

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT  
IMPACTS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA**

**STAGE ONE ANNEX 3**

**FINDINGS 2: MODERNISATION PROCESSES  
1995 - 2010**

*August 2010*

Mokoro  


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This Annex draws on Evidence Base 2 which summarises and compares data from this research (WIDE3) for 2010, and data from WIDE1 for the 1995 situation<sup>1</sup>. In a few cases we also use data made between 1995 and 2010 when these give important information on the modernisation processes at play in the 1995-2010 period (e.g. the provision of electricity and piped water in Yetmen in 1997, or people's views on decentralisation in 2003).

## Modernisation of community public goods

Aspects of modernisation that can be expected to affect all other processes and were found – though varying in intensity and effects – in all six communities include changes in:

- Settlement/urbanisation
- Connectivity/integration (roads and transport, communications, market)
- Access to electricity
- Ecology/climate/environment.

## Urbanisation

All communities have experienced some **urbanisation**, although this varies significantly across sites. The change was most marked in Girar and Turufe, two *peri-urban* sites (further development of Imdibir town which the kebele surrounds in Girar, and of the neighbouring town of Kuyera in Turufe). In Geblen and Hagere Selam, the kebele including Dinki (two *remote* sites) very small towns are emerging around the kebele centre where administrative/service buildings were concentrated (Mishig in Geblen, Chibite in Hagere Selam), in the form of denser settlements of newly built houses many of which have corrugated iron roofs and other 'modern' features (like more separate rooms for different usages). This is encouraged by the government through the kebele administration providing residential land to young landless households in Geblen, and in Hagere Selam youth were given land for kiosk shops in the new very small town. In Yetmen (*integrated*) the small town started in the 1960s, followed by villagisation during the Derg, but the vast agricultural potential of the area means that further urbanisation is somewhat 'kept in check' by the rural community surrounding the town, as evidenced by the serious conflict about the construction of the secondary school on rural communal land. The urbanising trend was least pronounced in Korodegaga (*remote*) though may have started in Sefara, the village in which administrative buildings are concentrated.

These changes had impacts on people's livelihoods and lives though their extent varies across sites. In all sites the 'urbanised', more densely populated areas enjoy better availability of services (e.g. health centre in Yetmen urban; electricity and piped water in Turufe centre; health post, wireless phone, Farmer Training Centre in Mishig and Chibite; electricity in Mishig; and a vet post and veterinarian in Chibite). In Geblen and Hagere Selam (Dinki's kebele) smaller proportions of the population live in these centres and are therefore directly benefiting from these advantages – although for people living elsewhere in the kebeles the greater proximity of services is also useful.

In the *remote* sites the effects of urbanisation on people's livelihoods are also less wide-ranging. So in Geblen, urbanisation brings some livelihoods change for Mishig's dwellers who engage in non-farm activities but so far little for the community members living in the 'far away' kushets except when they come to 'town' which is easier following the construction of a pathway. In contrast, in Girar and Turufe (*peri-urban*) urbanisation happened alongside a much more significant increase in economic activity in the urban centres, which also benefited people not living in these centres in terms of livelihood options. There seems therefore to be two distinct processes of economically-driven vs. administratively-driven urbanisation.

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<sup>1</sup> The original Village Studies can be accessed on [www.csae.ox.ac.uk/evstudies/main.html](http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/evstudies/main.html).

Greater urbanisation is seen as progress in Geblen, with people aspiring to move to the small town, and Girar, though some people also outline negative consequences of new habits such as youth spending time in bars and quarrelling or, in Girar, farmers neglecting their garden for daily labour in town. In Yetmen there is resentment between the rural and urban communities and a sense that the expansion of the town is a problem, notably as it takes away valuable farming or grazing land but also because of developments linked to urbanisation and disliked by rural Yetmen dwellers (e.g. prostitution, Protestantism, HIV/AIDS).

### Electricity

To some extent access to electricity is linked to *urban proximity* and *urbanisation* but not straightforwardly. There is no access at all in Dinki (remote and with some urbanisation in Chibite) and Korodegaga (both *remote*). Hagere Selam will not be prioritised as it is less densely populated than a few other kebeles in the wereda so it is unlikely that the community in Dinki will be connected in the foreseeable future. Korodegaga was connected at certain times in the past (by the landlord in 1973, during the Derg for the Peasant Association offices and irrigation); a connection is likely to be arranged again in the near future to operate one of the communal irrigation schemes which relies on electric pumps. In Geblen there is electricity in the small town at the centre of the kebele. In Girar people living in the villages of the kebele along the main road can be connected; some of those living in the 'inside' rural villages charge batteries for lighting their house. In Turufe electricity, which was available to the area near Kuyera town earlier, was extended to all areas of the dense central settlement in 2008 so most people have now access if they can afford the cost. There is electricity in Yetmen urban, but less than 10% of the rural dwellers are connected in spite of the proximity of the town, as the practice of extending lines from urban relatives or friends stopped partly because the light became very dim and partly with the deterioration of the relationship between the two communities.

In all communities where there is some electricity people highlight various other modernisation outcomes as consequences (e.g. possibility of starting metal or woodwork workshops in Girar, possibility for women to continue their activity more easily at night; access to electric grind mills, children able to study at night; new entertainment like TV and tape recorders), that extend to different proportions of the communities' population.

### Greater connectivity/integration

There was no change in outside access **roads** for the *integrated and peri-urban* sites. All three were alongside or near an all-weather road in 1995 and there has been no further improvement (in Girar there was a recent promise that the (gravel) road would be tarred in the near future). The biggest change in this respect was in Geblen (*remote, Tigray*), the centre of which is now linked to a major tarred road through a rural feeder all-weather road maintained through FFW. Access to Korodegaga has not changed and remains difficult on a sandy dryweather road – the lack of a bridge over the Awash river is a key issue. In Dinki the small road to the kebele (branching from the main road to Afar which is allweather but gravel) has been widened and is being further improved to facilitate planned irrigation developments in Chibite; but there was no change to the main road. For these two *remote* sites difficult access is a constraint, notably in terms of access to markets for farmers' products. In Geblen better access does not have the same importance in terms of agricultural markets but helps people commuting for daily labour opportunities, which is an important strategy for many.

Among the *integrated and peri-urban* sites there have been some minor improvements in the internal road network in Girar, but not much and this is a constraint for people living farther away from the main road, particularly when they want to sell their eucalyptus trees. Similarly, in Turufe the road to access Kuyera continues to be difficult at times in the year. In Dinki (*remote*) internal

roads were built to all gots. In Geblen (*remote*) improved paths that donkeys can use are being built to the remote kushets.

With regard to **markets**, access did not significantly change anywhere except in Geblen (*remote*) due to better access to the community generally; in addition there is a new market in the neighbouring kebele centre which makes it somewhat easier to sell perishable products like tomatoes but this benefits very few people as surplus production is rare. In Dinki (*remote*) there is a new market in Chibite, the kebele centre; it is growing but is far from substituting for the main market for farmers' products (Aliyu Amba), which is not more easily accessible than in 1995. In Korodegaga (*remote*) there was no change at all. In Dinki and Korodegaga this lack of change is a constraint (as just noted) as in both sites the production of irrigated vegetables and fruits picked up and arguably, this could have a bigger impact if market access was better.

In the *integrated and peri-urban* sites market connections were already good in 1995. Markets and related trade activities were and have remained very important in Yetmen and Turufe, with new products and new activities and in particular, transport-facilitating activities for the youth (this also happens in Korodegaga). In Girar having good access to a main road and a large and growing market in Imdibir town has become increasingly important for the farmers growing chat and eucalyptus trees to sell; the expansion of the market also provided more income-generating activities for other people (e.g. sale of pottery for women).

There is more **transport** from and to Geblen, and in Turufe people can now hire three-wheeler Bajaj from Kuyera to Turufe.

One big change in all communities in terms of connectivity/integration has come with greater access to **phone** services everywhere, again with variations in degree of change and effects. In the *integrated and peri-urban* sites and in Korodegaga (*remote*) due to its geographical proximity to Oromia's biggest town (Nazreth) the mobile phone network is available everywhere and use of mobile phone is ranging from widespread in Girar to fairly common in Turufe. In Geblen and Dinki (*remote*) the network is not yet available except in specific spots and the reception is not easy – but this may change in the future. In both sites the government installed a wireless phone service which works well in Geblen, less reliably in Dinki though this has improved lately. Phone is used to keep in touch with relatives and one's social network, and migrants in Ethiopia and abroad in e.g. Geblen, and also to arrange migration deals in e.g. Girar, as well as to get market information in e.g. Yetmen (phone said to be very important for traders and thieves), Girar (everyone has a phone, even shoe-shiners, and richer people have fancier phones) and Korodegaga. In Girar, Turufe and Geblen people use the phone to call transport in case of emergencies (e.g. birth deliveries or injuries) and in Girar they can call the vet directly.

Overall, Yetmen, Girar and Turufe remained better integrated/connected than Korodegaga, Geblen and Dinki - but small changes in sites that were previously isolated may have significant effects. Among the three *remote* sites, Dinki is now less well connected than Geblen and even Korodegaga. Access to Korodegaga is difficult but once across the river people can travel easily to Nazreth, the second or third biggest town in Ethiopia. In Geblen access to the zonal capital Adigrat is fairly easy, and the trip from Geblen to Adigrat much easier and shorter than from Dinki to the zonal capital Debre Birhan or even to the wereda centre Ankober – which is a very small town (less than 5,000 people).

### **Ecology/climate/environment**

The story here is not that positive. In all sites people talk about '**climate change**' and its negative effects (more erratic rain pattern in Dinki and Korodegaga and drought years becoming more frequent, recurrent drought in Geblen, some vagaries in the rainfall even in Yetmen, climate becoming hotter and more 'like in the lowlands' in Girar, recent drought in Turufe for the first time

since 1985). At the same time, there is at best mixed progress in tackling **natural resource management** (NRM) issues.

This is not due to lack of activity: since 2003 there have been many government-led environmental protection/rehabilitation programmes in all sites. But they have mixed success. In Yetmen (where environmental issues are not pronounced though this might change with e.g. increased pressure on the groundwater potential) there is limited interest. In Korodegaga (where enhancing soil fertility would be expected to be a concern) environmental protection works are destroyed by cattle and there is no serious effort to address this clash in priorities. In Girar the effects of the 'no land left idle' campaign do not seem to have been thought through or even raised as a potential issue. There are also unintended consequences of modernisation processes that negatively affect the environment and are not squarely addressed. So, water is a scarce resource in Geblen, yet it seems to be less carefully managed than in 1995 (disappearance of spring maintenance committee; water contamination linked to development of Mishig). In Girar people mention that eucalyptus trees may well be drying the soil but farmers continue to plant them as they provide a good income.

There is resistance when environmental measures affect people's ability to draw some immediate advantage from a natural resource (e.g. resistance to forestation efforts in Dinki as this leads to loss of residential or grazing land). When measures are implemented more authoritatively (like in Geblen for the zero-grazing programme) people complain about short term negative consequences on lives and livelihoods and it is not clear that enough is done, indeed, to mitigate these (e.g. loss of fodder but also of food items for household members). Across sites issues around **grazing land** are critical and this goes a long way to explain a number of community decisions, refusals and conflicts – discussed elsewhere. The bottom line is that where external intervention agents see denuded hillsides they want to reforest, whereas local people see precious grazing land, which has already become extremely scarce with agricultural and development encroachment. In one of the communities (Yetmen) an attempt to take grazing land led to a very serious conflict and death of a baby. In other communities consequences have not been that extreme but the situation may well be somewhat explosive (e.g. with the zero-grazing programme in Geblen).

In summary, priorities differ and clash: between rural people perceiving climate change and its negative effects tangible in the short run and government leading environmental efforts aimed at long-term improvements but adding further short-term disadvantages for people and therefore meeting resistance; between rural and urban people in the trade-off between land availability and infrastructure and service developments requiring land; and between investors and some local people. There also appears to be a lack of attention (among local and wereda actors) with regard to a number of environmental challenges raised by aspects of modernisation.

### **Modernisation of livelihoods**

In the livelihood field, major aspects of modernisation which have affected most communities – though differentially – include:

- Increased land scarcity
- Irrigation
- Diversification of agricultural crops and improved technologies
- Diversification of livestock activities and access to veterinary services
- Increased access to markets for outputs
- 'Inward investment'
- Increased opportunities for daily labour
- Increased theft
- Increased opportunities for traders
- Increased seasonal and longer-term migration elsewhere in Ethiopia
- A recent surge in international migration by rural men and women (mostly young) to Arab States, Yemen and Sudan

- Remittances
- New access to credit and saving

There is a general trend of diversification of the portfolio of livelihood options in all communities. The main impetus behind this is very different, more linked to market forces in the *integrated and peri-urban* communities and more to government/donor interventions in the remote communities. Within each community this diversification trend may apply at individual household level for some, but not all households. The remainder of this section outlines this trend in further detail.

**Land scarcity** (decreasing landholdings and larger number of landless households) is an important factor rendering diversification indispensable in some cases. It has become an ever bigger issue in all six sites, with differing responses and implications. E.g. increased use of communal land in Korodegaga for irrigation and Girar for agricultural expansion vs. strong mobilisation by older adults to protect whatever is left of it in Yetmen and Dinki, including against proposed use by groups of unemployed youth. Farmland plots have become unsustainably small in several communities, except perhaps in Korodegaga where landholdings were larger on average initially. In all sites new inheritance and divorce provisions enabling women to inherit/share land are only beginning to hit.

One implication common across all sites is the existence of various forms of **conflict** about land (over 'private' and communal land; between individual farmers; between farmers or the community and the government in relation to development activities or inward investment; between the youth as a social group and other groups in the community; intergenerational conflict within households, and between siblings notably married women coming back for inheritance). At the very least there do not seem to be fewer conflicts, which is contrary to one of the supposed objectives of the land registration and certification process, though they may be easier to resolve. Whilst there may be some abatement once demarcation and registration are complete, divorce and inheritance issues are there to stay. Another common feature across sites is the lack of a clear 'way out' for the growing group of landless/near landless households. Although a number of such households find what seems to be reasonable 'ways out' (e.g. working for parents, sharecropping or renting-in land, daily labour, migration, education and getting a job) these are either not feasible for all (e.g. land renting), or they represent relatively 'low level' opportunities (e.g. daily labour), or entail major challenges (costs and other obstacles faced by those trying the 'education and job' route or migrating).

**Irrigation** made a significant difference in Yetmen (integrated), Korodegaga and Dinki (both remote). In Yetmen and Korodegaga there is good potential as water is abundant (including ground water in Yetmen). There are fewer people directly involved in irrigated agriculture in Yetmen than in Korodegaga but those who are increased their income significantly, due to Yetmen's good access to the market and perhaps people's long-standing trading tradition. In both sites there were significant positive 'side effects', with other people getting a better income from daily labour opportunities, leasing of irrigable land, and activities linked to marketing the irrigated products (opportunities available for women as well as men, including youth). In Dinki irrigation expanded and is making a difference in the wealth of those households that have access to it but the potential is undoubtedly more limited. Better market access would, on the one hand, remove a constraint but on the other, compound the already rising pressure on water.

In Geblen more households are trying very small-scale seasonal irrigation and the government is encouraging this. But water is so scarce (no ground water, erratic rains) that except with large-scale investments in water supply/ storage facilities (and there is no consensus that this would be technically feasible at a reasonable cost) combined with the adoption of technologies such as drip irrigation (which are costly, for uncertain returns), it is unlikely ever to be more than a small complement to other options in local livelihood portfolios. In Turufe and Girar the development of irrigation was negligible in spite of some water potential. This could change with technological development, which is talked about in Girar, where a motor pump was recently brought, but

apparently not in Turufe (though wereda officials talk about plans for irrigation elsewhere in the wereda). However, in both sites farmers are likely to continue to respond to more immediately tangible market incentives such as the flourishing chat trade in Girar.

In relation to **agriculture and livestock diversification** it makes sense to distinguish between Yetmen, Girar and Turufe and the other sites. Looking at their trajectory between 1995 and 2010 the first three developed mostly 'independently' that is, without the considerable injection of food aid and related interventions seen in Geblen and Korodegaga, particularly since 2005. Dinki is an in-between site which has regularly depended on food aid but had fewer agricultural development interventions.

The main impetus behind diversification in the first three (*integrated and peri-urban*) sites came from their established potential for Yetmen and Turufe, a sense that diversifying away from enset was necessary in Girar (ever smaller plots, disease), the further development of market forces in Ethiopia which raised the importance of developing and tapping existing and new potential and to which farmers responded (with some support through government/donor interventions), and a level of local wealth such that there was enough capacity to seize those development opportunities. We could call these sites '**independent economies**'.

In Yetmen, (thus far) change occurred in agriculture (new crop mix, diversification through complementing teff production with appropriate technologies – irrigation, two-harvest-a-year with suitable crops, and broad bed making plough) and in livestock activities too (bull fattening, 70% households said to have a crossbreed cow and 12 farmers in a dairy co-op though the latter was said to face marketing problems). In Turufe too there was change in livestock activities (successful dairy production with cross breeds, bull fattening – though this concerns few farmers thus far), and less in agriculture (basically no change in crop mix though improved harvests from selected seed). These slight differences may be linked to the location of each site, with Turufe near local towns with growing demand for livestock products whereas Yetmen continued to rely on more distant markets as in the past.

There is a big change in Girar, which was not quite a market-driven place in 1995, though there was occasional sale of chat and eucalyptus whereas in 2010 a number of farmers have responded to market incentives by growing large amounts of chat and eucalyptus to sell the wood. There was more change in local small-holder agriculture than in livestock activities, and this is also linked to more distant markets (chat, eucalyptus wood). Chat emerged also as a response to land scarcity as farmers can get a good income even from a small plot. In contrast with Yetmen and Turufe, in Girar these developments are not those that are promoted by the government. They may also concern fewer people (enset production is still important) and/or have less 'side effects'.

In all three sites, trends with regard to change in the use of **fertiliser** and **improved seeds** were somewhat uncertain. There were some issues with the supply side (price increase, some issues with quantity, timeliness and quality). However, harvests in both Yetmen and Turufe in 2008 and 2010 were said to be really good, which seemed to be partly explained by the use of fertiliser and improved seeds. Farmers in Yetmen explained that they bought fertiliser from the market as it was not cheaper from the service co-op; there were mentions of using the offspring of selected seeds that neighbours farmers had bought/obtained a few years back. But poor farmers were said to have problems accessing fertiliser without credit in all three sites.

There is greater access to **veterinary services** but reliability and hence effectiveness has remained an issue whilst this is an area where the demand is great. In Yetmen and Girar government services improved but there continues to be problems of drug supply and storage and shortage of qualified people. In Turufe insemination services for crossbred are not timely. It is not clear whether there is more private sector involvement in this sector, and also whether there would be more room for it to get engaged (thus 'competing' with government services) than for the supply of fertiliser and improved seeds.



In contrast with the *independent economies*, in Korodegaga and Geblen market incentives were non-existent in 1995. In 2010 they have remained extremely weak in Geblen, and are unclear in Korodegaga. In these communities, much of the change that occurred in smallholder agriculture and livestock activities was led by the government with the support of donors and in Korodegaga, an NGO. This was intensified lately through a more structured set of government-led and donor-supported food security interventions. We could call these two sites '**aid dependent economies**'.

In Korodegaga the main focus has been the development of irrigation. As said earlier this could bring major changes in the livelihoods of many, although for this to happen, arguably more investment is needed in infrastructure linking the community to the market (and it would require that local farmers keep the upper hand on what is happening, including in relation to external investors). In Geblen, agriculture continues to give little or no return due to rain shortage. The main focus has been on small livestock and bee-keeping/honey production packages. But water scarcity is a terrible constraint, which has thus far not been addressed on a scale wide enough to provide realistic prospect of success of the packages in the short-run. There also is no veterinary service. In both sites there are other efforts – like the introduction of hybrid cattle in Korodegaga, or a push for farmers to use fertiliser and improved seeds and some small-scale irrigation in Geblen. It is not clear whether these could be sustainable options for some households in the community or if they represent a damaging diversion of attention, energies and resources, but are implemented because they are part of the government package. In these two sites, and outside of any government-led interventions, people try to build livelihoods based on a portfolio of different activities in which daily labour and various forms of migration are critically important (see below).

Dinki is an in-between case. Like in the *independent economies*, positive livelihood changes – a big change for those with access to irrigation to grow vegetables and fruits mainly for sale – happened largely through farmers' individual initiative (with initial support from an NGO in the 1980s). But the change was relatively small-scale due to a lower potential, and market incentives were also not so clear as in Yetmen, Girar and Turufe, due to Dinki's geographic and topographic remoteness. Like in the *aid dependent economies* many households in Dinki, relying on rainfed agriculture, continue to face food insecurity as it is regularly affected by drought. Dinki (*non-PSNP*) got regularly food aid since a long time and so is aid dependent too – although the community does not benefit from the government-led food security interventions in the same way as in Korodegaga and Geblen (*PSNP*). In contrast with Geblen and Korodegaga it could be argued that in Dinki there has not been enough support to help farmers develop the existing or latent potential (irrigation, maybe livestock activities although grazing land is scarce) apart from a veterinarian recently assigned to the area.

**Inward investment** in the local rural economies was found in only one site, Korodegaga, where it is linked to the irrigation potential. The activity of an Australian investor brought some benefit for the community (individuals and the community as a whole) – whilst leading to loss of communal land that would otherwise have been given to a group of landless unemployed youth. It remains to be seen whether farmers from Korodegaga could also benefit from technological transfer but in the long-run this is plausible. In Turufe an Ethiopian investor returning from Canada was given some land to produce vegetables and fruits but has not yet started.

Elsewhere there has been some small-scale investment by people from the community, in non-farm activities (e.g. establishing grinding mills in Geblen and Dinki [powered by water]). In Girar some farmers invest locally in the town, and there is also inward investment in the general development of the area by the Gurage diaspora. In addition to the activities of the big ethnic-/regionally-based Development Associations that are also found in Amhara and Oromia, this has taken targeted forms such as the contribution of an Addis-based Gurage iddir to the expansion of Girar's school.

One important change was an increase in opportunities for **daily labour** and more people competing for these. In Yetmen, Girar, Turufe, Korodegaga and Dinki the expanded activity in **local agricultural and trade and trade facilitation** (including in neighbouring towns) was one source of this increase.

In Korodegaga, Yetmen, and Dinki to some extent, the expansion of irrigation was a major factor. In Girar, some farmers with businesses in town also hire labourers. In Geblen local daily labour activities are more limited and much less related to agriculture or agricultural trade. People have to commute to other areas to find work e.g. in construction projects or quarry work. Construction work is important for some people in other sites too (though apparently not in Korodegaga). People with some skills (masonry, carpentry, stone-chiselling) can get better paid jobs. Food-for-work (FFW), under government/ donor and NGO food security interventions, provides some daily labour opportunities in the *aid-dependent communities* – though less reliably so in Dinki (*non PSNP*).

One related development, common across most sites though with variations in intensity, is that there is more **hired/paid agricultural labour** on a daily basis and also annual labourer hiring (in Turufe – with exploitative quasi-class aspects) and less group/reciprocal work arrangements (Yetmen, Girar, Geblen [where reciprocal arrangements have largely disappeared], Korodegaga). People found the former more flexible and therefore more compatible with the more varied livelihood portfolios that some of them seek to build, in the context of overall diversification at the community level noted earlier. There is also a trend for female-headed households to hire labour rather than sharecrop out as was the case in the past, in some sites (Turufe, Yetmen, women co-op in Girar, Korodegaga).

Daily labour rates have increased everywhere. Rates can fluctuate depending on the local supply and demand balance (e.g. in Yetmen in 2009 as untimely rains were threatening the harvest of teff, the daily rate jumped to unprecedented levels) or broader market factors (e.g. in Geblen the rate for quarry work went down during the downturn in construction activities linked to the period of high inflation in Ethiopia).

These various changes went along with an increase in access to markets for outputs – as noted earlier - and overall, an **increase in the 'commercialisation of smallholder agriculture'**. In Yetmen and Turufe this trend was already established in 1995 although amounts sold were far less; in Girar commercialisation of agricultural products intensified though this does not concern all households and is mainly related to chat and eucalyptus and not the grain and horticulture products that the government would like to see on the market; in Korodegaga this is linked to irrigation – although low output prices due to the difficulties of access are a disincentive, especially as irrigated production is input-intensive and input prices are high; in Dinki there is some commercialisation by the households with access to irrigation. Even in Geblen people try. This, in turn, led to increased **opportunities for traders**, a trend noted in Yetmen, Girar and Korodegaga particularly. It also went alongside an **increase in thefts** (of crops and even productive equipment) in a number of sites (Yetmen, Korodegaga, Girar, Turufe).

A series of change in **migration** patterns is also noticeable, with an increase in one or another form in all sites, linked to the trend of increased landlessness among the younger generations.

**Long-term migration abroad**, including Sudan, Yemen and Gulf States, much of it presumably illegal, has emerged as an option for men and women in Geblen and Korodegaga, apparently mainly women in Girar, and mainly men (and few) in Turufe. In Geblen one major source of seasonal migration to Eritrea and Saudi Arabia was shut off since the war with Eritrea and longer-term migration abroad is said to substitute, though with deeper social consequences. There are even cases of professionals (e.g. teachers) leaving families and jobs behind to migrate in pursuit of a better life. There are 'success stories' of people settling successfully and sending remittances (see below) – provoking a desire among others to emulate these (e.g. the young girls of Girar seeing young women returning on visit as role models and wanting to be 'modern like them'). But also stories of terrible hardships and costly failures, yet often these individuals are said to want to try again – e.g. in Geblen where arguably, the 'push' factors are very strong.

In several sites **seasonal or longer term migration** elsewhere in Ethiopia increased. This concerned Geblen, Girar, Yetmen, Turufe, and a few people in Dinki and in Korodegaga. Like for daily labour

people with some skills get better opportunities. For some people migration is no longer seasonal though it still is temporary: they no longer have a land to return to so it can take place any time of the year but it may be linked to the duration of a contract on a construction site for instance (e.g. in Geblen). In Girar the recent increase in migration, following some disruption in the mid 1990s linked to ethnic troubles prompted by the regionalisation policy, was a return to a long-standing tradition among the Gurage. Migration is now often long-term although migrants usually maintain strong links with their home area and family and visit regularly, particularly for the annual religious holiday of Meskel for Orthodox Christians and Arefa for Muslims.

The increase seems to be mainly migration to towns for **non-farm activities**. Men are engaged on construction sites and in transport facilitating activities. Trade is more often male; some Gurage female migrants also get into trade though this is not common. Young women in Turufe migrate to flower farms in Zway. Otherwise women often seem to find/take jobs as housemaids and in bars and shops. There is a growing though still small number of educated individuals getting jobs outside of their home areas, as teachers, DAs, kebele managers, HEWs or more highly qualified employees e.g. in government or for NGOs - in Yetmen, Turufe, Girar and Geblen, and a few in Korodegaga.

A number of families get **remittances** from migrants abroad, in Girar, Geblen, Turufe and (very few) Korodegaga (though there is some reluctance to recognise this in Girar). Most often these are used for the household's daily needs or to cover children's education costs; in some cases remittances were used as start-up capital (e.g. in Girar) though this does not seem to be frequent. Internal migration (in Ethiopia) also benefits families in various ways, including remittances and the possibility of sending children to live with older siblings or relatives and study in town or to get access to specialised medical care. Established migrants can also help new ones. This is a strong tradition among Gurage (Girar) and there are also cases in Yetmen (links with Metema). In Turufe it works 'the other way round': migrants established in Turufe 'import' wives and other labourers through links with their home areas.

A special case is that of 'migration' of children, which in some cases is akin to **child trafficking**. There is a decrease in the practice of sending young boys as herders, partly due to the pressure on parents to send their children at school. But there are still cases in poor and disadvantaged families (that are off the household ideal-type cycle due to e.g. death or divorce) in several sites. In Girar there was a decrease in the number of young girls (often just Grade 4 leavers) sent to work as housemaids for relatives in town where they were often abused, including sexually – due to greater availability of post-grade 4 education in the area, pressure on families to educate girls and a widespread campaign to stop this practice. But this also has not totally disappeared.

In all sites there was an expansion in modalities for farmers to access **formal credit** – alongside continued practice of calling on relatives and neighbours for small emergency loans in most sites, and continued and even increasing membership of equbs in most of the sites where these existed in 1995.

One exception is that in 2010 in most communities the provision of fertiliser on credit (subsidised by government) had either completely stopped (e.g. Yetmen) or was restricted depending on screening of farmers' production plan and inability to pay cash (e.g. Girar?). Geblen stood as a special case: unlike in the other communities, starting in 2007/8 farmers were strongly encouraged to take fertiliser on credit through the service co-op (this entailed some coercion). Everywhere, except apparently in Korodegaga, improved seeds had to be bought in cash (that is, they were not available through government-guaranteed credit). Sometimes they were given free to Model Farmers.

Apart from this, whereas in 1995 there was little access to formal credit in 2010 there were NGO-organised schemes (usually targeting specific vulnerable groups like the Catholic Mission organisation in Girar, and an NGO in Turufe for the parents of vulnerable children it was helping); regional MFIs (DECSI in Geblen, OMO in Girar, ACSI in Dinki and Yetmen, IMX in Turufe); food security-related package modalities in Korodegaga (through an NGO) and in Geblen (through DECSI);

'private' banks or MFIs (in Girar and Turufe). In most sites savings and credit associations for women had been initiated, usually with NGO support (Korodegaga, Girar, Turufe with support from a 'private' MFI) and/or linked to a government-led programme of women's empowerment (Girar, Yetmen urban). In Yetmen there is a farmers' savings and credit association and in Korodegaga the irrigation association provides credit (for agricultural inputs) to its members.

However, with some exceptions there were a number of constraints preventing widespread use of these various modalities. In many instances there seemed to have been not enough credit available, of the kind that people said they would like. In contrast, in Geblen there was actually 'too much credit' - with government officials pushing farmers to take credit to reach food security package programme targets, and there may have been some of this in Korodegaga as many ended up in debt following the 2009 drought. Group-based modalities, used for some government-led programmes like those aimed to organise youth in groups and engage them into productive activities, but also as the generic modality of regional MFIs, were disliked by people in most sites. In Turufe there was not yet much practical experience: IMX operations were at the stage of awareness-raising and a few groups had been formed but had not yet taken credit. In Girar there were serious issues of repayment for the OMO credit taken (individually) for new technologies as it was seen to be 'coming from government' (OMO is closely government-related), with resulting restrictions on the number of people who could take such credit. In Korodegaga there were repayment issues too and as a result, funds meant to revolve for people to take livestock were not revolving, also constraining the planned expansion of the scheme. In Dinki and Yetmen (the *Amhara* sites) few people took (formal) credit.

Various types of **co-operatives** (a movement in disarray in 1995 in the sites where co-ops had been established during the Derg) were found again in 2010. Their effectiveness and the extent to which they benefited their members are much variable, depending on the co-op type (service/multi-purpose vs. production vs. savings and credit; youth, women co-ops etc.) and the site. The legacy of the community's experience with previous co-ops (established during the Derg) also matters. For instance in Dinki, where the service co-op had been looted at the fall of the Derg with negative implications for the co-op members, it was not easy to convince them to be member of the recently re-established co-op. In most sites the fact that service/multi-purpose co-ops are not able to provide credit for fertiliser and other seasonal inputs to their members reduces their perceived usefulness. The revitalisation of various types of co-ops is typically a government-led intervention.

In all sites, **food insecurity** is now an issue which it is expected that government will help farmers to tackle, a significant change perhaps not so much compared to 1995 (as the Derg regime had started providing emergency relief – except in Geblen) but compared to earlier regimes that elderly people can still remember. Community members noted positive aspects of this change – e.g. in Korodegaga and Geblen for the poorer households, that food aid (under PSNP in those sites) helped survival and in Dinki, that it was useful especially for female-headed households. However, this was not taken as an exclusively good thing. In Geblen some members of the community expressed concern about a growing 'culture of dependency' entertained by people's expectations from the government. On the other hand in Dinki, just having 'free' food aid (instead of FFW which had been implemented for the past few years) was what people wanted – as noted elsewhere arising among others from a sense of unfairness as communities in Afar did not have to work.

### **Modernisation of people's lives: life styles, social relations and ideas**

Looking in the same way to data from 1995 and 2010 we found that among others the following modernisation dimensions had been important – differentially across and within communities – in people's lives:

- Improved houses and household assets for the better-off
- Access to family planning much more widely available
- Access to curative and preventive health treatments previously unavailable, e.g. TB, trachoma

- Recently improved mother and child care
- Improved nutrition
- Considerably increased access to education at all levels
- Emerging big changes to women's lives
- Some improvement in children wellbeing
- Greater uncertainty faced by the youth
- Much greater connection to the wider world, with a wider range of repertoires of ideas to draw from.

Access to **safe water** has remained a constraint for most households in five sites out of six – even in the *peri-urban* communities of Turufe and Girar. In Yetmen where most households have access to safe water this dates from 1997; no significant further change took place after this. Annual outbreaks of cholera were reported from most sites, and in some typhoid and giardia.

In all sites for the better-off there have been significant changes in **housing** (most often corrugated iron sheet roofs, walls using non-traditional materials such as 'blockets' and sometimes plastered, partitions between rooms to separate livestock from family members and more rooms with e.g. a separate kitchen) and a wider range of 'modern' household assets (including sofas, modern beds, chairs and tables, radios, tape-recorders and even TVs in the sites where electricity is fairly widespread). Often this went alongside greater *urbanisation* but not exclusively and so, there are a number of better houses in Korodegaga and in Dinki (the village itself, in addition to modern houses in Chibite, the kebele centre). In the *remote* sites modern houses became an investment. Local room renting emerged as a source of income (notably for female headed households) in Mishig in Geblen and in Chibite in Hagere Selam (Dinki's kebele), with a number of government employees having to find accommodation. Richer people also build modern houses in the closest bigger urban centres often with a view to accommodating their children attending further education in these places and also as a source of income.

In 1995, **family planning** was not available or on a very limited basis. Views on contraception were negative, on religious and cultural grounds (Muslims against it in Korodegaga, Turufe and Geblen, opposition from Orthodox Christians in Geblen, social status attached to high fertility in Imdibir/ Girar). In Dinki people were against the idea. There had been some promotion by the Derg (e.g. in Turufe) and the TPLF in Geblen. Contraception was used in some sites but by few women (Geblen, Turufe, Girar, Yetmen by prostitutes in town) including secretly (in Turufe). In 2003 contraceptives were available in most sites but little was known on their actual use, and the supply was not always reliable or in sufficient quantity. Since then **access** to family planning has continued to expand: contraceptives are **available** notably in the (government) health posts found in all the communities. Everywhere the **range of methods** has also expanded (including condoms, pills, injections, and various forms of implants and loops). NGOs have been instrumental in promoting family planning in some sites, but this change is largely linked to government-led interventions.

Yet there continues to be less certainty on the extent of actual regular **use** of contraception. People in some sites claim that use is high (e.g. the HEW 75% of women in Girar – though she has targets) – it is much smaller in others (e.g. 50 women in Geblen, which is likely to represent less than 20% of the women potentially concerned, and a kebele official said fewer than 5% women were taking pills including his wife). There continues to be high resistance on religious grounds, or by husbands (e.g. in Girar) but also by women who, in Yetmen for instance, refuse to use contraceptives even when their husband does not want more children because 'having children is getting expensive'. In several sites the data suggest that things may be changing faster with the younger generation of more educated girls: they link the use of contraception to women's rights of having a greater say over their life (which may well provide a stronger motivation than more abstract notions of population control). E.g. using contraception is useful in case of abduction if the girl is thinking of escaping (Dinki); or if a marriage does not work (Dinki, Yetmen); and for poor women (several sites).

In all communities there has been a substantial increase in access to **primary health care and preventive health** measures that were not available in 1995. **Distances** to health facilities have considerably decreased as shown in 0 below, though from quite different baselines in 1995. There remain big differences between *peri-urban and integrated* and *remote* communities. Change was generally less significant in relation to curative health than prevention – something that some people were complaining about in some sites (Girar, Dinki, Yetmen and Korodegaga). In Dinki and Yetmen (the Amhara communities) a nurse was posted at health post level as a compromise.

**Change 1995-2010 in access to health facilities**

	Services in 1995	Services in 2010	Change
<b>Peri-urban and integrated communities</b>			
Turufe (Oromia)	Nearest hospital Kuyera 3 kms (G) No health facility in kebele Private clinics in towns better but expensive	Hospital in Kuyera (Government/G) Health post in kebele (G) Health centre in Shashemene (8 kms) (G) and private facilities, and missionary facilities in Kuyera Land given, plan for health centre in kebele (G)	Some change in curative (more planned); big change in preventive
Yetmen (Amhara)	Nearest hospital 72 kms No health facility in kebele Private clinic in town but expensive	Hospital 72 kms (G) Health centre in urban Yetmen (G) Health post in Yetmen rural (G)	Big change in both curative and preventive
Girar (SNNP)	Nearest hospital 12 kms (NG) No health facility in kebele (?)	Hospital 12 kms (NG) Health post in Girar (G) Health centre in Imdibir town (1 km) (G), private facilities in Wolkite (30 kms)	Big change in both curative and preventive
<b>Remote communities</b>			
Korodegaga (Oromia)	Nearest hospital 30 kms No health facility in kebele	Hospital 30 kms Health post in Korodegaga since 2009 (G) Health centre Awash Melkasa 8 kms and Dera (wereda capital) (G) Numerous private facilities 30 kms (Nazreth)	Some change in curative, big change in preventive
Dinki (Amhara)	Nearest hospital 66 kms (G) No health facility in kebele Health centre Aliyu Amba 8 kms	Hospital 66 kms (G) Health post in kebele (1 hour walk) (G) Improved Health centre (G) in Aliyu Amba (8 kms, 2 hours) and Gorobela (wereda centre, 25 kms) and private clinics in Gorobela	Some change in curative, big change in preventive
Geblen (Tigray)	Nearest clinic 22 kms No health facility in kebele	Hospital 30 kms (Adigrat) (G) Health post in kebele (G) Health centre Adikelembes (G) (45 min walk from centre of kebele) and wereda centre (G) Private facilities in Adigrat	Some change in curative, big change in preventive

Some but not all this expansion is linked to government interventions, with health posts in all sites since 2009, and health centres much closer than in 1995 though distances are still greater in the *remote* sites (between 45 minutes and 3 hours walk for people in Geblen, Dinki and Korodegaga to get to a government health centre vs. health centres available in central or adjacent town in *peri-urban and integrated* sites). There was less change with regard to hospital level services. Private facilities have much expanded in the urbanised areas nearest to the communities and are within reach in all sites for those who can afford to pay. However, people in the *peri-urban and integrated* sites have more choice, including between government and private facilities.

There also is a big change with the presence at **community level of health workers** focusing on **prevention, health education, and some aspects of mother and child health**. In all communities there are government health extension workers. There are also 'health promoters' or 'reproductive health workers' or 'community conversation conductors', focusing on slightly different prevention/reproductive health/mother and child health issues depending on the community. This is usually facilitated by a mix of government, donor and NGO support. In Turufe there are home-based carers (for HIV/AIDS patients).

**Health-seeking behaviour** has changed with the easier access to modern health facilities and greater awareness of the benefits of being healthy (in Girar people with relatives in Addis Ababa may go there to seek treatment; across the sites people borrow or sell assets to cover health costs when they have to, and some iddirs have started providing assistance for sick members). However, in all communities many people continue to rely on traditional self-treatment and seek modern treatment only 'when it becomes serious' – or not at all and go to holy water or use other traditional means when they cannot afford the costs of modern treatment or believe that the case is beyond the capacity of the existing facilities and staff (e.g. for mental health problems in Yetmen, other cases in Geblen). Also, there are areas for which traditional medicine is considered very good such as bone setters, mentioned in most sites.

In 1995 there was some awareness of **HIV/AIDS** in Dinki and Geblen though no reported cases and no mention of it at all elsewhere. In 2010 there is much more widespread awareness of it thanks to health education generally and intensive awareness and prevention campaigns as per the government policy. However, the prevailing perception in all communities (among community members, in some sites health staff disagree with this) is that HIV/AIDS is mainly an urban problem, linked with migration to towns or men spending leisure time in towns. Yet there were a few (known and/or suspected) cases in all communities and AIDS orphans in Turufe, Yetmen and Dinki (though in Dinki, these were the children of a woman not from Dinki).

It is impossible to say whether generally health outcomes are better in 2010 than in 1995. There may be an expansion of **malaria** prevalence in the communities traditionally considered as 'not at risk' because they are mostly highlands (Geblen, Girar, Turufe and Yetmen), yet close to lowland areas. Several factors may have contributed to increase the risk of contamination, notably water harvesting and irrigation expansion, increased migration/mobility, and perhaps expansion of maize and climate change. **Tuberculosis** was said to be increasing in Dinki. But treatment was available in most sites whereas it was not in 1995. Medicine against trachoma is also now regularly available in several sites. **Vaccination, regular pregnancy check-up and safe deliveries** are now part of what women (and even men) talk about although this does not mean that services are used/adopted (some resistance to vaccination in Dinki and Yetmen - the two Amhara sites; in Dinki because it was suspected to be disguised contraception). These services are more easily available though variably across communities, depending on access to facilities and levels of staff capacity.

There has also been improvement in **nutrition**, linked in part to government interventions in health education and food security. A wider range of food items is also consumed, locally cultivated (e.g. injera in Girar, vegetables and fruits in several sites linked to irrigation) or found on the market (e.g. factory-made oil and pasta). Soft drinks and beer are also found in the bars in town, including in the very small town of Geblen. This trend toward a more varied diet may be more limited or even not applicable for poorer households or people may return to the traditional staple food item when they need cash and the new products are more easily marketable (e.g. in Girar households producing vegetables and fruits sell these to pay their taxes as enset is less easily marketable).

Between 1995 and 2010 there was considerably increased provision of and access to **education** and marked progress with girls' education in all communities, with variations in the extent of change and starting from very different baselines with in 1995 almost no provision/access in the *remote* sites and much better provision in the *peri-urban and integrated* ones – as shown in 0 below. This

progress was linked to a vast expansion of government provision. Some private provision emerged too at kindergarten and post-secondary levels in particular and used by children from richer families especially in the *peri-urban and integrated* sites.

**Table 1 Modernisation processes and outcomes in education in the six communities**

<b>Remote communities</b>		
Geblen (remote, Tigray)	Striking increase in provision and even more so access, from very low basis in 1995: Nearest primary school at 12 kms attended by 5% boys and 6 girls in 1995; even fewer children in secondary; no educated people in the village From there to, in 2010, high achievements, commitment and hopes from parents and students – but also a sense that not enough is done to support people’s efforts Primary: one full cycle (grades 1-8) school and two recently built satellite schools in remote kushets; almost all school-age children enrolled and gender parity New Grade 9 at 45 min walk from kebele centre (neighbouring kebele). Many girls continue to secondary (some girls were previously going to e.g. Edaga Hamus, Adigrat). TVET in Edaga Hamus (18 kms), Freweini (28 kms), Adigrat (30 kms)– but limited places Some graduates from and students currently at university (five families or more)	
Dinki (remote, Amhara)	Considerable increase in provision and access from low/very low basis in 1995 Expansion of main primary school + satellite school(s)	1% boys, no girl from Dinki at kebele Gr1-6 school, 1-2 hours walk from village. In 2010 school is Gr8. Satellite schools including in Dinki. Girls represent 50% enrolment. Secondary school just open in Aliyu Amba: only few children from Dinki
Korodegaga (remote, Oromia)	Post-primary requires staying away from home; few can do this No TVET in vicinity (60 kms Dinki, 30 kms Korodegaga)	41 students in Gr1-4 school of which 8 girls in 1995. More children go higher than Gr4 in 2010, but not yet very high for most children as main school still stops Gr5 (plan to further expand in future). Satellite school helps. More girls than boys enrolled now. First obstacle: post-grade 5 students have to attend in Sodere across the river.
<b>Peri-urban and integrated communities</b>		
Turufe (integrated, Oromia)	From a high basis in 1995 Government provision not much changed, higher enrolment in primary including girls Unemployment of educated people already an issue in 1995 In 2010, same concern.	In 1995: Gr1-6, secondary (Gr7-8) 3 kms, full secondary in Shashemene. 87.5% boys, 75% girls enrolled in primary. 25% girls enrolled in secondary. Some people educated at colleges, TTIs, university level. Main change in 2010: Gr1-8 full cycle in kebele but richer households send children to Kuyera better school. Private colleges in Shashemene and Kuyera - only rich households can afford.
Yetmen (integrated, Amhara)		In 1995: Primary and junior secondary in urban Yetmen; 20% children at school, girls = 50% enrolment; some people educated at colleges, TTIs, university level Main change in 2010: New (recent) government TVET in Bichena (17 kms) though poor quality and less attractive options. Richer households continue to send children to Debre Markos and elsewhere. Access to private education in towns for rich. Greater importance attached to education notably due to ‘push factor’ of lack of land for the youth.
Girar (integrated, SNNP)	Relatively high provision/access in 1995: Gr1-4 primary school, most children enrolled though only 50% school age girls. Full secondary in adjacent town, high costs, some go including girls. In 1995 many dropout/educated people - ‘many just help parents’ though ‘better farmers’ In 2010 some change, and some hopes: School expanded to Gr1-8 recently, which helps especially for girls (‘UPE’, broader women’s rights movement, and generally greater commitment to education and expectations). Felt need of TVET for Gr10 leavers and support to youth packages. Catholic Mission constructing one in Imdibir. Post-election promise university in woreda; now a few students elsewhere.	

In all sites, an important factor to explain enrolment expansion was the smaller distances to school (supply side). The still widely prevailing system of half day schooling (‘shift system’) facilitated enrolment too as it meant that children could attend school while continuing to help at home



(demand side). Most communities successfully opposed change to this system; in Geblen (*Tigray*) people reluctantly agreed for Grades 7 and 8. Poorer people in all sites face obstacles linked to their poverty. These emerge at primary education level in the *remotest* communities, whereas in the *more integrated* sites a higher proportion of children have a chance to attend the full primary cycle but poverty-related obstacles emerge at secondary and post-secondary levels.

As noted earlier, one major change is that there is now a sense that education can lead to other (and better) livelihood alternatives, through employment following academic qualifications or acquiring skills enabling moving out of farm-based livelihoods. In Geblen, Girar and Yetmen many people have high hopes that this could happen for their children or themselves – a response to a mix of pull and push factors (hope of a better life, status linked to employment, role models by people who succeeded earlier, attraction of other life styles – but also lack of land for the younger generations and, in Geblen, an increasingly clear sense that there are very few ways of reaching a sustainable livelihood in the area and not all the people in the community will succeed in staying on the land). There is much less of a sense that education is a ‘gate-opener’ in Korodegaga and Dinki. Turufe is a bit in between these two poles – with different groups in the community having different incentives (linked to job opportunities in Oromia and the Oromo administration for Oromo, while migrants want children to have links to larger towns like Addis Ababa – which is clearly more costly). Overall, in communities like Geblen, Girar and Yetmen the data suggest that considering the obstacles they face under the current policies people have begun to raise the questions of ‘education for what and for whom’ as challenges to the government.

There are emerging important ***changes in women’s lives***, and more change is bound to unfold in the short term as the impacts of recently passed laws unroll over time and as cohorts of more educated girls reach womanhood. As just noted in all sites girls’ education is on an upward trend. Moreover, in 2010 in all sites women could claim much expanded rights and there were a few cases of them doing so and obtaining their rights. There were changes in relation to circumcision and early marriages (with variations as in some communities these were lesser issues e.g. circumcision already very significantly reduced under the TPLF in Geblen); girls’ greater choice in marriage (e.g. in Yetmen, a fairly conservative community generally, partners now often know each other before marriage; in Yetmen, Turufe and Geblen, more educated girls are said to be more able to choose their partners); access to land for married women, women heading households and on inheritance; equal inheritance rights to men/boys; right to claim divorce and to equal share of properties in case of divorce; ban against widow inheritance (important; and decreasing in Turufe) and greater rights in case of polygyny (also strongly discouraged), which is especially important in the *Muslim* groups (polygyny is decreasing in Turufe, less so in Korodegaga).

These changes are working their way through, e.g. younger girls are no longer circumcised in families where older girls were. Most have yet to fully unfold, e.g. in Dinki the process of land certification under the two spouses’ names is not completed. In all communities the implications of the new legal provisions concerning property sharing and inheritance are only starting to emerge (with the new cases of divorce and death since the new land and family laws were passed).

In contrast with these changes, in most households in all the communities the division of labour has remained much the same as in 1995. There are claims from two sites that in some households men have started helping women with some domestic chores like fetching wood and water and doing a few chores for an wife active in the outside world. In several sites women gained access to different means of getting an income (e.g. women’s co-op in Girar and Korodegaga; launching small urban businesses in Geblen, and distilling in Turufe), but this clashed with unchanged expectations from husbands with regard to their wife’s domestic role (in e.g. Girar) and in several sites there was more or less active opposition from some members of the community to this economic empowerment agenda (Girar, Korodegaga, Yetmen opposition to women’s co-ops).

More broadly there was opposition to change toward greater gender equality and women's rights in general in all sites. There were differences in the extent and the main source of resistance, across sites and depending on the issue – linked to local ideas in turn depending much on the *ethnic/religious mix*. Husband resistance to joint land certification was observed among Muslim Argobbas of Dinki and initially in Girar (Gurage), and polygyny raised issues in Korodegaga (Muslim Oromo). Stopping circumcision appeared to be much harder in Dinki and Yetmen (Amhara) than Girar (SNNP) (the Amhara practice is less harmful than that in Girar). Even people who on the whole support the main direction of the change cannot agree with some of its implications digging deep in the social fabric of the community. So in Girar for instance, where the change is considerable as it faces the might of strong Gurage traditions and norms of male domination, an otherwise progressive clan leader cannot agree with the new dispensation through which women are entitled to claim divorce whenever they want (under the government system), bypassing the customary safeguards against this family and social disruption. It is noteworthy that in Yetmen where divorce is common, there is strong resentment by divorced men.

Across the board there was less progress with regard to women's political empowerment - from different baselines in 1995, therefore resulting in different outcomes in 2010. Building on the legacy of the TPLF promotion, women's political empowerment made definite progress in Geblen (*Tigray*) where in 2008 women representation on the local Council reached 30% and women were effectively raising gender issues - although there they were said to not yet have equal decision-making to men. In Yetmen and Dinki (*Amhara* communities though with a significant Muslim Argobba element in Dinki), politics and administration are still seen as male issues. In Korodegaga, Girar and Turufe (*Oromia and SNNP*) women's representation on community management structures is minimal, which could suggest the same understanding as in the *Amhara* communities. However, in those communities a number of women acquired some standing through an economic role (e.g. in the women's co-ops, savings and credit associations, Women's Association) which may be an entry point for a greater political role. The female wereda Councillor in Korodegaga, Dinki and Yetmen had had some influence on wereda level decision-making, with benefits for their kebele.

In all communities there was some **improvement in child wellbeing**. Children's schooling is one factor that was said to contribute. In several sites women were also noting the importance of better care for babies/infants (nutrition, hygiene, health care etc.) – this is part of what the government health extension workers teach, and may not yet be put into practice much. In particular, poor and disadvantaged children continue to face serious risks (hunger, lack of education, rape for girls).

In contrast, **youth** in all communities face greater uncertainty than in the past. In 1995, with the exception of some awareness of an emerging issue of youth unemployment in Turufe and Yetmen, there was no mention of 'the youth' as a specific social group. In 2010 the plight of the youth is at least recognised. However, the older generation of landholding farmers, to some extent concerned for their own children, have little or uncertain sympathy for the youth as a social group. On the contrary there is inter-generational competition for resources, mainly land in relation to the trend of increasing land scarcity noted earlier (note that this seems to be mainly a male issue). So in Yetmen and Dinki there was no support for government-proposed solutions to youth unemployment as it meant diverting communal land for the youth. In Geblen and Turufe there was initial resistance too though finally this was overcome – on a very limited scale in Geblen. In Korodegaga landless youth were initially not given access to irrigation opportunities; this has now changed but there continue to be signs of tension when youth groups compete with other groups in the community (story around pump for youth borrowed by landholders' irrigation association and not given back). In Girar there was apparently less tension – perhaps because youth migrate in larger proportions hence lessening the competition over local resources.

**Urbanisation** and greater commercialisation of smallholder agriculture provide new opportunities that compete less with older farmers' preferences (e.g. trade facilitation activities and other

informal sector jobs in towns) – but for these there may be competition among youth like in Girar about opportunities linked to chat trade.

To various degrees and through varied means all the communities were much more connected to the broader world in 2010 than they were in 1995 (education, roads, greater strength of market forces, greater penetration of government structures, systems and personnel, access to donor and NGO discourses, radio programmes, TV and newspapers, regular phone contacts, migration of more people to more different places, contact with ‘worldwide’ religious discourses). As a result there was an **expansion of the range of repertoires** which community members can use to think about and support their actions. Beyond the local customary repertoire, still strong in all communities, people could call on a local modern repertoire (specific to each community in what matters most in it), ethnic and religious belonging repertoires, and the government and donor/NGO repertoires (carried through all interventions and directly promoted through specific interventions aimed at changing people’s ideas).

In relation to *religious and ethnic mix*, religious belonging repertoires showed signs of tension between the usual tolerance and new and less tolerant ideas. In Dinki this was linked to outside influences on the community’s Muslim and Orthodox Christian groups, whereas in Girar and Turufe conversions to Protestantism attracted resentment. In comparison ethnicity was less salient. In the ethnically mixed communities there were periods of tension around the 2005 election in Turufe and to some extent Dinki, and there are ethnically-demarcated community organisations in Turufe; however, there was no sign that the ethnic belonging repertoire was used in a significantly more exacerbated manner in 2010 than in 1995 in those communities. In Geblen there were signs that ethnic belonging was becoming increasingly less important – with adult people saying that they could not identify precisely to which group they belonged.

The current (2010) dominant mix of repertoires is community-specific in terms of relative strengths of each repertoire and also alliances and contradictions between repertoires. For instance:

- The local customary repertoire was still notably strong in Dinki (*remote*), although it also showed signs of split due to greater influence of externally-brought new ideas in the ‘religious belonging’ repertoire of the two groups in the community (*heterogeneous*); community members made little use of the government (revolutionary democracy) repertoire and much greater use of the donor/NGO (democratic rights) repertoire.
- In Yetmen too (the other *Amhara* community) people are very selective in the use of government repertoire, rejecting it when it does not suit them; in Yetmen (*integrated* community) individualism is valued, which chimes with the donor/NGO repertoire but may also be reflect bitter memories of the Derg forced collectivisation, and resonates with the traditional ideal-type of having an independent household.
- In Korodegaga (*remote, ethnically and religiously homogeneous*) the local customary repertoire is not under threat in the same way as in Dinki (*remote, two ethnic and religious groups*) – although external religious fundamentalism was present, clashing with the community’s more tolerant traditional religious belonging repertoire; the local modern repertoire is quite strong, with a number of (other) new ideas having been ‘internalised’, notably on women’s rights by the women themselves.
- In Girar, the (*homogeneous*) Gurage site, the clan-based (ethnic belonging) repertoire is very important; in some instances it allied with the government and donor repertoires (e.g. in the campaign against female circumcision), in others there was less agreement between the repertoires (e.g. on women’s right to divorce). In this *peri-urban and urbanising* community the local modern repertoire is quite strongly influenced by urbanisation and migration - the latter not being a new factor.

- In Turufe (*peri-urban* community) the local modern repertoire is taking on board initially external ideas brought by the government and donor/NGO repertoires but it is also influenced by the prevailing *urbanisation*. Repertoires are also shaped by the strong *heterogeneity* of the community, with migrant repertoires more allied with modernism. There is an alliance between government repertoire and new progressive elements the customary Oromo repertoire over attempts to strengthen women’s rights.
- In Geblen (*remote, urbanising, ‘de facto’ transitioning out of the status of vulnerable cereal-based livelihood community*) the local customary repertoire is challenged in critical aspects, notably those related to the value of farming as they offer little/no prospect of wellbeing. Yet, the local modern repertoire is both strong and unclear, as none of the different alternatives suggested by this repertoire (education and job, migration, or hard work with government proposed packages) emerge as ‘the’ solution.

In each site, different people use variants of the ‘dominant mix’ and in addition they can and do use different variants at different times.

### Modernisation of social relationships and community governance

Finally, from 1995 to 2010 we found the following aspects of modernisation of the communities’ governance:

- Greater penetration of the state
- Resilience and transformation of community social capital
- More interaction between communities’ customary and modern governance systems
- Different kinds of violence and insecurity in a number of communities
- The emergence of a less parochial political outlook in most communities

These changes took place from significantly different baselines in terms of the communities’ governance landscape in 1995, as summarised in 0 below.

**Table 2: Community governance in 1995**

<b>Geblen</b>	Locally elected council (baito) during TPLF (against Derg) period, choosing local leaders, passing by-laws, responsible for land reform – succeeded by EPRDF local structures
<b>Girar</b>	Gurage customary community management (family, lineage, clan heads and elders’ councils; <i>ye joka</i> high court, laws and rules), weakened under Derg, stronger again in EPRDF early years
<b>Korodegaga</b>	Settling pastoralists with clan structures. Villagisation and cooperativisation under Derg, collapsing at Derg fall
<b>Dinki</b>	Remote, smuggling across Afar border to Djibouti during Derg. Complex relationships Afar-Argobba-Amhara
<b>Yetmen</b>	Traditionally against government and in 1995 hostility against ‘Tigrean government’. ‘Derg bureaucrats’ influential people in community.
<b>Turufe</b>	Villagised during Derg. Migrants (Northerners Amhara and Tigrayans, Southerners Wolayitta and Kembata) vs. Oromo (clan structures), expulsion of Kambata in early 1990s. 1995: Oromo political ascendancy (EPRDF + regionalisation)

In 2010 there was significantly **greater penetration of the state** in all six communities. This involved:

- A much wider array of government structures (wereda and kebele three branches of government, kebele sub-structures and committees), including at micro level (‘one-for-five’ or ‘one-for-ten’ [households] cells for instance) and of party structures, also extending branches at sub-kebele level
- Significant links between government and party structures and agendas, with different forms of link across communities (same leadership at micro and kebele levels in Dinki, Geblen and

Yetmen – on instruction from above in Yetmen; government employees as party link in Girar and likely Korodegaga where almost everyone was said to be a party member)<sup>2</sup>.

- A much greater range of government physical infrastructure (more schools, kebele offices, FTCs [though most inoperative], health posts) and of government-led activities, and the permanent presence of government employees at local level (more teachers, development agents, health extension workers and most recently kebele manager, and community police in some sites)
- The presence or revitalisation of government-related structures such as Women and Youth Associations (though most were not very active) and various forms of co-operatives, as well as a number of community-government ‘bridge’ structures and processes (e.g. ‘peace committees’ relatively recently established, formally at least, in all communities; Parent-Teacher Associations)
- A greater array of taxes and contributions.

This entailed a ‘de facto’ intensification of the relation between the community and ‘the government’ (*mengist*) and the party, with variations across communities in the main thrust of the relation and the extent to which it matters in people’s daily lives. No matter what, in all communities there was:

- Some awareness of the government and party structures, their roles, rights and responsibilities – to a greater or lesser extent across communities
- Some awareness of the government development model (also greater or lesser depending on the community) and (explicit or implicit) perspectives on it
- A big change with daily encounters with educated, paid, sometime outsider, government employees
- A pattern of interactions between government, community and go-between actors, in the ‘development interface’ space resulting in an overall thrust in the community-government relation ranging from distance and mainly distrust in Yetmen, to closeness but also a sense of not always welcome ‘tightness’ in Geben.

At the same time, in all communities the *community’s* customary ‘*social capital*’ (relations with relatives, neighbours everywhere; lineage and clan membership in Girar, Korodegaga and the Oromo group in Turufe; self-help organisations like iddirs and equbs in most communities; cultural and religious activities and structures; elders’ mediation and other dispute resolution/local justice institutions) remained important – perhaps most strongly so in Dinki (*remotest*) and Girar (*homogeneous* Gurage). However, there was also evolution, more so in some communities than in others, and in response to the inevitably greater interaction of the community and its customary governance structures with ‘the government’ as well as other factors.

In all communities **education** brought a big change in children’s socialisation and social capital. New forms of social capital were brought by **urbanisation** notably in Girar, Geben and Turufe, with outcomes not exclusively positive (youth quarrels in bars in town in Girar and Geben; high level of violence around chat trade in the town near Girar; youth bandit gangs in Turufe). In Yetmen one negative social capital outcome was the relatively recent but serious dispute between the rural and urban communities. In Geben some people expressed a sense that the community’s social capital was weakened because of the expansion of long term **migration**.

New forms of social capital also arose from government-related structures and activities (through e.g. the Women and Youth Associations where they have some success in bringing benefits to their members like in Korodegaga for the youth and Girar for the women, or the irrigation association in

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<sup>2</sup> Government and party structures were also strongly linked in 1995, but this is now expected to take place in a supposedly more democratic environment and it was recently ‘deepened’ at sub-kebele level.

Korodegaga too) and from the encounters with government employees living in the community (including encounters for non-professional reasons when government employees hire rooms, take breakfast in the local teashops, enjoy TV programmes in the local bars etc.).

In 1995 in some communities there was a sense that customary governance arrangements were getting stronger following the fall of the Derg. In 2010 there was a (relatively recent) trend of **greater interaction between customary and modern systems**, with government seeking alliance with the communities' customary governance institutions. Clan elders in Girar explained that immediately after the fall of the Derg elders and clan structures had become more powerful again whereas during the Derg PA leaders were more powerful. This had been followed by a period during which the EPRDF regime had strengthened government structures in a movement which was seen as a reaction against the new strength of customary systems after the Derg. For several years the formal government system did not pay attention to customary governance structures. The trend of government seeking alliance with them was recent. It is plausible that there was a similar pendulum movement in the other communities (see e.g. the Aba Gada system incorporated into a formal committee appropriated/co-opted by the wereda in Turufe) – likely with some differences in Geblen.

Thus in 2010 there were formal systems in place to call on **elders for dispute resolution** in collaboration with the modern arbitration system (kebele social court, wereda court and new land arbitration committees): the establishment of 'peace committees' or similarly called bodies that would see cases before they would go to court was mentioned in all communities. This seemed to be reasonably active in some communities (Girar, Geblen, Dinki, Turufe). The formal peace committee was not active in Yetmen, though elders were playing their usual mediation role but outside of the formal system. In Girar, where the customary clan-based justice system used to be very strong and dealing with family cases and civil cases as serious as murder, there were tensions around role demarcation and jurisdiction of the formal and informal justice structures, respectively.

In addition, in several communities certain community institutions were called upon for their **mobilisation** capacity, in support to government-led intervention or government-promoted ideas. This can be a double-edged sword. It was fairly successful with regard to the role of elders, iddirs and equbs and other local opinion leaders in combating harmful traditional practices against women, in Girar and in Turufe. In Yetmen this strategy of alliance failed, and customary governance structures spearheaded community resistance in several instances. As noted earlier, the Dersh mobilised the community against the construction of a secondary school on communal land, an event which turned violent, and in other less dramatic instances. In Turufe the iddir financed the delegation of elders who travelled to present to the Regional President the community's complaint against the plan of moving the hospital away from Kuyera – which suggests that in Turufe, like in Girar in relation to the justice system, the potential of customary governance can be harnessed but not entirely subdued to the government objectives.

Overall, the above suggests that with the greater penetration of the state at the community level and enduring strength of customary governance systems, there are an increasing number of points of interaction between the systems. Systems interact in both intended and unintended ways, which brings both intended and unintended outcomes.

The picture is mixed with regard to the evolution of the **level of violence and security** in the communities. It was said to be better in 2010 in Turufe (*peri-urban and urbanising*), but from a situation in which theft and banditry were said to be fairly common in the past. In contrast, things were said to have deteriorated in Yetmen (*integrated*) (although it is not clear that these perceptions relate to 1995, when insecurity was also high with anti-government and shifta activities and a curfew in place), Geblen (*remote with some urbanisation*), Girar (*peri-urban and urbanising*), and Korodegaga (*remote*). In Geblen the greater violence/ insecurity which (in contrast with Turufe) was said to be previously 'unknown in the community', was linked to *urbanisation* but also youth 'desperation'. In Girar too violence was linked to *urbanisation* and thefts were linked to the

increased economic opportunities in the area. In Korodegaga as well insecurity was linked to competition for resources compounded by emerging new economic opportunities. In Dinki (*remote*, least touched by some aspects of modernisation present in other sites) there seemed to be less violence linked to these broad socio-economic issues but serious cases feuding and of intergenerational conflicts linked to land scarcity were reported.

Finally, by 2010 in all communities a **less parochial political outlook** had emerged. In a number of instances people explicitly linked local governance practices and their evolution to broader (national) political/policy evolutions. In Girar (*SNNP*), some people explain how the post-2005 election 'good governance' package meant that 'local tyrants' could be removed. In Dinki and Yetmen (*Amhara*), the 'good governance' package and its focus on persuasion instead of coercion provided room for people to reject what does not please them – including endless meetings.

In Korodegaga (*Oromia*) and Geblen (*Tigray*), where the wereda and kebele administrations were using a degree of coercion in some instances (latrines in Korodegaga, packages in Geblen), some people were no longer simply ready to accept this – although there seemed to be less room for outright refusal or opposition. And so in Korodegaga one farmer noted that the government should consult farmers before it decides to implement policies (this was in relation to the government-promoted use of improved maize that in this particular instance had been a failure). Whereas in Geblen many people strongly criticized the kebele leadership for not taking up issues raised by the community at higher level (for instance in relation to the enforced packages), linking this to the tight grip of the party on the tabia leaders – but had no solution to this situation. A few women also blamed the government recent pro-rich orientation, linking this to the obstacle that local children from poor families face in trying to pursue their education.

## Conclusion

Different modernisation processes are often **interacting** (like for instance, urbanisation and increased economic activities) although the extent and outcomes of each link vary across communities depending on yet other factors (e.g. urbanisation and increased economic activities were linked in Girar, much less so in Geblen and Dinki).

Modernisation processes also have **unintended outcomes**, again contingent on other factors so that outcomes differ across communities and individuals. For instance, education raises expectations which, if they cannot be fulfilled, may push some young people into unwanted behaviours, raising the level of insecurity and violence in the community - this is said to happen in Geblen, though it surely does not concern all young people who cannot pursue their education, and in other communities it is not noted as such a big issue. Another example is how young women in Girar can now use mobile phones to arrange migration deals – so people in Girar point that mobile phones actually facilitate migration. This unintended outcome of better communications, likely to happen elsewhere too, has consequences that can be good or bad for the individual concerned depending on how her migration experience goes, and can have both positive and negative consequences for her family (depending whether she manages to send remittances) and for the community as a whole (with a weakening of the community if too many young people migrate as feared in Geblen, or a strengthening if the 'diaspora' of migrants invest in their home area as in Girar).

The outcomes of modernisation, some intended and others not, may actually represent **challenges** in further modernisation processes. We found that a number of such challenges are variably recognised and addressed. For instance, urbanisation raises new environmental and social issues (e.g. contamination of water in Geblen; violence linked to new entertainment forms and more drinking in Girar) that are either not recognised or recognised but not squarely addressed by the current processes. Similarly, education raises youth's and their parents' expectations about employment out of farming/rural livelihoods – but it is not clear that this challenge is recognised in its full extent (by government officials for instance).

Moreover, within communities modernisation processes have **different effects** for different households and people. This in some instances is intended or 'positive' (e.g. effects on women of the women's empowerment processes outlined above, different from their effects on men). In other instances it is not. For instance, in all the sites people who are poorer and/or live in remoter parts of the community were less affected by modernisation than those who are richer and/or live closer to roads and urban centres (see e.g. the contrast between people living in Mishig and in far-away kushets in Geblen, or between those with and without access to irrigation in Dinki). Genderage also emerged as a key cross-cutting variable affecting the impacts of all processes (see notably the difference in outcomes between women and youth). This is further unpacked in section 7.

To summarise, between 1995 and 2010 there were striking modernisation changes in the six communities including notably:

- Various degrees of urbanisation and greater (physical and other) connectivity/integration
- Generally greater diversification in local economies and in the livelihood portfolio of some households (in response to various mixes of push and pull factors), including options that entail greater mobility (education and employment, off-farm labour, migration)
- Increased and increasing land scarcity – which is a significant push factor toward diversification
- Increased commercialisation of smallholder agriculture, linked to irrigation in three cases out of the four where this trend is most pronounced (Dinki, Korodegaga and Yetmen vs. Girar)
- Considerably greater access to and use of modern education with significantly higher levels of education for the younger generations – and ensuing shift in expectations particularly in some communities
- Greater access to health services and emerging change in women and children wellbeing and likely, health outcomes
- Greater availability of private service provision in health and education, and choice of private services by some richer households
- Significant emerging change in women's lives
- Greater uncertainty for the youth
- An expanded range of repertoires of ideas about development and 'life in general', including notably greater acceptance and use of family planning (with variations in degree)
- Contingent and evolving greater interaction between the significantly expanded, government-linked modern governance system and customary local governance systems.

The processes underpinning these changes unfolded to extents that vary across the communities so that each community, starting from a community specific baseline in 1995, also reached a community specific set of modernisation outcomes in 2010. This set is, in turn, the community's baseline for further change.

In all the communities, some of the ongoing modernisation processes just analysed have set (community specific) directions that are likely to be resilient – or have revealed such directions, which may have pre-existed; some of the modernisation outcomes reached in 2010 are likely to have longer-lasting effects than others. Thus, the analysis of the modernisation processes and outcomes highlight a set of additional 'control parameters' - processes or sub-systems of the communities that are likely to fundamentally shape their futures.