

STAGE 3 FINAL REPORT

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Executive summary

Introduction

- The WIDE research covers twenty communities in Ethiopia selected as exemplars of different types of rural livelihood system. WIDE1 research was conducted in fifteen of the communities in 1994/5 and WIDE2 in all twenty in 2003. WIDE3 was undertaken in three stages between 2010 and 2013.
- This Stage 3 report focuses on six communities which are located in places with different kinds
 of agricultural potential: they include two kinds of coffee-based livelihood system, three cropbased systems (maize, tef, and potatoes/wheat), and one livestock-led system. We explore the
 trajectories of these communities under the EPRDF regime and assess the roles played by
 government development interventions in those trajectories.
- The communities are conceptualised as open and dynamic complex social systems nested in, and historically co-evolving with, the larger country system (see Annex 1). The historical trajectory of this larger system has been partially constructed and driven by social interactions in and among the myriad rural and urban community systems geographically spread over Ethiopia's landscape.
- The report uses the Stage 3 data to explore three sets of questions:
 - 1) Since the EPRDF came to power how have the six communities co-evolved and modernised with the wider Ethiopia in which they are nested and to which they contribute? What can we learn that is useful for the future from comparisons of modernisation processes across different kinds of communities during the EPRDF period?
 - 2) How did government interventions in the main sectors change between 1995 and 2013? What can be learned that is useful for the future from a close analysis of selected important interventions in place in the communities in 2013 about intervention design, planning and implementation?
 - 3) What has been learned from conclusions emerging in Sections 2 and 3?
- The remainder of the executive summary starts with brief stories of the trajectories of the six
 Stage 3 communities from the early 1990s into the future to provide background information so that readers will understand the rest of the executive summary.

The six communities

Adado, Gedeo: coffee, all Gedeo, 95% Protestant

- There was considerable continuity in the trajectory of the Adado community between 1995 and 2013. The kebele town had grown but not very much compared with other places. Lack of investment in roads contributed to continuing remoteness. The community was richer as a whole due to increasing coffee prices between 2003 and 2011, more non-farm activities and increased migration but there had been no economic structural change. Designed changes to the kebele structures had not had much impact on most people's lives.
- There were five notable changes since 1995 but in 2013 none looked as if they were going to change the trajectory of the community in the foreseeable future. Connections with the wider world had increased as a result of the expansion of Dilla and modern technologies. On average people were healthier and better educated than in 1995, as a result of government investments in health and education services and urban influences; many worked harder and aspired to urban lifestyles. Strategies of landless young men had not changed much: in 1995 and 2013 some aspired to government jobs through education while others migrated in search of land or for gold-mining. There were more opportunities to earn casual incomes in non-farm activities within Adado. People of all ages appreciated most of the development interventions and

lifestyle changes and were less committed to customary Gedeo beliefs. There were increased contacts with religious entrepreneurs outside the community including visiting preachers; the number of Protestant sects had increased to five and the small Muslim group of 50 people was networked with people in other kebeles. However there were said to be few tensions among the different religious groups.

The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Adado's trajectory includes the
difficult terrain and lack of investment in roads, the suitability of the area for coffee-growing, the
profitability of producing coffee for the international market (at least until 2011), wellestablished migration linkages, and the strong social cohesion. The main threat comes from the
volatility of international coffee prices though there is potential for diversification in the
medium-term.

Somodo, near Jimma: coffee, 85% Oromo Muslims, 68% Wahabi

- There was considerable continuity in Somodo's trajectory in the ten years between 2003 and 2010 with most changes being gradual. The roadside development had grown and the community was richer due to improved coffee prices until 2011 combined with an increase in the area planted with coffee. Chat production and prices had also improved and fruit and vegetable sales were increasing. There were no marked changes to economic institutions which, apart from government control of the fertiliser and improved maize seed markets, continued to be market-based. Designed changes to sub-kebele structures had not been implemented as planned but the programme of development interventions was appreciated. There had been considerable unemployment of partially educated youth in 2003 and this was also the case in 2013. Government played a bigger role in human re/production. The community continued to be divided into factions on the basis of ethnicity and religion but also continued to contain the resulting tensions.
- Five notable trends in the ten years have the potential to change the future trajectory of the community. People's 'interest to work' changed markedly associated with higher aspirations and willingness to experiment. The expansion of Jimma town the municipality had started to eat away at one of the community's border. In 2003 none of the majority Oromo Muslims migrated at all but by 2013 more than 300 young Muslims and Christians were working in Sudan and Gulf countries with many sending remittances to their families. It was predicted that in a few years all Oromo Muslims in Somodo would be wehabi sect members with uncertain consequences for relations with the government and women's rights. Increasing support for modern development repertoires and urban lifestyles was likely to clash with attempts to impose increasingly strict wahabi rules often supported by female migrants returning from the Gulf. Another uncertainty is what happens to international coffee production levels and prices which are prone to volatility..
- The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Somodo's trajectory included the success of the local farming system with its ability to diversify out of coffee if low prices make that advisable. This depends on its terrain which is conducive to producing various crops and its location near the urban markets of Jimma. Fourth is the community's experience in managing potential conflicts among people of different ethnicities and religions. Threats to continuity included declining coffee prices, the expansion of Jimma town, youth frustrations following the banning of migration, and potentially increasing tensions between government and wahabi leaders.

Oda Haro, near Bako: maize, 99% Oromo, 60% Protestant, 33% Orthodox, 7% Muslim converting to Wahabi

By 2013 Oda Haro had become much more connected to the wider world including through

trade links with Addis Ababa and other major towns related to great improvements in main roads. Small towns had appeared and grown nearby. People were healthier, better educated and committed to 'improving their lives'. Since the droughts of 2002 and 2003 there had been steady agricultural growth caused by good urban demand, links with private traders in towns, modern inputs, and extension services over the years. However, the community was deeply fractured. Proselytising by incoming religious entrepreneurs, starting with Protestants in the early 1990s, had led to a rapid shift from traditional and Orthodox Christianity such that Protestants were in the majority by 2000. The Muslim minority increased to 7% by 2013 through in-migration and were converting rapidly to *wehabism*. Youth and women were involved in a fight against long-standing patriarchal domination; women seemed to have made more progress than the young men. Relationships between the government, in the form of wereda officials and an unstable and competitive kebele leadership, and the community were uneasy.

- Uncertainties with the potential to affect the future trajectory of the community include the choices that will be made by the increasing number of frustrated un(der)employed semieducated young men as a result of control of land by the older generation, recent rapid expansion of education, and the dearth of non-farm opportunities in the area. In late 2013 there was also uncertainty about continuation of the opportunities for female migration to the Gulf which had opened up in the last few years; what would happen would depend on Government decisions made at Federal level. Another trend which might be affected by Government decisions in the future is the increasing importance of market relations in the economic structure. Government pressures on people to do agricultural work together in 1-5s runs counter to the strong growth in daily labour done seasonally by poor men, women and children. The promotion of Service Co-operatives may come up against the network of crop traders stretching into large cities. The move to organise youth and women in producer co-operatives may be undermined by individualistic aspirations to 'change one's life' partly generated by the government itself through its propaganda. Looking further ahead the community is likely to be affected by the growth of neighbouring Tibe town and maybe affected by climate change.
- The configuration of control parameters underlying the continuity of Oda Haro's trajectory included the successful farming economy, which depends on improvements to declining soil fertility, efficient economic institutions, urban demand, and good weather, and the successful community-level management of de-stabilising tensions related to religious, inter-generational and gender differences. Threats to longer-run continuity include a growing and ageing group of disaffected youth, religious conflicts, the expansion of Tibe town, and potentially premature Government encouragement of new economic institutions.

Oda Dawata, near Asela: wheat and potatoes, 70% Oromo Muslims, wahabi conversions, 30% Orthodox, mix of Amhara and Oromo

• Between 2003 and 2013 life in Oda Dawata had improved considerably. Connections to the outside world were better as a result of well-maintained main roads and modern technologies although those in the remoter areas were still somewhat cut off. 'Human capital' had improved and aspirations for success combined with a new willingness to work hard. In the early 2000s increased wheat productivity had led to falling prices and fertiliser debt but by 2013 urban demand and prices were good. Historic ethnic and religious tensions between Oromo Muslims and Amhara and Oromo Orthodox had continued but remained contained by elders and religious leaders. Relations with government which had been 'confused' around the 2005 elections were better. Development interventions since 2005 were welcomed although there was some criticism of too much training followed by lack of implementation and follow-up, and the focus on a small number of model farmers. There had been foot-dragging on the new government & party structures at sub-kebele level and youth appeared disillusioned with government politics.

- There were some notable forces for changes with the potential to send the community on a different track in the future. Urbanisation and some industrialisation was changing the roadside landscape and Gonde town had designated an area of the kebele's land to be incorporated into the town. Re-structuring of the local economy included increases in private trading networks, agricultural employment, women's non-farm activities, commuting for work to nearby factories and towns, urban migration, some illegal male international migration and most notably large numbers of young women migrating legally to the Gulf. Another trend is the possibly¹ growing influence of conservative Muslim wehabism many of whose values and norms conflict with customary norms and some increasingly accepted modern ideas. There are some uncertainties related to future Government decisions. The promotion of the Service Co-operative and joint working in 1-5s runs counter to the market forces that have been let loose. It is not clear what the repercussions of the Government ban on international migration will be if it is not lifted soon. Third For example the instruction that followers should not mix with Christians and women should be confined at home as much as possible. How government acts in relation to the Islamic religion at national level will be of interest to wehabi followers.
- The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Oda Dawata's trajectory included the growing success of the local farming system, rising demand for crops and animal products from growing urban populations, the increase in non-farm opportunities. Threats to continuity came from the potential expansion of Gonde town, increasing industrialisation and outside investment, youth frustrations due to un(der)employment, and potentially increasing tensions between government and wahabi leaders.

Sirba, halfway between Debre Zeit and Mojo: teff producing, 89% Oromo, mix of other ethnicities, all Orthodox

- By 2013 extremely rapid change in and around Sirba had knocked it on to a new trajectory. Continuity could be found in the human re/production systems which already in 1995 provided accessible government health and education services, the crops grown and livestock kept, absence of any religious conversions, and the mostly peaceful accommodation among ethnic groups. Health and education services were better and crop production, productivity and sale had increased considerably. Levels of education among the population were higher, particularly bringing changes to young women many of whom aspired to formal jobs or on failing Grade 10 or 12 a period of migration to the Gulf.
- The big force for change was the extremely rapid industrialisation and urbanisation travelling down the corridor from Addis Ababa via Dukem and Debre Zeit to Mojo and beyond which had recently started encroaching on Sirba's land. Even before any investors reached the locality there had been some structural economic changes related to growing sale of cash crops and moves to a more cash-based but mixed economy. Moneylenders had been replaced by credit organisations for poor, there was more labour hiring and fewer work exchanges, and a network of private traders stretching beyond the community and the local market bought crops and livestock products.
- A big change in one control parameter area the state of the meso system has pushed the Sirba community on to a new trajectory. It is set to become part of the industrialising and urbanising Addis Ababa – Mojo corridor.

Kormargefia, near Debre Berhan: livestock and livestock products

• In 2013 Kormargefia was a conservative and somewhat inward-looking Orthodox Christian rural community bordering the expanding town of Debre Berhan. Apart from new female migration to

¹ It was not clear from our research how many people were practising what was being preached by some.

the Gulf and the opportunities related to the urbanisation and industrialisation associated with the expansion of Debre Berhan and upgrading of the main road to Addis Ababa the structure of Kormargefia's economy had changed very little since 1995. Livestock and livestock products were the main sources of cash and the same crops were grown for subsistence with small surpluses sold in Debre Berhan market. Physically the community had changed very little and there were few internal roads. However, Kormargefia's establishment as a source of breed cattle for the area, increased urban demand for meat, milk, and eggs, the expansion of irrigated vegetable growing, the sale of eucalyptus, and improved crop productivity had contributed to considerable economic growth. The 2013 mixed economy was much more cash-based, farmers were more connected with markets, and the government was much more involved in the provision of credit, inputs and advice. Government was also more actively engaged in the human re/production system through its increased provision of health and education services and constant advice to families on how they should live and raise their children. Apart from a common desire to become richer and improve individual lives and lifestyles, society and culture had not changed very much. Amhara and Oromo continued to live peaceably together, there had been no threats to the dominance of the Orthodox church, traditional beliefs were still practised secretly, and while there was evidence of the usual tensions between teenagers and parents, land had been distributed to young men for housing and two farming co-operatives (1 woman) and they did not seem so angry as young men in some other places, although they had a similar distrust of government.

- The community's future trajectory depends on a number of 'unknowns' one of which is how rapidly the expansion of Debre Berhan proceeds. The kebele was twice as large between 1997 and 2005 but then half of it (three sub-kebeles) was incorporated into the Debre Berhan town administration. Some of this land was fenced off and distributed to investors, but in many parts physical investment has been slow to arrive. A second unknown is how quickly the very small 'town' emerging on the side of the main road from Debre Berhan to Addis Ababa will develop into a proper town. A third unknown in April 2014 is if and when young women from the community will be able once more to migrate legally to the Gulf following the Government ban in October 2013.
- In April 2014 the future trajectory of Kormargefia community is uncertain; in the language of complexity science it is in a 'chaotic' state.
- In the remainder of this executive Summary we focus on two important areas: future
 government strategies for already successful rural agricultural economies and the design and
 implementation of future development interventions. Further findings related to community
 modernisation and a comparison of government development interventions in 1995 and 2013
 are presented in the next section entitled Other headline findings.

Future government strategies for Stage 3 type communities

- The past government strategy appears to have has been based on the assumption that almost all rural economic production is agricultural and produced by smallholding peasant farmers. While this is a good description of many rural communities in 1995 and 2003 it does not apply to communities of the type studied in Stage 3 in 2013; they are well-integrated into markets, increasingly involved in non-farm activities including trade and business and have a reserve of educated labour with little to do if they stay in the community apart from those in communities in commutable distance of small factories.
- Smallholding farmers are currently expected not only to drive agricultural growth but also to
 contribute a considerable number of days to Public Works labour and participate in many hours
 of meetings and trainings. At the same time nearly all government's investment in rural
 economic development has gone to adult male farmers; most of it to the richer ones. This

strategy has been successful in getting the communities to their positions in 2013 but this group may be now sufficiently well-established and aspiring that it does not need focused nudging any more. The time may now be ripe to shift some government investment to activities that respond to changes in the division of labour that have already taken place, for example small rural industrialisation and very small local town development.

Tailoring interventions to anticipate and work with forces for change happening independent of Government actions

'To achieve what it sees as a sustainable transition to developmental capitalism, the Ethiopian government's policy is designed to sustain its influence over a panoply of key economic and business levers throughout the transition., i.e. through the medium term. It seeks to establish and maintain: close economic regulation by government, particularly in the financial sector; a strong State Owned Enterprise profile, particularly in a range of strategic infrastructure-related sectors; a high degree of state control of the provision and availability of credit to strategic sectors, both at the macro (CBE, DBE) and micro-levels (multiple MFI including DECSI and others); increasing involvement of co-operatives and mass associations in economic activity at local levels in line with its national vision..' (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011: 60)

- Given the changes in economic structures and institutions detailed in Section 4.1 one question for consideration is whether the government should modify the strategy described in Vaughan and Mesfin's quote. The evidence from these six sites, which have all experienced fairly continuous economic growth in recent years with most simultaneously undergoing economic restructuring, is that the engine of the growth is the hard work of private farmers, traders and businessmen 'trying to change their lives' and that most co-operatives and mass associations, had not worked efficiently or effectively.
- The Service Co-operatives and coffee-co-operative mostly lacked funds for buying farmers' outputs; one could not afford to buy the basic goods provided at cheaper prices by its Union; there were two cases of disappearing funds; fertiliser and improved seed were not always available on time; two SCs were storing spoiled seeds/fertiliser which farmers did not want to buy but which Unions would not remove; and the service at one was incredibly slow.
- The only producer co-operatives that were flourishing were the stone co-operatives in two sites; three in another site had not survived more than a few years. No women's co-operative with a life of more than a few months could be found and apart from the stone co-operatives those few youth co-operatives that did exist had very short lives. Youth associations did not exist or were doing nothing active in five of the communities and the report on the sixth came from a youth leader and was not backed up by any other evidence. Women's associations were not actively involved economically at the time of the research.
- On the other hand there were examples in all communities of successful individual women farmers /traders /business-people and young male entrepreneurs, one example being provision of transport on motorbikes and carts.

Missing interventions

- Many different kinds of people and the community as a whole would benefit from improvements in internal roads, including more of them and some all-weather roads.
- Irrigation infrastructure in all communities has been the responsibility of individual farmers working together; in some people are eager to expand their irrigation farming but the infrastructure can only be developed with inputs from the wereda, zone or Region.
- Effective agricultural extension packages with market connections for coffee-producing communities which promote diversification to provide a safety-net for periods when international coffee prices are low. In both sites the falling coffee price had led to increased investment in *chat* which was not supported by extension services.
- There are few livelihood interventions for poorer farmers, landless people, women, youth and

children.

Designing more efficient intervention packages

- There did not seem to be much wereda-level planning about appropriate intervention mixes for different kinds of community. Many interventions arrived as campaigns which had to be done 'now' causing officials to drop what they were doing before. There were complaints about plans announced in meetings but not implemented and projects started but not followed up. One of the reasons was that far too much was expected of wereda and kebele officials in terms of actions, meetings and reports. This was compounded by the need for party meetings separate from kebele meetings.
- An efficient system would use cost-benefit analyses and consider opportunity costs. For
 example, how efficient was it to devote many farmer days each year for 3 years on watershed
 management activities which had not achieved a lot, partly due to lack of follow-up.

Tailoring interventions to suit the seasonal rhythms of rural life

- The school year does not fit with demands for child labour during the main harvesting season.
- Annual meetings on kebele achievements and plans are currently held just as many harvest seasons get under way. A locally appropriate seasonal calendar for all kebele mobilisations would prevent some of the current clashes.

Tailoring interventions to suit different kinds of local circumstances

- Agricultural and livestock packages were remarkably similar in all communities; the priority given
 to improved seeds and standard issue fertiliser in livelihood communities where coffee and
 livestock led the livelihood system distracted DAs and farmers from focusing on more effective
 ways of increasing agricultural growth.
- Farmers in all communities attributed declining soil fertility to continuous use of the same fertiliser(s) over many years; in two sites Agricultural Research Institute tests found acid soil which could easily by improved with lime. Testing of soils by DAs and provision of locally appropriate fertilisers would supplement efforts to persuade farmers to use compost, intercropping and crop rotation with legumes.
- Currently there are policies for urban areas and policies for rural areas but many thriving farming
 communities close to urban areas are losing tranches of land to expanding towns which is
 associated in some places with illegal land sales. In areas where change is rapid re-structuring of
 weredas and kebeles can be a fairly continuous process continuous. Ordinary community
 members are often not informed or consulted about land allocation and investments decided at
 higher levels. Compensation for loss of land

Community-level human resource planning for efficient implementation of interventions

• Job descriptions for DAs, HEWs, and voluntary kebele officials are impossible to implement in practice; this leaves a wide area of discretion in which at one extreme some people struggle to do their best for the community and at the other some people focus on personal interests.

Choosing effective social mechanisms for changing people's minds and behaviour

 Section 3.2 contains complex stories about the use and effectiveness of different kinds of social mechanisms for changing the minds and behaviour of different kinds of people. This is an area where consultation with experienced practical psychologists and sociologists might produce dividends.


Final report

Introduction

The WIDE research covers twenty communities in Ethiopia selected as exemplars of different types of rural livelihood system. WIDE1 research was conducted in fifteen of the communities in 1994/5 and WIDE2 in all twenty in 2003. WIDE3 was undertaken in three stages between 2010 and 2013.

This Stage 3 report focuses on six communities which are located in places with different kinds of agricultural potential (Map 1): they include two kinds of coffee-based livelihood system, three crop-based systems (maize, *tef*, and potatoes/wheat), and one livestock-led system. We explore the trajectories of these communities under the EPRDF regime and assess the roles played by government development interventions in those trajectories. The communities are conceptualised as open and dynamic complex social systems nested in, and historically co-evolving with, the larger country system. The historical trajectory of this larger system has been partially constructed and driven by social interactions in and among the myriad rural and urban community systems geographically spread over Ethiopia's landscape.

Between 1991 and 2003 the pace of change in much of rural Ethiopia was hardly visible. The fifteen WIDE communities researched in 1995 did not look very different in 2003. However, from 2003, things did begin to change as increasing government and donor investments in infrastructure, environment, livelihoods, human resources and governance structures interacted with wider



Map 1: WIDE3 Stage 3 research communities

economic, social, cultural and political changes within and beyond Ethiopia. Over the last ten years Ethiopia's rural communities, especially those closer to main roads and towns, have experienced considerable and accelerating change driven by local mixes of external and internal developments.

Rapid and non-linear social changes are hard to study using conventional methodologies and there has been a surge of interest among policy theorists² in adapting and using mental models and methods developed in complexity science and theory which can handle both change and continuity. Our methodology, which is described in detail in Annex 1, has been built using the increasingly popular complexity paradigm. Complexity social science provides a paradigm for exploring both change and continuity, and when used with case-based methods can lead to innovative and practical policy-relevant conclusions.

The report uses the Stage 3 data to explore three sets of questions:

- 1) Since the EPRDF came to power how have the six communities co-evolved and modernised with the wider Ethiopia in which they are nested and to which they contribute? What can we learn that is useful for the future from comparisons of modernisation processes across different kinds of communities during the EPRDF period?
- 2) How did government interventions in the main sectors change between 1995 and 2013? What can be learned of use for the future from a close analysis of selected important interventions in place in the communities in 2013 about intervention design, planning and implementation?
- 3) With an eye to future interventions what can be learned from conclusions emerging in Sections 2 and 3?

These three sets of questions are addressed in turn in the three remaining sections of the summary report.

Before turning to the three main report sections we use the remainder of this introductory section to (1) provide a brief description of the WIDE longitudinal research study which began in 1994, (2) introduce important aspects of the social complexity methodology used in the study which is described more fully in Annex 1, and (3) present a few illustrative key findings from each of the three stages of the WIDE3 research.

The WIDE longitudinal research project

A brief history of WIDE

WIDE research began in 1994 as a comparative study of fifteen rural communities which had been selected as exemplars of the main agriculturalist livelihood systems in Ethiopia by economists planning the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey³. Parallel qualitative fieldwork by Ethiopian social scientists using secondary sources, rapid assessment techniques, and protocol-guided semi-structured interviews produced fifteen 'Ethiopian Village Studies' (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996) which later became known as WIDE1 (Wellbeing and Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia).

In 2003 the WIDE2⁴ fieldwork was undertaken in the fifteen WIDE1 communities plus three agriculturalist sites which had been added to the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey community panel in 1999, and two pastoralist communities where Ph.D. research had taken place in the 1990s.

² In the UK for example see Byrne and Callaghan 2014, Pawson 2013, and Ramalingam 2013.

³ Ethiopian Rural Household Survey http://www.ifpri.org/dataset/ethiopian-rural-household-surveys-erhs. The WIDE1 research was financed by the UK Overseas Development Administration and the lead researchers were Philippa Bevan and Alula Pankhurst.

⁴ WIDE2 fieldwork was conducted for a month in each site under the aegis of the 2002-7 ESRC-funded Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) Research Programme at the University of Bath http://www.welldev.org.uk/. The lead researchers in WIDE2 were Bevan and Pankhurst.

Between 2010 and 2013 a donor group in Addis Ababa⁵ funded new fieldwork in the twenty sites (WIDE3) which has been conducted in three stages: Stage 1 in six sites in early 2010; Stage 2 in eight sites in late 2011; and Stage 3 in six sites in spring and autumn 2013 (see Map 2 and Table 1).


Table 1: The twenty WIDE3 sites

| COMMUNITY | FIELD- WORK | LOCATION | LIVELIHOOD BASE* | IDENTITY GROUPS | REGION |
|------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------|--------|
| | | DROUGHT-PRONE AND REGULA | ARLY DEPENDENT ON FOOD/CASH-FOR-WORK | | |
| Gara Godo | ara Godo Late 2011 Remotish but new municipality Drought-prone & highly-populated; gardens – cash-crop coffee, root crops, fruit & vegetables; other land grain; PSNP | | 1 ethnicity 2 religions | SNNP | |
| Aze Debo'a | Late 2011 | Near zone town but remotish | Drought-prone & highly-populated; gardens – cash-crop coffee, root crops, fruit & vegetables; also grain; migration; PSNP | 1 ethnicity 1 religions | SNNP |
| Luqa | Late 2011 | Very remote | Vulnerable pastoralist + small irrigation + Emergency Food Aid (EFA) | 1 ethnicity 2 religions | SNNP |
| Do'oma | Late 2011 | Nr wereda town but very remote | Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP | 3 ethnicities 2 religions | SNNP |
| Adele Keke | Late 2011 | Near rapidly expanding Haramaya & on main road | Cash-crop chat [some exported to the Gulf] + vulnerable cereal; irrigation + PSNP; commuting for urban work | 1 ethnicity 1 religion | Oromia |
| Gelcha | Late 2011 | Near town & main road but remote | Pastoralist in transition + small irrigation + PSNP | 3 ethnicities 2 religions | Oromia |
| Korodegaga | Early 2010 | Remotish | Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP | 1 ethnicity 1 religion | Oromia |
| Shumsheha | Late 2011 | Peri-urbanish - near Lalibela town | Vulnerable cereal - sorghum, teff, beans, some irrigation + migration + PSNP | 1 ethnicity 2 religions | Amhara |
| Dinki | Early 2010 | Quite remote | Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + EFA | 2 ethnicities 2 religions | Amhara |
| Geblen | Early 2010 | Quite remote | Livestock – central role but vulnerable to drought; vulnerable cereal + a little irrigation + migration + PSNP | 2 ethnicities 2 religions | Tigray |
| Harresaw | Late 2011 | Quite remote | Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP | 1 ethnicity 1 religion | Tigray |
| | | INDEPENDENT ECONO | MIES IN AREAS WITH ADEQUATE RAIN | | |
| Girar | Early 2010 | Outskirts of <i>wereda</i> town but remotish | Highly populated; gardens - enset + cash-crop chat & eucalyptus+ migration | 1 ethnicity 4 religions | SNNP |
| Adado | 2013 | Quite remote | Gardens: cash-crop coffee, enset, barley, maize + migration | 1ethnicity 1+ religions | SNNP |
| Turufe | Early 2010 | Peri-urban - increasingly near to expanding Shashemene | Food surplus & cash crop potatoes & grain; commuting for urban work | 5+ ethnicities 4 religions | Oromia |
| Sirba | 2013 | Industrialising - on main highway between Bishoftu and Mojo – 20km to each | Food surplus + cash crop grain (<i>tef</i> , wheat) + commuting + migration | 1 ethnicity; 3 religions | Oromia |
| Oda Dawata | 2013 | On main road between Adama and Asela | Food surplus + cash crop potatoes & wheat + migration | 1 ethnicity, 3 religions | Oromia |
| Oda Haro | 2013 | Remotish – 16 km east of Bako | Food surplus + cash crop grain (maize+), oilseed, peppers, <i>chat</i> in 2003 + migration | 2+ ethnicities; 3 religions | Oromia |
| Somodo | 2013 | Peri-urbanish – 5 km from main road Jimma-Gambella; 20 km from <i>wereda</i> town | Food surplus + cash crop coffee, chat, and grain in 2003 + migration | 2+ ethnicities; 5 religions | Oromia |
| Kormagefia | 2013 | Peri-urbanish - near Debre Berhan town | Livestock – central role. In good years some crops sold for cash - barley, beans, wheat + commuting + migration | 1 ethnicity 1 religion | Amhara |
| Yetmen | Early 2010 | On all-weather road but remotish | Food surplus + cash crop grain; new irrigated vegetables; migration | 1 ethnicity 1 religion | Amhara |

 $[\]ensuremath{^{*}}$ Livestock played roles in the livelihood systems of all sites

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⁵ The donors who contributed to the Joint Governance Assessment Measurement Trust Fund were DFID, CIDA and the Dutch and the project was managed by the World Bank. The lead researchers were Bevan, Pankhurst and Catherine Dom.



Map 2: The Twenty WIDE research communities

The WIDE3 data has been used in two ways: to conduct comparative case analysis of the communities in 2010-13, and, in conjunction with the WIDE1 and WIDE2 data, to investigate the longer-term cumulative impacts of development interventions and wider modernisation processes on the trajectories of the communities and the life qualities of their different kinds of member.

The social complexity methodology

In this section we briefly describe how social complexity theory has provided a platform for developing the conceptual and analytic frameworks which we have used to inform the design of research instruments and choice of fieldwork respondent and the interpretation and analysis protocols enabling us to tackle the three sets of questions described earlier. We then describe how the empirical evidence was generated and used, concluding with a discussion of our attempts to engage with policymakers, advisers and academics in the research process from the very beginning. A more detailed description of the methodology can be found in Annex 1.

Social complexity theory

'The story of the universe is one of unfolding complexity. (p328) ...Energy and chemical elements produced by the stars have led to the emergence of intricate structures as organised as crystals and human brains (p10) ...Life is an emergent property which arises when physico-chemical systems are organised and interact in particular ways. ... A city is an emergent property of millions of human beings (p330)' (Coveny and Highfield, 1995)

Research by scientists and social scientists has demonstrated that material and social aspects of the world really are complex. The world is made up of many different kinds of complex and dynamic

open social system each with particular material, technological, social, economic, political and cultural dimensions. Social systems and their sub-systems are structured and energised by the activities of the different kinds of people who participate in them in different system roles. The unequally structured co-evolving systems in which people living in Ethiopia are organised include, among many others, households, communities, livelihood systems, kingroups, lineages, clans, other community-initiated organisations, formal and informal enterprises, government development interventions, towns and cities, NGOs, political parties, national and international donor systems, government systems, the country system as a whole, diaspora systems, world religious movements, international commodity markets and transnational companies.

Rural communities and development intervention programmes are the two main kinds of complex social system we have studied. Rural communities are constituted *materially* by physical aspects of the community place, people and other material resources, and *socially* through systems to produce livelihoods and re/produce people, co-ordinate members in social networks and organisations, produce and disseminate ideas, and manage the community politically. Social systems can stay much the same for long periods of time and they can change in processes ranging from slow and steady to very sudden. At any point in time the state of a social system is determined by a mix, or configuration, of key internal and contextual aspects or control parameters working together. Each parameter sets limits on the possible futures of the system with some parameters playing more important roles than others. However the salience of parameters partly depend on what is going on in other areas and a change in one area could reduce the salience of a long-standing dominant parameter. For example the importance of unreliable rainfall patterns declines with the introduction of sustainable irrigation and/or the diversification of the local economy including regular migration.

Development intervention programmes are structured differently from rural communities. They have relatively short lives during which they are constituted *materially* by the relevant physical infrastructure, material resources and the physical aspects of the people participating, and *socially* through the rules, division of labour and routines of the particular intervention system which organises the activities of intervention implementers, direct beneficiaries, second-order beneficiaries, those contributing resources or labour to the intervention, those disadvantaged by the intervention, and possibly others.

In order to make community data useful for answering the questions about community modernisation, development interventions and possible futures for different kinds of community posed above and building on what we learned in the Stage 1 and Stage 2 studies we have developed three analytical frameworks which are described in the next three sections.

The analytic framework for exploring the histories of community systems

Community systems are spatially-defined entities. The thousands of rural community systems found in the mountains, plains, valleys and deserts of Ethiopia are sub-systems of Ethiopia's macro system. Ethiopia, with a population of over 90 million, has around 30,000 *kebele* which are the smallest administrative unit and the site of intervention implementation. The boundaries of the community systems in which we conducted the WIDE3 fieldwork coincided with local kebele or sub-kebele boundaries in 2013⁶. The three stages of WIDE provide comparable data on the community structures and histories in 1995 (for 15 of the 20 communities), 2003 and 2010-2013 (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Synchronic and diachronic analyses

⁶ In some cases these were not totally coincident with the boundaries of the communities studied in 1995 and/or 2003.

Community systems can be deconstructed *synchronically* into sub-systems in four main ways. *From one perspective* each community ecosystem is located on its unique piece of geographical territory and constituted by living organisms (plants, microbes and animals including human beings) and the structured non-living elements of the environment including rocks, minerals, soils, water, and air. Within the community boundaries at any point in time the *place system* is constituted through (1) interactions among local manifestations of larger material systems - altitude, climate, topography, geology, and ecology and (2) material legacies of previous human interactions with the territory including land and water use, environmental degradation or re-habilitation, settlement patterns, roads, buildings and technological infrastructure. The people system is constituted by the population of material historically-constructed human beings and their current embodied physical and mental human resources and liabilities.

From a second perspective, community members are active in five institutional settings or subsystems which are simultaneously domains of power and fields of action. In these inter-secting and inter-acting structured sub-systems community members act together to fulfil the different functions required for the community system as a whole to remain in business: livelihood production, human re/production, social organisation, cultural norms, beliefs, and knowledge, and political management. While these functional systems are not directly visible to the human eye the day-to-day actions and social interactions among community members which constitute them are in principle visible and further traces of their existence are found in, for example, fields of wheat, primary schools, funerals, elections, and religious sermons. These functional sub-systems can be seen from two perspectives: they are *fields of action* in which different kinds of community members are active in different ways and they are *domains of power* hierarchically and unequally organised.

From a third perspective, there are two important nested sub-systems: household systems of different types which are spatially located in different places in the community territory. Households vary according to where they are situated on the household life cycle continuum, the extent to which they conform to the local norm of what household structures should look like, the main livelihood activities of members, and relative household wealth. Households are themselves constituted by people of different genderages who play different roles in the five functional domains of power. Each social actor has a genderage, class/wealth position, ethnicity, religion, maybe other community-relevant social statuses, a personality, accumulated human resources and liabilities, and a personal history. Individuals are constrained and enabled by their histories, the roles open to them in the different fields of action, their aspirations and their relative power positions in local structures of inequality and different configurations produce different levels of well- and ill- being.

From a fourth perspective the communities are unequally structured through relationships based on class relationships (ownership and/or control of the means of production), status relationships (where some should defer and others can derogate), and power relationships (where some can fix to get what they want and others must make the best of things).

Taken as a whole the material, functional and nested sub-systems and the encompassing systems contain potential control parameters which are those aspects of the community system and its context that, working together in a configuration, have a governing influence on its trajectory at the point in time when the synchronic snapshot of the state of the system is taken in an empirical research process⁷. Internal to the community there are ten important community-specific parameters related to the material systems of Place and People and the five functional sub-systems (see the internal parameters rows in Table 2). There are also external control parameters in the community context (see contextual parameters rows). These include elements in encompassing meso systems like the wereda and macro systems like Ethiopia as a whole. The operation of

⁷ In times of rapid change configurations of control parameters can change rapidly.

community social systems may also depend on external aspects of the five functional systems. For example changes in international coffee value chain systems can have a big impact on livelihoods in coffee-producing communities.

Table 2: Parameters guiding rural community trajectories

| Control parameter areas | | Parameters identified as potentially important for the communities studied |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| | 1. Place | Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology Remoteness - connections with wider world |
| | 2. People | 3. Current human resources & aspirations and well- /ill-being |
| | 3. The state of the local human re/pro/duction system | 4. Human re/pro/duction institutions |
| Internal | | 5. Farming system |
| parameters | 4. The state of the local economy | 6. Livelihood diversification |
| | | 7. Economic institutions |
| | 5. Social integration | 8. Community fault-lines & organised collective |
| | | agency |
| | 6. Cultural integration | 9. Cultural repertoires of ideas |
| | 7. Political integration | 10. Government-society relations & political settlement |
| | 8. External aspects of inter-secting functional systems | 11. E.g. market systems, education systems, wider religious systems, clan organisations |
| Contextual parameters | 9. Encompassing meso systems | 12. State of meso system: economy, society, culture, politics |
| | 10. Encompassing macro systems | 13. State of country system: economy, society, culture, politics |

The state of each community social system at a point or stable period in time depends on interactions among community-specific manifestations of the thirteen control parameters listed in column 3 of Table 2. In different types of community actual manifestations of these abstractly-described control parameters take different forms. For example, pastoralists occupy a different kind of Place from coffee farmers; potential social fault-lines in communities with a number of religions will be different from those with one religion but a number of clans. Also in different types of system, or at different times in the life of one system, different selective mixes or configurations of control parameters may be important in guiding trajectories. For example in a crisis period in a 'fragile community' relationships and activities in the political domain may be very important, while in a remote but stable community customary cultural ideas may play a more important role. In communities which are stable usually a configuration of a few control parameter manifestations dominate the working of the system with the remainder playing supporting roles and if one of these dominating parameters suffers a major change the system may quite quickly be set on a new path. A change in trajectory may also result from a change in a supporting parameter with knock-on effects for other parameters.

The analytic framework for exploring development interventions

We have used three frameworks to organise thinking about the design and implementation of many development interventions which have entered rural communities in recent years.

The intervention implementation chain

Development interventions are dynamic open complex social systems which are inserted into fluid community systems⁸ with the intention of bringing changes to people, institutions and the place. They intersect and co-evolve with government bureaucracies at different hierarchical levels, and

⁸ This section makes use of many of the ideas of Ray Pawson in his recent book on evaluation science (2013)

with other development interventions, community sub-systems, and in some cases with donor and NGO bureaucracies. They combine macro-level design, monitoring and evaluation with an implementation chain which fans out from the Federal Government through Regional Governments, zones, wereda and kebele (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: The policy journey

Government intervention systems in place in the different sectors: 1995 and 2013

For the three communities for which we have data in 1995, Adado, Sirba and Kormargefia, we compare the government systems in place in the main sectors in 1995 with those in place in 2013 (Section 2.1). To structure the discussion we are guided by the familiar internal control parameter area headings which are repeated in Table 3, column 1:

Management of the place

- Environment
- Infrastructure
- Land planning

Supporting people

- Women
- Youth

Human re/pro/duction services

- Drinking water
- Health services
- Education

Government services to support livelihoods

- Agricultural extension services
- Co-operatives

Credit
Working with the community
Introducing modern ideas
Kebele and party organisation

Table 3: Community control parameters and selected development interventions

| Control parameters | | Development interventions selected for indepth study |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| 1. Place | Terrain, settlement, climate | Watershed management, zero-grazing, tree-planting |
| 1. Flace | 2. Connections with wider world | 2. Internal, feeder and external roads |
| 2. People | 3. Human resources & aspirations | 3. Youth interventions4. Women interventions |
| 3. Lives system | 4. Human re/pro-duction institutions | 5. Safe water6. Health extension7. Primary education |
| | 5. Farming system | 8. Crop extension |
| 4. Livelihood system | 6. Livelihood diversification | 9. Migration regulation |
| | 7. Economic institutions | 10. Credit 11. Taxes & contributions |
| 5. Societal system | Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | |
| 6. Cultural ideas system | 9. Cultural repertoires of ideas | 12. Government 'awaring' and party propaganda |
| 7. Political system | 10. Govt-soc rel'ns & political settlement | 13. Kebele and party organisation |

The methodology paper (Annex 1) contains a table listing 103 separate interventions designed to change different aspects of people, places and community development institutions which were mentioned during the Stage 3 research. We have merged some items in the list and selected the 13 development interventions listed in column 3 of Table 3 for in-depth analysis of their design and implementation (Section 3.2).

The design and implementation of individual interventions

Development programmes are designed to produce changes in people, institutions, and/or the material environment which will supposedly lead to the achievement of certain outcomes. Each programme contains more or less explicit theories of how the combination of the planned resources and activities will produce the desired changes and outcomes. Each programme strategy depends on a more or less explicit theory of change involving (1) the planning of the social construction of the intervention (who should do what, with what resources, when and in which institutional context), (2) identification of the social mechanisms which will lead to change, and (3) the expected outcomes. Social construction planning requires identification of (1) specific roles for implementers and beneficiaries and sometimes other community members, (2) material infrastructure and input resources specific to the intervention, (3) an institutional set-up involving systems, rules and routines and (4) a time-frame detailing when which activities and material inputs should happen in which sequence and which outcomes are expected when.

Social mechanisms expected to induce change include: legislation and administrative fiat; material

and status incentives; targets; threats, fines and imprisonment; 'awaring' and training; dialogue and participation; targeting models, learning by doing, and learning by copying; organising and mobilising pressure from others.

Planned outcomes may relate to aspects of the community place, people and their behaviour, and/or community-level institutions

Table 4: Design theories of change and implementation realities

| Development intervention processes | | Theory of change in design | Implementation realities |
|--|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1.Social | Roles of implementers, beneficiaries etc | | |
| construction planning | Material infrastructure & inputs Systems, rules and routines Time-frame for activities, | | |
| 2.Social | inputs, outcomes Legislation and administrative fiat | | |
| mechanisms for influencing the | Material & status incentives Targets Threats, fines & imprisonment | | |
| behaviour of beneficiaries and other | 'Awaring' and training Dialogue and participation | | |
| community members | Targeting models, learning by doing & copying | | |
| 3.Social | Organising and mobilising pressure from others Salaries, per diems | | |
| mechanisms for influencing the | Instructions Targets & reporting | | |
| behaviour of intervention | Gimgema Opportunities for training | | |
| implementers | Promotion and demotion Place outcomes | | |
| 4.Consequences | People outcomes Institutional outcomes Community-government relation | c c | |

As Table 4 shows the design framework can also be used to explore what actually happened when interventions were implemented allowing comparisons of design and implementation. Row 4 under heading 4 adds a social mechanism which is usually not considered in intervention design and that is the collective community reaction which is influenced by the behaviour of opinion leaders and reference groups. At one extreme an intervention may evoke *co-operative* individual or collective responses among the majority of intended beneficiaries and others and at the other it may be met with overt or covert *resistance*. In some cases responses may be more *complex* with acceptance of some aspects of the intervention and not others, or due to a clash of interests acceptance by some and resistance by others.

The analytical framework for thinking about community futures

In order to think about community futures beyond 2013 it was first necessary to establish their longer-term trajectories. This involved the use of a framework to explore the states of the 13 control parameter areas identified above in Table 2; this framework is used in Section 4.1 with the data from 1995 and 2013. It was also useful for looking to the future to use a framework to identify the main causes of continuity and change in the communities' trajectories between 1995 and 2013 including the roles played by development interventions. This informed Section 4.2 which identifies potential forces for change and continuity independent of government interventions likely to be at work in the different types of community.

Establishing community control parameters at a point in time

Table 5: Establishing control parameters at a point in time

| | Control parameters | Questions to ask re each community |
|-----|--|--|
| 1. | Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | 1. How easy is it to grow crops, keep livestock and live here? |
| 2. | Connections with wider world | 2. How easy is it for people living in different places in the community to access people outside the community, markets, services, etc?. |
| 3. | Current human resources & aspirations | 3. What are the particular competences and aspirations of the men, women, male and female youth and children currently in the community? |
| 4. | Farming system | 4. What crops are produced with what agro-technologies and which livestock are kept and how well do the choices work with each other and the place? |
| 5. | Livelihood diversification | 5. What off-farm economic opportunities are available and where? |
| 6. | Economic institutions | 6. How efficient are the local mixed economy institutions in the provision of farm inputs, choice of products and techniques, and sale of outputs? |
| 7. | Human re/pro/duction institutions | 7. How efficient is the local mix of family, public and private institutions for producing, investing in and maintaining people? |
| 8. | Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | 8. Considering identity group differences ⁹ , gender relations, adult-youth relations, and rich-poor relations how socially integrated is the community? |
| 9. | Cultural repertoires of ideas | 9. What are the main features of the customary and modern cultural repertoires? What is the balance of community support for each and who are the main opinion leaders? |
| 10. | Government-society relations & political settlement | 10. How strong is the political settlement between the community and the government and what is it based on? How do different kinds of people channel their political interests? |
| 11. | External inter-secting systems | 11. What is going on in the input and output markets which local farmers interact with?12. What are the consequences of incoming religious and political ideologies and new ideas from wider identity groups, diasporas, towns, and global media? |
| 12. | State of meso system: economy, society, culture, politics | 13. What economic or other plans is the government implementing in the wider area? Are there any other powerful people implementing plans for the area?14. What is the state of relations with neighbouring communities? How dangerous are potential or existing resource or other conflicts? |
| 13. | State of country system: economy, society, culture, politics | 15. Are there any aspects of the macro situation directly affecting the community? |

In order to trace the trajectories of the communities it was necessary to identify the configuration of control parameters guiding the trajectories at particular points in time. Table 5 shows the questions asked in relation to each community to help to establish the parameter configurations in 1995 and 2013.

The causes of change and continuity since 1995

The questions listed in Table 5 were used to explore the configuration of control parameters in each community in 1995 and 2013 and consider the causes of change and continuity (Table 6)

Table 6: Comparing control parameters in 1995 and 2013 and the causes of continuity and change

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Causes of change & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|--|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | | | |
| Connections with wider world | | | |

.

⁹ For example ethnic, clan, lineage, and/or religious differences

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Causes of change & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|------|------|--|
| Current human | | | |
| resources & | | | |
| aspirations | | | |
| Farming system | | | |
| Livelihood | | | |
| diversification | | | |
| Economic institutions | | | |
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | | | |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective | | | |
| agency Cultural repertoires of ideas | | | |
| Government-society relations & political settlement | | | |
| External inter-secting | | | |
| systems | | | |
| State of meso system: | | | |
| State of country system: | | | |

Generating and using empirical evidence from the communities

Each piece of qualitative and quantitative data can be viewed as an evidence trace of the trajectory of the community at the time it refers to. In Stage 3 through synchronic comparisons of the communities using data made in 2013 we have identified different types of community and described how they work. These complexity synchronic perspectives have been used to develop conceptual frameworks to underpin the design of the set of research instruments, the choice of fieldwork respondents and the analytic frameworks for interpreting and analysing the qualitative data. The main methodological processes used in the WIDE3 synchronic exploration are (1) comparisons exploring similarities and differences in community features to enable (2) identification of common mechanisms at work in all the communities and (3) classification of communities into kinds or types at the points in time when the data were made on the basis of the control parameter mix.

Using the data from all three WIDE projects diachronically we have developed modernisation narratives for each community and traced continuities and changes in their trajectories by comparing control parameter figurations in 1995, 2003 and 2013.

Engaging with policymakers: consultations and dissemination

Engagement with donors and government during the WIDE3 research

From the beginning of WIDE3 we assumed that our community-level research could be policy relevant by filling an information gap for government and their development partners. As funding was provided by a group of donors through the World Bank managed Joint Governance Assessment and Measurement (JGAM) Trust Fund, we thought that there indeed were donors who agreed that the research could play this role. On the government side we got clearance for the research from the Ethiopian Development Research Institute head, Ato Neway Gebreab, also Advisor to the Prime Minister. Accordingly at the outset we tried to engage jointly with donors based in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government, academics and NGOs in Ethiopia, non-resident academics with an interest in Ethiopia, and UK-based academics with an interest in methods for development-related research.

We established a WIDE3 'worknet' (inventing the term) in the hope that members drawn from these different constituencies would get involved in the project and contribute comments and ideas in workshops and meetings and via email – while we would feed them regularly in different ways. Our main vehicles were regular small workshops and meetings with Addis-based donors and government officials (separately, see below), Rapid Briefing Notes emerging during fieldwork de-briefings, presentations developed for workshops and meetings, the successive Final Reports and academic papers and presentations.

Table 7 lists the meetings with donors and government through the life of WIDE3 – including the very last meetings focused on 'WIDE Discussion Briefs', which we describe in the next section.

Table 7 Consultation meetings with donors and government throughout the life of WIDE3

| Date | Research stage | Event | |
|------------|----------------|--|--|
| Nov-Dec | WIDE3 Stage 1 | Workshops and meetings to present the research Stage 1 plan and consult | |
| 2009 | | on key topics of interest, with 4 donor groups ¹⁰ | |
| | | Crosscutting | |
| | | • PBS | |
| | | • PSNP | |
| | | Governance | |
| April 2010 | WIDE3 Stage 1 | Presentation of early findings from Stage 1 to the Netherlands Embassy , at | |
| | | their request | |
| June 2010 | WIDE3 Stage 1 | Dissemination meetings/workshops on Stage 1 main findings for discussion, | |
| | | with 6 donor groups | |
| | | 2 donor agencies (Netherlands, Irish Aid) | |
| | | 4 donor groups (PBS, PSNP, RED/FS +, education and health) | |
| September | WIDE3 Stage 2 | Consultation meetings to present Stage 2 plan and consult on key topics of | |
| 2011 | | relevance, with 7 donor groups : education, health, governance, PBS, PSNP, | |
| | | RED/FS, social equity | |
| December | WIDE3 Stage 1 | Dissemination workshop convened by EDRI for government officials from | |
| 2011 | | various agencies, to present the Stage 1 findings and plan for Stage 2 | |
| February | WIDE3 Stage 1 | Meeting with Dr Abraham Tekeste, State Minister MOFEP , to present | |
| 2012 | | WIDE3 Stage 1 key findings and Stage 2 plan | |
| June 2012 | WIDE3 Stage 2 | Dissemination meetings/workshops on Stage 2 main findings for discussion, | |
| | | with 6 donor groups | |
| | | 3 donor agencies (DFID, Netherlands and Norway) | |
| | | 3 donor groups (PBS, PSNP/HABP, RED/FS+) | |
| June 2012 | WIDE3 Stage 2 | Dissemination workshop convened by EDRI for government officials from | |
| | | various agencies, to present the Stage 2 preliminary findings and plan for | |
| | | Stage 3 | |
| November | WIDE3 Stage 2 | Panel session at the 18 th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies | |
| 2012 | | (ICES), Ethiopia in Movement, Movements in Ethiopia, in Dire Dawa | |
| | | Presentation of 6 papers focusing on specific topics and | |
| | | communities drawing on Stage 2 findings | |
| Feb/March | WIDE3 Stage 3 | Consultation meetings to present Stage 3 and consult on key topics of | |
| 2013 | | relevance, with 2 donor groups | |
| | | RED/FS, PBS and PSNP donor groups | |
| | | UNICEF on nutrition, health, education and social protection | |
| May 2013 | WIDE3 Stage 3 | Dissemination focusing on Stage 2 findings and ongoing Stage 3 research with DFID | |
| October | WIDE3 Stage 3 | Dissemination meetings/workshops on Stage 3 findings from first fieldwork | |
| 2013 | | with a view to inform second, gap-filling fieldwork, with 3 interest groups | |
| | | DFID | |
| | | Joint government-donor RED/FS workshop including inception | |
| | | presentation on livelihood-focused discussion briefs (see below) | |
| | | • Lecture on 'Service delivery in rural Ethiopia: 1995-2013' at Addis | |
| | | Ababa University | |

 $^{^{\}rm 10}$ A number of academics and NGO representatives attended some of these meetings.

| Date | Research stage | Event |
|------------|----------------|--|
| October | WIDE3 Stage 3 | Meeting with Dr Abraham Tekeste, State Minister MOFED , and Ato Tefera |
| 2013 | | Deribew, Minister of Agriculture (separately) to present Stage 2 & Stage 3 |
| | | main/preliminary findings and the discussion brief process |
| March 2014 | WIDE3 All | High Level Discussion Forum on Policy Implications of WIDE3 research |
| | Stages | findings – with senior government officials and focusing on five topics (see |
| | | below) |
| March 2014 | WIDE3 All | Discussion Forum on WIDE3 briefs – with World Bank and other donors |
| | Stages | |

The worknet, which by 2013 had around 100 members, played its role to some degree, with three limitations:

- First, the very high turnover of generally over-stretched donor and NGO employees meant that
 we often interacted with people who had no prior exposure to earlier stages of the research,
 which made substantive engagement more difficult.
- Second, early on in the course of the research we found that there was a disconnect between donor and government mental models about how development should be pursued, making dialogue between them uneasy. It therefore seemed that getting government and donors together in the same room might not be the best way for them to engage with the research. As a result, the worknet became a network of non-government actors; all but one of our dissemination meetings were bilateral (research team and either Government, or donors); and while we seized opportunities to have dedicated meetings with government officials we also send shorter outputs to those who were interested.
- Third, we faced a dearth of academics with time and/or inclination to get involved in this kind of research.

The WIDE Discussion Briefs

Reaching Stage 3 we started brainstorming on means (besides meetings, workshops and research outputs) to draw on the research evidence in ways that would be more directly useful to policy-making and implementation. A few key topics arising from discussions with government and other stakeholders were identified and in order to draw out implications from the research on these topics, the JGAM funding agencies and World Bank agreed to commission consultants within Ethiopia and abroad to write concise briefs on the following topics:

- 1. Unlocking agricultural growth
- 2. Farming and value chains
- 3. Work creation for the rural youth
- 4. Equitable service delivery
- 5. Models and realities of transformation.

The first three briefs were written by two members of the Economic Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) of the Ethiopian Development Research Institute, the other two by international consultants known by us or other authors. The briefs were discussed at a High Level Discussion Forum with senior Government officials on 6th March 2014. The World Bank convened the Forum and strictly kept to this convening role, leaving space for a discussion between Government officials, the authors of the briefs and the WIDE3 team¹¹. The following day the authors and the WIDE3 team held a meeting, also convened by the World Bank, for the JGAM donors and other interested partners¹². Comments received at these meetings were taken into consideration by the authors to finalise the WIDE

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¹¹ The High Level Discussion Forum was attended by three of the Advisors of the Prime Minister, Ato Neway Gebreab, Ato Andreas Eshete and Ato Abay Tsehaye; Ato Abdul Fatah Abdullahi, Minister MOLSA; Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal, Head of the Planning Commission; Ato Wondirad Mandefro, State Minister of Agriculture; and two other MOFED representatives. ¹² Present: DFID, Canadians, Netherlands, USAID, EU, PBS Secretariat and RED/FS Secretariat.

Discussion Briefs.

The agreed way forward is for the World Bank to submit the finalised briefs to the Government officials involved and seek their views on dissemination and any other actions that they would like to see being taken, going forward. We hope that this may include, among others, a joint GOE-DP discussion of the briefs. We outline in the next section what we see as possible other further steps.

While not painless the process of preparing these briefs brought up a number of lessons which we hope can be useful in further steps taken to bridge the WIDE3 research with policy-making and implementation in Ethiopia.

First, about the value of *independent* research – In the course of our rare but important interactions with Government officials it became clear that one of the major strengths of the WIDE3 research, as perceived by them, was its independence from donors' agendas and policy discourses. Maintaining this independence was therefore important. This was a major factor in deciding that the process of engaging on the WIDE Discussion Briefs would start by bifurcated discussions first with government then with other stakeholders. We believe that this was a sensible decision – although as explained above, we do hope that a joint discussion will occur in future now that these separate discussions have been held. Going forward we believe that further thoughts should be given on how to strengthen independent, policy-relevant research in Ethiopia.

Second, on the *nature of the briefs* - While initially the papers prepared were called 'policy briefs', in the inception discussions the authors, the WIDE3 team and the WB agreed that the aim was not to come up with policy recommendations (which there is no shortage of in Ethiopia) but rather to draw on the WIDE3 evidence to bring policy and implementation questions and possible implications to the attention of policymakers, thereby contributing to current debates through discussions with government, donors, and other stakeholders. This understanding led us to rather call the papers 'Discussion Briefs'.

The briefs were prepared in the spirit of the research – that is, "telling the stories behind the numbers, which are needed in order to understand the numbers"¹³. They aimed to be short and selective papers, focusing on specific points arising from the WIDE3 data and felt to require attention in relation to each topic. While the authors were familiar with the thrust of the government policies and programmes in their respective area of focus, the briefs were not intended to review these (the readership was expected to be familiar with them as well). The briefs were also expected to be fully based on the WIDE3 findings and to focus on current concerns regarding the implementation of policy. In inception discussions with the authors and in later discussions with the WB it was agreed that looking at the WIDE3 findings together with other bodies of evidence and taking a longitudinal perspective in order to document the evolution of policy and practice by drawing on earlier research round (WIDE1 and WIDE2) would be separate exercises. The briefs would therefore represent a first kind of product aimed to bridge between the WIDE research and policy-making and implementation in Ethiopia.

Third, on the *process* to develop them – It became clear in the course of the drafting process that the time required to prepare the Discussion Briefs had been seriously underestimated; and that the process of producing them to a standard that all involved parties would feel comfortable with had been somewhat underdeveloped. It was a real challenge for the authors, confronted with the richness and fine-grained and detailed nature of the WIDE data, to try to do justice to the diversity of contexts in the 20 communities while at the same time extracting some broader key findings and issues for discussion. It would also have been desirable to better map out at the outset the respective roles of, and the process of interaction between, the authors, the WIDE3 team, and the World Bank. Not doing so raised some frustration on all sides as roles were being played out at the

¹³ In the words of Dr Abraham Tekeste, State Minister of Finance, at one of our meetings with him.

same time as they were being explained to other actors.

For instance, while the briefs were said not to represent the views of the WIDE3 team, the World Bank or the JGAM donors, they were called WIDE briefs and the WIDE3 team was expected to provide inputs; but this was only made clear to the authors in the course of the process. The World Bank also decided to carry out an internal peer review of the draft briefs – with the stated objective of allowing identifying anything that might undermine the World Bank relationship with GOE. Again this was not foreseen at the outset, while the review brought additional work for the authors. More fundamentally, it was a fine line to tread for the authors, together with the WIDE3 team, to respond to comments at times reflecting the World Bank mental model and/or a lack of familiarity by some of the peer reviewers with the policymaking and policy dialogue context in Ethiopia, while maintaining the independence of the research and of the Discussion Briefs drawing on it.

Thinking ahead

At the closure of the WIDE3 project we see (at least) three main streams of work emerging, as follows:

- 1. More could be done to draw on the existing data both in terms of content (other topics etc.) and process (joint GOE-donor discussion, involvement of regional governments etc.) to make the research findings more easily accessible to policymakers and practitioners in Ethiopia
- 2. Both the GOE and donors expressed interest in the longitudinal nature of the research. This brought us to think about a subsequent round. We have suggested in earlier discussions that it would be interesting to do a rapid round of going back to all 20 villages in as short a period of time as possible, in 2015/16, with a view to establishing a baseline again at the closure of the GTP1 and the start of its successor.
- 3. Thinking further ahead, we hope that the WIDE research can find an Ethiopian home and, in its current or in a simplified form, become institutionalised as one of the ways in which Government and its development partners follow up the long term impacts of development interventions and broader modernisation processes in Ethiopia.


Some key findings from earlier stages of WIDE3

We conclude this section with lists of key findings from WIDE3 Stages 1 and 2.

WIDE3 Stage 1 communities: some headline findings

The six Stage 1 communities are shown in Map 3. Three of them, Geblen (Tigray), Dinki (Amhara) and Korodegaga (Oromia) were situated in drought-prone, food-insecure and aid-dependent areas while three, Yetmen (Amhara), Turufe (Oromia) and Girar (SNNP) were self-sufficient. Some of the headline findings from this stage of the research are listed below.

In all sites we found increased new public buildings, bringing petty urbanisation to the remoter sites, increased urban linkages and increased involvement in markets of all kinds. Diversification had led to bigger off-farm and non-farm sectors with more daily labour and petty business opportunities. Selected seeds and fertiliser had reached all communities leading to increased productivity in sites with good water availability, and breed cattle were beginning to spread. In three sites commercial irrigated vegetable production was an important element of the local economy. Compared with 1995 improved agricultural, livestock and NRM extension services and packages were in place. All the agricultural economies had experienced recent economic growth except one in Tigray where incessant drought had led to decline. Women's involvement in economic activities had increased considerably and rights to land were beginning to be implemented; in all sites there was increasing and problematic youth landlessness and (under)employment.



Map 3: WIDE 3 Stage 1 communities

- There had been big lifestyle changes since 1995 especially for richer households. These had only taken place recently in the remoter sites. There was improved access to curative health services though there were still problems for very poor households and those in remoter kebele areas. New preventive and Mother and Child health services had been launched in all communities including family planning, various sanitation packages, malaria prevention, and vaccination though there were problems related to shortages and community resistance. People in four sites did not have any safe water. There had been big changes in primary enrolment, especially in the remoter sites and for girls. There were increased inter-generational tensions related to youth landlessness with a minority resorting to theft, addictions and violent conflict.
- Informal social protection systems were still strong and there had been no big changes in community-initiated organisations. There had been an expansion in the range of cultural repertoires (sets of ideas) available to the community though local customary repertoires had remained strong with aspects hidden, particularly some of those characterised by the government as Harmful Traditional Practices. Compared with 1995 there was much greater penetration of the communities by the state involving a sub-kebele level array of overlapping government and party structures and associated with this a wider range of institutions and people that government could use to mobilise people to respond to development policies and packages. There was also much greater interaction between community-initiated organisations and customary institutions and government systems. There were signs of class formation as land had remained in the same hands, rich farmers had grown richer, partly as a result of the Model Farmer focus on the more successful, and numbers of landless people involved in daily labour had increased considerably.

- Many of the changes described above took place after 2003 with acceleration of change after 2005. During these five years development interventions grew in scope and funding through a mix of sometimes closely entwined government and donor funding and activities. At the same time a period of annual 'double-digit' growth' was entered.
- In speculative mode we suggested that all of the communities continued on much the same course between 1995 and 2003 and beyond to 2008 or so, with minor and cumulative changes which pushed them further from equilibrium. But there no important changes to the key external and internal factors determining the direction of the community (control parameters). However, by 2010 internal and external changes in three of the communities had pushed them to states of disequilibrium or 'chaos' (in the language of complexity (social) science) such that they were very unlikely to remain on the same trajectory.
- The communities we believe may have been setting of in new directions were the PSNP-dependent community in Tigray undergoing rapid youth exit after repeated failure in the core livelihood system; the peri-urban site near Shashemene which was poised to become a suburb; and the drought-prone Arssi Oromo site on the banks of the Awash which was experimenting quite successfully with a range of institutional modes for organising irrigation.
- The communities following a course which was in place in 1995 included a tef and wheat
 exporting community in Gojjam which had grown richer but otherwise not changed much, a
 peri-urban Gurage community of whom the same could be said, and a drought-prone
 community near Afar which was richer as a result of some irrigation but still regularly dependent
 on food aid.


WIDE3 Stage 2 communities: some headline findings

The eight Stage 2 communities depicted in Map 4 were all found in drought-prone, food-insecure and aid-dependent areas. Harresaw (Tigray), Shumsheha (Amhara), Adele Keke (Oromia) and Do'oma (SNNP) had vulnerable cereal-producing livelihood systems; Aze Debo'a and Gara Godo produced coffee; and Luqa and Gelcha depended on agro-pastoralism.

The headline findings from the Stage 2 Summary report ran to twelve pages. Here a small selection is presented.

- There were reports of *climate change* effects from all sites including increases in temperature, shorter rainy seasons, more erratic and intense rains, unseasonal rains which damaged crops, streams drying up, and decreasing levels of groundwater.
- *Urbanisation processes* had affected all communities: in one *kebele* a new highway was a growth point for a tiny town, in three *kebeles* small towns were growing fast, while four *kebele* centres were in commutable distance of growing towns.
- All communities had suffered annual rain shortages whose severity varied by year; all had
 suffered at least one severe drought since 2003. Nevertheless the six agriculturalist sites had
 experienced economic growth related to improvements in roads, increases in agricultural and
 non-farm incomes and the PSNP. There had been no equivalent economic development in the
 two pastoralist sites although there were signs of a possible take-off in the more remote one.
- Landlessness was a problem in all sites, especially for youth.
- A *richer farmer class* was solidifying in the agriculturalist sites with many diversifying into trade or other businesses.
- The main focus of agricultural extension was cereals and fertiliser and the shift to higher-value crops such as onions, peppers, spices, sesame, chat, coffee, & eucalyptus was mainly farmer-led.
- Not all government-provided fertiliser and seeds were suitable for local soils and climates.
- Only two wereda agricultural offices were actively promoting irrigation.
- Five of the eight sites had been affected by different kinds of inward investment involving loss of

- community land but also new employment opportunities.
- Few livelihood interventions focused on women and youth were sustained for any length of time.



Map 4: WIDE3 Stage 2 research communities

- In all communities provision of *health services, drinking water* and *education* had expanded considerably since 2003 bringing many benefits
- Ideal households were still patriarchal although men's authority over women and youth had
 declined and in some households greater female economic participation was paralleled with
 greater male domestic participation
- Malaria regularly caused deaths in the majority of communities.
- Stigma meant that researching HIV/AIDS was impossible.
- Very poor people could not afford to use health and education services and use by poor people was restricted.
- In all communities there were *strong social networks* and numerous *community-initiated organisations*; informal social protection involved neighbours, relatives and wider kin, friends and in some places Protestant churches and/or clan/lineage structures.
- Religious identity was an increasing focus for organisation; youth interest in religion had increased.
- Cultural entrepreneurs potentially bringing new beliefs, knowledge, norms and values into the communities included wereda officials, school teachers and extension workers, opposition party followers, organisations associated with ethnic identities, religious leaders and missionaries, returned ex-soldiers, international and urban migrants, and media actors.

 In all communities government-community relations were influenced by people's appreciation of new infrastructure, improved security and services, particularly education and health, and some community-specific interventions. However, there were also instances of violent conflict, refusal to co-operate, foot-dragging, and resentful conformity.

Community modernisations in the Stage 3 sites

In this section we first very briefly relate the stories of Ethiopia and each of the six communities up to November 2013. Then we compare the different areas where modernisation processes were at work between 1995 and 2013 across the six communities under the headings of space and place, people and their lives, human re/production systems, livelihoods, society, cultural ideas, and politics. In conclusion we provide some headline findings which have emerged from the analysis in the section.

Ethiopia story to 2013

In more recent history rural communities in Ethiopia suffered four major upheavals as a result of Menelik's imperial expansion in the late 19th century, the Italian occupation (1936-41), the Derg military coup and imposition of socialism (1974-91), and the civil war which brought the EPRDF to power in 1991:

- Menelik's imperial expansion to the south replaced the considerable variety of local polities with a mix of (1) territories occupied by northern landlords many of whom were soldiers in which farmers became tenants and (2) a few unoccupied territories whose leaders had not resisted the emperor's armies and reached arrangements to pay tribute.
- During their 5-year occupation the Italians built around 4,000 kms of roads. By 1941 more than 150,000 soldiers and around 75,000 civilians were spread over the country. Some Ethiopians collaborated with the occupiers and some took to the bush to fight them.
- Following the return of Haile Selassie in 1941 a slow programme of patchy modernisation was introduced which accelerated in the 1960s when a number of primary schools were built with external support.
- Following the 1974 military coup Derg soldiers and student campaigners were sent to rural areas
 to implement the land reform and organise Peasant Associations. Prior to the 1974 revolution,
 except in the turbulent times already described, most Ethiopians conducted their daily lives in
 accordance with customary norms peculiar to each community. The Derg was the first
 government with a plan to take modernising programmes to all of Ethiopia's rural communities.
- The Derg socialist programme for rural communities included land nationalisation and use rights on up to 10 hectares for smallholders, service and producer co-operatives, some health and education services, an adult literacy programme, re-settlement, some forced, from areas affected by the 1984 famine, villagisation, and agricultural quotas determining what each farmer had to sell to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation at fixed, low prices. There was regular forced conscription for the Derg army. Religious practices were discouraged and the rights of women and excluded groups such as craftworkers promoted. There were major droughts and famines in the mid-1980s which led to a food aid programme financed by western government and an influx of foreign NGOs to some areas.
- While the EPRDF was taking charge of the country there was a period of unrest as Peasant
 Associations ceased operation. The period of the Transitional Government from 1991 to 1995
 saw liberalising economic reforms, widespread poor harvests in 1994, the establishment of new
 kebele structures, some development interventions, consultation on a new Constitution, and
 religious freedom. In 1995 the Federal Republic of Ethiopia was established based on the
 concept of 'ethnic federalism'.

During the period from 1995 to 2002 the Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation
programmes and the associated Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System
(PADETES) was launched, health and education five-year plans supported by donor funding were
produced, and local government was re-structured at least twice. There was war with Eritrea
between 1998 and 2000. In 2002 wereda de-centralisation and the first donor-supported
poverty reduction plan, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
(SDPRP) were prepared.

Figure 3, which is not based on official government or World Bank statistics¹⁴, shows Ethiopia's economy did not show much per capita growth in the twenty years from 1980 and in 2002/3 the widespread drought caused a serious reduction in the slowly increasing GDP per capita. However between 2004 and 2012¹⁵ the economy experienced strong growth which, according to official figures, averaged more than 10%, while household poverty declined from 39% to 30%.




Figure 3: Economic growth in Ethiopia since 1980

Source: http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/Ethiopia/GDP Per Capita PPP US Dollars/accessed 30/12/2013

The changes reflected in the Figure 3 graph are associated with some key processes and events in the period 2003 to 2013, including government and donor interventions. Other important happenings at macro level of potential relevance to rural communities with agricultural potential included:

Events

- Wereda de-centralisation implementation 2003
- Implementation of the SDPRP 2003-5
- Opposition parties officially won 219 (40.2%) seats in the national elections in 2005 which were followed by unrest
- Kebele re-organisation followed the 2005 election
- Implementation of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development (PASDEP) 2006-10
- There were droughts in some areas in 2008 and 2011

¹⁴ While the statistics may be disputed there is agreement about the trend.

¹⁵ The figures for 2013-2016 are predictions.

- The EPRDF won all but two seats in the 2010 national elections
- Implementation of the Growth and Transformation Plan 2010-15
- In 2010 kebeles were re-organised: sub-kebele, Development Team and 1-5 structures were introduced
- Following Meles' death in 2012 Hailemariam Desalegn became Prime Minister
- In 2013 the EPRDF overwhelmingly won the elections for 3.6 million local government positions

Trends

- During the period Ethiopia experienced economic growth, some structural economic change, poverty reduction and human development improvement
- Gross Value Added data indicate that agriculture represented 45.2% of the total GVA in 2010, down from 54.8% in 2001 and 65.7% in 1991; whereas trade and other services represented 20% each, up from 15-17% ten years before 16
- GoE's official statistics show a decline of the poverty headcount from 49% in 1994/5 to 42% in 1999/00 to 38% in 2004/5 to 29.6% in 2010/11, although the number of poor people declined very little since 1994/5, due to population growth.
- The UNDP Human Report Development Report shows that Ethiopia recorded an average annual gain of 3.1% in the Human Development Index between 2000 and 2012. It is one of only 14 countries in the world to have sustained a gain of more than 2% over that period of time.
- Rural connections with urban areas increased during the period due to urbanisation (17% of population in 2010), improved roads and the spread of mobile phones
- Religious proselytising by different Protestant sects and the Wahabi Muslim sect grew and interest and participation in all religions increased especially among young people
- International migration and diaspora links increased and accelerated

The events and trends described here as key to Ethiopia's historical trajectory since the end of the 19th century played out in different ways in the six communities; in the next section we tell the stories of each.

Adado story to 2013

Adado, in Bule wereda, Gedeo zone and SSNP region, is 10 km from the wereda centre Bule (market, Grade 12 school) and 25 km from the zonal capital Dilla (Grade 12 and TVET, coffee trade, consumption goods). It is located in a mountainous area at 7-8,000 feet. Good rainfall (fairly continuous from February to September) and a cool environment make it suitable for enset and specialty coffee. Erosion was said not to be a huge issue but in September 2013 a big landslide due to heavy rains destroyed everything on 7 ha and washed away the pipe bringing safe water to Adado. The area has historically been very densely populated.

History up to 1991

The imperial period was marked by conflicts over land control and taxes between neftegna (soldier-settlers) and local people including clashes with the army in 1960, the gradual intensification of coffee production by the Gedeo in the 1940/50s, the arrival of Protestant missionaries in the early 1950s and the completion of the Addis-Dilla-Kenya road. The Gedeo clan-based communal form of

¹⁶ http://www-

 $[\]underline{wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/22/000158349_20140122090840/Rendere}\\ \underline{d/PDF/WPS6749.pdf}$

social and political organisation under an Aba Gada's supreme authority was important, as were the Gedeo's long-standing relationship of economic exchange and occasional violent conflicts over land and borders with the Guji Oromo. The Italians brought maize, iron hoes and rural-urban trade. The Derg brought land reform which was appreciated; a school, a clinic and a Service Cooperative which were not, due to poor services and forced SC membership (the SC was abandoned in 1990); conscription which people tried to avoid including through underage marriage; the quota system and price controls which led farmers to grow less coffee. Taxes were high, people were forbidden from worshipping, and the government political leadership tried to undermine traditional leaders and elders. The area was very densely populated. Migration for gold-mining started in 1988.

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

The EPRDF period started with conflicts between the Gedeo People Development Organisation which did not follow the EPRDF rules and the Gedeo People Development Movement created to replace it; and between the Gedeo and Guji when much Guji land was allocated to the SNNP Region in 1995. The two political parties quarrelled again in 2000; wereda officials promoted political tolerance but GPDO members were reportedly harassed during the election campaign. There was no land redistribution under the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-5); terracing was introduced but seen as imposed. There was a clinic but no doctor or nurse, drug shortages, staff absenteeism and corruption; low uptake of family planning still in 2003; vaccination campaigns resisted by some mothers; deaths due to typhoid, TB and HIV. An estimated 20% boys and 8% girls irregularly attended a G1-6 school in 1995; they were more in 2003 and an annual campaign 'agitated' parents to send children, but most were unable to attain higher education due to poor quality and not affording costs. By 2003 there was a kebele office, a Service Co-operative office and shop and a marketplace. There was no safe water in 1995 but 3 wells were dug in 2002 with community labour and NGO funding. The dry-weather road connecting Adado to the outside world was built and needed to be annually maintained but people seeing no government investment were not willing.

Land was crucial in wealth differentiation; average landholdings already very small were said to decrease and land conflicts to increase; in 1995 100 households were landless and people wanted the government to provide counteracting policies. There were big differences between wealthy (estimated 2%) and poor and destitute (estimated 70%) people, subsistence farmers (the majority) and those involved in coffee trade, and rich farmers and daily labourers working for them. In the early 1990s coffee was sold to the SC which washed it and prepared it for the international market, and the price had increased dramatically (from 2 to 17 birr/kg) following the free market policy. People wanted new coffee production technology. But the coffee price started declining from 1996 which, together with land shortage and less rain since 2000, severely affected people's income; by 2003 the SC plant was no longer operational and people had to carry their coffee a long way to sell to private traders. The agricultural extension package was introduced in 1993 (1 agent/9 PAs, working through 10 innovative contact farmers each with 46 followers, and 1 one-month trained local assistant) but the services did not address crop disease issues. In 2003 there was agricultural credit for maize seed and fertiliser and for bull fattening but few participated; and since 2000 credit from OMO in Bule used by rich farmers including for trade. Male seasonal trading (since 1935), migration for land or to gold mines (increasing in 2003) were complementary options. In 1995 Adado was notable for saving cash which was rare in rural communities.

Women had no land rights but in 2003 a few fathers had given land to daughters; women's rights were starting to be better respected compared to 1995 (e.g. land used by widows raising their children and not remarrying) but polygyny still prevailed. By 2003 many women were raising an income for the household (selling kocho, harvesting coffee and doing petty trade and for the poor domestic work) but there was no women-specific intervention. Religious groups coexisted peacefully. The government sometimes consulted community leaders, and elders, iddirs and clans were important in dispute resolution though people could also choose to bring cases to the kebele.

The Gada system was revived in 2002/3. Land tax, which had reduced in the early 1990s but was still considered as high, was raised in 2000; reportedly, some people had to sell assets to pay and avoid imprisonment. There were fears that regionalisation would heighten conflict and hinder mobility.

Adado in 2013

There was a small urban centre. The health centre was the only modern building though many houses (grouped in flat areas, scattered elsewhere) had tin-roofs. A dry-weather road connected Adado to the Dilla-Bule gravel road; the community had to do public works every year to maintain it and complained that although the area was producing exported niche coffee, the government did not help. There was no public transport; access by cars and motorcycles was sometimes impossible in the rainy season. In most places there were no internal roads. There had been electricity since 2003 (120 meters – 10% of households but an estimated 70% actually connected, not available in the remotest areas, unreliable in dry season) and a poor mobile connection in some spots (since 2008, 200 users in 2013). There were annual fluctuations in rainfall but no reported climate change impact except an unusual malaria epidemic in 2012 and the unusually heavy and long rains in 2013.

The population (1,150 official households of which 100 female-headed and 170 landless) was 100% Gedeo, 95% Protestant and 5% Muslim (though Islam preceded Christianity in the area). Due to the growing economy the proportions of very rich (estimated 5%), rich (10%) and middle-wealth (44%) households had increased. Families were large but the age of marriage was reportedly increasing as it was more difficult for young men to get land or establish an independent livelihood. Children were better cared for. Almost all were at school, many also working. Most passed Grade 8 but many failed Grade 10 and did not find jobs, while there was unmet demand at the wereda for college/ university graduates. Youth aspirations had changed but were not easily met. Women's rights were legally established but going against customs, thus implemented only if the woman had the confidence to push. Nourishing diet was one of the health packages and richer households diversified what they ate; bread had become common. In 2012/3 six water points were built with community labour, but they functioned only from April to September 2013 after which the main pipe was washed away by a landslide. There was only one HEW, supposed to work with the new 1-5s but she was not and was struggling to serve the whole kebele. Recently, increased attention was given to maternal health instead of sanitation and hygiene, although in November 2013 the HEW said that the 'skilled delivery' package was the least popular in Adado - even though there was a health centre in the kebele centre and it was better staffed and equipped in April 2013.

Land measurement, started in 2006, was stopped due to problems in registering polygynous wives. The local economy had grown with better coffee price in 2005-2011; and diversified, with rich farmers engaging in trade, services and livestock activities, and poorer families engaged in non-/offfarm activities to supplement their small agricultural incomes; but it remained highly dependent on coffee (for cash) and enset (staple food). Since 2011 the coffee price on the international market had been falling. 95% of the land was planted with coffee and enset; the latter was not included in the extension package, but affected by disease with no solution so farmers produced suckers locally. Much attention was given to coffee production and the extension service helped (new seeds, regular training on use of compost and local seedlings to avoid diseases, improved planting, harvesting and handling techniques). The Adado Farmers' Union, re-established in 2008, had a coffee processing plant used by 8 other kebeles. Farmers appreciated the possibility of selling coffee there although a private plant in a nearby area had had higher prices in 2012 and there had reportedly been embezzlement of funds so the Union did not have sufficient funds to pay for farmers' coffee until they had sold it on. In October 2013 a kebele meeting was told that all fresh coffee had to be sold to the Union. Dry coffee was sold in Dilla. Farmers had reduced the area planted with maize as there had been frequent problems with bad improved seeds that they were nonetheless forced to take, and they could not use fertiliser except in areas strictly separated from coffee. Fertiliser was expensive and credit had stopped in 2012. 150 households practised homestead watering of vegetables and fruit and 12 households had dug wells for this but river catchments were not suitable

for irrigation without pumps.

The animal population was reducing due to land and fodder shortage although short-term fattening was widespread. The nearest vet service was in Bule. There was contradictory information about the AGP, in April 2013 said to be soon introduced to do lots of things, but with not much to show by November. DAs found wereda plans unrealistic and ignoring the local context. There was more wage labour due to more intensive farming. More than 200 people were involved in business activities (trade, shops, tea-houses, mini-restaurants, TV places, drinking and bakery houses, skilled work, petty services); 100 people provided transport services (80 donkeys, 10 bicycles and 10 motorcycles). Much of the activity followed the coffee cycle; the harvest season also gave daily labour opportunities (collecting and work at plant) to very many local people (including many children dropping out) and in-migrants. 200-250 people worked as government employees elsewhere. Land shortage and lack of local jobs pushed many young men to migrate for land elsewhere, in town and for gold mining; the latter was said to have increased in the past few years. A few young women migrated to towns every year, which was new. Up to very recently there was no support to non-farm activities; in October 2013 a new wereda 'rural youth job opportunity' sector gave credit to 13 groups of 3-5 male youth who had saved 20% of the capital needed for grain trading, fattening, restaurants/teashops; young women had not been able to save enough yet. OMO used to provide credit but had stopped due to bad debt; two local savings and credit associations were short-lived (2006-2010); a few people were saving at OMO but most used other means to save and get loans including various kinds of equb.

With occasional tensions (e.g. Protestant church's split; Muslims feeling insulted by Tsega followers), religious groups intermixed in iddir and equb. There were many male and female iddirs, with little interaction with the government. The Aba Gada, which was much appreciated by government as many social problems were solved through the system, died in 2012 but was going to be replaced. Elders were active in dispute resolution, reporting to the social or wereda courts for referred cases. Among new things were preference for work over leisure, the perceived desirability of urban lifestyles and a much greater flow of information through TVs, FM radios on mobile phones and greater linkages with urban areas. Young people were active in bringing new modern things.

In 2005 EPRDF won by a narrow margin; in 2010 and 2013 there was no opposition candidate. The community kebele Cabinet members faced a high workload in spite of the plan that the kebele manager would do most of the day-to-day work. There was gossip about corruption by kebele leaders but no action and no change in the 2013 election. Since 2010 three zones, development teams and 1-5s had been established and were supposed to be the main vehicle for development interventions, especially, agriculture for household heads' structures and health for women's structures. They were also meant to be used to mobilise farmers for group farm work and people for Public Works, meetings etc. Some government officials reported some activity but most people could not describe how the structures were supposed to function and some said they were not functional. In spite of the supposed distinction between development and party structures in practice both talked about development and people referred to hiwas (party cells) and not development teams. It was not clear whether Public Works were compulsory (absentees brought to prison by militia) or not. There was appreciation of electricity, safe water, the coffee plant, the HEW door-to-door approach but complaints about roads, poor school, forced participation in maize and fertiliser interventions, and the lack of kebele/government concern for the youth; and a feeling that elected officials had not matched expectations.

Regional and wereda programmes included road and water investment (SLM) and economic diversification (AGP). Ideas about diversification away from coffee included: fishery ponds, beekeeping, apples, bananas, mangoes, bamboo and eucalyptus, ginger (under coffee plants), livestock fattening (based on artificial nutrition); considerable scope for pump irrigation; and MSEs for youth. However there had been little diversification in Adado by November 2013.

Somodo story to 2013

Somodo, in Mana wereda, Jimma zone of Oromia Region, is 20 km from Yebu, the wereda centre (secondary school, TVET, health centre), and while the centre of the kebele is 17 km from the centre of Jimma by road (TVET, hospital, consumption goods, trade, wage work) part of the community borders Jimma town. The closest urban centre is Belida at 4 km (secondary school, big market, health centre). It is in the *weyna dega* belt and enjoys a favourable climate for crop and animal production and has traditionally been an area of production of coffee and maize. It has three perennial rivers. There is some erosion but it is not as problematic as in some neighbouring kebeles. Somodo has always had a majority of Oromo Muslims (81% in 2013) and a mix of other ethnicities; in 2003 these included Yem (18% in 2013 – mostly Orthodox Christians) and some Kembata, Amhara and Shewa Oromo Christians who were not mentioned in 2013 when the other 1% were said to be Dawro.

History up to 1991

The kingdom of Jimma Abba Jiffar (established in the 1830s) submitted to Menelik in the 1880s; coffee became a major cash crop. Haile Selassie annexed the kingdom in 1932. Land belonged to local landlords. There were grain mills, cars and a G1-6 school (1963). The Italians developed Jimma as a centre of Islamic learning. In 1952 the government and USAID set up an agricultural school in Jimma; experiments with coffee seedlings were conducted. In 1953 the trip from Jimma to Addis Ababa reportedly took two weeks; by 1968 it was an 8-hour car drive. The Derg began with violent conflicts between the *zemecha* students and their peasant followers, and local small land-owners, richer farmers and the local police. The Derg sided with the latter and closed the *zemecha*. The period saw land redistribution, the establishment of a producer cooperative and a multipurpose SC in 1975, villagisation (11 *jiga*), the introduction of latrines (in most households) and technologies (tractors, maize thresher, biogas, cross-bred cows) and a small soap-production factory, all abandoned when the Derg collapsed. Social exclusion of craftworkers decreased. Yem people who had come to work for an Amhara landlord in Imperial times were given the land and settled in the area. There was conscription, forced enrolment of the Muslim women (traditionally staying at home) to work for the Women Association, and restriction on economic activities, especially trade.

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

The EPRDF period started with violent conflicts, among ethnic groups as Oromo Muslims wanted to expel other groups – this was stopped by Yem soldiers; and between OPDO and OLF - the government took control after many killings. In 1994 there was conflict among students in the Jimma area. Early years saw the introduction of the free market policy (1992) and the Sasakawa agricultural package (1995), training of political cadres (1994), and the merging of three kebeles to form Somodo in 1996.

By 2003 the all-weather road connecting Somodo to the main Jimma-Yebu road and to Belida was being maintained annually. Three households had electricity. The SC was reorganised in 2002 and there was a local market. The school offered Grade 8; enrolment had risen especially of girls but the quality was poor and there was high absenteeism during the coffee harvest. Many school leavers and dropouts lacked access to land and had no job opportunities; government was blamed for not creating jobs. There was access to contraception (since 2000) through two local women (113 users); polio vaccination; a clinic and drug shop in Bilida (4 km); an anti-HIV/AIDS club (2000) and quite high awareness. Most people used safe water from 8 well-developed wells and a water pump (2002).

Ownership of land, especially planted with coffee, was driving big wealth differences. 315 of the 1,200 households were landless. Land ownership had changed a lot through successive land transactions (no redistribution); in 2003 some land was given to ex-soldiers who had gone to fight against Eritrea (pushed by landlessness and the lack of local opportunities). Fathers were reluctant to give land to their sons. The community's economic status had first considerably improved with

the increasing coffee price (1994/5-1997: tin-roof houses, grain mills, modern goods) then drastically declined with much lower prices from 1999 onward, aggravated by a poor harvest in 2002 and for the first time, coffee cholera caused by poor weather in 2003, which also killed many animals. Two DAs living in the kebele and a vet visiting every 15 days provided extension services (introduction of fruit trees as cash crops, improved coffee, training on fertiliser application and coffee handling, vaccination, treatment and drug provision etc.). The DAs worked with the farmers selected for the extension programme, who had privileged access to fertiliser and improved seeds, and not poor farmers unable to pay or middle farmers whose outputs could not cover the costs of inputs. There was credit (Ministry of Agriculture, SC) but people had to repay immediately after harvest when prices were low. Other activities included trade, grain mill running by the rich, share-cropping and daily labour, petty trade (women) and shops (15) but employment opportunities were low. Few people migrated though there was some seasonal urban migration of Yem men and women for daily labour construction jobs; the building of Jimma university had provided new opportunities.

Government attempted to improve women's position (girls' education, anti-FGM and early marriage campaign, advocacy for divorce and inheritance rights; WA, women affairs' kebele cabinet member, women councillors) with mixed effect in this rather conservative society; for *Wahabi* women, norms were becoming stricter. There were religious tensions and conflicts (between Orthodox and Protestants, and Sufi and *Wahabi* Muslims) and men promoting *Wahabism* were arrested in the mid-1990s. Ethnic and religious distinctions had political ramifications: Oromo Muslims were '1st class citizens' and occupied all kebele positions. Kebele leaders tended to exclude elders and sheiks from decision-making; family disputes were seen by the formal courts (not elders or sharia). A militia was formed in 1995. Development teams were formed in 2000 and replaced by *got* and *gare* in 2003. The government gave expanding roles to the socially most important 11 *iddirs* (1/*jiga*). Land tax had increased and the government had started taxing grain mills and trade but was accused of unevenness. There was reportedly corruption especially on land issues, even after the 2001 political renewal.

Somodo in 2013

The 11 jiga (1 mainly Yem, 3 mainly Sufi, 5 with Wahabi majorities and the others more mixed) still existed; the settlement was denser along the all-weather main road and roadside land was in demand but very expensive. There were 3 schools, a FTC, health post and kebele office in one compound, electricity (about a third of the households, not accessible in some jiga) and mobile phone (since 2006, now 1 phone in most households). There were minibuses and city buses on the main road, crowded on market days. An all-weather road connecting neighbouring kebeles to Somodo had been recently built with community labour and cash contributions; internal roads had not changed much but some PWs were organised to clear them. Rains were regularly good although in 2011 and 2012 they started late and the 2011 crop harvest was poor.

The population (1,209 households, 90 female-headed) was Oromo (81%), Yem (18%) and Dawro (1%); 85% Muslim, 10% Orthodox and 5% Protestant. The community was better off than in 2003 (better coffee farming, chat, remittances), with an estimated 17% very rich and rich, 66% middle and 17% poor, very poor and destitute; but inflation and falling coffee prices in the past two years had affected incomes. Most youth married late because it was difficult to establish an independent livelihood. Almost all children were at school but Grade 8 results were poor due to different issues related to inputs, teachers and students. Most students continuing to secondary education failed at Grade 10 and joblessness was discouraging. There were issues in implementing women's rights provisions. Most women continued to have little independence; before the ban in October 2013 many young women had legally migrated to Arab countries but this reportedly had not changed their status as most families did not save for them but spent the money on themselves. Diets were more diverse especially in richer households. Safe water was not an issue although people in some villages had to walk longer distances. HEWs had been in place since 2007. Their focus seemed to be latrines, vaccination, family planning, malaria prevention and treatment (there were severe

epidemics in 2008 and 2009) and recently, a big push on skilled delivery (the nearest HC was in Belida, 4 km, and there was an ambulance from mid-2013) although with mixed results.

Land certification (by spouses jointly) had not been not completed maybe because polygyny was still common. Land had been given to hundreds of youth (without certificates) but by 2013 many had left it, some land had been taken away from youth groups, and there was alleged corruption of kebele leaders in relation to land allocation. Crops grown included chat and eucalyptus - high demand and good market but no extension services; teff, wheat, barley, beans with varieties introduced by the DAs and Jimma ARC; and irrigated vegetables (85 farmers in February 2013). The local economy remained dependent on coffee and maize. The falling coffee price (by half from 2010 to 2012) hit coffee growers, local traders and 'investors' (outsiders owning washing plants) who in turn, were unable in 2013 to advance money for the traders to lend to farmers (who repay in coffee) – yet many needed these loans to buy inputs for their other crops. Credit was available from WALKO for those eligible (an estimated 60 people had taken a loan, uptake was low partly due to Wahabi influence) but not from the SC which provided fertiliser and seeds – although in 2013 the SC had arranged for credit from WALKO given the breakdown in the coffee lending chain. The extension services paid much attention to coffee production (improved varieties – the DAs recently had bred 1 million seedlings; training on handling techniques; quality control at collection points) and this was appreciated. Some people wanted the SC to invest in a coffee washing plant; others thought the SC could not compete with the outside investors.

There were issues with supply and uptake of modern inputs, especially for maize. The 2011 and 2012 harvests were poor and some attributed this to poor quality SC seeds; the seeds seemed suitable for some parts of the kebele and not others. In 2012 only 35% used inputs willingly; some were threatened with prison. What farmers said they would buy was more than they actually did buy leading the DAs and SC to over-estimate needs which resulted in financial losses for the SC left with unsold surpluses. Farmers appreciated the Jimma ARC as they demonstrated each activity practically and followed up closely. In 2013 for the first time ever DAs got some funds and undertook demonstrations on the FTC land. Irrigation was expanding: a few farmers followed outside investors who showed the way with pump/furrow irrigation on the Abay River; others used water from wells; most used wetland cultivation. There was no wereda support but a new and energetic crop DA said he planned to address this.

There were fewer cattle than in 2003 due to land and fodder shortage but the quality was gradually improving; artificial insemination was beginning to take off and many fed cattle at home. The DA wanted to introduce modern milk production techniques and link producers to Jimma market. Oxen and shoat fattening was expanding. Livestock extension also focused on modern honey production but the kebele lacked an extractor and moulder and modern hives were expensive. Coffee harvesting and trade were major but seasonal occupations for many. There was daily labour on other agricultural tasks and in Jimma (many commuted daily). There were grain mills, many shops of various sizes, tea-houses, local drink houses in the Christian area, 2 restaurants, petty service providers, transport service providers, and carpenters, including a self-initiated small group of youth who bought machines to produce furniture which seemed promising. Apart from three stone cooperatives, one successful for a while but all three non-functional by November 2013, nothing was done for the youth. Many migrated (male urban migration and illegal migration to Sudan, female mainly legal migration to Arab countries), which injected cash into the local economy but reduced the community's young labour force. Some shop-owners were complaining that they had to pay taxes in excess of their income, and some youth with shops closed them and migrated.

There continued to be conflicts and tension between religious groups, e.g. Muslims who occupied all top leadership positions were accused of 'hidden negligence'; and tensions between Sufi and *Wahabi* Muslims and between the government and *Wahabi* followers, e.g. when religious representatives were elected at kebele level. In the 11 *jiga iddirs*, leaders were also DT leaders and bridged with the kebele and mobilised people for development activities; *iddir* elders got cases from

the kebele and social court and shared property in cases of divorces sent by the wereda court. Elders were trained by the wereda court and police to prevent conflicts during the coffee harvest. Both modernists and conservatives liked transport, grain mills, electricity and mobile phones. Modernists, including youth, also liked modern farm technologies although some youth did not want to engage in agriculture.

In 2005 many Yem voted for Kinijit and subsequently faced discrimination; in 2010 they voted for EPRDF and things became better. The 2013 local election led to shifts in the top kebele positions. There were mixed accounts of people's appreciation of the leaders, including allegations of corruption, non-Oromo Muslims feeling dominated and poor people feeling neglected. Some leaders said that the zones, DTs and 1-5s supposed to channel information, make people work together and monitor each other's activities and strengthen security, were appreciated but others said they were hated as 1-5s had been given input quotas to enforce on their members. In November 2013 organised female 1-5s were not functional but the DAs and HEWs said that of late the kebele officials, party leaders, DT leaders and 1-5s were supporting them better.

The federal MDG Fund provided better budgets for a number of programmes. The wereda plan was to complete inter-kebele road connection, work on education quality and safe water supply and expand farming and non-farm activities. Key informants said that Somodo needed diversification through ox fattening, Artificial Insemination (AI) and milk production; irrigation; and wood- and metalwork for the youth.

Oda Haro story to 2013

Oda Haro, in Bako wereda, West Shewa zone, Oromia, is 17 km from the wereda centre Bako (TVET) and 108 km from Ambo. It is adjacent to Tibe which by 2013 was a small market town (SC, new HC). Most of the land is flat and suitable for farming; two sub-kebeles are in the *weyna dega* zone, flat with some slopes and good for agriculture but vulnerable to floods. Most of the third sub-kebele, Botto, is in the *dega* zone; it has some mountains and is remote.

History up to 1991

Bako Tibe wereda was incorporated in the Ethiopian empire during the expansion of Menelik's Shewa kingdom in the 1880s. In the imperial period, land belonged to landlords. People died of malaria and cholera; and girls married as young as 7 with some dying as a result of abduction. By the 1960s people were growing red pepper for sale. During the Derg period land was given to the tenants; there was villagisation, an attempt to introduce latrines, a school, a strong Women's Association, and droughts and famine in 1977 and 1984/5.

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

With the change of government there was looting, de-villagisation and disruption in farming and tax collection. Both OPDO and OLF operated in the village for a while. There was sporadic fighting after OLF was expelled and about a hundred people died. Tax collection resumed and land redistribution was stopped. By 1994 the EPRDF was fully in control. There was drought and famine in 1993/4. Three PAs were merged to form Oda Haro in 1999; but in 2003 the residents of Botto, considered as lazy by others, did not feel part of Oda Haro. In 2003 951 households (of which 58 were femaleheaded and many landless) lived in 3 villages; most residents were Oromo with a few Amhara. An asphalt road cutting through connected the PA to Tibe (minibuses); other roads were dry-weather. Health workers came from time to time to inform people about hygiene, family planning etc. but only a few women used contraception. Malaria was very serious. The school, upgraded to Grade 8, faced issues and was low quality. There were many unemployed high school graduates and landless young people. Fathers wanted their sons to remain unmarried to keep their land and their sons' labour.

There were big differences between rich and poor and conflicts between rich employers and

labourers when they were not paid. In 2003 wage labour was common but considered as a low status activity. Harvests were good between 1998 and 2001. People produced maize for subsistence and red pepper, sugarcane and niger seed as cash crops. By 2003 many people used traditional irrigation, some growing sugarcane, tomatoes and potatoes, others maize. Maize production substantially increased in 2000 and 2001, some said thanks to the extension services, but the price plummeted. It then declined in 2003 with the drought; by then, farmers also lacked capital/credit to buy inputs. Some farmers had moved away from traditional crop-growing techniques and used fertiliser and improved maize seeds on credit from the government; but input supply was insufficient. Many dropped out from the extension programme in 2000 after falling into debt due to low maize prices. There were mixed stories of use of credit, with some people forced to sell land to pay debt. A vet clinic opened in 2002; there was vaccination only during epidemics. Cattle prices were very low. There were few other activities (2 shops, local drink-making) and few local jobs. Men migrated seasonally to Jimma (coffee picking), Ambo and Bako and a few worked on construction in Tibe. There was no report of female migration.

Women controlled some resources. Polygyny was common. Some women managed to escape widow's inheritance and some asked elders for their share of property during divorce, which was uncommon. But the community as a whole rejected stopping female circumcision. Protestants started converting people in 1994 and by 2000 they were dominant. There were tensions between Orthodox and Protestants and in 2001, when a mosque was built, between Protestants and Muslims. Elders were moral authorities and resolved conflicts. Clan linkages remained strong over incipient class distinctions. Important decisions were taken through both iddirs and the kebele and elders on some issues. The kebele was found too vast to administer and tax. A new land tax system was introduced; some very poor people failing to pay had 5-year arrears and some were imprisoned. There was political activity in 1996 (training), 1999 (election preparation), 2002 (conference on opposition and corruption) and 2003 (PA evaluation). In 2001 there were students' protests about the low price of grain and soaring price of fertiliser. The latter was a major issue for farmers blaming government for it.

Oda Haro in 2013

There was no town but people easily went to adjacent Tibe. There were 2 kebele offices, a Health Post, an FTC and two schools. An electric line passed through but the community was not connected despite repeated demands; there were a few solar batteries. Mobile phone connection was available (200 phones). The Addis-Nekemte asphalt road, recently upgraded, gave easy access to near and far towns. Since 2010 a feeder road programme (community PWs, 50% MDG Fund) had improved internal roads and there were more than 160 carts in the community; but there remained issues (lack of roads in remotest areas, roads narrow and easily damaged by floods). The climate had become hotter. In the past three years belg rains had been poor and meher rains variable. Most land was used for farming; in May 2013 land on two mountains was fenced and declared forest land and residents had to move elsewhere.

Of the 719 households, 269 were landless (most of the young generation) and 129 female-headed. 60% were Protestants, 32% Orthodox and 7% Muslim (Sufi and *Wahabi*). There was an estimated 20% very rich and rich, 20% middle and 60% poor, very poor and destitute. Some thought that generally people's status was improving, even for poor people as everyone tried hard since the 2010 GTP training. Botto zone was poorest. The richest people were Muslims engaged in both farming and trading. Most married women used contraception (some male resistance). Children were better cared for. There were two G1-8 schools but said to be of low quality. Most children at school also worked and the schools closed at harvest time. Most children failed Grade 10 or Grade 12 and private college graduates failed the Certificate of Competence and found no job, leading to declining aspirations. In 2013 there were 150 educated jobless youth. The whole community still rejected the ban on female circumcision. Polygyny was still practised but there was reportedly progress on women's divorce rights and less male violence due to iddir and 1-5s' action. 70% had access to safe

water thanks to a government programme but most had to walk long distances. Since 2008 HEWs taught on the packages but many people would not let them come into their compounds. Malaria prevalence was strongly reduced (attributed to DDT, bed nets). HEWs should provide safe and clean delivery services but had not been trained and the HP had no delivery kits. TBAs could not practise except in emergency. There was an ambulance but people had to pay for fuel.

Most land was registered (by spouses jointly). Land was scarce and there was resistance to giving communal land to young people. Major changes in households' wealth were attributed mainly to trading, irrigation farming and international migration (remittances from young women in Arab countries were estimated to represent 5% of the community's income). Maize, sorghum, tef, niger seed and red peppers were grown in weyna dega areas; barley, wheat, maize, tef, beans and chickpeas in Botto; and sugarcane, various fruits and vegetable and maize on irrigated land. Due to declining soil fertility demand for fertiliser was high and supply by the SC was insufficient. There were also issues with the quality and on-time supply of improved maize seeds by the SC (different seeds used for different soil types). But improved maize production with surpluses for sale had contributed to improved livelihoods. Farmers sold to who gave the best price, SC or traders - which varied over the year. Recently ATA had started experimenting new varieties with a few farmers. Bako ARC was not that helpful as it did not bring any solution to diseases affecting red pepper and recently to the issue of maize burning. In 2013 the kebele gave land for the FTC and DAs started experimenting; they gave various advice but farmers generally thought that they didn't work well since Meles's death, just pushing farmers to buy fertiliser, pesticides and improved seeds and working with rich model farmers, but when they complained at the wereda the DAs tried to retaliate.

By 2103 70 ha were irrigated (rivers, streams and wells) and more than 200 households were involved. There were 7 private pumps but most was traditional and managed through cooperatives. There was no government support except training. People had started copying a land renter from Addis Ababa and had been able to use more land for irrigation. The main issues were shortage of water (the kebele wanted funds to put a big pump on the Sama River), lack of access to seeds and pesticides and price fluctuations. Big traders came from Addis to buy tomatoes and sugarcane. Eucalyptus sale was increasing. Until 2013 livestock-rearing was mostly traditional and affected by shortage of grazing land and fodder and lack of regular vet services, but in 2013 people's interest in cattle and shoat fattening increased as livestock prices were much higher. There was high demand for breeds but lack of supply and the vet service (from Tibe) did not cover all areas. Paid labour had become a major income source for many.

By October 2013 there were at least 180 people engaged in non-farm business; six large traders (two owned trucks rented out at 40,000 birr/month); many young people and women petty trading vegetables and crops, teahouses, shops, part-time carpentry, weaving, local drink-making, some firewood, charcoal and grass selling, and 45 people giving mule cart service. Some rich Oda Haro residents had opened grain mills, a clinic, a private school and shops in Tibe. Men migrated for seasonal agricultural labour (very few); to urban areas many to work in factories; and illegally to Sudan. There were also jobs on the road but this was over. Some women migrated to urban areas; international (mostly legal) migration was increasing until the government ban on migration in October, which some people disagreed with. There was group-based credit from WALKO. It helped some people; others had to leave the community as they could not repay; loans were too small for the big farmers and many preferred investing rather than saving; young people were unable to save enough to be able to borrow. Except a cooperative (2010, 40 male members) given forest land to maintain and exploit in the future but which did not get proper support, there was no specific intervention for youth, or for women. Some traders had licenses and paid tax to the wereda but complained that there was no standardisation and they had to compete with "illegal traders" not paying anything.

In the past few years Protestantism rose and many Sufi converted to Wahabism. People celebrated

together but there were tensions between religious groups and leaders in particular. The wereda and kebele (but not people) considered *Wahabism* as extremist and this was discussed at monthly inter-kebele meetings. Wereda officials suspected that some *Wahabists* from Addis Ababa with links with 'terrorists' were hiding in Oda Haro. Elders handled disputes and represented the community in important government meetings. Iddirs had been given a lot of power in acting against thieves, ostracizing them and their families if they didn't conform and reporting the sanctions to the administration. Some thought that farmers did not accept new ideas easily; others stressed that people's aspirations had changed since 2010 and everyone worked hard. In 2005 many youth had supported the opposition and their ideas were still usually dismissed by officials; there was also tension between the adult and young generations.

In 2005 an opposition party reportedly won the election but this was subsequently over-turned by the government who imprisoned many youth for supporting the opposition. In 2010 people voted EPRDF with the promise of getting electricity which had not happened. In 2013 the 1-5s were meant to prevent the formation of opposition parties at local level. Many believed that since Meles's death favouritism, nepotism and bribery at wereda level had become major problems. There were allegations of corruption by kebele officials and the chair was replaced. The kebele Cabinet seemed riddled with competition for power, including by the kebele manager, a powerful leading farmer and ex-vice-chair more interested in his own activities than serving people. The zone, DT and 1-5 structures were supposed to be in place but people did not accept instructions and did not want to cooperate in the 1-5 labour-sharing system; the 1-5s did not meet between April and November 2013. Women DTs created in 2010 were not active. Using model farmers was said to be more effective than these structures. As kebele officials worked without pay people had started to refuse to take on roles; the wereda planned to involve model farmers in managerial roles. People thought that there were too many programmes coming down from the wereda which were implemented in fits and starts, never completed and without follow-up.

The AGP had announced a budget for 17 kebeles including Oda Haro; people were trained in April 2013 and registered for various farming and non-farm activities but by November no funds had been disbursed and there was gossip of misappropriation by wereda officials. The wereda had plans to expand SMEs and organise youth in cooperatives but had no funds. Kebele officials said that the government plan was to change most farmers into model farmers.

Oda Dawata story to 2013

Oda Dawata, in Tiyo wereda, Arssi zone, Oromia, surrounds Gonde town and is at 15 km from Asela, the zonal and wereda capital, on the main road between Asela and Adama. Generally the area is self-sufficient. About 60% of the terrain is flat or sloping, 39% steep and 1% gullies. The three zones have different terrains and climates: Mecro-Begejo is mainly flat, lower (weyna dega at 2,200m), and hot; Akiya and Chebote include steep and cooler land (dega at 3,000m). There are two perennial rivers.

History up to 1991

First Oromo came and settled in the higher and cooler Akiya and Chebote. After several years of a bloody campaign, Menelik conquered the rich and fertile Arssi land in 1886. The area came under Amhara administration. Under Haile Selassie Amhara settled in the flat Mecro-Begejo. Tractors, combine harvesters, grain mills and a school in Gonde (1970) were introduced. One farmer started irrigation using canals that an Italian had dug for a watermill. Under the Derg 3 ha were irrigated. Tractors and combine harvesters belonging to government were difficult to access. Farmers could not trade. There was villagisation, and a producer cooperative between 1985 and 1990.

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

There was fear, suspicion and tension in 1991-92, increasing after a bloody conflict between Oromo and Amhara in neighbouring Arbagagu. In 1993 OPDO and OLF began to establish their networks. In

1994 peace prevailed to some extent thanks to the elders and religious leaders but ethnic divisions still existed in 2003 and were noticeable because of language. Four PAs were merged in 1995 to form Oda Dawata. In 2000 70% of the 875 households were Oromo and 25% Amhara. Intense deforestation since 1991 was said to explain rising temperatures; erosion was a major issue in some steep areas. The main rains were from June to September. Land distribution stopped in 1991; by 2003 there were numerous landless. Many rich people had landline phones in Mecro-Begejo (2000). There was electricity in Gonde and Mecro, a HP and an agricultural extension unit in Gonde. The Asela-Adama and Kulumsa-Zigway roads crossing the PA gave good access to Mecro-Begejo but Chebote and Akiya had only internal roads, widened in 2002. Most people relied on water from the rivers. A family planning office opened in 2003 but Islam did not allow contraception. An anti HIV/AIDS club was established in 2002; a Health Centre (10% community contribution) started service in 2003. School enrolment (including of girls) had increased considerably but most students stopped at Grade 8 as families could not afford the costs of sending them to Asela for high school. There were many unemployed school leavers.

Land and especially livestock ownership determined wealth, although some young people became rich through farming on leased land. People grew wheat, maize and sorghum (*meher*, *weyna dega* land); barley, peas, beans and potatoes (*meher*, *dega* land); potatoes, barley and beans (*belg*) and; irrigated potatoes and vegetables in Begejo. Farmers bought fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides and weed-killers on credit, but struggled to cover input costs when they were not getting a good price for their products like in 2000. Those not affording input costs tended to lease out their land. A first extension package (1999, experts deciding what to plant when and amount of fertiliser, few farmers involved) was replaced by the family package in 2003, giving decision-making to the households. There was training by the wereda agricultural office and the extension unit in Gonde. There was not enough water to reach all those paying tax for irrigated land. There was fattening, vaccination, and increased preference for crossbreed cattle (better milk production and ploughing capacity), but they were expensive so not widespread. Other activities included wage labour during harvest and annual agricultural servant hire, cattle trade, retail and wholesale grain trade, petty business activities (women), and daily labour in Asela (men). There was little male migration but a few women migrating, mainly to towns.

Male household heads no longer had exclusive decision-making on property. Female circumcision and polygyny were decreasing. Women struggled to get the law on equal rights to property on divorce implemented. Arssi Oromo were Muslims; Shewa Oromo and Amhara Orthodox. Both 'hated' Protestants, whose number was rising especially in Gonde town. Elders, who could also be religious or clan leaders, handled all social issues including conflicts; many disputes were related to land. They had good relations with PA officials. Clan and lineage relationships remained very important for Arssi Oromo. PA leaders, in charge of administration, tax collection and dissemination of government policies and directives, were respected. Land tax had increased. Attitudes to government were ambivalent. Some Amhara feared that ethnic federalism would lead to instability.

Oda Dawata in 2013

People, especially from Begejo and Mecro, frequently interacted with Gonde town; parts of Begejo and Mecro, still inhabited mainly by Amhara, were urbanised. The FTC, kebele, DA and vet offices and a HC were all in Mecro along the main road. Each ketena (4) had its full cycle primary school. There was one HP in Akiya. Electricity coverage ranged from 95% in Begejo to none in Chebote. Around 80% used mobile phones. There were internal dry-weather roads in Mecro and part of Begejo; a start was made in 2013 through URRAP (50% costs met by wereda; 100 birr/household) to connect Akiyo (not finished) and Chebote (damaged by floods). Most areas were inaccessible by trucks in the rainy season. There were a few carts. Tree cutting was banned. Watershed work had started in 2012 and while not fully successful flooding had reduced though not everywhere. Rains were good from 2008 but started later (March) and were more erratic in 2011 and 2012 and it was hotter in the dry season. These changes had affected crops. The 2013 weather was good and an

excellent wheat crop expected.

Of the 1,624 households, 490 were female-headed and 741 landless; very few men in their 20s had land. The population was 80% Oromo, 19% Amhara and 1% from other groups; 70% Muslim (Arssi Oromo), 29% Orthodox (Amhara and Shewa Oromo) and 1% Protestant; and (estimates) 30% very rich and rich, 40% middle and 30% poor, very poor and destitute. Christian Amhara in Mecro-Begejo were considered to be generally better-off. Half of the community had no access to safe water. Almost all children attended primary school and more than 95% secondary school; but expectations from education were usually dashed given the difficulty for graduates at all levels to find jobs. Female circumcision was reduced; the kebele estimated a rate of 20% and unlike in Oda Haro everyone asked about the ban said they agreed with it; women struggled to get their rights against elders and male officials and corruption in court but the high number of female-headed households arose from more widows refusing inheritance, and more divorces. HEWs, struggling to get people to adopt latrines since punishments were abolished, focused on cleanliness, balanced diets, family planning, vaccination and, since April 2013, skilled delivery at the Health Centre, reporting some success with the recent free ambulance service and Centre offering coffee and food ceremonies. Wereda health officials complained that they were involved in many other activities, including political; this was also true for 29 volunteers trained by JICA, who had become DT leaders and no longer helped much on health issues.

Land registration was prepared but there had been no action. The local economy had gradually improved thanks to potato growing and good prices, better productivity of grain and irrigated crops, increasing non-farm business and labour, and migration to the Middle East; with many households engaged in several activities. Potatoes, wheat, peas and beans were leading cash crops. More land was allocated to potatoes, wheat and peas; since five years sales of potatoes had vastly increased and sales of barley, vegetables, chat and eucalyptus had gone up too. Input prices rose steadily while harvests and output prices fluctuated (e.g. in 2012 farmers faced a significant reduction in wheat production, attributed by some to expired fertiliser, and in price, due to government importing and selling cheap flour to local factories), causing some farmers to use local seeds and insufficient fertiliser with knock-on effects on productivity. Credit was no longer available. In 2013 the SC provided fertiliser, improved seeds (no seeds for potatoes, pulses, oilseeds and trees), pesticides and weed-killers but faced shortages and untimely supply at times, low trust from farmers as previous cashiers had embezzled funds with impunity, and competition from private suppliers in 2011. The wereda had since banned private supply but in the meantime the SC had a surplus of improved seeds that farmers would not buy as they were old and yet the government did not want to supply other seeds until these were sold. Generally farmers wanted new seeds every year and tried to get them from different sources (SC, Kulumsa ARC, other farmers, and recently ATA for selected farmers of different wealth statuses who had also received urea to experiment). Some farmers had started planting in line, intercropping and using recommended quantities of seeds and fertiliser. Tractors and combine harvesters were rented from private individuals in the neighbouring wereda (roughly 100 and 200 farmers respectively); this was said to be cheaper than hiring labour. In 2012 all rain-fed outputs were sold through a network of traders based in Gonde. In 2013 the wereda had given instruction that the SC should buy all outputs (with a 1 million birr loan from the Union) to prevent farmers from being cheated by traders. By end 2013 60 ha were irrigated by 50 households with at least 12 pumps but most by gravity. Due to water shortage only 2 harvests were possible and there was no scope for expansion without significant investment which people had repeatedly asked the wereda to do, to no avail.

Most farmers used zero-grazing, had many crossbred cows and produced surplus milk sold to a dairy cooperative. FAO had trained an AI inseminator and given him the equipment; people were very satisfied with his services. Fattened oxen were sold at much higher prices than in 2008. Sheep fattening and poultry production were good sources of income for women and youth although chicken epidemics were frequent and there was no effective medicine. The use of modern beehives

introduced by DAs was spreading. DAs gave zone-based services and had close contacts with the model farmers. Since May 2013 two DAs were BSc holders and the wereda had regular meetings with all DAs to ask their inputs. Other activities included: increasing, better paid daily labour, grain/vegetable trade, local drink-making, a grain mill, some skilled work, firewood, charcoal, grass and hay sale, petty services, transport services (one car, donkeys, horse-carts), formal jobs (100 locally and 90 elsewhere), daily labour in Kulumsa ARC, on a local stone extraction scheme run by an outside investor and in local factories as well as permanent jobs at the Gonde flour factory. Male migration, elsewhere in Ethiopia (urban and long term agricultural) and illegal to the Middle East and Sudan, was increasing. Female migration to the Middle East was huge and rising (80-100 annually). Remittances were changing lives for those successful and their families. Saving was promoted even in schools; those involved in business preferred investing. Apart from a number of youth stone cooperatives and confusing reports on new cooperatives in October 2013, there was no government specific intervention for youth and for women although most women had an independent income source.

Arssi Oromo referred to the Shewa Oromo as 'Amhara' since they were Orthodox Christians. A quarrel between neighbours had triggered a fight in one zone between an Oromo clan and the Amhara with continuing repercussions. Both Muslim and Protestant groups were rapidly increasing; Protestants were actively trying to convert people. Apart from not sharing the same meat people interacted and sometimes intermarried. However, Muslims and Orthodox had started establishing religiously-based iddirs. There was some tension among Muslims following the introduction of *Wahabism* and returning migrants were said to want to make people as conservative as in Arab countries. Iddir leaders were trained on peace and security and development and mobilised people for public works and financial contributions. TV, radio and links with big cities and organisations like the flour factory made people very willing to adopt modern ideas and practices.

While in 2005 there were several parties which 'confused people', in 2013 there was only one party. There were allegations of corruption by kebele officials and courts and ordinary people could do nothing as the kebele officials were protected by corrupt wereda officials – although by October 2013 the kebele chair had been replaced partly due to alleged corruption. Unpaid cabinet members had not enough time to serve well, and distrusted each other. The Arssi Oromo dominated politically and clanship affected politics. The zone-DT-1-5 structures were in place but not working as planned. People were 'individualistic' and not interested, unhappy with them as control mechanisms, bored with politics; and did not want to be in 1-5s with disliked neighbours. Many youth were not interested in politics but some criticised the government because of growing landlessness and joblessness, and distrusted the youth organisations as instruments to control them. There were too many central government strategies for improvement in various areas, and not enough time for government employees at community level to implement them so they faced criticism from the people.

There were two important campaigns in the wereda in April 2013: expanding model farmers' best practices and joint government/ community environmental protection. The MDG Fund had helped to build roads inter-connecting the 18 kebeles. Since early 2013 the wereda then kebele officials had told the youth that there was a plan to create many jobs for unemployed rural youth through cooperatives and SMEs in metalwork, carpentry, forest protection and honey making, agricultural activities and mineral extraction, but by November 2013 nothing had happened.

Sirba story to 2013

Sirba, in Ada'a wereda, East Shewa zone, Oromia, is located on both sides of the long-existent Addis-Adama-Shashemene main road, at about 20 km from and mid-way between Mojo and Debre Zeit. The latter is the wereda centre (shopping and selling, preparatory school, colleges, credit office). Most land is on a wide plain at 1,800-1,900 masl (weyna dega) and fertile, though part of it is vulnerable to flooding during the rains. In 2013 almost 90% of households were Oromo Orthodox

Christians; the remainder were a mix of ethnicities.

History up to 1991

Sirba was incorporated in Menelik's Shewa kingdom in the 1880s. In the 1960s tenants operated most farmland for 29 landlords. Three landlords started to use tractors and combine harvesters, evicting their tenants. An association was organised to distribute fertiliser. During the Derg Sirba became a 'model village'. Part of the land was communal with people supposed to work on it and get a share of the product. In 1983 a Producers' Cooperative was formed and given the best land and other privileges; upon introduction of the free market economy it was disbanded and the land divided between the 18 members who still held it by 1994. The Derg period was harsh: high taxes and quotas of products to be sold at low prices to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (PA leaders used both as a way to attack opponents and benefit allies), conscription, villagisation, fines and beating e.g. for not using latrines, and weakening of religious life. Health centres, schools, a solar pump (1989) and vaccination were more positive sides.

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

In 1992 ethnic conflicts between Amhara and Oromo in Arssi affected Sirba a little – the community was 80% Oromo and the rest Amhara and fewer Wolayita and Tigreans, all Orthodox. The regionalisation policy led to exclusion of non-Oromo from political meetings and there were factions in the community. The main road was tarred already in the early 1990s. Some households had biogas introduced by FAO in 1992. There were about 20 school completers and 5 college completers. In 1994 the main crops were teff and wheat; teff was increasingly being sold, pushing farmers to abandon intercropping and crop rotation. Farmers kept cattle, shoats, donkeys and chickens and in the early 1990s selling them gave a good income; there was some ox fattening for holidays, milk was sold, and one man practised large scale poultry farming. Wealth depended on land and livestock ownership and hard work. Fertiliser was distributed on credit but not timely, not in the required quantity, and often at a higher price than when ordered. By 1995 all PA leaders were Oromo, there were several years of bad debt, and people had left the Derg villages, returned to their homestead and abandoned using latrines. The return of demobilised soldiers was a shock and by 1995 they were among the 100 landless in Sirba; by 2003 landlessness was the most serious problem of the village.

Farmers were initially better off with the coming of the EPRDF (land, good harvests, no forced labour contributions and increased grain price) but by 2003 economic prospects were gloomy and more people getting ever poorer. Sirba became a sub-kebele of the larger Udie kebele in 2001. In 2003 the land did not give good yields without fertiliser, the price of which had dramatically increased; the same supply issues were prevailing. Tractors, threshing machines could be hired (MOA, SC in Ude, private farmers).

The solar pump and two hand pumps built during the Derg collapsed in 1999 and in 2003 most people were relying on unsafe water. The nearest primary school was in another PA at 2 km in 2003. By 2003 enrolment had increased as parents were more aware of the importance of education. The nearest health centre was still in Debre Zeit (20 km) in 2003. Having a large family was a way for women to gain respect.

By 2003 livestock holdings had decreased due to lack of grazing land, cost of fodder, diseases and lack of market – e.g. for milk. Due to land shortage an increasing number of people were engaged in non/off-farm activities including grain trade, retail trade of eggs, dung cakes, straw and small quantities of grain and local drink-making (women), shops, work as guard and hired labour. Men and women moved to towns for work (daily labour, work as domestic or bar ladies respectively); some youngsters moved there for months.

Progress for women included: declining polygyny and widow's inheritance, getting more property (including livestock) on divorce, abduction declared illegal, rising marriage age, and land declared common spouses' property. The elders' council handling disputes was recognised by government;

elders no longer had power but were respected, and on occasions participated in decision-making. The Gada system was culturally important; kinship and an increasing number of iddirs were socially important. By 2003, PA leaders were not feared like under the Derg. But, as life was harder and taxation high, the government was said to have 'forgotten the peasants and the educated' and it had lost acceptance by the community.

Sirba in 2013

Ude town, where the rural Udie kebele office is, had become a separate municipality. There was watershed work since 2011: rehabilitating Sirba mountain, terracing along people's farms to reduce flooding and tree-planting on both (Debre Zeit ARC had an experimental nursery in Sirba). Many minibuses on the main road gave easy access to DZ, Mojo, Dukem, Addis etc. but the inter-kebele road programme was unsuccessful (management issues, contractors' failure). Internal dry-weather roads were impassable for trucks and sometimes cut-off by floods in the rainy season. All but 5 households had electricity; there were about 500 mobile phones. Rains were good from 2008 to 2011 but in 2012 they came and stopped early which caused reduced harvests.

By 2013 there were 224 tax-paying households (6% landless, 7% female-headed; 90% Oromo, 18 rich Amhara and Tigreans and a few others). With the growing importance of cash crops all wealth groups were richer than 10 years ago (estimated 38% very rich and rich, 30% middle, and 32% poor, very poor and destitute). Most people bought safe water (private individual or NGO-built communal water point); some got it free from the Chinese construction camp. Sirba's school (2009) was upgraded to G1-6 in 2013 (NGO support and community contributions). It faced various shortages; and less than %rd of 7 year-olds started school on time in 2013. The school in Udie had been upgraded to Grade 10 but expectations were decreasing seeing the growing joblessness; 117 Grade 10 and college graduates or dropouts depended on their parents. Abduction and female circumcision had greatly reduced; male violence, still common, was dealt with by elders. Polygyny and widow inheritance were said to no longer exist, and women rights in divorce, widowhood and inheritance to be better practised. The HP (2006), burned down in 2012, was being reconstructed. Most married women used contraception. Measures taken to encourage deliveries at the HC included rewarding the TBAs and an ambulance. Only 4 households had no toilet; the HEW had monthly meetings with women, went door-to-door, and had started working with 7 better educated women designated as DT leaders. Despite bednets and spraying malaria epidemics were annual and there was shortage of quinine. HIV/AIDS was suspected to be the cause of some of ten recent deaths in the kebele.

With the growing importance of teff as a cash crop for the national market, demand for rented land had increased including from outsiders. Crops like teff, chickpeas, lentils, wheat and peas had a higher market value and many farmers had increased production using fertiliser and improved seeds (DAs said 75%). Unlike 5 years earlier there was no credit for fertiliser; DAs had introduced improved chickpea and lentil seeds in 2010 and there was credit for improved seeds from the Udie SC but the supply was not always timely. A few farmers could not afford modern inputs and produced less, which increased inequality. The SC provided fertiliser (most preferred to buy there), improved seeds (many thought they were not really improved but some bought them there because they could get credit), chemicals and other items - based on demand identified by the DAs through the DTs and 1-5s. Until 2013 the Debre Zeit ARC was also providing seeds to reproduction associations which returned the same quantity after harvest and could sell the rest to local farmers but in 2013 they gave their best seeds to traders from which farmers could buy but without credit. The DAs (1 DA crop/village) taught about best farming techniques with some success (e.g. planting in line for teff) though the kebele chair mentioned some enforcement. Rich farmers rented tractors and some combine harvesters. An NGO-provided a water point, electric pump and drip meant to irrigate 15 ha which reached 18 farmers and only 3 ha because of land ownership issues; by October 2013 the project had stopped due notably to corruption by the NGO worker. There was a government plan to dig 150 wells in the kebele, which would give access to irrigation for all landed farmers; 11 wells (3 in Sirba) had been dug in 2009 and 2011 but were sealed although in June 2013 work had started to extend pipes to the farms. The AGP programme (started at wereda level) provided inputs for irrigation.

People had fewer cattle and shoats than in 2003, focusing on quality and feeding them at home. Improved breed cows introduced in 2008 were increasingly used for milk production and some bought improved feed. 550 households in the *kebele* supplied the wereda milk processing company daily and some complained that the supply exceeded the demand. The DAs facilitated access to improved cattle through links with 3 research institutes; there was credit and a vet shop (2007) providing vaccination, medical treatment, delivery service and castration though it faced various shortages. Credit was available from WALKO (though stopped by October 2013 because of conflict in a group), community saving groups and banks but people were increasingly more likely to use their savings to invest. Moneylenders had disappeared and there were big equbs (one businessman said that bank loans were too small). Government encouraged cooperatives, targeting youth in particular (bull fattening, seedling production, beekeeping, poultry). By November 2013 only one group had got credit. There were talks of AGP funds for associations of educated and unemployed youth who should save 1,000 birr each, which some said was unfeasible, and the kebele chair said they were trying to organise youth in each village.

Other activities included grain mills, carpentry, construction, metal work, tyre repair and shops, various petty services and transport services (2 people owned middle-sized buses), stone cooperatives with a total of 200 members (one got credit for a crusher which was broken and being repaired). Women were increasingly involved in small trade, shops and local drink-making but there was no specific intervention. 35 educated people had higher level jobs outside the community; youth graduated from universities had to be EPRDF members to get a government job. Wage labour had significantly increased with the expansion of industries and farm enterprises in the area, due to continue as there was a huge demand for investment land. Young men commuted to other villages for agricultural work; many migrated to work on construction projects or in industries in nearby places. Young women migrated too for similar jobs, work in flower farms or domestic or bar work; some migrated to Arab countries (32 had migrated from Sirba). The sending back of illegal migrants and ban on migration was perceived as a problem at the time of the second fieldwork in November.

Most people were Orthodox, with a few Protestants and Muslims at kebele level. Elders mediated during conflicts. Iddirs were important, especially the big iddir to which most households belonged, which mobilised people for things like rebuilding the HP and was open to ideas from the youth (e.g. the construction of a concretised drinking pond for cattle saving long treks to the nearest river and the upgrading of Udie school to Grade 10). The government also used the iddir to promote messages and mobile resources and labour. New ideas and innovations also came from urban linkages and women returning from working in Arab States bringing business ideas, international clothes and a different attitude to life.

While in 2005 there were opposition parties and confusion, in 2010 there was only the EPRDF. In 2011 there were factions supporting different people as kebele chair; some appointments were said to result from bribery of wereda officials. The DTs and 1-5s were not working as planned, both male especially with regard to cooperation in farming, and female as 'women did not do what they were told'. In October 2013 a big gimgema severely criticised the kebele leadership for loose follow-up hence poor implementation of the kebele plan but no-one was demoted. There were frequent shifts of attention with new activities coming down from the Region leading to neglecting existing programmes. The kebele was increasingly demanding that all businesses, even very small ones, were registered and paid taxes, while a farmer selling 50,000 birr worth of eucalyptus was not taxed. Women and youth organisations were not active in Sirba. The community was divided with regard to outside investments taking land: not all compensations were seen as sufficient and some thought that the returns in terms of well-paid jobs were not materialising as promised.

Industrialisation and urbanisation along the road was poised to continue apace with increasing impact on Sirba. Recent nearby investments included Al Ahmoudi taking over the nearby hotel, 3 flower farms, a gas station, and blocket factory and weedkiller factories. One investor completed building of a large poultry farm in October 2013. The Addis Ababa-Adama 6-lane expressway due to be completed in April 2014 borders Sirba; the new railway to Djibouti due to be completed by 2016 will cross Sirba. A Master Plan for Denkaka, one of the emerging towns in the wereda, is being developed. It will affect some areas of Sirba and residents have been told not to build new houses as they may be demolished if they don't fit with the plan.

Kormargefia story to 2013

Kormargefia, in Basona Werena wereda, North Shewa zone, Amhara, straddles the main Addis Ababa-Debre Berhan road and is located between Chacha (8 km) and Debre Berhan (10 km). It is situated at about 2,700 masl (dega) on a plain, much of it swampy, with a few hilly areas (mostly gently sloping) used for settlements. The area is affected by frost during meher rains. Belg rains are highly unreliable. The population is mainly Amhara and Oromo have been assimilated.

History up to 1991

Debre Berhan was founded in 1456. The area strongly opposed the Italian invasion, returning to normal life in 1943. The Italians built the tarred road to Addis. Debre Berhan got electricity in 1955 and was one of Ethiopia's 27 First Class Townships in 1958. Almost all local farmers were tenants for a few landlords; the few with land paid a fee to landlords. In 1975 land was distributed (10 ha/farmer). The Derg era saw substantial conscription, livestock vaccination (1974), a start in using fertiliser (1975), the introduction by ILCA of a livestock rearing centre providing crossbred cattle and the establishment of a SC running a mill (1978), famine and large male migration to towns in 1984, some resettlement in Jimma and Wellega, mass sale of livestock in 1985, the introduction by ILCA of oats and potatoes (1986), villagisation (1988), and a Producers' Cooperative disbanded on the introduction of the free market economy (1989).

The EPRDF 1991-2003 period

In 1991 there was no fighting; the SC was dismantled and its assets stolen; some farmers returned to their previous homesteads; some settlers returned. In the early 1990s wealth depended on plot size and quality, herd size, success in farming, and other income sources; livestock-rearing was important as livestock prices had been rapidly increasing. Migration was uncommon and birth control was not appreciated. By 1995 landholdings had dwindled to an average of 2 ha due to population growth. There were no staff at the local clinic; Red Cross health workers came monthly for vaccination. The 1997 land redistribution substantially changed land ownership patterns, affecting those with large land tracts (especially the Derg 'burocrats'), giving land to landless or land-poor people in fairly arbitrary ways and prompting numerous disagreements. In 1996 a number of PAs including Kormargefia were merged into Fagy kebele and the agricultural extension programme started. ACSI started providing group-based loans in 1997, giving preference to women. The money had to be invested in the agreed business. In 1998 an epidemic ravaged sheep. There was food-for-work from 1999 to 2003 but distribution was said to be biased.

By 2003 there was a strong sense that things had been much better in the early 1990s; as life had become more expensive no-one cared for the others any longer. Wage labour had increased, and no-one could survive without engaging in non-farm activities (firewood, charcoal, straw and dung cake sale, crop and livestock trade, some skilled work. Livestock were fewer due to insufficient grazing land and fodder cost (e.g. straw price doubled from 2002). ILCA taught about breeding animals but only richer farmers could benefit though many farmers benefited from a Debre Berhanbased dairy programme. The main crops were barley and beans, mostly for consumption though surpluses were sold. The extension programme had gradually expanded but the fertiliser price had steadily increased and soon only a few farmers could afford it. A new SC had been established in

2001 and provided fertiliser and seeds on credit with land as collateral. It was suggested that it only benefitted rich farmers. People wanted the government to construct irrigation schemes. There had been no internal road construction.

While most had good access to springs or wells, there was no safe water. People still had to go to Debre Berhan for any health treatment. The school had been supported by ILCA and SIDA since the early 1990s; and expanded with community contribution in 2002. In 2003 it faced many issues (untrained teachers, high number of pupils/class, no teaching aids, unpopular self-contained policy).

Women inherited their husband's property, but equal inheritance from parents was not upheld in practice and husbands kept the land in divorces. Female circumcision was still practised; early marriage had reduced; women could file cases to divorce. Disputes were first dealt with by elders, who also punished people deviating from social norms but whose social position was lower than the new kebele leaders. Religious leaders, linked to government officials, could also mediate. In the early 1990s three groups made decisions: the PA, elders elected by the PA, and elders elected by the village. Decentralisation in 2003 gave increasing responsibilities to kebele leaders (elected since 2000) and was said to have led to improved/expanded services and better relationships between the community and government employees. But people did not accept the replacement of the spokesman they used to elect to tell government about their problems by cadres selected from the kebele administration by the government.

Kormargefia in 2013

In 2005 three sub-kebeles of Fagy kebele were transferred to the town administration and the land distributed to investors. The remaining kebele, renamed Kormargefia, had three sub-kebeles: Kormargefia, Milki and Aloberet. In 2013 the Derg villagisation sites were more densely populated and the one near the main road was developing into a small town. The main road was well-maintained. A new inter-wereda road crossed the kebele toward Debre Berhan; but the sub-kebele bordering Debre Berhan was cut-off from the town as that land had been fenced by an investor. There was no road to the kebele centre; the few internal roads were impassable in the rainy season. Electricity was used by the church, a grain mill and the kebele chairman. A few households used solar panels for lighting. Mobile phones (2004) were used by about half the households. Temperatures were said to have become more extreme and rains more erratic.

By 2013 there were 980 households (29% female-headed, 699 landed); Amhara (95%) and Oromo (5%) (all Orthodox Christians) inter-married and shared social organisations and representation at kebele level was proportional. Inequality was said to have decreased; there were (estimates) 15% very rich and rich, 60% middle and 25% poor and very poor (proportionally fewer than in 2008). Most people had access to safe water all year round but the kebele rationed water as the level in some of the 10 covered springs was decreasing. Beyond G6 students had had to go to Tebase, which many could not afford, but the Kormargefia school was upgraded to G7 in 2013 and planned to reach Grade 8 in 2014. Many wanted their children to continue to secondary but were disappointed by the many failures after so much investment; students from better-off families got support, poorer ones didn't. There was no job opportunity for educated youth in the kebele. There was mixed evidence with regard to female circumcision though very early marriage of Amhara girls had declined. Elders and kebele and wereda officials were an obstacle to implementing women's rights on divorce and widowhood; women brought cases of inheritance from parents to the court. In October 2013 there were new HEWs and they were unhelpful, living in Debre Berhan and hardly ever present at the HP. Latrines had been built under threats from the kebele administration but were infrequently used. Contraceptive use was widespread but women had to phone the HEWs to get them. In spite of a government attempt to stop TBAs from practising, most deliveries in 2013 had been at home.

Smallholder mixed farming with a prominent role for livestock, and irrigation for 26% households, was the main contributor to the local economy, though migration and non-farm activities were also

important. Surpluses of staple crops (barley, broad beans and wheat) were sold. Improved barley and wheat seeds had been available since 2003 and by 2013 about a third of farmers bought them from the SC; others recycled their seeds or bought from other farmers. Some seeds were also provided by the Debre Berhan Research Centre (previously ILCA) and by an NGO to poor farmers. The supply was insufficient and seeds from the extension service not always good. Fertiliser was available only from the SC (private supply was banned). Credit for fertiliser and seeds was available from the SC only for a few poor farmers; other farmers could borrow from ACSI to buy inputs. After an unsuccessful attempt at introducing BBM ploughs (too heavy) many farmers prepared broad beds manually, having copied from a neighbouring wereda. Farmers rejected the advice of planting in line as it required a lot of weeding and left crops more exposed to frost. The main cash crop was eucalyptus planted on non-arable land; second and third were irrigated potatoes and carrots (the latter on the rise as less prone to disease). Eucalyptus was sold wholesale to licensed traders coming with lorries, or by tree on the Debre Berhan market. 26% of households practised irrigation (86.5 ha), almost a third with pumps and the others using canals or bucket-watering. DAs facilitated access to pumps and gave advice. There were marketing issues as traders could not reach the farms during the rainy season. Potato seeds came from farmers' own reserves. Improved prices had increased the profitability of livestock production.

There were more cattle than in 2003; 28% were hybrid. DAs facilitated access to AI provided by DBRC and there was some NGO support as well. Kormargefia was the main source of breeding bulls in the area (as it had been since the Derg). Milk (collected and sold daily to a private processor in Chacha), butter, dung cakes and hides were important products. Sheep-rearing was practised by all households since the sudden price rise in 2008; around 30% were hybrid. Grazing land had decreased as some had been allocated to an investor, youth cooperatives and watershed; farmers used different types of fodder and some bought fattening medicine. The vet service used to be better than in 2003 (vaccination, drugs twice a week) but by October 2013 was interrupted as the vet went for training. Many had used ACSI credit to buy sheep or cattle.

There were no traders as farmers sold their products directly. There was one grain mill, one shop, a few areki bars, other women making areki and selling it to retailers, part-time carpenters and builders, firewood and dung cake sale. Government did not provide credit or inputs for non-farm activities, just advice. Job opportunities were mostly informal daily labour for the DBRC, on construction projects, and for industries and factories in Debre Berhan and the area. Migration had increased greatly, mainly to towns (male and female) and Arab countries for young women. The first woman migrated more than 5 years ago and the trend had risen ever since; in 2012 and 2013 twenty went each year. In late 2013 government gave chickens and vegetable seedlings to a few women and had organised a meeting to promote vegetable cultivation. But women said that nothing was done and 'earlier promises about income-generation were totally forgotten'. Most young men were landless; a few selected in a community meeting had been allocated communal land or 'land without heir'. The kebele had also allocated 4 ha of irrigated land to a cooperative (57 members including 8 young women by October 2013), for a fee (640 birr/year); and another 6 ha of rainfed land to a group of 16 young men in 2013. Officials were advising youth to form groups and join the YA to get land or jobs but the youth were suspicious about government wanting to control them. In September 2013 the kebele administration registered unemployed youth telling them that the wereda would provide credit for farm and non-farm activities but nothing had happened by November.

There was high resistance to new religious ideas, especially Protestantism. Religious leaders were involved in dispute mediation. Iddirs were also used in dispute resolution through elders meeting once a month and reporting to the social court on cases they handled. Iddirs acted as a bridge between community and kebele administration. The social court had been given mandate over a number of iddirs and equbs, to help address possible disagreements between members.

A number of farmers and young men opposed government political views but were not organised in

opposition parties; some strong farmers, who were 'Derg burocrats', refused to be model farmers or party members. The government tried to reach out to the youth in various ways, e.g. calling meetings to recruit young women as 'vanguard' and registering young men as party members at the same time as registering them for the credit scheme for unemployed youth that was being prepared (see above). The zone-DT-1-5 structure had been rolled out since 2010 (male)/2012 (female) but in 2013 kebele and sub-kebele structures were not fully functional. It was not clear how active DTs and 1-5s were. Cabinet members lacked commitment as there was no compensation for the time they spent and the risk of disagreement with community members that they faced. Most people did not like watershed management projects but were relatively positive about school construction and roads and bridges maintenance.

The community's trajectory was influenced in various ways by Debre Berhan's development and the expansion of investments in the area (including land being taken away notably for factories on one hand and job opportunities on the other hand). Wereda officials, ranking the kebele as medium in dairy farming but next to last in agricultural development, wanted to change this and put emphasis on dairy production, fattening, improved livestock production and irrigated farming.

Modernisation processes since 1991

Between 1991 and 2003 the pace of change in much of rural Ethiopia was hardly visible. The fifteen WIDE communities researched in 1995 did not look very different in 2003 and as noted above in all the communities people reported considerable hardship in 2003. However, Over the last ten years Ethiopia's rural communities, especially those closer to main roads and towns, have experienced considerable and accelerating change driven by local mixes of external and internal developments.

In this section we describe the impact of changes since the early 1990s¹⁷ on the community places and people and the five functional domains - livelihoods, human re/pro/duction systems, society, culture, and politics. Government interventions involved in the modernisation process are described briefly here as they are considered in detail in Section 3 and we consider their contribution to modernisation in Section 4.

Modernisation of space and place since the early 1990s

Inequalities in access to 'modernity' related to degree of remoteness

Rural people's access to 'modernity' largely depends on where they live. There are differences in
access among communities related to terrain, distance from main roads, and the quality of the
road network connecting the community to the main road. However, it is difficult to generalise
about access at community level as there is considerable variation within communities; for
example there may be people living in a community bordering a major highway who have to
walk for 2-3 hours to reach it.

Climate and weather

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• The weather in Ethiopia fluctuates quite widely – sometimes from year to year and sometimes over longer periods as evidenced for example by the continuous droughts in the 1980s. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between these fluctuations and longer-run changes in climate. Rains were poor in four of the communities for 3 or 4 years leading up to 2003. In 2013 there were reports of hotter climate and less rainfall in recent years in four sites although this perceived change was not associated with big changes in agricultural production and the rains in 2013 were very good.

¹⁷ We have village studies in 1995 for Adado, Sirba and Kormagefia and some history of what happened in the early 1990s from the WIDE2 study in 2003 for all six communities.

Accessibility: terrain and roads

- One of the most notable changes between 1995 and 2013 was in roads. All sites except Adado
 were adjacent to or very near main roads which were in poor condition in 1995 and excellent
 condition in 2013. The steep terrain, long rainy season, and lack of investment in roads by the
 Gedeo zone meant that the feeder road from Adado to the Bule-Dilla road and that road itself
 were difficult to navigate particularly during the rains.
- Internal roads were much better than they had been in 1995 everywhere but Kormargefia, but they were not allweather leading to problems in the rains. There were also remote areas without road access.

Environment, ecology and land use

- None of these sites suffered from severe erosion in the early 1990s or in 2013. While much of
 the Adado terrain was steep it was protected by the perennial crops of coffee and enset and the
 trees planted to shade the coffee. Floods regularly affected Oda Haro. In 2010 the government
 launched an annual campaign for watershed management which was conducted in all the
 communities.
- In 1995 there were reports of loss of trees in *Oda Dawata*, *Sirba* and *Kormargefia* and in 2013 deforestation was mentioned as a major factor in *Oda Haro*, *Oda Dawata*, and *Somodo*. Considerable numbers of trees had been planted on communal and individual land in all sites starting in the Ethiopian Millennium and in 2013 in a number of sites small areas had been fenced off, planted with trees, and named as Meles' Parks. Eucalyptus had become an important cash crop in all sites.
- Soil fertility was declining in Adado and Sirba in 1995 and reportedly in all six sites in 2013.
- The amount of land allocated to communal grazing had reduced considerably. In 2013 there was
 none in Adado, Oda Dawata or Sirba and in Kormargefia the kebele leaders had recently started
 leasing it out to individual farmers and two youth groups. Private grazing land was being fenced
 off and zero-grazing increasing.
- In 2013 small amounts of land had recently been given to individual investors in *Kormargefia* and *Somodo*. In *Sirba*, on the Debre Zeit to Mojo road, a number of small plots by the roadside had been given to investors and there were more negotiating with the wereda in October 2013.
- Since 1995 rapid population growth, in the context of a land system where smallholders rights
 were registered and land sales were illegal, had led to denser settlement, pressure on land,
 growing numbers of landless people, especially youth, and a rise in the number of land
 transactions, including illegal sales.

<u>Urbanisation</u>

- In 1995 the only communities which contained or were adjacent to 'towns' were Oda Dawata
 which surrounded the town of Gonde and Adado where PA offices, a school, clinic, Service Cooperative office and shop and a coffee-processing site were surrounded by 25 tin-roofed houses.
- By 2013 Adado town had grown through roadside building though not hugely and Gonde was
 continuing its take-over of Oda Dawata land. The roadsides either side of Gonde were looking
 increasingly urban and the same was true for those parts of Sirba and Somodo bordering the
 road. Oda Haro was adjacent to the growing town of Tibe which did not exist in the early 1990s
 and urbanisation on the roadside leading into it was visible. There was an incipient very small
 town on the Kormargefia roadside.
- Somodo had recently lost land which bordered Jimma town and Kormargefia land which bordered Debre Berhan. The town plans for Gonde, Tibe and Denkaka (which was adjacent to

Sirba) all included extending into land currently part of the rural kebeles.

- In 1995 there was no electricity in any community. By 2013 some of the households used it in all sites except *Oda Haro*. Some households in *Oda Dawata* had electricity in 2003 but for most there and elsewhere investment had come later, particularly after 2008. Only three households had access in *Kormargefia*. In one of *Oda Dawata*'s zones 95% of households had electricity while in another there was none. There were a few solar panels in *Kormargefia*. Biogas had been introduced in the model village of *Sirba* in the late 1980s and used by some households thereafter; in 2013 interest in it had recently grown and this was also the case in *Oda Dawata*.
- In 2003 some households near Gonde in *Oda Dawata* had landline telephones and in 2004 a mobile signal arrived. By 2013 there had been mobile phones in all sites for some years.
- As described in the next section by about 2008 urbanisation, increased links with urban areas
 and in general with the outside world had started to generate big changes in people, lifestyles
 especially for richer families, and the 'local modern repertoire of ideas'.

Modernisation of people and their lives since the early 1990s

In the next section we describe the considerable changes in people's lives since the early 1990s which can be attributed to a mix of increased wealth, exposure to urban life, education, and government interventions related to health and women's rights.

Human resources, liabilities and aspirations

- Compared with 1995 community populations in 2013 were much larger particularly noticeable being the increase in numbers of young people and children.
- In 2013 the population was on average more educated, healthier, and diets had generally improved.
- In 1995 much of what happened was attributed to 'god'; in 2013 many people, particularly young ones, told the interviewers that they 'wanted to change their lives'.
- Young people valued education, income-generating activities, urban life-styles, and in some
 cases urban and international migration. Young farmers were more likely to introduce new
 technologies and techniques and young mothers more likely to consider delivery at the Health
 Centre.

Inequality in access to 'modernity' related to social inequalities

- As described above people's access to 'modernity' is related to the degree of remoteness of the
 place where they live. When considering human re/pro/duction institutions distance from
 schools, waterpoints and health facilities is a big factor influencing take-up of modern services.
 Access to these services as well as what families can provide is also related to wealth, status and
 power which in turn are associated with different kinds of household.
- In all the communities in 2013 we identified eight types of household: four types which owned land and four which were landless:

Land-owning households

- self-supporting households with both big farming and big business/trade; some sharecropped or rented in more land
- households mostly depending on farming with minor contributions from other activities
- households doing some farming but relying more heavily on other activities
- households renting or share-cropping land out to focus on other activities or because unable to use it efficiently

Landless households

- households farming on others' rented or sharecropped land plus other activities
- households involved only in non-farm private activities or employment
- households involved in hand-to-mouth activities such as daily labour, wood or grass selling, or petty trade
- destitute households relying on informal social protection
- Wealth inequalities were notable in 1995 but communities as a whole were considerably poorer. By 2013 the gap between the rich and poor had grown considerably and there was an emerging set of very rich farmers often also involved in trade or other business activities. There were signs of class formation as the growth of landlessness was accompanied by an increase in daily labour. However, there was no suggestion that poor people were poorer than they had been in 2003 and the proportion of people in poverty were said to have declined in *Somodo, Sirba, Oda Haro*, and *Kormargefia* with corresponding increases in the middle-wealth categories who were also better off. In *Adado* there had been a very small reduction in the proportion of poor people due to improved attention to work while destitute people were migrating for work in towns; there had been no change in the proportion of very poor people. In *Oda Dawata* daily labour opportunities had reportedly reduced the proportion of destitute people but growing landlessness had increased proportions of poor and very poor people.
- Despite these improvements due to population growth there were still substantial numbers of poor, very poor and destitute people in all communities whose lifestyles contrasted greatly with those of the very rich. Big differences between rich and poor children were highlighted in all six communities and evidenced by the stories of the 13-year old male and female children interviewed, in terms of clothing, diet, hygiene, work/education balance and generally, opportunities in life
- There were big lifestyle changes among rich and middle income households with more land and other resources, better housing with tin roofs increasingly common, furniture, utensils, electronic equipment and better clothing. Very rich households had TVs in all sites except *Oda Haro* where there was no electricity and *Kormargefia* where only one household had electricity and a TV. There were DVDs and satellite dishes in four sites, and fridges in *Oda Dawata*. Rich people owned houses in nearby towns in all sites. A few owned grinding mills and there were car-owners in at least *Sirba* and *Somodo* while two people in *Sirba* owned mini-buses.
- Economic growth had provided opportunities to some poorer members of the communities
 including daily labour and commuting for work but not all. From *Oda Haro* there was a
 description of a 'downward spiral' trapping poor people who were also hit harder by inflation. In *Oda Dawata* poverty was associated with 'lack of plan' and hopelessness, in *Kormargefia* with
 feelings of inferiority and in *Somodo* poor people were said to be poorly considered and treated
 by kebele officials.
- Poor people did not have the resources to be able to seize rising economic opportunities; diversification was for survival, not for accumulation as in rich households. Poor households had assets and sometimes land but not enough. Very poor people had only their labour, 'had to work for others', 'have to accept anything'. Destitute people often lacked labour and relied on informal social protection mechanisms.
- Poor people had less or no access to services such as education, health treatment, and credit and suffered poorer diets, clothing, and housing. It was harder for children and youth from poor families to establish independent livelihoods and improve their lives.

Adult life-styles

• In 2013 relations between men and women were less unequal than they had been in the early 1990s thanks partly to laws and programmes introduced by the government since 2003.

- Daughters, widows and divorced women officially had land rights even if they still had to struggle to achieve them in the face of male bias among elders and government officials. While male violence against women still existed, rape, marriage by abduction and domestic violence were illegal, sometimes prosecuted and becoming less acceptable. However, poor women and those without supportive male relatives found it impossible to get justice.
- Women were more involved in income-generation activities on and off farms and controlled the income that they earned. In all communities there were stories of successful women farmers or businesswomen, some single and some married. At wereda level there was affirmative action to increase female participation in higher education activities and government jobs.
- There were small signs of increased political participation by some women but the majority were not interested.
- Men's roles remained primarily in the work domain and they still played a dominant role in social affairs and household decision-making in most households. However, taboos in place in the 1990s were losing salience in 2013. Some fathers were actively involved in child-rearing, some men and boys fetched wood and water and took grain to the mill and some occasionally cooked. In some sites people with donkeys and carts provided a water delivery service.
- However, Government teaching that men should participate in domestic work had been resisted in *Somodo* by followers of the *Wahabi* Muslim sect who also had strict norms about women's activities outside the household in a move that ran counter to trends elsewhere.
- Women were more aware of the importance of hygiene and sanitation, vaccination, healthy nutrition, and baby and childcare.

Youth

- The transition to adulthood by young people was taking longer than in the past. From later
 childhood many young people combined education with household work and part-time incomegenerating work leading to absenteeism and dropping-out/dropping in cycles until they were
 either successful in education or dropped out altogether, often after failing Grade 8, Grade 10,
 and less frequently Grade 12.
- Un(der) employment of young men with increasing levels of education was becoming an
 increasing problem. Land shortage, lack of jobs and limited capital constrained their ability to
 have independent livelihoods, leading to migration by some and for those who stayed later
 marriage and frustrations. Some were involved in theft which was particularly reported in *Oda Haro* and *Oda Dawata*.
- In 2003 female migration was rare and international migration not mentioned but by 2013 some young women from all sites but *Adado* had migrated to Arab countries mostly through legal channels. Girls from *Somodo* were also migrating illegally to the Sudan. In *Oda Dawata* it was said that every household had at least one migrant; some left husbands and children behind. Many migrants sent remittances and returned with savings to invest in houses and businesses. The status of young women was said to have increased as a result in all the migrant-sending communities except *Somodo*.
- There was also increasing urban migration. Those young women who were eventually not
 successful in education and did not migrate usually stayed at home till marriage sometimes
 working as daily labourers or in the non-farm sector. Girls were getting married later which was
 associated with continuing education, more income-earning possibilities and more freedom to
 choose partners; in none of the sites did the government law banning marriage until 18 seem to
 be enforced.
- Unlike in the 1990s and partly as a result of school attendance adolescent boys and girls were

free to interact. There were reports of increasing extra-marital pregnancies, abortions and births among young women.

• The teenagers who were interviewed generally wanted much fewer children than the prevailing average family size in the communities, with many claiming two was enough.

Children

- Babies and young children in richer households were receiving much better care in terms of feeding, hygiene, and clothing than in the 1990s. In some communities modern medical care for children was also mentioned as a new and good thing.
- The common preference for male children in the early 1990s had somewhat reversed in several communities; daughters reduced the pressure on household land and there was the new possibility that they might migrate and send remittances.
- In Adado, Oda Haro, and Oda Dawata people noticed that children were starting incomegenerating work earlier than in the past, even in rich households. This was associated with a desire to get an independent income often among others to finance their education; in Oda Dawata 50% children self-financed their education. In Adado it was also was linked to the fact that children were smarter than in the past partly as a result of going to school.
- Children from richer households were generally better able to study better and further as they
 usually had less work responsibilities and the family could afford private education if need be.
 Children from poor families were less likely to attend primary school, start on time, or have time
 and energy to study well. They were more likely to drop out early and/or often. They were even
 less likely to be able to attend secondary and higher education level due to prohibitive living
 costs even when government-sponsored.

Modernisation of human re/pro/duction systems

Socialisation and education

- In 1995 most child socialisation and education was performed in households though community members generally would also advise and punish children and a minority of children attended school for longer and shorter periods. Varying proportions of children in the communities attended school in the early 1990s. In *Adado* it was an estimated 20% of boys and 5% of girls and in *Sirba* about half. Children were not expected to attend at 'the right age' and not many students continued to secondary education.
- By 2013 the balance of institutional responsibility for child socialisation and education had shifted. As described above families were better institutions for children growing up than they had been in 1995. Community members no longer regarded themselves as responsible for the good behaviour of all children, confining their attention to their own sons and daughters.
 Primary education enrolment in all communities was said to be nearly universal and schools had taken responsibility for some aspects of education and socialisation.
- Many more children attended secondary and post-secondary education than had been the case in the 1990s though exam failures and the fact that many young people with diplomas and degrees could not get employment had led to some disenchantment with education. This coexisted and competed with the desire to 'change one's life' through education that led to a formal job as it had done in the past for those who passed the exams. In all communities there were students studying at TVET and private colleges and universities and educated people employed, often elsewhere, who acted as role models.

Health

There were no reports of family planning services in the early 1990s but in 2013 they were

available at Health Posts and Health Centres and reportedly used by many women; estimates of take-up by married women ranged from 40% in *Adado* to 80% in *Oda Dawata*. In two sites it was said that household sizes were smaller than in the past, especially among newer households. Factors at play behind the increased acceptance of contraceptive use beyond government supply and teachings included education, urban influences, increasing costs of raising children, later age of marriage, and less reliance on children for household work.

- In the early 1990s women gave birth at home almost without exception. By 2013 there had been some change but despite a government campaign to get all babies delivered at Health Centres launched early in 2013 some months later due to practical and cultural barriers most births were still taking place at home, often with assistance from Traditional Birth Attendants.
- In 1995 Adado had a health clinic but elsewhere people had to travel to the nearest town. Starting in 2006 Health Posts were built by Public Works in all communities except Adado which still had the clinic, and two Health Extension Workers were appointed to deliver sixteen packages in the areas of hygiene and environmental sanitation, disease prevention, family health and health education. In 2013 new health centres had recently been built in Adado, Oda Dawata, and Udie (Sirba's kebele) and in all sites there were health centres within 10 kms.
- However, those who could afford to used private clinics as the services were better and they could also afford expensive treatments. For example, one rich farmer from *Adado* spend 10,000 *birr* on kidney surgery. This contrasts with a poor farmer's daughter in *Somodo* with anaemia who self-medicated using packed tomato juice. No community had a functional system for exemption from health fees. In *Adado* the practices of milk teeth removal and uvula cutting had not been totally eliminated but there was much less use of traditional and self-treatment than there had been in the past; this was also mentioned in *Kormargefia* and *Somodo*.
- Access to safe water had greatly improved since the early 1990s. For example there were no protected springs in Adado or Kormargefia in 1995 and in Sirba, which did have two hand pumps and a solar pump there had been problems of phosphorus in the water which forced people to go to neighbouring kebeles to get drinking water. In 2013 there were still some problems of poorer access for more remote areas and outstanding issues in all communities notably slow response to water point failures. In Sirba there was no government-supplied water: some farmers with private wells and electric pumps sold water; there was a waterpoint which had been constructed by an NGO with a small charge; and the Chinese road construction compound provided free water.

Social protection

- There was little change in social protection institutions between 1995 and 2013: caring for people in need was basically the responsibility of kin networks and community-initiated organisations such as *iddir*. The very poor and those without relatives were those most at risk.
- In Sirba, Kormargefia and Oda Dawata there had been what seemed to be one-off NGO interventions to help small numbers of poor people, orphans and malnourished children.
- Religious congregations played some social protection role for some poorest community members though usually the help did not extend beyond 'charity'.
- Government did very little. In Oda Haro wereda level officials admitted that they did not have enough budget to support the poor and vulnerable and there was very limited access to credit and savings services for them.

Modernisation of livelihood systems since the early 1990s

The local economies

• As shown in more detail below there have been enormous changes to the local economies since

the early 1990s; many of these took place after 2003. In all six sites since then there has been economic growth driven by a mix of:

- improvements in agricultural productivity, increased demand for products, better access to markets, inflation, and new aspirations
- rising involvement in trade and other non-farm service and manufacturing enterprises; there were mixes of petty, small and medium businesses led by local entrepreneurs in all sites
- growing daily labour opportunities
- increasing investment in land and businesses in local towns
- opportunities for business, employment and daily labour through commuting
- remittances and savings from migrants

Changes in the structures of the rural mixed economies

- This economic growth in the communities has been accompanied by structural changes.
- Rural livelihood systems involve a mix of private and public sector activities. During the Derg the
 public sector dominated farming controlling amounts and prices of outputs to be sold, supplying
 inputs through Service Co-operatives often prioritising Producer Co-operatives, forbidding
 agricultural labour and farmers from trading, etc. Many of these restrictions were abandoned in
 1989 and in the 1990s the EPRDF was not very active in the field of agriculture apart from some
 activities in agricultural extension with agents who covered large areas, and the provision of
 fertiliser and food aid in very bad droughts.
- In the mid-1990s in Peasant Associations throughout the rural areas the 'private sector', which was constituted by smallholders, traders, moneylenders, equb, and informal enterprises, was freed from many restrictions and given space to organise itself. Many respondents in the WIDE1 village studies appreciated this freedom after their experiences under the Derg although it is clear that some markets, for example for fertiliser, were 'missing' and such 'free markets' as existed were not competitive. Credit could only be obtained from relatives or moneylenders who charged exorbitant rates to poor people who often entered into long-term dependent relations with the lender, sometimes involving labour services. Commodity traders were in powerful positions; for example it seemed that coffee traders in Adado colluded to set the same low buying price.
- By 2003 government had increased public sector activities related to farming which across the
 Stage 3 sites included the provision of fertiliser and in some places hybrid seeds on credit,
 expanding extension services in some places to 'models', the revival of Service Co-operatives,
 activities by agricultural research centres, and improving veterinary services. However, rising
 costs of inputs, poor weather and/or low prices due to gluts resulting from higher productivity,
 had led many farmers into debt.
- In 2013 the government was much more actively trying to control farming production in the communities with the aim of increasing the productivity of the major grain crops, improving coffee quality, encouraging the growth of high-value crops and reducing the numbers but improving the quality of livestock. Related to this push for growth starting from 2010 newly designed kebele structures¹⁸ had been put in place. These involved a hierarchy of groups the smallest of which had 5 or 6 members.
- Government had a monopoly on fertiliser sale and were involved in the dissemination of improved seeds alongside private providers; they seemed to control the distribution of hybrid maize seeds which farmers in Adado and Somodo were 'forced to take'. In growing the main

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 $^{^{18}}$ These are described below in this section and in more detail in Section 3

grain crops farmers were meant to work to annual plans agreed with the Development Agents who should provide detailed advice on such matters as the best time to plant, the amount of fertiliser to use and how to apply it, and so on. The provision of inputs and credits was no longer done directly by weredas but they facilitated the work of Service Co-operatives and government and NGO MFIs. They also propagated the idea that youth and women should join together in producer co-operatives to get involved in farming and non-farming activities and had just started to provide credit for a few groups in October 2013. Service co-operatives should also be involved in buying farmers' outputs: coffee in *Adado*, maize in *Oda Haro*, wheat and other products (though not potatoes) in *Oda Dawata* on the theory that their prices would be better than those of private traders since they would be working in the interests of their members and they could store the crops for sale when prices were higher.

- Meanwhile the 'private sector' had expanded since the 1990s. Smallholders were much more actively engaged in agricultural markets, networks of traders had burgeoned, and SMEs had entered new fields and were expanding. Moneylenders had disappeared but been replaced not only with government-backed MFIs and NGO schemes but also equb-style local organisations some with extremely large contributions and pots. Households had diversified their activities with many combining different portfolios of farming and non-farming activities. New private operators had entered the market including schools, churches and potentially health centres raising an income from assets or labour, including in one case a school hiring out students for the potato harvest. Despite this flowering of non-farm activity there had been no systematic, large-scale and continued government support for a sector which is important arena for women's economic empowerment and some rural youth employment, apart from restricted credit in some places. The implementation of the business licence and taxation programme had caused a number of very small businesses to close down.
- With big changes in both the public and the private sectors the 2013 mixed economies looked very different from those in 2003. Farmers were sometimes wary of participating in either sector; for example farmers in Sirba were doubtful of the quality of fertiliser from the Service Co-operative since it had no expiry date and also suspected the Co-operative was buying 'improved seeds' from private sector suppliers who were passing off ordinary seeds as improved.

The six livelihood systems

• The WIDE communities were selected as exemplars of Ethiopia's main farming systems in the 1990s. The six selected for the Stage 3 research have all been self-sufficient since the early 1990s except for *Kormargefia* which received food aid for a period of 5 years leading up to 2003, and *Oda Haro* which received aid for one year as a result of the 2002/3 drought.

<u>The coffee-producing communities – Adado and Somodo</u>

Farming

- Adado and Somodo have both grown coffee as a cash crop for a long time. Livestock were not
 major contributors to the livelihood system in either community although both had some
 fattening in 2013. By then Adado was producing niche fresh coffee under the Yirgacheffe label
 and there were moves to improve coffee quality to get higher international prices in Somodo.
- In the early 1990s the staple in *Adado* was *enset* supplemented by maize and the same was true in 2013 but there was also some sale of yams, beans, *enset* products, and eucalyptus and fruit and vegetable growing using watering was expanding. In *Somodo* in 2003 the staples were maize and *tef*, and *enset* was a fall-back in the lean season. Sale of *chat* had increased in recent years and selling of fruit had been recently introduced. By 2013 more *chat* was being grown, eucalyptus had become an important source of cash and irrigation of vegetables had recently started. Some Amhara investors had identified a suitable place by the river and asked for land;

they had given some training and local farmers were starting to copy them.

Non-farm activities

SMEs – services and manufacturing

In 1995 in *Adado* men, and recently some women, were involved in rural—urban trading. In 2003 coffee trading and petty trade had grown and there was a tea-room and occasional brickmaking. By 2013 business was said to be as important as farming for rich and middle-wealth households with around 200 people involved in trade, shops, a bakery, butchering, restaurants, barbering and motorbike services. In 2003 in *Somodo* trading was common; coffee was traded locally and to nearby town traders, and young men were involved in this and the chat trade. Many women traded small amounts of agricultural products on market day. In 2013 fresh coffee was sold through an extended network of traders to outside investors for export and there were a number of *chat* brokers. Along the roadside there were many shops, tea-shops, drinking houses etc and more smaller ones elsewhere in the kebele. There were grain mills, carpenters, and transport services using donkeys and 1 pick-up.

Employment

In 1995 in Adado there were seasonal employment possibilities at the service co-operative coffee-washing plant; this was closed in 2003 and coffee had to be taken to Dilla creating the monopolistic opportunities for traders described above. In 2013 there was once more a coffee union in Adado which employed 8 permanent workers and seasonal work during the harvest. There were around 10 employed domestic workers and 10 guards and nursery workers. In Somodo in 2003 there were no reports of local employment; in 2013 there were 10 grainmill employees, 3 guards and some relatives employed in the small roadside businesses.

Migration

• Off the farm migration to Shakiso for gold-mining provided an outlet for landless youth in densely-populated Adado throughout the EPRDF period and was said to be on the increase in 2013. There was also a small amount of migration for farmwork which often ended with the acquisition of land and some urban migration. In 2003 in Somodo the only migration was by the minority Yem group; men and women migrated seasonally for urban daily labour. By 2013 'every household had a migrant'; females migrated legally to the Gulf and illegally to the Sudan while most males migrated illegally to the Sudan. There were also a few commuters to Jimma.

The grain exporters – Oda Haro, Oda Dawata and Sirba

Farming

Crops

• In 2013 *Oda Haro* was an example of a maize-exporting farming system; 6 traders from the community sold to traders in Addis Ababa in competition with the Service Co-operative which in 2013 bought about 25% of output. But in 2003, when drought had just hit the community, maize was mostly consumed at home with any small surpluses sold locally. Red pepper was the main cash crop though problems of 'cholera' were reported. Other cash crops sold locally included niger seeds and chat. There was a small amount of traditional irrigation on land near streams where sugarcane, bananas and other fruit, and vegetables were grown for local sale. Daily labour was low status but common. In 2013 *chat* and niger seeds were still being sold while red pepper was sold to local traders who sold on to traders in Ambo and Addis Ababa. Traders came from local areas and Addis Ababa to buy irrigated vegetables. Eucalyptus sales brought in good incomes. 70 hectares of land was irrigated mostly using traditional technologies though there were 12 pumps in the kebele. 90% of the output was sold. Recently a group of people from the Amhara region with considerable irrigation experience had rented land and introduced a

- planting pattern using a mix of irrigation and rain that could give 3 harvests a year. Daily labour was now a common source of income for women, youth and children.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 there was no main cash crop though surpluses of the subsistence crops were sold in local markets: wheat, maize, and sorghum from the lower land areas and barley, peas, beans, maize, sorghum and potatoes from the higher areas. There was some irrigation in 2003 using a water turbine constructed for a grainmill by an Italian during the invasion. Richer farmers employed agricultural servants and daily labour including in-migrants during the harvest. In 2013 wheat was a major cash crop and more than 90% of peas and potatoes were sold; people were growing far more potatoes because they were profitable. Sales of *chat* had increased by 5% since 2008 and eucalyptus by 20%. The area of irrigated land had increased to 32 hectares, some around the water turbine and some using another river; some was gravity fed and the rest fed by pumps. Onions and cabbages were the main vegetables grown. In rich households only 30% or so of labour needs were covered by household members and the number of agricultural servants and use of daily labour had increased. Around a half of young men and a third of women were said to be involved in daily labour. For the 2012 wheat harvest about 100 farmers rented tractors and almost 200 combine harvesters which was cheaper than hiring labour.
- In 1995 Sirba was described as being in a food surplus area with crops grown for both subsistence and cash. These included tef, wheat, beans, chickpeas, barley, millet, maize and sorghum which were grown using annual rotation and some inter-cropping. Tef was gaining importance as a cash crop and increasing amounts were being planted. In 2003 the weather for the last 3 years had been dry and yields had declined substantially. People were said to be getting poorer and poorer. The main crops grown were tef, wheat and maize but there were 'no cash crops'. In 2013 tef had become the most important cash crop, followed by chickpeas and lentils. There was a high demand for eucalyptus and a little garden irrigation using wells and pumps; an NGO project on 18 hectares had recently stopped working due to various institutional problems. In another larger area the government had started laying pipes to connect drip irrigation to two deep wells which had been bored earlier; the plan was to charge farmers for the electricity and water they used.

Livestock

Animals

- In *Oda Haro* in 2003 there had just been a major loss of cattle due to trypanasomiasis; even so the cattle price was very low probably due to the drought. One farmer had crossbred cattle. In 2013 the number of cattle was said to have declined due to shortages of land, fodder and labour. Only two farmers had crossbreeds. An expanding number of people engaged in fattening bulls and sheep for sale for festivals.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 there were a few but rising number of crossbred cows and bulls. In 2013 an estimated 20% of farmers had improved cattle and in 2013 the community hosted National Calf Day due to its recent good performance in producing cross-bred calves. There was a dairy co-operative. The number of shoats had decreased. Most people were involved in fattening to sell at a higher price.
- In Sirba herds were declining due to scarcity of grazing land; they were fed on private land or straw. There was bull fattening and some milk sale. Cross-breeding was available nearby for a small fee but no Sirba farmer had used it. In 2003 herds were said to have declined further. In 2013 again there were fewer cattle. Most were traditional but the number of cross-breed were increasing. There were fewer shoats. Livestock fattening and milk production had become increasingly important in recent years.

Poultry

- In *Oda Haro* in 2003 chickens were kept for sale for small cash expenditures. In 2013 there was little interest in poultry due to disease epidemics which did not respond to ineffective drugs.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 there were a rising number of crossbreed chickens. In 2013 it was reported that they regularly suffered from epidemics for which there were no drugs. There were a number of egg traders, who bought them from the farmers and sold them in Gonde and Asella to restaurants.
- In *Sirba* in 1995 there was petty trade in eggs and no change reported in 2003. In 2013 poultry farming was common though there were regular outbreaks of disease which particularly affected improved breeds. An investor who had returned from an Arab country and lived in Addis Ababa was about to start a poultry farm with thousands of chickens.

Bees

- In Oda Haro in 2003 there was no mention of bees though in 2013 people said that the
 community used to be known for its honey but the bees had been affected by pesticides and
 deforestation; still a few farmers produced large quantities of honey which they sold at a good
 price.
- There was no mention of bees in *Oda Dawata* in 2003. In 2013 people said there were more bees than in 2003; bee-keeping skills had improved and some modern beehives were in use. The main risk came from pesticides which killed bees.
- There were no reports of bees in 1995 or 2003 and in 2013 respondents said the bees had left when the forest was cut down in the 1980s.

Non-farm activities

SMEs - services and manufacturing

- In *Oda Haro* in 2003 farmers supplemented their income by trading red pepper, cattle, coffee, and maize though increasing competition was making it less profitable. One farmer said he had gone bankrupt as the maize price had dropped. There was a part-time carpenter and two shops. During the dry season a few people did building work in Tibe town. Women made and sold areki and local craftwork. In 2013 179 people were said to be involved in non-farm business including big, medium and small traders, part-time carpenters and weavers, local drink-makers, small teahouses and 3 shops. Many people, especially women and poor men sold firewood, grass and charcoal.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 farmers were involved in trading cattle and the retail and wholesale grain trading. Women were involved in petty trade, making and selling local drinks, and firewood sale. In 2013 there were no large or small traders in the kebele as they were based in Gonde town. There were some very successful businesspeople including a woman farmer who was involved in trade and owned a grain mill and a car used for public transport. There were a small number of tea-rooms. Roughly 40 people sold wood and 10 people charcoal though both these activities were illegal. About 50 people sold grass. More than 20 men were involved in skilled work and providing petty and transport services. More than 100 women produced local drinks and there were a small number of tea-rooms.
- In *Sirba* in 1995 there were two wholesale grain traders and skilled work opportunities. Farmers sold grain, wood, charcoal and beans and women sold grain eggs, dungcakes, and straw. In 2003 non-farm business activities had increased especially in trade and drinking houses; there was a big shop run by a woman. In 2013 wholesale grain trading had declined as most farmers sold directly in markets or to traders in Udie, Mojo or Debre Zeit. Women were involved in smallscale retail trading. Other activities had increased including shop-keeping, drink houses, petty services, and transport services including 2 minibuses owned by *Sirba* residents. Opportunities

for skilled workers had increased. There were three successful stone co-operatives in *Sirba* quarry which involved around 150 men.

Employment

- In *Oda Haro* in 2003 there were employment opportunities for around 10 people mostly in the rainy season. In 2013 there were 29 people in non-farm employment including the kebele manager who came from *Oda Haro*.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 there were no employment opportunities for men or women. In 2013 the stone producing investor employed about 30 daily labourers. More than a fifth of people, including about half the youth, commuted for work, most to Gonde flour factory, Kulumsa Agricultural Research Institute, or for construction work.
- In Sirba in 1995 a few were employed as guards and in drink houses; there was high unemployment among high school leavers and dropouts and ex-soldiers. In 2003 little had changed but by 2013 things were very different due to the spreading beyond Debre Zeit of the industrialisation which had started along the Addis Ababa-Debre Zeit road. Wage employment opportunities were constantly increasing. In October they included brick and blocket factories, flower and vegetable farms, and the Chinese road construction company base. A new modern egg production facility had just been built and Sheikh Alamuddin had bought the hotel situated in the kebele and asked for 200 hectares of land for an unknown purpose. The new toll highway between Addis Ababa and Nazreth was under construction nearby and there was to be a station on the planned new railway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti.

Migration

- In *Oda Haro* in 2003 men went for seasonal work around Jimma during the coffee harvest and those who 'hated farming' migrated to town; no-one could remember a female migrant. In 2013 there was seasonal male agricultural migration for coffee harvesting and to Humera. Around 25 men had migrated to towns. Many young men had worked on the main road construction which had finished in 2012; a few had gone with the company to areas where the road was still under construction. Some educated people worked in the wereda administration and there were 15 people working as teachers and HEWs in other places. Women were now migrating, some to towns and increasingly since 2010 to Arab countries; more than 35 had left in the year leading up to April 2013. Illegal migration to the Sudan by both males and females was mentioned.
- In *Oda Dawata* in 2003 a few men went to Asella for manual work. A few women migrated to towns and there was one woman who had gone to work in an Arab country and was sending remittances. In 2013 male migration for long-term agriculture and to towns was rising. Female urban migration had increased and it was estimated that around half of young women and a fifth of adult married women with children were working in Arab countries. Remittances were increasingly important in the local economy.
- In *Sirba* in 1995 some young men and women worked in Debre Zeit and visited frequently. In 2003 young people migrated for work to nearby towns. In 2013 there was seasonal male migration to work on construction sites and some young women went to work in factories; some in Dukem were studying at the same time. 35 educated people from the community had formal jobs outside. 32 young women were working in Arab countries.

The livestock-led farming system – Kormargefia

Farming

Livestock

• In 1995 the Derg 'livestock rearing centre' had ceased to exist. Farmers had fewer cattle due to diseases and shortage of grazing land. People sold milk, butter and dungcakes. In 2003 there

were said to be fewer cattle for the same reasons. ILCA training on breeding was only benefitting richer farmers. More milk, butter and dungcakes were sold. In 2013 *Kormargefia* was a recognised sources of breeding bulls in the area and there were more hybrid cattle especially dairy cows. Milk, butter, and dungcakes were important sources of cash. Fattening of cattle had increased and since the sudden rise in the price of sheep in 2008 all households kept and fattened sheep.

- In 1995 people sold eggs in Debre Berhan; this had increased in 2003. In 2013 chicken-rearing had increased and eggs were an important source of cash; many youth and some children produced and sold eggs.
- In 1995 and 2003 bees were not mentioned. In 2013 most of the area was considered too cold for bees and there was also a shortage of flowers; fewer than 10 people had one or two traditional hives. Honey was sold in Debre Berhan market.

Crops

In 1995 the most important crops were barley and beans; the area was known for its areki production using the barley. Small surpluses were sold. Farmers hired daily labour in peak seasons. In 2003 there had been no significant change. In 2013 surpluses of barley, beans and wheat were sold; the main cash crop was eucalyptus which farmers planted on hillsides. There was irrigation using canals and pumps with about 100 users. There were ten pumps which were rented out. Potatoes were the main irrigated cash crop but they were being increasingly replaced with carrots which suffered less from disease. 18 farmers were growing eucalyptus seedlings on irrigated land. There had been a significant increase in the wages of agricultural servants and daily labourers.

Non-farm activities

SMEs – services and manufacturing

• In 1995 non-farm activities included agricultural retail trade, selling trees, carpentry, sewing clothes, making and selling dungcakes and selling local drinks. By 2003 non-farm activities had increased as the cost of living had increased. People sold firewood, charcoal, straw, and dungcakes. In 2013 there was no wholesale trading as every farmer sold outputs directly in Debre Berhan market. There were four shoat traders but little increase in non-farm business apart from 2 small shops, a bar, and a grainmill on the roadside. Middle-wealth and poor women produced local drinks but only poor people sold it directly.

Employment

• In 1995 there were no employment opportunities. In 2003 there had been Food-For-Work annually since 1999. One woman had been employed for two years as a storekeeper and clerk in the kebele. In 2013 a few residents had jobs at ILCA and there was temporary daily construction labour on the dairy farm investment site. The kebele employed 4 guards and road watchers. 80 people, including young women, were employed on construction sites and in factories and small enterprises such as shiro-roasting 'factories' in the area; some of these people commuted on a daily basis.

Migration

In 1995 a very few people migrated seasonally to Addis Ababa and other towns to work as daily labourers but it was uncommon. In 2003 urban migration had increased. In 2013 migration from the community had increased significantly. Some of the estimated 80 people described in the previous paragraph stayed in Debre Berhan. There was some seasonal male migration for harvesting but this was reducing as more opportunities opened up locally. Many men had migrated to work on the recent road construction but this had finished and many had returned to the community. Migration to Addis Ababa by males and females had increased. Female

migration to Arab countries had started recently and there were 40 working abroad.

Changes in important aspects of the livelihood systems

Land

• Since 1995 there were more and smaller land plots in all sites. However, particularly in recent years, there had been counter-processes of land accumulation through leasing, sales and sharecropping by richer farmers seeking higher production. One obligation of model farmers mentioned in one community was to increase production by leasing land.

Labour

- Related to more intensive work to increase productivity, the emergence of a wealthy class of
 model farmers, the increase in landlessness and children's participation in education and
 income-generating work there was much greater use of labour beyond the family than there had
 been in 2003, especially in peak agricultural seasons. There were various mixes of local daily
 labour, seasonal in-migrant work, agricultural servant work and higher and rising wage rates for
 all kinds of agricultural labour. Such daily labour was seen as low-status in 1995 but in 2013 was
 an indispensable source of independent income for some poor and landless adult men, and
 some women, youth and children.
- Married women, women heading households, young women and girls were economically more
 active everywhere, some within the community and others commuting to flower farms or
 migrating to towns or internationally. Degrees of participation varied. Within communities parttime participation of adult and young women and girls in local independent agricultural and nonfarm activities had increased but there were few full-time local opportunities. Women's cooperatives had not been sustainable anywhere.
- Youth co-operatives had been more successful than those for women but they had not provided
 work for many members of the new youth cohorts which start looking for full-time work each
 year. Many of those who joined co-operatives were still experimenting with various ways of
 making a living and the co-operative was a staging post in their transition to adult work. In some
 cases some members worked on for some years and were successful but when many of the
 original members had left to pursue other opportunities there were considerable institutional
 problems.
- While opportunities for non-farm self-employment, wage labour and formal employment for youth varied across the communities youth unemployment had become a major issue and was said to be rising everywhere. It especially affected somewhat educated youth who had failed Grades 8, 10 or 12. In *Sirba* some families had 5 unemployed educated sons and daughters.
- Children's participation in household work seemed to have declined a little while incomegeneration activities had increased, in some places from an earlier age than in the past.

Technologies

- There was large-scale use of tractors and combine harvesters in *Oda Dawata* for wheat; they
 were cheaper than hiring labour; a larger number used tractors in *Sirba* in 2013. Farming
 machinery had been used in both sites in the 1960s and during the Derg. They had also been
 used in *Somodo* during the Derg though not since.
- The BBM plough was rarely used anywhere, but farmers in *Kormargefia* and *Sirba* were constructing broad beds for planting using locally-invented techniques. Another farmer-invented technique found in *Sirba* (*tef*) and *Oda Dawata* (wheat) was to sow seeds in lines by attaching a plastic bottle with a hole to the plough and filling it with seeds. In *Oda Dawata* fertiliser was mixed with the seeds.
- Led by model farmers there had been increasing use of modern inputs, particularly fertiliser and

- improved seeds, and new techniques and technologies such as intercropping and line planting. When something worked well other farmers were keen to copy.
- Irrigation use varied: in *Adado* it was a small additional income for a few households while in *Kormargefia* and *Oda Haro* it was a significant livelihood source for a significant minority. Irrigation production had expanded considerably since 2003 and greater potential was talked about at wereda levels but there had been little government investment in irrigation infrastructure apart from *Sirba* where wells and pipes were being installed on land large enough in theory to provide an irrigated plot to every household. 'Missing' investments mentioned included a small dam in *Kormargefia*, night storage tanks in *Oda Dawata*, big pumps in *Adado*, and wells in *Somodo*. There was untapped river potential in *Adado*, *Somodo*, *Oda Haro* and *Oda Dawata*.

Connections to international crop markets

 Output price fluctuations were linked to domestic markets (Oda Haro maize, Oda Dawata flour though linked to GOE import activities, Sirba tef) and international markets (Adado and Somodo coffee, Oda Dawata peas)

Livestock

- Livestock and products played a leading role in *Kormargefia*'s local economy and were significant in *Sirba* and *Oda Dawata*; they were somewhat important in *Oda Haro* but less so in the coffee sites. Availability and uptake of improved cattle varied from very small in *Adado* to highly significant in *Kormargefia* which has been a well-known source of improved breeds for the surrounding areas since the Derg. There was some cattle and shoat fattening for consumption during local festivals everywhere and improved dairy cows for milk sale in nearby towns in three sites. Improved poultry breeds were found everywhere though numbers varied significantly across communities; many young men in *Sirba* and *Oda Dawata* were keeping improved chickens. Attempts to promote bees in new places by DAs had not been very successful.
- There was a decreasing in herding and an increase in zero-grazing with a wider range of fodder inputs. There was a general perception that fodder shortage was constraining potentially profitable livestock rearing and production.

Non-farm activities

- Trade has been discussed above. Sources of non-farm employment varied: in three communities there were growing opportunities in nearby factories/flower farms and small enterprises. Local inward investment had generated a few labour opportunities, for example a stone crusher in Oda Dawata, a dairy farm in Kormargefia, irrigation in Somodo, and a flower farm near Sirba, although in Sirba and Kormagefia these were considerably less than had been promised when the community agreed to accept the handing over of the land.
- In 2003 no commuting for work was reported from any of the sites but by 2013 it was an option in *Somodo* (to Jimma), *Sirba* (to flower farms and other enterprises along the Debre Zeit-Mojo road), *Kormargefia* (to enterprises on the road to Debre Berhan), and *Oda Dawata* (to enterprises on the Adama –Asela road and to Gonde and Asela).
- Urban migration had increased everywhere and by 2013 international migration to the Gulf or Sudan had become very important in two sites and was of growing importance in three sites, though it had not yet reached Adado.

Modernisation of society

Ethnicity and religion

In 1995 in *Sirba* 80% of the population were Shewa Oromo; by 2013 the figure had risen to 90%; the remaining 10% was a mix of ethnicities. 95% in *Kormargefia* were Amhara with a 5%

- increasingly assimilated Oromo minority. In both these sites, which were homogeneous in terms of religion, relations among the groups had not been problematic.
- Orthodox and Protestant Christianity and Sufi and Wahabi Islam were present in different mixes
 in all communities and had some influence on local social norms and practices and their
 followers' lives. Except in the small Muslim community of Adado, Wahabism had been rising in
 the communities with Muslim congregations Somodo, Oda Haro and Oda Dawata; in 2013 the
 relationships between Wahabi groups and government in these communities were uneasy
 reflecting events at national level.
- In the four religiously heterogeneous communities, religious identities mattered in various ways.
 In some places these identities interacted in complex and various ways with ethnic identities and these communities exhibited different patterns of tension and at times conflict between identity groups.
- Some communities had seen little change in their religious composition between 1995 and 2013. For example *Adado* was already predominantly Protestant in 1995 and *Kormargefia* and *Sirba*, then and in 2013 were exclusively Orthodox.
- Other communities had seen radical change. In *Oda Haro* Protestantism was emerging in the mid-1990s but by 2013 it was dominant with more than 60% of the community following the religion. Islam did not start to emerge until the early 2000s but by 2013 almost 10% of the population were Muslims including some who had migrated in from Jimma, and there was a growing *Wahabi* congregation. In 2013 there were tensions between Muslim and Protestants over conversions and between *Wahabi* and Sufi. Muslims dominated the maize trade and there was a considerable wealth difference between the predominantly Muslim, richer Alemgena zone and the poorer and remoter predominantly Orthodox and Protestant Boto zone.
- In Somodo minority Christian groups (20%) perceived themselves as marginalised in the government structures. Muslim Oromo were richer and seen as first class citizens. Within the dominant Oromo Muslim group there was lack of mutual respect between Wahabi and Sufi Muslims. In Oda Dawata, Amhara and Oromo Orthodox Christians (30%) who lived nearer to the road were said to be richer, but Oromo Muslims to dominate the kebele structures. There were tensions between Wahabi and Sufi and occasional flare-ups between Orthodox followers and Muslim Oromo. In Adado (100% Gedeo) there were instances of tensions within Protestant churches leading to splits, and tensions between some of these churches and the small Muslim community.

Elders

Elders had remained as important as they were in 1995 in solving various types of disputes and
conflicts in all communities, usually in ways that were recognised by and linked to formal justice
organisations. But in 2013 they had to deal with many more disputes between husbands and
wives and their linkages with government had increased.

Iddirs

- Iddirs had remained important in all six communities in their primary function of assisting bereaved households.
- Iddirs had different bases of organisation across and within communities. For example there were village-based iddirs in *Somodo*, clan- and church-based iddirs in *Adado* (which had several Protestant churches), while there was one large iddir and several smaller clan and religion-based iddirs in *Oda Dawata*.
- Iddirs had taken on expanded roles in various directions. For example, in *Oda Haro* they had extended powers against thieves and other deviants, including fines and excommunication,

which were recognised by both kebele and wereda administrations. In *Oda Dawata* and *Sirba* they had supported specific development projects, raising financial contributions in a systematic manner.

Elites

- Compared with 1995 networks of local elites had become more complex. There were strong links and overlaps among the different types of elite which included kebele leaders, elders, religious leaders, wealthy and successful farmers, *iddir* leaders, and clan and other traditional leaders where these existed. Very wealthy traders and other businesspeople had high status but they were less linked to the other types of elite.
- Networks extended to wereda levels. In Somodo, Oda Haro, Oda Dawata and Kormargefia
 wereda and wereda court officials were said to give preferential treatment to rich people,
 people connected with kebele leaders or with wereda officials, and people having strong
 relatives; this was especially the case when women were seeking justice.
- In addition to elders conflict resolution was also carried out by clan and lineage leaders in Oda Dawata, leaders of gada structures in *Adado* and *Oda Haro* who dealt with disputes 'beyond elders' capacity', and religious leaders in *Kormargefia* who considered the most serious conflicts in church compounds. In *Somodo* and *Kormargefia* conflicts were first seen by elders attached to *iddir*.

Relations between rich and poor people

- There were emerging class relationships between rich landed households hiring labour and the
 poor landless and land-poor people who often provided it. Class relationships were also shaped
 by processes of land accumulation by richer farmers rental and share-cropping. This pattern
 was already present in 2003 in Sirba and Oda Dawata.
- In all communities a category of 'very rich' farmers/traders/business people had emerged with various assets and lifestyle activities which distinguished them from the 'rich' as well as everyone else.
- In Kormargefia poorer farmers with less land did not want to get advice from rich landed ones.
- Relationships between rich and poor people were complex. Strong clan linkages and obligations
 crossed wealth categories in *Oda Dawata* and there was said to be mutual respect between rich
 and poor in *Adado*. In *Somodo* very rich people had employees but all wealth groups mixed
 socially.

Gender relations

- Changes in women's rights to property and economic and political empowerment have been discussed above.
- Wahabism was a factor contributing to increasingly unequal relations between men and women in the places where it had taken hold: Somodo, Oda Haro and Oda Dawata. Confinement to the house had increased in Somodo and in all three communities some women had started to veil themselves completely.
- Female international migration and the economic changes that this brought about in some cases were said to have raised women's status in the community in *Oda Haro* and *Kormargefia*; this was not the case in *Somodo* where there seemed to be more exploitative relationships between parents and daughters.

<u>Inter-generational relations</u>

• Youth were variably integrated in the community, ranging from alienation in *Oda Haro*, where young men said their ideas were dismissed by officials as they were regarded as 'opposition'

since youth had voted for CUD in 2005, to ready acceptance and implementation of young people's ideas when found useful, in *Sirba*, for example the digging of a pond for livestock to save herders making a long journey to the nearest river and the upgrading of Udie school to Grade 9-10.

- Farmers and kebele leaders in Somodo, Oda Haro and Oda Dawata were not keen to give land to
 youth groups though this was not the case in Kormargefia. In Adado, Oda Haro and Kormargefia
 lack of access to land was said to be a reason for conflict between generations/within families; in
 Oda Dawata the young generation forced to sharecrop land felt exploited by the old landed
 generation; in Somodo lack of access to land prompted increased migration out of the
 community.
- Expectations of assistance to parents by children still prevailed, with migration particularly by females playing a role in this pattern, but they coexisted with trends challenging this norm, notably
 - It was harder for young people to establish independent livelihoods
 - lack of access to land by the young generation had become a big issue in all communities,
 with varying extent of intergenerational tension across communities.
- There were various other tension points between generations, including children making
 financial demands on parents re migration or education (in Sirba) or about differing ideas (in
 Oda Haro, Oda Dawata) or when young people converted to Protestantism (Sirba, Kormargefia).
- Many older people complained about young people's life styles and ways of dressing and some felt they had lost control of the new generation.

Modernisation of cultural ideas

Modern and customary repertoires of ideas

- Modern and customary repertoires are ideal-type collections of ideas which are part of
 different world views. Individuals can mix and match elements from each repertoire to suit their
 current needs. For example in Adado and Oda Dawata a new interest in one's culture had
 emerged. In Oda Haro, Adado and Sirba people practised both world and traditional religions. In
 Somodo even those resisting new technologies and modern health care appreciated transport,
 electricity, grain mills and mobile phones.
- What was considered as part of the modern repertoires in 2013 varied across the communities, but in all six 'hard work' was an element, together with acceptance of new ideas and techniques for farming and interest in business, commercialised agriculture, regular income, and achieving wealthy life standards. In all communities elements of the modern repertoire were part of the repertoire that Government was trying to inculcate in the community. In four communities people specifically said that young people were more likely to adopt ideas from the modern repertoire.
- Customary repertoires in 2013 were much more 'modern' than they had been in the early 1990s as they had adjusted to incoming modernising influences over the years.
- A number of salient disagreements between modern and customary repertoires related to
 norms for women. For example in Adado the customary repertoire favoured arranged marriages
 and the modern one partners' choice. In Somodo the customary supported female circumcision
 and the modern one accepted that it was harmful. In Oda Haro there was no modern repertoire
 recognition of harm caused by female circumcision. In Sirba and Kormargefia the customary
 repertoire strongly rejected pre-marital sex by couples living together although this was not
 problematic in the modern repertoire.

Incoming religious ideas

- All religions were trying to improve their teachings or had become stricter. At the same time in some communities there were discourses promoted by the government about the value of religious tolerance. Communities were linked to broader religious congregation through priests, preachers and sheikhs visiting from outside and sometimes overseas. There were also links through funding, including for wehabi mosques. Some parents in *Oda Haro* were sending their children to study in well-known fundamentalist Muslim schools and in *Oda Haro*, *Oda Dawata* and *Somodo* migrants returning from the Gulf were bringing new ideas.
- Protestantism had grown considerably in the communities and their vicinities since the early 1990s. It was followed by nearly everyone in Adado, an estimated 65% of people in Oda Haro, a small minority in Somodo, and 1% in Oda Dawata. There were none in Orthodox Sirba and Kormargefia but some in the neighbouring areas of Udie and Debre Berhan; in Kormargefia people were said to hate them. There were a number of different Protestant sects including some which may have had links to congregations in the US.
- 70% of the population in *Oda Dawata* were Muslims some of whom were attracted by *Wahabism*. An estimated 90% of the population in *Somodo* were said to be Muslim and 80% of these were estimated to be members of the *Wahabi* sect. There had been a link with Saudi Arabia in the later 1990s and reports of the arrest of a *Wahabi* preacher but in 2003 the sect had very few supporters. One suggestion of why it had become so attractive in the intervening ten years was that people from Saudi Arabia had provided finance to celebrate Muslim festivals and another that migrants to Saudi Arabia came back with conservative ideas. 10% of *Oda Haro's* population were Muslim an unknown proportion of whom belonged to the *Wahabi* sect. 5% of the population in *Adado* were Muslim but there was no talk of different sects.
- In the communities with a significant rise in *Wahabism* some people commented on how it was at odds with both customary and modern norms. In *Somodo* they identified stricter rules for women and the way wehabists despised Sufi followers. In *Oda Haro* Muslim returnees from the Gulf had started wearing veils. In *Oda Dawata* the strict rules were said to alienate others.

Incoming political ideas

- Unlike in 1995 people acknowledged the EPRDF domination of political life.
- In 1995 national issues being discussed in the communities included the Constitution, regionalisation and 'democracy' which had been brought to people's attention by government officials. In 2013 as a result of radio, TV and increased urban linkages there was greater awareness of national issues. For example, in *Adado* people said that Meles' death in August 2012 had 'created some kind of social crisis all over the country' while a number of *Oda Haro* respondents said that since his death 'motivation was lacking at wereda level' which had had an impact on the work ethic at kebele level.
- There was general awareness of the salience of corruption as a national 'hot topic' which had energised some people to start to talk openly about corruption at kebele and wereda levels although there was still some fear that this could lead to retaliation.
- People in *Oda Haro* had been very impressed with the GTP training and in *Sirba* the government was credited with having made a big difference in relation to gender equality.

Other incoming ideas

Important other sources of ideas included urban and international migration and links with
people who lived in cities and other urban areas particularly through mobile phones. TV and
radio brought news and messages about development and also allowed people to appreciate
the existence of other cultures and traditions in Ethiopia; those with satellite dishes could follow
international events and learn about cultures beyond Ethiopia.

Modernisation of politics

Local government structures

- By 1995 the TGE had dealt with varying levels of local resistance following the fall of the Derg
 and Government Peasant Association structures were in political control in all six communities.
 The government was not very active in other fields allowing people to carry on their lives so long
 as they did not offer any political resistance and followed instructions. In both 1995 and 2003
 some communities said that one of the PAs' responsibilities was to present the needs and
 demands of the community to higher authorities.
- This was not the case by 2013 when, at least in theory, a deeply penetrating hierarchy of
 government and party structures was in place at kebele and sub-kebele levels. In the
 development structure the Cabinet, which consisted of a mix of unpaid community volunteers
 and wereda employees, supervised sub-kebele structures through their leaders which
 supervised Development Teams through their leaders which supervised 1-5 groups through their
 leaders.
- In the party structure an executive committee of around 16 members supervised party cells which had varying numbers of members depending on who had joined the party in the particular area. The development and party structures were independent in theory but many of the same people held posts in both. For example the kebele chair, or sometimes vice-chair, was also the community party leader and Development Team leaders were almost always party cell leaders. The structures acted primarily as a means for top-down mobilisation for participation in interventions and upward reporting on progress and security.
- In 2013 there had been a recent push to establish or activate female Development Teams and 1-5s. There were rules about kebele, sub-kebele, DT and party meetings and who should report to whom when. However, as described in Section 3 by late 2013 neither male nor female structures had been implemented as designed, although some of them had been used, perhaps patchily, for some purposes.
- Other kebele structures in place in 2013 were various committees, a militia, a Social Court and
 the kebele Council which had between 100 and 300 members, half of whom were women in
 most of the communities following the April 2013 elections. One of their tasks was to monitor
 and evaluate the work of kebele officials and wereda employees working in the community.
 Women and Youth Associations, said to have been quite active during the Derg, were either not
 in place or dysfunctional and the same applied to the recently established Youth Leagues (for
 party members) and Youth Federations.
- In most places in 2013 there were around 200 model farmers with three ranks upon whom DAs focused most advice and resources. There was some confusion about the criteria for selection of model farmers. Following the 2005 election the government selected 200 farmers from each kebele and consulted and trained them for 15 or so days. During the meetings they joined the party and in some places this was said to be more important than farming excellence. In 2010 a new list of criteria for model farmers was circulated which included farming excellence, participation in non-farm activities, and willingness to adopt new things and train others. However, there were also suggestions that model farmers should also be party members and that DT and 1-5 leaders should be model farmers.
- There was a contradiction between the government's economic and political agendas which was evidenced in the disconnect between the design and operation of the kebele and party structures. If those with roles in kebele and party structures had performed all that was expected of them they would not have met the requirement to be exemplary in their livelihood activities. In the event kebele and party roles and rules deemed to be important by the wereda were more or less conformed to but otherwise officials' private economic activities took priority especially in peak farming and trading seasons.

Taxation and contributions

In 2013 land tax was higher than it been in 2003 but given increases in incomes did not reflect
the value of the land as evidenced in costs of renting. As described in Section 3 landholders also
were expected to make 'voluntary' contributions of cash and in kind and of labour for Public
Works and many of these were not progressive. There had been a recent push to increase tax
revenues from non-farm enterprises.

Experiences of elections and Government-community relationships

- In all the communities, except *Sirba* where the Derg villagisation had been notably brutal, there was opposition to the arrival of the EPRDF in 1991. The OLF was active in *Oda Haro* and *Oda Dawata*, a Gedeo opposition party in *Adado*, a group in *Kormargefia* which probably contained some ex-Derg 'burocrats', and the Yem were not supportive of the new regime. These experiences resonated in the 2005 elections. In *Sirba* there was 'confusion' due to the presence of opposition parties, in *Adado* the EPRDF won but narrowly, and in *Somodo* the Yem voted for the CUD and were subsequently "discriminated against'. In *Oda Haro* people claimed that an opposition party had won but the government had subsequently over-turned the result. It had also imprisoned and tortured many youth. The same allegation was made by teenage respondents in *Oda Dawata* to explain the lack of interest in politics on the part of young people. In *Kormargefia* many Derg burocrats who had been banned from participating in politics supported the CUD and after the election the ban was lifted.
- By 2013 there were no spaces for political discussion in the communities and a suggestion that
 dialogue about development was difficult since disagreement with government ideas could be
 seen as evidence of support for opposition parties. Given this situation it was very difficult to get
 a sense of the attitudes of community adults to the federal government although it was clear
 that there was appreciation of the recent economic growth, improved security, and growth in
 the provision of services. Young people interviewed either said that youth in their communities
 were not interested in politics or that they would support an opposition party if one came to the
 area.

Development interventions

The dramatic change in development interventions between 1995 and 2013

In this section we use data from the three communities studied in 1995, Adado, Sirba and Kormargefia, to illustrate the big change in government interventions and service provision in rural communities between 1995 and 2013. We consider fourteen 'sectors':

- Environment
- Infrastructure
- Land planning
- Women
- Youth
- Agricultural extension services
- Co-operatives
- Credit
- · Drinking water
- Health services
- Education
- Working with the community
- Introducing modern ideas
- Kebele and party organisation

Management of the place

Environment

Adado

- Watershed management
 - **1995:** ILCA taught farmers how to increase agricultural productivity through water and soil conservation techniques
 - **2013:** Watershed management to reduce erosion at roadsides

Trees

- 1995: TGE abandoned Derg's forced afforestation in enclosed areas; instead each farmer gets seedlings to plant on his own plot and some have had a marginal effect on preventing deforestation and soil erosion though coffee and enset also help to prevent it and it is infrequent
- **2013:** Tree seedlings prepared near the river distributed to the community in 2013; farmers plant trees to shade coffee plants

Sirba

- Watershed management
 - **1995:** Most of Sirba not at risk of water erosion; those tilling marshy land practice terracing; no collective programme
 - **2013:** Sirba mountain under re-habilitation through the watershed management programme; terracing constructed on Sirba mountain through PWs

Trees

 1995: Tree cover has declined - about 6 hectares of trees scattered in household compounds; no collective programme

2013: In 2010 some plots of land were reserved for growing trees – this is supposed to help to protect against soil erosion, attract wild animals, bring rain and prevent drought; trees were planted on the terraces on Sirba mountain through PWs

 Individuals planting eucalyptus for sale had increased tree cover despite extension agents in most places discouraging this due to negative aspects of drying the land and contributing to erosion

Kormargefia

- Watershed management
 - **1995:** Almost every peasant builds ridges of stone and earth on his plot to control erosion.
 - 2013: Many terraces constructed in the last 5 years on farms, hills and gullies but little has
 changed due to destruction by livestock and floods and farmers selling stones from the
 terraces; terraces on steep eroded places have helped to slow floods and accumulate soil.
 There was watershed terracing through public work on a hill site which was declared a
 protected area and named as a Meles park

Trees

- 1995: Not more than about 2% of the area is covered with trees. Recently people had been forced to plant trees by the PA and the Ministry of Agriculture; no-one could cut trees from the community forest without permission
- **2013:** Trees were planted in the Meles park through PW; the kebele was ranked 5th best in the wereda for watershed work and given a cup; there was community work to look after the seedlings but no-one turned up including the organisers.
- There had been a big increase in the planting of eucalyptus for sale

Infrastructure provision

Adado

- Roads and transport
- **1995:** Main Addis-Nairobi asphalt road completed in the 1970s; no transport to wereda centre 1.5 hours walk; transport to *Dilla* possible in private cars; roads constructed and maintained through community co-operation
- **2013:** Addis-Nairobi road upgraded 2003 and maintained since; road to *Dilla* and Bule on problematic terrain still not all-season motorbikes introduced by agriculture and health workers in 2012; 10 owners in 2013 and one Isuzu truck
- Community affected by the poor state of feeder and internal roads and paths still maintained by Public Works
- Public buildings
- **1995:** built by Public Works during the Derg; kebele office, Service Co-operative office and shop and coffee-washing plant
- **2013:** Health centre only 'proper building'; school, Coffee Union office, FTC and kebele buildings all built by Public Works; the Coffee Union planned to construct 2 'modern' classrooms.
- Urbanisation
- **1995**: *Dilla* had 2,851 people; Adado had 25 tin-roofed houses, market, and 1 shop run by the service co-operative
- **2013**: *Dilla* had 59,150 people; Adado town had 90 households; 11 places serving drinks/food; shops, bakery; new service providers battery charging, torch maintenance, barber
- Electricity
 - **1995:** no electricity
 - **2013:** At least 10% of 1150 households connected including all town houses; an unknown number of others connected to houses with meters
- Communications
- 1995: no telephone
- 2013: mobile phones started in 2008; first used by government health workers and teachers then the community; more than 200 currently although the signal was only available in some spots in the kebele
- Radio/TV
- **1995:** none
- 2013: many radios; 30 TVs; Satellite dishes came in 2011 6 currently;

Sirba

- Roads and transport
- **1995:** located on the allweather main road connecting Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; vehicle transport available from the village to Debre Zeit or Mojo at a price of 1 birr; donkeys were the most common form of transportation of grain, wood etc
- **2013:** internal roads are dryweather problems during the rains maintained through PWs; the main road is regularly maintained and in good condition and there are minibuses, two owned by Sirba residents (7 *birr* to Debre Zeit); one private car; horse-and-carts to Denkaka town; a new multi-lane toll road from Addis Ababa to Adama was under construction in a neighbouring kebele near to the community; the new railway will also pass near Sirba
- Public buildings:
- **1995:** Not mentioned in the study
- 2013: Sirba is a sub-kebele of Udie where there are kebele and municipality offices,
- Urbanisation
- 1995: About 20 km to Debre Zeit and 20km to Mojo.

- **2013:** The kebele town is called Denkaka; part of Sirba is about to be transferred to the town and plans for construction and new building were under way.
- · Electricity and other technologies
- 1995: Biogas fuel production; a solar water pump; no electricity
- **2013:** Nearly every household had electricity; it was used for lamps, charging phones, TV, tape recorders, refrigerators, pumping underground water and a few stoves.
- Communications
- **1995:** No telephone
- **2013:** Mobile signal is not bad but sometimes it totally fails; there are about 500 phones in the village used to communicate with relatives and check market prices and by groups of school children to listen to music.
- Radio/TV
 - **1995:** Wealthy people had radios and there were some in the school
 - **2013:** Five years ago only one man owned a TV; now most wealthy and middle-income households have one; radios are common

Kormargefia

- Roads and transport
- 1995: Haile Selassie regime constructed a gravel road connecting Addis Ababa to Asmara;
 the Italians invaded shortly after and constructed a tarred road. The road runs through the kebele
- Donkeys and horses mainly used for transporting grain and other local products
- 2013: Main road well-maintained and an allweather gravel inter-wereda road goes through the kebele
- Only one road to one of the sub-kebeles wide enough for cars; during the Derg there was a
 road from the main asphalt road to the kebele centre but it was not maintained and has
 disappeared cars can only get to the community by driving across flat farmland this
 makes it difficult to sell irrigated vegetables during the rains, and open businesses and
 engage in trade
- Public buildings:
- 1995: No information
- 2013: Kebele office with three rooms, Health Post, primary school, plan to build a vet office
- Urbanisation
 - 1995: 10 km to Debre Berhan
- **2013:** The bus fare to Debre Berhan is10 *birr*.
- 20 minutes on main road in public transport to the wereda town Chacha 8 km away
- Emerging rural town in Kormagefia by the main road.
- Industrialisation
- Along the road to Debre Berhan investment in two beer factories under way and some shiroprocessing sites
- *Electricity:*
 - **1995:** None
 - **2013:** Only three places have electricity: the church (lighting and loudspeaker), the grain mill and the kebele chairman's house (lighting, TV, radio, charging mobile phones)
 - Some households have solar panels used for lighting, charging mobiles and listening to music
- Communications
- **1995:** No telephones
- **2013:** Mobile phones in 2004 improvements since 2010; around half the households use them; mobile signal fairly good but no electricity to charge batteries
- Radio/TV
 - **1995:** wealthy households have radios; some peasants listen to the radio to acquaint themselves with what is going on in other parts of the world

- 2013: wealthier households have radios; the kebele chairman is the only person with a TV

Land planning

Adado

- Use of land
 - 1995: land allocated to coffee and enset, forests, private grazing, housing and maize/sugarcane, gesho and beans
 - 2013: houses concentrated in the urban centre and otherwise scattered densely; no communal grazing land
- Access to land
 - 1995: shortage of land not addressed; share-cropping and limited cash rental
 - 2013: people buy urban land illegally if possible contracts to rent up to 30 years; other contracts from 1-3 years; no farming land to re-distribute; parents give sons a place for a house

Sirba

- Use of land
 - 1995: crops and houses, no communal grazing or forest land; some land given to investors
 - 2013: crops, 120 has for houses, 50 has unproductive land; no communal grazing land; 1 hectare for stone quarrying;
- Access to land
 - 1995: >100 landless people; villagers considered the current landholding to be inequitable
 and had appealed to higher authorities through the PA; some were expecting re-distribution;
 share-cropping; since 1975 land rental has been illegal but it was practised.
 - **2013:** Land registration completed 6 years ago; share-cropping not common; leasing very common
 - No land sales but wereda said the problem in administering Udie kebele was the illegal construction of houses that are mushrooming it had become hard to control unplanned town development and informal land sales.
 - However, there was a 10-year plan for the expansion of Denkaka and those living in the part
 of Sirba included in the plan had been warned not to construct any new buildings since they
 might be not fit with the plan and be destroyed.

Kormargefia

- Use of land
 - 1995: people have private grazing land and there is some communal grazing in some areas; a very small community forest planted during the Derg
 - 2013: Part of the community (Fagy and Bokafia) was re-allocated to the Debre Berhan town administration and the land was distributed to investors who have fenced it off but not yet invested
- Access to land
 - **1995:** Government takes land from the very old who cannot use it or pay tax and gives it to landless people but there is not enough for farmers establish new families
 - Large numbers of share-croppers and also some leasing though renting is not allowed officially
 - Members of the Producers' Co-operative (later known as burocrats) distributed the land among themselves when the co-operatives ceased to exist and some complain that as a result they have more land than other famers in the PA
 - **2013:** land certification was reported to have enhanced women's rights; irrigable land had been distributed to two youth groups whose members were almost all male.

Government interventions supporting people

Women

Adado

- Interventions for women generally
 - **1995:** none
 - 2013: wereda structures to mainstream women's issues since 2006 though not very effective
- Land rights
 - **1995:** women have no land rights; 21 women paying land tax all widows living with the husband's children; occasionally a woman can inherit if she is the only child
 - 2013: Widows and divorced women have the right to take property and girls have the right to inherit; but still difficult to implement in the face of male bias at all levels, bribery and women's lack of confidence; land registration process started in 2006 was not completed partly attributed to problems resulting from polygyny; a few educated fathers had given land to daughters
 - Economic empowerment
 - **1995:** none
 - 2013: in the Agricultural Growth Programme at least 40% of beneficiaries should be women although in November it was not clear that the programme had actually started; attempt to establish women's development teams and 1-5s in 2013 and to get them to save in order to take credit to participate in rearing cattle and sheep and produce vegetables in groups
 - Affirmative action to increase women's participation in educational opportunities and government employment in the wereda 5 women recently put in leadership positions in the civil service, wereda council, and wereda cabinet
 - Political empowerment
 - 1995: No women politically active
 - **2013:** 50 women members of the kebele council total 200; attempt to mobilise women in 1-5s; Women Affairs representative in the Cabinet
 - Gender relations interventions
 - **1995:** none
 - 2013: Polygyny is illegal but sometimes cases stopped due to bribery
 - Some cases of rape and domestic violence pursued

Sirba

- Interventions for women generally
 - 1995: Nothing institutionalised
 - **2013:** Wereda office working on land and other property rights, affirmative action, political empowerment, and various forms of male violence
 - No active women's organisation in the kebele
- Land rights
 - **1995:** Women can own and inherit land; married women have no right to claim father's assets
 - **2013:** 20 years ago girls were seen as someone's property and family property was traced through the male line now daughters have equal inheritance rights
 - Economic empowerment
 - 1995: 1992 the Ministry of Agriculture organised two groups of women to look after donated improved chickens; project did not work since not all took their turn so the chickens were distributed among the members.
 - **2013**: Affirmative action for posts at the wereda and in schools to encourage female students
 - Women participate in Public Works

- Political empowerment
- **1995:** No women politically active; in 2013 a woman said in the past it was taboo for married women to participate in public meetings
- **2013:** 150 women members of the kebele council total 315; attempt to mobilise women in 1-5s; Women Affairs representative in the Cabinet
- Women's participation in politics had improved with greater involvement in kebele meetings
- Gender relations interventions
 - **1995:** None
 - **2013:** Abduction no longer acceptable girls able to choose their marriage partner; marriages have a formal procedure under the municipality office
- Widows can own the whole property of the family, manage their own children and have the right to re-marry
- Most divorces take place at the social court or wereda court so women's rights were said to be respected; joint land certificates enhanced women's rights to land
- Wife-beating still common due to alcohol, lack of money to give wives for consumables, men's need to dominate all decisions, trying to confine wives in the house at least two cases a month at the wereda.

Kormargefia

- Interventions for women generally
 - **1995:** None
 - **2013:** Wereda office working on land and other property rights, affirmative action, political empowerment, and various forms of male violence

Land rights

- **1995:** Women have equal rights to inherit or own land and there are a large number of women heading households with their own plots of land
- Ideally both sons and daughters have an equal right to inherit the property of dead parents although in practice dying parents make wills
- **2013:** The commitment to implement daughters' inheritance of land has been high since 2006; many cases were reported last year; elders do not support the law
- All land has been registered; wives own it jointly with their husbands
- Economic empowerment interventions
 - 1995: None but women active in selling dungcakes and local drinks
- **2013**: Kebele chair organised a meeting about income-generation schemes to plant vegetables but women said that government actually did nothing for women
- Political empowerment interventions
- **1995:** None
- **2013**: No mention of women Council members; Women Affairs and core party women members
- Gender relations interventions
- **1995:** None though if a couple divorce they divide the wealth equally although the men keep the land; fathers keep children
- Widows should inherit their husband's property and his relatives get nothing; she can remarry
- 2013: Five cases in the wereda of dead men's brothers trying to plough the dead man's land
- Last year 18 cases related to divorce were reported to the wereda but elders, kebele and wereda leaders are not committed to implementing the law

Youth

Adado

- Interventions for youth
 - **1995:** None apart from education
 - **2013:** 91 young volunteers allowed to participate in public work;
 - Young people organised to save a deposit (20%) to get credit; only young men since it is hard for young women to save a deposit
 - No female circumcision among the Gedeo
 - Early marriage is illegal but some problems in enforcing the law
 - Around 100 young men registered as members of the Youth Association but no activity the kebele office is not much concerned with youth affairs

Sirba

- Interventions for youth
 - **1995:** None apart from education
 - **2013:** Government tried to organise youth in co-operatives and give credit for stone production, grain trade and poultry; three successful stone co-operatives working. AGP fund will used to bring 30 youth into association and budget used for seedlings and bull fattening list of young men from the kebele sent to the wereda.
 - Arrangement of marriages by parents while girls were under 18 had largely reduced
 - Female circumcision which was common 10 years ago has greatly reduced; school clubs raise awareness and practitioners warned; one jailed for 3 months in 2011
 - Youth League and Federation have been there since 2012 but neither functions as they have no leader

Kormargefia

- Interventions for youth
 - **1995:** None apart from education
 - **2013:** Kebele leased 4 ha of irrigable land to 51 young men in cooperative to cultivate vegetables and rainfed land to 16 young men. Wereda promises to provide credit to youth and registration has begun.
 - Wereda puts pressure on kebeles to deal with early marriage and research showed there
 has been a reduction; recent case of a 13 year-old whose mother was sent to prison for a
 year and father for 3; problems of corruption and fear of appearing in court as an eyewitness
 - Real work to implement the choice of partner rule began in 2009; different sectors of the wereda including police, WYC office, schools and other security organisations working together
 - In 2010 female circumcisers were given warning letters so they could avoid quarrels with those asking them for the service; the practice was said to have reduced but it still continued in secret to some degree

Human re/pro/duction services provided by government

Drinking water

Adado

- Drinking water
 - **1995:** Abundant water in 5 springs and 2 rivers but not safe water
 - **2013:** Main source of water mountain springs; community cleans springs once a month/two months; kebele recently got piped water collected from a spring in a tank; the pipe was destroyed in a landslide in September; one borehole not functioning; shortage of wereda

budget, spare parts and plumbers

Sirba

- Drinking water
 - **1995:** Constant and steady supply of drinking water from two hand pumps and a solar pump; each household contributed 2 *birr* for the repair of the hand pumps; there was a problem of phosphorus in the water and people had to go to neighbouring kebeles to get drinking water
 - **2013:** Private water wells using electricity with some selling to others; NGO-funded supply with fee (5 years ago); Chinese road company supply (3 years ago) free

Kormargefia

- Drinking water
 - **1995:** Generally water is not a problem most farmers have spring water near their houses and sometimes they dig wells
 - 2013: Ten water points converting springs to safe water; most people use them though a few use unprotected springs; & points built by Amhara Redevelopment Organisation in 2006 and 3 by an NGO in 2011; one water point under construction; for some waterpoints the kebele established quotas due to shortages attributed to the lowering of water levels.

Health services

Adado

- Curative health services
 - **1995:** Health clinic built during the Derg; no nurse or doctor and the supply of drugs is irregular; open 24 hours a day; 'The health clinic has not cured people of illnesses, although they pay large amounts of money'; nearest hospital Dilla
 - **2013:** August 2013 laboratory organised at the modern health centre and 4 health workers added; since the landslide the centre has had no water
- Preventive health services
 - **1995:** Clinic said to provide public health services including the Expanded Programme of Immunisation although the community did not identify these; and family planning services which few women used; no awareness of preventive measures against diarrhoea; no latrines
 - 2013: No Health Post due to the clinic; should be 2 Health Extension Workers but one on maternity leave; education on hygiene and environmental sanitation, family planning, HIV/AIDS, mother and child health care; Vitamin A for children, polio campaign; estimated 50% of women use contraceptives; main focus shifted from hygiene and sanitation to antenatal care and delivery at the Health Centre

Sirba

- Curative health services
 - 1995: Nearest clinic, hospital, doctor, modern midwife and pharmacy in Debre Zeit 20 km from the PA
 - **2013:** Health Centre in Udie started work in 2012 it provides vaccinations, medicine and delivery services
 - The wereda has a plan for health centres to rent out the extra space in their compounds to earn income to buy equipment and medical supplies
- Preventive health services
 - **1995:** During the Derg villagisation every household had to prepare a latrine but after the heyday of the programme villagers abandoned many of them as they reduced garden space and were expensive to replace; estimates of between 0 and 10 in the village
 - **2013:** The Health Post built in 2006 burned down in April 2012; *iddir* collected 60,000 *birr* to rebuild it, the community promised labour power, the wereda promised financial and technical support and the new post was under construction at the end of 2013

 Five years ago prevention activities were not there but now one HEW is assigned to each of the three sub-kebeles supervising the households to complete the 16 packages and providing maternal services, family planning and EPI vaccination for babies.

Kormargefia

Curative health services

- 1995: There is a health clinic which used to provide first aid but now there is no nurse or doctor and it is closed most of the time; they have no drugs but only alcohol, plasters, bandages and gentian violet
- The nearest operational clinic and hospital are in Debre Berhan
- **2013:** There are health centres in Chacha and Debre Berhan; the nearest hospital is in Debre Berhan.

Preventive health services

- **1995:** The PA is visited by immunisation staff at least once a month but only a few mothers and sometimes none wait at the fixed places
- The only latrines were in the school
- 2013: Health Post constructed in 2006 through Public Work; two HEWs who were reluctant
 to attend kebele meetings and rarely at the HP they lived in Debre Berhan and
 concentrated most of their efforts on the sub-kebele nearest to the town; the previous
 HEWs had lived in the HEW house and provided regular services including first aid at night
- The wereda is prioritising mothers and children and the transmitted disease package

Education

Adado

Pre-school education

- **1995:** None
- **2013:** Some girls and boys going to pre-school starting at around 6 before they start formal school at 7; child-to-child system in which clever Grade 5 students teach the small children.

Primary education

- 1995: G1-6 school in Adado and G1-8 in Bule; shortage of classrooms and furniture but not textbooks 'The school does not provide a good education so students cannot attend higher education'; an estimated 20% of boys and 8% of girls attended primary school; parents paid book rent and expenses with the amount depending on ability to pay average cost 64 birr; poor school attendance
- **2013:** G1-8 school; many children start school at 7 but around 5% are not in the grade for their age —a few in their early 20s; shift system; absenteeism for work especially high during the coffee harvest; male dropout for migration to gold mines said to be increasing; many fail Grade 8

Secondary education

- 1995: High school in Dilla; an estimated 0.01% of boys attended and 1 girl; many secondary school dropouts have returned to farm; the limited number who have completed high school have been given jobs in the Gedeo zonal administration
- **2013:** G9-10 in Bule (costly) and G11-12 in Dilla (more costly); many fail Grade 10 and cannot get employment;

Post-secondary education

- **1995:** Junior agro-technical institute in *Dilla*
- **2013:** TVET college and university in *Dilla*. No unemployment problem for the community's college and university graduates; approximately 200 people from Adado were estimated to be civil servants mostly working in Bule wereda office.

Sirba

Pre-school education

- **1995:** None
- **2013:** One kindergarten in Udie for children 4-7 constructed by an NGO but insufficient classrooms and compound not suitable for children

Primary education

- **1995:** Nearest school (G1-8) is in Denkaka/Udie (2 kms); fee 10 *birr* a year; main problems were shortage of classrooms, water, stationery and books
- Estimated 50% of children enrolled in primary school; it was considered that literacy and numeracy are not so important for girls
- 2013: Sirba school G1-4 opened in 2008 and has expanded with NGO assistance; plan to upgrade it to 1-6 in2013/14; recently well-fenced and trees and flowers planted; it has a guard hired from the school budget
- Shortages of teachers, classrooms, and textbooks and no electricity so can't learn from radio lessons; Head said that the community awareness about education needs to improve
- G5-10 in Udie

Secondary education

- 1995: Secondary school in Debre Zeit attended by some boys and girls
- **2013:** G9-10 in Udie; preparatory school in Debre Zeit and Mojo good public transport but most students need to find accommodation in town

Post-secondary education

- **1995:** Five students from Sirba have attended colleges and four are employed in government offices outside the community
- 2013: Private colleges in Debre Zeit

Kormargefia

Pre-school education

- **1995:** None
- 2013: Zero grades in each of the kebele's primary schools but only practical for those living near the schools

Primary education

- 1995: School built in 1988 expanded to 6 classrooms; additional 4 rooms built by ILCA;
 students dropout during the year
- Education free for those with a letter from the kebele; others pay 3 *birr* a year 30% of which stays with the school
- Of 113 students at the beginning of 1994 73 were female (more Oromo girls than Amhara) and 40 male
- **2013:** Main primary school expanded with NGO help to Grade 7; also a G1-4 school in another sub-kebele
- Almost all teachers live in Debre Berhan or Tebase town and have problems with public transport leading them to be late or absent sometimes
- Since 2011 the schools have received a large budget; every student has access to individual textbooks

Secondary education

- **1995:** 20 students transferred to secondary school last year
- **2013:** From G8 the nearest secondary school is in Tebase a suburb of Debre Berhan which is 6km from the kebele; many move to town; G10 passing points for both girls and boys increased recently and many failed

Post-secondary education

- **1995:** No mention

- **2013:** Private colleges in Tebase; university in Debre Berhan

Government interventions to support livelihoods

Agricultural extension services

Adado

Crops

- 1995: One Agricultural Development Centre and Extension Agent and local assistant trained for one month for 9 kebeles. Ten innovative 'contact farmers' selected from the community on inclination and ability to adopt improved farming taught on demonstration plots; each has 46 'follower farmers' who they are supposed to teach. 'The DA did not help them increase production. On the contrary, once they brought in very low production coffee seeds'
- 2013: Three DAs should work in each of the three sub-kebeles but the NRM DA had been transferred and was not replaced; advice on quality coffee-growing and harvesting and new seeds; improved maize seeds (poor quality) and people forced to take fertiliser; new crops introduced boyna (yam), salad, beetroot, caulis, cabbage; advice on planting in line, the right number of seeds to use and inter-cropping

Livestock

- **1995:** Number of livestock very limited and there are no vaccination programmes and cross-breeding practices; some people fattened livestock for income
- 2013: DA livestock giving advice (mainly to people on the roadside: on fattening bulls and rearing sheep how to rear and feed animals; recent appointment of vet for 3 communities; vaccination service; spraying service for sheep; information on high-breed chickens but mostly not implemented; promotion of bee-keeping and 4 modern hives given by AGP; one man launched a fishery using artificial ponds

Sirba

Crops

- 1995: There was a Development Agent based in the neighbouring kebele of Udie who kept records of yields in Sirba; yields in 1993/4 were lower due to crop diseases and pests – pesticides and chemicals had not been delivered to him
- The DA visited contact farmers occasionally
- Inputs, especially fertiliser were not provided on time before the onset of the rainy season and when delivered it is not the requested amount; the Ministry of Agriculture and Service Co-operative provided credit with a down payment; the productivity of crops has been increased by the use of fertilisers
- The Ministry of Agriculture and the Service Co-operative hired out tractors along with private owners; 12 farmers used the service last year
- **2013:** One Crops DA working in Sirba: intensive work to increase the productivity of the farmland and grow a variety of crops (e.g. lentils, fruit trees)
- Distributes improved seeds and fertiliser, and educates about using BBM methods, planting in line, the amount of seed to use, application of weedkiller and pesticides, crop rotation
- Credit for improved tef, chickpea and lentil seeds; cash for other inputs
- Some farmer suspicion about the quality of seeds and fertiliser at the Service Co-operative but also doubts about private traders

Livestock

- 1995: The DA Office provided details of the numbers of different livestock in Sirba
- A campaign of vaccination against anthrax was carried out in 1991
- There was a cross-breeding station in Udie but no-one in Sirba had cross-bred animals
- **2013:** One livestock DA for the whole kebele and vet for 5 kebeles; they assess epidemics and provide vaccination services; some shortage of materials, no electricity and not enough

lab equipment

- Access to cross-breed livestock facilitated; some farmers have cross-breed cattle; dairy production and sale of milk becoming more common
- Kebele office provides high-breed chickens
- DA tried to introduce beehives but farmers said the area was not suitable

Kormargefia

Crops

- **1995:** The only modern input farmers use is fertiliser; they can get it at the right time but many cannot afford it now
- ILCA introduced oats and potatoes in 1986 and showed the farmers how to cultivate them
- Some farmers had been trained in irrigation practices; the people would like the government to construct irrigation schemes
- **2013:** Three DAs one in each site; focus of crop work is persuasion to take improved seeds, use enough fertiliser, construct broad beds, plant in line, and control weeds; also advice to use irrigation though no facilities or resources

Livestock

- **1995:** Vaccination was started in 1974 by the Ministry of Agriculture and major livestock diseases are now under control
- Cross-bred cattle introduced to the area by ILCA in 1978; dairy production and sale of milk becoming more common
- 2013: Wereda rated Kormargefia as next to last kebele in agricultural development work achievement; extension work will be intensified to help the community increase marketoriented production with emphasis on dairy production, fattening, improved livestock and irrigation; they have decided to assign a vet to the kebele; there had been no vet service for the past 6 months
- Amhara ARI (old ILCA) provides a hybrid service but no longer free; due to focus on sheepbreeding for the whole of Northern Shewa
- Assistance to get credit from ACSI for sheep-rearing and fattening
- Advice to produce honey using improved beehives but people don't think the place is suitable for bees and most refused to take them

Co-operatives

Adado

- Producer Co-operatives
 - **1995:** Co-operative farming was abandoned with the fall of the Derg
 - The coffee co-operative had a coffee-washing facility and bought fresh cherries from the farmers
 - **2013:** Young people being organised in groups to form co-operatives for farming and non-farm activities
 - The coffee-washing facility was not in use in 2003 but by 2013 the Coffee Union was part of the wider Yirgacheffe Union and was buying and washing coffee.

• Service Co-operative

- 1995: The service co-operative was formed during the Derg by members in 9 PAs who contributed 12 birr; the only shop available in Adado is the one run by the service cooperative and it mostly stocks blankets, sugar, salt, umbrellas, sickles, and stationery; the service co-operative has a coffee mill. 'The SC does not provides services of which the community is in need'
- **2013:** The coffee union in Adado also serves 8 other communities (the co-operative was not working in 2003); under the previous management an amount of co-operative money had allegedly disappeared; in 2013 the kebele held a meeting and banned the sale of coffee to

- private investors since the Union had suffered from competition in 2012 partly due to having no money to buy farmers' coffee and expecting them to provide it on credit.
- The wereda co-operatives office initiated 17 Gedeo co-operatives in 2006 including one in Adado with the aim of trading grain, operating a grain mill and fattening bulls. It saved money but did not start operation. Then the wereda office asked all of them to transfer their money into a wereda account to organise a co-operative union, but as people saw that the money of a co-operative in a neighbouring kebele had disappeared they disbanded the co-operative and distributed the savings among members.

Sirba

Producer Co-operatives

- **1995:** No producer co-operative since the Derg
- 2013: No farming or non-farming co-operatives 'like they see on TV'
- Three big stone co-operatives working in Sirba quarry have 200 members; kebele chair said they needed help with the provision of machines and a formal market structure to avoid brokers who take much of the profit.
- Training for 8 youth co-operatives in the kebele

Service Co-operative

- **1995:** Service Co-operative provided fertiliser on credit but there was scarcity of basic commodities previously available
- The SC hired out a tractor
- **2013:** Udie Service Co-operative has 1141 members: it distributes fertiliser, improved crops of all types, chemicals, consumption goods, construction materials, spraying materials, fodder, BBM etc. Members get priority. Last year some fertiliser was not used and was spoiled. This year there was a delay with the improved seeds and some farmers got worried and planted seeds from other sources.

Kormargefia

Producer Co-operatives

- **1995:** Derg producer co-operative disbanded
- **2013:** Irrigation co-operative with 50 landless youth including 6 women which used to produce individually but was recently instructed to work in 1-5s; rainfed land recently given to another youth group for farming

• Service Co-operative

- 1995: Service Co-operative stopped functioning after the coming of the EPRDF
- **2013:** One Derg SC has been rejuvenated though it has not yet provided dividends; member of zone farmers' co-operative union
- SC only source of fertiliser as private traders were banned when the union was established
- Main source of improved seeds
- Sells consumer goods including sugar at government prices; prices a bit lower than private shops but frequent shortages
- No plans to trade farmers' crops

Credit and saving

Adado

Credit and saving

- **1995:** no Government credit; *equb*; saving of cash more common than elsewhere in rural Ethiopia
- **2013:** OMO MFI credit halted due to failure to repay debt; Commercial Bank provides credit for those with collateral; some people saving small amounts in OMO MFI

Sirba

Credit and saving

- **1995:** Farmer got credit for fertiliser from MoA through the SC with a downpayment; otherwise used moneylenders
- **2013:** Oromiya Credit and Saving Association managed by wereda gave group and individual credit with 20% saving for farming and non-farming activities like butchery, rural bars and grain and livestock trade; criteria are kebele residence and owning a fixed asset and if person is married the partner must sign training but no land.
- Credit was also available from GUDINA, a community organisation formed by the wereda at village level which gave credit in the rainy season and collected the debt in the dry season.

Kormargefia

Credit and saving

- 1995: in 1991 many farmers were given credit for fertiliser but they had not repaid it and in a recent meeting of 6 kebeles an extension worker told them they must pay it back this year or they would not get fertiliser on credit this year; the farmers said that last year's harvest was so poor they could not pay the debt this year and set up committees in each kebele to appeal to the authorities in Debre Berhan.
- **2013:** Wereda credit for inputs ended this year; now wereda facilitates access from ACSI, ALMA and NGOs; no credit for non-farm activities; banks don't give credit to farmers
- ACSI group collateral, kebele letter, ID card or land certificate; currently around 250 people saving in ACSI.
- Since April many *equb* have come under the social court; people preferred *equb* because of the minimal bureaucracy and ability to borrow individually but wanted some way of enforcing people to contribute their share once they had taken the pot.

Governance

Government working with community organisations

Adado

Religious organisations

- **1995:** 90% of people Protestant, 5% Muslim and 2% Orthodox; no mention of engagement of religious leaders with government.
- 2013: The kebele office asks the Kalehiwot leaders to disseminate information; they tell the
 congregation to participate in development activities; the HEW passed messages on
 vaccination and family planning in church; no unwanted intervention of government in
 religious matters.

• Community-initiated organisations

- **1995:** Significant change since the end of the Derg government now recognises traditional community leaders and elders; they are consulted and sometimes invited to government meetings concerning the community's welfare and interests.
- **2013:** Some elders consulted when big decisions are made in the community; the Aba Gada institution highly appreciated by government as it resolves many social problems..

Sirba

Religious organisations

- **1995:** Traditional religious practices alongside Orthodox Christianity; no mention of any government interest.
- **2013:** The DAs were meeting the community at church gatherings to pass their messages about preparing soil, getting fertiliser, sowing in line, crop rotation, flood protection, control of weeds and pests.
- The kebele chair was also an Agafari (speaker of sorcery) in the Kallu ritual

- Community-initiated organisations
 - 1995: Many iddir but no mention of any connections with government
 - Community elders make decisions on occasion 'but the officials of the PA have taken control of community decision-making; they order us what to do and what not to do'
 - Traditional political authority circulated among the five *Gada* every eight years but they are now relegated to rituals, marriage and other minor social aspects
 - During the Derg the institutions of *kallu* was suppressed as a backward cultural practice; now openly exercised
 - 2013: Government uses the common iddir to mobilise the community to contribute cash as it did to rebuild the Health Post and build a G5 classroom for the school; the iddir leaders have a formal letter from kebele officials and save the money collected in a bank and issue receipts when the money is used for the work needed; iddir also convey messages like appointments for PWs
 - The wereda and social courts sends cases to be seen by elders who will try to reconcile them Kormargefia
- Religious organisations
 - **1995:** Talk of factions waging armed struggle against the government and agitating people when they were gathered for church services; allegation that the clergy had been agitating farmers to rise up against the TGE
 - 2013: Recently the church announced its support for the government's ban on female circumcision; the church had also encouraged people to work hard together in co-operatives in order to improve the community
- Community-initiated organisations
 - 1995: Suggestion that elite elders and religious leaders were selected to work for the PA which involved a lot of committee work
 - 2013: Iddir are co-operating to persuade people to attend kebele and wereda called meetings
 - Dispute-solving elders from zone- based iddir meet in a community dispute house once a month to try to solve disputes and then report to the social court
 - The kebele vice-chairman was also an elder

Government interventions to introduce modern ideas

Adado

- Government
 - 1995: Ideas about democracy, Regionalisation and the Constitution had reached the community
 - **2013:** Relatively new to the community are government workers teaching about development, savings, HIV/AIDS, sanitation, elections etc
- EPRDF party
 - **1995:** No mention of the active promotion of ideas by political parties
 - **2013:** Party cells should meet every 15 days and read a political newspaper

Sirba

- Government
 - 1995: The Regionalisation policy increased ethnic awareness among the villagers
 - Not much change in the political, legal, social and cultural practices of the village as a result of national policies
 - **2013:** Government provides educative and modernising messages related to all sectors through large meetings, small meetings and training for selected participants and the

activities of employees and kebele volunteer officials

EPRDF party

- **1995:** No mention of political parties
- **2013:** Party newsletters printed in Oromiffa are distributed at a cost of 50 cents; cells meet monthly and discuss the party's new ideas and rules from the top

Kormargefia

Government

- 1995: No reports of interventions designed to change people's ideas directly
- **2013:** Noticeable connection between development and politics; different stages to 'brainwash people re political issues and knowledge' beyond meetings at kebele and sub-kebele levels the political work in the schools was reported as very significant

EPRDF party

- 1995: There was some hostility to the TGE and reports of an active undercover opposition in the area
- 2013: Under the party structure there is a sub-structure called 'party issues and advertisement' which should be headed by the vice-chair but it has never actively operated in Kormargefia
- Main routes or delivering development and political messages are the DTs and 1-5s, an annual general meeting for all farmers and model farmer meetings
- Party newspaper said to be delivered 'at least twice a year'

Government political interventions

Adado

Kebele organisation

- 1995: The PA could force people to do many things during the Derg for example they banned Protestant worship and turned the church into the PA office. When the Derg fell there was conflict and a Peace and Stability Committee was established which was replaced with a kebele administration. The PA had local police, a local prison, and a court. PA officials were elected by the people and related to wider political and administrative structures through the wereda agents.
- **2013:** Kebele structures involved a chain of command which included a Cabinet, committees, Council, social court, three sub-kebeles each with their own Development Teams containing a number of 1-5 groups; 1-5s not working as intended and people talked about *hiwas* (party cells) rather than Development Teams

Party organisation

- 1995: In 1991 two parties both claiming to represent the Gedeo clashed; each side arrested members of the other organisation and tortured them. By 1995 the Gedeo party in power was affiliated with the EPRDF
- **2013:** Party organisation within the community party executive, 13 cells and 480 members *Sirba*

Kebele organisation

- **1995:** Villagers are not open in political discussions; one view was that if PA leaders were selected from the *Gada* groups they would be more accountable
- 'The officials of the PA have taken control of community decision-making; they order us what to do and what not to do'
- **2013:** Kebele structures involved a chain of command which included a Cabinet, committees, Council, social court, three sub-kebeles each with their own Development Teams containing a number of 1-5 groups; community attitudes to 1-5s 'not well-developed'

Party organisation

- **1995:** No mention of political parties
- **2013:** 99% of the community said to be party members; there is a central committee and party cells with 8 or more members.

Kormargefia

Kebele organisation

- **1995:** People did not want to elect people to draft the Constitution but they were threatened with having no land in future unless they did
- 2013: Following re-organisation started in 2010 to establish kebele structures involving a chain of command which included a Cabinet, committees, Council, social court, three sub-kebeles each with their own Development Teams containing a number of 1-5 groups; it is unlikely that the structures were working as planned but all the information on them came from the people who should have been implementing them

Party organisation

- 1995: One view was that elites work hard to get richer but government oppresses them;
 they could not say anything because they fear the government who watch them closely
 through their agents
- Opposition group in Debre Berhan so there were sometimes security problems; claims that
 opposition party members visited farmers at night to preach that they should oppose the
 government and the TGE had the information and went to the farmers' houses and tortured
 them to give information, and that if they resisted they were killed
- **2013:** Party primary organisation consists of 16 leaders; only influential young and richer hardworking exemplary farmers have been recruited for party membership total 260 male heads of households and 25 female heads. Party and development structures were independent but many of those with roles in them held posts in both.

How important development interventions were working in 2013

Having compared government activities in the three communities for which we have 1995 data in 1995 and 2013 in this section we explore in some detail the implementation of 17 of the more important interventions in all six communities in 2013. As shown in Table 8, 2 of these relate to space and place, 2 to people, 7 to livelihoods, 3 to human re/production, 1 to societal systems, 1 to culture, and 1 to politics.

| Table 8: Community control parameters and | selected develonment interventions |
|---|------------------------------------|

| | Control parameters | Development interventions selected |
|------------------|--|--|
| Place | 1. Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Watershed management and tree-planting |
| Flace | 2. Connections with wider world | 2. Internal, feeder and external roads |
| People | 3. Human resources & aspirations | Youth interventions Women interventions |
| Lives system | 4. Human re/pro-duction institutions | 5. Safe water6. Health extension7. Primary education |
| | 5. Farming system | 8. Crop extension |
| Livelihood | 6. Livelihood diversification | 9. Migration regulation |
| system | 7. Economic institutions | 10. Credit 11. Taxes & contributions |
| Societal system | 8. Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | |
| Cultural ideas | 9. Cultural repertoires of ideas | 12. Government 'awaring' and party propaganda |
| Political system | 10. Govt-soc rel'ns & political settlement | 13. Kebele and party organisation |

For each type of intervention we have a calendar of federal-level interventions introduced since 2003 with some reference to important earlier interventions. We then briefly describe the problem which the intervention is designed to address and the macro-level government solution and present a more detailed ideal-type model of how the intervention *ought* to be implemented at kebele level constructed from responses in the Stage 3 research mainly from wereda and kebele officials. We then use the data to describe actual implementation of each intervention considering the activities, players and systems associated with it. We then describe the mechanisms used to try to produce appropriate behaviour by implementers, beneficiaries and others and conclude with a discussion of the consequences of the intervention for the community place, people and institutions.

Place interventions

Watershed management and tree-planting

Table 9 shows how and when the main federal-level watershed management interventions (of relevance to communities not in receipt of the Productive Safety Net Programme) were introduced.

Table 9: Main federal-level watershed interventions for communities with agricultural potential

| Year | Federal-level watershed interventions |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | Watershed management interventions were first introduced under the Derg |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | Community-based Participatory Watershed Development Guidelines |
| 2006 | PASDEP |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | Sustainable Land Management Programme for watershed development |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP Efforts to expand watershed management including effective water and moisture retaining works. The conservation and management of natural resources will mainly rely on the farmers and government capacities. |
| 2011 | Launch of Climate Resilient Green Economy Vision and Strategy with accompanying Ethiopia Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC). Fast track initiatives focusing on hydropower potential; large-scale promotion of advanced rural cooking technologies; efficiency improvements to the livestock value chain; and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). Enhanced farmers' awareness and community labour contributions are key to implementing the new vision. |
| 2012 | Climate Resilient Facility to mobilise and co-ordinate financing |
| 2013 | |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Heavy rains on bare slopes lead to soil erosion and floods and climate change has been associated with loss of tree cover. Protecting existing forests and creating new ones might, over the long term, create income-generation opportunities for some landless youth. Increasing use of irrigation which would allow production of high-value crops depends on efficient management and use of rain and surface and groundwater resources. Increased animal feed can be produced through planting improved fodder on terraces and zero-grazing. Integrated watershed management programmes involving soil and water conservation structures, re-forestation, gully treatment and area enclosures can reduce flooding and erosion, improve local weather, increase the amount of water available for irrigation and rehabilitate land that can be exploited for livestock production, beekeeping, and tree and fodder planting by landless people – including youth. Box 1 describes the ideal-type watershed management projects in the communities in 2013.

Box 1: Ideal-type watershed management and tree-planting in the communities in 2013

Soil conservation

- Terracing
- Making ditches
- Gully treatment

Tree conservation and planting

- Area enclosures, protection of existing forests
- Tree planting: campaigns on public land and encouragement of private planting
- Improved fodder planting

Implementation institutions

- Wereda
- DAs
- Agricultural research Institutes
- Kebele volunteers in kebele, sub-kebeles, DTs and 1-5s
- Community organisations

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about watershed management included the DAs, kebele volunteers at different structural levels, and farmers and wives of different household wealths.

Implementation of the intervention

Activities

Soil conservation

Adado: Most activities on road improvement contribute at the same time to watershed management (ditches to avoid water runoff, paving, terracing). In 2011 big push under the SLMP; 2 months, 150 people paid. Since then work is not paid; it is sometime of poor quality and does not last.

Somodo: Terracing is done every year for the past few years, in most erosion-prone areas selected by DAs and officials; Somodo is much less prone to erosion than neighbouring kebeles.

Oda Haro: Terracing, digging ditches, planting trees and grasses along the terraces is done annually since 2011, mainly to try and reduce flooding in the flat fertile land of the kebele. Some check dams did not resist; 50 kms out of 83 kms of terrace built need improvement; but where the works has resisted it has been effective.

Oda Dawata: Watershed management (soil bunds, terraces with stones) started a few years ago. In some areas check dams were built in the wrong way or not done properly and the water was diverted in the wrong direction.

Sirba: Constructing terraces and check dams through PWs has been undertaken as a government intervention to address erosion – as watershed management works on Sirba and Udie mountains. Mixed reports with regard to effectiveness.

Kormargefia: PWs to build terraces and check dams have been undertaken to address erosion in hilly areas though most are used as residential areas. Most recent focus (past 3-5 years) on two sites including both public and private land.

Tree conservation and planting

Adado: No intervention to plant trees on communal land as no such land. People plant trees to protect coffee trees from heavy rain and sun. DAs give seedlings of appropriate trees. There is a nursery and seedling distribution under the SLMP. Conflicting information re eucalyptus planting

(DAs advise against vs. some farmers planting and getting a good income).

Somodo: Jimma ARC provides elephant/vetiver grass as fodder and to maintain the soil; farmers appreciate this and would like more of it; they also provide gravillea and conifer seedlings. Tree planting used to be only on an individual basis - to get an income (including eucalyptus), to protect coffee trees, and along land boundaries following DAs' and Jimma ARC's advice. Two Meles's Parks (on communal land, 0.75 ha) were created between April and November 2013.

Oda Haro: Tree and grass planting along terraces is not very successful (seedlings not enclosed, easily damaged by livestock), although a lot was done especially since the Ethiopian Millennium. The wereda does not provide seedlings of eucalyptus but people continue to plant it for the income. An area of forest was given to a youth co-op to protect and exploit and this has started making a difference. In May 2013 wereda officials demarcated and fenced 2 other forested areas and people dwelling there were displaced to other places.

Oda Dawata: Ban on tree cutting in the whole kebele, enforced since 3 years; enclosed and protected area. Somewhat successful though on a limited scale. Tree/grass planting along terraces is promoted; model farmers and well-connected households got seedlings from the agricultural office, the Kulumsa ARC or the Asela Malt Factory but this was not widespread.

Sirba: Planting trees through PWs has been undertaken as a government intervention to address erosion. Reforestation programme started 10 years ago, not very successful; 12.5 ha set aside by kebele administration; holes dug in April-May and trees planted in July (rainy season); 35,000 trees planted in 2013. Individuals plant trees, especially eucalyptus (discouraged by wereda but seedlings continue to be provided).

Kormargefia: Eucalyptus planting has much expanded as an income source. Tree planting as an intervention was limited but happened in one site; some people explain that most seedlings dry up because of lack of follow-up.

Players (for both soil conservation and tree-planting)

Adado: Watershed activities are initiated by the wereda agriculture office through DAs. Kebele leaders and DAs decide what needs to be done. Community people are divided, some appreciative, others saying that except some minor road and canal repairs nothing serious was being done, no support/input from the wereda whilst it would be critical given the difficult terrain. Wereda officials say they closely follow-up; but in November 2013 no measure had been taken to start addressing the consequences of the September 2013 landslide which had affected 6-8 ha land and cut off the main water pipe to Adado.

Somodo: Wereda/kebele officials and DAs as organisers; wereda officials also oversee/monitor the work done. Jimma ARC also active in 3 jigas/2 watersheds. Farmers appreciate the Jimma ARC inputs. Iddirs and religious leaders help mobilise the community; DTs and 1-5s organise their members and advise and encourage them to participate.

Oda Haro: DTs and 1-5s are supposed to mobilise community members; and to ensure that seedlings planted are protected. Thanks to their lead role much progress was made in terms of more land being terraced in the last 2 years. The wereda give general directions, but prioritisation of what to do is done at kebele level (Cabinet). Kebele officials are supposed to enforce the law against deforestation. In the last year different actors were involved in producing tree seedlings (schools, FTCs, churches, public and private irrigated land) to address the wereda-wide shortage of the previous year.

Oda Dawata: DTs and 1-5s responsible to protect trees in their areas; but youth and poor people get an income for charcoal making. DTs and 'development armies' are responsible to organise and conduct watershed work. Effectiveness of mobilisation for PWs varied (better in Chebote and Akiya zones). Wereda officials provide technical support and training, and supervise works including

through 'spot visits'.

Sirba: DT and 1-5 leaders are supposed to mobilise people and ensure that all members participate in PWs and complete their objectives; but people are reluctant. Debre Zeit ARC is closely involved in tree planting in Sirba. Wereda officials take part on occasion to act as models.

Kormargefia: DAs are responsible to select terracing sites. People contribute labour (60 days/ year) and should have their own tools. Kebele leaders should follow up on trees planted but as they do not do this most seedlings dry up. DTs and 1-5s are used to mobilise people; 1-5 leaders meet at the end of each day to review performance and plan activities for the next day. DT leaders track members' participation and report to the wereda.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines (for both soil conservation and tree planting)

Adado: Work is organised as 'campaign'; no fixed number of days/year, it varies depending on what is to be done each year. All should participate though some (opponents to government 'who mix politics and development') do not. Conflicting information as to whether participation is compulsory or not; some talk about sick, elderly and pregnant women being exempted. In 2011 under the SLMP a lot of work was done. In 2013 people talked about 2 days a week for various types of PWs including road improvement.

Somodo: Terracing can cover private land if necessary given the terrain configuration; farmers owning the land are responsible to maintain the terraces once built. Officials talked about 50 days/year, people about 21 days (2-3 days/week so work completed in 2 months). Sick, elderly and other unable people are exempted. Absentees can be fined but generally this does not happen as they are made to do their share. Female-headed households contribute like other households. Kebele officials may let poor people do less than their full share.

Oda Haro: People are supposed to work 30 days/year. Everyone should participate except those officially exempted (elderly, ill, children, students, disabled). In the past 2 years the kebele started fining people who do not participate. There is a law against deforestation and recently guidelines were developed to bring the deforesters to court, but the kebele struggle to enforce them.

Oda Dawata: All households should send one representative to participate. Landless households are not expected to participate. Works take place off peak agricultural season (Jan-Feb), 3 days/ week for men and 1 day/week for women. No fines as per government policy.

Sirba: 34 days/year in December and January; everyone between 18 and 50 and in good health is expected to participate. No penalty, the kebele gives warnings but that makes no difference.

Kormargefia: 60 days/year in January to March from 9-11 am every day, for the household head or one other representative of the household; most respondents complained that 60 days were too much and disrupting their other activities. People are supposed to come with their own tools but some said they didn't have any so there was a shortage. Some people, who oppose government but not openly, refuse to participate; there is no punishment but the kebele cabinet tries to convince them.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of beneficiaries and other community members

Legislation and administrative *fiat:* Law and recently guidelines against deforestation in Oda Haro (though kebele struggle to enforce this); government ban against tree cutting in Oda Dawata enforced 3 years ago (some areas started to recover).

Material, status and other incentives: In Adado lack of government investment in infrastructure played as a disincentive for people to contribute efforts to watershed management activities; in

2011 people were paid under SLMP, not since. In Somodo the successful farmer had started constructing terraces on his land before it started as PW campaign, he was taken as an example by the DAs who organised an interview of him on Oromia TV. In Somodo and Kormargefia people talked about a celebration to mark the end of the conservation PWs. In Sirba, people's participation (in tree planting) was better than other villages because the Debre Zeit ARC worked closely with people, providing trucks of seedlings, hiring local guards and giving incentives. In Kormargefia people were said to be keener on PWs for roads, bridges and public buildings because they want to see the benefits of their work – and this is less tangible for watershed work.

Targets: In Oda Haro, people participating to tree planting were expected to plant between 5 and 20 trees in 2-3 days. In Sirba, terracing work was done by individual quota and people could return home when they have completed their quota.

Threats, fines & imprisonment: In Somodo fines were mentioned but not used as people were made to do their share of work instead. In Oda Haro the kebele started implementing fines in the past 2 years as they found that it was more difficult to mobilise people who had become individualistic and focused on their own agricultural activities. In Oda Dawata fines cannot be used and as people know this their participation is limited. In Sirba as well there is no penalty and kebele warnings (that people who do not participate might be excluded from kebele services) did not make a difference. In Kormargefia according to kebele officials there was also no punishment, and kebele leaders tried to convince those not participating (who are covert political opponents); but one respondent said her neighbours were taken to the social court by the militia because they refused to participate.

'Awaring' and training: Awaring and/or training was mentioned in Adado, Somodo, Oda Haro (where it was linked to the GTP training and selection of 200 model farmers having to implement government policies including in relation to NRM), Oda Dawata (how to build terraces and check dams), Sirba (people realise the benefits of terracing and can use grasses planted on hillsides; training and awareness-raising said to have brought better participation according to kebele officials). In Sirba officials explained to farmers that preventing erosion meant that Ethiopia's soil would not be taken away by the Nile to Egypt.

Dialogue and participation: In Somodo, people did not have much problem with contributing labour as long as this is done outside of the coffee harvesting season. In Kormargefia kebele officials requested the youth to participate in watershed tree planting but they resisted, arguing that the kebele did not pay attention to creating income generation opportunities for the youth.

Targeting models, learning by doing & copying: In Somodo the successful farmer who had started terracing on his own initiative was taken as example and interviewed on Oromia TV. In Sirba kebele officials gave information to the community about best experiences and successes of farmers in Tigray, Dire Dawa and Harar; wereda officials took part in the work on occasion, to act as models and encourage community members.

Organising and mobilising pressure from others: In Oda Dawata there was a 'chain of control' for PW participation (zones-DTs-1-5s) but some people resisted due to lack of awareness; and better-off and households with connection with kebele leaders did not participate.

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of intervention implementers

Salaries, per diems, other incentives: Bule (Adado) wereda ranked best in the zone re watershed management, thanks to good public participation and close wereda follow-up.

Instructions: In Adado and Oda Haro environmental conservation works follows directions from the wereda but what precisely is to be done is decided at kebele level.

Targets & reporting: In Somodo and Oda Haro DAs mentioned very precise numbers (of households participating and kms of terrace constructed) suggesting that there may have been targets to fulfil.

Dialogue and participation: In Sirba wereda officials were said to participate to PWs on occasion, to act as models and encourage people.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Community people

In Adado in several of the households interviewed the wives were the ones to carry out the work. In Somodo people refused to work on Tuesdays which are market days in Belida. In Oda Haro there seemed to be some appreciation of the work done (reduction of runoff water, diversion away from farmland) where it has been successful. In Oda Dawata people were said not to be keen to participate (hard work, disrupting people's work, not well organised and technically faulty so people waste their time). In Sirba wealthy households may send employees to cover PW responsibilities.

Kebele volunteers at all levels

Mobilising the community and organising people for PWs – including for watershed management and tree planting – is a major responsibility of the new sub-kebele structures and it seems to be the only one which they effectively carried out in all communities. In Kormargefia some DT and 1-5 leaders said their role has been source of tension with members frequently absent or late. They wanted the duration to be reduced, which would increase people's willingness to participate.

DAs

DAs are (together with kebele leaders and/or wereda experts/officials) generally those deciding what has to be done and leading technically. In Oda Dawata insufficient technical expertise was said to be the reason why works were ineffective.

Other actors (e.g. iddir leaders etc.)

In some instances (e.g. Somodo) iddir and religious leaders are asked to contribute to mobilise people for PWs.

Place

In Adado watershed management interventions were somewhat effective in ameliorating access though this is still very limited. In Somodo terracing on the most erosion-prone areas helps, especially when it is done with tree/grass planting, and farmers wanted more inputs (e.g. seedlings) to be able to do this more. In Sirba and Kormargefia some people were complaining that tree planting and terracing, respectively, reduced grazing land. In Kormargefia some farmers complained that terracing resulted in water-logging affecting crops, and one woman said it created an environment conducive for rats.

Government-community relationships

In Kormargefia the imposition of 60 days of PWs was a strain in the government-community relationship.

Roads

Table 10 shows how and when the main federal-level rural roads interventions were introduced.

Table 10: Main federal-level rural roads interventions

| Year | Federal-level rural roads interventions |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | |
| 2006 | PASDEP – construction of almost 20,000 km of new roads by 2010 90% in rural areas; improved maintenance. |

| Year | Federal-level rural roads interventions |
|------|---|
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP emphasis on rural electrification, Universal Rural Road and Access Programme (URRA - all kebeles to be linked by 2015). |
| 2011 | Ethiopian Road Authority restructured into 2 entities, Eth Road Construction Corporation (construction) and ERA (regulation) |
| | Five-year strategy prepared to stabilise road construction costs |
| 2012 | Intensive preparations for URRAP (strengthening of wereda roads offices, training for small and medium local enterprises and local professionals and technicians) |
| 2013 | Scaling up of URRAP implementation – providing a total of 502,300 skilled and unskilled labour opportunities nationwide in 2012/13 |

The problem and the development intervention solution

The more easily community members can move around within their communities the more efficiently farmers, their spouses, young people and children can participate in agricultural work, non-farm business and employment, marketing, education, community organisations, meetings and informal social life and get health treatment. Taking farming inputs to farmland and outputs to marketplaces is facilitated or constrained by the quality of internal roads, as is the ability of traders to buy at the farmgate. Remoter community areas with poor road, path and bridge access are less likely to be visited by wereda and kebele officials, DAs and HEWs. Road and path access also affects the work of religious leaders, elders and other leaders of community-initiated organisations.

The more easily community members can travel outside the community locally and more distantly the more connections they can make with people outside and the more open they become to new ideas and ways of doing things. It is easier for people to attend secondary and post-secondary education, get treatment at health centres, private clinics and hospitals, commute and migrate for work. Feeder and external roads also affect the supply and prices of inputs and access to local, national and global markets for cash crops, livestock and livestock products. Box 2 provides an ideal-type model of road-building in and around the communities in 2013.

Box 2: Ideal-type road-building in and around the communities in 2013

Main roads

Building, upgrading and maintenance of nearby main roads

Feeder roads

Building, upgrading and maintenance of feeder roads

Internal roads and paths

Creation of more internal roads and paths; maintenance

Implementation institutions

- Federal government
- Regional government
- Wereda
- DAs
- Kebele volunteers in kebele, sub-kebeles, DTs and 1-5s
- Community organisations

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on community roads included wereda officials, kebele employees and volunteers at different structural levels, farmers and wives of different household wealths, traders and other business people, and teenagers.

Implementation of the intervention

Main and feeder roads

Activities

Adado: In 2011 the main road was widened and improved (ditches, paving) under SLMP (people paid); works did not last everywhere and required annual maintenance, last in 2013 without SLMP support (including bridge construction for which the community provided 3 big trees).

Somodo: In 2000 EC the main road crossing Somodo and connecting to various towns including Jimma was made all-weather and widened; a City bus service started (in addition to private minibuses, access for cars and trucks etc.); some community people lost land but were compensated. In 2004 EC a new inter-kebele road connecting two remoter kebeles to Somodo and the main road was completed, with community cash and labour contribution; it was not yet inaugurated so public transport had not started. The main road was annually repaired by the wereda rural development office.

Oda Haro: The Addis-Nekemte road was recently reconstructed. When works were ongoing a new bridge over the Sama River had been constructed as a diversion, which was very useful for the people from Abicho zone; but it was dismantled when works were completed, much to the dismay of the community.

Oda Dawata: The main Addis-Asela road was upgraded in 2003 EC; good all-weather roads connecting Gonde to neighbouring areas were annually maintained.

Sirba: No major change as the main Addis-Adama road was tarred 15 years ago or so; some maintenance 5 years ago.

Kormargefia: The main Addis-Debre Berhan road was upgraded and widened 2 years ago (making it easier to walk with packed animals without fearing accidents). The regional government built a new, all-weather inter-wereda road crossing the southwest of the kebele, which helped dwellers in those parts.

Players

Adado: Community provided labour and wood for bridges. The wereda provided gabions but these were not used. The community blamed the government for lack of infrastructure investment even though the area was of importance for foreign currency earnings (due to coffee), and highlighted the need for and lack of skilled labour that the wereda should provide for some of the works; wereda officials explained the works required were beyond their capacity and should be zonal/regional responsibility (very difficult topography). SLMP was a player in some years but not the last two.

Somodo: The wereda rural development office is leading in the construction of main and feeder roads. Funding for the new inter-kebele road came from URRAP (regional plan for the wereda prioritising roads); the community contributed cash (amount depending on wealth and poor people exempted) and labour; investors active in the wereda contributed cash too. The city bus company Ambessa runs the City bus service.

Oda Haro: Not mentioned, likely to be federal investment; a Chinese company carried out the works, which provided temporary jobs for young men of the community.

Oda Dawata: Not mentioned, main road likely to be federal or regional responsibility.

Sirba: Not mentioned, main road/highway likely to be federal responsibility.

Kormargefia: A Chinese company upgraded the main road, presumably on federal funding; this provided temporary jobs for young men from the community. The regional government constructed the inter-wereda road.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: No clear system in operation; strong sense among community that government should do more; and among wereda officials that this should be zonal/regional level.

Somodo: The wereda is leading in main/feeder road construction, and annual repairs. Major investments are undertaken when the wereda gets funding (e.g. new road under URRAP). The wereda plan is that all inter-kebele connecting roads should be finished within 2 years after which there will only be need for maintenance works.

Oda Haro: Some community members highlighted that ditches along the road were not all well-built and there was a risk of flooding.

Oda Dawata: No information.

Sirba: No information.

Kormargefia: No information.

Internal roads and paths

Activities

Adado: PWs were used to widen some internal paths, but they still could not be used by vehicles (even difficult for motorbikes in rainy season).

Somodo: There was some annual activity through PWs to maintain internal roads (clearing; some years ago destroying fences that had been put up by farmers encroaching on public land). But internal roads and paths remained difficult and generally not passable for vehicles (even carts) in the rainy season.

Oda Haro: Much activity took place in the past 5 and especially 2 years, to improve internal roads and paths – still dry-weather only, at times damaged by flooding, and some areas not yet reached, but big progress.

Oda Dawata: There was some recent activity to connect the 2 more remote zones (Chebote and Akiya) to Gonde; a new Gonde-Chebote road was constructed (2004 EC) but many said it was of poor quality, already damaged by floods as there was nothing to control erosion; a new Gonde-Akiya road (with a bridge over the Kulumsa River cutting off Akiya) had been started but stopped before completion.

Sirba: Internal roads, dry-weather and very muddy (no vehicle access and even difficult to walk) during the rainy season, were annually maintained; flood control PWs undertaken since a few years also helped with roads.

Kormargefia: Annual repairs were needed on internal roads, all dry-weather only and only one wide enough to be used by cars. In March 2013 people worked 4 days/week during 2 weeks. Two years ago a temporary bridge was built over a river which otherwise swells during the rainy season and cuts-off parts of the kebele from the main road; other parts still lacked a bridge and were cut-off. More parts were cut-off as land was fenced for investors and people could no longer use the footpaths crossing this land to reach Debre Berhan.

Players

Adado: All community members were expected to participate to PWs including for road works. Most respondents severely criticised the government lack of attention to access.

Somodo: Annual PWs were undertaken by the community mobilised through the jiga.

Oda Haro: The community and the government shared costs (government funding from the MDG Fund); the community contributed labour, the government provided some technical support and

materials. DTs played an important role to mobilise people.

Oda Dawata: Cost- and labour-sharing between the community (cash, about 100 birr/hh, and labour) and the wereda (50% cost including materials and skilled labour; technical advice); community mobilised through PWs organised by the DTs. Zones were instrumental in collecting contributions (e.g. Akiya zone had collected 70,000 birr for a road between Akiya and Kulumsa).

Sirba: PWs (on road maintenance and flood control) were organised by kebele officials, recently through the DTs and 1-5s.

Kormargefia: Annual repairs of internal roads and the work to build the temporary bridge were undertaken as PWs. For the bridge the wereda provided a skilled person to direct the works. The community asked the wereda to build a permanent bridge but got no reply so far. It is also the wereda which gave the land fenced off and therefore cutting off access to parts of the kebele, to investors.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Internal roads and paths maintenance were part of PWs; not very systematically done.

Somodo: Annual PWs for maintenance (in 2013, 2 days/week July-September and more will be done after coffee harvest); one member of each household was expected to participate; heads of households could send their son but otherwise youth were not expected to participate.

Oda Haro: Shared responsibility (costs and work) between community and government.

Oda Dawata: Shared responsibility (costs and work) between community and wereda.

Sirba: Internal roads were maintained/rebuilt through PWs each year; if a road was damaged repairing it was given priority in the PWs as internal access is indispensable.

Kormargefia: Annual PWs to repair roads before and after the rainy season; these were additional to the 60 days for environmental PWs. Occasional contribution by the wereda

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of beneficiaries and other community members

Legislation and administrative *fiat*: Some of the road works were carried out under rules from the programme funding part of the works, e.g. SLMP for the main (dry-weather) road in Adado, URRAP in Somodo. There seems to be specific cost-sharing rules also for the regional MDG Fund (Oda Haro, perhaps Oda Dawata).

Material, status and other incentives: Generally improvements in roads and access are highly appreciated; people are well aware of the various benefits and therefore usually willing to contribute. In Kormargefia people were said to be more willing to contribute labour for roads and public buildings, than for environmental protection.

The presence or absence of government support is an important element. In Adado the lack of investment in infrastructure by the government played as a disincentive. In Oda Haro government significant contribution (cash, materials, expertise) for the construction/ improvement of internal roads seemed to have played as an incentive for the community to contribute. In Oda Dawata this potential was there too but works seemed to be technically weak which the community resented.

In Adado in 2011 major works on the main road were carried out employing poor people who were paid (30 birr/day) and complained about the low rate while this was financed by an NGO (SLMP) which could have afforded more.

Dialogue and participation: In all sites the community had 'participated' in different ways to road developments. In Somodo wereda officials reckoned that the success of the wereda plan to

complete all inter-kebele roads within a few years depended on their ability to mobilise communities and communities' willingness to contribute. In Oda Haro and Oda Dawata there was cost-sharing even for the development of internal roads.

Organising and mobilising pressure from others: Annual road clearance works were organised by the jiga in Somodo. In Oda Haro the DTs were used to mobilise labour for the internal roads; in Sirba the DTs and the 1-5s. In Adado the kebele sub-structures were supposed to be key in mobilising people for PWs on the external road.

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of intervention implementers

Salaries, per diems, other incentives: In Adado people explained that kebeles in the wereda emulated each other in carrying PWs, but works by the community alone was not sufficient and government investment was needed also to ensure quality.

Instructions: The push on inter-kebele road construction was said to be part of the regional plan for the wereda and of the wereda plan as well, in Somodo. In Oda Haro (and Oda Dawata?) the big push on internal roads is also likely to respond to instructions from above coming together with the regional MDG Fund money.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Community people

In Adado the main road crossing the kebele was widened so that in 2013 cars and trucks could access; this brought benefits for coffee growers, traders and shop-owners, and job opportunities for the few motorbikes offering transport services from/to Adado. But as it still was only dry-weather it was impassable for days at a time in the rainy season. Internal paths were very difficult even to walk during the rains. This state of affairs drastically limited transport options (and made them very expensive) and caused problems for all activities, especially coffee export - the mainstay of the local economy.

In contrast in Somodo the major improvements in external access (upgraded main road, new all-weather connecting roads passing through previously more remote parts of the kebele) brought all sorts of benefits, said to be worth even by farmers who lost land planted with perennials (they were compensated but as they highlighted this was a one-off instead of annual income from the land).

Generally access still widely varied within communities; in more remote areas it could still take an hour or more to get to a main road (e.g. in Oda Haro it could take 30 min-1 hour, in Kormargefia an hour and a half; in Oda Dawata access to the good external roads was difficult in two zones, due to lack of internal roads). Whatever improvements in roads led to new service transports (e.g. motorbikes in Adado, minibuses in Somodo, carts in Oda Haro).

There were all sorts of consequences to the fact that internal access significantly deteriorated during the rainy season including crops rotting on fields as trucks could not access farms (e.g. Kormargefia), activities such as sale of wood for construction having to stop (e.g. Somodo), lower prices obtained for crops sold at the farm gate (e.g. Somodo, Oda Haro), children having to walk much longer to get to school (e.g. Sirba), and even people and livestock drowning when trying to cross a swollen river without bridges in Kormargefia.

In communities crossed by or with access to major trunk roads (Oda Haro, Oda Dawata, Sirba and Kormargefia) public transport was available but could be difficult to access as there was no nearby bus station and vehicles passing by tended to be full.

In Oda Haro, Sirba and Kormargefia, where major road works had been undertaken or were ongoing, these provided job opportunities (unskilled labour and a few other jobs e.g. as mechanics) for community members, especially young people. But these were temporary (e.g. in Oda Haro and

Kormargefia works were completed not long before the fieldwork).

In Sirba people mentioned noise pollution for those living along or near the Addis-Adama highway crossing the kebele; in Somodo people mentioned dust as the all-weather road is of gravel.

Kebele volunteers at all levels

In so far as works on roads involve PWs by the community, the consequences for kebele volunteers were the same as for environmental PWs; although it seemed that generally willingness to contribute/participate was less of an issue for works like roads, than e.g. watershed management (this was explicitly stated in Kormargefia).

Other actors (e.g. iddir leaders etc.)

In Somodo the jiga (eleven villages, each with an iddir) were instrumental in mobilising the community for the annual clearing works on the internal roads.

Place

Due to lack of investment in roads Adado remained unattractive for investors in spite of its huge coffee-related potential. In Somodo the road developments were part of a trend towards increasingly dense links with the outside world – including the booming zonal capital Jimma. In Oda Haro, Kormargefia, Sirba and Oda Dawata the major improvements made to the main road crossing the kebele or adjacent to it had significant consequences for the place, starting by the land taken for the roads themselves. In Oda Haro the fact that some of the ditches along the (widened) road were not well constructed was said to increase the risk of flooding. Uncontrolled or poorly controlled flooding seriously affected internal roads in parts of Oda Haro, Oda Dawata, Sirba and Kormargefia.

Government-community relationships

In Adado the lack of investment in infrastructure by the government played was a bone of contention between the community and the government. In Kormargefia, people wanted the wereda to support more (e.g. modern bridge). Community members generally highlighted improved internal access as a priority; only in Oda Haro and Oda Dawata was the government beginning to respond to this in a systematic fashion.

People interventions

Interventions for young men

Table 11 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions for youth focused on young men were introduced.

Table 11: Federal-level interventions to change opportunities and wellbeing of young men

| Year | Federal-level youth-focused interventions (mostly targeted at young men) |
|---------|---|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2004 | National Youth Policy. |
| 2005 | Youth Development Package – Urban (TVET and MSE); rural (youth groups/co-ops). |
| 2006 | PASDEP – Faster job creation; building human capital through education and especially TVET, skill training for unemployed; selected public works interventions (urban devt & food security) First Youth Sector Development Programme (self-employment & formal/informal employment opportunities, rural youth to acquire land plots from grazing land) TVET programme is a centre piece of government youth strategy |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP – Emphasis on SME creation and job creation through large-scale public programmes including urban housing, urban development (e.g. cobble-stone paving of roads), focused on urban employment |
| 2011 | Revised Micro and Small Enterprise development strategy, aimed among others at youth; focus |

| Year | Federal-level youth-focused interventions (mostly targeted at young men) |
|------|---|
| | on urban areas exclusively |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | In the 3 years since the start of the GTP, 481,000 jobs created through urban housing development and associated programmes |
| | Organising youth in groups for agricultural development and outside agriculture |

The problems and the development intervention solutions

Due to population growth leading to intense pressures on farming land, the continuation of the patriarchal system, land laws, lack of access to oxen for ploughing, and lack of capital for share-cropping and to buy inputs most young men in rural communities find it very difficult to become farmers. Furthermore, many young men with some years of education do not want to specialise in agricultural work and would like to set up non-farm enterprises or be employed in or near the community or leave the community to find work in urban areas or overseas (international migration is discussed below). Rural youth unemployment and underemployment has been increasing as every year a new cohort of boys and young men gives up school and want to work full-time (many young males combine school and work over many years). The government solutions to rural youth un(der)employment is the promotion of youth co-operatives and very recently 1-5s and access to credit very recently dependent on saving a deposit.

Young people have always been excluded from decision-making processes in rural communities. However, in the lead-up to the 2005 election when there was a space for political debate some rural youth became interested in national-level politics with many supporting opposition parties. The government had not expected to lose seats in rural areas and following the election and during ensuing demonstrations there were arrests of some active rural young opposition supporters and accusations of their harsh treatment (for example in Oda Haro and Oda Dawata). Stories of these experiences, combined with the domination of kebele politics by adult men, led to a return to political apathy on the part of young men. The government solution to lack of participation by young men in kebele government has been the establishment of the three kinds of youth organisation described in Box 3.

Box 3: Ideal-type programme to promote youth participation and wellbeing in 2013

Youth co-operatives and 1-5s

- Bull fattening, poultry, forest exploitation including honey, irrigated and rainfed agriculture if land is available
- Non-farm stone, metalwork, carpentry, services (e.g. tea houses, restaurants)

Youth organisations

- Youth Associations
- Youth Leagues
- Youth Federations

Implementation institutions

- Wereda Women, Youth and Children Office, Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Co-operative Bureau
- Kebele Women, Youth and Children Affairs

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on youth programmes included kebele officials, youth leaders, farmers and wives of different household wealths and teenagers aged 13-19.

Implementation of the intervention – youth co-operatives, credit and 1-5s

Players and Activities

Adado: credit for jobless who completed grade 10 given in 1-5. FW2 credit given to 41 youth (one

woman) in 13 teams, for livestock fattening, grain trading and restaurants. Largest credit 35,000 birr; 20% deposits. Selection of credit for youth by kebele committee, including DA, chair, OMO MFI agent and kebele manager

Somodo: three stone cooperatives with 48 male youth initially but reduced to 22 and none successful. Initially up to 467 youth had received land from the communal grazing land but most was taken back. One youth cooperative for vegetable farming had lost its land; some youth given credit on a group collateral basis.

Oda Haro: One youth cooperative with 40 members given land on mountain to protect and use forest; they planted thousands of trees. 30 youth got credit from wereda savings and credit association to trade in livestock and rent irrigated land to produce vegetables. Kebele plans to organise youth in small cooperatives for livestock fattening and grain mills, irrigation, forest management through AGP, some training and group formation but not yet implemented.

Oda Dawata: three youth stone cooperatives, one for grass for livestock fodder and recently a sugar cooperative. Plans for organising youth in SMEs for carpentry, metalwork, protecting forest, honey and agricultural activities, and to expand non-farm activities in construction and services. Kebele screened applicants for youth cooperatives and sent to SME office which sent to wereda mineral and energy office.

Sirba: 3 youth stone cooperatives with 40, 44 and 60 members. Kebele with wereda plans to organised youth in bee-keeping and to provide credit for livestock fattening. An AGP fund will be used for 30 youth in associations. 14 men were brought into an association to establish 2 grinding mills.

Kormargefia: irrigable land given to youth cooperative with 42 members (4 female) and rainfed land given very recently to another youth group.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Somodo: Youth stone cooperatives do not have employees but some work on commission loading, and middlemen find clients. Clients come from Jimma and buy a truckload for 600 birr, of which 150 birr paid for labour to load and of the rest 75% deposited and 25% shared among members. They rented half the land to a construction company that had a crusher, but it became bankrupt. They bought a truck but have not paid all the amount so it is under the owner and there is a disagreement.

Oda Dawata: Cooperative leadership comprises chair, vice-chair, secretary, cashier and controller. Stone cooperatives have internal rules and regulations including how much as saved and distributed and how to deal with dropouts. Profits allocated equally, do not employ wage labour. Have to renew licence annually but so far no tax. Government buys stone from them.

Sirba: Youth in stone cooperatives given space in the quarry, pay tax, vat and a contribution to the cooperative of 30%. Sometimes the cooperatives rent crushers and excavators and despite the costs it is profitable although brokers take a big cut. Youth who are to be involved in the AGP programme must be educated, unemployed and not involved in the quarry or working for the Chinese company.

Kormargefia: Youth in the irrigation co-operative were recently told to work in 1-5 groups rather than individually as they had been doing.

Implementation of the intervention – youth organisations

Players and Activities

Adado: There are around 100 men registered in the Youth Association but no activity it is just a structure with no activities.

Somodo: Youth association is to organise youth in economic activity; the Youth league works on party issues, including recruitment and propaganda. The Federation is also engaged in party work but mainly concerned with sports and related issues. However the league and Federation are not active.

Oda Haro: No youth associations; the youth do not want to be involved in politics.

Oda Dawata: Youth association has 550 members, engaged in irrigation, stone extraction, selling grass for animal fodder. The Youth league is a political organisation and has 200 members engaged in youth association activities and sport, though the league is less active than the association. The federation is supposed to supervise the association and league and to be neutral about party membership but is not active.

Sirba: There is no youth association or any other formal kebele youth organisation. Youth leagues and a youth federation have existed since 2011 but none of these is functioning because they have no leaders. A youth club was established with NGO support and has 42 members of whom 22 are girls, is working on girls issues and unemployment and credit. The club members write poems, stories and perform dramas. 90 youth were registered by the kebele to participate in volunteer activities, e.g. wereda event to commemorate Meles with poetry and performance competitions.

Kormargefia: The youth association has 60 members, the league has 45 members and the federation has no separate leadership but has 15 leaders: five from the league, five from the association and five from HIV/AIDS clubs. Not much activity. About 15 youth met last year five times to talk about development issues. They advise youth to cultivate vegetables and provided vegetable seedlings to some young women. The League recruits party members and mobilises youth for elections and development work. The Federation facilitates work and land access, defends women rights, promotes interests of youth at cabinet and council meetings. However, a number of youth said the organisations did not exist and that any activity by youth was at the individual level and the kebele is not much concerned with youth affairs.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Somodo: Youth association is to organise youth in economic activity; has a chair, vice chair, secretary, accountant and cashier. The Youth league works on party issues, including recruitment and propaganda. The Federation is also engaged in party work but mainly concerned with sports and related issues. However the league and Federation are not active.

Oda Dawata: Youth association related to youth cooperative activities; youth league mainly sport but less active; federation in theory supposed to supervise the association and league but not active.

Sirba: No government established associations only an NGO sponsored youth group with a resourced centre.

Kormargefia: The Youth Association has limited agriculture related activities; the League is involved in party recruitment and the Federation does not seem to exist in practice.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the interventions

Material incentives

Adado: credit for farm and non-farm group activities.

Somodo: Land provided for youth for 3 stone cooperatives, land given to youth for farming from communal gazing land taken back and used for other purposes. The stone cooperatives did not get other support such as training, advice, technical support and this is believed to have explained their failure.

Oda Haro: One young man mentioned pressure for youth to become party members and possible advantages in getting employment

Oda Dawata: land for stone cooperatives provided free for five years. Youth who participate in local politics may be given priority in employment; those who don't may be branded as opposition.

Sirba: The stone cooperative got a crusher through credit for 180,000 birr and repaid the loan but the crusher broke and has been taken to Addis from maintenance.

The youth club established by an NGO has a centre in which members of the club have free access to computers, musical instruments, a tape recorder, TV and a stage where they perform their art.

Kormargefia; irrigable land given to youth cooperative with 42 youth (4 female); some got seeds from wereda agricultural office.

Training

Somodo: training for youth 3 years ago on business activities but did not succeed.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Adado: credit for young men in groups but only a few (41 and only 1 woman).

Somodo: of the 3 stone cooperatives, only one was seemingly successful, due to dropouts and migration and by November event hat one was no longer functional. The cooperatives have not changed lives and do not represent a sustainable livelihood option. Land given to youth for farming has mainly been taken back by the Kebele and used for other purposes.

Oda Haro: A few young men obtained credit for agricultural and livestock production.

Oda Dawata: Some young men obtained work in the stone cooperatives.

Sirba: Some of the youth in the stone cooperatives who used to be 'spenders and drunkards' are now 'becoming wise to build their one family and house and rent an plough land'.

Place

Oda Haro: Land given to youth cooperative on mountain for protecting the forest said to be making a difference to the environment though their activity was said to be below expectations due to lack of proper support from the Kebele and wereda.

Sirba: The stone cooperatives are providing some income and employment for the community.

Institutions

None of the youth associations in any of the sites seems to be very active; in a few sites youth leagues are involved in political mobilisations; the federations are unknown or only exist in name.

Government-community relations

Interventions for adult and young women and girls

Table 12 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions for women and girls were introduced.

Table 12: Main federal-level interventions to change opportunities and wellbeing of women

| Year | Interventions to change opportunities and wellbeing of women and girls |
|---------|---|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP Establishment of Women Affairs' Office in PMO (1993/4), Bureaus at regional level, desk at wereda level; new Family Law (2000) addressing legal marriage age and strengthening women's rights in divorce, inheritance etc. |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | Revised Penal Code addressing issues of rape, abduction, FGM, domestic violence & abortion. New Land Proclamation and land registration programme (1997 Tigray; 2003 Amhara; now rolled out in Oromia and SSNP) recognise women's rights to land. |

| Year | Interventions to change opportunities and wellbeing of women and girls |
|------|---|
| | Women Affairs established as separate Ministry; Regional Bureau now Cabinet member; full office at wereda level. |
| 2006 | PASDEP One of PASDEP pillars 'Unleashing potential of women' including maternal health, liberating time through water supply provision, intensifying women's responsiveness to agricultural extension, micro-credit, NRM and small business promotion, legislative and institutional reforms to protect the rights of women and open opportunities for them. (Donor-supported) National Action Plan on gender, updating previous (2001) Plan. |
| 2007 | GOE-development Women Development and Change Package: emphasis on mainstreaming through affirmative action in all sectors; main focus on women's economic empowerment. |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP – Emphasis on women's economic empowerment through women cooperatives gradually transformed in medium level enterprises; organising women in self-help groups; providing women savings and credit services; training on management and business skills Female DTs and 1-5s |
| 2011 | |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | Anti-HTP Strategy |

The problem and the development intervention solution

In the customary patriarchal structures of Ethiopia's rural communities women were often treated as pieces of property. They might be very young when married, parents arranged marriages without consulting them, and in some cultures when a husband died the wife was 'inherited' by a brother and when a wife died her family was expected to provide a substitute sister. In some cultures divorced women left the house with nothing but their clothes. They were over-burdened with domestic work and in some places confined to the homestead. If they earned some income the husband controlled it. Rape, abduction and domestic violence were common. When schools were introduced priority was usually given to sending sons.

The Derg started a process to institutionalise increasing women's rights and opportunities which the EPRDF has continued so that by 2013 there were a set of interventions at Federal level to promote girls' education at higher levels, outlaw female circumcision, women's rights, participation in income-generating farming and non-farm activities, and community management and politics (see Box 4).

Box 4: Ideal-type programme to promote female participation and wellbeing in 2013

Land rights

- Wives should be included in land certificates
- Widows should inherit the dead husband's land and be free to farm the land and re-marry
- Daughters have equal rights to inherit parental land with sons

Economic empowerment

Creation of farming and business opportunities for women

Gender relations

- Women should have equal property rights in marriage
- Divorced women should share household assets
- Rape, abduction and domestic male violence are illegal

Political empowerment

- There should be affirmative action for wereda and kebele Cabinet appointments
- · Half the members of the kebele Council should be women

Young women and girls

- Female circumcision outlawed as an HTP
- Early marriage girls below the age of 18 should not marry
- Young women have the right to choose their marriage partners
- Affirmative action is necessary to increase the number of girls attending secondary and preparatory schools

Implementation institutions

- Federal government
- Wereda
- DAs
- Kebele volunteers in kebele, sub-kebeles, DTs and 1-5s
- Community organisations

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on interventions for women included wereda officials, kebele employees and volunteers at different structural levels, farmers and wives of different household wealths, and teenagers.

Implementation of the interventions – land rights

Activities and Players

Adado: Land registration in wereda though problems when two wives and plan for the process to be redone. No registration in Adado, though some fathers spontaneously giving some land to their daughters, and case of wife had successfully taken her claim to land from her parents to court and won the case.

Oda Dawata: The land certificate and register now include the woman's name alongside husband's. The law enables women to inherit land from parents and from deceased husband, and to have half a share on divorce. But law enforcement limited especially on inheritance from parents.

Oda Haro: Wives own land with husbands and on certificates. 124 FHH with land paying taxes. No land provided by government for women to farm. The law enables women to inherit and own land but it is still very rare for an unmarried woman to own land.

Kormargefia: Land registration completed with names and photos of both husbands and wives though some men tried to resist. 5 cases of women's land rights brought to wereda last year; most got a decision, delays when absence of woman's name on certificate. Kebele distributed land to young men but not young women.

Sirba: Land registration completed 6 years ago and partners have a photo on the certificate and sign entitling women to land on death or divorce

Somodo: Land certification started in 2010 but not completed; wife's name on certificate.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Land registration and issuing of certificates with wife's name and signature in four of the six sites; some resistance reported in Kormargefia, where women's land cases being reported to wereda, registration not completed in Somodo and not started in Adado though undertaken in part of wereda.

Implementation of the interventions – economic empowerment

Activities and Players

Adado: Affirmative action for girls and women through allowing them opportunities with lower marks. Young women given credit by Omo and had to save and bought cows.

Oda Dawata: New cooperative established in July 2013, with 28 women members. It supplied oil and sugar and was working well. kebele leadership, DAs and model farmers raising awareness; idea of separate cooperatives for women for livestock production, but no training or resources given.

Oda Haro: One unsuccessful case of women getting together to form a women's association and raising their own capital.

Kormargefia: Government started giving chickens and vegetable seedlings to a few women but has

not have much impact on their economic status. Promises on income-generation initiatives totally forgotten since April. Food For Children has distributed vegetable seedlings to women, which has enabled some to earn some income from the production to purchase clothes and finance other basic needs.

Sirba: Engaginal Foundation NGO provided credit to a group of 30 women through the Oromia Credit and Savings Institution, and trained them in business and trade; most now have shops or sell drinks but on an individual not a group basis. RATSON NGO organised training for 30 women on poultry and plans to provide them with seed money. The NGO also provided credit with no interest for work on livelihoods. Oromia Microfinance Office provides some income generation support to women who live with HIV/AIDS

Somodo: Government and NGO sponsored MFI training in entrepreneurship, business skills and savings. 11 groups formed with 329 women. DAs trained on livestock rearing and vegetable production in gardens. Women contributing money through 1-5s to buy chickens, sheep for fattening, vegetable production and trading. Women's credit access improved through OCSA and Harbu MFIs

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: MFI providing credit for young women on condition that they save which was not easy for most.

Kormargefia: Limited government and NGO sponsorship of women's income generation opportunities.

Sirba: NGO sponsorship of a few women's groups with training in income-generation and credit, also available from MFIs.

Somodo: Credit from government and NGO sponsored MFIs and training; DAs training on livestock and vegetable production.

Implementation of the interventions – gender relations

Activities and Players

Female circumcision

Adado: Female circumcision not part of Gedeo custom

Oda Dawata: Assumed to have almost disappeared due to government action and threats of punishments.

Oda Haro: Community opposes intervention to stop female circumcision. Despite campaign most especially Muslims practice it and practice it earlier to avoid detection and officials do not want to implement the law.

Kormargefia: Reduction of female circumcision and training for circumcisers and warning letters. Role of NGO and Orthodox church. HEWs observed under 5 girls and found small numbers; fear of breaking the law but no prosecutions.

Sirba: Awareness on illegality of female circumcision, much reduced and not done openly. School girls' and virgins' clubs reporting cases. Practitioners trained one jailed for 3 months in 2011 and few dare to violate law.

Somodo: Reduced but still an issue and practised in secret and under-reported. Awareness raising and legal measures against circumcisers and parents. Iddirs given mandate to punish parents; fines of up to 200 birr; 3 cases in process, and if confirmed by health centre punishments.

Early marriage

Adado: Wereda tries to stop underage marriage, though bribery of police and collusion between parents and children and prison sentences less than law allows, and no cases brought to courts last year.

Oda Dawata: One court case on early marriage last year; wereda women's and children's affairs has 7 members each follows up on 3 kebeles.

Oda Haro: . Early marriage of girls often by voluntary abduction, sometimes as second wives though practice declining.

Kormargefia: . Wereda women, youth and children affairs found reduction in early marriage. NGO arranged discussion forums and awareness meetings. WYC office use kebele women's affairs, HEWs, and school clubs to campaign against HTPs. Wereda pressures kebele to deal with early marriage – recent case of mother imprisoned for 1 year and husband for 3 years when 13 year old girl married off. But corruption and lack of transparency and pressure on girls to lie about age.

Sirba: Awareness raising in girls and virgins and HIV/AIDS clubs in schools. Integrated efforts by police WCYA office and local security; HEWs provide advice and RATSON NGO materials to schools. No cases report from Sirba. Recently some young people have started to arrange marriages at municipality office.

Somodo: Underage marriage is still an under-reported issue though Women's Affairs and school club raise awareness the latter through drama and music. Students report to wereda education bureau who reports to women and children's affairs for follow up. One case stopped when marriage feast prepared; but problem as girls and boys have relations earlier and parents fear unwanted pregnancies. Plan international with wereda women's affairs provide education and arranged mechanism for community punishments.

Polygyny

Adado: Difficult to enforce law against polygyny as deeply entrenched, though Protestant majority do not practice it. Using Development teams; police informed and courts arrange divorce of second wife, but no case last year and bribery of courts and police and when women support it nothing can be done.

Oda Dawata: Polygyny reduced but still common despite government intervention, biases and corruption in cases brought to court.

Oda Haro: Wereda women and children affairs office has head and three experts but less active since Meles's death and give polygyny less priority

Kormargefia: No polygyny and government cannot control men having mistresses.

Sirba: Not practised.

Somodo: Reduction of polygyny but Sharia allows it and frequent cases, when senior wife not consulted. One case husband imprisoned for 8 months.

Widow inheritance

Adado: No longer practised and not an issue.

Oda Dawata: Women can now inherit but are also free to remarry someone of their choice.

Oda Haro: Hundee local NGO provides education on HTPs including widow inheritance and marriage to wife's dead sister.

Kormargefia: Wereda have been receiving cases of widow inheritance but difficult to enforce law as lack of information and officials biased.

Sirba: Not practised

Somodo: Reduced but some cases; women's affairs educate widows about their rights.

Abduction

Adado: The wereda officer mentioned that government is creating awareness against abduction as part of the HTPs harming women. In Adado increased awareness of strong penalties but cases rarely taken to government.

Oda Dawata: 7 cases of abduction in the wereda last year, difficult to distinguish between voluntary and forced abductions; wereda trying to create awareness.

Oda Haro: One man who abducted a 17 year of girl was imprisoned for 3 years

Kormargefia: Government and NGO activities led to reduction in abduction and can lead to imprisonment for 15-20 years though risks for girls still remain. 4 cases reported last year, two ending in reconciliation, one man was published with 3 months imprisonment and another with 5 years.

Sirba: The integrated efforts of government and NGOs brought about changes and practice reduced greatly; one case reported but the girl said she wanted to marry and was not under age despite parents' school certificate. Another case girl convinced by parents and partner to arrange marriage. Elders now refuse to negotiate the marriage in cases of forced abduction.

Somodo: Parents only report if man refused to marry daughter. One case reported in kebele. Forced abduction changed to voluntary and no longer an issue.

Rape

Adado: The wereda women, children and youth office have been creating awareness. However in cases of rape of married women this may be more complicated. The health office, schools and the police and Protestant church also involved in awareness raising activities. In Adado adult and young community members reported government teachings and public campaign and strong penalties as being effective to drastically reduce rape in the community.

Oda Dawata: 6 cases of rape came to court last year; some resolved by elders and some did not get justice due to corruption at the court or health service.

Oda Haro:. In rape cases especially poor or without relatives cannot easily get justice at wereda and zone levels.

Kormargefia: Reduction attributed to government awareness raising and the threat of imprisonment. However, still seen as a risk and despite cases no prosecutions.

Sirba: Reduction attributed to government action, though cases still occur and not reported.

Somodo: 6 rape cases reported in wereda in past 7 months, one to be sentenced for 5 years; parents only report if man refused to marry her. One case reported in kebele.

Divorce

Adado: Women can only obtain property after marriage, do not take land but equivalent property though usually not enough and get nothing from the house; no cases brought to court last year.

Oda Dawata: No justice for women without relatives or links to wereda officials. Men get away with violence and if reported legal office bureaucratic. Implementation of women's rights on divorce not resulting in equal share of property some due to corruption, though most women benefit and some do well afterwards.

Oda Haro: Process to get rights after divorce bureaucratic and costly requiring written document and court tend to send cases back to elders who favour men.

Kormargefia: 5 land cases and 18 divorces cases reported last year but kebele officials sometimes overturn court decisions and elders also biased.

Sirba: Increasing rate especially among young couples according to wereda official. Women able to get property divided partly attributed to joint land certificates.

Somodo: Major cases handled by court relate to divorce; about 20 cases per year; women's affairs and kebele officials and elders try to reconcile the couple; if fail taken to court that writes letter to kebele for elders to divide the property, but men hide assets so women often do not get proper share.

Land inheritance

Adado: Daughters customarily do not inherit land and no cases last year.

Oda Dawata: Not much change or interventions as daughters not expected to inherit.

Oda Haro: Owing to land shortage no willingness to change the custom of only sons inheriting land.

Kormargefia: Attempt to push for daughters to inherit land but elders say they will pass it on to their husbands; many cases reported last year

Sirba: Despite law in inheritance disputes families favour sons living close over daughter moving away for marriage.

Somodo: Very few cases of daughters claiming inheritance.

Domestic violence

Adado: No cases of rapes reported last year, though rape of married women when husbands not at home husband given compensation. Domestic violence big issue and awareness raising by wereda and police not sufficiently effective, though reported as decreasing at kebele level.

Oda Dawata: The women and child's affairs' office gave a recent example of a woman whose hand and head was broken by her husband and she was seriously hurt. She was not able to walk by herself. Her neighbour brought her to the office and the office took the case to the court. Her husband was only arrested for two days. This kind of result is discouraging for the office and for other women.

Oda Haro: Domestic violence reduced due to role of government, UNICEF and iddirs. Women can report to iddir committee that can punish the offender, and cases can be taken to the wereda court, though elders and courts can be biased in favour of men.

Kormargefia: All respondents agreed that domestic violence against women has reduced as a result of recent government initiatives. The kebele has been working to raise awareness of women's rights and the legal consequences of domestic violence. However, some said it still occurs and is not seen as abnormal.

Sirba: Wife beating common and women's affairs sees at least two cases a month, most of which do not go to court. No rape cases reported.

Somodo: The wereda women affairs' officer explained that domestic male violence against women is a big issue in the wereda; often drunkard men, and during the coffee harvest, but women fear reporting cases. Though some reported decline in Somodo due to government interventions others felt that wife beating was till common.

Implementation of the interventions – political empowerment

Activities and Players

Adado: In wereda affirmative action and 5 women put in leadership positions; women also in wereda cabinet positions and 3 school heads, but limited role of women in politics in Adado.

Oda Dawata: About half the councillors are women after the election, one zone leader a woman but not active.

Oda Haro: Though women are supposed to participate in kebele affairs few do; no one committed to increasing women's participation in kebele structure and intervention not performed fully at wereda level.

Kormargefia: Wereda pressure on kebele to increase women's representation; meeting of young women above 16 called by Kebele last year to join the party as vanguards. Few attended the meeting for women above 18 this year as most don't want to participate in politics, though their confidence and morale increased due to wereda concern.

Sirba: Affirmative action for girls in schooling and for vacancy announcement at wereda special consideration of female applicants. 19 year old claimed improvement in women's participation in politics, public meetings, elections and being council members.

Somodo: Attempts to increase women's involvement in kebele structures to 50% of council members and 30% of cabinet members, and 50% of women competitors for the election of kebele administrators, though not fully achieved; targets better at wereda level. In Somodo only women in cabinet HEW and women's affairs; 59 women in council; no women youth leader or development team leader.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: affirmative action in wereda but not at kebele level.

Oda Dawata: Attempt to increase number of women in council.

Oda Haro: increasing women's representation even at wereda level limited.

Kormargefia: Wereda pressure on kebele to increase women's representation and meetings for women to join the party but limited interest.

Sirba: Some improvements at wereda and kebele level claimed but little evidence apart from affirmative action at wereda for vacancies and for girls education.

Somodo: Pressure from wereda to increase women's involvement in kebele but limited success.

Implementation of the interventions – young women and girls

Activities and Players

Adado; Affirmative action for girls and women in educational opportunities and to get positions in government with lower marks. Experience sharing among girl students doing well, promise not to drop out to get married. Prizes 100 birr for girls going to preparatory school.

Sirba: Affirmative action for girls in schooling and for vacancy announcement at wereda special consideration of female applicants.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the interventions

Land rights

Land certification completed in 4 of the six communities; Somodo started Adado not yet. Said to increase women's rights on divorce and stronger rights for widows but little change for daughters' rights to land.

Economic empowerment

Adado: Affirmative action for girls and women through allowing them opportunities with lower marks. Young women given credit by Omo and had to save and bought cows.

Oda Dawata: Women's association offers access to credit and savings; Busa Gonafa MFI loans mainly for women engaged in farming, trading, cafes, spinning and weaving. Wereda support with training.

Kormargefia: Government started giving chickens and vegetable seedlings to a few women but has not have much impact on their economic status. Promises on income-generation initiatives totally forgotten since April.

Sirba: RATSON NGO organised training for 30 women on poultry and plans to provide them with seed money. The NGO also provided credit with no interest for work on livelihoods.

Somodo: MFI training in entrepreneurship, business skills and savings. DAs trained on livestock rearing and vegetable production in gardens. Women contributing money through 1-5s to buy chickens, sheep for fattening, vegetable production and trading. Women's credit access improved through OCSA and Harbu MFIs.

Interventions to change human re/pro/duction systems

Safe water

Table 13 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions to provide safe water were introduced.

Table 13: Federal-level interventions to provide safe water

| Year | Interventions to provide safe water |
|---------|---|
| Teal | Water Sector Development Plan 2002-2015 following Water Resource Management Policy |
| Earlier | (1999): GOE-financed capital investment to supply drinking water; operation & maintenance financed by communities. |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | National Universal Access (to water) Plan (MOW). |
| | PASDEP |
| 2006 | Protecting Basic Services programme starts (co-financing GOE transfer to Regions forward to wereda for wereda-provided services, incl education, health and watsan). |
| | WASH (water, sanitation & hygiene) protocol between water, education and health ministries. Starting rollout of community-based wereda WASH plans, WASH committees at all levels. |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | Water UAP only 10% financed. Preparation of new government WASH programme. |
| | GTP |
| 2010 | PBS2 launch |
| | National WASH inventory undertaken. |
| 2011 | New GOE-led WASH programme foreseeing 4 modalities for water points: wereda-managed, community-managed (including construction), NGO-managed and self-supply and encouraging expansion of self-supply and of multi-usage schemes. |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | Results of national WASH inventory not yet available by mid-2013. |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Drinking unsafe water causes diseases. Fetching water from distant sources is time-consuming and more likely to be done by women and girls. The Federal Government has committed to fulfilling Target 10 of MDG 7 – reducing by 50% the proportion of the population without access to water and sanitation by 2015¹⁹. The GTP targets are to achieve 98% access to safe water in rural areas by

¹⁹ http://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/wash.html accessed 14/04/14

2014/15 (66.5% achieved by end 2012/13) and no more than 10% of non-functional water schemes.

In Box 5 we have constructed an ideal-type of the provision of safe water in rural communities in 2013, using WIDE 3 data. The sections below illustrate that there were variations in implementing the ideal-type.

Box 5: Ideal-type provision of safe water in 2013

Programme to construct new water-points

- Objective: 98% access to safe water means almost everyone in communities should have access
- Wereda programme, often with donor financing or, recently, with regional financing from the MDG Fund, should be prioritised in government budget as investment costs expected to be shared between funding source, wereda and community
- NGO programmes complement
- Use of different technologies and approaches depending on the terrain; no information as to whether water sale by people having private access is regulated or not
- Community contributes to waterpoint construction in various ways (labour, financially)

Management of existing water-points

• Water committees in charge of the different water-points; regulating access (opening hours), recruiting and paying guards, regulating how much water households can take if necessary

Maintenance and repair of existing water-points

- Through public works communities ensure basic maintenance such as e.g. cleaning springs
- Water committees make minor repairs and inform the wereda office of problems they cannot solve
- Wereda has plumbers and transport means and can respond to communities' requests for support; this should also be prioritised in wereda budget
- Community water committees charge fees to be able to cover management (e.g. guard salary) and maintenance costs; funds deposited at the bank; wereda audit two times a year; poor households may be exempted from charge
- Spare parts are bought by the management committees using the funds they raise from users; if beyond their capacity the wereda supply them.

Implementation institutions

- Wereda
- NGOs and private enterprises and individuals
- Water committees in charge of particular waterpoints
- DTs and 1-5s to mobilise community for public works
- · Kebele and community-initiated organisations raising funds and organising community labour
- No reports of Kebele WaSH Teams as set out in the Ethiopia WaSH Implementation Framework²⁰

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about the provision of safe water wereda officials, kebele officials and farmers and their wives in households of different wealth.

Implementation of the intervention

Programme to construct new water-points

Activities

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Adado: Wereda coverage rate 36.1% by end 2004 EC. Most people in rural Adado use springs and rivers (water considered as safe as it does not cause illnesses). Recent development of a spring diversion scheme (pipe connected to a spring) allowed construction of six water taps in Adado town area. Community contributed labour: daily from 6 to 9 am for 6 months according to kebele officials; people mention 10-15 days, wives sent by husbands, and 3 miscarriages due to hard work (transporting stones, cement and wire on top of hill); some financial contributions too. A few

²⁰ A FDRE document 'The WaSH Implementation Framework' dated 09/08/11 accessed on 14/04/14 http://cmpethiopia.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/full-wif.pdf

months after the taps were installed (and not yet officially inaugurated) a big landslide destroyed the main pipe; two months after the event there was no sign of movement by the wereda to repair the scheme.

Somodo: Wereda coverage rate 70.5% by end 2004 EC. In Somodo 49 springs of which 19 developed (cemented) with government and community participation, others fenced and regularly cleaned. 1 hand pump fitted on deep borehole was dug by government more than 10 years ago. Some people mention a plan for a river diversion scheme which would provide tap water; no mention by wereda or kebele officials. By Nov 2013 a recent attempt to dig another borehole to install piped water failed after digging for 60 meters without finding water.

Oda Haro: Wereda coverage rate estimated around 45%. An estimated 70% households in Oda Haro have access to safe water via taps (8 pumps in various locations, including the main school) and springs (some of them recently improved). Two more remote zones least well served, using rivers and ponds. No detail on modalities of recent construction activity in the community.

Oda Dawata: Wereda coverage about 24%. In Oda Dawata around 40% households, most of them in two zones, use unsafe water all the time. Wereda programme has started work in Oda Dawata one of 4 kebeles). No detail on construction modalities; financial contributions by households 'registering for tap water' (like successful farmer); people expected to get tap water after the 2013 harvest. No mention of labour contributions.

Sirba: No coverage stats for the wereda. In Sirba most households have access to safe water. While until recently the main source were boreholes, now most people buy or get tap water from three sources: 1) an NGO constructed a water scheme (electric pump) for both irrigation and drinking water – considered as 'public tap'; 2) a Chinese road company built its own tap and supplies water to the community; 3) three wealthy individuals have taps - no information on how they got them (e.g. successful farmer and businessman).

Kormargefia: Wereda coverage rate 49.6%. In the kebele most people have access to safe water. Ten of the many springs were developed - 7 with funding from an Amhara regional organisation in 2006, and 3 with NGO support in 2011. The same NGO developed a water point for one school, with community participation. All households interviewed wanted government to do more. Some households contributed financially for the wereda to develop their spring but this had not yet been done.

Players

Adado: Funding source for the new (destroyed) scheme not disclosed. Wereda officials mentioned regional MDG Fund, AfDB WASH, and a few years ago an NGO which constructed hand pumps including three in Adado (see below). Community provided labour; business people in addition gave financial contributions.

Somodo: Wereda provide pumps with no payment, for private wells that can be used by small groups of 8-12 households willing to share other costs; 8 households got pumps in this way; these wells are not used for drinking water. No information was given on the funding for the failed attempt to dig another communal well in Somodo. At wereda level officials mentioned activities supported by Regional MDG Fund and AfDB.

Oda Haro: No detail on any recent construction activity in Oda Haro. DA NRM mentioned that community was willing to contribute money for water projects and the kebele had asked the wereda but got no response so far. Wereda officials noted challenge as some partners stopped working in water development (e.g. Mekane Yesus, NGO).

Oda Dawata: Wereda programme on regional funding; in Oda Dawata/Mecro zone, interested households registered and paid contribution. Some funding was given by Asela Malt Factory.

Sirba: NGO and Chinese road construction company; presumably wereda installing private taps on demand and against payment.

Kormargefia: Amhara regional development association and NGO. Wereda expected to develop springs. No mention of public works in relation to safe water provision.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: MDG Fund is a regional scheme. Under AfDB financing there is cost-sharing; the wereda used to have to finance 17% and community 5%; this then changed and the wereda share became 51.5%; as this was not foreseen in the wereda budget they had to stop one project (not in Adado).

Somodo: Both MDG and AdFB funding (for projects not in Somodo) are managed at zonal level (contract awarding etc.); wereda collects community share and deposits this and its own share on zonal account. Water points handed over to wereda (and communities) for operation.

Oda Dawata: Interested households register for tap water and pay contributions (no detail).

Sirba: No detail on how private taps are acquired. Wereda officials explain that underground water studies are not used, which leads to water points drying off and not being replaced even though the studies had predicted that they would dry off after a certain time.

Management of existing water-points

Activities

Adado: Wereda officials explain that they form water management committees and train them, for each water point. Not mentioned by anyone in Adado.

Somodo: Management committee for the hand pump, composed of households using the tap and rotating; tap opened twice a day. At least one developed spring also has a management committee (they recently installed a tube to make the water safer). A number of springs do not have management committees; non-developed springs said not to need this.

Oda Haro: Kebele officials describe the ideal-type with one water committee in each gare, focusing on water quality and checking the pumps. People interviewed did not mention committees but two mentioned iddirs and one mentioned contributions for a guard's salary.

One spring (in one of the more remote zones), giving very pure water and initially developed under the Derg, was given to people from the zone who gave responsibility to manage it to the iddir, who in turn contracted out the responsibility to a private individual. Water from the spring is sold to cafés and restaurants in Tibe, and to individuals from Tibe who pay for it; the iddir gets a fixed 300 birr/month and the man kept the rest of the sale money. It is not clear whether people from the zone pay as well.

Oda Dawata: No mention of committee, even for the government water tap (birka) found in one of the zones (Begejo). Protected springs have become the main safe water source in the kebele; also no mention of committee. Private taps (from which some people from Oda Dawata buy water) have meters and owners are charged accordingly.

Sirba: Wereda officials describe the ideal-type; no information on how boreholes were managed in Sirba. The NGO water point is supposed to be maintained through selling the water and there is a committee (it is not clear what this will become as the associated irrigation activity had collapsed by November 2013). Private taps (e.g. successful farmer) have their own meter. Successful businessman has his own electric pump on his borehole so pays according to electricity consumption. Kormargefia: For water from protected but undeveloped sources there is no committee and no payment, these springs are maintained by the users. For the developed springs there are water committees, fixed schedules to get water, guards to open the water points, and payment. The kebele administration imposed quotas for water as the level of water decreases in some of the springs.

Players

Adado: No mention of waterpoint management committee(s).

Somodo: Water management committees for the hand pump and some of the springs.

Oda Haro: Through a private individual an iddir sell water to people and businesses from outside the community. Iddirs seem to manage other water points too.

Oda Dawata: Private tap owners in Gonde town sell water expensive price, including to residents of Oda Dawata close enough from Gonde. Wereda water office fixes the price of water from public taps like in Begejo.

Sirba: Chinese company does not charge (long queues). Water from the NGO scheme is charged for, not clear by whom and how the price is fixed. Private individuals charge buyers.

Kormargefia: Community members clean the undeveloped springs; committees manage the developed springs; kebele administration impose quota.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: The new taps were not opened throughout the day and the schedule was irregular as the taps were not yet officially inaugurated.

Somodo: Hand pump tap opened twice a day (6 to 9 am and 4 to 7 pm); quota of 2 jerricans of 20 litres by household morning and evening; committee members are changed regularly. No quota for springs.

Oda Haro: No mention of regulation for the water sold by the iddir.

Oda Dawata: Wereda officials explain there are water committees for all types of water points, but charges only for water from deep wells using generator or electricity to pump water - like in Gonde. Price of water fixed by wereda water office for public taps (officials say 10 cents/20 litres, people say 15 cents). Private tap owners charge more expensive price (officials say 30 cents for 20 litres, people say 0.5 to 1 birr/20 litres); they are charged according to consumption shown by meter; there does not seem to be any regulation of the price they then ask to buyers.

Sirba: Apparently no regulation of private sale, said to be around 0.25-0.30 cents/20 litres, and points are open from 7 am to 6 pm.

Kormargefia: Developed springs opened twice a day early morning and late afternoon; quota 20-30l/household and day; payment 1.5-2 birr/month by users for the guard's salary.

Maintenance and repairs of water-points

Activities

Adado: Two out of three hand pumps built earlier stopped functioning a year ago and there was no mention of repairs planned. One borehole was also not functioning. There is PWs for spring cleaning. Before the landslide people using the taps did not mention any payment; two months after the event there was no sign of movement to try to repair the pipe.

Somodo: Households using tap water pay 3-5 birr/month to the water management committee. The committee had to manage one big repair not long ago, for which it had to ask additional one-off contributions. For some springs users also pay (e.g. 1 birr/month to maintain a tube newly fixed to make the water safer); for others there is no payment.

Oda Haro: Kebele officials described the ideal-type, with one committee in each gare maintaining the pumps and calling on the wereda when the problem was beyond their capacity. People interviewed noted that the springs or wells they were using were well protected/ maintained. Two households mentioned the spring they used was maintained by the iddir. Apart for the salary of the

guard in one case, no mention of payment.

Oda Dawata: No detail on maintenance activities by Somodo respondents. People pay for water from the government birka (public tap) and for water from privately-owned taps.

Sirba: Wereda officials explain that most repairs/maintenance are done by the regional government because they are beyond communities and even the wereda's means. The wereda used to maintain solar water points but stopped when the tap option became available (there were 2 in Sirba, that are now out of order). Much of the water supply is depending on electricity and in November 2013 there were reports of serious issues with lack of water because of frequent electric disruption.

Kormargefia: Wereda officials described the ideal-type – including that spare parts are bought by communities from private suppliers. In the kebele there is a concern that springs dry up in the dry season much earlier than in the past, reflecting a lower water level that some people attribute to the expansion of eucalyptus plantations. No measure other than the quota on water from developed springs was mentioned. Developed springs are treated with chemicals every 2 years by wereda; the wereda also send technicians for repairs (e.g. broken pipe). Undeveloped springs are maintained by the users.

Players

Adado: The community provides labour to maintain the springs. The wereda faces severe constraints to provide support when there are critical repairs: no plumber, meagre operational budget. Officials are not convinced by the capacity of local water-point management committees to be able to repair properly.

Somodo: Community (spring cleaning); water users (financial contributions); water committees (manage contributions and repairs). No mention of wereda maintenance activities by anyone in Somodo. Wereda officials describe acute challenges to ensure functionality of water points, arising from government exclusive focus on infrastructure expansion with no focus (budget, cost-recovery system, qualified personnel) on water point operations.

Oda Haro: In some cases maintenance assured by iddir. Wereda highlighted big challenges (lack of qualified personnel, budget etc.).

Sirba: Region to ensure repairs. Electricity company is a major actor as much of the water supply in Sirba (and the wereda as a whole) is pumped electrically.

Kormargefia: Wereda treat springs, community clean undeveloped springs. Wereda officials described challenges (lack of budget) but the wereda has experts to assist communities.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Somodo: Poor household asked to contribute to use hand pump like any other household (3 birr/month); told that they can use springs or rivers if they cannot afford; but asked half the additional one-off contribution needed to fix a major technical issue faced with the pump in the past few months.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of beneficiaries and other community members

Generally there does not seem to be a need to convince communities about getting and using safe water, on the contrary.

Legislation and administrative *fiat*: Some form of contribution (labour and/or financial and/or management) is expected from communities/users for safe water infrastructure development and/or maintenance in all communities.

'Awaring' and training: Training of water management committees explicitly mentioned in Adado, though Adado people did not mention committees. Wereda officials unconvinced of the committees' capacity in Adado (technical and financial) and Sirba (financial).

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of intervention implementers

Salaries, per diems, other incentives: The low attention that wereda Cabinets seem to give to safe water supply in budgetary terms seemed to demoralise wereda water officials in all weredas.

Instructions: Weredas get instructions from higher government levels concerning financing modalities (e.g. cost-sharing under AfDB funding).

Consequences of the intervention

People

Community people

In Adado, one episode of acute watery diarrhoea in 2001 EC was contained as the health centre staff put up tents to accommodate sick people; there were some cases reported in November 2013 (no safe water at all for 2 months with the destruction of the pipe by the landslide). In Sirba wereda officials reported an episode four years ago in another kebele, also with no deaths due to rapid response by the wereda health office. No such episode since at least 5 years in Somodo, Oda Haro, Oda Dawata, Kormargefia.

In Adado no safe water at all since the pipe was destroyed (September 2013, no action by November).

Access is improving but there remained issues in all six communities, with less than universal access and varying distances to travel and times to queue, as follows:

Access

- Adado: by end 2013 everyone used springs and rivers again
- Somodo: Most people have access to safe water from springs
- Oda Haro: 70% access via taps and springs; in the 2 remoter many use rivers and ponds.
- Oda Dawata: 40%, mostly in 2 zones, have no access at all
- Sirba: Most households have access to tap water
- *Kormargefia*: Most people have access from protected springs and 10 developed springs. Distance/time to travel and queuing:
- Adado: When taps were working for some people this was a considerable improvement though the opening schedule was irregular and queuing could be an hour.
- Somodo: households mentioned 15 to 30 min walk to get water but that some people in remoter villages have to walk longer; queues at the hand pump can be 30 min
- Oda Haro: 15 min walk and no or small queues for the households interviewed, but DA NRM noted that many have long distances to go
- Oda Dawata up to 30 min walk ('a little far'); government tap is less expensive but long queues so many prefer private taps
- Sirba: 5 min and no queue for those with a private tap or access to one nearby, as open the whole day; variable for others; water from the Chinese construction company is free but there are long queues
- Kormargefia: 10-15 min in rainy season, up to 1 hour in dry season; at least 30, up to 50 minutes queuing

A number of community members got a salary for working as water point guards.

Community labour for safe water seemed to be not very demanding- except in Adado for the recently completed (then partly destroyed) spring diversion/tap water supply scheme. One striking consequence were three miscarriages by pregnant women made to work on the construction.

Government volunteers

Safe water supply does not appear to be a major call on kebele leaders' time beyond possibly relaying community's requests for water investment as in Oda Haro (people willing to contribute money but no wereda response thus far). Committee members spend time, but this was nowhere mentioned as a major issue.

Others

In all weredas, water officials sounded frustrated by the lack of prioritisation given to water development in the wereda budget.

In Oda Haro the iddir that had been given the responsibility of managing a spring from which water was sold had access to much more significant capital than the other iddirs and could lend to its members.

In Oda Dawata and Sirba, individuals owning a tap got an income from selling water.

Place

In Kormargefia there is a concern that the water level is decreasing under the combined pressure of rising safe water consumption, rising use of water for irrigation, and expansion of eucalyptus plantations.

Only in Ada'a wereda (Sirba) did wereda officials mention underground water studies and they noted that they were not well used as water points were left to dry up without being replaced even though the studies had predicted their lifetime.

Institutions

In Kormargefia all six households interviewed wanted the government to do more in relation to safe water provision.

Health extension services

Table 14 provides a history of the introduction of the Federal-level public health programme.

Table 14: Federal-level interventions to provide preventive health services

| Year | Selected interventions to provide preventive health services |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| | HSDP II. |
| 2004 | Launch of Health Extension Package: planned training and deployment of Health Extension Workers (2/kebele); focus on family health, disease prevention, hygiene and sanitation, health education, and 1 st aid (16 packages). |
| | Continued focus on primary health care (plan for Accelerated Expansion). |
| 2005 | Deployment of first batch of HEWs. |
| | National Hygiene and Sanitation Strategy (MOH). |

| Year | Selected interventions to provide preventive health services |
|------|---|
| | PASDEP |
| | Protecting Basic Services programme starts (co-financing GOE transfer to Regions forward to wereda for wereda-provided services, incl education, health and watsan). |
| | PBS health additional component: expansion and equipment of health posts, bed nets etc. |
| 2006 | Continued deployment of HEWs; uneven coverage of HEWs in different Regions. |
| | National five-year strategic plan for malaria control in Ethiopia. |
| | WASH (water, sanitation & hygiene) protocol between water, education and health ministries. Starting rollout of community-based wereda WASH plans, WASH committees at all levels. |
| | National Reproductive Health Strategy 2006-2015. |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | HEW deployment almost up to target; key to implementation of a number of health strategies (new & ongoing), incl malaria control, child survival, nutrition, sanitation, reproductive health. |
| 2009 | |
| | GTP – Stresses importance of 1 HP/kebele to institutionalise HEP at community level; and envisages 100% primary health care coverage (1 HP/5,000 and 1 HC/25,000 people) by 2014/15 PBS2 launched |
| 2010 | HEP mid-term review highlights progress in awareness, but uneven in behaviour change, and deep dissatisfaction of HEWs with their job conditions and lack of career prospects. Focus has been mainly on 3 packages: immunisation, family planning and sanitation (especially latrines). |
| | GOE launches Integrated Community Case Management (iCCM) initiative (2009/10); 25,000 HEWs trained to treat pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition at community level. |
| | HSDP IV new emphasis on maternal and child health, and especially reduction of maternal mortality. |
| 2011 | Start rolling out new health development army approach (2010/11). |
| | New Health Extension Programme guidelines. |
| 2012 | Start rollout of Community Health Information System, whereby health posts keep folders for each family in the kebele. |
| 2012 | New emphasis on maternal and infant mortality reduction: promotion of skilled delivery (at health centres and above); distribution of ambulances (1/wereda); free maternity services at health centre level. |
| 2013 | Free maternity service at hospital. Best practice dissemination (e.g. porridge/coffee ceremony at HC, traditional ambulances, pregnant women monthly conferences, dialogue with TBAs, promotion of 'home delivery-free kebeles'). |
| | GTP APR 2012/13 stresses achievements in hygiene and sanitation, especially latrine coverage (86%) still below target (92%) |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Many diseases, other illnesses and deaths in rural communities are potentially preventable through the institutionalisation of public health programmes. Ethiopia is also committed to the health-related MDGs and had already achieved MDG 4, reducing under-5 mortality by two thirds between 1990 and 2015, ahead of the 2015 target year. The commitment to meet MDG 5, improving maternal health, and MDG 6, combating transmittable diseases is made in the HEP. Interventions to decrease maternal mortality rates include Ante-Natal and Post-Natal care for mothers and a huge increase in the number of deliveries attended by skilled health workers in Health Centres. This requires an increase in delivery suites, midwives and ambulances, discouraging Traditional Birth Attendants from attending home births, and pressurising pregnant women into going to Health Centres for their deliveries. The health extension programme includes a comprehensive set of public health interventions; we have reconstructed an ideal-type model of those interventions using Stage 3 data in Box 6.

Box 6: Ideal-type health extension programme in the communities in 2013

Hygiene and environmental sanitation

- Personal hygiene including handwashing after latrine use
- Environmental sanitation: solid and liquid waste disposal
- Water supply and safety measures
- · Construction and use of latrines
- Healthy home environment separate kitchen and livestock house
- Food hygiene and safety measures including kitchen cupboards
- Control of insects and rodents

Disease prevention

- Malaria control
- Identification, treatment and advice related to transmissible diseases, particularly TB and HIV/AIDS

Family health

- Family planning
- Ante-natal and post-natal care including immunisation
- Good nutrition especially for pregnant and lactating women and infants (breast-feeding only for 6 months)
 and children
- Clean and safe maternal deliveries in Health Centres
- (Adolescent health no talk of this in any community)

Health education - especially on 'harmful traditional practices' with consequences for health

- Milk teeth removal, uvula cutting, and branding and cupping
- Female circumcision

Implementation institutions

- Two health extension workers for each kebele
- Visits to health post
- Model households
- DTs and 1-5s especially those for women
- Kebele and party meetings
- Training of selected people

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about health extension included Health Extension Workers, wereda and kebele officials, women and their husbands in households of different wealths, and girls and young women of different ages and wealths on specific topics.

Implementation of the interventions

Activities

Hygiene and sanitation

Adado: Previously the main focus of health extension activities. Latrines and hygiene and sanitation were among most popular packages. Women in all interviewed households had been 'awared' of the various packages either within the last year or before this; households were said to use latrines. No problem with other packages though pest control did not seem prioritised. Public spaces were being cleaned (e.g. school with teachers, market). In 2013 public latrines were built along the roadside through PWs.

Somodo: Using latrines was one of the most popular packages although only 50% washed hands after defecating. Awareness-raising for this and most packages took place 3 or 5 years ago; nothing new since. The HEW checked whether dishes were kept clean when she visited households. No mention of pest killers.

Oda Haro: HEWs taught about the link between sanitation and hygiene and health; the community had been generally receptive. There was a big change in use of latrines according to kebele officials though 2 households (of the 6 interviewed) didn't have a latrine (land use for crops, lack of time). The waste disposal package was among the least well accepted as people use waste as manure. No mention of pest control.

Oda Dawata: In recent past the focus on health extension services extended beyond sanitation and

disease prevention to prioritise maternal health. Lots of efforts were deployed for people to have and use latrines. No new advice or activity on any of the sanitation/hygiene package had taken place in the last 12 months.

Sirba: Most sanitation and hygiene package were said to be among the most popular because they had been extensively introduced for a long time by HEWs teachings etc. Community respondents reported little activity by HEWs in the last 12 months, generally and in relation to the sanitation and hygiene packages.

Kormargefia: Following intensive teachings and pressure (threat of punishments) most households had latrine but several didn't use them. Waste disposal was unpopular. HEWs had not been very active recently

Disease prevention

Adado: Immunisation was a big success - thanks to strong follow-up by 1-5s, though cultural practice of women not going out for 3 months after delivery was an obstacle; drug supply used to be regular though there was shortage in an emergency vaccination campaign against polio and measles in 2013 and the wereda had not addressed this. Conflicting information on malaria prevalence and prevention. TB and first aid did not seem to be a big focus. Some awareness-raising but no mention of specific HIV/AIDS testing activities; some activity through school club and churches (and TV). Somodo: Vaccines were kept in the HP fridge; HEWs travelled to sub-villages for vaccination (e.g. recently for meningitis and polio). No tablets against 'onko' (onchocerciasis) were given in 2013, unlike previous years. Much activity against malaria (bed nets twice in 5 years, removal of stagnant water, HEWs trained in rapid diagnosis, regular supply of test kits and drugs) made a big difference though there seemed to be some relaxation of effort. No new teaching since several years on TB. Information on HIV/AIDS in school lessons (and through TV and radio) but no big push. Oda Haro: Most accepted packages include malaria prevention; the HEWs' work led to big change according to the kebele leader. HEWs trained people, especially mothers, on preventive health including HIV/AIDS and vaccination. Vaccination was well accepted, to the point that mothers would bring their children rather than relying on the HEWs' visits. Malaria prevention was big: bed net distributions, house-spraying, water removal, checks by DTs and 1-5s, teaching on taking patients to the HP as soon as possible; it made a big difference. No training on TB and HIV/AIDS in past 12 months.

Oda Dawata: Immunisation was an area of success. Malaria was not a problem. There had been mobilisation by megaphone about TB and HIV/AIDS, explaining symptoms and what to do (TB)/encouraging people to get tested (HIV/AIDS). The school educated young people about HIV/AIDS.

Sirba: Immunisation was among the most popular packages. In Nov 2013 in the past 12 months there had been a polio vaccination campaign; anti-malaria spraying and a widespread campaign on use of bednets by HEWs, 1-5s and iddirs (widely used since 10 years, distributed at HP every year, up to 4 bed nets/family). Against HIV/AIDS: IEC/BCC - HEWs said a lot remained to be done as there wasn't much behaviour change; schools provided education; programmes on HIV/AIDS on TV; condoms available at HP but young men didn't often take them. Community members reported little activity by the HEWs in the last 12 months.

Kormargefia: There was no malaria. The kebele did not implement the government advice for people to get HIV tested before getting married; informal school clubs taught about HIV. Party cadres rejected the condoms that government was distributing freely to them, finding them disgusting, so the government stopped providing them. In the past few months, people had to call to ask HEWs to come when the time for their child or wife's vaccination was coming.

Family health

Adado: Recent shift with main focus now on ante-natal care, delivery at health centre, post-natal and infant care. Yet, delivery at health centre was the least popular package; HEW said she delivered a number of women; there was one TBA – as per the wereda policy she would not be trained but got

safe delivery kits (they can assist in emergency cases). Family planning and antenatal care were successful, though getting access to FP for young unmarried women could be problematic as premarital sex was frowned upon; antenatal care was being used by women to know their risk status and if found low/no risk they would not go to the HC to deliver. No abortion, infertility and fistula services. There seemed to be little activity re adolescent reproductive health (one mention, no support by school for girls menstruating).

Somodo: No infertility, abortion and fistula services. Use of contraceptives among married women was one of the most popular packages but access for young women was problematic (culturally and religiously frowned upon). Traditional abortion services existed and were being used. Adult women had not heard anything about adolescent reproductive health. The primary school had started helping girls menstruating. Pregnant women were registered (HEW travelling to sub-villages) and strongly advised to attend antenatal care when they were 'linked to a health institution to go for delivery'. No training and no kits for TBAs, not supposed to assist deliveries. One ambulance at the nearby HC; 2 jigas had cultural ambulances. Teachings about importance of breast-feeding, including house-to-house (and messages on TV and radio).

Oda Haro: Most accepted packages included family planning and child nutrition. HEWs targeted especially women on child care, family planning, and the importance of prenatal care and skilled deliveries. Young women would still prefer getting contraceptives in the nearby town, fearing the HEWs would report them to their parents. There was awareness-creation on contraception at school. No abortion service; traditional abortions were being used but very risky; those who could afford would get modern services in town. Low awareness of fistula. In relation to skilled deliveries: monthly education programme for pregnant women and male household heads through DT and 1-5 leaders; peer experience sharing programme; wereda ambulance though no fuel budget. HEWs raised awareness, did house-to-house visits, registered pregnant women, could assist deliveries but never did.

Oda Dawata: HEWs spent a lot of time following up pregnant women, advising on FP (recent shift in focus on maternal health), and on nutrition and breastfeeding. 1-5s were supposed to help pregnant women to get to a health facility to deliver - mixed accounts as to whether this was effectively done. FP was an area of success - but HEWs, giving lots of different options for married women, advised abstinence to unmarried young women who would get the service in nearby towns. Abortion seemed to be very taboo; no mention of fistula. HEWs taught and advised women throughout pregnancy, collected info/ document their name (through 1-5 networks) so as to call them for ANC, vaccination, teachings on balanced diets etc. One HEW was trained and helped 8 women deliver. TBAs got gloves to assist only in emergency cases. New measures: ambulance, in principle traditional ambulances in each DT, coffee and porridge ceremony at the health centre.

Sirba: Maternal and child care was among the most popular packages. HEWs were said to spend a good deal of their time on maternal services, EPI vaccination and FP. HEWs advised women to have children before they use long-term contraceptives; they were recently trained in placing implants but not removing them; there was a community awareness programme to introduce the new contraceptive. Most young people didn't get contraceptives from the HP for fear of being reported to their parents. No abortion and fistula services in the kebele. Skilled deliveries: recent training for all DT leaders (men and women); monthly pregnant women's conferences (since 4 months); free ambulance service (since July 2013); HEW monthly meeting with 1-5s (education, information); porridge-eating ceremonies at HC; HEWs trained on safe deliveries but discouraged from practising; TBAs rewarded for bringing mothers to deliver at HC. HEWs also encouraged women to exclusively breastfeed for 6 months.

Kormargefia: As HEWs were mainly absent women had to beg them to get contraceptives; in Nov 2013 one woman reported no any family health service at the HP since April 2013. No infertility and safe abortion services in the kebele; available in nearby towns, but young women with unwanted pregnancies also used traditional medicines with severe negative effects, or resort to dramatic practices (one girl gave birth and threw the baby in a pond). Skilled delivery: one HEW/kebele was

trained in safe delivery and all HPs in the wereda got equipment (financed by an NGO) but HEWs feared practising and the policy favoured deliveries at the HC. The HEWs and wereda officials gave a conference to warn TBAs to stop, but they rejected this. There was an ambulance but hardly available in practice when called (no fuel, gone for another trip). HEWs supposedly visited mother and child in their house and advised on exclusive breastfeeding.

Health education (focusing on HTP)

Adado: Teachings against uvula cutting and pulling milk teeth were resisted (deeply rooted culturally).

Somodo: Main focus on female circumcision. HEW reckoned progress though hesitant, and not clear that HEWs played a major role in whatever progress there was.

Oda Haro: The wereda-initiated big push on female circumcision was ineffective. The government ban was rejected by the community as a whole; there was no investigation or serious action against those carrying out circumcision.

Oda Dawata: Female circumcision had strongly diminished/stopped thanks to government teachings.

Sirba: Several respondents challenged the statement that circumcision is detrimental to women's health.

Kormargefia: As in Sirba.

Players (for all activities)

TV and radio were important players in the health extension programme in all communities (messages on breastfeeding and nutrition, information on HIV/AIDS and TB etc.).

Adado: In 2013 there was only one HEW (other on sick leave then maternity leave) over-worked. Kebele management was mostly supportive though kebele leader did not come and vice-chair only once or twice a month when she organised awareness-raising sessions. The kebele manager was actively supportive (e.g. convinced a woman to deliver at health centre by going to her house). The female DTs and 1-5s (health army, volunteers leading female DTs), described by wereda officials and the HEW when speaking 'officially', were in reality not functioning as they should and the HEW admitted to being confused as to whom she should work with.

Somodo: In April 2013 there was only one HEW, alone since a while, overworked. In Nov two more HEWs had joined. The wereda provided a fridge for the HP. Previous health volunteers were supposed to be replaced by the DT and 1-5 structures, much effective according to officials (antenatal care, vaccination etc.) while most community members reported that these were not active. Kebele leaders and other government employees supported the HEW who also worked with the kebele women affairs' officer. School lessons about HIV/AIDS and support to menstruating girls.

Oda Haro: Community provided labour to build HP, wereda provided materials. In 2013 there were two HEWs in Oda Haro, though not living in the community, which prevented them from giving full service (not available in evenings/nights and week-ends, shorter days to be able to return home). They should be working very closely with zone and DT leaders. Previous health volunteers had stopped working in 2013. The activity of female sub-kebele structures was low (no structures at zone and DT level, 1-5s not functional).

Oda Dawata: Two HEWs, heavily involved in non-health activities (agriculture, politics), as were the health volunteers (1 in each DT); managed by the kebele manager (new system). There was supposed to be a health army of 1-5 networks (teaching one another, sharing experience, checking on and helping pregnant women) but although one woman said this was effective, the kebele manager said it was not.

Sirba: The community provided labour for HP construction 7 years ago and was contributing again financially (through iddir) and labour to rebuild the HP that had burned, with wereda providing financial and technical support. RATSON (an NGO) was active in various ways (e.g. helping for the HP

reconstruction, financing a bajaj before wereda got an ambulance; financing a recent training of DT leaders on maternal health). Three HEWs in the kebele, one/village; two recently arrived didn't speak Oromiffa. Until 2011 health volunteers, mostly men, helped the HEWs; this was then replaced by the female 1-5s (so far 30 women in 6 groups); there were also 7 DT leaders with better education, most closely working with the HEWs. In relation to birth deliveries, the role of HEWs and TBAs was said to be limited to providing information and ensuring follow-up; the main role was with the HC.

Kormargefia: Two HEWs; but in Nov 2013 one had been absent (for training) and not replaced for 5 months; community members expressed much dissatisfaction with the current HEWs which were mostly absent and inactive. Until 2012 there were health volunteers but this was then replaced by the women development army (female DTs and 1-5s), responsible for following up and checking implementation of the packages and passing information to their members. Kebele officials had organised female DTs the year before but these were not active.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: HEW did 3 days house-to-house visits, service at HP, teachings etc., and compiled regular reports to wereda. HEWs should have weekly meetings with 1-5 leaders.

Somodo: The HEW gave service at the HP one or two days/week and the rest of the time travelled house-to-house. She registered pregnant women.

Oda Haro: The HEWs gave HP-based services and carried out house-to-house visits; vaccination were done routinely or through campaign when required, which then included house-to-house visits and vaccination days at zonal level. HEWs were supposed to meet 'DT and 1-5 leaders and health army members' weekly, review their reports and pass these to the health centre but it is doubtful that this was done very systematically. The HEWs had a follow-up book and ID for each pregnant woman.

Oda Dawata: HEWs (one of them was Cabinet member) were managed by the kebele manager. They provided HP-based services 2 days/ week and the rest in various outreach activities. They were supposed to be in regular contact with 1-5 leaders though the kebele manager said this was not practical. Kebele leaders used to support e.g. sending someone to carry the vaccination box, but did no longer; however, they had managed to get wereda support to build residences for the HEWs.

Sirba: HEWs taught through DTs, meetings, and door-to-door visits in each village. There were supposed to be monthly meetings of the HEWs with the 1-5 members in each village, focusing on maternal health. An outgoing HEW (going on maternity leave) handed over and oriented the new ones before she left.

Kormargefia: HEWs were supposed to meet DT leaders every 2 weeks and DT leaders to pass info to 1-5s every week – though it is unlikely that this happened in reality, considering the reportedly low level of HEWs' activity. Recently HEWs had registered members of households and put numbers on people's doors.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Material, status and other incentives: In Somodo previously paid volunteers helping with vaccination were less effective as they stopped getting pocket money with the phasing out of the programme. Costs of delivery, antenatal check, mothers' and child vaccination and of any pre- and post-delivery treatment was met by the wereda which was thought to be an incentive, in Oda Haro. In Oda Dawata and Sirba the health centre was trying to provide an attractive environment for women to deliver (coffee and porridge ceremony); in Sirba mothers were given baby clothes and bed sheets and TBAs were rewarded (shoes and umbrella) when bringing a mother to deliver at the HC. In Sirba, the HEWs explained how seeing their children in good health was an incentive for mothers to bring them for vaccination, making it a lot easier for the HEWs to implement this package as opposed to e.g. latrine construction which demanded repeated visits and teachings.

Targets: In Sirba there was evidence of targets for home visits, latrine construction, solid waste disposal, liquid waste disposal, family planning services and health education; and reporting results against these targets.

Threats, fines & imprisonment: In Somodo one poor woman explained how long-term contraceptives were being imposed on women - though it seemed she had mainly been the focus of intensive persuasion. TBAs had been warned of consequences if they assisted deliveries and if anything happened; this was also the case in Kormargefia but the TBAs rejected this threat. In Oda Dawata HEWs explained that there were no longer punishments for those not implementing e.g. the latrine package and as a result people had less respect for HEWs and were unwilling to implement their advice. In Kormargefia there had been threats of punishment against those not building a latrine; this had not been used as everyone had built a latrine though HEWs thought that not all households were using it.

'Awaring' and training: Lots of awaring was taking place in all communities, most recently much focused on maternal health; in all, the female 1-5s were supposed to have a major information role, although their actual level of activity seemed to be generally much lower than designed. In several communities (e.g. Adado, Somodo, Oda Haro, Oda Dawata) lessons about FP focused on the value of small families (high living costs/inflation, support to women's economic empowerment, better health for women) and there was a general trend in the new generation wanting fewer children.

In Adado training of a few selected women had taken place recently (2 days/week, for 2 months). 29 volunteers (1/DT) were trained by JICA in Oda Dawata but shifted their activities to being DT leader once the programme stopped. In Sirba there was one HEW/village so HEWs could closely teach the community; however the new HEWs didn't speak Oromiffa which limited their interaction with women. There had recently been training on maternal and child health aimed to prevent maternal mortality for all DT leaders (6 days for all, 4 additional days for women only); and TBAs had been trained in safe delivery. In Kormargefia HEWs had recently trained a few model farmers for 3 months on environmental hygiene.

Dialogue and participation: In Adado, Somodo, Oda Haro, Sirba and Kormargefia the HEWs explained that targeting women for health extension messages and training was effective (more susceptible to implement what they are told to do; greatest influence on home environment and can influence others; packages much more directly related to women's daily lives; more likely to meet and discuss). In Adado the HEW said she doesn't use harsh words, only convinces people in a friendly way to do things. In Somodo she said that she had good acceptance because she was born in the community and was close to people. In Oda Dawata HEWs and health volunteers were heavily involved in politics; this was said to confuse people and that their role in health was being side-lined. In Sirba one HEW explained that she sometimes helped women she visited to finish their tasks so that they could concentrate on what she had to tell them. There were meetings/ conferences of/for pregnant mothers in Sirba and Somodo (pregnant women described their experiences at government HCs or hospitals).

Targeting models, learning by doing & copying: The HEW in Adado mentioned model families but nobody else in the community did. In Somodo the HEW said 259 model families graduated in 2003 EC and one of the interviewed wives was a model for solid waste disposal. In Kormargefia 505 households graduated in 2013, a lot more than the previous 152, though one only needed to attend training to graduate and HEWs were not convinced that people adopted the packages in practice.

Organising and mobilising pressure from others: In Adado the HEWs use churches, Aba Gada leaders and elders to teach the community and equbs and iddirs to pass messages.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Community people

Change in lifestyle under influence of HEP teachings and other factors (influence of urban areas, e.g. in use of latrines; and of more modern housing in e.g. keeping livestock in a separate dwelling). In Adado and Kormargefia people said that hygiene was valued but buying soap was problematic for poorer members of the community.

In most communities access to contraceptives for unmarried young women remained difficult (shy to be seen and no measures to address this); there was no local support for young women with unwanted pregnancies – with cases of dramatic consequences for the mother or the child; and young men wouldn't use condoms openly, which likely made them being less used than desirable.

In several communities (Adado, Somodo, Oda Haro, Kormargefia) there was little activity related to HIV/AIDS; a general perception that this was not a big threat for the community; no information on cases. In Kormargefia the health extension services were said to be much disconnected from young people generally.

Health Extension Workers

HEWs were either overworked (e.g. in Adado and Somodo where only one was present for a long time) or not very helpful (e.g. in Oda Haro, Oda Dawata and Kormargefia) partly because they wouldn't live in the community (no facilities) but in the neighbouring town (even though in Oda Dawata there was a residence for them). In some instances replacing HEWs dropping out, or just going on maternity leave, had to wait for a new batch of trainees or was seemingly not prioritised (e.g. in Adado).

Other government employees and kebele volunteers

Other government employees and kebele volunteers were expected to support the HEWs; the extent to which this actually happened varied across communities and individuals (e.g. in Oda Dawata kebele leaders used to send someone to carry the vaccination box of HEWs but did no longer; in Kormargefia HEWs cited the lack of support by the kebele administration as one of three challenges).

Other actors (e.g. iddir leaders etc.)

In some instances iddirs played a role in supporting health extension (e.g. mobilising the community to contribute to rebuild the HP in Sirba).

Place

In Kormargefia HEWs said that shortage of water hindered the adoption of the health packages.

Institutions

Primary education

Table 15 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions to provide primary education were introduced.

Table 15: Federal-level interventions to provide primary education

| Year | Selected interventions to provide primary education |
|---|--|
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| | EDSP II, |
| | Primary education expanded to 8 (instead of 6) years in 2002; use of local language; fee free education (since 1996) but voluntary contributions encouraged. |
| | Campaign for Universal Primary Enrolment starts. |
| 2004 | UPE campaign including enforcement. |
| 2005 | Alternative Basic Education policy approved |
| | PASDEP |
| 2006 | ESDP III |
| 2006 | Protecting Basic Services programme starts (co-financing GOE transfer to Regions forward to wereda for wereda-provided services, incl education, health and watsan). |
| 2007 | UPE campaign through persuasion. |
| 2008 | General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) starts, as joint GOE-donor response to low education quality: school improvement plan and grant; teacher education etc. |
| 2009 | Increased qualification standards required from G1-4 school teachers (from certificate to diploma); summer/continuous upgrading programme starts |
| | GTP |
| 2010 CTD | PBS2 launch |
| 2010 GTP (Oct 2010), PBS 2 launch. | ESDP IV Greater attention to teachers' Continuous Professional Development in all primary schools; emphasis on reaching 100% net intake rate in G1 (i.e. 100% school-age children start at 7), community participation including to combat dropout; |
| | National Policy Framework for Early Childhood Care and Education; importance of pre-primary education as a preparation for better primary schooling. |
| 2011 | |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | Launch of GEQIP 2 – foreseeing creation of new Inspection System and new Teacher Licensing and Relicensing system. |
| | GTP APR 2012/13 stresses importance of student-centred approaches, encouraging teachers' initiatives, school management efficiency, community participation as well as various input supplies to tackle persistently high dropout rate and lower-than-expected G8 completion rate. |

The problem and the development intervention solution

There are many tangible and intangible benefits to education. In particular as Ethiopia continues to modernise there is an increasing need for an educated and healthy workforce. Educated farmers are more likely to adopt modern methods, educated young people more likely to seize and create opportunities for non-farm work and educated parents more likely to have fewer children and care for them well. A good primary education system contributes to improvements in all these areas and Ethiopia has made achieving universal primary education a priority²¹ and has also been working to improve the quality of primary education.

Using the WIDE 3 data we have constructed an ideal-type of the primary education programme in the communities in 2013 (Box 7), although as shown in the sections below, there were variations in implementation across communities.

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²¹ http://news.linkethiopia.org/resources/Ethiopias%20progress%20MDG2.pdf accessed on 14/04/14

Box 7: Ideal-type primary education programme in the communities in 2013

Programme to construct new primary schools or extend existing schools

- Community contribute labour and/or cash, wereda may contribute some resources
- Existing schools upgraded on an annual basis to follow cohort up to Gr8; additional schools built in large kebeles to reduce distances for children from more remote areas in low grades
- Schools should have safe water, separate latrines for boys and girls and ideally, electricity

Organisation and management of existing primary schools

- Wereda closely follows up through regular meetings with head teachers, dedicated supervisors for clusters of 5-6 schools, regular reporting by head teachers
- Kebele closely follow up through kebele education committee comprising of kebele officials, head teacher and possibly parents
- Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) manages school affairs (finances)
- Separate/dedicated committee is in charge of tackling late enrolment, absenteeism and dropout
- Schools get a grant from the government; they are encouraged to mobilise financial resources in various ways to complement their other sources of funds; this can include fees levied from families

Staffing

- Schools should have enough teachers; they should be qualified up to the required standards and motivated, putting enough time-on-task; and ready to give extra-tutorials for weak students
- Head teachers and deputy head teachers should not have to teach except to replace absentee teachers

Enrolment, attendance and dropout

- Gr1 enrolment at age 7 is emphasised as well as regular attendance. Responsibility for this is shared between parents, school staff, DTs and 1-5s, party cells, PTA, kebele education committee, dedicated school committee. There are rules for students who are absent without reason
- Schools work by shift and this allows students to also contribute to household activities in the other shift.
 Even so it is harder for poor children to enrol/attend
- Schools can accommodate peaks in seasonal labour demand by closing for a period of time (e.g. grain harvest) and catching up at other times in the school year

Quality of education

- Critical concern for all those concerned (parents, students, school staff) as primary education quality is said to determine success or otherwise to pass to higher education level
- Government supplies textbooks to a 1:1 ratio for all subjects in all grades; schools are encouraged to have a library with additional books
- Various measures are implemented to try and raise education quality including regular meetings and
 experience-sharing among head teachers of neighbouring schools, close follow-up and advice by
 supervisors, organising students in 1-5s, remedial classes for weaker students, continuous professional
 development for teachers etc.

Curriculum

• Students must learn enough English to be able to study in English from Gr9 onwards; for this teachers themselves must feel confident in English and students should practise.

Implementation institutions

- Wereda
- NGOs
- Education kebele committees, Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs)
- Kebele Cabinet
- · Schools, heads and teachers
- · Kebele and community-initiated organisations raising funds and organising community labour
- Kebele Cabinet
- · Schools, heads and teachers
- Kebele and community-initiated organisations raising funds and organising community labour

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about the primary school included the head teacher, kebele officials, and parents and children of different wealth statuses.

Implementation of the intervention

Programme for expansion of school infrastructure

Activities

Adado: One Gr1-8 school; classrooms, offices and teachers' accommodations all in mud walls; no change in past 10 years except adding classrooms. There is electricity and water but not since the landslide destroyed the main pipe.

Somodo: 3 primary schools, oldest one (built in the past with Italian support, nice compound and buildings) expanded to Gr8 and 2 more schools built in past 10 years; in each smaller school an additional classroom was built in the fall 2013 (reaching Gr5 and Gr7). All in good state, though only Gr1-8 has electricity, hand-piped water (though pump now not functional) and latrines.

Oda Haro: One Gr1-8 full primary school and one Gr1-6 school (upgraded to Gr8 before the 2013/14 school year), both built from mud and wood, iron sheet roof; school grant budget used to cement floor in Gr1-8 school; no teachers' accommodation: no electricity (as in Oda Haro as a whole); tap water and separate latrines in Gr1-8 school though girls' latrine out-of-order.

Oda Dawata: Five full-cycle schools, one to two in each ketena.

Sirba: Gr1-4 school opened in 2008 (3 classrooms and 1 office) expanded in 2011 (2 classrooms) with NGO and community funding; plan to upgrade to Gr6 (enough classrooms but lack of teachers); recently school was well fenced and trees and flowers planted for decoration; no electricity. Kormargefia: 3 primary schools (1/sub-kebele, main school upgraded to Gr7 for 2013/14 school year); no electricity; water nearby and latrines. Built with community labour (around one month each year) and in-kind contribution (wood), e.g. two years ago new classrooms. Recently 4 new classrooms, library, and lab under construction, with NGO money. New standard building being constructed for one of the satellite schools, with federal budget.

Players

Adado: No support from wereda at any time; all buildings constructed only with community labour. By late 2013 the Coffee Union was planning to construct 2 blocks of modern classrooms.

Somodo: The wereda provided iron sheets, blackboards, textbooks and technical assistance; other materials (e.g. wood) and labour (mainly by carpenters) was contributed by the community, especially by residents of the zone in which the school was being built/ expanded.

Oda Haro: Latrines in Gr1-8 school built with USAID support; school plans to build additional classrooms with funds raised in various ways (see below).

Oda Dawata: Parents want schools to be upgraded to Gr9-10 so students could complete secondary education locally.

Sirba: Community, NGO support. Wereda supported upgrading of kebele school to Gr9-10 but no mention of support for primary school expansion.

Kormargefia: Community labour, NGO recent support; federal budget for one of the satellites.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Thus far community shouldered all responsibilities for school infrastructure. Somodo: Government support focusing on expanding infrastructure; insufficient teaching materials, seats, libraries, books.

Organisation and management of schools

Activities

Adado: School head teacher and school supervisor report shortages/issues to wereda which addresses them; one wereda cabinet member is especially responsible for the school. Kebele education committee (best functioning among committees) meets once/twice every 2 weeks, controls school income and expenditures, buys stationary, assesses school activities. Most parents mention no fees. School gets income from farming activities. Head teacher is kebele Cabinet member.

Somodo: Supervision by cluster head, closer than wereda. Twice a week meeting with all teachers

from 6 cluster schools to discuss strengths & weaknesses and share experiences. School manages its income including community contributions and pays guards from it. No formal fees but parents contribute for occasional activities e.g. maintenance of facilities. Head teacher is Cabinet member. *Oda Haro*: School get grant funds every year, used for refurbishing classrooms, purchasing learning materials and furniture; financial contribution from each household but no fees; income from its 3 ha land production (farmed by community members). Support from USAID used for water pump and latrines (not good quality, girls' latrine no longer functional). Once a week visit by supervisor (one/4 schools), monthly meetings at wereda level with all head teachers – capacity building in reporting and school management. As Cabinet member head teacher attends monthly Cabinet meetings; also involved in the monthly inter-kebele meetings. He is appreciated by the community, always available from 8.30 am to 5.30 pm.

Oda Dawata: School management very active in raising income for school (hiring out students for potato harvest, annual school day with local drinks prepared and sold, payable cards for access to library, charging for renting out football pitch). No registration fees. A number of parents praise the very active education committee. Head teacher works 9 hours/day 5 days/week; said to be determined to encourage education in community.

Sirba: Head teacher in post since 2009. Reports to, discusses issues with wereda, and sends them students' results. Wereda calls monthly meetings. Contradictory information re school fees, but mentions that some students don't attend because of cost of registration fees; fee payment on credit so parents can pay after harvest.

Kormargefia: Head teacher is head of very active education committee, praised for committee's activity by kebele officials. He is responsible for all 3 schools; provides weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports to wereda. Unannounced inspection about twice a month. Since 2011/12 schools get an annual budget with which they bought books, built toilets, bought new chairs and built the library. No school fees.

Plavers

Adado: Head teacher, supervisor, dedicated wereda cabinet member to address school issues. Kebele education committee to oversee school including financing.

Somodo: Parents' contributions; kebele collecting contributions for school guards' payment. Oda Haro: School grant from international donors to Ethiopia. Community contributes financially through fees and contributions to pay for guards, cleaners and contract teacher, and labour to farm school land; USAID support. Wereda supports through meetings and deployment of supervisors. Supervisor regularly visits. Head teacher reports.

Oda Dawata: School management raising funding in different ways. Vice-head said schools become like private enterprises; others praised active education committee which closely controls progress. Parents contribute in various ways.

Sirba: Head teacher reporting, wereda calling meetings and passing instructions (e.g. re dropouts and on-time enrolment, see below). Households pay fees.

Kormargefia: Head teacher reporting, wereda getting reports and organising unannounced inspections, education committee planning and getting results.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Regular meetings of kebele education committee.

Somodo: Twice a week meetings of all staff from 6 clustered schools in Belida. Poor households are exempted from contributions.

Oda Haro: Weekly visits by supervisor, monthly head teachers' meetings at wereda level.

Sirba: Poor students exempted from fees with letter from kebele.

Staffing

Activities

Adado: Used to be staffing issues but now the wereda allocates enough human resources at the start of each year.

Somodo: Kebele collect contributions to pay 3 school guards. Teachers living in Jimma often late; don't spend enough time on task. Some reports give a sense that students' and teachers' lack of interest mutually fuel each other.

Oda Haro: Big shortage of qualified teachers in wereda as a whole; not easy to attract qualified teachers in Oda Haro; head and deputy head also teach. Lack of teachers (esp language subjects) repeatedly raised by head teacher and PTA to wereda, and raised as big issue by all parents interviewed, but no or partial response; decided to hire local teacher paid by community. Head teacher wants to use grant funds to attract teachers but not allowed.

Oda Dawata: In Mecro school, no problem in getting teachers from wereda, though privately trained teachers may be less good, especially in English; no secretary or store keeper; guard paid by community (which sometimes fails). In one other school, teacher shortage led to students being sent back home; parents want a strong director like before, who could handle all issues and teach in place of absentee teachers.

Sirba: Insufficient budget at wereda level to hire additional teachers to upgrade school to Gr6 (enough classrooms, head teachers asked for at least two additional teachers). School hired a guard on its own budget.

Kormargefia: Enough teachers but almost all live in Debre Berhan or Tebase, face transport issues and are late or absent. Parents question teacher's commitment when they see high failure rate.

Plavers

Adado: Wereda allocating enough teachers. Head teacher, supervisor reporting shortages. Somodo: Most teachers live in Jimma, late in morning, no time for lesson preparation as spend time in transport. Suggestion by some parents that wereda should help motivate teachers by improving school facilities.

Oda Haro: Wereda fails to provide enough qualified teachers. School management and PTA reported the problem. Community had to step in and pay for local hire.

Oda Dawata: Wereda deploys enough teachers. Community pays for guard.

Sirba: Head teacher reported shortages. Wereda faces financial constraints, unable to allocate enough teachers.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Wereda allocates budget resources for staffing at beginning of budget year.

Somodo: Head teacher does not mention any action against teachers' absenteeism.

Oda Haro: Grant funds cannot be used to pay teachers.

Kormargefia: Head teacher does not mention any action against teachers' absenteeism.

Enrolment, attendance, dropout

Activities

Adado: No more than 5% school-age children not at school. Most parents aware of need to send children at 7, though overage students in all grades (20-25 year-old students at school). School committee working on reducing dropout which is a big issue, communicating with families concerned by assigning cell members to deal with the cases. School has regular meeting with parents and kebele administration in relation to children's attendance and work. Reducing absenteeism also facilitated by shift system but all children want to get morning shift as market is afternoon. Most children combine school and work (for family, for an income, in some cases in order to finance their education). After coffee harvest most return but some drop out. Cases of no attendance or drop-out and sometimes drop-in again, for issues of costs, ill-health, or migration. Increasing dropout by boys following elders migrating to gold mines.

Somodo: Most 7-year old enrolled, though overage students in all grades (oldest pupil is 22 in Gr8). Absenteeism during coffee harvest: head teacher and others say it's a big issue, causing failures at exams, but head teacher tries to downplay it in a discussion with the supervisor. School thought of rescheduling calendar but found it impossible because of summer teachers' classes. Kebele education committee not able to control absenteeism. Cases of no attendance as household cannot

afford; very late enrolment, overage students feeling ashamed; repeated dropout and drop-in for various reasons including 'lack of interest' (e.g. one 19-year old Gr6 leaver who dropped out 6 years ago wanting to return to school). Much more likely for poor children to not attend or miss school. *Oda Haro*: Big change is girls' enrolment, thanks to significant change in attitude and proximity of schools. Shift system because of teachers' and classrooms' shortage also helps as allows parents to retain some of their children's labour. Head teacher repeatedly discusses with parents about avoiding heavy workload for children. Schools close for 1-2 weeks at peak harvest time; catch-up classes during week-end. Dropouts happen due to issues of affordability e.g. when father sick, or lack of interest.

Oda Dawata: 100% of 7-year old enrolled in Gr1. Few overage students (oldest student 24 in Gr4). Low dropout rate as school works hard to bring back those who drop out; likely to dropout and not return are female students migrating to Arab countries. Absenteeism on market days, dropout because of financial constraints — USAID tries to help. E.g. young son on poor female-headed household got educational materials, soap and bed sheets.

Sirba: Only 30 of 52 school-age children enrolled in G1 in 2011. Dropouts are an issue. Wereda instructed kebele to mobilise the community to enrol children on time and reduce dropouts; teachers and kebele leaders went door-to-door to remind parents; teachers discuss problems with parents if students dropout/ force parents to send dropouts back. Cases of students not attending because of costs (e.g. poor household).

Kormargefia: 99% 7-year old are at school. Oldest student 20-21. School works hard to reduce dropout and absenteeism, using DTs and 1-5s to tell their members to send children to school and reduce their work burden at home. Shift system helps. School takes a break if unseasonal rain during harvest time.

Players

Adado: Students' families, cell members communicating with the families, making it easier for school staff to control absenteeism. Activities organised by a dedicated committee working on absenteeism/dropout.

Somodo: Teachers (don't help as often late in morning); kebele education committee (not very effective); parents and children lack interest (uneducated parents, discouragement with failures); some households can't afford (children placed as fulltime house servant). Most children combine schooling and work (e.g. G3 student paying himself for pens and exercise books).

Oda Haro: School administration decides to close school for and give catch-up classes after harvest. Oda Dawata: School brings back dropouts. USAID paid for all educational costs for 120 poor students, families get food and support to start income-generating project.

Sirba: Wereda instruction, kebele mobilise community, school staff does most of the work (door to door, discussion with parents).

Kormargefia: School, DTs and 1-5s. 1-5s responsible for registering and reporting all school age children and whether or not they are at school.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Students failing G8 exams cannot re-sit, so some register as new student in neighbouring kebele.

Somodo: Teachers' summer classes prevent reorganising school calendar to accommodate peak demand for children's labour during coffee harvest. Student absent for some time without health certificate are not admitted back (case of poor household's daughter anaemic and self-medicated). Oda Haro: Schools closed for a week or two during harvest season. Rumour that G8 students failing could not re-sit.

Sirba: Permission for unjustified absence only for 3 days/semester.

Quality of education

Activities

Adado: No KG; child-to-child system. Enough staff. Book supply by Region through wereda, including

recent good quality books for 2013/14; but insufficient supplementary readers in library due to enrolment increase. School uses its own income for equipment. System of 1-5s in place. Parents assess quality based on sufficiency of books and teachers and also infrastructure (need more classroom, library) and teachers' commitment to closely advise students. Head teacher sees big differences between rural and urban schools.

Somodo: High students/classroom ratio (80-120). No KG; effort to provide 0-grade but does not work well (no dedicated teachers, kids don't stay). Books provided by USAID, no shortage except missing English teachers' guides. USAID also provided teachers' in-service training. Regular meetings of all teachers for 6 schools in cluster, experience-sharing, close follow-up by supervisor easily accessible to resolve issues. But insufficient time-on-task and poor commitment of teachers (late as live in Jimma, spending time in transport so no time to prepare lessons; teaching because no choice, not by interest). School grant since 2000 EC, used for lots of things (infrastructure repairs/replacement, new or repairs of furniture, water pump). School has a computer, printer and duplicating machine. 1-5s established since 2011, mostly unsuccessful as students don't respect each other and quarrel. Absenteeism has knock-on effect on learning quality and pass rate.

Oda Haro: No KG except Tibe; plans for 0-grade. Shortage of qualified teachers esp language, shortages of textbooks (1:2 or 2:3, even 1:5 maths Gr8), self-contained teachers not up to standards, teachers not familiar with English, only a few use self-made teaching aids (lacking). Some in-service teacher training (wereda). Students in 1-5s; tutorial classes by teachers. Grant funds help with better infrastructure and equipment. All parents interviewed raise concerns with lack of textbooks and teachers (one said students spend time idle at school).

Oda Dawata: Nearest private pre-school in Gonde. Head teacher believes that self-contained and automatic promotion policies in Gr1-4 are sources of poor education quality and reasons for low literacy and numeracy. Measures to strengthen quality: tutorials by teachers, increased families' follow-up, 1-5s for students to study together. Teachers should be better paid to be motivated. Real problems in getting stationary, equipment and textbooks from wereda. Some textbooks should be revised to levels better suited to the year's group ability.

Sirba: Quality affected by shortage of teachers and textbooks; students cannot take books to read at home. Lack of electricity prevents using radio lessons. Head teacher believes self-contained policy and late start are causes of low education quality.

Kormargefia: 0-grade in each school but not practical for young kids. Enough teachers but often late or absent. School budget (grant) helped getting books. Parents assess quality based on better textbook availability (even for lower grades now), better classrooms and teachers, and children's open-mindedness, but weak follow-up of students by teachers and of teachers by school administration.

Players

Adado: Wereda (teachers, books); school (equipment, additional books).

Somodo: Wereda (establishing cluster system, deploying supervisors); USAID (textbooks, in-service teacher training); unstated actor providing school grant; Jimma university (computer, printer and duplicating machine). Suggestion by some parents that wereda should help motivate teachers by improving school facilities. Parents judge school/education quality on quality of infrastructure, teachers' attendance and attitude, exam pass rates. Successful businessman's wife wants to send her son to a private school in Jimma as she is dissatisfied with quality.

Oda Haro: Regional government is training more teachers, expected to reduce shortage. Wereda promotes 1-5s and tutorial classes, organises in-service teacher training.

Oda Dawata: Wereda failed to provide stationary, equipment and textbook since 2004 EC. *Sirba:* Wereda failing to send enough teachers.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Regular report from head teacher and supervisor to wereda if shortages.

Somodo: Government support focusing on expanding infrastructure, not good enough when

insufficient teaching materials, seats, libraries, books.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of beneficiaries and other community members

Legislation and administrative *fiat:* Compulsory primary education

Material, status and other incentives: In Adado the lack of any support by the wereda in upgrading the school infrastructure is said to be a disincentive for the community. In Somodo and Sirba poor students or households are exempted from contributions and fees, respectively (kebele decision). In Oda Dawata poor students get support from USAID, including food and support to start an incomegenerating project for the family.

Threats, fines & imprisonment: In Sirba, parents are forced to send absentee children back (no detail on how).

'Awaring' and training: In all communities there is a lot of 'awaring' by various actors (school staff, kebele leaders, committees) to encourage parents to send/keep children to school. Various mixes of 'awaring' (no formal training mentioned) and dialogue – E.g. in Adado a school committee focusing on dropout/attendance send delegates (cell members) to discuss with parents; the school has regular meetings with parents and kebele administration on children's attendance and work. In Oda Haro the head teacher repeatedly discusses with parents to convince them to reduce children's workload. In Sirba kebele leaders and teachers went door-to-door to remind parents to send children to school on time, and teachers go and discuss with parents when students are absent. In Kormargefia the school uses the DTs and 1-5s to tell members to send children to school and reduce their workload. These means do not always work (e.g. not effective in Somodo).

Dialogue and participation: Examples of schools trying to accommodate community's priorities e.g. closing for harvest and catching up later (Oda Haro, Kormargefia) but finding it impossible to completely reschedule school year to accommodate coffee harvest time in Somodo, due to teachers' summer classes at fixed time.

Targeting models, learning by doing & copying: students were organised in 1-5s in most communities. In one (Somodo) it was said not to work because students quarrelled and did not respect each other.

Organising and mobilising pressure from others: Communities are regularly mobilised (by the school administration, the kebele education committees, the DTs and 1-5s, the school staff, cell members) to contribute to school infrastructure expansion and to the school's functioning in various ways as well as sending/keeping their children to school. In Sirba this was done following wereda instructions to the kebele administration

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of intervention implementers

Salaries, per diems, other incentives: Low teachers' salaries was raised as an issue in Oda Dawata. In Oda Haro school and PTA decided to locally recruit and pay a contract teacher, who is happy to work for a salary much lower than the official one because he was previously unemployed. In Somodo and Kormargefia teachers living in nearby towns because of lack of good facilities, put insufficient time-on-task (late or absent, no time to prepare lessons).

Instructions: In Sirba, the wereda instructed the kebele administration to mobilise the community to send children to school on time. In Oda Haro the head teacher is prevented from using the school grant to attract good teachers because it is not allowed.

Targets & reporting: All schools mentioned reporting to the wereda, some seemed to do so more systematically than others (e.g. Kormargefia v. Adado); no mention of targets but implicit targets such as 100% net enrolment intake in Gr1

Dialogue and participation: Wereda calls regular meetings with head teachers (e.g. Oda Haro, Sirba); supervisor closely follows up (e.g. Adado, Oda Haro); regular cluster meetings with all teachers to discuss challenges (e.g. Somodo)

Consequences of the intervention

People

School staff

Head teachers and teachers must accept to spend enough time in the communities. This is not always the case (e.g. in Somodo and Kormargefia).

Head teachers should have (in principle) a very high workload (Cabinet membership, regular reporting to and meeting at the wereda and/or cluster level, leading or supporting others/committees in promoting enrolment and attendance and in raising funding for the school; in addition to (not mentioned) assessing teachers etc.).

Parents

Parents have to cope with a reduced labour force from within the household. In several communities children's schooling was said to be one of the reasons for increased demand for hired labour; but poor families cannot afford this.

Parents also have to finance their children's education (e.g. petty trade for poor household, coffee income for rich one in Adado, income from potato in Oda Dawata, sale of eggs and crops and remittances in poor female-headed household in Sirba, milk sale in Kormargefia). However in all communities, there were children financing themselves or contributing to it, as young as G3.

Children/students

More children get more educated but many are left stranded on the way, unable to get employed as they have not gone high enough on the education ladder.

For girls, education was said to contribute to combating early marriage in several communities, but the reverse still happened too i.e. girls dropping to get married.

In most communities financing their education costs was said to be one of the reasons why children wanted to work.

Others

Various types of community member not necessarily parents themselves had to spend time contributing to school management and especially, actively participating in convincing parents to send children to school and reduce their workload (kebele leaders, committees' members, cell members, DT and 1-5 members)

Place

Building new schools takes land. In none of the communities was this mentioned as an issue.

Government-community relationships

In Adado the community was unhappy about the total failure of the wereda to help with improving the school infrastructure. This is part of a broader community narrative of lack of support by government in infrastructure development in the area.

In other communities the wereda was failing to support in other ways (not able to allocate teachers in Oda Haro and Sirba, not able to provide stationary in Oda Dawata), but this was less salient.

In all communities parents and students are concerned by the lack of prospects for somewhat educated children/youth and there is a sense that government is not doing enough to address the un(der)employment that they face.

Interventions to change livelihood systems

Crop extension

Table 16 provides a history of Federal-level government interventions to increase crop productivity in areas with good agricultural potential particularly since 2003.

Table 16: Federal interventions related to crops in communities with good agricultural potential

| Year | Interventions related to crops |
|---------|--|
| | ADLI introduced in 1995 |
| Earlier | ADLI revamped in 2002: emphasis on modern inputs (fertiliser, improved seeds), service co-ops, credit; water harvesting and irrigation; livestock development. |
| 2003 | SDPRP Reform of extension; new training programme for DAs; research and development of tailored packages. |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | Deployment of new diploma-holder DAs at kebele level (3 DAs, crop, livestock and Natural Resource Management/NRM). |
| 2006 | PASDEP Elements of the strategy include the shift to higher-valued crops, promoting niche high-value export crops, a focus on selected high-potential areas, facilitating the commercialization of agriculture, supporting the development of large-scale commercial agriculture where it is feasible, and better integrating farmers with markets -both locally and globally. The majority of this response will have to come from the private sector, which includes millions of small farmers. Intensified extension support and specialised extension services for differentiated agricultural zones. Network of demonstration centres. Supporting small-scale irrigation. Reforms to improve the availability of fertiliser and seeds. Better-functioning agricultural markets for both inputs and outputs, and institutions, including improved value chains, information flows, quality and standards support, and cooperatives that strengthen the position of farmers in the market. Protecting Basic Services programme starts (co-financing GOE transfer to Regions forward to |
| | wereda for wereda-provided services, incl agriculture extension) |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | Growing interest in 'growth potential areas' and recognition of the need to invest in them as well as tackling food insecurity. |
| | Rural Economic Development/Food Security (RED/FS) established as joint GOE-donor group. |
| | GTP shift to higher-value crops; intensified commercialisation, development of a more transparent and efficient agricultural marketing system and increased investment in marketing structure. Key strategy is scaling of best technologies and practices of model farmers and development of new technologies for dissemination. Also strengthening of government structures to provide effective services to increase productivity. Promotion of multiple cropping, better adaptation to climate variability, ensure food security, intensify use of country's water and natural resources. Priority to expansion of small-scale irrigation schemes and also medium and large —scale irrigation. |
| 2010 | Commercial horticulture will be integrated with the surrounding smallholder farming. Promotion of private large-scale commercial farms in areas which are not occupied or utilised by people. |
| | Launch of PBS 2. Increased focus on agriculture. |
| | Agriculture Transformation Plan and Agricultural Policy and Investment Framework 2010-2020 (PIF) (finalised in March 2011). Unfunded financing priorities include irrigation (38%); rural commercialisation (6%); NRM (20%). Focus on sharing best practices, irrigation, review of seeds policy and development of integrated seeds system development, invest in research & extension & links with farmers, livestock development (AI, dairy policy, link pastoralists to markets), value chain development incl links to private sector, labour-intensive rural road investment, strengthening farmers' organisations and cooperatives, strengthening access to finance (RUSACCOs, MFIs, voluntary savings). |
| | Launch of the Agricultural Growth Programme, focusing on 80 high potential weredas. |
| 2011 | Establishment of Agricultural Transformation Agency under PM authority. Initial focus on growth potential areas and selected programmes and crops: seed sector, soil health and fertility management, cooperatives, input/output markets and extension and research; and tef, maize, wheat and pulses) + a number of crosscutting initiatives (e.g. soil composition mapping to adapt fertiliser formulae). |

| Year | Interventions related to crops |
|------|---|
| 2012 | Launch of 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Ethiopia', linking food security to investment in agricultural growth potential areas; seeking to harness private sector engagement and; including commitments by GOE (e.g. ratifying new seeds proclamation; support to smallholders in mechanisation & commercialisation e.g. out-growers' contracts etc.). 14 private companies sign 'letters of intent'. Focus on farmers' cooperatives. GOE launched (ATA-prepared) Agricultural Cooperatives Sector Development Strategy. |
| | AGP experiencing slow start, said to be primarily due to high turnover of GOE officials. |
| 2013 | PBS 3 launch. |
| | New seeds proclamation passed (Jan 2013). Teff working strategy (ATA). |
| | Emphasis on expanding small-scale irrigation schemes (thanks among other things to NRM activities), scaling up model farmers' experiences, improving agricultural input supply and application, and expanding agricultural extension services |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Economic growth in Ethiopia depends to a large extent on increased production of subsistence and cash crops for sale within Ethiopia and for export. The government strategy for increasing productivity in place by 2013 included a big focus on small farmers in the private sector including cooperatives to strengthen their position in the market (see below), increased irrigation, an extension service to promote the use of modern inputs and growing techniques, growth in the production of higher-value crops including niche high-value export crops such as boutique coffee, and better integration of farmers with local, national and global markets. Box 8 shows the ideal-type model of the crop extension service that should have been in place which has been constructed from the Stage 3 data.

Box 8 : Ideal-type crop extension service in 2013

Subsistence and cash-crop grain:

- Farmers' work plans including time of planting
- Ensuring access to fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides and weedkillers
- Prescribed amounts of fertiliser (urea and DAP) and improved seeds and techniques for application
- Use of the Broad Bed Maker plough
- Planting in line
- Techniques for weedkiller and pesticides

High-value coffee:

- Use of improved seeds
- Compost not fertiliser
- Good harvesting (coffee cherries properly ripe, no plastic bags, etc)

Crop diversification:

- Seeds and advice for crops new to particular communities, e.g. lentils, potatoes,
- Promotion of fruit through the provision of seedlings
- Promotion of vegetables and fruit grown using irrigation

Implementation institutions

- Three Development Agents, one based in each of the three sub-kebeles
- Farmers' Training Centre demonstrations and training
- Agricultural research institutes including demonstration days open to all farmers
- Model farmers 3 grades
- Champion farmers
- Kebele and party leaders supporting the DAs
- DTs and 1-5s
- Kebele and party meetings
- Training of selected people
- Experience-sharing visits outside the kebele

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about crop extension included Development Agents, farmers and their wives in households of different wealths, young people, and kebele officials. In the light of statements by ordinary people some of the statements made by DAs and kebele officials seemed to

describe the official policy rather than its actual implementation.

Implementation of the intervention

Activities

Adado: mainly on coffee, use of locally produced seedlings, compost, advice on mixed farming and suitable trees and crops, and techniques for picking and handling coffee. Also promotion of maize (farmers 'forced' to take the seeds) but do not grow well without fertilizer and/or not productive, and barley and beans. Advice on techniques to boost production such as line planting and intercropping. But small scale as farmers focus on coffee and inset.

Somodo: primary focus on coffee; training on improved techniques from production to harvesting to improve quality and therefore price. Provision of improved seeds and advice on seedlings production. Most coffee growers seemed happy with the services provided in relation to coffee. Focus on maize (farmers again 'forced' to take not very productive improved seeds), with improved seeds and fertilizer, improved wheat and *tef* more recent through Jimma ARC followed up by DAs.

Oda Haro: primary focus on maize; improved Teff seed introduced last year. The DAs started last year to train farmers to practise inter-cropping (mixing vegetables and beans with maize); introduction of haricot and soya beans by the Bako ARC, and two new maize seed varieties by the ATA with 4 farmers. Farmers concerned about cost of inputs.

Oda Dawata: focus on wheat, provision of improved seeds of wheat, maize, barley, lentils and spices. The government and Kulumsa's research institute provide improved wheat seeds at a 2 yearly interval to the model farmers, who then have to sell some of their output as seeds. DAs also advise farmers to do: line planting, composting, intercropping and crop rotation. Advice is also provided on the quantity of inputs a farmer should use e.g. 100 quintal of fertilizer and seed for a hectare of land.

Sirba: DAs promote row planting, crop rotation, alternating chickpeas and teff to improve soil fertility, use of inputs. Debre Zeit ARI had provided improved seeds to seed producing associations but stopped in 2013. DAs working with women to show them how to handle weeds and weedkiller.

Kormargefia: Focus on barley, wheat and fava beans, and on irrigated land lentils and linseed. DAs promote use of fertiliser, improved seeds, irrigation management, planting techniques and tending; some dissatisfaction with improved seeds that might fail to germinate or, for wheat, the plants produce very little grain. Disagreement with line planting that requires a lot of weeding that exposes crops to frost. Promotion of BBMs but not much receptivity. Teaching on composting. DAs advised farmers to plant apple seedlings supplied by the NGO Food For Children but they dried up.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: DAs promote fertiliser use, row planting, intercropping, composting.

Somodo: DAs providing advice on coffee from planting to harvesting and composting, but not practical for those with less livestock. Adjustment of system with DAs planning input needs with farmers, DAs in charge of a zone each and using DTs and 1-5s and change in who the model farmers are.

Oda Haro: training by DAs and provision of improved seeds by ARC and ATA.

Oda Dawata: The government and Kulumsa's agricultural research institution provide improved wheat seeds at a 2 yearly interval to the model farmers, who then have to sell some of their output as seeds. Improved seed has also been provided by government for maize, barley, lentils and spices.

Sirba: DAs promote row planting, crop rotation, alternating chickpeas and teff to improve soil fertility, use of inputs. DAs working with women to show them how to handle weeds and weedkiller.

Kormargefia: DAs promoted improved seeds and irrigation techniques. DAs record the needs of each farmer for fertiliser and report the total to the wereda, which then distributes it through the

union and the service cooperatives. DAs were told that organic fertiliser was available at the wereda. They collected data on the amount required by the farmers but when they went to the wereda, they were told that the supply had been exhausted and farmers thought that they were liars. The Kebele leadership co-ordinated crop production and watershed work and the Kebele with the DAs facilitated the purchase of an irrigation pump by a farmer.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Material incentives

Adado: Provision of coffee seedlings by DAs.

Somodo: provision of improved seeds and advice on seedlings production. DAs have also produced breed coffee from improved seeds, and will distribute the seedlings to farmers next year. The introduction of a new plough by the Jimma research centre was a failure.

Oda Haro: introduction of haricot and soya beans by the Bako ARC, and two new maize seed varieties by the ATA with 4 farmers, but cost of inputs high.

Oda Dawata: Provision of improved seeds of wheat, maize, barley, lentils and spices. Extension service provided BBM to 12 model farmers to distribute it to all other farmers however, there has been no interest in using it.

Kormargefia: DAs facilitate access to pumps for irrigation, improved seeds, fertiliser, apple seedlings through an NGO.

Advice etc

Adado: Advice from DAs on coffee planting intercropping, composting cereal row planting, fertiliser use etc; advice on coffee appreciated but not on cereals. Farmers interest in ginger not addressed.

Somodo: Provision of coffee seeds and seedlings; pesticides but with delays. Some acceptance of DA advice about row planting, spacing and amount of seeds to be used.

Oda Haro: DAs trained farmers to practise inter-cropping (mixing vegetables and beans with maize).

Oda Dawata: Advice on row planting, intercropping, crop rotation, amounts of fertilizer and seed.

Sirba: DAs advice on planting, crop rotation, use of inputs, fertiliser weedkiller.

Kormargefia: DAs taught about irrigation management, planting techniques and tending, composting.

Consequences of the intervention

Adado: Improvements in coffee production and receptivity but lack of acceptance of improved seeds and being coerced to take improves maize seeds and concerns over price of inputs, and no advice on other important crops notably enset.

Somodo: Advice and assistance on coffee welcomed and some acceptance of improved techniques of planting and use of inputs promoted by DAs, but no support on irrigated vegetables and enset and chat production which would have been welcomed.

Oda Haro: interest in improved seeds but serious concern over cost of inputs.

Oda Dawata: Some interest in improved seeds but concern over input costs; lack of interest in BBM.

Sirba: According to the DAs those who have properly applied the packages have accumulated wealth: bought houses in Debre Zeit and cars, rent additional land for more production, use tractors etc. Many count their cash in thousands rather than hundreds.

Kormargefia: Limited success and impact as dissatisfaction with improved seeds, planting techniques such as row planting, the use of BBM, failure of apple seedlings.

Migration regulation

Table 17 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions to manage migration were introduced.

Table 17: Federal interventions to regulate migration

| Year | Interventions to regulate migration |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | |
| 2006 | PASDEP |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | Amendment to the Proclamation on Private Employment Agencies (PEAs) with a view to enhancing accountability on PEAs for the welfare of migrant workers in destination. First signature of bilateral labour agreements (e.g. with Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan). |
| 2010 | GTP |
| 2011 | Establishment of a national council and task force to educate the public and caution illegal human trafficker |
| | Issuance of the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, air or sea, ratified by the House of People's Representatives and giving power to the Minister of Justice to enforce the Protocol |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | Government (October) announces travel ban for migrant workers, effective on the date of the announcement, and either 'lasting for seven months' or 'until the government has found a lasting solution'. |

The problem and the development intervention solution

In the last few years legal and illegal migration by young women and men from rural areas has increased rapidly. Most legal migration is to the Gulf, while most illegal migrants have travelled to the Gulf, Sudan and beyond, and South Africa. One result has been the injection of remittances into the communities some of which has been invested in productive activities by families and the migrants on return. They have also brought new skills and attitudes conducive to the promotion of development. On the other hand the process is risky, especially for those travelling illegally, and there have been deaths, injuries and rapes on the journey, mistreatment by some employers including refusal to pay salaries, migrants returning 'empty-handed' and/or suffering from mental problems, and maids charged with murder of children. Another concern in communities with large outflows is the loss of a productive generation of young people.

In October 2013 the Government announced that it was banning all citizens from travelling abroad to look for work and that the ban on legal migration would last for at least seven months or longer while better arrangements were put in place. They also started a clamp-down on the agents (or traffickers) and warned parents and young people of the dangers involved in migrating illegally (Box 9). An estimated 120,000 undocumented migrants returned from Saudi Arabia in December 2013.

Box 9 : Ideal-type programme to regulate migration in 2013

Government ban on migration

- Ban on legal migration for maybe for 7 months (until May 2014)
- Clamp-down on illegal migration
- Officials in all sectors relay messages about high risks of migration, and negative impact through loss of most active young workforce of the communities

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on youth migration included kebele/party officials, men and women in households of different wealth, teenagers aged 13-19 and other different kinds of community member.

Implementation of the intervention

Adado: No direct interventions on migration. Land shortage and youth un(der)employment big push factors for male migration mainly to gold mines but also some agricultural wage labour and sharecropping and urban for daily work by men and recently a few women for domestic work. Concerns about migration relate to some children dropping out of school and in the gold mines risks of landslides but no interventions.

Somodo: Wereda officials said that migrating to Sudan and Arab countries was becoming one of the HTPs in the wereda. Youngsters, especially young women who complete G10 drop out of school and migrate to seek high income; usually those from richer families migrate legally and those from poorer families illegally. They are vulnerable to many risks; many cases of women coming back HIV+ and pregnant. During the second fieldwork legal and illegal migration has decreased/stopped since the banning by the government. When some youths heard about the banning of migration they asked kebele officials in a meeting either to provide job opportunities to youth or negotiate with the government to remove the ban.

Oda Haro: The temporary ban on migration has affected the community. The most important form of migration is of young women to Middle East and only form with policy interventions; some 35 women in the last year sending remittances. In November 2013 community members generally against the ban though they thought it was good to act against illegal brokers and give training to legal ones. Officials and community leaders highlighted the problems and loss of young educated energetic individuals. However, most community members felt that blocking migration would fuel joblessness and the government should not prevent young women from changing their lives and those of their families and some 10 girls had already paid down payments for processing migration and many were waiting for visas.

Oda Dawata: The moratorium on international migration has a big effect on the community. Most important migration of women to the Middle East estimated at 100 per year or roughly one per household, which is a source of income for community, for households and young women; families sponsor the migration and obtain remittances. During fieldwork 2, people heard of the ban on the radio, knew of the abuses and the action against illegal brokers. The ban is believed to be temporary and has removed the most lucrative opportunity for young women to earn income and assist their households. Most people against the ban though government workers more aware of the negative sides. One returnee suggested that migrants should be trained in communication and use of electrical equipment and be able to express their needs, and to improve the role of agents.

Sirba: Wereda officials came to inform the community of the ban and they also heard about it on the radio. Some 120 women had migrated to Arab states in past two years 32 from Sirba; some young women also work on flower farms, and young in towns mainly on daily labour or as housemaids, waitresses or in factories and young men mainly in daily labour. The international migration has been increasing in part as legal migration easier, some have enabled their families to build tin roof houses and open businesses. People bring business ideas and also they advise other young women to migrate at least for a year or two to bring change to their family. These returnees wear miniskirts and trousers, they carry bags on their shoulders, they wear glasses, they have mobile phones and cameras. Their houses are also different, they have TVs, and furniture. The respondents have heard of the abuses and one young woman died in unknown circumstances. However many came back bringing household items and look happy and learnt to work hard and cooking and home management skills. They save money in banks and the best houses built by them and some opened shops, a beauty salon etc. Overall international migration is helping the community to have improved lifestyles and supported family economies as well as the schooling of children in the

families. The impact on economic life are more positive than negative.

Kormargefia: The ban on migration to the Middle East has affected the community. Migration of young women to Arab countries is the most important form of migration with estimates of up to 40 in the past 4-5 years, and the only type affected by interventions. Land shortage and need to repay loans to MFIs were mentioned as push factors. They send remittances within 4 months to parents two of who contracted land near the main road to build tin roof houses. One person estimated they send 6-7000 birr per year and some families start businesses in Debre Berhan. International migration leads to work burden on mothers, low marriage rate and children reared by grandmothers and great-grandmothers.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

The intervention is affecting all sites except Adado. The main way in which information about the ban was obtained in all sites was through the radio.

Sirba: wereda officials came to explain the ban to the community.

Somodo: youth asked kebele officials to provide alternative jobs or negotiate with government to remove the ban.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Young women are those most affected in all five sites, and the ban will reduce their opportunities to gain income and assist their households. However, it is the families that sponsor the girls to migrate so they are also concerned. Some of those who had already processed visas or provided down payments, notably in Oda Haro, or were planning to leave soon or who had returned but were planning to migrate again were those most directly affected.

Place

Evidence from all sites that migrants have brought about changes in the lives of their families mainly in building better houses, for instance in Sirba tin roof houses by the roadside or businesses such as beauty salons, shops, grinding mills, sponsoring education and small businesses of siblings. The ban will reduce remittances from migrants but returnee migrants may invest energies and resources locally.

Institutions

The international migration entirely family-based initiatives though delala brokers and agencies are the intermediaries and the ban should prevent illegal migration networks.

Credit and savings

Table 18 shows how and when the main federal-level credit and savings interventions were introduced.

| Year | Interventions to provide credit and attract savings |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP |
| 2003 | GOE-guaranteed credit for farming inputs; regional MFI group-based credit (very different coverage in different Regions) |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | |
| 2006 | PASDEP |
| 2007 | |

| Year | Interventions to provide credit and attract savings |
|------|---|
| 2008 | |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP stresses importance of savings both at macro level, as a source of financing for GOE projects, and at micro level |
| | Agriculture Transformation Plan and Agricultural Policy and Investment Framework 2010-2020 (PIF) (finalised in March 2011) including strengthening access to finance (RUSACCOs, MFIs, voluntary savings). |
| | Growing emphasis on government-promoted RUSACCOs to promote savings and expand access to microfinance in rural areas and on strengthening existing savings instruments. |
| 2011 | |
| 2012 | |
| 2013 | |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Investment in farming and SMEs is facilitated by access to credit. In the 1990s the main lenders in rural communities were moneylenders with very high rates of interest (often 100% over 6 months) although there was government credit for agricultural inputs in some places. In bad years farmers were unable or unwilling to repay debts which accumulated over the years. In 2013 there are large sums of outstanding debt in many weredas. Another related issue which has been identified as a macro-economic problem is the low rate of domestic savings. The government has responded to these problems in a number of ways. Around 2010 regular government credit for inputs was stopped in most places and a campaign of debt recovery was launched. At the same time Regional government MFIs were encouraged to replace government loans for agricultural inputs and extend other lending through schemes involving group borrowing, collateral and kebele supervision designed to make failure to repay less likely. This was followed by an injunction that all borrowers must save a deposit before accessing credit and government promotion of rural savings and credit co-operatives (RUSACCOs) often with support from NGOs. Box 10 shows an ideal-type model of government credit and savings interventions in the rural communities in 2013.

Box 10 : Ideal-type programme to provide credit and attract savings in 2013

Government credit for farming

Savings – people wanting to borrow must save a deposit first

Land and other asset holders can get credit in groups with a kebele letter and collateral; individuals need collateral that can be sold if necessary to pay the debt; farmers should say what they will invest in Special schemes for groups of women and youth involve savings, groups and co-operatives

Government credit for non-farm activities

Savings – people wanting to borrow must save a deposit first

Land and other asset holders can get credit in groups with a kebele letter and collateral; individuals need collateral that can be sold if necessary to pay the debt; borrowers should say what they are going to invest in Special schemes for groups of women and youth involve savings, groups and co-operatives

Government credit for anything

Land and other asset holders can get credit in groups or individually with conditions but can spend it on what they like – banks and some MFI schemes

Government debt collection

Outstanding debts should be collected before more credit is issued

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on credit and savings included kebele/party officials, MFI officials, farmers, traders and people involved in SMEs, men and women in households of different wealth, teenagers aged 13-19 and other different kinds of community member.

Implementation of the intervention

Players and Activities

Adado: Credit for fertiliser stopped in 2012 and only a few can afford to purchase it; credit for improved seeds to be paid at coffee harvest. Credit for jobless youth who completed Grade 10 given to 12 groups organised in 1-5 groups, all male except 1 female group; due to pay back in 5 years. Five groups started working fattening 11 oxen; also sheep fattening and one group a restaurant. In Fieldwork 2 41 youth (1 female) mentioned livestock fattening, grain trading and restaurants. A few richer farmers and those who go to urban areas for materials for teashops and other businesses save in commercial bank in Bule. New initiative to promote savings with a steering committee covering 3 kebeles, with saving box for each household through Omo officers. The agent collects the saving with are registered in the household's ledger account. The plan is to save 76 million birr 20% from households and the rest from government. Omo expects saving of 3000 birr per year. So far 78 households (53 men and 25 women) have been saving small amounts.

Somodo: Credit from Oromia Savings and Credit Association (WALKO; 8 groups have taken loans with 25 members all male. 11 women's saving groups with 329 women. Three groups have registered with MSE to borrow money for livestock rearing. The Service Cooperative deal with WALKO last year to provide credit for fertilisers and seed. OCSA credit to groups of 25-64.

Oda Haro: Credit through Oromia Savings and Credit Association. Credit for around 30 youth organised in a group from wereda savings and credit association to trade in livestock and rent irrigated land to produce vegetables. The wereda Savings and Credit association provides credit for small traders organised in groups to engage in vegetable and livestock trade.

Oda Dawata: ATA gave credit for fertiliser and seed to some determined farmers (from rich, middle and poor). FAO provides improved seed on credit at lower prices. Oromia Credit and Saving Association (WALKO) provides credit mainly used for livestock purchase, also credit from NGO sponsored MFI Wasasa and Busa Gonafa. There are also village savings and loans associations that are very active. Government plans to promote RUSCACCOs to provide credit as well as MFIs.

Sirba: credit for seeds of *tef* and chick peas and lentils from kebele agriculture office and from the Amhara research centre *tef*, wheat and fodder seeds; cattle breeds from wereda and shoats through Passion Connection NGO. Credit from WALKO MFI and Gudina RUSACCO for farm inputs; other MFIs in Debre Zeit Gasha and Oxsassa. Credit for youth who can save 1000 birr; one group got 34,000 birr. Credit for women organised in association from RATSON NGO with no interest to work on livelihoods. Passion Connection credit for borehole, for 30 women in income generation, for breed cattle to two farmers.

Kormargefia: credit from ACSI the main source used mainly for sheep rearing and fattening. Wereda plan to mobilise Service Cooperative and kebele funds lying idle in bank without interest and give these to ACSI. Livestock distributed on credit basis from NGO Food for Children for poor farmers including some who livestock had died (8 sheep and one heifer). Fertiliser part credit part cash for 120 poor people selected by the community with wereda collateral budget. Improved seeds provided to 140 farmer by Food for Children. Global Fund provided credit to 45 households helping orphans for income generation.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Credit to jobless youth by kebele steering committee selecting those fit and able to pay back. Committee has 11 members, including the DA as secretary, the chair, OMO MFI agent and kebele manager. Youth credit groups have to deposit 20% downpayment. The 41 youth collected 46,200 birr and got 231,000 birr credit. Largest credit was 35,000 birr. Money given at Wereda bank but linked with Omo. Credit from Omo but not strong for livestock fattening not for fertiliser and seed. Omo central committee with chair, vice-chair and secretary from the community. Credit ceiling of

5000 birr and interest 12% falling to 8% in second round and 5% in third round. Group collateral way of collecting debt. Debt used to be collected at wereda but now agent hired in 2012 most have paid back, 24,000 outstanding. To open an OMO saving account one has to pay 25 birr, and the minimum saveable amount is 5 birr, the interest was said to be 5% and people can withdraw when them want.

Somodo: WALKO groups need letter from kebele testifying they will repay loan; loans of 2000-10000. Groups saving of 10% required; interest of 15%. Women's groups saving 1 birr for last three years but not enough to engage in business activities. They have a chair, vice, secretary and cashier. Many keep the money with cashier but some plan to save through WALKO in future.

Oda Haro: Farmers forms groups of 5 and get a letter from the kebele to get credit and need to show collateral vial the wereda. 14 groups can form a cooperative with 70 members. Interest from WALKO is 15% People can save 20 birr a month and 10% is kept for death insurance. Payments are three times a year; 5 people left the community when they could not pay but their family and group had to pay. Women's association offers credit for those who have save 20%; most credit from Busa Gonafa is for women engaged in farming, spice trade, spinning and weaving, selling vegetables and cash crops and with cafes.

Oda Dawata: Farmers have to organise in groups of 5 to 10 to get credit from MFIs who lend to anyone who is resident and has wealth such as land, livestock or eucalyptus; the group must propose what they will use it for. Loans are up to 2000 birr with 300 birr annual interest. Repayment of credit from Walko and Wasasa within a year but generally after harvest and from Busa Gonafa within two years. In village savings and loans associations people save 2-5 birr monthly and after harvest 200-500 birr annually and also 50 to 100 kg in crops.

Sirba: Selection of farmers for seed credit from ARC who are hard workers and live close to road access, initially through kebele but now directly with the farmers; seeds to be returned after harvest in same amount as provided (generally 20 kg). WALKO expects people to join in groups of 10 organised through the wereda, and they get credit of 2000-10000 birr. Higher amounts for those who been members longer and known as reliable in repayments. Wife must sign if husband takes loan and vice versa. 20% savings expected; wereda is guarantor for associations taking credit. DA ensures debts are paid. Youth groups need to organise, get licence and recently save 1000 birr to get a loan.

Kormargefia: Selection of beneficiaries for livestock from NGO by Kebele cabinet. They signed that they would repay in five years (though one respondent said that people who received livestock before have not repaid). Selection of fertiliser credit beneficiaries by development teams and cabinet. Kebele manager said that people do not prefer OMO MFI or commercial bank for saving as it involves documents and guarantee and collateral and the credit is for investment or trading whereas people want credit for death, illness, house burning weddings etc. A young woman said there was a problem for women to get credit as need to save and they do not have farmland.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Adado: group collateral; if credit for improved seeds not paid back at coffee harvest time risk of imprisonment.

Somodo: recently education about importance of saving to start up activities; initiation to organise youth to involve in farming on communal land with credit on group collateral basis.

Oda Haro: credit for women through Busa Gonafa MFI with wereda support in skills training.

Sirba: training for people obtaining credit provided at wereda level by government and NGO sponsored MFIs. Training for women's groups provided by Passion Connection for incomegenerating activities.

Kormargefia: People not paying loans back to iqqub taken to social court.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Adado: People happy with the credit but recent so results will be seen in future. Credit mainly for men in groups and some male youth but fairly small-scale and numbers.

Somodo credit for some groups through WALKO and strong women's savings groups that are trying to link up with MSEs.

Oda Haro: WALKO loans said to have helped many move out of poverty; interest rates lower than moneylenders. Some credit for youth and for small traders.

Oda Dawata: some farmers obtaining fertiliser and seeds credit from ATA and FAO. Credit from WALKO, NGO-sponsored MFIs and villages savings and loans associations mainly used for livestock purchase.

Sirba: Some credit for seeds, breeds and for youth and women through NGOs. A range of options for obtaining credit.

Kormargefia: Some poor farmers obtaining livestock and seeds on credit from NGO and part credit for fertilisers with wereda collateral budget. Credit to households helping orphans for livelihood activities.

Place

Adado: credit for youth groups livestock fattening, grain trading and restaurants small stimulus to local economy; some traders able to get loans from bank for teashops and businesses.

Somodo: Some loans from WALKO used for agricultural inputs and from women's saving groups mainly useful for livestock rearing.

Oda Haro: youth credit stimulating irrigated vegetable production and livestock fattening on a small-scale

Oda Dawata: credit for fertiliser and seeds helping some farmers and credit from Government and NGO-Sponsored MFIs and village and loan schemes providing credit options for many to improve livelihoods but debt risks.

Kormargefia: Credit stimulating livestock fattening from ACI and NGOs.

Institutions

Adado: Omo main MFI, some credit for youth groups and rich farmers from commercial bank

Somodo: Walko with involvement of service cooperative for inputs and women's credit with link to wereda MSE.

Oda Haro: Walko main provider, credit for youth and traders through wereda credit and savings association

Oda Dawata: Range of loan providers: Both Government (WALKO) and NGO-sponsored NGOs Wasasa and Busa Gonafa, and village savings and loans associations.

Sirba: Range of providers: from WALKO for youth and for women; several NGO-sponsored MFIs (Gasha, Oxsassa) and directly from NGOs (RATSON, Passion Connection).

Kormargefia: ACSI main credit provider, but NGOs Food for Children and Global Fund for poor and vulnerable households.

Taxes and contributions

Table 19 shows how and when the main federal-level taxation interventions were introduced.

Table 19: Federal interventions to raise taxes and community contributions

| Year | Interventions to raise taxes and community contributions |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | Land tax introduced 1875 |
| | Land tax rate definition and collection became a regional government responsibility in 1995 |
| | Comprehensive tax reform programme ongoing since early 2000s, supported as a component of the Public service Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP), aimed to broaden tax base, streamline tax system and rates, and build tax payers and collectors' capacity |
| | VAT and other tax reforms such as Tax-On-Turnover (TOT) for businesses not registered under VAT (annual turnover less than 500,000 birr), introduced in 2002 |
| 2003 | SDPRP envisages community participation in road maintenance, watershed management, construction and maintenance of water points, management and financing of education and health; the wereda devolution is expected to help in mobilizing community contributions, indispensable to bridge the gap between sector plan requirements and available public resources from domestic revenues, grants and budget financing (no overall target for community contributions is fixed). |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | Investment Climate Study in the run-up to PASDEP reveals businesses' concerns with among others access to land, and overall tax systems |
| 2006 | PASDEP emphasises the importance of the ongoing tax reforms to strengthen domestic financing of the plan, and calls for greater efforts to mobilise additional resources outside the taxation system incl increased community contribution expected to be facilitated by the ongoing wereda level decentralisation. Communities expected to contribute, together with NGOs & private sector, between 6% costs of plan for electricity and 77% plan for HIV/AIDS (and e.g. 10% plan for agriculture and 33% for education). |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | Further tax reforms through Proclamation amendments |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP further stresses the importance of tax reforms, including reducing tax holidays thus far granted; highlights substantial contribution to development required from communities to reach the plan's domestic resource mobilisation objectives. |
| 2011 | |
| 2012 | Amendment to Business Registration and Licensing Proclamation, aimed to establish transparent and competitive domestic trading system. |
| 2013 | |

The problem and the development intervention solution

In order to fund the operations of government all Governments need to tax the population. Farmers have paid (very low) land taxes since the 1975 proclamation of land to the tiller and market taxes have a long history. Recently the government launched a campaign to register and licence SMEs including shops, tea-houses and other small businesses and collect income tax from them. These taxes are not spent at kebele level.

At kebele level there is always a shortage of funds to implement development intervention investments and running costs. As communities have grown richer they have been increasingly mobilised to contribute cash and resources in kind such as wood for buildings. Community members are also expected to contribute a number of days labour for Public Works to build and maintain roads, public buildings, and environmental structures and plant trees (see Box 11).

Box 11: Ideal-type programme to raise taxes and community contributions in 2013

Land tax

Tax rates depend on land sizes

Market tax

Market taxes are charged for the site or in the case of livestock per head

Licences and income tax

SME owners should register and get a licence; an estimate is made of their annual income and they are charged income tax accordingly

Cash contributions

There are annual regular contributions collected alongside tax for such things as kebele office expenses, guards wages, sport, Red Cross and Regional Development Associations

There are one-off contributions for kebele projects such as road-building, school expansion or a waterpoint which may be collected via iddir

There may be one-off contributions for projects at wereda, zone and Regional and national level, for example the Renaissance Dam.

Contributions in kind

Contributions of wood are made for public buildings

Labour contributions

Internal roads are maintained annually through Public Works and public buildings constructed and maintained as the demand rises.

A campaign for watershed management through Public Works was launched in 2010/11; such work is usually done over a month or more following the local harvest.

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on taxes and contributions included kebele/party officials, men and women in households of different wealths and other different kinds of community member.

Implementation of the intervention

Taxes (land, market, income and licenses)

Activities

Adado: The kebele administration collected only the land tax (40,000 birr annually), and remitted it to the wereda. Other taxes (market, income, licenses) were either retained (e.g. government employees get their net salary) or paid to other authorities. All land sizes were taxed. Only one businessman with multiple businesses had a license (250 birr) and paid income tax (300 birr), and a hide-and-skin trader had a license (250 birr), all other small businesses and economic activities were not taxed (petty trade, coffee trade, small tearooms etc.). Late-payers were called by the militia.

Somodo: The kebele administration collected only the land tax (68,000 birr annually) (December to April), and unlike in the past, informed the wereda finance office and deposited the money to the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia branch in Yebu. Other taxes were paid to other authorities (officials from wereda finance office for market taxes in Belida; wereda revenue office for licenses and income tax), on the market, and annually in June respectively. Very small land plots were not taxed. Small shops and businesses used to not be taxed but the wereda revenue officers recently instructed small shop/teahouse owners to get a license as well. As an example the successful businessman paid 220 birr annually for his licence and 2,500 birr as income tax. Mill owners should have a license, not all had one in reality. Coffee and eucalyptus trade were not taxed.

Oda Haro: Land tax (33,020 birr) was collected upon mobilisation by DT leaders; those refusing to pay might be imprisoned as kebele leaders said they would be imprisoned if they were late to bring the tax to the wereda. Market taxes and licenses and income taxes were not collected by the kebele but other authorities. Petty traders and small traders did not need to have a license and paid market taxes estimated by the market tax collectors. Five big traders selling to traders in big cities had licenses and paid an income tax.

Odadawata: Only land tax was collected by the kebele administration (66,000 birr), calculated for different households on per ha basis. Tax collection was smooth; people paid on time because of the fines for late payment. Nobody interviewed paid an income tax (government employees paid directly); even those involved in trade usually did not have licenses. Market taxes were paid occasionally by those selling or buying livestock.

Sirba: In addition to land tax (41,460 birr, some problems with late payers) the kebele had started registering small business and giving them licenses. Traders also had to pay income tax, and some had started doing so (a grain trader, 2 butchers, a bar, the two better restaurants, some shops).

People were told they should get permission from the kebele before starting any business, and get licenses, even areki bars. People noted odd things like the fact that eucalyptus trade was not taxed (even for incomes of 50,000 birr) while selling stone was taxed.

Kormargefia: The kebele administration collected land taxes as directed by the wereda, usually with a one-month deadline following a general community meeting at which they announced the deadline. Regular financial contributions were collected at the same time. Market taxes were paid by those selling on the market in Debre Berhan. Only one person, the grain mill owner, had a license and paid income tax; others might try to escape (e.g. an occasional livestock trader caught once and fined but who will continue secretly). Eucalyptus sale was not taxed although wereda officials had recently instructed the kebele administration to record the sales.

Players

Adado: Kebele administration, wereda administration, taxpayers (all households for the land tax, very few for other taxes), militia. The Coffee Union paid land tax on the land on which the plant was installed.

Somodo: The kebele chair, vice-chair and security and justice were the Cabinet members in charge of land tax collection. Other players: wereda finance officials, wereda revenue officials, CBE branch, taxpayers including youth owning shops, and petty traders on market.

Oda Haro: Kebele administration and DT leaders for the land tax; 450 taxpayer households (269 landless did not pay). Market tax collectors on the markets; wereda trade and industry office for licenses and income tax.

Odadawata: Kebele administration for the land tax; 900 taxpaying households.

Sirba: The kebele administration collected land tax, gave permissions for opening businesses and registered businesses for licenses. Income tax rates for traders were decided by the wereda finance office based on observing people's sales. License/income tax payers included grain owners, traders, bigger restaurant owners, car owners, butchers, some shop owners but not (yet) barbers, small bar owners.

Kormargefia: The wereda (fixing land tax rate, wereda tax office instructing the kebele to record eucalyptus sale); kebele administration (meeting with the community, coordinating tax collection); male DTs responsible for organising land tax collection; tax payers.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Land tax was based on holding size regardless of fertility (25 birr for 0.5 ha, 450 birr for 17 ha). Market taxes seemed to be paid by transaction and/or presence at the market (not fully clear). No information on the basis to fix license cost and income tax rates and why some business had to have license/pay tax and others not. One person (successful farmer, opposition supporter) complained that he didn't have the details between tax and contributions.

Somodo: Land tax was based on holding size and whether or not the land was planted with coffee; plot under 0.25 ha but with coffee were taxed; plots under 0.125 ha were not taxed. Min and max tax paid were 15 birr for 0.25-0.75 ha and 265 birr for 4 ha and more. Market taxes were paid per transaction (not clear for petty trader). To get a license people first needed a letter from the kebele then they went to the wereda revenue office; income tax rates were defined based on estimates of the business income. There were many complaints about unfair taxation (income estimates too high).

Oda Haro: The land tax was calculated based on the total amount expected from the kebele by the wereda, apportioned to holding sizes (and varied between 15 and 260 birr). Market taxes for petty traders were paid based on estimates made by the tax collectors. Licenses and income taxes were fixed by the wereda trade and industry officials; the big traders complained about lack of

standardisation (e.g. people with an income higher than them and not asked to have a license) which they said was due to corruption and nepotism at wereda level.

Odadawata: Land tax was paid on per ha basis, around 40 birr per ha.

Sirba: Land tax was paid on per ha basis, 40 birr per ha; all households paid even for housing land only. Businesses were supposed to have licenses and traders to pay income tax though this seemed to have been in process. Market taxes were 5 birr/week for any trader selling anything on the market, but farmers selling their own products were not taxed. Stone trade was taxed but not eucalyptus trade.

Kormargefia: The land tax was divided into two components, agricultural income tax and rural land use tax, both calculated on per ha basis by the wereda and given to implement by the kebele (rates paid reportedly ranging between 75 and 230 birr); grazing areas and tree plots were not taxed. Eucalyptus trade was not taxed. Market taxes for livestock were paid per livestock head sold.

Contributions (cash, in-kind, labour)

Activities

Adado: Labour contribution through PWs (see watershed management, roads and safe water development). Said to be enough PWs and no need to prioritise. In-kind contribution e.g. trees for a bridge. Cash contributions included annual regular ones (Red Cross, Gedeo Development Association, sports), school contribution, and 'one-off' contributions such as for the Renaissance Dam and for the water development project. Some mentioned a kebele administration fee.

Somodo: Labour contributions through PWs (see watershed management, roads and safe water development; also for school infrastructure expansion). Said to be enough PWs and no need to prioritise. Regular cash contributions included school guards, sports, water, Red Cross and Oromia Development Association; officials and individuals gave different rates; all households were said to pay these; some people complained about paying Red Cross contributions while they didn't get any service. One-off contributions were paid for road construction.

Oda Haro: Regular annual financial contributions (sports, Red Cross, school, Oromia Development Association), and one-off (roads). All households expected to pay –flat rates for the regular ones, according to capacity for roads. Labour contribution through PWs for environmental protection, internal road construction, water point construction and cleaning, school construction, farming for the school.

Odadawata: There were regular annual contributions (Red Cross, sports, Oromia Development Association, school – fixed amount, same for all) and occasional additional ones, for local, regional and federal project (e.g. road construction, piped water; Oromia regional sport hall; wereda administrative building; Renaissance Dam – depending on household wealth) and PWs. Landless households seemed exempted from all.

Sirba: Much demand for PWs, with all 18-50 year-old members supposed to participate 15-60 days per year. Fixed annual contributions included Red Cross, sport, kebele logistics/court expenses (not clear whether the same or different things), a significant contribution for the school. One-off contributions included Renaissance bonds and recently, contributions to rebuild the health post. Inkind contributions included barley for the porridge ceremonies for deliveries at the health centre.

Kormargefia: There were annual fixed contributions (Red Cross, sport, kebele office and school guard, Amhara Development Association, road watchers to prevent theft), collected at the same time as the land tax, and occasional contributions e.g. for water point development and school infrastructure expansion (e.g. library construction) – and for the celebration marking the end of the watershed management PWs. There were PWs for infrastructure expansion or maintenance (e.g. roads, school) and environmental protection (60 days/year).

Players

Adado: The kebele administration collected the various financial contributions; kebele structures organised PWs for labour contribution.

Somodo: Regular financial contributions were collected at the same time as the land tax by the kebele leaders, and deposited at the bank while informing the wereda finance office. No information on the players for the road contributions. Jiga iddirs were used to organise some PWs (road clearing, school infrastructure) and sub-kebele structures for environmental PWs. Wereda officials supervised PWs, evaluating leaders' performance.

Oda Haro: See watershed management, roads and safe water development for PWs.

Odadawata: Landless households were not expected to contribute cash or labour. See watershed management, roads and safe water development for PWs.

Sirba: Kebele leaders and wereda experts discussed works to do with the community and the community decided. The iddir mobilised the community and collected the funds for the HP reconstruction.

Kormargefia: Same as for land tax for annual cash contributions. See watershed management, roads and safe water development for PWs.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: Poor households exempted from Gedeo Development Association, sport and school contributions; school contributions paid only by those with children at school. Red Cross paid only by members. Elderly people exempted from sport contributions. Household contributions for Renaissance Dam decided based on wealth and so as to achieve the kebele fixed amount of 2,000 birr. Cash contributions for water by 'business people' only, and said to be voluntary. Labour contributions voluntary, no punishment for absence under 'good governance' system.

Somodo: Contributions for school guards were given to the school; other contributions were deposited at the bank together with the land tax. Contributions for road construction were based on wealth and said to be 'according to people's capacity' (100-200, 300 and 500 birr rates; a few well-to-do households paid 1,000 or even 2,000 birr); poor and 300 households in crisis were exempted, following decision by the community. PWs were organised after the harvest for terracing (4 times/week for about 5 hours for 1 month); in June for road clearing and classroom construction; in Sep-Oct to dry stagnant water. Youth were not expected to participate.

Oda Haro: No detail on how financial contributions were collected; as opposed to land tax, all households involved. Elderly, disabled, ill, children and students were officially exempted from PWs.

Odadawata: No information on how financial contributions were collected. Landless households seemed to be exempted from all contributions.

Sirba: There was no penalty for non-participation in PWs, just advice. Contributions for the school were 100 birr per year for household with no child at school; 350 birr for those with at least one child. Households paid 100 birr for the HP reconstruction, which seemed to be a flat rate for all.

Kormargefia: See watershed management, roads and water for PWs. Regular contributions were collected at the same time as the land tax. No information as to whether this meant that only landed households paid them.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of beneficiaries and other community members

Legislation and administrative fiat: Tax regulations were mentioned everywhere as basis for the tax

interventions, although information was often quite confused even on e.g. land tax rates and whether or not different types of household paid or didn't pay. Some contributions were also fixed according to some administrative rules (e.g. for roads under URRAP or under the MDG Fund regulations). A number of contributions seemed to be fixed by local (kebele) administrative *fiat* (e.g. school contributions in Sirba; contributions for kebele logistics in Adado, Sirba and Kormargefia). Material, status and other incentives: In Somodo there was a celebration to mark the end of the (environmental) PWs, attended by wereda officials, and prizes for the best performing (DT?) leaders. In Kormargefia such a celebration was mentioned as well, and people contributed 10 birr for it. Targets: In Adado, presumably the amount of 2,000 birr for the Renaissance Dam was a target for the kebele to achieve. The land tax amount expected from the kebele in Oda Haro is presented as if it was a target, apportioned to households proportionally to land holding size. This may be more general, even if not stated elsewhere in the same way.

Threats, fines & imprisonment: In Adado the militia 'called' late payers; but labour participation was voluntary. In Somodo there was punishment (not specified) for late payers; but some people mentioned fines for those not participating to PWs and giving 'unbelievable reasons'. In Oda Haro a trader saw his balance confiscated by wereda officials to force him to pay (as he was complaining about lack of standardisation and unfair treatment). In Odadawata there were fines for late (land tax) payers. In Kormargefia one occasional livestock trader was caught by police and fined as he didn't have a license, but he said he would continue secretly as he did not see why he should pay a license for an occasional business.

Organising and mobilising pressure from others: In Sirba the big iddir was instrumental in mobilising the community and collecting funds for local projects such as school infrastructure expansion and reconstruction of the health post.

Social mechanisms for influencing the behaviour of intervention implementers

Instructions: In Kormargefia the kebele administration was instructed to start recording eucalyptus sale and was given the land tax rate by the wereda. In Somodo the wereda revenue officers recently instructed small shop/teahouse owners to get a license as well.

Targets & reporting: see above re targets put to the community, presumably arising from wereda imposing targets onto kebele leaders. Kebele cabinet members seemed to be under pressure to collect land tax in e.g. Adado (mentioning that late payment put them in trouble with the wereda) and Oda Haro (kebele leaders would be imprisoned for late payment hence resorted to threats of imprisonment for late payers). In Sirba they mentioned late payment by some people as an issue.

Consequences of the intervention

People

Community people

There were some forms of exemptions in all communities, but these varied across communities. E.g. in Adado poor people were exempted from some contributions, but would pay land tax even on a very small plot; in Sirba people would pay land tax even on housing land. In most communities everyone would pay some of the cash contributions, even the landless not paying land tax, except in Odadawata where landless people were exempted from other contributions as well, including labour contributions.

In most cases people interviewed seemed to have an idea of the detail of what they were asked to pay (tax vs. different contributions); less so in Kormargefia. In Adado the person who said he was not given the detail was the successful farmer also supporter of the local political opposition party.

In several communities there were complaints about unfair taxation and/or taxpayers being put in competition with people who didn't pay tax. This was always linked to the licensing and income tax system. In Somodo there were instances of shops run by young people and forced to close as the

tax demanded from them was said to be higher than their income. In Sirba licensing was in progress and even smaller business had been asked to register.

In Sirba the way people discussed taxes and contributions showed that they were well aware of the fact that their labour contributions were indispensable substitute to the meagre kebele and wereda budgets.

Kebele volunteers at all levels

Kebele cabinet members seemed to be under pressure to collect land tax in e.g. Adado (mentioning that late payment put them in trouble with the wereda) and Oda Haro (kebele leaders would be imprisoned for late payment hence resorted to threats of imprisonment for late payers). In Oda Haro DT leaders were reluctant to put pressure on their members to pay tax, in turn putting kebele leaders under pressure.

In Kormargefia 10 kebele leaders and model farmers encamped for a 25-day wereda-level training in Debre Berhan at the harvest time had had the community mobilised to harvest their crops and grass; this was not taken lightly by the farmers who had had to sacrifice some of their time working for others who got training, per diem, bed and food – but recognised that these leaders and selected farmers could not resist the government.

Place

Part of the 'taxes and contributions' were used for place-specific public goods (public buildings, environmental conservation structures) in all communities - although far from all of it.

Institutions

A wide range of structures were involved in tax collection, from the community up to the wereda. At wereda level differently named offices were involved in different communities.

Government-community relationships

In most communities some difficulties were mentioned in relation to tax collection. In several communities one emerging potentially sticky point in government-community relationships was the perception of unfair (or not standardised) taxation system. In Oda Haro this was combined with allegations of corruption by wereda officials deciding who should have a license and pay income tax and who could escape.

Interventions to change ideas in the communities

Table 20 shows how and when the main federal-level interventions to change ideas in the community were introduced.

| Year | Interventions to change ideas through government and party persuasion |
|---------|--|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP Wereda level decentralisation launched in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray Regions. |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | |
| 2006 | PASDEP Post-2005 election consultation and development of 'good governance package'; large-scale training of government officials at all levels (CB agencies leading). |
| 2007 | Rollout of GOE-developed 'good governance package': stop to coercion, use of models, participation and persuasion; emphasis on client information and complaint handling mechanisms etc. |
| 2008 | |

| Year | Interventions to change ideas through government and party persuasion |
|------|---|
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | GTP silent on decentralisation (unlike SDPRP and PASDEP). |
| | GTP emphasis on accountability for service provision through generalisation of use of balanced score cards; development of customers' service delivery charters etc. |
| 2011 | |
| 2012 | GOE review of implementation of good governance package: mixed picture on participation; lack of incentives for kebele leadership a major constraint; more capacity and resources needed at kebele level. |
| 2013 | |

The problem and the development intervention solution

Each development intervention is designed to change particular aspects of people's behaviour. There are different mechanisms for doing this one being 'learning by doing'. Another is to try to change the way people think assuming that this will lead to changes in the way that they behave. 'One purpose of many development interventions in Ethiopia is to replace people's customary orientations to action deemed to be 'anti-development' with modern reflexive orientations.' (Annex 1 Social Complexity Methodology: 8). The government approach to this has mostly depended on meetings and trainings, some of which take weeks rather than days. Recently a party newspaper produced once every 15 days has been sold to party members to read alone or in meetings. Radio and TV programmes are also used to convert people to belief in various development goals and activities (see Box 12).

Box 12 : Ideal-type programme to change community ideas in 2013

Government information

Kebele meetings

Various trainings

Party propaganda

Meetings

Newspaper

Modern media

Radio and TV programmes

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed who provided information on kebele and party meetings included kebele/party officials and different kinds of community member.

Implementation of the intervention

Activities

Adado: Important messages in health care focus on preventive health care, sanitation and HIV/AIDs, and recent campaign on institutional delivery, on gender issues, girls education and women's economic empowerment and broader rights agenda. For the youth awareness raising on SMEs. Teachings on development, include individual household nursery sites for coffee seedlings, watershed management and tree planting, savings, the new ideas of the AGP (credit for group ox fattening), roads improvement, the Millennium dam campaign, elections. The community was part of the movement of Continuing development initiatives undertaken by late PM Meles Zenawi'. Some community respondents suggested there was not much new and that it was the usual message of working hard, producing more and improving lives. Some mentioned good governance, democracy and human rights, and tolerance. Young people mentioned the messages about girls' education, underage marriage, HIV/AIDS, forming 1-5 groups, income for women and group formation and credit for SMEs, adding that livelihood relations activities have not been supported; there was also some concern expressed about growing inequalities.

Somodo: Government messages include promoting participation in work on soil and water conservation activities, in agriculture using more modern inputs and producing quality coffee. There are also messages on changing ideas in relation to delivery at health institutions, family planning, female circumcision, girls' education, women's economic empowerment and more generally women's rights. The government's message to the youth is about getting organised and creating one's own income-generating activity; and to not disregard any job, though as some youth mentioned the advice is not accompanied by any practical support. Household heads and wives confirmed that wereda officials brought ideas related to better farming practices, timely use of fertiliser and planting new coffee trees supposed to give a higher yield; and about engaging in soil and water conservation activities. There was also mention of encouraging people to take credit to both expand their farming means and engage in new non-farm activities. Wereda officials also provided awareness and advice to the community on religious tolerance and the importance of living in harmony among religious groups.

Oda Haro: The new ideas introduced by government include the use of improved agricultural inputs, the expansion of irrigation schemes, public participation in environmental protection, improving local infrastructures such as internal roads and drinking water, the expansion of education and health services, and establishing better security and governance through the use of formal structures and iddirs.

Oda Dawata: The main ideas promoted through the media include progress on the Renaissance Dam at national level, and the importance of terracing and check dams at community level. Ideas were brought to the community by the DAs about the use of fertiliser, modern bee hives, improved seeds and improved chickens. Farmers were shown that it was possible to produce spices and the Kulumsa Agricultural Research Institute was producing improved seeds. Recently the wereda promoted biogas with model farmers selected. Wereda officials have also promoted ideas about peace and democracy, the importance of work simplification and time management.

Sirba: The government, through the kebele, wereda and extension workers, encourages farmers to increase agricultural production through new technologies, such as improved seeds, fertiliser, compost, pesticides and irrigation, and techniques, such as planting seeds in lines. DAs also encourage farmers to produce both crops and livestock products for the market and to diversify their production, including more cash crops such as vegetables. The government has actively promoted gender equality through awareness raising programmes focused on female circumcision, underage marriage, rape, abduction and women's rights to property on divorce and inheritance. The government promoted preventive healthcare and sanitation, pressurising residents to build latrines, teaching about HIV/AIDS and promoting the use of bednets. TV programmes show the successful experiences of other agricultural communities in the country. These programmes emphasise the importance of hard work.

Kormargefia: Main messages include changes in education, agricultural production, health extension and the prohibition of harmful traditional practices. In education the focus is on all school age children going to school and recently pre-school and adult education. In agriculture more market-oriented livestock and crops production, especially milk and livestock fattening and irrigated vegetable production and the promotion of co-operatives (which is an area some agree with but others would like to see promotion of individual entrepreneurs). In health extension HEWs requiring all households to build a latrine, and improve sanitation, waste disposal and build improved stoves. On the prohibition of harmful traditional practices government officials and extensions workers campaign against female circumcision, forced abduction, rape, underage and arranged marriages and domestic violence.

Players

Adado: Wereda and Kebele officials and government employees; development teams and cells, models within the development teams, school clubs.

Somodo: Wereda officials notably women and children's affairs on women' rights and HTPs, kebele officials and extensions workers.

Oda Haro: Kebele officials, development teams and 1-5s. General meetings infrequent but women not required to come and youth discouraged. Party meetings but generally when officials come. Trainings for models once or twice a year. Training is given by the DAs but also by officers from the wereda agriculture, health and micro-finance officials

Oda Dawata: wereda officials, kebele officials, extension workers notably DAs on development and the Agricultural Research Centre. Model farmers selected to implement new technologies such as biogas.

Sirba: Government officials, extension workers notably DAs, HEWs, teachers.

Kormargefia: Wereda and Kebele officials, government extension workers, development teams and 1-5 groups.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour and routines

Adado: government ideology introduced by wereda officials and implemented by kebele officials and government employees. The main routes are the development teams and cells. General meetings have become rare to avoid people getting confused with new things. Frequent trainings are held for models in development teams with good motivation and acceptance in the community (e.g. on watersheds, coffee and inset seedlings and compost preparation, health extension). The models speak at meetings and share their experiences with others.

Somodo: The wereda women's affairs representative noted that their campaigns for women's rights and against HTPs are not supported in practice may some within the wereda. Different messages are aimed at different constituencies including farmers, women, youth etc.

Oda Haro: The new ideas include use of improved agricultural inputs, expansion of irrigation schemes, public participation in environmental protection, improving local infrastructures such as internal roads and drinking water, expansion of education and health services, and establishing better security and governance through formal structures and iddirs. Radio programmes are also important, the most popular being the Oromia Radio programme. Respondents mentioned understanding the presence of different cultures and traditions in Ethiopia, gaining information about the government developmental programmes and news about major problems that happened at the regional or federal level. One farmer mentioned learning about the harm of female circumcision. There were also programmes about farming, market information, modern farming systems and women and children's rights.

Oda Dawata: The wereda promoted the idea that cases should be dealt with at 1-5, development team or zone level rather than coming immediately to the Kebele level so that farmers do not waste time waiting at Kebele for their cases to be heard.

Sirba: The government messages going through the kebele and extension workers are sectorally defined in agriculture, health, education, women and youth affairs and address different sections of the community.

Kormargefia: Discussions in kebele meetings and role of the extension workers, development teams and 1-5 groups. The kebele receives the party newspaper at least twice a year. The cells work on improved sanitation and campaigns against HTPs using 1-5 groups.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Adado: Government messages passed on the radio, including FM radio; many listen to programmes in the Gedeo Language. Ethiopian television is also an important medium for transmitting government messages and some have TVs whereas other watch TV when they go to market or towns. Respondents mentioned obtaining information on prices, business opportunities, corruption,

awards for model farmers, youth groups organising and getting credit, improvements in health, agriculture, technology adoption, savings, family planning, family discussions, HPTs hygiene, child care practices, women's access to economic opportunities, better justice, and HIV notably through drama.

Somodo: Government messages are channelled to the community through the wereda and kebele administration and the party structures and newsletter. Kebele officials explained that kebele meetings are in principle held every month but as attendance is not good meetings are taking place at sub-kebele zone level. Also, since the introduction of the new structures the development teams and 1-5s are the main routes through which development and political messages are delivered to the community. It is not common to listen to government messages on the radio but some of the messages are brought to people through the TV. Model and champion farmers also transfer their knowledge and government messages, especially about efforts to increase productivity. But model farmers do not transfer party/political messages or information. There was some evidence of coercive measures such as for farmers to take improved maize seeds and a case of women who was pressurised by health workers to have a family planning implant.

Oda Haro: Government ideas were on through kebele officials who disseminated them to gares (development teams) and 1-5s. The 1-5s are meant to meet every month, and the development teams every 2-3 months. However meetings are not always as planned and actually the 1-5s may meet only once a month or less. General meetings are called occasionally at kebele level especially when officials come from the Wereda to pass new directives. Most meetings are held at zone level and attended by all adult men in the community. Men who do not attend are fined a minimum of 10 birr. Women are not expected to attend. When kebele/zone meetings are organised young people are not invited to participate. The administration admitted that this was mainly since they raise issues related to jobs and land which are very difficult to answer, resulting in young people being largely excluded from the political and developmental discussions. Party meetings are also held although not frequently, providing members information about the party's programmes, news and directives through the party newspaper which is distributed every six months. Party members are expected to pass the information to others through kebele meetings. The kebele administration has no mechanism to control and follow-up whether the meetings are carried out, or to evaluate plans against implementation. So meetings are organised when instructions come from the wereda to do something. Government ideology is passed on through training courses organised once or twice per year for the model farmers who are expected to persuade others to adopt new agricultural practices. The majority do not have regular access to radios or television due to the lack of electricity. Some families have battery powered radios, others solar powered radios, and yet others listen to the radio on their mobile phone.

Oda Dawata: Development and political messages are delivered to the community through the sub kebele structures. Cabinet officers deliver the messages to leaders of zones and development teams, and in turn development team leaders deliver them to 1-5 members. Cabinet officers then follow up. People have good access to TV and radio. Modern media was said to make people familiar with new ideas more quickly; people heard about the Renaissance Dam, farming and irrigation, as well as about democratic rights.

Sirba: Many people in the community now have TVs. They have access to Oromia TV and radio in Afaan Oromo, as well as Ethiopian TV and radio in Amharic. Some households also have satellite TV decoders.

Kormargefia: Discussions in kebele meetings and role of the extension workers, development teams and 1-5 groups. The kebele receives the party newspaper twice a year. The cells address HTPs and improved sanitation using 1-5 groups. Many farmers have radios which provide information on national and international events which they discuss with friends. Only the chairman has a TV; others watch in cafes in town.

Consequences of the intervention

Adado: though some do not view the messages as very new, messages on livelihoods, health case and women's rights are clearly understood. Changes in infrastructure, livelihoods diversification, health care and education were seen positively though better standards in services were mentioned, and the policy of institutional delivery was not being accepted. Though extension advice and support on coffee production was appreciated the push for farmers to take improved maize seeds was resented. There was some criticism that advice for the youth was not followed up with training, material or financial support. There was a view that values have changed with more of an emphasis on hard work to change one's lives. There were contentions over intergenerational relationships, gender relationships and women's rights, urban influences and religious values.

Somodo: There are positive views about improvements in infrastructure and livelihoods often resulting from hard work. Advice on improving coffee production seen as useful there were worries about the fall of coffee prices. The main area of contentions was the pressure to take fertiliser and improved maize seeds at high prices was resented. Youth expressed a feeling that the suggestions for livelihoods were not accompanied with support. Though people appreciated improvements in education many felt this did not lead young people to access jobs. Though the health post was viewed positively people still felt they had to travel far for health care. Some suggested that the new government sub-kebele structures were not functional. Lifestyle changes have been important notably resulting from changes in communications with mobile phones and TV and satellite dishes, providing information and leading to changing values.

Oda Haro: There was some contention about intergenerational issues notably a concern that young people were abandoning customary beliefs and being influenced by modern lifestyles. There was a feeling that education was not leading to improving livelihood opportunities for the youth as many struggled to find work and were dependent on their parents. The ban on female circumcision was a message that was strongly resisted by the community. The means of promoting government messages included involving not just formal structures but also the iddirs. Meetings were mainly for men and women were less aware of government messages, and youth discouraged from taking part as they tended to ask awkward questions such as on land and employment.

Oda Dawata: Many areas of development were viewed positively, However, there was a sense that traditional values were being undermined as more individualistic values spread. Though the development of government structures could promote development and working together some felt these were not functional and that leaders were not competent. There were also concerns expressed about increasing poverty. Access to modern media, notably radio and television has made people familiar with new ideas more quickly including national and local issues.

Sirba: Government messages offering some advice considered useful by farmers to improve production and productivity. There was contestation of the ban on female circumcision that has considerable support among the elderly. The older generation is worried about the loss of traditional values among the youth apprehensive about changes in lifestyles brought about by urban influences and returnee migrants, and are worried about youth migrating away.

Kormargefia: Messages on education, agricultural production, health extension and HTPs were well understood, though there was resistance to the requirement to participate in 60 days of public works and on the question of female circumcision, and to a lesser degree on early marriage. There was some scepticism about co-operatives and a desire for support for entrepreneurship expressed, there was also some contention over the spread of urban influences undermining local values.

Interventions affecting local government organisation

'We can thus conclude that in the end, development is a political process first and economic and social process later. It is the creation of a political set-up that is conducive to accelerated development that sets the ball of development rolling.' Meles Zenawi on the Developmental State, Columbia University 2007

Table 21 provides a history of Federal-level government programmes to change local government organisation. The Table does not include EPRDF policies and programmes as we have not had access to information on these.

Table 21: Federal-level interventions to change local government organisation

| Year | Interventions to change local government organisation |
|---------|---|
| Earlier | |
| 2003 | SDPRP Establishment of super-ministry of Capacity Building (MCB) and corresponding structures at Regional and wereda level; National Capacity Building Programme (from 2001 onward). |
| | Wereda level decentralisation launched in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray Regions. |
| | Donor-financed Public Service Capacity building Programme (PSCAP) starts in support of 6 out of 14 programmes of NCBP (justice reform, civil service reform, tax reform, urban management, ICT, District Level Decentralisation). |
| 2004 | |
| 2005 | |
| | PASDEP |
| 2006 | Protecting Basic Services – Financial Transparency and Accountability components start, including pilot 'social accountability' projects. |
| | Post-2005 election consultation and development of 'good governance package'; large-scale training of government officials at all levels (CB agencies leading). |
| 2007 | Deployment of kebele managers (wereda administration employee working at kebele level) as part of good governance package; kebele leadership no longer paid. |
| 2008 | Local elections: enlarged wereda and kebele Councils, participation of Membership-Based Associations (WA, YA) to council meetings (in line with good governance package). |
| 2000 | PSCAP Phase 2 is launched (2009-2013). |
| 2009 | PSCAP Business Process Re-engineering (BPS) starts. |
| 2010 | GTP emphasis on accountability for service provision through generalisation of use of balanced score cards; development of customers' service delivery charters etc. |
| 2011 | Growing emphasis on efforts to combat corruption – e.g. publication of corruption perception surveys by the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) annually since 2011. |
| 2012 | GOE review of implementation of good governance package: mixed picture on participation; lack of incentives for kebele leadership a major constraint; more capacity and resources needed at kebele level. |
| 2013 | |

The problem and the development intervention solution

The maintenance of security and the implementation of development interventions in rural communities requires a local government structure. The Government solution has involved a mix of government and EPRDF party structures which are in principle independent but which are staffed by officials playing roles in both structures. The programme to introduce new structures at kebele level began in 2003 when wereda-level de-centralisation was launched in the four big regions. Following the 2005 election a 'good governance package' was developed and as part of this in 2007 there was a re-structuring of the kebele leadership the main features of which were the deployment of paid kebele managers and the end of payment for elected officials including the kebele chair. In the lead-up to the 2010 election party cells (*hiwas*) were put in place in some areas to mobilise people to register and vote and after the election new sub-kebele development structures, including Development Teams and 1-5s, were launched alongside the party structures. Using the Stage 3 data we have constructed a model of government and party structures which it seemed lay behind what has gone on in the Stage 3 communities since 2010 (Box 13) although as shown in the section on implementation there were minor design variations among the sites.

Box 13: Ideal-type government and party structures in 2013

Kebele structure: 'command chain'

Cabinet: chair, vice-chair, security/militia head, women youth and children affairs, Development Agent, Health

Extension Worker, Head teacher, kebele manager as secretary; chair should serve 2 days a week

Social court: independent of cabinet; 3 officials

Committees: not obligatory

Kebele Council: 300 members, half women; responsible for choosing & holding Cabinet officials to account;

should meet once a month

Sub-kebele leadership 3 sub-kebeles led by a committee of 5 responsible for organising the activities of the Development Teams and reporting to kebele leaders; one member is a Development Agent

Development Teams: groups of 25-30 households led by a committee of 5 responsible for organising the activities of 1-5 groups and reporting to sub-kebele leaders; each DT leader is also the head of a 1-5; separate DTs for women

1-5s: 5 neighbouring households under the leadership of the head who is also a DT leader; separate 1-5s for women

Party structures: kebele chair is the party leader; party executive with 20 members; party cells with variable numbers of members depending on who had joined in the vicinity

Relation government and party structures: separate in principle but linked through joint holding of party and some government positions

Kebele structures tasks

Agriculture: implementation of extension programmes – e.g. ordering fertiliser, taking what was ordered and applying it according to extension instructions, implementation of farming activities at the planned times; planting in line; using BBM plough; working in turn on each other's land

Health: implementation of health extension programmes; mainly a women's responsibility through their 1-5s (the Health Army)

Public Works: mobilising people for PWs

Meetings: mobilising people for 1-5, DT, sub-kebele and general kebele meetings

Community security: patrols; reporting strangers; reporting interest in other political parties

The interviews and data

The respondents interviewed about the kebele structures included kebele and party officials at all levels, husbands and wives in households of different wealth statuses a number of whom held official positions, and a number of different kinds of key informant. In the light of what ordinary community members said it is clear that many, though not all, officials had provided information about the intended structure towards which they were working with roles which in principle would be quite onerous. In practice the structures were not fully operational. They were introduced from 2010 in a staggered way starting with male sub-kebele structures, then Development Teams and then 1-5s. Structures for women were introduced later and it seemed that the 1-5s were preceding the Development Teams.

Between April and November 2013 in all communities there was evidence of a push from the wereda to get the structures working properly so we are here first describing how the structures seemed to be working in April and then describe what had happened since. It was too early to draw any conclusions about how effective the government push to institutionalise the structures was proving but our discussion below suggests there are number of mechanisms at work in rural communities working against full institutionalisation.

Implementation of the intervention in the six sites

Cabinet volunteers

Players

General: The expected workloads of voluntary Cabinet members included attendance at regular cabinet, kebele, and party meetings, and particularly from April greater contributions to intervention implementation at sub-kebele levels which in some places included house-to-house visits. Cabinet members were also meant to be successful model farmers and lead by example in adopting new technologies and activities. Most officials were prioritising their own livelihood activities over their

unpaid kebele responsibilities since there was not time to do both well, particularly at peak farming times which had become more frequent for those with irrigated land producing two or three harvests. Some officials were also involved in non-farm business.

Adado: The chair had been in places since 2008.

Somodo: A new chair was elected in April and the old chair became vice-chair following his election to the wereda council. He was 'difficult to engage with, not interested and not very well informed about the community'. His brother was a national MP and there were allegations that he had given him some kebele irrigated land; people were said to be afraid of him because of his connections. Oda Haro: The chair in April was removed in September 2013. There were reports of bad relations among Cabinet members: competition for the kebele chair position, 'cruel' kebele manager who had been a cabinet member

Oda Dawata: A new chair was appointed 11 days before the second fieldwork following the removal of the previous chair as a result of *gimgema*. The cabinet suffered from clan-based competition, mistrust and differential dedication to the work

Sirba: the chair who had been ousted two years ago had run a hostile campaign against his replacement including allegedly having him beaten up

Kormargefia: The chair, who had been in place since 1992, was rarely at the kebele office. The cabinet rarely met and while some were dedicated many were not active.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

The cabinet structure in five of the communities conformed to the ideal-type structure. In conservative *Kormargefia* (near Debre Berhan) there was no women's affairs representative but there was a youth representative which no other Cabinet had.

The Oda Haro and Oda Dawata chairs had been replaced through *gimgema* conducted by the kebele Council; the reasons for their removal included failure to do the job properly and allegations of corruption

Material resources

Households made small annual contributions for kebele expenses. Even so Adado cabinet members had to supply stationery from their own pockets.

While kebele leaders were unpaid there were signs that it was possible for them to use their positions to bring in some income. For example in Adado the chair and the justice committee head were richer than the wealthiest coffee trader and had been poor when they came to power, though people were reluctant to talk openly about how they had become richer.

A key resource was the control over land allocation. There were charges of land corruption in Somodo, Oda Haro, Oda Dawata and Sirba while the Kormargefia leadership had started leasing the communal grazing land to individual farmers and reportedly did not provide receipts for the payments unlike tax payments.

Another source of funds was justice – 'to get decisions made quickly you had to give them something if only a cup of coffee'.

In all sites kebele leaders said that paying people is the only way to make sure people carefully carry out their responsibilities.

Timing of activities

Adado: The Adado chair said in theory the volunteers should only work 2 days a week but they did much more than that. The Cabinet was meant to meet twice a month in Adado; punctuality was a problem

Somodo: The Somodo chair said the chair should serve for 3 days a week but this was not possible without payment. In Somodo they should meet once a week but often sessions were postponed; absenteeism was particularly high on market days and during the coffee harvest. There was no cabinet meeting at all during the first fieldwork which lasted five weeks.

Oda Haro:

Oda Dawata: The ousted Oda Dawata chair said in April the cabinet only came 2 days a week: one day to serve those who needed them and the other to review each other's performance.

Kormargefia: The kebele manager in Kormargefia said the cabinet rarely met due to absenteeism.

Government employees

General

Adado: In Adado government employees were responsible to the wereda.

Somodo: Development Agents and Health Extension Workers said in the past they had been expected to work alone but that since April kebele officials (with a new chair), party members, Development Teams, and 1-5s had been collaborating with them in a new way.

Oda Haro: Wereda and kebele officials considered wehabism as an extremist group linked to terrorists and employees like HEWs, seemed to endorse the government's message. DAs and HEWs attended the monthly inter-kebele meetings on security issues.

Oda Dawata: DA comment: many strategies to improve society's condition are spread down from government for employees to implement but they are not given enough time. They are blamed by the society because what they are taught is not implemented.

Kormargefia: HEWs said the DTs and 1-5s were created by the wereda to 'amalgamate' development and politics.

Kebele manager

Players

Adado: In job 5 years. He has had 2 months training on governance.

Somodo: In job 5 years. In principle he is not allowed to study as higher officials think he cannot do his job well if he attends education; attending secretly.

Oda Haro: Ex-chairman become kebele manager in 2012 and is considered as a Cabinet member; He said he got the position as he better fulfilled the criteria than the other 5 candidates (has a diploma in law). Rumour he bribed wereda officials. He said he was not working for money as the salary is very poor; working to contribute his knowledge and skills to the community.

Oda Dawata: In place 6 years.

Sirba: Manager replaced in June; previous had worked for 2 years. He served both the rural kebele and Denkaka municipality.

Kormargefia: manager in place for 3 years. He is also kebele vice-chair and a member of the 16-person core party structure. Lives in Debre Berhan 'because Kormargefia lacks facilities' and is regularly absent.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: Not a cabinet member and accountable to the chair. He and the DAs worked together closely on party issues. He was appreciated by the community and considered a political activist Somodo: Works as information desk officer, record keeper, reporter; he must collect reports from all kebele officials including DAs and secretaries of zones. Over-burdened by role and diverse responsibilities. Tasks put him in an awkward position; if he pushes kebele officials for reports there are difficulties but if he does not deliver reports on time wereda officials complain – sometimes he does not like his job.

Oda Haro: Manager acts as information desk. Expected to organise and oversee all activities in the kebele and report community's questions and demand to the wereda. Poor relations with Cabinet and not doing job properly but no-one controls him.

Oda Dawata: Works 7 days a week all year but still can't manage all sectors. Lacks support from Cabinet and committees. Allegations that people wanting ID cards have to pay 40 birr bribe. Sirba: He was responsible for co-ordinating the agricultural and health extension programmes but the DAs and HEWs did not co-operate. Good relations with Cabinet and Committees. He had

modernised the way the administration worked and was always available so issue were handled faster than before.

Kormargefia: The wereda regularly transfers kebele managers and he worked in another kebele before. Works well with the chair on development and political activities (though they had only met once briefly in a month – FW1). DT leaders are required to bring a weekly report to the kebele manager on development activities and the chair on party activities.

Headteacher

Players

Adado: No information on the head.

Somodo: Head in place 17 years. Oda Haro: Male head available daily 8.30 to 50.30 which was much

appreciated.

Oda Haro: Male head teacher
Oda Dawata: Head is 29 and male.

Sirba: Woman headteacher in Sirba school.

Kormargefia: The head has been at the school for 5 years; he is director for all three kebele schools

and leader of the Education Committee.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: Education committee controls dropouts (cell members are assigned to deal with cases), buys stationery, controls the school income and expenses and evaluates activities. Wereda allocates resources based on reports from head teacher and school supervision. Since supervisor allocated there are faster responses to issues. School and kebele administration meets parents whose children are absent.

Somodo: Since 2009 wereda established Cluster Resource Centres each supervising 6 schools; it is now easier to get solutions rather than waiting for wereda officers. Education committee not effective in tackling absenteeism.

Oda Haro: Monthly meetings of all head teachers with wereda officials leading to action plans for each school; 1 supervisor appointed for 4 schools. Wereda response to some issues slow. The school complements the school grant with community contributions and income-generation.

Oda Dawata: School has become a commercial enterprise: students made to save and hired out as potato harvesters. Starting in 2013 local drink production sold at school fete, collecting money from football match players, library card payment. Teachers should be given further training and paid better.

Timing of activities

Somodo: School found it impossible to re-organise the school calendar to fit with the coffee harvest because of teachers' summer upgrading education.

Sirba: The headteacher has close links with the wereda education office: reports activities, discusses problems, sends students' results; office calls monthly meetings.

Kormargefia: He reports weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly and annually to the wereda and there are unannounced inspections. Supervision started in 2009 but is now more frequent: once or twice a month.

Development Agents

Players

Adado: In first fieldwork (5 weeks) there was no NRM agent and the Crops DA was attending. training; FW2 vet for 3 kebeles coming twice a week. Somodo: Each DA is secretary to a zone. No Crops DA for 8 months in April. DA livestock in place 5 years and NRM 2 years.

Oda Haro: Three DAs – Livestock female. DAs live in town and since Meles' death visited only some days a week and sometimes only half a day. People complained at a meeting with wereda but no

action and DAs tried to retaliate against those who complained.

Oda Dawata: Three DAs in place in April each responsible for a zone; by November 2 with diplomas replaced by 2 with degrees.

Sirba: Three DAs in place each working in a zone; DA Livestock female.

Kormargefia: Three DAs each working in a zone; DA livestock female. All had been in place for 8 months in April 2013.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: It was not fair that farmers were forced to take bad improved maize seeds which failed the DA's germination test. Wereda brings plans that are very ambitious and expectations are too high; planning should be done bottom-up considering the situation in Adado. Livestock DA gives advice but not backed up with access to resources.

Somodo: Each DA reports to the kebele administration and manager. Good collaboration between sectors; teachers and HEWs assist in delivering messages to farmers. Frequent refreshment training. DAs are EPRDF members and get party work.

Oda Haro: Each responsible for one zone; they are supposed to liaise with HEWs and kebele leaders so they can integrate and backup messages passed by each. They are involved in different activities related to health, education and gender. DAs also involved in monthly inter-kebele meetings focusing on security issues. They should report any request from farmers to the wereda. Oda Dawata: Wereda started trying to improve services by having discussions with all DAs

sometimes. DAs managed by the kebele manager and overseen and supported by the wereda office. Each DA responsible for a zone but they live in town as no money to build them a house. Change in approach: work in the villages not the office. *Sirba*:

Kormargefia: Unrealistic promises should be avoided to repair declining trust between farmers and DAs.

Timing of activities

Kormargefia: DAs report weekly to the wereda agricultural office either in writing or by phone. A wereda supervision team comes once or twice a year to assess their performance.

Health Extension Workers

Players

Adado: Only one active HEW for 1000+ households; the other was sick and then pregnant. Active one was sick and pregnant in fieldwork 2.

Somodo: One HEW in place for 6 years and working alone for a year in April; in November there were 2 more HEWS – total 3. She worked with the Women Affairs officer.

Oda Haro: Two HEWs lived in town and only came to the community for a few days a week and even on days they came only stayed half a day; no service at weekends. In November they had started building a house for HEWs next to the Health Post.

Oda Dawata: Two HEWs.

Sirba: Three HEWs, one for each community. The 2 interviewed in April (1 had been in Udie for 6 years and the other for 2) had left by November, one for upgrade training and the other for maternity leave.

Kormargefia: Two HEWs in place since 2012. They live in Debre Berhan and commute despite having houses in Kormargefia; are frequently absent or late and visit the sub-kebele near Debre Berhan more often.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: She had 15-day training at wereda level. Main work lags behind when she is compiling reports.

Somodo: Teachers and DAs educate people about health packages in various meetings. In FW2 HEWs were planning and doing all package activities with the Cabinet which brought better change.

Wereda officials recognised high turnover due to low salaries.

Oda Haro: HEWs are expected to work very closely with sub-kebele and DT leaders. HEWs involved in monthly inter-kebele meetings on security. Wereda comment on issues: maternity leave, frequent meetings and lack of transport affect working hours, limited skills affect reporting and services, gaps when HEWs on training.

Oda Dawata: HEWs managed by the kebele manager. Two days a week in the Health Post (in 1 remoter zone) and other days on outreach (new). In FW2 the 1-5s/health army was not functional; there were about 20 volunteers in the DTs. HEWs trained women at zonal level. HEWs also involved in agricultural demonstrations and distribution of improved seeds, collecting party fees and supporting the women and child affairs office.

Sirba: Wereda officials recognised the problem of high staff turnover due to wanting to live in towns and the low salary. Other problem is that 1 year is not enough to teach all the packages and there is no field training. HEWs choose this work as a last resort.

Kormargefia: The HEWs have divided the kebele into two for out-reach. One left for training in July leaving only one. They lack support from the kebele administration.

Timing of activities

Sirba: There are monthly meetings of HEWs with the wereda health office.

Kormargefia: They report weekly to the wereda health office in writing or on the phone and a supervision teams comes once or twice a year to assess their performance.

Kebele Council

Players

Adado: 200 members 50 women.

Somodo; at the 3-day meeting before the April elections none of the 59 female members was

present. The Yem minority had few representatives on the Council *Oda Haro*: The Council had 100 members 50 of whom were women.

Oda Dawata: Since April half the members are women.

Sirba: since April the Kebele Council has 315 members 150 of whom are women; before April there were 300 members and 60 women. The kebele manager said that the members were 'courageous evaluators'.

Kormargefia: There are 300 members. Most of the kebele council were re-selected by the party and re-elected by the people in April.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: The agenda focuses on current pressing issues in the kebele and they discuss these issues and send reports to the wereda council. Council had conducted *gimgema* sessions of the militia and kebele chair in the last year – the previous one had been dismissed in 2008 following a negative assessment and the current one had improved his performance following a warning *Somodo*: The Council should meet every 2 months to evaluate the accomplishment of planned activities but sometimes the Cabinet had not met to prepare so it was difficult to raise issues. *Oda Haro*: The cabinet members were elected from these and the Council could also dismiss them which they had done to the previous kebele chairman in September 2013.

Oda Dawata: Since the election in April there had been a new Council approach: cabinet members and kebele officials should be reviewed through *gimgema* every two months to check they are implementing government policy and working effectively. They are given 2 oral warnings and the third time they are fired. Under these procedures they recently fired the kebele chair and vice-chair. The new chair was proposed by the Council's administration committee (20 members). The key issues discussed in the last two meetings were: how to improve the livelihood of the community, the status of their kebele in the wereda and how to become more efficient. They also discussed about school dropouts and lack of teachers in their kebele. No key decisions were made but they were

given advice on the implementation of government policy. Absentees should be fined 30 *birr* and it was government policy that 3 consecutive absences should lead to dismissal but as everyone would like to be dismissed this was not implemented. Lack of meetings affects overall kebele activity as the Council is very important in making decisions

Sirba: The agenda is kebele work in general and evaluation of the administrators.

Kormargefia: Agenda is the preparation of the plans and budgets for the kebele and the evaluation of heads of sectors by *gimgema*. They found the performance of one militia was not acceptable and so made him return his gun and he was forced to work unarmed. Two model farmers were demoted in 2010.

Timing of activities

Somodo: Council should meet every 2 months.

Oda Haro: In theory the Council meets once a month but the members are farmers so it meets 3-4 times a year.

Oda Dawata: Since April The Kebele Council had met twice between April and November.

Sirba: The Council should meet every month but only held three meetings last year.

Kormargefia: Council should meet once a fortnight but there had only been three meetings in the eight months prior to the fieldwork.

Sub-kebele leadership

Players

Adado: sub-kebele leadership of 3 put in place in 3 sub-kebeles in 2010.

Somodo: the kebele is divided into three zones. Each sub-kebeles had a 7-member administrative body with the DA being the secretary.

Oda Haro: the kebele is divided into 3 zones each led by 5 leaders.

Oda Dawata: There are 4 zones and 3 sub-kebeles one of which contains two zones. Sub-kebeles are led by 5 elected people

Sirba: Sirba is now one of three sub-kebeles in Udie kebele. There is no sub-kebele formal structure but the three vice-chairs each living in a different sub-kebele are responsible for them.

Kormargefia: Since 2010 there have been 3 zones led by the kebele officials who are resident in them.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: Sub-kebele leaders were only involved in development activities (not politics) though not in those related to coffee production. They should organise Public Works, collect data on health and farmers' needs for agricultural inputs, organise meetings, promote group work by 1-5s on each other's farms (should be 3 hours a day on each) and use *gimgema* to punish the under-performing. In practice it seemed that the three levels of sub-kebele structure had done little related to farming between April and November 2013.

Somodo: The DA reported to the kebele administration and the manager about activities in the zone. Zone leaders should call Development Team leaders to pass messages on agriculture, health, education and other development interventions

Oda Haro: The sub-kebele leaders are responsible for organising the activities of the Development Teams.

Oda Dawata: The five sub-kebele leaders are responsible for organising people for development activities, peace and security and good governance. They are encouraged to solve as many things as possible at zonal level.

Sirba: The vice-chairs work on security, administration, health, education, party work, communication and mobilisation for development.

Kormargefia: The sub-kebeles are led by the kebele officials who reside in them; no formal structure. Each Development Agent is responsible for one sub-kebele. The information from officials and

ordinary members about the operation of the sub-kebele structures was so contradictory that an observer suggested that the kebele official respondents had given information about the intended structure towards which they are working rather than the structures functioning in practice.

Timing of activities

Somodo: The sub-kebele leaders should hold fortnightly meetings to monitor and evaluate what was done compared with the plan.

Development Teams

Players

Adado: Development Teams were established in 2011; reports of 20-60 members led by a 4-person committee; August 2013 instructions to establish separate groups for men and women which had been done on paper but they were not functional. *Somodo*: there were 45 Development Teams with 25-40 members. There were separate women's 1-5s but not separate DTs.

Oda Haro: There are 25 DTs made up of 25-30 households who are responsible for following-up the activities of the 1-5s and reporting to zone leaders. However, Development Team leaders reportedly focused on their private activities and did not engage properly in mobilising their teams for development. Between April and November the wereda made a big move to activate women's structures.

Oda Dawata: The 29 Development Teams each have a leadership of 5 and each leader leads a 1-5. In November each Development Team reportedly had a health volunteer working with the HEWs but the women's 1-5s had not started to function.

Sirba: There are 62 Development Teams with 28-30 members in the kebele with separate teams for men and women; Sirba has 9 male DTs and from last year should have 9 for women.

Kormargefia: There are 28 DTs. Since April all women were being organised in DTs for health activities. In September the Health Extension Worker posted a map showing the residences of the members of each DT in the leader's house. By November they had not been used for any interventions.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: Serious gimgema of the DT leaders performance was said to be conducted by higher kebele officials.

Somodo: Each team should have a committee of 5 handling different problems. Leaders should pass the messages from the sub-kebele leadership to the 1-5s.

Oda Haro: DT leaders focusing on private activities.

Oda Dawata: DTs should mobilise members to participate actively in development activities and Public Works – but 1-5s were not active.

Sirba: DTs are responsible for implementing agriculture and health extension programmes, security patrols and mobilising for kebele meetings and Public Works. They have a head, secretary, treasurer and a political representative responsible for public organisation and party activities. They have written rules and regulations. Also their work plans are written and a copy given to the kebele administration. If anyone fails to follow the rules or the workplan they can be penalised by the head usually in the form of additional Public Works.

Kormargefia: The most important activities of DTs are mobilising for Public Works and meetings and leading the 1-5s. Male DT heads should report to the DAs once a week and monthly to the kebele office. The reports are supposed to help the kebele monitor activities and inform them about social, economic and political changes in different parts of the kebele to enable them to find solutions to problems.

Timing of activities

Adado: Development Team leaders should meet the 1-5 leaders on the last Friday of each month for 3-5 hours to report on 1-5 attendance, the creation of model farmers etc.

Somodo: DTs were meant to meet every week and every fortnight there should be a meeting of all the members of the DT to discuss development issues and what had been going on in their villages. Oda Dawata: They should meet once a week to discuss what they have done in the week and plan what they will do next in the areas of development, peace and security, health and education.

1-5s

Players

Adado: In November 2013 practically 'there are no 1-5s functioning; they are only on paper'; very few respondents could describe the kebele sub-structures.

Somodo: There should be 248 1-5s and separate women's 1-5s but they were not working properly in November 2013.

Oda Haro; However both men and women were reportedly not interesting in co-operating in the 1-5s.

Oda Dawata: Practically there are no 1-5s functioning; they are only on paper. The knowledge acquired from the wereda is suspended at Development Team level

Sirba: There are 105 1-5s for men and there should be the same for women. Women's 1-5s started in 2012 and by November 2013 there were 5 female teams in place in Sirba with strong links with different sections of the community. Membership is entirely voluntary and one can leave at any time.

Kormargefia: No information on how many or whether they were actually working since all the respondents were party members and hypothetical leaders of 1-5s.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Adado: 1-5s launched in 2012; they should work co-operatively including during the coffee harvest and be used for social activities. Health volunteers should lead the women's 1-5s and focus especially on maternal health. Not working in November 2013.

Somodo: members should share information and follow up that the others are implementing what they have been told to do. 1-5s were given a push in 2012 but by November 2013 were still not fully established and did not work as intended; this was attributed to lack of follow-up by wereda and kebele officials and low awareness on the part of the community. People were not using them for labour co-operation and one leader said that people were frustrated by receiving so many messages from the same person and did not take much notice. The DA had tried to use them to force people to take the required amount of fertiliser.

Oda Haro: 1-5s were meant to be responsible for mobilising people for Public Works, making everyone actively engaged in farming and helping one another. They were not working properly in November 2015.

Oda Dawata: 1-5s only on paper.

Sirba: Sometimes the meetings of the 1-5s are not done properly but all of them are active. They discuss a lot but their real involvement in action is limited; some are reluctant and this discourages the others and some members behave badly.

Kormargefia: 1-5s should be used for implementing agricultural and health packages, mobilising people for Public Works, registering school drop-outs, ensuring the repayment of debts, and collecting land taxes.

Timing of activities

Somodo: 1-5s were meant to meet every 3 days and if there was an extra need at night. *Sirba*: 1-5s should meet at least once a week.

Party structures

Players

Adado: there was a party executive and 13 cells with four leaders and 7-40 members. There were

480 party members, 54 female amounting to 42% of households.

Somodo: in general the party does not seem to be overwhelmingly present. There were 20 party organiser from the 3 zones including all Cabinet members which and 45 party cells. There are 359 party members, 59 female roughly 30% of households.

Oda Dawata: There were 20 members of the party executive who were meant to meet every two weeks and 307 party members amounting to 32% of households.

Oda Haro: In the kebele as a whole there were 60 political party organisers including the party executive and 22 cell leaders. Cell membership was between 4 and 8 depending on the number of party members in each Development Team. Party membership amounted to 179 or 40% of 'official households'.

Sirba: Party membership had greatly increased in recent years and had reached 99%; one respondent said that if someone in the community refused to be a party member it would not be good for relations between the government and the community.

Kormargefia: The core party structure at kebele level had 16 members including the chair, vice-chair and kebele manager. There were 284 party members amounting to 29% of households; only influential young and richer hardworking exemplary farmers have been recruited for party membership and only a few youth related to the Youth Association are asked to be party members.

Systems, rules, divisions of labour, routines, activities

Somodo: Party and development structures are independent though the leaders are the same. One interviewed party member said he stopped going to meetings 2 years ago as they were too frequent and the issues discussed were never implemented.

Oda Haro: One respondent said that most people were not members by choice and apart from election times not much work was done by the political leadership – more focus on economic development. In November party members were trained and told to agitate the people to side with the government in the 2007EC election.

Oda Dawata: Attendance was better than for kebele meetings as you could be expelled for non-attendance. Development Team leaders are also cell leaders so can easily mobilise people for party politics. They advise people not to join another party and work closely with the government. They should control 1-5 members about where they have been and what they are doing and get them to report any newcomers, for example religious leaders.

Sirba: Members of the political executive collect reports from the cabinet and government employees and evaluate the political activity in each sector. Party cells are separate from DTs and 1-5s although cell leaders are also DT leaders; there is no limit on the number in the group. Kormargefia: Four of the sixteen core party members were responsible for one sub-kebele, and six each in the other two sub-kebeles. The leaders divided responsibility for the DTs in their zones among them. DT leaders are meant to bring a weekly report to the kebele manager on development activities and the kebele chairman as head of the core party structure on party activities. Party cells had 7-10 members and a leader and a secretary. Party and development structures were separate in principle but linked; all DT leaders were leading farmers and cell leaders so they led both development and party activities within their teams. Most ordinary farmers did not know the difference between the party and the kebele leadership. DT/1-5 leaders are to be active party members selected from the party cells and kebele level party leadership. The party executive mobilised leading farmers to become exemplary for the community and selected for the kebele and wereda council elections through cells and 1-5s.

Timing of activities

Adado: party executive was meant to meet every month and party cells were meant to meet once a fortnight.

Somodo: party cells should meet every 2 weeks when there are discussions and newsletters are distributed.

Oda Haro: In October there had recently been a strong move to strengthen the role of the party at

grass roots level. The wereda decided that cells should meet every 2 weeks to aware people about the overall government programme including focusing on farming, not selling crops when prices were low, not sending daughters overseas through illegal brokers, and looking after peace and security in the area.

Oda Dawata: Party executive was meant to meet every two weeks. Once a month there was a meeting of all party members.

Sirba: Members of the political executive meet every month (or 2 months). There is a monthly meeting for party members but no punishment for non-attendance. A number of respondents who said they were party members had not been to any meetings.

Kormargefia: Sub-kebele leaders are meant to meet the leaders and secretaries of cells each weekend and the core party structure is meant to meet the sub-kebele leaders once a week.

Mechanisms used in the implementation of the intervention

Legislation and administrative fiat

- The new sub-kebele structures were put in place in 2010 through administrative fiat. The same is true of party structures
- Government employees are moved by administrative decision and elected kebele councillors are party members chosen by the party executive
- The wereda also regularly introduced minor changes to rules, divisions of labour, routines and activities as administrative decisions

Material and status incentives

Kebele employees

- All are paid salaries; these are considerably lower than the incomes of the richer farmers and business people in the kebeles.
- Further training is an incentive to meet targets and score highly in gimgema

Kebele volunteers

- Kebele cabinet volunteers are not paid salaries or expenses while working in the kebele; per diems for meetings outside the kebele are an incentive
- As described above cabinet volunteers can use their control of resources such as land and access
 to justice to make some income; some may feel it is not unfair since they do not understand why
 they should spend most of their working week on unpaid kebele duties.

Party members

- There were assertions from a few people that in order to get a government job it was necessary to be a party member; there were also assertions that it was important to have a relative in a powerful position in the wereda.
- In one community, Sirba, everyone had reportedly joined the party so party membership could not be a criterion for accessing incentives.
- In the other five sites where majorities were not members there were no assertions that people who did not belong to the party could not access government services, except that agricultural extension services were focused on model farmers who were meant to be party members; however they may not have been active

Targets

- Kebele employees are given targets against which they report to the wereda; this provides an incentive to report what ought to have happened rather than what did.
- We did not have any information about targets for kebele volunteers or party members

'Awaring' and training

 Kebele, sub-kebele, DT meetings, Party meetings were used to teach people about the new structures and what their roles in them

Dialogue and participation

- The wereda employing the DAs in Sirba had recently instituted regular meetings of all DAs for discussions and feedback
- It was unclear how much dialogue and participation there might be in kebele and party meetings and this might have varied across the communities or the type of meeting.
- In Oda Haro one rich farmer had stopped attending meetings since he said if those who raised problems they wanted discussed were likely to be accused of being members of the opposition.

Creating models

 Model farmers were meant to be exemplary in all development activities including active participation in Development Teams and 1-5s

Consequences of the intervention

Consequences for people

Government employees

Somodo: Kebele manager not allowed to pursue education but was doing it part-time secretly. HEW did not get her salary increment every 2 years. She was not allowed to pursue education at a private college and the wereda health office only sponsors a few HEWs based on performance. This makes HEWs want to leave. She had failed her evaluation in spite of hard work because she worked alone and had no help from kebele officials; this had recently changed and she was happier. Oda Haro: No education opportunities for kebele managers unlike employees in other sectors. Manager unhappy with workload vs pay. Government is trying to give HEWs access to training programmes.

Kormargefia: The kebele manager does not like his job and does not want to continue; lives in Debre Berhan but salary is too low to live in town and transport is costly.

Government volunteers

Oda Haro: The kebele chairman sacked in September 2013 in Oda Haro said cabinet members did not come to meetings on time or give due attention to government directions and programmes. Some cabinet members wanted his chair, the kebele manager did not do his job and the kebele was too big and problematic to administer.

Beneficiaries

Adado: Poor farmers with small plots said that if they were involved in shared work in their 1-5s they would spend more time working on others' farms

Generally: People in 1-5s are neighbours and already have established relationships, including networks of co-operation, with the people they live near. They may be close friends, bitter enemies or somewhere in between and the particular local dynamics will affect the way different groups of five neighbours respond to attempts from above to organise them for development and security activities. These communities have up to 250 1-5s and there is likely to be a range of responses in the different kinds of very small neighbourhood.

Consequences for the place

Kebele buildings can contribute to the formation of a nucleus for the growth of small towns; in two sites people reported building huts in each sub-kebele for administering justice and local meetings which in turn could become nuclei for future urban development. We do not have any information on how the sites were chosen and whether this was in a context of 'sub-kebele town planning'

Consequences for institutions

Oda Dawata: poor performance of the sub-kebele institutions was explained by lack of kebele follow-up, lack of knowledge about what the programmes were for, and lack of interest in working in the structure as people were keen to work on their livelihoods.

Consequences for community-government relations

Oda Dawata: farmers were unhappy with follow-up and control mechanisms by which Development Team leaders reported how they were farming to Zone leaders who shamed them in Zone meetings if they were not following the government plan for when things should be done.

Oda Haro; there were complaints about the way in which politics was interfering with development and unhappiness about government pressure in relation to both politics and religion.

Headline findings on how important interventions were working in 2013

Watershed management and tree-planting

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Ideal-type integrated watershed management programmes involving soil and water conservation structures, re-forestation, gully treatment and area enclosures through PWs for up to 60 days a year.
- Soil conservation work everywhere; lack of expertise/poor quality in four communities.
- Tree-planting: 2 Meles' parks in one site; some limited success on another; seedlings not
 protected from livestock in two and dried through lack of follow-up in another; only individual
 planting in one coffee site.
- Elephant grass on terraces in two sites appreciated, died in another.
- Work was done everywhere but it was not clear for how many days and how many did not participate fully or at all.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

Community members

- In two sites tree cutting was legally banned although there were problems of enforcement in two sites.
- In one site people were paid under SLMP in 2011 only; there were celebrations arranged by the wereda at the end of the PW in two communities; in one (which later failed to follow-up on tree seedlings) the kebele was ranked 5th in the wereda and given a cup.
- Targets were set in two sites: in one for the number of trees to be planted and the other the length of terrace to be dug by each individual.
- Fines for non-attendance were implemented in one community and threatened in another. Two had no fines and this limited participation; kebele officials in one threatened exclusion from kebele services but this made no difference. In one some people were taken to the social court by the militia after refusing to participate.
- 'Awaring' and/or training were mentioned in five communities.
- In Somodo, where terracing took place on individual farmer's land in turns, people were willing
 to participate so long as it was not in the coffee harvesting season; the kebele tried to persuade
 youth to participate in one community but they declined.
- A Somodo farmer who had started terracing on his own initiative was interviewed on Oromiya
 TV. In one site the community was told about successes in other parts of the country and
 wereda officials sometimes participated in the work to set an example.
- The zone-Development Team-1-5 'chain of control' was not totally effective.

Intervention implementers

Adado's wereda was ranked best in the zone for watershed management.

- In two sites the work followed directions from the wereda but what was done precisely was decided at kebele level. DAs were heavily involved.
- In two sites the DAs provided very precise numbers of households participating and kms of terrace suggesting targets to fulfil.
- In some communities iddir and religious leaders were asked to mobilise people for PWs.

Consequences

- Wives in one site and employees in another did some of the work
- Mobilising the community through the sub-kebeles structures for watershed management their most effective activity in all communities. In one site DT leaders said their role had led to tensions with absentees and latecomers.
- There was some reduction of flooding and erosion in four sites; in two people complained terracing reduced farm/ grazing land and some undid it.
- In one site the imposition of 60 days PWs strained the government-community relationship

Roads

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Main highways near all communities had recently been upgraded. In four the highways passed
 through the kebeles. The main road leading to the highway in one site was well-maintained by
 the wereda but in Adado the responsibility lay with the community and the work did not last
 long. The wereda said the difficult terrain required zone or Regional inputs.
- There had been some improvements everywhere in numbers and quality of roads but most were still dryweather and in two sites were not wide enough for vehicles.
- Internal roads were maintained by Public Works only in four sites; in two in addition to PWs
 there had been cost-sharing between wereda and community and the government had provided
 some technical support and skilled labour.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Some of the road works were carried out under programme funding rules in four sites.
- People highly appreciate improvements in roads making them willing to contribute labour and if necessary cash.

Consequences

- Road access for those living in less remote areas had improved considerably in five sites but not much in Adado.
- Community members everywhere generally highlighted improved internal access as a priority but only in two sites was the government beginning to respond in a systematic fashion.

Youth interventions

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

Youth co-operatives and 1-5s

- Credit in one site was about to be given to 41 youth in 13 '1-5' teams. Credit had been given or promised for similarly small numbers to be organised in co-operatives in four other communities.
- Land had been given to two agricultural co-operatives in one community and one for beekeeping co-op in another, where there were promises of more land.
- Three stone co-operatives had gone out of business in one site; in another three with a total of 200 members were successful.

Youth organisations

 There were no effectively active youth organisations in five communities. In Oda Dawata the YA leader said it had 550 members engaged in irrigation, stone extraction and selling grass although this was the only report of this.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Youth have more often received promises of land and credit than delivery in the past though there seemed to be a new programme in 2013.
- In two sites pressure on youth to become party members and possible advantage sin getting employment was mentioned.
- Training was only reported from one site and it was not followed up.

Consequences

• Under pressure from smallholders kebele officials in Oda Haro were reluctant to give land to youth; in Oda Dawata land worked on by a group of youth without official permission was allegedly given to the kebele chair's brother as an investment.

Women interventions

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Land rights: land certification completed in four sites but in two delayed associated with polygyny; some implementation but still male resistance and male official bias
- Economic empowerment: affirmative action reported in two communities; credit for selected women and young women in four sites mainly associated with NGOs in three who provided training in two. Young women had difficulty saving required deposits.
- *Gender relations*: female circumcision was highly resisted in one site, reduced but still an issues in one, much reduced but still practised in two, had almost disappeared in one, and was not part of local custom in the sixth.
- Under-age marriage had reduced everywhere due to opportunities for education and incomegeneration but some girls still married under the age of 18. There had been a few but not many court cases.
- Polygyny was not practised in two Orthodox Christian sites but 'the government cannot control having mistresses'. It was still practised in four sites and hard to follow-up in three where *sharia* allowed it.
- Widow inheritance was no longer practised in two sites and rarely in a third; few cases said to be difficult to enforce in one community.
- Abduction had decreased though risks still remained; sometimes it was hard to tell the
 difference between forced and voluntary abduction; some cases of prosecution and relatively
 short terms of imprisonment.
- Some reduction in rape of unmarried girls; not so clear about married women. It was hard for poor women and those without effective male relatives to get justice.
- Divorced women were claiming rights to property but faced difficulties achieving them due to male bias.
- There were no or very few cases of daughters claiming inherited land except in Kormargefia (Amhara).
- Domestic violence was a big issues in four communities but reduced in two; few cases and male bias.
- Political empowerment: affirmative action for wereda (and theoretically kebele) positions in two weredas; more participation in structures and meetings but still not very great as most women do not want to be involved in politics.
- Young women and girls: affirmative action in educational opportunities and to get government positions with lower marks in two communities.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Legal certification of land rights
- Affirmative action

- Incentives of credit, seedlings, chickens for small numbers
- Campaigns against HTPs affecting women; sometimes support from wereda and kebele Women
 Affairs officials; campaigns and girls' clubs in schools
- · Warnings, trainings and threats of imprisonment for circumcisers; occasional imprisonment
- Threats of imprisonment sometimes carried out for rape, abduction, early marriage.
- In Sirba elders refused to negotiate marriages by abduction; iddir committees in two sites could punish male offenders/parents who circumcised daughters.
- Half kebele councillors women in a number of communities; attempts to increase women's involvement in DT and 1-5 structures and kebele meetings.

Consequences

Increasing role of Wereda women's and children's affairs in HTPs, defending women's rights and
coordination with justice sector, notably courts and police. A justice committee set up in
Somodo to accelerate cases. Some involvement of NGOs and churches in HTP issues.
Involvement of MFIs and NGOs in credit and income-generation activities. Iddirs involved in
punishments and fines for circumcision in Somodo and in domestic violence in Oda Haro.

Safe water

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Most people had access to safe water in two sites; elsewhere some people in remoter zones did not.
- In one site there was concern that the water level was decreasing and for some springs the kebele imposed quotas.
- A landslide had damaged the town's piped water in Adado but it was not repaired after two
 months; shortages of wereda budget, parts and plumbers in the five sites where they were
 responsible for water.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- People want safe water.
- Some labour, finance and management expected from the community.
- There were no kebele level water committees; waterpoints were managed by users.
- In Sirba all water was provided by private individuals, an NGO projects and a private firm.
- The low attention that wereda Cabinets seem to give to safe water supply in budgetary terms seemed to demoralise wereda water officials in all weredas.
- They got instructions from higher levels concerning financing modalities.

Consequences

- Cases of cholera in Adado in 2009 and 2013.
- Less time spent walking for water for some but queues a problem for many.

Health extension

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Two HEWs were not enough to cover all sixteen packages and all areas of the kebeles; in three
 communities there was only one for some months. In one site the HEWs did not speak the local
 language.
- Hygiene and sanitation: latrines, hygiene and sanitation used to the main focus of extension activities but attention had recently shifted; many households had latrines though it was not clear how many used them. Hand-washing after use was not practised by all.
- *Disease prevention*: immunisation and activities to prevent malaria were accepted; there were rumours of HIV/AIDS deaths in some communities but less activity on this than in the past.
- Family health: Contraceptive provision was very popular everywhere. There had been a recent shift in the main focus of the HEP to ante-natal care, delivery at health centres, post-natal care

and infant care. ANC more popular than safe and clean delivery and PNC. Women's resistance to delivery at the HC was associated with difficulties in getting to them, rude treatment by staff, being exposed to male gazes, and inability to practise the customary traditions after birth. There had been efforts to deal with all these problems in health centres near five communities and their deliveries had probably risen although it was hard to get believable statistics.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- HEP messages were regularly relayed on radio and TV.
- In Sirba there was evidence of targets for home visits, latrine construction, solid waste disposal, liquid waste disposal, family planning services and health education; and reported results against these targets.
- A lot of awaring and training took places in various government and other community for a with a recent focus on safe and clean delivery. There had been some training for selected women in 3 sites.
- ANC, delivery, vaccination etc was generally free.
- TBAs were threatened with consequences if they assisted with deliveries that ended problematically in two sites. People in Kormargefia without latrines had been threatened with punishment which was said to have been effective.
- Graduation depended on attending training in one site.

Consequences

- Lifestyles, particularly of richer people, were changing under the influence of HEP teaching and urban influences.
- In most places access to contraceptives for unmarried women was a problem. HEWs did not connect much with young people.
- HEWs were either over-worked or not very helpful partly because they would not live in the community. When one HEW left there was often a gap until a new one came.
- Other government employees and kebele volunteers were expected to support the HEWs; the extent to which this actually happened varied across communities and individuals.
- There was no mention of a kebele health committee by anyone interviewed on the health
 extension package. There also did not seem to be very strong links with the kebele Cabinet in
 most places although in Oda Haro the HEW said that the relatively new kebele chair was actively
 promoting the HEP.

Primary education

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Programme to construct new schools or extend existing ones: in all communities the number of schools and grades increased most years; one community had 5 full-cycle primary schools.
 Communities contributed labour, wood and sometimes cash.
- Organisation and management of schools: some schools received funding from the government (school grant), and some from USAID; all received contributions from the community/parents and a number raised funds through farming on the school land, holding fetes, and in one case hiring out students to harvest potatoes and wheat. School heads were very active usually heading and education committee.
- Some schools were part of larger clusters and one was inspected without announcement about twice a month.
- *Staffing*: two schools reported teacher shortage and two teacher lateness and absence due to their residence in nearby towns. In two communities there had been contributions to hire untrained educated youth as extra teachers.
- Enrolment, attendance and dropout: All or most children of school age were enrolled in four communities; in one a substantial minority of 7 year-olds were not enrolled. In four sites the

school staff led efforts to enrol students, control absenteeism and bring dropouts back. One community had a dedicated committee while another did not make much effort. DTs and 1-5s were said to be involved in two communities though elsewhere people said they were not functioning well if at all.

- In one site G8 failures could not resit but could register in schools in other kebeles; in another there was a rumour that resits were ending.
- In all sites there was absenteeism at harvest time; one school closed for a couple of weeks and
 made up the time over weekends later. Another wanted to re-organise the school calendar but
 could not due to teachers' summer classes.
- In two communities poor students were exempted from fees/contributions with a letter from the kebele and in another USAID supported 120 poor students and their families.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- It was compulsory to attend primary education
- In all communities there was a lot of awaring about the importance of primary education by school staff, kebele leaders and committees.
- Students were organised in 1-5s in most communities; in one it did not work unless there was a good homeroom teacher as students quarrelled.
- Communities were regularly mobilised to contribute to school infrastructure expansion and to the school's function in various ways as well as sending their children to school.
- In one community the wereda instructed the kebele administration to mobilise the community to send children to school on time; in another the headteacher was not allowed to use the school grant to attract good teachers.
- Low teachers' salaries were an issue in one community.
- The wereda called regular meetings with head teachers in two sites, supervised closely in two and held regular cluster meetings with all teachers to discuss challenges.

Consequences

- Head teachers have very high workloads
- Parents have to cope with a reduced workforce and some had to finance their children's education; in all communities there were children financing all or part of school costs.
- More children attained higher levels of education than in the past; it was said to combat early marriage in several communities.
- In most communities financing education costs was one of the reasons children wanted to work; in some they started younger and worked more than in the past.
- In all communities parents and students were concerned about the lack of prospects for somewhat educated youth; there was a sense government was not doing enough to address the un(der)employment they faced.

Crop extension

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- Two coffee economies: DAs focused mainly on coffee to improve quality; unproductive improved
 maize seeds 'forced' on reluctant farmers who could not use fertiliser when planting maize in
 coffee gardens.
- Agricultural Research Institutes were conducting experiments with various-sized groups of farmers in four communities.
- In most sites DAs had started to promote irrigation and provide some advice on management and production; there was no input (apart from fertiliser) or infrastructure provision though they had facilitated access to pumps by a few farmers. They did not advise on marketing. In-migrant experts had leased land in two communities and were being copied.
- In all sites there was advice on planting in line, inter-cropping, crop-rotation, amounts of seed

and fertiliser to use etc. Some model farmers followed the advice, often on small plots of land, and if successful there would be copying by those with enough resources and labour. Farmers were using improved inputs and working harder on their farmers though it was not clear how many were following the recent advice on techniques.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Improved coffee seedlings were produced for future free distribution
- New things were given first to model farmers though sometimes they had to pay for them.
- In line with government policy the main focus until recently had been on richer model farmers; attempts to use Development Teams and 1-5s to reach middle and poorer farmers and promote co-operative working in 1-5s had had little success.
- Advice to model farmers was still the main mechanism used; there were also demonstrations on farmers' plots and FTC land in some areas recently and cross-kebele learning visits.

Consequences

- Farmers in the livestock-led economy were dissatisfied with the improved seeds and not convinced the new techniques would work on their waterlogged soil.
- Advice on coffee was appreciated in the coffee sites but forcing of poor improved maize seeds resented.
- More support in relation to irrigation infrastructure, inputs and marketing would have been welcomed.
- According to the DAs in Sirba those who have properly applied the packages have accumulated wealth: bought houses in Debre Zeit and cars, rent additional land for more production, use tractors etc.

Migration regulation

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

 All international migration, legal as well as illegal, was banned by the Government in October 2013 for at least 7 months. If the ban continued five of the communities who sent young women legally to the Gulf would be considerably affected. There had been considerable illegal migration of unemployed educated young men and some young women to the Sudan from Somodo and youth were very concerned.

Consequences

- While government officials stressed the risks and harms associated with migration that was
 done illegally, the harms that young girls migrating legally faced, and the loss to the community
 of educated, energetic and skilled labour, many community members considered the impact on
 women, families and the community to be more positive than negative.
- Many young women had sent remittances and returned with savings to invest in incomegenerating activities and new confidence, attitudes to work etc.

Learning from the past and looking to the future

This concluding part of the paper has two sections. The first explores the modernisation trajectories of each of the communities from the early 1990s into the future. The second raises some issues of relevance for the future planning and implementation of development interventions.

The communities in 2013 – poised between past and future

Continuity and change in the six communities

In this section we compare control parameters in 1995 and 2013 for three communities and 2003 and 2013 for the other three communities in order to identify changes and continuities in

configurations of control parameters and their causes. For each community we use the comparison to suggest possible future trajectories to inform out discussions in section 4.2.1 on designing and prioritising interventions to suit different kinds of anticipated future local conditions.

Adado

Table 22 shows considerable continuity in the trajectory of the Adado community between 1995 and 2013. The kebele town had grown but not very much compared with other places. Lack of investment in roads contributed to continuing remoteness. The community was richer as a whole due to increasing coffee prices between 2003 and 2011, more non-farm activities and increased migration but there had been no economic structural change. Designed changes to the kebele structures had not had much impact on most people's lives. Five notable changes are highlighted in grey in Column 4 of Table 22 but in 2013 none looked as if they were going to change the trajectory of the community in the foreseeable future.

The increase in connections with the wider world resulting from the expansion of Dilla and modern technologies had not led to any structural changes. On average people were healthier and better educated than in 1995, as a result of government investments in health and education services and urban influences; many worked harder and aspired to urban lifestyles. Due to the density of settlement in 1995 many young men were landless; some aspired to government jobs through education while others migrated in search of land or for gold-mining. These strategies had not changed much by 2013 although there were more opportunities to earn casual incomes in non-farm activities within Adado. People of all ages appreciated most of the development interventions and lifestyle changes and were less committed to customary Gedeo beliefs. Another new feature was the increased contacts with religious entrepreneurs outside the community including visiting preachers. The number of Protestant sects had increased to five and the small Muslim group of 50 people was networked with people in other kebeles. However there were said to be few tensions among the different religious groups.

Table 22: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 1995-2013 - Adado

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²² & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|--|--|--|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Mountainous, dense settlement, small PA centre, trees-enset- coffee, fertile soil | Mountainous, dense settlement, kebele centre and roadside development increased a bit, trees-enset-coffee | No change apart from slow growth of kebele 'town' and roadside development |
| Connections with wider world | Expansion of feeder road network linked to coffee trade but roads poor; Dilla less than 3000 people and 'distant'. No electricity | Roads still poor although some improvement in feeder road and internal paths 2013; Dilla had more than 59,000 people. Motorbikes; mobile phones; 30 TVs; 6 satellite dishes 10% with electricity meters, up to 70% connected | Roads improved to transport coffee from the Union; Big change in wider world connections due to urbanisation & modern technologies |
| Current human resources & aspirations | Many junior secondary dropouts; a few completed high school with government jobs; only one diploma graduate. Respect for efforts to be self-sufficient. Unemployed youth migrating Women no rights | Children in richer and educated families cared for better. Most children go to school at 7. Children work more for cash as they are smarter due to education. Few young men wanted to be farmers: aspirations education + govt jobs, migration to goldmines, business — many had plans. Girls plans included education, formal job and/or marriage to educated man. Approx 200 from Adado working as civil servants. Women's incomegeneration increased. Women's rights not implemented. | Education, urban influences and HEW training led to new aspirations for education and income and urban lifestyles among youth |

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²² Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²² & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|--|--|---|
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | Family, traditional health, 20% boys & 8% girls irregularly attended G1-6 school; G7-8 Bule, high school in Dilla, 3 boys & 1 girl in 2ndary school; poor health centre | Better childcare within families especially richer ones. 50% use of contraception; awareness about hygiene, sanitation, M&C care, nutrition etc; modern HC – new lab, 4 more staff; G1-8 school, many fail G8; G9-10 Bule, G11-12 Dilla, many fail G10 and unemployed. TVET and University Dilla; no unemployment problem for graduates. | Big changes in human re/production institutions due to Government investment in health and education services and urban influences. |
| Farming system | Enset, coffee, smallscale maize, barley, beans, livestock, food secure and surplus producing; coffee price just risen considerably; | Enset, coffee, smallscale maize, beans, vegetables, fruit, livestock; coffee price rose from 2003-11 but falling since 2011. Farmers 'forced' to take improved maize seeds. | Little change in products though more vegetables; improved coffee quality attributed to DA teaching. DA made to force people to take the maize seeds. |
| Livelihood diversification | Women recently started petty-trading and selling drinks and food. Migration in search of land and for gold-mining | More people involved in non-farm activities including smallscale coffee-trading from farms to government and investors' coffeewashing plants. Migration for gold-mining and land increased. | Increased activity but no structural change |
| Economic institutions | Service Co-operative bought coffee; few goods for sale, unappreciated | Coffee co-operative with coffee-washing plant re-launched 2008; corrupt leaders removed in 2012 but lost capital not returned; selling to private investors banned for the 2013 harvest | Coffee co-operative not flourishing |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | Gedeo; Protestant; Muslims 5%; rich – many plots of land, tin roofs etc; very poor no land & small poor huts; few started employing wage labourers | All Gedeo; Protestant sects 95%; Muslims 5%. Internal social cohesion strong Bigger difference between rich and poor households; no suggestion of exploitation. Some normal tensions between youth and older generation over 'improper' clothes, watching movies, friends of the opposite sex, etc | No change – internal social cohesion continued strong |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Policies should be adjusted to the customs and traditions of the people. Religions co-existed with local traditional religious beliefs | Decline in customary Gedeo religion. Most people are contented with development changes and appreciate improved lifestyles. Attraction of urban clothing, cleanliness, alertness and lifestyle. Recognition of problems faced by poor. Welcoming of an 'emerging work culture' compared with past. Younger generation wanting smaller families. | Urban influences increasing aspirations; greater connectedness with outside world itself much more inter-connected; government interventions |
| Government- society relations & political settlement | Bad memories of imperial and Derg times; conflict during TGE; request for policies to counteract poverty and provide services | 2005 – Gedeo opposition party quite active – confusion who to elect – EPRDF won by a narrow margin. Still a few members. After people were told there would be improvements in roads and health but promises not kept and people complained. Since 2010 some +ve changes but much more should be done. Govt involving elders and religious leaders in development promotion. Non-acceptance of delivery at the HC and enforcing use of poorly producing 'improved' maize seeds. Confusion about the new kebele structures. | Improved relationship with government somewhat dependent on interventions |
| External inter- secting systems | National and international coffee market | International coffee market Protestant and Muslim religious networks; churches/mosque played a role in teaching good social norms | No change – still highly reliant on what happens in the international coffee market Increased religious integration due to activities of religious entrepreneurs and greater connectivity |
| State of meso system | Historic conflicts with Guji but also exchanges; conflict in wereda in 1995 related to regionalisation | Joint wereda committee to manage Gedeo- Guji relations. Conflict in 2006 between Gedeo and Amhara students in Bule. Threats of violence with other communities reduced. | Violence less appreciated than in the past; strong government security actions |

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²² & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|-------------------------|---|--|---|
| State of country system | Regionalisation had reduced migration for gold mining and farming | Worries about 'social crisis' following Meles' death in 2012 | Not much interest in national politics in 1995 or 2013. |

The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Adado's trajectory includes the difficult terrain and lack of investment in roads, the suitability of the area for coffee-growing, the profitability of producing coffee for the international market (at least until 2011), well-established migration linkages, and the strong social cohesion.

Somodo

Table 23 shows there was also considerable continuity in Somodo's trajectory in the ten years between 2003 and 2010 with most changes being gradual. The roadside development had grown and the community was richer due to improved coffee prices until 2011 combined with an increase in the area planted with coffee. Chat production and prices had also improved and fruit and vegetable sales were increasing. There were no marked changes to economic institutions which, apart from government control of the fertiliser and improved maize seed markets, continued to be market-based. Designed changes to sub-kebele structures had not been implemented as planned but the programme of development interventions was appreciated. There had been considerable unemployment of partially educated youth in 2003 and this was also the case in 2013. Government played a bigger role in human re/production. The community continued to be divided into factions on the basis of ethnicity and religion but also continued to contain the resulting tensions.

There are six notable changes highlighted in column 4 of Table 23 some of which have the potential to change the future trajectory of the community. First, in 2003 the 'interest of people to work' was low; by 2013 big positive changes to attitudes and behaviour were reported including higher aspirations and willingness to experiment. Second, as a result of the expansion of Jimma town the municipality recently took some of the kebele's land on its border; this is a process that is likely to continue. Third, in 2003 no Oromo Muslims migrated but by 2013 more than 300 young people, pushed by lack of local employment opportunities and attracted by legal and illegal migration brokers, were working in Sudan and Gulf countries with many sending remittances to their families. One estimate was that they contributed about 15% of the community's 'GDP'. It was not clear in November 2013 what the impact of the Government ban on migration put in place in October 2013 would be but there had already been an angry response from young men in a kebele meeting. Fourth, it was predicted that in a few years all Oromo Muslims in Somodo would be wehabi sect members; the consequences of this for relations with the government and women's rights is uncertain. Relatedly, and fifth, increasing support for modern development repertoires and urban lifestyles was likely to clash in some way with attempts to impose increasingly strict wahabi rules often supported by female migrants returning from the Gulf. Finally, the economy will be strongly affected by what happens to international coffee prices; the global market for coffee is characterised by volatile prices and production levels.

Table 23: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 2003-2013 - Somodo

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²³ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|--|--|--|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Weyna dega climate favourable for crops and animal production; mostly flat - some erosion in sloping parts but not hugely problematic; can't produce without fertiliser. | Recently PWs on terraces in more vulnerable parts of the kebele. Increasing amounts of fertiliser needed; liming experiment increased outputs. Tree planting to shade new coffee trees and for sale. 2011 late rain affected maize; hotter? Good weather 2013. Increasing roadside settlement. | Slow growth of roadside development. Jimma expansion – suburbanisation of part of the kebele |

²³ Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²³ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|--|--|---|
| Connections with wider world | Closest urban centre Bilida (4 km) – allweather road; 17 km from Jimma, 20 km from Yebu (wereda town). No electricity. | Part of the community bordering Jimma town taken by the city administration. Increasing number have some connection with urban areas. Improved external roads, public transport to Jimma, mobile phones from 2006 – good signal, electricity (about 35% hhs), TVs, a few satellite dishes. Internal roads not well-maintained and no transport. | Improved connections to wider world – external road building and modern technologies |
| Current human resources & aspirations | Male babies preferred. Children becoming more ambitious. Many unemployed school leavers and dropouts living with parents. Two college graduates employed by govt. Interest of people to work is low. Significant change for women is in formal education. | Reported big and positive change in attitudes and behaviour – greater willingness to try new things in relation to farming, irrigation, and trade; value of educating children; women's involvement in economic activities. Urban lifestyles and aspirations being copied. Many young people want to be educated and marry someone educated; many want to live in the community. | Education, urban influences, extension services led to increased aspirations and willingness to experiment. |
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | Family main socialiser. Close kinship for mutual obligations. No of children increased due to vaccination. Diseases sent by God – traditional treatments, sorcery but Wahabi discouraging THP use. Clinic and drug shop in Bilida. Pharmacy, hospital, modern midwife services Jimma. G1-8 school founded 1963; no enrolled increased, quality deteriorated, high absenteeism in coffee harvest, many students self-sponsoring; | Women were aware of HEP teachings on infant and childcare although it was not clear how much they were practised. Health Post; modern Health Centre in Bilida; 5 traditional health practitioners. Three primary schools: G1-8, G1-4, G1-6. Most children sent to school at the right age except some poor. Secondary school in Bilida, G11-12 in Yebu. Poor G8 results and many G10 failures. Most parents wanted adolescents to continue in education and so did they. Some wanted daughters to migrate to Arab countries. TVET centres in Yebu and Jimma. | Less family and more government responsibility for human re/production due to investment in health and education services; improved family care due to interventions and urban influences. |
| Farming system | Traditionally coffee and maize; 1994 good coffee yield and high prices windfall; 2003 50% farmland maize, 35% tef. Cash crops coffee, chat, fruit (increasing); coffee prices low, chat prices high. Seasonal in-migration due to labour shortage | Most farmers still produce grain crops for subsistence but no longer on garden land which is used for intensive coffee and chat planting. Avocado and enset sold. Vegetable growing and more fruit – some hand watering; start of irrigation using river; 3 in-migrants using water pump. | Increased coffee and chat production triggered by good prices; extension advice to improve coffee quality for better prices. Irrigation introduced by in-migrants; govt promotion of vegetable and fruit growing using hand watering. |
| Livelihood diversification | 315 landless hhs. Unemployed young men trade chat. Many soldiers joined up in 1998 due to unemployment. Some tea-houses, shops and grinding mills. Women sell livestock products, chat, coffee, fruit for petty cash. No Oromo migration; some seasonal urban migration by Yem men and women | More tea-houses, shops and grinding mills on the roadside. Network of coffee traders; other trading. Some established men no longer farming but relying on business. Male migration – mostly illegally to the Sudan; female migration illegally to the Sudan and legally to Arab countries. More than 300 young people abroad. The ban on migration in October 2013 led people to wonder where the kebele would put the large number of jobless young who could no longer migrate. | International migration by young men and women was a major change caused by lack of local opportunities and the activities of migration brokers; the ban in October 2013 had not yet had a major impact. |
| Economic institutions | Customary labour co-operation institutions; No credit organisation; short-term credit for inputs; equb during harvest | WALKO provided credit but few interested. Loans from coffee traders. Three youth stone co-operatives recently closed; one youth association took land for vegetable farming but the kebele re-allocated it. Coffee harvest sold to private investors via trade network. Fertiliser and (unwanted poor quality) improved maize seeds via the Service Co-operative; shortages 2011 & 12 but not 13. | No noticeable change in economic institutions; co-operatives not very successful in 2013. |

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²³ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|---|--|
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | Not tight-knit community – religious factions and ethnic heterogeneity. Majority of Oromo Muslims. Fighting among Christians in 1998 and Muslim Wahabi and Sufi groups in 1999 Yem mostly Christian the largest minority; some Kembata, Amhara and Shewa Oromo Christians. Gap wealthy and poor decreasing since everyone is getting worse off; incipient class formation since the good year 1994. | 81-90% Oromo Muslims; 8%+ Yem, a few Kulo, Kembata, and Dawro. Wahabi estimated 80% of the Muslim group. Some disagreements between Wahabi and Sufi leaders and between the Wahabi and the government over the process to elect religious representatives which the Wahabi boycotted. Small Orthodox congregation and small but slowly growing Kalehiwot Protestant church. | The community continued to be divided into factions on the basis of ethnicity and religion but to manage the related tensions |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Gada system, clan and lineage organisation and traditional religion being forgotten. People open to outside interventions but prefer to bring change piece by piece. They prefer modern laws. Wahabi condemning elements of both modernity and tradition as un-Islamic; banned alcohol and dancing but failed to impose sharia and women's veil. | Conservative elders resisting fertilisers, pesticides and modern health care but accepting grain mills, electricity, mobile phones, transport. Men conservative in relation to women and their rights. Students, youngsters and model farmers liked modern ideas. Urban influences generally seen as positive. | Increasing support for modern repertoires related to most aspects of development as a result of greater connectedness to the wider world and government interventions alongside increasingly strict wahabi rules |
| Government- society relations & political settlement | Elders and sheikhs excluded from PA leadership – inexperienced (educated) youth picked for loyalty to ruling party. Changes in kebele structures 2000 and 2003. PA positions reserved for Oromo Muslims. Tendency to speak openly, defend one's rights and advise leaders. Kebele mobilised people to support EPRDF/OPDO. | No opposition parties in the 2010 and 2013 elections. 'What is the point of elections?' development activities are started before elections and stopped straight after and all the community knows this. Govt involving elders, religious and iddir leaders in promotion of development. New subkeble structures given a push last year not working as intended. Criticisms of government – not enough done for unemployed young people; forcing of dubious improved maize seeds; no action re rapidly declining coffee price; interference in Muslim affairs | Development interventions welcomed though some cynicism; foot-dragging on new government & party structures; main concerns youth unemployment and 'interference in Muslim affairs. |
| External inter- secting systems | National coffee market 3 daughters of a notable Haji lived in Saudi Arabia and helped the family financially and to visit them. | International coffee prices decreased over past three years: affects coffee farmers directly and the nonfarm activities dependent on coffee incomes. | Due to a period of good prices more global acreage under coffee; bumper harvest in Brazil in 2012. |
| State of meso system: | No problems reported | Relations with neighbouring kebeles said to be smooth. | |
| State of country system: | Considerable number of ex- soldiers – Derg and Eritrea war | Government actions related to the Islamic Affairs Council at national level in 2012 had some repercussions in the community. | Increasing numbers of wahabi followers in rural communities with Muslim members like Somodo as a result of preaching and networking. |

The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Somodo's trajectory included the success of the local farming system with its ability to diversify out of coffee if low prices make that advisable. This depends on its terrain which is conducive to producing various crops and its location near the urban markets of Jimma. Fourth is the community's experience in managing potential conflicts among people of different ethnicities and religions. Threats to continuity included declining coffee prices, the expansion of Jimma town, youth frustrations following the banning of migration, and potentially increasing tensions between government and *wahabi* leaders.

Oda Haro

Column 4 in Table 24 describes some trends affecting the trajectory of Oda Haro since the early 1990s. The community was much more connected to the wider world including through trade links with Addis Ababa and other major towns related to great improvements in main roads. Small towns had appeared and grown nearby. Government had taken more responsibility for human

re/production through its investment in health and education services; infant and child care was improving as a result of health education and urban influences. Since the droughts of 2002 and 2003 there had been steady agricultural growth caused by good urban demand, links with private traders in towns, modern inputs, and extension services over the years. Proselytising by incoming religious entrepreneurs had led to a shift among the majority from traditional, Orthodox and Sufi practices to Protestantism and *wehabism*. Youth and women were involved in a fight against long-standing patriarchal domination; women seemed to have made more progress than the young men. Relationships between the government, in the form of wereda officials and an unstable and competitive kebele leadership, and the community were uneasy.

Uncertainties with the potential to affect the future trajectory of the community include the choices that will be made by the increasing number of frustrated un(der)employed semi-educated young men as a result of control of land by the older generation, recent rapid expansion of education, and the dearth of non-farm opportunities in the area. In late 2013 there was also uncertainty about continuation of the opportunities for female migration to the Gulf which had opened up in the last few years; what would happen would depend on Government decisions made at Federal level. Another trend which might be affected by Government decisions in the future is the increasing importance of market relations in the economic structure. Government pressures on people to do agricultural work together in 1-5s runs counter to the strong growth in daily labour done seasonally by poor men, women and children. The promotion of Service Co-operatives may come up against the network of crop traders stretching into large cities. The move to organise youth and women in producer co-operatives may be undermined by individualistic aspirations to 'change one's life' partly generated by the government itself through its propaganda.

Looking further ahead the community is likely to be affected by the growth of neighbouring Tibe town and maybe affected by climate change.

Table 24: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 2003-2013 – Oda Haro

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁴ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|--|--|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Flat near the main road; Botto hilly with forest. Everyone entitled to share of trees + grass – can sell it. Trees overused, erosion leading to declining fertility – fertiliser saved its life. Increasing roadside building. Rain becoming erratic and irregular. | Most of the land flat and favourable for farming. Highland in north – erosion leading to flooding in flat area. Plan to incorporate Ebicho grazing land in Tibe within next 10 years. Extensive PWs to protect the environment in last 5 years; terracing reduced erosion. Climate change – unpredictable rain in last few years and hotter - attributed to de-forestation. | Maybe climate change – but no significant new effects including on agriculture |
| Connections with wider world | 16km east of Bako, adjacent to small Tibe town. Asphalt road runs through PA; minibuses. No electricity. Two shops. | Transport costs fell on completion of new Addis-Nekemte road tho shortage. Now Tibe is important market centre; new one at Sheboka (8 km) 4 small shops, 6 crop shops, teashops in Botto. No electricity. Some rich have solar radios. Estimated 200 mobile phones. In last 2 years many dryweather internal roads and paths built by PW – MDG fund and community cash (50%). 160 mule carts since & donkeys. Shortage in remoter areas, flooding. | Community much more connected to wider world including through trade links with Addis Ababa and other towns greatly assisted by improved main roads; also growth of small nearby towns |
| Current human resources & aspirations | High birth and infant death rates. Many landless young men living with parents, work as daily labourers. High birth rate. Before people were strong – lost courage due to lack of rain. Women more involved in agriculture. Girls should not visit own frequently and be shy. Gender div of labour | People started actively engaging in farming after GTP training. People working longer and harder. Increasing jobless educated (150 including 82 private college graduates) and uneducated youth. Most young people want to focus on education, get a govt job, and/or live in towns. Young women want to migrate abroad. Parents want daughters to go to school or migrate rather than marry. Most | Many frustrated un(der)employed semi- educated young men as a result of control of land by the older generation, recent rapid expansion of education, and dearth |

²⁴ Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

.

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁴ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|--|--|---|
| | maintained via taboos. Educated young men conscious and sensitive – don't accept advice. Malaria big problem. | land registered – wives on certificates. Women declared independence by doing daily labour. Gender div of labour breaking down. Some educated people employed in wereda administration. 15 working as teachers and HEWs outside the community. | of non-farm opportunities in the area. Youth disillusioned with government. |
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | Polygyny common but less – religious teaching and poverty. Widows keep land. Children raised in the shadow of elders advising and socialising them; no longer punished severely; taken to clinic when sick. Self-treatment of illnesses. Mission health centre in Tibe; rich use private clinic.2 TBAs – HCs for complicated deliveries. Both boys and girls go to the school (G1-8); decision depends on what hh can afford. Poor quality education; most high school graduates unemployed. | Move from 2 to 3 meals a day and more varied diets for those who could afford it; children no longer given leftovers. I Health Post; people now well aware of many of the packages; malaria, family planning and child nutrition most accepted. Great improvements in awareness about caring for pregnant women, infants and children; easier for richer families to practice. Children with stepmothers not properly cared for 1 full cycle primary school and 1 G1-6. G1-10 opened in Tibe 2 yrs ago. TVET in Bako so challenge to most girls and poor males. Most fail G10 or G12 or Certificate of Competency | Less family and more government responsibility for human re/production due to investment in health and education services; improving family care due to interventions and urban influences. |
| Farming system | Maize main food crop; surplus sold productivity of maize increased dramatically due to extension but prices very low – didn't cover fertiliser cost. Harvests usually good. Buy different types of improved maize seed, plant in lines, pesticides and fertiliser.SC. Cash crops sugarcane, niger, peppers, chat increasing. Agricultural extension started 1993; many dropped out in 2000. Traditional irrigation started 1999, more using in 2003. Poor rain 2002 and 2003, malaria, food aid. | Mainly maize for consumption and market; % land increased and improved seeds led to surplus for sale. DA training and advice said to have contributed to the expansion of farming. Irrigation expanded 2005 – 70 has, 160 beneficiaries, 7 private pumps, number of co-ops; outputs mainly sold. GTP training to expand it. 2013 extension services focused on rich model farmers and pushed inputs to the others; fewer visits to the community, many farmers did not accept their advice. <i>Dega</i> crops in Botto. Chat mainly for home consumption; Eucalyptus increased. | Growth of local economy associated with agricultural growth caused by good urban demand, links with private traders in towns, modern inputs, extension services over the years. |
| Livelihood diversification | People trade berbere, cattle, coffee, maize. Muslim women sell salt and spices. Women make clothes and drinks. Man makes doors. Male migration Jimma coffee harvest & urban. | Involvement in non-farm activities has been increasing. 179 involved in non-farm enterprises including 6 large competing grain traders in the community, 90 women making/selling alcoholic drinks, 45 mule carts. Some seasonal agricultural male migration; 30 contract workers on Chinese road, 25 urban migrants, a few illegal migrants to Sudan. Female urban migrants and increasing migration to Sudan and Gulf in last 3 years for remittances after dropping out of education G8,10, TVET. >35 in last year. | Rapid growth of female international migration opened up new futures for semi-educated young women with few other local opportunities in the last 3 years |
| Economic institutions | Debo declining, wonfel increasing. Poor people do daily labour. Saving and credit provision started 2000 – led to debts for some. Moneylenders but declining. Equb. | Debo down, wenfel among poor. Communal herding. Paid labour more common – irrigation and model farmers. Source of income for poor, children and women. Daily labour for maize started recently. In-migrants growing tomatoes on share-cropping basis. SC only sells improved maize seeds – quality problem. Less than 25% sell maize to SC – rest to local traders and in Tibe market. Big traders come from Addis to buy tomatoes. Peppers sold to middlemen traders. Youth co-operatives hardly functioning; women co-operative not sustainable. Credit for inputs and non-farm activities from WALKO; larger amounts from private credit services. | Increasing importance of market relationships. Daily labour done by poor men, children and women. Most outputs sold to private traders. Government credit too small for rich farmers and businessmen. Women and youth producer co-operatives not sustainable. Service Co-operative not very functional. |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | Protestants started converting people in 1993 dominant by 2000; relations Mekane Yesus and OC poor. Mosque built with external assistance. Traditional rituals practised simultaneously. All Oromo except few | 99% Oromo some past Amhara migrants mixed thro marriage. Amhara are OC, Oromo mix: 32% Orthodox, 60% Protestant, 7% Muslim (50 households), traditional <1% tho some practise both. More religious teaching and stricter rules. Wehabi emerged recently and has been | Proselytising by incoming religious entrepreneurs had led to a shift among the majority from traditional, Orthodox |

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁴ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|---|---|
| | Amhara serving OC. Lineage obligations declined. Merging of 3 kebeles caused a problem; people think chair favours his village. Considerable differences rich and poor landless doing daily labour – looser relnships since they can borrow from savings assn. Poor always dominated; conflicts with rich employers common. Community integrated by shared ethnicity and clan, feasts, and co-operation – grazing land, labour-sharing, constructing houses, weeding in groups etc. Botto peasants seen as lazy. No respect older and younger people; land major source of conflict. | expanding. >100 followers –constructed own mosque and brought new preachers from other places. Common to have followers of difft religions in same house. Very rich, rich and middlewealth groups increased – after GTP training middle following models; poor and destitute moving out of poverty. Still 60% estimated to be poor, very poor or destitute and suffer many disadvantages. Conflict between generations increasing; adults do not want to share land, some consider young people as useless, when they get their own incomes they feel economically independent. Expansion of women's rights increased conflicts between husband and wife. | and Sufi practices to Protestantism and wehabism. There were tensions between Orthodox and Protestant. The Muslim group was small but richer through trade; conversions to wehabism linked with outsiders had caused further rifts. Youth and women were fighting long-standing patriarchal domination. |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Until 1998 when he died most people believed in <i>kallu</i> . People started working on most OC holy days. High agricultural productivity prized; land size, number of children and relatives add to prestige. Keen for modern irrigation. Believed in scientific and traditional health services. Students want jobs so go to school. | Some farmers resisted accepting new ideas; pretended to accept but actually reluctant. Aspirations for development have changed in the last 3 years – some changing very fast. Model farmers are the leading modernisers. Young people wear urban clothers; said to be reluctant to participate in customary beliefs and values and do not respect older people; modern education contributed to this. Clothes of wehabi Muslims changing including returning migrants; difference between Muslim and Christian girls emerging Customary leaders and elders are the leading conservatives; they support female circumcision and oppose youth clothes and hairstyles and strict religious practices. Also support agricultural health, education and good governance interventions. | Increasing support for modern repertoires related to most aspects of development as a result of greater connectedness to the wider world and government interventions. Conservatives disliked some aspects of youth cultures and the promotion of increasingly strict religious practices. |
| Government- society relations & political settlement | 1992 conflicts between OPDO and OLF – 100 died. Since EPRDF children going to school and learning in own language, cases can be taken to the wereda. Citizenship rights respected; religious freedom. 2000 village opposition to moving Oromiya capital. Conference on opposition groups in 2002. Elders accepted as moral authorities and important in community decision-making. Decisions made through iddir and kebele. Women more likely to get justice. Many informants did not know much about govt policies. OPDO active kebele assemblies common. Need to stop female circumcision not accepted. | Govt changed 2005 election result then worked hard to change livelihoods & organise people round political agenda. Many youth imprisoned. Young people still seen as opposition deliberately not involved in meetings & almost excluded from political and economic activities in the community. Govt recognised customary organisations in order to mobilise people for PW, health packages and security. Iddir used to punish thieves. Wereda/kebele accusation that wehabi were hiding a man from Addis Ababa wanted for 'terrorist' links not accepted by community. Officials mainly concentrate on their own work; people not accepting instructions from the Devt team leaders who are sometimes in conflict among themselves. Conflicts within Cabinet. Allegations of corruption at kebele and wereda levels. Poor people now included in the development discourse. Huge campaign to stop female circumcision but people resisted. | Uneasy relationships between the community and kebele and wereda government in 2013. Allegations of corruption at both levels. Foot-dragging re official responsibilities by unpaid Cabinet members and Development Team leaders due to desire to improve their households economically. |
| External inter- secting systems | Decentralisation empowered the wereda and the DA. | Maize, tomato, pepper traders in Addis Ababa and other big towns. | The growth of trade networks was important for agricultural growth |
| State of meso system: | Frequent disputes with neighbouring PA due to encroachment. Close security relationships between villages and kebeles. | Co-operation with neighbouring kebeles on security issues; ongoing conflicts with 3 kebeles over trees and water for cattle and irrigation. | Close government control of security in the area |
| State of country system: | Not mentioned | Radio and TV help people understand the presence of different cultures and traditions in Ethiopia. | Spread of electricity, radio and TV masts and satellite dishes |

The configuration of control parameters underlying the continuity of Oda Haro's trajectory included the successful farming economy, which depends on improvements to declining soil fertility, efficient economic institutions, urban demand, and good weather, and the successful community-level management of de-stabilising tensions related to religious, inter-generational and gender differences. Threats to longer-run continuity include a growing and ageing group of disaffected youth, the expansion of Tibe town, and potentially premature Government encouragement of new economic institutions.

Oda Dawata

Table 25 shows that while in 7 control parameter areas there were no structural changes in some there had been considerable improvements. Connections to the outside world had improved due to improved main roads and modern technologies although those in the remoter areas were still somewhat cut off. Education, urban influences, government training, national and international radio and TV, and livelihood improvements had contributed to improved 'human capital' and higher aspirations on the part of farmers, women and youth, combined with a willingness to work hard. Families still played a big role in socialising children but in 2013 almost all were enrolled in primary school at 7 and parents' awareness of better infant and childcare practices had increased as a result of HEP training, urban influences, and messages on the radio and TV. The community was economically much better off as a result of good demand and prices for rainfed and irrigated crops related to urbanisation (unlike in the early 2000s) and increased production and productivity partly related to government extension and recently research institute activities. Historic ethnic and religious tensions between Oromo Muslims and Amhara and Oromo Orthodox had continued but remained contained by elders and religious leaders. Relations with government which had been 'confused' around the 2005 elections were better. Development interventions since 2005 were welcomed although there was some criticism of too much training followed by lack of implementation and follow-up, and the focus on a small number of model farmers. There had been foot-dragging on the new government & party structures at sub-kebele level and youth appeared disillusioned with government politics.

There are three notable forces for changes highlighted in column 4 of Table 25 with the potential to send the community on a different track in the future. The first is the expansion of Gonde town which had designated an area of the kebele's land to be incorporated into the town. Second, there had been some re-structuring of the local economy and changes in economic institutions with increases in private trading networks, agricultural employment, women's non-farm activities, commuting for work to nearby factories and towns, urban migration, some illegal male international migration and most notably large numbers of young women migrating legally to the Gulf. It is likely that urbanisation and industrialisation along the roadside will continue offering more employment opportunities. It is not clear what the repercussions of the Government ban on international migration will be if it is not lifted soon. Third is the possibly growing influence of conservative Muslim wehabism many of whose values and norms conflict with customary norms and some increasingly accepted modern ideas. For example the instruction that followers should not mix with Christians and women should be confined at home as much as possible. The role of government in relation to the Islamic religion at national level was a cause for concern by some wehabi followers.

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²⁵ It was not clear from our research how many people were practising what was being preached by some.

Table 25: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 2003-2013 – Oda Dawata

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁶ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|--|--|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | 75% plain; the rest hills; 3 villages; PA surrounds Gonde town. Forest coverage reduced from 11% to 5% in last 10 years – believed to have caused temperature rise – seedlings distributed; erosion becoming a major problem; some flooding | Near Gonde and the main road settlements are densely populated and urban style. In remoter parts hamlets and scattered houses. Wind and floods eroding soil in two places; watershed mmt from 2012 not very well done. Area hotter, late rain 2011/12, good 2013. Some land bordering Gonde town to be taken in future. | Some roadside development; Gonde town expanding into kebele land. |
| Connections with wider world | Urbanisation in and around Gonde; Mekro and Begejo situated along main highway between Nazreth and Assela. Taxis and buses on main road. Road to Ziway through Begejo. Chebote and Akiya no roads. Part of 1 village had electricity; telephone service in Gonde. Many people had radios; a few TVs. | Those near Gonde have frequent urban interactions; in the kebele there are tearooms and small shops. External roads of good quality but transport shortage. New roads to remoter areas damaged/not completed. Electricity in 4 ketenas – 95%, 85%, 20%, 0. 80% use mobile phones; signal a bit problematic | Improved connections to wider world – external road building and modern technologies; remoter parts are less well connected. |
| Current human resources & aspirations | Farmer differentiation based on efficiency, interest, capacity – hardworking (should be models), middle, poor (lease land). Landless youth/unemployed school leavers a problem. Educated young people no longer immature & emotional – good ideas for the community. Some govt employed college graduates. Clear gender div of labour. Women still expected to defer to men but some change/idea of rights. Children expected to help according to capacity. Most illnesses from poor sanitation, malnutrition, basic living conditions. | Fewer disabled children and orphans as healthcare starting from pregnancy improved. Children working for themselves much earlier (12 instead of 18, younger if poor). More than half children in one school self-financing. Girls playing football in clubs. 100 residents with formal jobs; about 90 employed elsewhere. Young men want to study, farm by team, and/or trade – don't want to live with family on farm. 50% un(der)employed. 5-8% men and 13% women migrated to look for work last year. Almost all women have own income; woman model farmer. Gender div of labour declining. In the past people did not actively participate in work but that has changed. | Education, urban influences, government training, national and international radio and TV, and livelihood improvements contributed to improved 'human capital' and higher aspirations on the part of farmers, women and youth combined with willingness to work hard. |
| Human re/pro/ duction institutions | Family – polygyny common. Main child-rearing by family – society teaches social values and norms. Less respect between children and parents. Large Muslim families – religion against birth control. Marie Stopes clinic in Assela. HP in Gonde 2003, G1-8 school Gonde 1970, primary school 1984; junior schools in Akiya-Lokicha and Kulumsa. Increasing education costs excluding poor. Number of students increased drastically including girls. Most students cannot afford education from G9 in Asela. Lots of high school dropouts especially girls. | Improvement in living standards since 2003; 3 meals a day. Some improvement in infant and child care. Families are strong and tend to be large; father authority figure, mother enforces rules and teaches cultural and religious values and skills to become self-supporting adults. 85% said to be using contraception. 490 women heading hhs – great increase as women refused to be inherited and divorce up. Holy water; witch doctor; HP in most remote sub-kebele; HC in Mecro. HEP training. Full cycle primary schools in each of 4 ketenas, + first cycle school in Akiya. 100% 7-yr olds said to be in school. Most children miss class on market day and the school makes up the class. Rich students pay for tutorials. Commuting to 2 sec schools. | Families still strong in socialising children but more aware of good infant and child care due to HEP, urban influences, and radio/TV. Better access to secondary schools – more schools in commuting distance. Growth in private education assisting richer students. |
| Farming system | Generally self-sufficient in food; shortages in 1985 and 1999 due to weather. Wheat, maize, sorghum lower down barley, peas, beans, potatoes higher up, irrigated vegetables, no cash crops but surpluses sold. Low wheat prices don't cover input credit. Tractors & combine harvesters; fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides, weedkillers. Improved cattle, milk, fattening. Govt training in modern ag techniques for some. | No change in types of crop grown; more potatoes as profitable – burning our soil (also frequent fertiliser and pesticides). 32 has irrigated, 12 pumps recently introduced by govt. About 60% farming for subsistence and 40% for cash; 99% of potatoes sold. Vegetable, chat and eucalyptus sales increasing. Tractors, combine harvesters, improved seeds (recently wheat not effective), fertiliser, modern planting techniques – by better-off farmers. 20% improved cattle – milk, fattening. | Changes in rainfed agriculture and irrigated veg production techniques and productivity due to DA awareness raising about used of modern inputs and good demand and output prices. Irrigation expanded as far as possible without infrastructure investment. |

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 $^{^{\}rm 26}$ Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁶ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|--|--|---|
| Livelihood diver -sification | Trade, manual labour in town, petty businesses and firewood sale (women). 100 soldiers in army, 300 ex-soldiers. Hardly any male migration; small female urban and 1 woman in Arab country sending money. | 30% involved in non-farm business (many women); 5% in non-farm employment; 20% commuting for work 30% migration to Arab countries – mostly legal female; some illegal male. Until ban female migration accelerated in last 3 years (100 a year). Increasing remittances. Male and female urban migration. (34% young men). Good agricultural & non-farm work for young women. | Structural change – trading and commuting related to local urbanisation & industrialisation; migration within Ethiopia by 'pushed' poorer; female int migration remittance pull |
| Economic institutions | Reciprocal labour-sharing no change, debo decline, wage labour, market for products poor. Moneylenders with exorbitant rates; govt credit for inputs; many equbs; | Labour on smallholdings increased to increase productivity. Only 30% labour done by hh members in richer hhs. Daily labour by poorer youth (50%), women (30%), adult men (5%). Labour exchange between 2 farmers not changed but small group exchanges declined. Farmers got inputs from a private company until 2012; the SC faced a financial crisis and the government banned private providers though some still used them illegally. Most outputs were sold to private traders. SC did not buy outputs in 2012 due to lack of budget but funds were being going to be lent to it by the Union in 2013. Only a few took credit from WALKO for inputs. | Structural change – big increase in agricultural labour; development of networks of private traders; modern flour and malt factories and ARI employment. |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | 70% Oromo (Muslim Arssi Oromos and Orthodox Shewa Oromos), 25% Amhara, 5% Siltie and others. Arssi Oromo clans & lineages important. 1991 ethnic conflict, 1994 relative stability, 1998 ethnic division declined though not totally. 2003 living harmoniously. Strong sense of Ethiopianism. Respect between rich and poor important. Strong social cohesion through equb, iddir etc. Youth fashions not accepted. | Youth noticed discrimination based on religion & ethnicity. Strong clanship affects kebele politics. Christians wealthier than Muslims. A recent neighbour dispute had escalated into violent conflict between Christians and Muslims. New class of very rich; more middlewealth who are wealthier; more poor and very poor due to landlessness, destitution decreased. Youth want to follow technology and modernisation leading to conflict with older generation who criticise clothes, hairstyles, work habits, boyfriends before marriage etc. Land in the hands of older people who exploit young. | Very rich and rich increased through hard work, technology and govt encouragement. Historic ethnic and religious tensions continued but controlled by elders & religious leaders; split between Wahabi and Sufi Muslims in the last five years added a new dimension. |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Some Orthodox followers also believe in sorcery. Positive attitude to rural development; some traditional practices weakening – e.g. polygyny, female circumcision, abduction; girls some choice in marriage partner; idea of women's rights; consumer items and materialism. | Frequent interactions with ARI, modern factories, links through children to large cities and abroad, TV and radio combined to make people active and flexible in accepting modern ideas and practices. Number of holidays reduced by Muslims and Orthodox. Some Muslims dressing in religious clothes; youth in modern clothes. New appreciation of cultural history. | Increasing support for modern repertoires related to most aspects of development as a result of greater connectedness to the wider world and government interventions alongside increasingly strict wahabi rules |
| Government- society relations & political settlement | Elders key in conflict resolution — cordial relationship with PA. Cabinet of 5 responsible for administration, tax collection, disseminating govt policies and directives to the farmers. Party members should serve as a bridge between party and community and identify political dissidents in other parties. Wereda decentralisation led to quicker responses. Ambivalent attitudes to government policies. People have right to express their thoughts. | Elite network of elders and religious leaders interacts with kebele leaders. Development Teams and 1-5s not working as planned; most people are becoming more individualistic and do not want to work with the structure. Unpaid kebele officials cannot do own work or kebele work properly. Party members given priority in services and employment. Different political parties in 2005 confused the community; in 2010 even though all the community needs were not met there was more progress than before and people supported the only party operating. Too much training with no implementation; support focused on a few model farmers. Youth disillusion with govt politics. | Development interventions welcomed though some criticism of lack of implementation and follow-up; footdragging on new government & party structures; youth disillusioned with government politics. |

| Control parameters | 2003 | 2013 | Change ²⁶ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| External inter-secting systems | Amhara worried about ethnic Regions | 70% Oromo Muslims, wahabi conversions. Internal tensions in Islamic religion since 2011: Returned migrants from Arab countries introduced Jihadism to passive followers of Islam. Missionaries come from AA and Shashemene and some young men go to Bale to learn the Quran. 30% Orthodox mix of Amhara and Oromo. Disagreements in the community since 2008 related to the introduction of Wahabism. Significant increases in Orthodox participation and fund-raising; new teaching in Amharic good — people learned about fasting. | Wahabism promoted by missionaries, religious schools in Bale, and some migrants returned from the Gulf. |
| State of meso system: | No mention | No disagreements with adjacent kebeles – similar ethnicities, religions, and cultures – except tension of irrigation water use with upstream kebele. | |
| State of country system: | No mention | No mention | |

The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Oda Dawata's trajectory included the growing success of the local farming system, rising demand for crops and animal products from growing urban populations, the increase in non-farm opportunities. Threats to continuity came from the potential expansion of Gonde town, increasing industrialisation and outside investment, youth frustrations due to un(der)employment, and potentially increasing tensions between government and *wahabi* leaders.

<u>Sirba</u>

The story emerging from Table 26 is one of extremely rapid change in and around Sirba which by 2013 had already knocked it on to a new trajectory. Continuity could be found in the human re/production systems which already in 1995 provided accessible government health and education services, the crops grown and livestock kept, absence of any religious conversions, and the mostly peaceful accommodation among ethnic groups. Health and education services were better and crop production, productivity and sale had increased considerably but the changes had taken place in a gradual fashion. Levels of education among the population were higher, particularly bringing changes to young women many of whom aspired to formal jobs or on failing Grade 10 or 12 a period of migration to the Gulf to earn money to support families and invest on their return. The big force for change was the extremely rapid industrialisation and urbanisation travelling down the corridor from Addis Ababa via Dukem and Debre Zeit to Mojo and beyond which had recently started encroaching on Sirba's land. Even before any investors reached the locality there had been some structural economic changes related to growing sale of cash crops and moves to a more cash-based but mixed economy. Moneylenders had been replaced by credit organisations for poor, there was more labour hiring and fewer work exchanges, and a network of private traders stretching beyond the community and the local market bought crops and livestock products.

Table 26: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 1995-2013 - Sirba

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁷ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|--|---|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Flattish; little water erosion except on marshy land where farmers build terraces and dykes individually. 6 has scattered trees. Only meher rain. Forced villagisation 1985 – 86hh remained; 92 left. | Sirba mountain in the middle and mountains around kebele borders; 3 gullies. Weyna dega altitude suitable for <i>tef</i> , wheat, chickpeas and peas. Flooding not a problem due to PWs terraces and erosion minimised. Sirba quarry in rocky area used by co-operatives. Rain 2008-11 good; 2012 came and stopped early; 2013 good. Suggestion of less rain and greater heat compared with pre-2002. | Maybe climate change but production not affected like it was 1999-2002 |
| Connections with wider world | On main road AA to Dire Dawa; 20km to D Zeit and Mojo; vehicle transport; schools, marketing, medical treatment; 2 hhs with biogas, rich hhs had radios | Main highway regularly maintained and in good conditions; road busy 24 hrs; transport. Industrialisation along roadside started. Kebele town Denkaka in neighbouring sub-kebele Ude. 8 shops, 20 drink houses in Sirba. Parts of Sirba village included in Denkaka town expansion. Internal dryweather roads wide enough for trucks; problems even walking in rains. Sirba village has electricity. Most have radios and TVs. About 500 phones; signal all right though sudden failures. | Extremely rapid industrialisation & urbanisation encroaching on the kebele |
| Current human resources & aspirations | Malaria severest disease; 20 school leavers from G2 to G12. Five college graduates, 4 working for govt. >100 landless; women's rights in marriage improved;. | Malaria epidemic every year but treatment quick. 5% hhs landless; educated youth unable to get land or jobs: 117. When people get money they aspire to build a town house rather than invest in the farm. Many boys do not want to be farmers; want education, careers and wealth. 20 yrs ago girls seen as male property – now legal rights. Gender div of labour changing. No opportunities for educated girls; those who fail G10 want to go to Arab states. Others fear late marriage and pre-marital pregnancy. | Higher levels of education especially females. Un(der) employment Many youth aspiring to urban living. |
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | Adults ate better food than children. Modern health services in D Zeit and AA (maternity); 4 THPs and 3 kallu. Primary school 2 kms – all rich children enrolled, no poor ones; secondary school 20 kms. | Parents share land with sons so they live almost together but limited interference from older generation. Children's diets improved a bit. HP burned down; new one under construction; 5 years ago 1 HEW – now 3. New HC (vaccination, medicine, delivery services) and 2 private clinics in Udie; hospital in DZ; 3 THPs. 58% 7-yr olds enrolled - both boys and girls are sent unlike in the past. G1-4 Sirba, G5-10 Udie. Fee 100 birr. Children work on farm and in house; boys might start income-earning around 13 and girls somewhat later. G11-12 DZ. | Families still strong in socialising children; better access to healthcare & education but fees deterring some poor |
| Farming system | Food surplus: tef, wheat, beans, chickpeas, barley, millet, maize, sorghum – surpluses sold. Irregular supply fertiliser &pesticides. Tractors & sprayers. Milk sold. No communal grazing land. Liberalisation led to increased grain prices. | Cash crops increasingly common due to their financial benefits. Production of <i>tef</i> (most important), chickpeas (second), lentils (third), wheat and peas increased through fertiliser use. Seed associations prepared and distributed improved seeds. Intensive work by DAs especially with model farmers improved agricultural practices. High market demand for eucalyptus. Individuals irrigating garden plots using wells and pumps; NGO scheme stopped working for institutional reasons; large govt borehole scheme under construction. No communal grazing. Sales of milk and eggs to DZ. Some urbanites rented land and tractors and planted earlier using modern techniques; many farmers copied early planting. | Since the poor harvests of 1999-2002 farmers production and productivity considerably increased due to profitability of cash crops & extension services |

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 $^{^{27}}$ Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁷ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|--|--|--|
| Livelihood diversification | Grain trade; petty trade; wood and charcoal sale; part-time carpentry, guarding, drinking houses; 5 shops, teachers and other civil servants. No seasonal migration; a few settled in D Zeit. | Many families depending on farming for livelihood; nearby opportunities for women and young men in factories, flower farms, construction, Chinese road company; women's petty trade, shops, local drinks increased. Middle traders – best business Dec-Aug. 100 men involved in stone co-operatives. Two minibuses. Summer vacation work on floriculture (females) and construction (mainly males). Others do this all year. Commuting/migration to Dukem for factory work and Adama for construction. Rumours of investors taking more kebele land for unknown purpose. Male migration for work during rainy season; female urban migration; 32 girls migrated to Arab countries – increasing until the ban. | Structural change - local construction & industrialisation increased non-farm employment opportunities for young; females migrating to Gulf |
| Economic institutions | Share-cropping and land renting to richer farmers; 30% work done in working parties; hiring labour very common; money or seed borrowed from local moneylenders; credit from govt for fertilisers with a downpayment; harvest equb; | Land leasing very common. Fertiliser from SC for cash. Improved seeds of different types with credit from kebele. Also sold by farmers. In 2013 DZ ARI distributed their improved seeds to traders rather than giving them to the seed associations to replicate leading to a shortage. Farmer distrust of inputs from both private sources and the SC. Credit from WALKO and govt-backed village savings association; criticism of red tape. WALKO stopped lending due to conflict over unpaid debt. Many equb, some with very large pots. In-migrant seasonal daily labourers; reciprocal labour exchanges reducing. Some servants. All farming outputs sold in markets or to traders. Questions as to why successful farm and non-farm co-operatives shown on TV have not happened in Sirba. | Structural change: moneylenders replaced by credit organisations for poor; more labour hiring, reduced work exchanges; crops and livestock products sold privately |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | Community not tightly knit – ethnic groups (82% Oromo, 13% Amhara, 2% Tigrayan, 3% Wolayittan)and factional differences. All Orthodox; Oromos practise traditional religion too. At the beginning of ethnic federalism some friction between majority Oromo and non-Oromo resolved peacefully due to inter-marriages and other ties. Gap between rich and poor very wide and little mobility; incipient class formation. Poor farmers dependent on moneylenders. Mehber & iddir. | In Sirba village 89% Oromo, 5% Amhara& 3% Tigrayan (all rich or middle), 2.5% SNNP (all poor), 2 'ferenji' with American father/Oromo mother. Good relations between ethnic groups & some inter-marriage. Social organisations not based on ethnicity. All Orthodox. Most very rich and rich 10 years ago are now richer; some very poor able to contract land or keep poultry/shoats became poor or middle. Older generation want youth to farm but youth want good education and urban lifestyles; sometimes conflict. Young men can now talk to the older generation in tella houses and women can go to bars with husbands. Young people less interested in religion although church is an acceptable place to meet friends. Modern ideas about childbearing, women's education and work having some impact. | Only 1 religion and good relations among ethnic groups; inequality increased as progress of rich greater than that of poor though poor less dependent on rich. Adult men, young men, & women mixing in public. |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Traditional Oromo religious beliefs still strong | Old people, religious leaders and conservative religious followers usually oppose modern ideas and participate in customary practices. They oppose girls' trousers and boys and girls walking together and living together without marrying. The younger generations and religious groups do not support customary tree meetings which are gradually losing support. Young DAs introducing modern ways of farming; young people suggesting new things like a concrete dam for water for livestock. | Traditional Oromo practices declining; youth full of new ideas often welcomed by older generation |

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁷ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|---|---|--|
| Government- society relations & political settlement | Rival groups competing in quest to control power and thus economic benefits. Main decision-makers are PA officials. Elders often relegated to ritual; also disputes between households. Since regionalisation policy political meetings not attended by non-Oromos. Many complaints re unfair allocation of tax rates and land (appeal for redistribution made). Villagers not open in political discussions. | Overlapping elites – kebele leaders/iddir leaders/elders and networks with successful farmers – but not traders. Elders and religious leaders not involved in decision-making though there was an elders' representative to the kebele. Religious and iddir leaders pass on development messages. <i>Gada</i> and sorcery institutions still active. After disagreements between two groups the previous kebele chair was removed for poor administration and allegedly selling land. Created trouble for new chair including having him beat up. Wereda said to be open to bribery. Male 1-5s not working as planned; most sticking to customary interactions in their chosen neighbourhood. Almost 99% of the kebele said to be members of the ruling party, though only 300 paid the fee. No Government youth association functioning. Opposition party symbols and confusion during 2005 elections which EPRDF won. Some segments of the community unhappy about their land being given for new investments without their knowledge. Too many new activities from the region leading to neglect of other programmes. Need integrated programme implementation. | Community focus is on economic growth; accommodated to government and party reorganisation by all joining the party but not implementing the sub-kebele structures as planned. |
| External inter- secting systems | Regionalisation policy increased ethnic awareness among villagers; otherwise national policies had changed little. | Female returnees from Arab states create businesses, open shops, build tin-roofed houses and try to improve their families' lives. Their houses are different, they dress differently, and have cell phones and cameras. Some rich people are copying them. | 'Global' lifestyles being introduced by returning migrants |
| State of meso system: | No quarrels with neighbours. | 4 kebeles recently transferred from the wereda to town administration. Problem of illegal construction of houses and unplanned town development related to informal land sales. New toll road and railway at edge of kebele. | Area changing extremely rapidly from rural to industrial and urban |
| State of country system: | Not mentioned | Not mentioned | |

A big change in one control parameter area – the state of the meso system – has pushed the Sirba community on to a new trajectory. It is set to become part of the industrialising and urbanising Addis Ababa – Mojo corridor.

Kormargefia

Kormargefia (Table 27) is a conservative and somewhat inward-looking Orthodox Christian rural community bordering the expanding town of Debre Berhan, and its future trajectory partly depends on how rapidly that expansion proceeds. The kebele was twice as large between 1997 and 2005 but then half of it (three sub-kebeles) was incorporated into the Debre Berhan town administration. Some of this land was fenced off and distributed to investors, but in many parts physical investment has been slow to arrive. A second unknown is how quickly the very small 'town' emerging on the side of the main road from Debre Berhan to Addis Ababa will develop into a proper town; this again depends mainly on the interest of private investors in the wider area. A third unknown is whether recent 'erratic rain' is part of the historic pattern of weather fluctuations or a harbinger of climate change. A fourth unknown in April 2014 is if and when young women from the community will be able once more to migrate legally to the Gulf following the Government ban in October 2013.

Apart from this migration and the opportunities related to the urbanisation and industrialisation associated with the expansion of Debre Berhan and upgrading of the main road to Addis Ababa the structure of Kormargefia's economy had changed very little since 1995. Livestock and livestock products were the main sources of cash and the same crops were grown for subsistence with small surpluses sold in Debre Berhan market. Physically the community had changed very little; there were 3 villages with other houses scattered across the rocky hills, the flat land was used for crops and

grazing and there was no internal road to the kebele centre. However, Kormargefia's establishment as a source of breed cattle for the area, increased urban demand for meat, milk, and eggs, the expansion of irrigated vegetable growing, the sale of eucalyptus, and improved crop productivity had contributed to considerable economic growth. The 2013 mixed economy was much more cashbased, farmers were more connected with markets, and the government was much more involved in the provision of credit, inputs and advice. Government was also more actively engaged in the human re/production system through its increased provision of health and education services and constant advice to families on how they should live and raise their children.

However, apart from a common desire to become richer and improve individual lives and lifestyles, society and culture had not changed very much. Amhara and Oromo continued to live peaceably together, there had been no threats to the dominance of the Orthodox church, traditional beliefs were still practised secretly, and while there was evidence of the usual tensions between teenagers and parents, land had been distributed to young men for housing and two farming co-operatives (1 woman) and they did not seem so angry as young men in some other places, although they had a similar distrust of government.

Table 27: Control parameters and causes of change and continuity 1995-2013 – Kormargefia

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁸ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|--|---|---|
| Terrain, settlement, climate, ecology | Land mostly flat; altitude dega; some swampy; belg and meher rains; deforestation - recently PA forced people to plant trees (on hills); soil fertility declining; individual farmers build terraces; villagisation - some returning after 1992. Droughts 1984, 1991, food aid 1997-2002 | A few hills some with steep slopes; Ex-Derg villages still relatively densely populated (3); otherwise scattered settlements on rocky hilly parts. Small amount of communal land affected by floods/erosion – 2 watershed projects since 2010 but lack of follow-up. A few farmers have terraced their land. Area re-allocated to DB in 2005; land distributed to investors but no investments completed. No drought since 2008 but rain more erratic - tho good in 2013. | Weather – rain said to be more erratic recently but there have been earlier unreliable periods. |
| Connections with wider world | Tarred road from Debre Berhan to Addis Ababa goes through the kebele; pack animal transport; some radios in rich hhs. | Between Debre Berhan (10 km) and wereda town Chacha (8km) both on main road to AA. New gravel road from Chacha to DB goes through kebele; transport on both roads. Small town growing near main road, small bar, shop, grainmill. Absence of well-paved internal roads causes problems in rains. Community cut off by river in full course. Cars/lorries drive on farmland in dry season. One road blocked by an investor's fence. Only transport inside kebele is pack animals. 3 places use electricity: church, grainmill, kebele chair (has only TV in kebele). A few use solar panels for lighting. Mobiles introduced 2004; expanded since 2010 (about 50% have). Fairly good signal but no electricity to charge batteries. Used to listen to radio. | Recent town formation in the kebele along the main road and fast-growing factories between the kebele and Debre Berhan |
| Current human resources & aspirations | Landless youth and returned soldiers sharecrop. Women own land. Clear gender div of labour. Six school leavers in the PA | All land certified; no landless but youth without work and not in education. Gender div of labour blurring. Youth aspirations changed in last 5 years; prefer to leave the kebele; some want to continue education and aspire to university. Most parents prefer to send daughters to Arab states rather than school or marriage. Many young men would like to marry returned migrants as they are rich & modern. High reduction in early marriage in the wereda. Every farmer aspires to buy an urban house for rental income and many have. Two women ploughing small plots of land. | Education, legislation and proximity to Debre Berhan contributed to improved human capital, women's right & economic participation and aspirations for wealth on the part of farmers, wives and youth |

²⁸ Important changes to control parameters are highlighted in grey; continuities and less significant changes are left unhighlighted.

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| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁸ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|-------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Farming system | Livestock (cattle and sheep – prices rising) and subsistence barley, beans and some wheat, other legumes, linseed – small surpluses sold . ILCA introduced cross-breeds in 1978. Sale of milk, butter, dungcakes. Vaccination from 1974. Government extension and provision of seeds & fertiliser on credit (unpaid debt due to poor harvest); some farmers trained in irrigation practices | Recent increase in cattle and decrease in sheep. More than 2003 especially dairy cows including hybrids: milk, fattening, eggs and dungcakes contributed to increased incomes. Subsistence crops in order of importance: barley, beans, wheat – some linseed, lentils, peas, oats. Surpluses sold. Main cash crop eucalyptus – increasing each year. Two permanent rivers increasingly used for irrigation: potatoes, carrots, garlic, cabbage. 157 using gravity and 100 pumps. DAs advise on technical aspects of production, facilitate access to seeds (about ½ buy improved seeds) and to use irrigation but provide no facilities or resources. SC provides fertiliser with half credit for a few poor farmers. Wereda said kebele was second to last on agricultural production. Complaints that extension focuses on richer model farmers. | Little change in the structure of the farming system apart from an increase in irrigated vegetables. Crop, livestock and livestock product production and productivity considerably increased related to urban demand, copying and extension |
| Livelihood diversification | Sewing clothes, local drinks. Migration uncommon; a little seasonal urban migration | Land given to selected unmarried landless dropouts for houses/shops. A little daily commuting. Male and female (from 13) urban migration important and slightly increased. Seasonal agricultural migration reduced as cattle fattening providing alternative income source. Long-term male migration to Bale/Arssi/Jimma – 20 last year. No traders – every farmer sells his own outputs. People's involvement in non-farm business remains as rare as before: grainmill, 1 small shop, 3 carpenters 1 full-time, 7 occasional smallscale areki producers, 1 more regularly. One investor – fattening and milk production only employed 3 – employed 25 on re-construction. Habesha beer factory employed construction workers – will affect community; food-processing co-operative in Tebase employing young women. Around 80 employed outside including10 in DB wool factory. Currently c40 domestic servants in Arab countries; first went 5 years ago – increased in last 2 years - last year 20 went legally. Thinking influenced, remittances, returnees starting businesses – girls highly respected. | Big change – urban migration (especially Debre Berhan) by males and females and female international migration, start of commuting with more likely in future. |
| Economic institutions | Ox-labour and labour exchanges; also daily labour (nearly 50% farmers do it). SC disbanded 1991. Moneylenders, credit from grain traders, iqqub. 7 saints days a month – half days in church and no work. | Farmers do not work on holy days. Most use family labour only a few use daily labourers (4 adults, 7 young men and no women) and servants (9) though for harvesting rich and some middle use inmigrant daily labour. doing daily labour. Govt monopoly on fertiliser. Most outputs sold in Debre Berhan market; some eucalyptus sold wholesale on the farm. 250 saving in ACSI; NGO soft loans for poor. People prefer iqqub – cultural attachment, minimal procedures, no groups. Nos involved and amount saved increasing. Suggestion that people working in co-operatives do not work to full potential as they expect others to do their job and have different views and choices. | Structural change - to mixed economy with more government involvement but also much more use of private markets |

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁸ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|---|--|---|--|
| Human re/pro/duction institutions | All adult hh members culturally responsible for the wellbeing of every other member. Parents teach children skills and morality. Head assisted by other members in making decisions. Red Cross comes to vaccinate once a month – low take-up. Health clinic closed – nearest and hospital in Debre Berhan, 3 TBAs, other THPs. Church schools, primary school 1988 – 1994 Gs1-4 88 students more girls (all Oromo – Amhara early marriage). More children at school when villagised. | More varied diets. Child malnutrition a serious problem 5 years ago – reduced to about 6 per kebele due to NGO programme. Improved personal hygiene tho problem for poor; changes partially attributed to HEP but poor HEW service in 2013. Parents buy children good clothes & shoes and even mobiles. Health Post constructed 2006; People go to nearest schools and health centres across borders. Use of THPs greatly declined. G1-7 school at kebele centre. G8 and above go to Debre Berhan. All send children to school and encourage completion of 2ndary school though disappointment if they fail after considerable expenditure. Many finance private courses. Church teaches follower morality; youth participation in choirs and Sunday education has increased. | Improved standards of living, urban influences and government services led to some improvements in diet, hygiene, use of modern health services and schooling managed by the family |
| Community fault-lines & organised collective agency | About a quarter Oromo (but not same kebele as in 2013), the rest Amhara; all Orthodox; intermarriage; people lived together for more than a century. Wealth inequalities – land size, herd size, savings. Elites are rich – some got wealth from community administration – getting richer. Local organisations include PA, elders, working parties, iddir, mehaber, iqqub, churches. | 95% Amhara, all Orthodox, inter-marry, share all social organisations, proportional representation in kebele management. Overlapping elites included kebele leaders, elders, church and iddir leaders, and some leading farmers. Very rich, rich and middle increased and poor and very poor reduced since 2003. Help to poor families from NGO and orphans from Govt. Inequality reduced but poor still could not afford secondary education and poor girls faced poor clothes, hygiene levels and nutrition. Land given to youth individually and to two farming co-operatives. Nothing for educated youth to do in the kebele; plenty of credit for business including fattening. Inter-generational relations not bad; common disagreement is over family land. Teenagers disrespect their parents. | Little change in social cohesion which has remained good. The community has distributed land to youth and though disillusioned with govt they do not seem angry as in they do in some other communities. Inequality has reduced though poor children still face problems |
| Cultural repertoires of ideas | Fanatic Orthodox – will not tolerate Protestantism; some won't employ Muslim daily labourers. Refusal to talk about witches due to Orthodox Church disapproval. | All farmers trying to improve their wealth by hard work – many had. 10 had bought solar panels and more planned to. Successful model farmers good examples re dairy and irrigation production. Religious rules becoming stricter including fasting, attendance and contributions had increased, and educated preachers from wereda came twice a year. Preaching in Amharic for the last 5 years. Even so people don't spend much time on religious activities. Secret following of kalicha and witches. Comment that the inter-connection between development work and politics was very noticeable – different stages to brainwash people; levels of political work in schools said to be significant. | While very near to Debre Berhan and open to ideas relevant for increasing wealth the community simultaneously appears remote and conservative with little real acceptance of EPRDF propaganda. |

| Control parameters | 1995 | 2013 | Change ²⁸ & continuity 1995 - 2013 |
|--|--|--|---|
| Government- society relations & political settlement | People in key govt positions using power to get wealthy – competition. Elders and religious leaders elite members. People's participation in political life of country restricted to the use of the PA structure. Complaints that PA leadership had been very harsh since 1975 – implemented socialist agricultural policies which did not take account of farmers' interests. Some political institutions created by Derg still functioning as extended hand of new government. Impression of strong resistance to some govt regulations. Elites could not say anything against the govt because they feared them and govt agents watched them. | Kebele office moved to Kormargefia in 2005 when 3 of 6 sub-kebeles were given to the Debre Berhan administration. Kebele re-organisation 2010 led to better community participation in watershed management. None of the 6 interviewed households mentioned participation in Development Teams, 1-5s or party cells; those in official positions describing what should happen rather than what did. Current chair in place since 1992. Cabinet and Council rarely met and the core party structure even less often. Problem of responsibility with no return and commitment to model farmer commitments. Community said to have no disagreements with Government; a few people politically against the government refused to participate in Public Works. Youth not interested in government organisations; some vaguely wanted ruling power to be handed to other parties. Church advising followers to participate in watershed work and stop HTPs. | The community was quite hostile to the TGE in 1995 but by 2013 had learned to live with the EPRDF regime. Leaders were committed to development though not the political project. They favoured their networks. |
| External inter- secting systems | Not mentioned | Debre Berhan economy | |
| State of meso system: | Sporadic opposition activity in Debre Berhan area – suspects imprisoned. | Good relations with neighbouring kebeles. | |
| State of country system: | People had different views on the Constitution and 'democracy' | Not mentioned | |

In April 2014 the future trajectory of Kormargefia community is uncertain; in the language of complexity science it is in a 'chaotic' state.

Designing, prioritising and implementing interventions to suit different kinds of community and different anticipated future local conditions

Tailoring interventions to anticipate and work with forces for change happening independent of Government actions

'To achieve what it sees as a sustainable transition to developmental capitalism, the Ethiopian government's policy is designed to sustain its influence over a panoply of key economic and business levers throughout the transition., i.e. through the medium term. It seeks to establish and maintain: close economic regulation by government, particularly in the financial sector; a strong State Owned Enterprise profile, particularly in a range of strategic infrastructure-related sectors; a high degree of state control of the provision and availability of credit to strategic sectors, both at the macro (CBE, DBE) and micro-levels (multiple MFI including DECSI and others); increasing involvement of co-operatives and mass associations in economic activity at local levels in line with its national vision..' (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011: 60)

- Given the changes in economic structures and institutions detailed in Section 4.1 one
 question for consideration is whether the government should modify the strategy
 described in Vaughan and Mesfin's quote. The evidence from these six sites, which have all
 experienced fairly continuous economic growth in recent years with most simultaneously
 undergoing economic re-structuring, is that the engine of the growth is the hard work of
 private farmers, traders and businessmen 'trying to change their lives' and that most cooperatives and mass associations, had not worked efficiently or effectively.
- The Service Co-operatives and coffee-co-operative mostly lacked funds for buying farmers'
 outputs; one could not afford to buy the basic goods provided at cheaper prices by its Union;
 there were two cases of disappearing funds; fertiliser and improved seed were not always

- available on time; two SCs were storing spoiled seeds/fertiliser which farmers did not want to buy but which Unions would not remove; and the service at one was incredibly slow.
- The only producer co-operatives that were flourishing were the stone co-operatives in two sites; three in another site had not survived more than a few years. No women's co-operative with a life of more than a few months could be found and apart from the stone co-operatives those few youth co-operatives that did exist had very short lives. Youth associations did not exist or were doing nothing active in five of the communities and the report on the sixth came from a youth leader and was not backed up by any other evidence. Women's associations were not actively involved economically at the time of the research.
- On the other hand there were examples in all communities of successful individual women farmers /traders /business-people and young male entrepreneurs, one example being provision of transport on motorbikes and carts.

Missing interventions

- Many different kinds of people and the community as a whole would benefit from improvements in internal roads, including more of them and some all-weather roads.
- Irrigation infrastructure in all communities has been the responsibility of individual farmers working together; in some people are eager to expand their irrigation farming but the infrastructure can only be developed with inputs from the wereda, zone or Region.
- Effective agricultural extension packages with market connections for coffee-producing communities which promote diversification to provide a safety-net for periods when international coffee prices are low. In both sites the falling coffee price had led to increased investment in *chat* which was not supported by extension services.
- There are few livelihood interventions for poorer farmers, landless people, women, youth and children.

Designing more efficient intervention packages

- There did not seem to be much wereda-level planning about appropriate intervention mixes for different kinds of community. Many interventions arrived as campaigns which had to be done 'now' causing officials to drop what they were doing before. There were complaints about plans announced in meetings but not implemented and projects started but not followed up. One of the reasons was that far too much was expected of wereda and kebele officials in terms of actions, meetings and reports. This was compounded by the need for party meetings separate from kebele meetings.
- An efficient system would use cost-benefit analyses and consider opportunity costs. For
 example, how efficient was it to devote many farmer days each year for 3 years on watershed
 management activities which had not achieved a lot, partly due to lack of follow-up.

Tailoring interventions to suit the seasonal rhythms of rural life

- The school year does not fit with demands for child labour during the main harvesting season.
- Annual meetings on kebele achievements and plans are currently held just as many harvest seasons get under way. A locally appropriate seasonal calendar for all kebele mobilisations would prevent some of the current clashes.

Tailoring interventions to suit different kinds of local circumstances

- Agricultural and livestock packages were remarkably similar in all communities; the priority given
 to improved seeds and standard issue fertiliser in livelihood communities where coffee and
 livestock led the livelihood system distracted DAs and farmers from focusing on more effective
 ways of increasing agricultural growth.
- Farmers in all communities attributed declining soil fertility to continuous use of the same fertiliser(s) over many years; in two sites Agricultural Research Institute tests found acid soil

- which could easily by improved with lime. Testing of soils by DAs and provision of locally appropriate fertilisers would supplement efforts to persuade farmers to use compost, intercropping and crop rotation with legumes.
- Currently there are policies for urban areas and policies for rural areas but many thriving farming
 communities close to urban areas are losing tranches of land to expanding towns which is
 associated in some places with illegal land sales. In areas where change is rapid re-structuring of
 weredas and kebeles can be a fairly continuous process. Ordinary community members are
 often not informed or consulted about land allocation and investments decided at higher levels.
 Compensation for loss of land is patchy.

Community-level human resource planning for efficient implementation of interventions

• Job descriptions for DAs, HEWs, and voluntary kebele officials are impossible to implement in practice; this leaves a wide area of discretion in which at one extreme some people struggle to do their best for the community and at the other some people focus on personal interests.

Choosing effective social mechanisms for changing people's minds and behaviour

• Section 3.2 contains complex stories about the use and effectiveness of different social mechanisms for changing the minds and behaviour of different kinds of people. This is an area where consultation with practical psychologists might produce dividends.