.

¹³⁶ The most recent year with data released for regional aggregates (World Bank 2009).

Box 32: Assessing teacher quality

Teacher quality is extremely difficult to define, as it depends not only on observable and stable indicators but also on behaviour and the nature of the relationship teachers maintain with their pupils or students. Teaching qualifications, however, are administratively defined; they are grounded on relatively objective assessments of skills, abilities and knowledge that are recognized as important (though this is subject to continuous debate). Moreover, despite the measurement limitations and data challenges, 'teacher qualifications' is conceptually and practically more approachable than 'teacher quality' or 'teaching quality'.

Potential indicators deal with:

- academic qualification;
- pedagogical training;
- years of service/experience;
- ability or aptitude;
- content knowledge.

The last two can be measured through individual assessment. These indicators have the advantage that they can be governed by policy. Governments can set and regulate standards on academic qualifications, adjust salary scales so that experience is rewarded and improve teacher development and motivation through testing and rewarding of competence.

(Kasprzyk 1999 in Education For All 2005)

502) 10.6 Go-between case studies: success stories and poor performers

Creating state-community alliance for successful service delivery: Ceara, Brazil.

The performance of the Ceara state government in north-eastern Brazil turned rapidly from bad to good in the mid 1980s. Ceara is part of Brazil's poorest region where one third of the population lives in absolute poverty. The state government had a clientelistic method of governing resulting in poor quality administration. However in the period 1987-93 the Ceara economy had a 3.4 per cent growth rate. One cases of good performance from interventions introduced at this time the rural preventative health program. The program hired 7,300 community health agents, tripling vaccination coverage and reducing the infant death rate by a third. (Tendler 1997 summarised by GSDRC no date)

Increasing farmer incomes in India and Kenya

Since 2000, both the Agricultural Technology Management Agencies (ATMAs) in India and the National Agricultural and Livestock Program in Kenya have set up stakeholder forums from national to district and subdistrict levels to plan and set priorities for extension activities. Both promote farmer interest groups around specific crop and livestock activities, farmer-to-farmer learning and knowledge sharing, and marketing partnerships with the private sector. Based on favourable evaluations of the first phase (including an estimated 25 per cent increase in farmer incomes in most ATMA districts, far more than the 5 per cent in most neighbouring districts), the two programs are being scaled up to the national level, and similar initiatives are under way in many other countries, such as Tanzania. (WB 2007)

Limited outreach of previous extension programs in India

According to Glendenning et al (2010) government extension programs, extension services of the national agricultural research system, cooperatives, and nongovernmental extension programs have a very limited outreach (NSSO 2005).

- The 2003 National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) survey showed that 60 percent of farmers had not accessed any source of information on modern technology to assist in their farming practices in the past year.
- Of those who had sourced information, 16 percent received it from other progressive farmers, followed by input dealers.
- Of those farmers who had accessed information, the major problem of extension services was found to be the practical relevance of the advice (NSSO 2005).

Review of the mixed success of Farmer Field Schools

- A recent study by Davis et al. (2010) found that FFSs increased income and productivity in East Africa.
- Global impact studies of FFSs show reduced use of toxic pesticides and 4–14 percent higher yields for FFS graduates who cultivated cotton compared to the control (van den Berg and Jiggins 2007).
- Despite these impacts, and additional benefits of FFSs—including facilitating collective action, leadership, organization, and improved problem-solving skills (Waddington et al. 2010)—some challenges include delayed release of funds, lack of coordination between stakeholders, and the overloading of local extension officers by FFS organizations. There are also problems of elite capture where groups contain officials and large and wealthier farmers.
- Another concern of the FFS program is the potentially limited diffusion of specific component technologies through farmer-to-farmer interactions on a large scale, as it is difficult to scale up the benefits received by farmers who participate in the FFS to farmers who do not directly participate in the FFS (Braun et al. 2006). Braun et al. suggest that, based on the experience of FFSs to date, “too many characteristics of the FFS erode during mass replication for the benefits to be sustained” (2006, 39).
- In Africa, FFSs increased productivity, knowledge gain among farmers, and empowerment, but these benefits were limited to the most directly engaged farmers (Davis 2008).

(Glendenning et al 2010)

Teachers count.

- Attracting qualified people into the teaching profession, retaining them and providing them with the necessary skills and support is arguably the single most important factor for raising learning

achievement levels. And assigning such teachers to disadvantaged children is one of the keys to achieving more equitable learning outcomes. The experience of Yemen underlines the strong association between teacher availability and school performance, as well as the disparity in access to qualified teachers:

Table 1.11: The quality of schools serving poor students varies

School characteristics of low- and high-performing schools serving poor students, TIMSS, low income countries, 2007

| | Grade 4 | | | | Grade 8 | | | |
|--|---------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|-------|------|
| | Yemen | | El Salvador | | El Salvador | | Ghana | |
| | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High |
| Average school mathematics score | 150 | 310 | 251 | 338 | 289 | 345 | 239 | 332 |
| No. of schools | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 18 |
| % of teachers with teaching certificate | 42 | 92 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 62 | 77 |
| Class size (number of students) | 51 | 39 | 23 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 43 | 42 |
| % of schools with inadequate learning materials | 29 | 8 | 33 | 43 | 23 | 36 | 17 | 30 |
| % of schools with inadequate instructional space | 33 | 50 | 0 | 22 | 25 | 11 | 31 | 32 |
| % of students grouped by ability | 42 | 64 | 5 | 33 | 28 | 17 | 32 | 4 |
| % of schools with homework of more than 1 hour | 46 | 56 | 40 | 42 | 20 | 18 | 27 | 22 |

Notes: All schools included in the table were in the bottom tercile in terms of student socio-economic status. Schools with 'high' ('low') performance are those that were in the top (bottom) tercile for mathematics performance. Data in the table are based on student and teacher responses in these schools. Schools with inadequate learning materials are those whose directors said their school had a lot of problems with instructional materials. Schools with inadequate instructional space are those whose directors said they had some or a lot of problems with instructional space.

Source: EFA Global Monitoring Report team calculations based on TIMSS 2007 data (Foy and Olson (eds.), 2009).

(Education For All 2011)