

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS
IN RURAL ETHIOPIA: WIDE3 STAGE 3**

**STAGE 3 SIX COMMUNITIES WITH
AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL: SHORT
SUMMARY**

MAY 2014

Mokoro


Philippa Bevan, Catherine Dom and Alula Pankhurst

Executive Summary	i
1. Introduction	1
2. WIDE3 community trajectories 1995-2013	2
Adado, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region	2
Somodo, Oromia Region.....	3
Oda Haro, Oromia Region.....	4
Oda Dawata, Oromia Region	4
Sirba, Oromia Region	5
Kormargefia, Amhara Region	6
3. Community modernisations since the early 1990s.....	7
Modernisation of space and place	7
Modernisation of people and their lives	7
Modernisation of human re/production systems	8
Modernisation of livelihood systems	9
Modernisation of society.....	10
Modernisation of cultural ideas	11
Modernisation of politics.....	11
4. Differences in development interventions 1995 – 2013	12
Environment interventions.....	12
Infrastructure interventions	12
Land planning interventions.....	13
Women interventions.....	13
Youth interventions	13
Human re/production services.....	14
Government interventions to support livelihoods	15
Government working with community organisations.....	16
Government interventions to introduce modern ideas	17
Government political interventions.....	17
5. The workings of selected development interventions in 2013	18
Watershed management and tree-planting.....	18
Roads	19
Youth interventions	20
Women interventions.....	20
Safe water.....	22
Health extension.....	22
Primary education	24
Crop extension.....	25
International migration regulation.....	26
Credit and savings.....	26
Taxes and contributions	27
Interventions to change ideas of communities	29
Interventions affecting local government organisation	30
6. Considerations for the future	31
Future government strategies for Stage 3 type communities.....	32
Design and implementation of future development interventions	32
7. A future for WIDE?	35

Executive Summary

1. The WIDE research covers twenty communities in Ethiopia selected as exemplars of different types of rural livelihood system. WIDE1 research was conducted in fifteen of the communities in 1994/5 and WIDE2 in all twenty in 2003. WIDE3 was undertaken in three stages between 2010 and 2013. This Stage 3 report focuses on six communities located in places with different kinds of agricultural potential: they include two kinds of coffee-based livelihood system, three crop-based systems (maize, *tef*, and potatoes/wheat), and one livestock-led system.
2. In this summary we describe the communities' modernisation trajectories from the early 1990s into the future and identify important modernisation processes in the different sectors. We pin-point major changes in government-provided public goods, institutions and services and compare the designs of selected interventions with their *de facto* operation in 2013. On the basis of this analysis we make some suggestions about future government strategies for successful rural agricultural economies such as these and the design and implementation of interventions. We conclude with some suggestions about how the WIDE project might be taken forward.
3. *Modernisation trajectories and processes*: all six communities experienced considerable modernisation since the early 1990s involving (1) better connections to the wider world through a much enhanced road network, better access to electricity, urbanisation and the spread of information and communication technologies (2) denser populations with improved health, education, awareness, higher aspirations, and more modern lifestyles (3) improving opportunities and rights for women and better family childcare and socialisation (4) economic growth and varying degrees of economic restructuring including increased rates of migration and the emergence of a new class of 'very rich' farmers/businesspeople (5) greater awareness of life and events in the rest of Ethiopia and beyond and increasing involvement in modern religious practices and (6) wariness about getting involved in government-led community management..
4. Sirba, on the road between Mojo and Debre Zeit, was becoming a different kind of community under the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation. The trajectories of the other five communities had not changed direction but in four of them rapid urbanisation was starting to eat into community land. Other potential threats to trajectory continuity included declining coffee prices (two communities), increasing tensions in communities with ethnic-religious mixes (three communities), and youth frustrations related to increased education and aspirations in a context of few local opportunities, potentially exacerbated in four communities by the ban on international migration.
5. *Changes in government interventions between the early 1990s and 2013*: overall there had been a considerable increase in public goods in the form of roads, marketplaces, kebele offices, Farmers' Training Centres, Health Posts and Centres, safe drinking water, primary and secondary schools, electricity (though not in two communities) and mobile, radio and TV masts. Preventive and curative health and education services had expanded. The paper gives some detail on the public goods and services available in and near each community and the gaps remaining.
6. In 1995, unlike 2013, there were no interventions for women related to marriage, land rights, gender relations, or economic and political empowerment; although in 2013 there were many implementation problems.
7. Minimal agricultural extension services were available in the mid-1990s; by 2013 the service covered crops, livestock and Natural Resource Management (though not all the communities had the full quota of experts) and the government was much more involved in supporting and monitoring farming activities.
8. There was restricted access to credit in some communities in the early 1990s. In 2013 in most communities there was credit for farm and non-farm activities through Regional MFIs with conditions, which recently included saving, but no advice or resources for non-farm activities.
9. In 1995 the government did not work closely with local elites but this had changed by 2013 when government was involving elders and other customary leaders, religious leaders and model farmers in

mobilising community members for all aspects of development.


10. In the early 1990s Peasant Associations were led by a committee which interacted with wereda agents. The 2013 kebele structures, which operated in parallel with party structures involved a kebele Cabinet, committees, a Council, and a social court, and three sub-kebeles each with a hierarchy of Development Teams containing a number of '1-5s' made up of five or six households.
11. *Implementation of selected interventions in 2013*: the 13 selected interventions were watershed management and tree-planting, roads, youth co-operatives and political organisations, interventions for women, safe water, health extension, primary education, crop extension, regulation of international migration, credit and savings, taxes and contributions, interventions to change community ideas, and kebele organisation. Our analysis shows that there were usually significant differences between the designed intervention and what was actually implemented.
12. *Future government strategies for successful agricultural communities*: to date government strategy depends on the assumption that almost all rural economic production is agricultural and produced by smallholding peasant farmers. While this is a good description of many rural communities in 1995 and 2003 it does not apply to communities of the type studied in Stage 3 in 2013; they are well-integrated into markets, increasingly involved in non-farm activities including trade and business and have a reserve of educated labour with little to do if they stay in the community apart from those in commutable distance of small factories or large towns.
13. Smallholding farmers are currently expected not only to drive agricultural growth but also to contribute a considerable number of days to Public Works labour and participate in many hours of meetings and trainings. At the same time nearly all government's investment in rural economic development has gone to adult male farmers; most of it to the richer ones. This strategy was successful in getting the communities to their positions in 2013 but this group of leading farmers may be now sufficiently well-established and aspiring that it does not need focused nudging any more. Also the time may be ripe to shift some government investment to activities that respond to changes in the division of labour that have already taken place, for example small rural industrialisation and local town development.
14. *Design and implementation of future interventions*: these need to be tailored to anticipate and work with forces for change which will happen independent of Government actions. For example, the evidence from the six Stage 3 communities is that the engine of the economic growth is the hard work of private farmers, traders and businessmen 'trying to change their lives' and that most co-operatives and mass associations had failed to work effectively.
15. 'Missing' interventions we have identified included improvements to internal roads, medium-scale irrigation infrastructure beyond the capacity of farmers to construct, packages to promote diversification in the coffee-producing communities, interventions for poorer farmers, landless people, women, youth and children, and planned rural-urban economic linkages.
16. We identified inefficiencies arising from inappropriate intervention mixes, the campaign approach, and absence of cost-benefit analyses. Some interventions were not tailored to suit the seasonal rhythms of rural life and others did not suit different kinds of local circumstances. Job descriptions for government employees and voluntary kebele officials were not implemented as designed as a result of far too much to do and lack of incentives.
17. The description of how selected development interventions were working in 2013 contains complex stories about the use and effectiveness of different kinds of social mechanisms for changing the minds and behaviour of different kinds of people. This is an area where consultation and research with experienced practical psychologists and sociologists might produce dividends.
18. *Taking the WIDE project forward*: (1) there is scope to use the overall and sector-specific research findings to inform the work of a range of government and donor policymakers and practitioners in Ethiopia; (2) a rapid WIDE4 conducted in all 20 communities in 2015/16 would provide useful information for the launching of GTP2; and (3) it would be good to find an Ethiopian home to take the WIDE longitudinal research into the future.

1. Introduction

The WIDE research covers twenty communities in Ethiopia selected as exemplars of different types of rural livelihood system. WIDE1 research was conducted in fifteen of the communities in 1994/5 and WIDE2 in all twenty in 2003. WIDE3 was undertaken in three stages between 2010 and 2013¹.

This Stage 3 report focuses on six communities which are located in places with different kinds of agricultural potential: they include two kinds of coffee-based livelihood system, three crop-based systems (maize, *tef*, and potatoes/wheat), and one livestock-led system (see map 1). We explore the trajectories of these communities under the EPRDF regime and assess the roles played by government development interventions in those trajectories.

Map 1: WIDE3 Stage 3 research communities



The communities are conceptualised as open and dynamic complex social systems nested in, and

¹ WIDE3 is also known as the ‘Long Term Perspectives on Development Impacts in Rural Ethiopia’ research. The three stages from 2010 to 2013 were financed by the Joint Governance Assessment and Monitoring (JGAM) Trust Fund with funding from DFID and the Canadian and Dutch Governments managed by the World Bank. Three final reports have been produced for JGAM: Stage 1 (2010), Stage 2 (2013) and Stage 3 (April 2014). Summaries for Government were produced for Stage 1 (March 2011), Stage 2 (April 2013), and Stage 3 (this document).

historically co-evolving with, the larger country system². The historical trajectory of this larger system has been partially constructed and driven by social interactions in and among the myriad rural and urban community systems geographically spread over Ethiopia's landscape.

The full report uses the Stage 3 data to explore three sets of questions:

- (1) Since the EPRDF came to power how have the six communities co-evolved and modernised with the wider Ethiopia in which they are nested and to which they contribute? What can we learn that is useful for the future from comparisons of modernisation processes across different kinds of communities during the EPRDF period?
- (2) How did government interventions in the main sectors change between 1995 and 2013? What can be learned that is useful for the future from a close analysis of selected important interventions in place in the communities in 2013 about intervention design, planning and implementation?
- (3) What has been learned from conclusions emerging in Sections 2 and 3?

This summary starts with brief stories of the trajectories of the six communities from the early 1990s into the future. Then, looking across the communities, we describe the modernisation processes in play in the different sectors from the early 1990s. Next we focus on development interventions, showing how much government-provided public goods, institutions and services in three communities³ had changed between 1995 and 2013, and describing the *de facto* operation of selected development interventions in the six communities in 2013. This leads to a section focusing on suggestions for future government strategies for already successful rural agricultural economies and the design and implementation of future development interventions. We conclude by briefly suggesting how the WIDE project might be taken forward now that the WIDE3 research project has been completed.

2. WIDE3 community trajectories 1995-2013

Adado, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region

- Adado is in the Gedeo zone; its livelihood is dominated by coffee; all people are Gedeo, 95% are Protestant and 5% Muslim.
- There was considerable continuity in the trajectory of the Adado community between 1995 and 2013. The kebele town had grown but not very much compared with other places. Lack of investment in roads contributed to continuing remoteness. The community was richer as a whole due to increasing coffee prices between 2003 and 2011, more non-farm activities and increased migration but there had been no economic structural change. Designed changes to the kebele structures had not had much impact on most people's lives.
- There were five notable changes between 1995 and 2013 but none looked as if they were going to change the trajectory of the community in the foreseeable future. Connections with the wider world had increased as a result of the expansion of Dilla and modern technologies. On average people were healthier and better educated than in 1995, as a result of government investments in health and education services and urban influences; many worked harder and aspired to urban lifestyles. Strategies of landless young men had not changed much: in 1995 and 2013 some aspired to government jobs through education while others migrated in search of land or for gold-mining. There were more opportunities to earn casual incomes in non-farm activities

² This is further developed in the Stage 3 full summary report and Annex 1, available on request.

³ Only Adado, Sirba and Kormargefia were included in the 15 communities researched in 1995.

within Adado. People of all ages appreciated most of the development interventions and lifestyle changes and were less committed to customary Gedeo beliefs. There were increased contacts with religious entrepreneurs outside the community including visiting preachers; the number of Protestant sects had increased to five and the small Muslim group of 50 people was networked with people in other kebeles. However there were said to be few tensions among the different religious groups.

- The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Adado's trajectory includes the difficult terrain and lack of investment in roads, the suitability of the area for coffee-growing, the profitability of producing coffee for the international market (at least until 2011), well-established migration linkages, and the strong social cohesion. The main threat comes from the volatility of international coffee prices though there is potential for diversification in the medium-term.

Somodo, Oromia Region

- Somodo is near Jimma; its livelihood is dominated by coffee. 85% of the community members are Oromo Muslims (including about two-thirds *Wahabi*).
- There was considerable continuity in Somodo's trajectory in the ten years between 2003 and 2013 with most changes being gradual. The roadside development had grown and the community was richer due to improved coffee prices (until 2011) combined with an increase in the area planted with coffee. Chat production and prices had also improved and fruit and vegetable sales were increasing. There were no marked changes to economic institutions which, apart from government control of the fertiliser and improved maize seed markets, continued to be market-based. Designed changes to sub-kebele structures had not been implemented as planned but the programme of development interventions was appreciated. There had been considerable unemployment of partially educated youth in 2003 and this was also the case in 2013. Government played a bigger role in human re/production. The community continued to be divided into factions on the basis of ethnicity and religion but had also continued to contain the resulting tensions, even though the *Wahabi* Muslims had boycotted the national elections for the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council in October 2012.
- Five notable trends in the ten years have the potential to change the future trajectory of the community. People's 'interest to work' changed markedly associated with higher aspirations and willingness to experiment. The expansion of Jimma town the municipality had started to eat away at one of the community's border. In 2003 none of the majority Oromo Muslims migrated at all but by 2013 more than 300 young Muslims and Christians were working in Sudan and Gulf countries with many sending remittances to their families. It was predicted that in a few years all Oromo Muslims in Somodo would be *Wahabi* sect members with uncertain consequences for relations with the government and women's rights. Increasing support for modern development repertoires and urban lifestyles was likely to clash with attempts to impose increasingly strict *Wahabi* rules often supported by female migrants returning from the Gulf. Another uncertainty is what happens to international coffee production levels and prices which are prone to volatility.
- The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Somodo's trajectory included the success of the local farming system with its ability to diversify out of coffee if low prices make that advisable. This depends on its terrain which is conducive to producing various crops and its location near the urban markets of Jimma. Fourth is the community's experience in managing potential conflicts among people of different ethnicities and religions. Threats to continuity included declining coffee prices, the expansion of Jimma town, youth frustrations

following the banning of migration, and potentially increasing tensions between government and *Wahabi* leaders.

Oda Haro, Oromia Region

- Oda Haro is a maize producing community in Bako wereda. 99% of its members are Oromo, of whom 60% are Protestant, 33% are Orthodox and 7% are Muslim increasingly converting to *Wahabism*.
- By 2013 Oda Haro had become much more connected to the wider world including through trade links with Addis Ababa and other major towns related to great improvements in main roads. Small towns had appeared and grown nearby. People were healthier, better educated and committed to 'improving their lives'. Since the droughts of 2002 and 2003 there had been steady agricultural growth caused by good urban demand, links with private traders in towns, modern inputs, and extension services over the years. However, the community was deeply fractured. Proselytising by incoming religious entrepreneurs, starting with Protestants in the early 1990s, had led to a rapid shift away from traditional and Orthodox Christianity such that Protestants were in the majority by 2000. The Muslim minority increased to 7% by 2013 through in-migration and were converting rapidly to *Wahabism*. Youth and women were involved in a fight against long-standing patriarchal domination; women seemed to have made more progress than the young men. Relationships between the government, in the form of wereda officials and an unstable and competitive kebele leadership, and the community were uneasy.
- Uncertainties with the potential to affect the future trajectory of the community include the choices that will be made by the increasing number of frustrated un(der)employed semi-educated young men as a result of control of land by the older generation, recent rapid expansion of education, and the dearth of non-farm opportunities in the area. In late 2013 there was also uncertainty about continuation of the opportunities for female migration to the Gulf which had opened up in the last few years; what would happen would depend on Government decisions made at Federal level. Another trend which might be affected by Government decisions in the future is the increasing importance of market relations in the economic structure. Government pressures on people to do agricultural work together in 1-5s runs counter to the strong growth in daily labour done seasonally by poor men, women and children. The promotion of Service Co-operatives may come up against the network of crop traders stretching into large cities. The move to organise youth and women in producer co-operatives may be undermined by individualistic aspirations to 'change one's life' partly generated by the government itself through its propaganda. Looking further ahead the community is likely to be affected by the growth of neighbouring Tibe town and maybe affected by climate change.
- The configuration of control parameters underlying the continuity of Oda Haro's trajectory included the successful farming economy, which depends on improvements to declining soil fertility, efficient economic institutions, urban demand, and good weather, and the successful community-level management of de-stabilising tensions related to religious, inter-generational and gender differences. Threats to longer-run continuity include a growing and ageing group of disaffected youth, religious conflicts, the expansion of Tibe town, and potentially premature Government encouragement of new economic institutions.

Oda Dawata, Oromia Region

- Oda Dawata is near Asela. It produces wheat and potatoes. Its population is 70% Oromo Muslims with a number of *Wahabi* conversions and 30% Orthodox who are a mix of Amhara and Oromo.

- Between 2003 and 2013 life in Oda Dawata had improved considerably. Connections to the outside world were better as a result of well-maintained main roads and modern technologies although those in the remoter areas were still somewhat cut off. 'Human capital' had improved and aspirations for success combined with a new willingness to work hard. In the early 2000s increased wheat productivity had led to falling prices and fertiliser debt but by 2013 urban demand and prices were good. Historic ethnic and religious tensions between Oromo Muslims and Amhara and Oromo Orthodox had continued but remained contained by elders and religious leaders. Relations with government which had been 'confused' around the 2005 elections were better. Development interventions since 2005 were welcomed although there was some criticism of too much training followed by lack of implementation and follow-up, and the focus on a small number of model farmers. There had been foot-dragging on the new government & party structures at sub-kebele level and youth appeared disillusioned with government politics.
- There were some notable forces for changes with the potential to send the community on a different track in the future. Urbanisation and some industrialisation were changing the roadside landscape and Gonde town had designated an area of the kebele's land to be incorporated into the town. Re-structuring of the local economy included increases in private trading networks, agricultural employment, women's non-farm activities, commuting for work to nearby factories and towns, urban migration, some illegal male international migration and most notably large numbers of young women migrating legally to the Gulf. Another trend is the possibly⁴ growing influence of conservative Muslim *Wahabism* many of whose values and norms conflict with customary norms and some increasingly accepted modern ideas. For example the instruction that followers should not mix with Christians and women should be confined at home as much as possible. There are some uncertainties related to future Government decisions. The promotion of the Service Co-operative and joint working in 1-5s runs counter to the market forces that have been let loose. It is not clear what the repercussions of the Government ban on international migration will be if it is not lifted soon. Third, how government acts in relation to the Islamic religion at national level will be of interest to *Wahabi* followers.
- The control parameter configuration underlying the continuity of Oda Dawata's trajectory included the growing success of the local farming system, rising demand for crops and animal products from growing urban populations, the increase in non-farm opportunities. Threats to continuity came from the potential expansion of Gonde town, increasing industrialisation and outside investment, youth frustrations due to un(der)employment, and potentially increasing tensions between government and *Wahabi* leaders.

Sirba, Oromia Region

- Sirba is located halfway between Debre Zeit and Mojo. It is a teff producing community comprising of 89% Oromo and mix of other ethnicities, all Orthodox.
- By 2013 extremely rapid change in and around Sirba had knocked it on to a new trajectory. Continuity could be found in the human re/production systems which already in 1995 provided accessible government health and education services, the crops grown and livestock kept, absence of any religious conversions, and the mostly peaceful accommodation among ethnic groups. Health and education services were better and crop production, productivity and sale had increased considerably. Levels of education among the population were higher, particularly bringing changes to young women many of whom aspired to formal jobs or on failing Grade 10 or 12 a period of migration to the Gulf.

⁴ It was not clear from our research how many people were practising what was being preached by some.

- The big force for change was the extremely rapid industrialisation and urbanisation travelling down the corridor from Addis Ababa via Dukem and Debre Zeit to Mojo and beyond which had recently started encroaching on Sirba's land. Even before any investors reached the locality there had been some structural economic changes related to growing sale of cash crops and moves to a more cash-based but mixed economy. Moneylenders had been replaced by credit organisations for poor, there was more labour hiring and fewer work exchanges, and a network of private traders stretching beyond the community and the local market bought crops and livestock products.
- A big change in one control parameter area – the state of the meso system – has pushed the Sirba community on to a new trajectory. It is set to become part of the industrialising and urbanising Addis Ababa – Mojo corridor.

Kormargefia, Amhara Region

- In 2013 Kormargefia, with a livelihood dominated by livestock and livestock products, was a conservative and somewhat inward-looking Orthodox Christian rural community bordering the expanding town of Debre Berhan.
- Apart from new female migration to the Gulf and the opportunities related to the urbanisation and industrialisation associated with the expansion of Debre Berhan and upgrading of the main road to Addis Ababa the structure of Kormargefia's economy had changed very little since 1995. Livestock and livestock products were the main sources of cash and the same crops were grown for subsistence with small surpluses sold in Debre Berhan market. Physically the community had changed very little and there were few internal roads. However, Kormargefia's establishment as a source of breed cattle for the area, increased urban demand for meat, milk, and eggs, the expansion of irrigated vegetable growing, the sale of eucalyptus, and improved crop productivity had contributed to considerable economic growth. The 2013 mixed economy was much more cash-based, farmers were more connected with markets, and the government was much more involved in the provision of credit, inputs and advice. Government was also more actively engaged in the human re/production system through its increased provision of health and education services and constant advice to families on how they should live and raise their children. Apart from a common desire to become richer and improve individual lives and lifestyles, society and culture had not changed very much. Amhara and Oromo continued to live peaceably together, there had been no threats to the dominance of the Orthodox church, traditional beliefs were still practised secretly, and while there was evidence of the usual tensions between teenagers and parents, land had been distributed to young men for housing and two farming co-operatives (1 woman) and they did not seem so angry as young men in some other places, although they had a similar distrust of government.
- The community's future trajectory depends on a number of 'unknowns' one of which is how rapidly the expansion of Debre Berhan proceeds. The kebele was twice as large between 1997 and 2005 but then half of it (three sub-kebeles) was incorporated into the Debre Berhan town administration. Some of this land was fenced off and distributed to investors, but in many parts physical investment has been slow to arrive. A second unknown is how quickly the very small 'town' emerging on the side of the main road from Debre Berhan to Addis Ababa will develop into a proper town. A third unknown in April 2014 is if and when young women from the community will be able once more to migrate legally to the Gulf following the Government ban in October 2013.
- In April 2014 the future trajectory of Kormargefia community is uncertain; in the language of complexity science it is in a 'chaotic' state.

3. Community modernisations since the early 1990s

Modernisation of space and place

- Access to 'modernity' varied between and within communities and was related to terrain, the quality of internal paths and roads, feeder roads and main roads and the availability of internal and external transport services. The internal roads in all communities were dryweather only causing considerable problems during rains.
- When asked about it people in four communities described climate change in terms of recent erratic rains and higher temperatures though these may have been part of normal weather fluctuations; rains in 2013 were excellent.
- Soil fertility was reportedly declining everywhere; in two communities Agricultural Research Institutes had identified acid soils and recommended the application of lime.
- Since 1995 rapid population growth, in the context of a land system where smallholders rights were registered and land sales were illegal, had led to denser settlement, pressure on land, growing numbers of landless people, especially youth, pressure to migrate, and a rise in the number of land transactions, including illegal sales.
- Land had been given to inward investors in three communities; promises of employment and good wages had not been kept in two cases.
- Past or planned urban expansion was incorporating land from five of the communities.
- Access to electricity varied from none in one community to 95% of households in one sub-kebele. A few households had installed solar panels and biogas. By 2013 there had been mobile phones in all communities for some years; people used them to keep in touch with migrants and traders, get information about prices and call transport in health emergencies.

Modernisation of people and their lives

- Population densities had increased; on average people were more educated and healthier. The fatalistic cultures of the 1990s were being replaced by cultures of aspiration.
- Young people particularly wanted 'to change their lives' through education, income-generating activities and/or urban or international migration. They were more open to modern farming techniques, smaller families and Health Centre deliveries. Their commitment to some new things such as 'international clothes' and teenage romances had led to tensions with the older generation.
- The transition to adulthood (independent livelihood and household, marriage, child[ren]) by young people was taking longer than in the past. In all but one community (Kormargefia) from quite early in childhood the strategy was to combine education, household work and part-time income-generating work. Everywhere only a small minority managed to get beyond Grade 8, 10 or 12 and some dropped out between exams.
- When this happened young women faced a choice between marriage, income-generation through daily labour and/or non-farm activities like petty trade and local drink-making, or urban or international migration (5 of the communities) until the moratorium on international migration at the end of the fieldwork period.
- Young men's choices were different. A few young men were given farmland by their families and/or leased or share-cropped land in. In two communities small numbers were involved in youth farming co-operatives, and in two others in stone co-operatives. Other local opportunities included seasonal daily agricultural labour, seasonal trade, and in some communities transport

and other services, carpentry or metalwork. Un(der)employment of young men with increasing levels of education, including diplomas and degrees in some communities, was becoming an increasing problem everywhere. Commuting for work met some need in two communities and urban migration was a growing solution everywhere. Until the ban illegal international migration had provided an outlet for many young men in one site and one or two in other communities.

- Relations between men and women were less unequal, thanks partly to laws promoting women's rights introduced by the government since 2003 and very recently affirmative action at wereda level. Women were more involved in income-generation activities on and off farms, including two who ploughed, and male taboos against participation in domestic work were beginning to break down. They were more aware of the importance of hygiene and sanitation, vaccination, healthy nutrition, and baby and childcare. There were small signs of increased political participation by some women but the majority were not interested.
- Richer farmers had larger landholdings and often leased extra land; many of them employed male agricultural servants and daily labour which was done by local poor adult men, women, and male and female youth and some children, and seasonally by in-migrants in some places.
- Inequality had increased with the emergence of a new class of very rich farmer/businessmen. Very rich households were adopting urban life-styles and might have a good tin-roofed house, a town house, modern furniture, more and better quality utensils, a TV with satellite dish, a refrigerator and other electric equipment, biogas, and better clothing and diets.
- Proportions of poor people in most communities had decreased and in some they were less poor. However, given population growth in all communities there were still substantial numbers of poor, very poor and a few destitute people whose lifestyles contrasted greatly with those of the rich and very rich.
- A poor household might have a small hut with a leaky grass/enset roof, and traditional furniture and utensils. They did not have the resources necessary to seize economic opportunities, had less access to government services including agricultural and health extension, education, health treatment and credit, and were unable to afford better private services unlike richer people. They suffered from poorer diets, hygiene, and clothing. Poor women and those without networks to people in authority could not get justice. Big differences between rich and poor children and young people were highlighted in all six communities with concomitant consequences for their adult life chances.

Modernisation of human re/production systems

- Social protection institutions had changed little: caring for people in need was basically the responsibility of kin networks, neighbours and community-initiated organisations such as *iddir*. The very poor and those without relatives were those most at risk. Religious congregations played charitable roles and in three communities NGOs had made small interventions, but the government was doing very little, if anything.
- Compared with the early 1990s family childcare and socialisation in 2013 had improved due to increased wealth and income, urban influences and the much increased responsibility for human re/production taken by government, though poor households faced the problems described earlier.
- Health Extension Workers worked to change attitudes and behaviour through the 16 packages. New modern health clinics had been built in the vicinities of the communities; richer households used private clinics and poorer ones relied more on self-treatment and traditional services. Access to safe water had greatly improved though there were problems of poorer access for remote residents and slow responses to waterpoint failures.

- Use of contraception had risen from almost zero in the early 1990s to estimates of 40-80% of married women in 2013, although unmarried girls had problems accessing it. In the early 1990s women gave birth at home almost without exception. By 2013 there had been some change but despite a government campaign to get all babies delivered at Health Centres launched early in 2013 some months later due to practical and cultural barriers and preferences most births were still taking place at home.
- Primary education enrolment in nearly all the communities was almost universal and all or most 7 year olds were enrolled in 2013; schools were involved in socialising as well as education although attendance was often irregular for many children. In the past many had started late and interrupted schooling for shorter and longer periods for various reasons. Many more children attended secondary and post-secondary education though as described earlier many failed or dropped-out.

Modernisation of livelihood systems

- There have been enormous changes to the local economies since the early 1990s most taking place after 2003. Economic growth everywhere has been driven by a mix of:
 - improvements in agricultural productivity, increased demand for crops and livestock products, better access to markets, inflation, and new aspirations
 - rising involvement in trade and other non-farm service and manufacturing enterprises; there were mixes of petty, small and medium businesses led by local entrepreneurs in all communities
 - growing daily labour opportunities
 - increasing investment in land and businesses in local towns
 - opportunities for business, employment and daily labour through commuting
 - remittances and savings from migrants
- This economic growth was accompanied everywhere by structural changes involving the 'mix' in the local mixed public-private sector economies and an increase in the proportions of community 'GDPs' produced through local non-farm activity, commuting and migration and remittances.
- The 'private sector' in rural areas in the early 1990s consisted of smallholders, traders, moneylenders, *iqqub*, and informal enterprises. By 2013 there had been considerable expansion of both private and public sector institutions in the fields of credit, work and employment, agricultural input provision, agricultural output sale, and SMEs in service and manufacturing sectors.
- Government savings and credit organisations did not lend big enough sums to very wealthy rural farmers/ traders/businessmen, and banks would usually not lend to them, so they had set up credit networks and *iqqub* with very large pots.
- Government moves to get people to work together in producer co-operatives and 1-5s had mostly failed in the face of increasing individualism related to the desire to change one's live, the preservation of some customary reciprocal exchanges, and the institutionalisation of daily labour. There were also bureaucratic problems for co-ops registering, problems of financial management, leadership, staff management, clarity of roles and responsibilities and memories of bad track records of earlier co-ops.
- Government had a monopoly on fertiliser sale which was often provided through Service Co-operatives and were involved in the dissemination of improved seeds through Service Co-

operatives and Agricultural Research Institutes alongside private providers; they seemed to control the distribution of hybrid maize seeds which farmers in Adado and Somodo were 'forced to take'. Farmers were suspicious of the quality of inputs provided by both SCs and private traders.

- Most crops and all livestock and livestock products were sold in private markets with the exception of fresh coffee in one site sold to the kebele coffee union and a small proportion of maize in another sold to the Service Co-operative.
- New 'private' operators had entered the agricultural market including schools, churches and potentially health centres raising an income from assets or labour, including in one case a school hiring out students for the potato and wheat harvests.
- Developments in the non-farm sector were largely taken forward by private entrepreneurs. There was limited government-backed credit in some places and private or NGO-sponsored MFIs in some communities. The implementation of the business licence and taxation programme had caused a number of very small businesses to close down.
- Modern private sector flower farms and/or factories provided employment opportunities through commuting and/or migration for young people in three communities, while legal and illegal migration agencies had recruited migrants to Arab states and Sudan from five communities. Female migrants mostly went to Arab states and were mostly legal; males (mainly from one site) mostly went to the Sudan and were mostly illegal.

Modernisation of society

- Compared with 1995 networks of local elites had become denser and more complex. There were strong links and overlaps among the different types of elite which included kebele leaders, elders, religious leaders, wealthy and successful farmers, *iddir* leaders, and clan and other traditional leaders where these existed. Very wealthy traders and other businesspeople had high status but they were less linked to the other types of elite.
- Two communities consisted of only Orthodox Christian, one with 90% Shewa Oromo and the other with 95% Amhara, and in these life had not been affected by religious modernisations and relations between the ethnicities where there were small minorities were smooth. Each was prone to factional politics.
- Two communities had Protestant majorities and in both the number of sects had increased due to quarrels within sects and proselytisers from outside though they seemed to live together quite harmoniously. Conversions from Sufi Islam to *Wahabism* had led to conflicts with government in three communities.
- In one community Muslim Oromo dominated the kebele though Orthodox Amhara and Oromo were wealthier on average; tensions occasionally led to fighting. In another community minority Christian groups (20%) perceived themselves as marginalised in the government structures; Muslim Oromo were described by one respondent as 'first class citizens'.
- Many religious leaders were party members and passed on government messages and advice to participate in development activities during religious services.
- Elders had remained important; by 2013 they dealt with many more disputes including between husbands and wives and their linkages with government had increased. In one site awareness of the government-led agenda on women's rights and HTPs had led to greater wariness in involving themselves in such cases. In addition to elders conflict resolution was also carried out by clan and lineage leaders in Oda Dawata, leaders of gada structures in Adado and Oda Haro who dealt with disputes 'beyond elders' capacity', and religious leaders in Kormargefia who considered the

most serious conflicts in church compounds. In Somodo and Kormargefia conflicts were first seen by elders attached to *iddir*.

- *Iddir* had taken on expanded roles in various directions including collecting contributions for specific development projects and administering justice. Government messages were passed at *iddir* meetings in some communities.

Modernisation of cultural ideas

- Customary repertoires of ideas in 2013 were much more 'modern' than they had been in the early 1990s as they had adjusted to incoming modernising influences over the years.
- What was considered as part of the modern repertoires in 2013 varied across the communities, but in all six 'hard work' was an element, together with acceptance of new ideas and techniques for farming and interest in business, commercialised agriculture, regular income, and achieving wealthy life standards. There had been changes in diet with more bought and processed food.
- A number of salient disagreements between modern and customary repertoires related to norms for women, particularly relating to female circumcision, arrangement of marriages, pre-marital sex, and in some communities polygyny and inheritance of widows.
- Local repertoires were under assault from a number of sources. Returned urban migrants brought urban influences. Religious preachers from outside the communities provided congregations with ideas about Islam and Christianity. Returning international migrants brought a mix of new ways of dressing and behaving and religious ideas. Local radios and TVs taught people about differences within Ethiopia; satellite TV opened up a view on to a world beyond Ethiopia.
- In parallel with these influences the government sent regular messages, advice and instructions through development and party meetings, wereda employees, the party newspaper, and via religious leaders and *iddir*.

Modernisation of politics

- By 2013 in theory a deeply penetrating hierarchy of government and party structures was in place at kebele and sub-kebele levels, the latter involving male and female Development Teams made up of smaller 1-5 groups and separate mixed party cells. However, in all communities kebele and party leadership activities were limited and neither male nor female structures had been implemented as designed although some aspects had been used patchily for some purposes.
- There was a contradiction between the government's economic and political agendas. If those with roles in kebele and party structures had performed all that was expected of them they would not have met the requirement to be exemplary in their livelihood activities.
- While land taxes were progressive they were very low and did not reflect the value of the land as evidenced in costs of renting. Taxpayers were also expected to make 'voluntary' contributions of cash and in kind and of labour for Public Works and many of these were not progressive though some were. One problem was that they were often suddenly demanded. The recent push to increase tax revenues from non-farm enterprises had hit some of those relying on them for survival hard.
- In all the communities, except Sirba where the Derg villagisation had been notably brutal, there was opposition to the arrival of the EPRDF in 1991 which caused conflicts for two or three years. This legacy may have been a factor in the 2005 election results. In all communities there were opposition supporters, in one they reportedly won before the result was changed, the EPRDF

won quite closely in three, and there was opposition support from minorities in the other two. In two communities people said many youth opposition supporters had been imprisoned and treated harshly suggesting this was the reason for lack of youth interest in politics.

- By 2013 there were no spaces for political discussion in the communities and a suggestion that dialogue about development was difficult since disagreement with government ideas could be seen as evidence of support for opposition parties. Given this situation it was very difficult to get a sense of the attitudes of community adults to the federal government although it was clear that there was appreciation of the recent economic growth, improved security, and growth in the provision of infrastructure and services. Young people interviewed either said that youth in their communities were not interested in politics or that they would support an opposition party if one came to the area.

4. Differences in development interventions 1995 – 2013

This section describes changes in government-provided public goods, institutions and services between 1995 and 2013 in Adado, Sirba, and Kormargefia. We did not have 1995 data for the other three communities.

Environment interventions

- In 1995 in Sirba and Kormargefia farmers with land at risk of erosion constructed terraces; in 2013 this continued and also watershed management programmes including tree-planting on collective land had been done for some years using Public Works though follow-up action had been weak.
- In Adado, where erosion was reduced through land coverage by coffee trees, shade trees and *enset*, farmers had been taught water and soil conservation techniques in 1995. In 2013 they used the watershed management programme to reduce erosion along the road. Tree seedlings were available for individual planting.

Infrastructure interventions

- Big improvements in local infrastructure in Adado in 2013 included the well-maintained tarmac road between Dilla and Addis Ababa, expansion of Dilla from less than 3,000 inhabitants to almost 60,000, and in Adado itself a new modern Health Centre recently upgraded with a lab, electricity for a majority of households, a mobile phone network, and radio (none in 1995) and TV signals.
- The feeder and internal roads and paths were somewhat improved compared with 1995 but still problematic; there was more transport though problems during the rains.
- Both other communities had benefitted from well-maintained tarmac roads heading for Addis Ababa with ample transport; these had existed in 1995 but had not been well-maintained, although there was transport. By 2013 Debre Berhan and Debre Zeit towns had grown considerably. Both communities had mobile phone networks. In Sirba nearly every household had electricity, many had TVs and most had radios. Only 3 buildings had electricity in Kormargefia (1 TV, many radios). Wealthy people in both communities had had radios in 1995.
- Kormargefia had only 1 dryweather internal road wide enough for cars; Sirba had a number but they were impassable during rains. Pack animals were widely used in Kormargefia and horses and carts in Sirba.

Land planning interventions

- Adado was already densely populated in 1995; land was allocated to houses, garden plots, farmland, and private grazing and this had not changed by 2013. Parents gave sons plots for houses. The town had expanded along the roadside and people bought urban land illegally if they could.
- In 2013 some of Sirba land had been given to investors, 1 hectare was used for stone quarrying and part of the village was being incorporated into Denkaka town. In neither 1995 nor 2013 was there any communal grazing land. In 2013 informal land sales and illegal construction of houses were not being controlled.
- By 2013 Kormargefia's kebele had lost half its land to Debre Berhan town; some had been fenced off by investors but not used. A few hectares had been given to outside investors for dairy farming and fattening; communal grazing land was being leased to individual farmers.
- Renting which had been illegal in 1995 was practised everywhere in 2013.

Women interventions

- In 1995 there were no interventions for women related to land rights, economic and political empowerment, or gender relations in any community, although in both Sirba and Kormargefia women could own land under customary arrangements.
- In 2013 wereda structures had been trying to implement the Family Law since 2003 and mainstream women's issues since 2006.
- Women in all communities by 2013 were aware of their land and family rights but there were problems in implementing those that ran counter to customary norms since elders, officials and court officers were overwhelmingly male. Customary norms were more strongly adhered to in Adado including by women themselves.
- Officials made a few half-hearted attempts to involve women in economic empowerment activities but most did not take off and those that did, did not last very long.
- There were Women, Youth and Children Affairs representatives in all kebele Cabinets, women members of core party structures and women Council members: around half in Sirba, 25% in Adado but no mention of them in Kormargefia. Attempts to mobilise women in Development Teams and 1-5s had not been very successful although a few women in each community had been actively engaged. In Sirba women's participation in kebele meetings had improved. No government organisations for women were active.

Youth interventions

- The only youth-focused interventions in 1995 were in education.
- In 2013 in Sirba there were three successful stone co-operatives with around 200 members; a list of 30 young men had been sent to the wereda for AGP funding. In Kormargefia land had been given to two youth agricultural co-operatives with 67 members. In Adado 41 young men in 13 groups had had or were on the way of getting credit for non-/off-farm activities under a new 'rural youth job creation' wereda programme.
- Female circumcision which was common in 2003 had reduced in Sirba (a practitioner was jailed for 3 months) and in Kormargefia (circumcisers were given warning letters to show to potential clients); it had never been practised in Adado.
- By 2013 there had been a reduction in parental arrangement of marriages of girls under 18 in Sirba and even younger Amhara girls in Kormargefia (parents of 13 year-old imprisoned) though

there were other forces for change apart from government legislation. There had been some problems in enforcing the law in Adado.

- Youth organisations were not active in Adado (kebele office were not interested in youth affairs), Sirba (no leaders), and Kormargefia (no-one was aware of the organisations).

Human re/production services

- In 1995 Adado had abundant water but none of it was safe, in Sirba there were pumps but a problem of phosphorus in the water so people had to go to neighbouring kebeles, in Kormargefia most people had spring water near their houses and some dug wells.
- In 2013 the main sources of water in Adado were mountain springs regularly cleaned and a new spring-fed tank piping water to the kebele centre but the pipe was destroyed in a landslide in September 2013 and not repaired by November. One borehole was not functioning and there was a shortage of wereda budget, spare parts and plumbers.
- In 2013 in Sirba people either paid for safe water from private water wells or an NGO-funded supply or queued for free safe water provided by the Chinese road construction camp. In Kormargefia there were ten safe waterpoints using springs and one was under construction; for some there were quotas due to shortages attributed to the lowering of water levels. A few used unprotected springs.
- In 1995 Adado's health clinic had no nurse or doctor, Kormargefia's no staff at all so people had to go to Debre Berhan (10 km), while Sirba residents had to go to Debre Zeit (20 km). The take-up of contraceptive and vaccination services was rare. While the Derg had promoted latrines everywhere there was no government activity in 1995.
- By 2013 Adado had a modern health centre and Sirba had one nearby, though it had no water. Kormargefia residents still had to go to Debre Berhan or Chacha (8 kms). Staffing and supplies were much better than in 1995 but there were concerns about access to drugs and staff attitudes to rural people.
- By 2013 the communities had been receiving preventive health education for up to 7 years. In 2013 Adado did not have a Health Post as there was a Health Centre; Sirba's Health Post had burned down and was being rebuilt. The Kormargefia Health Extension Workers (HEWs) lived in Debre Berhan and rarely visited the Health Post focusing their activities on the sub-kebele adjacent to the town. Most people in all communities were aware of the advice in the 16 packages.
- In 1995 there was no formal pre-school education anywhere although there were church schools in Kormargefia. In 2013 some 6 year-olds in Adado and Kormargefia were attending Grade 0 and there was a (poor quality non-government) kindergarten for 4-7 year-olds near Sirba.
- In 1995 in Adado there was a G1-6 school (estimated 20% boys and 8% girls enrolled) and G1-8 in Bule; in 2013 the Adado school was G1-8 and most were enrolled with many starting at 7. In Sirba in 1995 there was a nearby G1-8 school with an (over?) estimated 50% of boys and girls enrolled. In 2013 Sirba had a G1-6 school and nearby there was a G1-10 school. In the Kormargefia area in 1995 there was a primary school which had lost many pupils after families had returned to their homesteads from Derg villages. More girls (only Oromos) were said to attend than boys. In 2013 there was a G1-7 school at the kebele centre (expanded with NGO help) intending to expand to G8 in 2014. School budgets had increased since 2011.
- In Adado in 1995 an estimated 0.01% of boys and 1 girl attended high school in Dilla but there were many secondary school dropouts farming; the few Gedeo children who had completed high school had some jobs. In Sirba a few boys and girls attended secondary school in Debre Zeit

and in Kormargefia 20 students had transferred to secondary school in 1995.

- In 2013 in Adado the nearest G9-10 school was in the wereda town (costly) and G11-12 in Dilla (more costly); many failed Grade 10. In Sirba Grade 9-10 was available in nearby Udie, G11-12 in towns 20 km distant. Public transport was good but most needed to find accommodation in town. In Kormargefia G9-10 was in a suburb of Debre Berhan 6 km from the kebele and G11-12 further away in more central Debre Berhan.
- In 1995 there were no reported post-secondary graduates in Adado though there was a junior agro-technical institute in Dilla. Five students from Sirba had attended colleges and four were employed in government offices. There was no mention of post-secondary education in Kormargefia. In 2013 there were government TVET and private colleges in Dilla, Debre Zeit and Debre Berhan though few reports of students attending government TVET courses. In spite of the general expansion of universities, including new universities in Dilla and Debre Berhan, there were few reports of people attending university, in contrast to the numbers attending private colleges.

Government interventions to support livelihoods

- In 1995 Adado had an agricultural development centre with an extension agent and an assistant trained for one month who served 9 kebeles and worked with 10 innovative 'contact farmers' in each kebele. There was a Development Agent (DA) in a kebele neighbouring Sirba who visited contact farmers occasionally and had information about livestock numbers, and in Kormargefia there was mention of International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) and its activities in the livestock and crop sectors though not DAs, and that some farmers had been trained in irrigation practices.
- In 2013 there should have been three DAs trained in Crops, Livestock and NRM in each site although since each was responsible for one sub-kebele they had to cover all the specialities, and they also had some party responsibilities and had recently been supporting health extension workers. In Adado there had not been an NRM DA for a while. In Sirba there was a Crops DA solely for the sub-kebele and they shared Livestock and NRM DAs with the other two sub-kebeles. In Kormargefia all three DAs were in place.
- In 1995 the Adado agent provided ('very low production') coffee seeds. In Sirba fertiliser was not provided on time and when delivered was not the requested amount; the Ministry of Agriculture provided credit with a downpayment through the Service Co-operative and hired out tractors alongside private owners. In Kormargefia no agricultural inputs were reported by the DAs; ILCA introduced oats and potatoes.
- In 2013 under instruction from the wereda DAs in Adado banned the use of fertiliser on maize grown in gardens inter-cropped with coffee to maintain coffee quality but (reluctantly) 'forced' farmers to use improved maize seeds which required fertiliser. They advised on quality coffee-growing and harvesting, introduced some new crops, and advised on maize and coffee planting techniques. In Sirba DAs arranged distribution of fertiliser through the Service Co-operative and improved seeds which were also available from the Debre Zeit Agricultural Research Institute. There was credit for improved *tef*, chickpea and lentil seeds. The DAs gave advice about a range of farming techniques. In Kormargefia they persuaded people to take improved seeds and use the standard amount of fertiliser, plant in line, control weeds, and use irrigation.
- In 1995 there was no reported extension or vet service for livestock in Adado. In Sirba there was a nearby cross-breeding station but no-one had used it. In Kormargefia the MoA had been providing vaccination since the 1970s and ILCA had introduced cross-breed cattle in 1978 and these services continued.

- In 2013 in Adado DAs gave advice (mainly to people near the roadside) on fattening bulls and rearing sheep; a vet covering 3 kebeles had recently been appointed who provided a vaccination service and sheep-spraying. There was information on high-breed chickens, promotion of bee-keeping with 4 modern hives distributed. One man had invested in a fishery using artificial ponds. In Sirba there was a vet for 5 kebeles assessing epidemics and providing vaccination; there was a shortage of equipment and supplies. Access to cross-breed cattle was facilitated and high-breed chickens provided. Attempts to introduce beehives had failed. In Kormargefia ILCA had become an Agricultural Research Institute and started charging for hybrid services. The wereda planned help the community increase market-orient dairy production, fattening and improved livestock and had decided to assign a vet to the kebele. Farmers were advised to produce honey using improved hives though most refused to take them.
- In 1995 in Adado there was a coffee co-operative with a washing facility which bought fresh cherries from farmers. In 2003 the co-operative was no longer operative but it was revived and by 2013 was part of the wider Yirgacheffe Union. In 2013 a kebele meeting was called and a ruling made that fresh coffee could no longer be sold to private investors and must be sold to the co-operative. In Sirba in 1995 there was no producer co-operative; in 2013 there were a number of stone co-operatives with many members and training for 8 projected youth co-operatives. In Kormargefia there was no producer co-operative in 1995; in 2013 a youth irrigation co-operative in its second year of operation had been instructed to work in 1-5 groups instead of individually and a rainfed agricultural co-operative had just been given land.
- In 1995 in Adado there was a Service Co-operative which sold basic goods but was not appreciated by community respondents. In 2013 there was no Service Co-operative. In 1995 in Sirba a Service Co-operative provided fertiliser on credit and hired out a tractor but there was a scarcity of the basic goods it used to sell. In 2013 the Service Co-operative in another sub-kebele distributed fertiliser, improved seeds, chemicals, and basic goods although there were some problems described in the next section. In Kormargefia in 1995 there was a 'rejuvenated Derg SC' which was a member of the zone farmers' union although it had never distributed dividends. It was the only source of fertiliser as private traders were banned when the union was established. It sold basic goods at government prices but there were frequent shortages.
- In 1995 there was no government credit in Adado. In Sirba there was credit from the MoA for fertiliser with a downpayment. In Kormargefia there had been credit but farmers had not repaid so had been told there would be no credit in 1995; they were appealing on the grounds of the poor 1994 harvest. In 2013 in Adado OMO micro credit had been stopped until outstanding debts were repaid; a few people were saving small amounts. In Sirba the Oromia Credit and Saving Share Company gave group and individual credit with 20% saving for farming and non-farming activities and small amounts of credit were also available from a government-backed village savings and credit organisation. In Kormargefia the wereda facilitated access to credit from Amhara Credit and Savings Institution (ACSI) for agricultural inputs; 250 people were reportedly saving in ACSI. People preferred to use *iqqub* but used the social court to enforce people to pay their shares.

Government working with community organisations

- In 1995 in Adado there was no mention of engagement of religious leaders with government. Unlike the Derg they recognised traditional community leaders and elders consulting them and sometimes inviting them to meetings. In Sirba there was no mention of government interaction with religious or *iddir* leaders. The PA officials had 'taken control of community decision-making' and gave orders to elders. In Kormargefia there was gossip that some of the clergy had been agitating farmers to rise up against the TGE but also a suggestion that elders and religious leaders were involved in PA committee work.

- In 2013 kebele leaders in Adado asked religious leaders to disseminate information, HEWs passed messages after services and leaders told their congregations to participate in development activities. Selected elders were consulted about big decisions and elders resolved various kinds of conflict including some referred to them by the social court. Conflicts too serious for elders were seen by the Aba Gada. In Sirba DAs passed messages at church gatherings and the government used the community-wide *iddir* to mobilise the community to contribute cash for the re-building of the Health Post and a G5 classroom. Wereda and social courts sent cases to elders for reconciliation. In Kormargefia *iddir* leaders persuaded people to attend government meetings; elders from zone *iddir* met once a month to try to solve disputes and reported to the social court.

Government interventions to introduce modern ideas

- In 1995 ideas about democracy, Regionalisation, and the Constitution had reached all communities through meetings. There was no mention of interventions designed to change people's ideas directly or of attempts to get people to join the EPRDF. In 2013 in Adado people noted that government workers teaching about development, savings, elections, sanitation etc were relatively new to the community. In Sirba the government provided 'educative and modernising messages' related to all sectors through large and small meetings, trainings for selected people, and the activities of employees and kebele volunteer officials. In Kormargefia messages were meant to be disseminated through Development Teams, 1-5s, annual general meetings for all farmers and model farmers meetings though it was not clear how often these happened. There was a suggestion that the government was trying to 'brainwash' people on political issues and that the political work in the schools was very significant.
- In all communities party cells were meant to meet every 15 days (Adado), monthly (Sirba), 'at least twice a year' (Kormargefia) to read and discuss the party newspaper though it was not established that this actually happened.

Government political interventions

- In 1995 in Adado the not-long formed Peasant Association (PA) had local police, a prison and a court; officials were elected by the people and related to wider political and administrative structures through wereda agents. There had been conflicts since 1991 between two Gedeo parties but by 1995 the party affiliated to the EPRDF was in power. In Sirba villagers were not willing to talk about political matters; one view was that if PA leaders were selected from the *Gada* groups they would be more accountable. There was no mention of political parties. In Kormargefia people had resisted electing people to draft the Constitution but had allegedly been threatened with losing their land unless they did. There was an active opposition group in Debre Berhan and occasional security problems which made it difficult for people in nearby Kormargefia to express opinions contrary to government policies.
- In 2013 official kebele structures in all communities involved a theoretical division of responsibilities among a legislature, executive, and judiciary and a chain of command which included a Cabinet, committees, Council, social court, and three sub-kebeles each with their own Development Teams containing a number of 1-5 groups. There were theoretically independent party structures integrated by individuals simultaneously holding positions in both structures. As discussed in the next section in all communities implementation was very different from what had been designed.
- Recruitment to party membership varied. In Adado there were 480 party members (42% of households) and in Kormargefia only influential young and richer hardworking exemplary farmers had been recruited for party membership (260 male household heads and 25 female

heads – 29% of households). In Sirba ‘everyone’ was said to belong to the party.

5. The workings of selected development interventions in 2013

In this section we describe selected aspects of the implementation of 13 of the more important interventions in all six communities in 2013. For each we (1) compare ideal-type⁵ and actual implementation, (2) describe the main mechanisms used to try to produce appropriate behaviour by implementers, beneficiaries and others⁶, and (3) briefly present some consequences of the intervention for the community place, people and institutions⁷.

The analysis suggests that there usually are significant differences between ideal-type and actual implementation, in various ways across communities and sometimes across time. It also tells a complex story with regard to behaviour change mechanisms, with different mixes of mechanisms being used across interventions and for one intervention across communities, and different results as well – as shown by the findings on consequences. These findings are the basis on which we drew the considerations offered in the next section (section 6), on the planning and implementation of future development interventions.

Watershed management and tree-planting

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: integrated watershed management programmes involving soil and water conservation structures, re-forestation, gully treatment and area enclosures through Public Works (PWs) for up to 60 days a year.
- *Implementation*: Soil conservation work everywhere; lack of expertise/poor quality in four communities.
- Tree-planting: 2 Meles’ parks in one site; some limited success on another; seedlings not protected from livestock in two and dried through lack of follow-up in another; only individual planting in one coffee site.
- Elephant grass on terraces in two communities appreciated, died in another.
- Work was done everywhere but it was not clear for how many days and how many did not participate fully or at all.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

Community members

- In two communities tree cutting was legally banned although there were problems of enforcement in both communities.
- In one community people were paid under the Sustainable Land Management Programme in 2011 only; there were celebrations arranged by the wereda at the end of the Public Works in two communities; in one (which later failed to follow-up the tree seedlings) the kebele was ranked 5th in the wereda and given a cup.
- Targets were set in two communities: in one for the number of trees to be planted and the other the length of terrace to be dug by each individual.

⁵ How the intervention *ought* to be implemented at kebele level

⁶ The mechanisms used to induce behavioural change among beneficiaries and implementers include legislation and administrative *fiat*; instructions; material, status and other incentives for the beneficiaries or the implementers or both; targets and reporting; threats, fines and imprisonment; persuasion and co-option; organising and mobilising pressure from others.

⁷ These three areas are covered in considerable detail in Section 3.2 of the Summary Report.

- Fines for non-attendance were implemented in one community and threatened in another. Two communities did not use fines and this was said to lead to limited participation; kebele officials in one community threatened exclusion from kebele services but this made no difference. In one some people were taken to the social court by the militia after refusing to participate.
- 'Awaring' and/or training were mentioned in five communities.
- In Somodo, where terracing took place on individual farmer's land in turns, people were willing to participate so long as it was not in the coffee harvesting season; the kebele tried to persuade youth to participate in one community but they declined.
- A Somodo farmer who had started terracing on his own initiative was interviewed on Oromiya TV. In one site the community was told about successes in other parts of the country and wereda officials sometimes participated in the work to set an example.
- The zone-Development Team-1-5 hierarchy was not totally effective.

Intervention implementers

- Adado's wereda was ranked best in the zone for watershed management.
- In two communities the work followed directions from the wereda but what exactly was done was decided at kebele level. DAs were heavily involved.
- In two communities the DAs provided very precise numbers of households participating and kms of terrace suggesting targets to fulfil.
- In some communities *iddir* and religious leaders were asked to mobilise people for PWs.

Consequences

- Wives in one site and employees in another did some of the work.
- Mobilising the community through the sub-kebele structures for watershed management was their most effective activity in all communities. In one site DT leaders said their role had led to tensions with absentees and latecomers.
- There was some reduction of flooding and erosion in four communities; in two people complained terracing reduced farm/ grazing land and some undid it.
- In one site the imposition of 60 days PWs strained the government-community relationship.

Roads

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: building, upgrading and maintenance of highways, feeder roads and internal roads and paths.
- *Implementation*: Main highways near all communities had recently been upgraded. In four the highways passed through the kebeles. The main road leading to the highway in one site was well-maintained by the wereda but in another the responsibility laid with the community and the work did not last long. The wereda said the difficult terrain required zone or Regional inputs.
- There had been some improvements everywhere in numbers and quality of internal roads but most were still dryweather and in two communities were not wide enough for vehicles.
- Internal roads were maintained by Public Works only in four communities; in two in addition to PWs there had been cost-sharing between wereda and community and the government had provided some technical support and skilled labour, under the Universal Rural Road and Access Programme.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Some of the road works were carried out under programme funding rules in four communities.
- People highly appreciate improvements in roads making them willing to contribute labour and if necessary cash.

Consequences

- Road access for those living in less remote areas had improved considerably in five communities but not much in Adado.
- Community members everywhere generally highlighted improved internal access as a priority but only in two communities was the government beginning to respond in a systematic fashion.

Youth interventions

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

Youth co-operatives and 1-5s

- *Ideal-type*: farm and non-farm youth co-operatives.
- Credit in one site was about to be given to 41 youth in 13 '1-5' teams. Credit had been given or promised for similarly small numbers to be organised in co-operatives in four other communities.
- Land had been given to two agricultural co-operatives in one community and one for bee-keeping co-op in another, where there were promises of more land.
- Three stone co-operatives had gone out of business in one site; in another three with a total of 200 members were successful.

Youth organisations

- *Ideal-type*: each community to have a Youth Association, Youth League and Youth Federation.
- There were no effectively active youth organisations in five communities. In Oda Dawata the YA leader said it had 550 members engaged in irrigation, stone extraction and selling grass although this was the only report of this.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Youth have more often received promises of land and credit than delivery in the past though there seemed to be a new programme beginning to be rolled out in late 2013 (called 'rural youth job opportunity creation' in one community)⁸.
- In two communities pressure on youth to become party members and possible advantages in getting employment was mentioned.
- Training was only reported from one site and it was not followed up.

Consequences

- Under pressure from smallholders kebele officials in Oda Haro were reluctant to give land to youth; in Oda Dawata land worked on by a group of youth without official permission was allegedly given to the kebele chair's brother as an investment; in Somodo there were allegations of officially banned land transactions made by kebele officials with individual investors at the expense of the youth.

Women interventions

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

Land rights

- *Ideal-type*: wives included in land certificates; widows and daughters should inherit land.

⁸ The programme aimed to provide credit to small (1-5-like) groups of youth who must save 20% of the capital required for various types of activity (including non/off-farm).

- *Implementation*: land certification was completed in four communities but in two delayed associated with polygyny; there was some implementation of widows' rights but still male resistance, male official bias, and women unwilling to claim their rights. There were no or very few cases of daughters claiming inherited land except in Kormargefia⁹. In Somodo a few educated fathers gave land to their daughters.

Gender relations

- *Ideal-type*: female circumcision, under-age marriage, widow inheritance and polygyny banned; women's right to choose marriage partner; divorced women have right to household assets, rape, abduction and domestic male violence illegal
- *Implementation*: it was hard for poor women and those without effective male relatives to get justice, when cases were brought to court.
- The ban against female circumcision was highly resisted in one site; female circumcision was reduced but still an issue in one, much reduced but still practised in two, had almost disappeared in one, and was not part of local custom in the sixth.
- Under-age marriage had reduced everywhere due to opportunities for education and income-generation but some girls still married under the age of 18. There had been a few but not many court cases.
- Polygyny was not practised in two Orthodox Christian communities but 'the government cannot control having mistresses'. It was still practised in four communities and hard to follow-up in three where *sharia* allowed it.
- Widow inheritance was no longer practised in two communities and rarely in a third; few cases said to be difficult to enforce in one community.
- Abduction had decreased though risks still remained; sometimes it was hard to tell the difference between forced and voluntary abduction; some cases of prosecution and relatively short terms of imprisonment.
- Some reduction in rape of unmarried girls; not so clear about married women.
- Divorced women were claiming rights to property but faced difficulties achieving them due to male bias.
- Domestic violence was a big issue in four communities but reduced in two; few cases and male bias.

Economic empowerment

- *Ideal-type*: creation of farming and business income-generating opportunities for women.
- *Implementation*: affirmative action reported in two communities; credit for selected women and young women in four communities mainly associated with NGOs in three who provided training in two. Young women had difficulty saving required deposits.

Political empowerment

- *Ideal-type*: affirmative action for wereda and kebele positions and girl's education.
- *Implementation*: affirmative action in two weredas - educational opportunities and to get government positions with lower marks and appointment of more women.
- More participation in structures and meetings but still not very great as most women do not want to be involved in politics.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Legal certification of land rights
- Affirmative action
- Incentives of credit, seedlings, chickens for small numbers

⁹ An Amhara community where women customarily owned land.

- Campaigns against HTPs affecting women; sometimes support from wereda and kebele Women Affairs officials; campaigns and girls' clubs in schools
- Warnings, trainings and threats of imprisonment for circumcisers; occasional imprisonment
- Threats of imprisonment sometimes carried out for rape, abduction, early marriage.
- In Sirba elders refused to negotiate marriages by abduction; *iddir* committees in two communities could punish male offenders/parents who circumcised daughters.
- Half of the kebele councillors were women in a number of communities; attempts to increase women's involvement in DT and 1-5 structures and kebele meetings.

Consequences

- Increasing role of Wereda women's and children's affairs in HTPs, defending women's rights and coordination with justice sector, notably courts and police. A justice committee set up in Somodo to accelerate cases. Some involvement of NGOs and churches in HTP issues. Involvement of MFIs and NGOs in credit and income-generation activities. *Iddirs* involved in punishments and fines for circumcision in Somodo and in domestic violence in Oda Haro.

Safe water

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: most rural households should have access to safe water
- *Implementation*: most people had access to safe water in two communities; elsewhere some people in remoter zones did not.
- In one site there was concern that the water level was decreasing and for some springs the kebele imposed quotas.
- A landslide had damaged the town's piped water in Adado but it was not repaired after two months; shortages of wereda budget, parts and plumbers mentioned in five communities (in the sixth site safe water came mainly from non-government sources).

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- People want safe water.
- Some labour, finance and management expected from the community.
- There were no kebele level water committees; waterpoints were managed by users.
- In Sirba all water was provided by private individuals, an NGO projects and a private firm.
- The low attention that wereda Cabinets seem to give to safe water supply in budgetary terms seemed to demoralise wereda water officials in all weredas. They got instructions from higher levels concerning financing modalities.

Consequences

- Cases of cholera in Adado in 2009 and 2013.
- Less time spent walking for water for some but queues a problem for many.

Health extension

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

Health Extension Package

- *Ideal-type*: Health Post and two Health Extension Workers in each kebele.
- *Implementation*: Two HEWs were not enough to cover all sixteen packages and all areas of the kebeles; in three communities there was only one for some months. In one site the HEWs did not speak the local language.

Hygiene and sanitation

- *Ideal-type*: latrines, hand-washing after latrine use, solid and liquid waste disposal, healthy home environment; food hygiene, control of insects and rodents.
- *Implementation*: latrines, hygiene and sanitation used to be the main focus of extension activities but attention had recently shifted; many households had latrines though it was not clear how many used them. Hand-washing after use was not practised by all.
- Waste disposal not popular; little mention of other packages.

Disease prevention

- *Ideal-type* : immunisation, malaria control – bednets, spraying, removing stagnant water; treatment for malaria; identification, treatment and advice related to transmissible diseases especially TB and HIV/AIDS.
- *Implementation*: immunisation and activities to prevent malaria were accepted; there were rumours of HIV/AIDS deaths in some communities but less activity on this than in the past.

Family health

- *Ideal-type*: contraception, ante- and post- natal care, good nutrition for mothers and infants, clean and safe deliveries, adolescent health.
- *Implementation*: Contraceptive provision was very popular everywhere.
- There had been a recent shift in the main focus of the Health Extension Programme to ante-natal care, delivery at health centres, post-natal care and infant care. ANC was more popular than skilled delivery and PNC. Women's resistance to delivery at the HC was associated with difficulties in getting to them, rude treatment by staff, being exposed to male gazes, and inability to practise the customary traditions after birth. There had been efforts to deal with all these problems in health centres near five communities and their deliveries had probably risen although it was hard to get believable statistics.
- No adolescent health service in any community.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- HEP messages were regularly relayed on radio and TV.
- In Sirba there was evidence of targets for home visits, latrine construction, solid waste disposal, liquid waste disposal, family planning services and health education; and reported results against these targets.
- A lot of awaring and training took places in various government and other community fora with a recent focus on safe and clean delivery. There had been some training for selected women in three communities.
- ANC, delivery, vaccination etc was generally free.
- TBAs were threatened with consequences if they assisted with deliveries that ended problematically in two communities. People without latrines in Kormargefia had been threatened with punishment which was said to have been effective.
- Graduation depended on attending training in one site.

Consequences

- Lifestyles, particularly of richer people, were changing under the influence of HEP teaching and urban influences.
- In most places access to contraceptives for unmarried women was a problem. HEWs did not connect much with young people.
- HEWs were either over-worked or not very helpful partly because they would not live in the community. When one HEW left there was often a gap until a new one came.
- Other government employees and kebele volunteers were expected to support the HEWs; the extent to which this actually happened varied across communities and individuals.

- There was no mention of a kebele health committee by anyone interviewed on the health extension package. There also did not seem to be very strong links with the kebele Cabinet in most places although in Oda Haro the HEW said that the relatively new kebele chair was actively promoting the HEP.

Primary education

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

Programme to construct new schools or extend existing ones

- *Ideal-type*: community to contribute labour, cash and/or wood; wereda may contribute. Existing schools upgraded to follow cohorts up to Grade 8; additional schools built in big kebeles to reduce distances for children in remoter areas.
- *Implementation*: in all communities the number of schools and grades increased most years; one community had 5 full-cycle primary schools. Communities contributed labour, wood and sometimes cash.

Organisation and management of schools

- *Ideal-type*: close wereda and kebele follow-up; PTA; education committees; schools encouraged to mobilise financial resources to complement government funding.
- *Implementation* : some schools received funding from the government (school grant), and some from USAID; all received contributions from the community/parents and a number raised funds through farming on the school land, holding fetes, and in one case hiring out students to harvest potatoes and wheat. School heads were very active usually heading an education committee.
- Some schools were part of larger clusters and one was inspected without announcement about twice a month.

Staffing

- *Ideal-type*: schools should have enough motivated qualified teachers ready to give tutorials to weaker students.
- *Implementation*: two schools reported teacher shortage and two teacher lateness and absence due to their residence in nearby towns. In two communities there had been contributions to hire untrained educated youth as extra teachers.

Enrolment, attendance and dropout

- *Ideal-type*: enrolment at 7, regular attendance, handling of absenteeism during harvest period.
- *Implementation*: all or most children of school age were enrolled in four communities; in one a substantial minority of 7 year-olds were not enrolled. In four communities the school staff led efforts to enrol students, control absenteeism and bring dropouts back. One community had a dedicated committee while another did not make much effort. DTs and 1-5s were said to be involved in two communities though elsewhere people said they were not functioning well if at all.
- In one site G8 failures could not re-sit but could register in schools in other kebeles; in another there was a rumour that re-sits were no longer allowed.
- In all communities there was absenteeism at harvest time; one school closed for a couple of weeks and made up the time over weekends later. Another wanted to re-organise the school calendar but could not due to teachers' summer classes.
- In two communities poor students were exempted from fees/contributions with a letter from the kebele and in another USAID supported 120 poor students and their families.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- It was compulsory to attend primary education

- In all communities there was a lot of awaring about the importance of primary education by school staff, kebele leaders and committees.
- Students were organised in 1-5s in most communities; in one it did not work unless there was a good homeroom teacher as students quarrelled.
- Communities were regularly mobilised to contribute to school infrastructure expansion and to the school's function in various ways as well as sending their children to school.
- In one community the wereda instructed the kebele administration to mobilise the community to send children to school on time.
- In another community the headteacher was not allowed to use the school grant to attract good teachers.
- Low teachers' salaries were an issue in one community.
- The wereda called regular meetings with head teachers in two communities, supervised closely in two and held regular cluster meetings with all teachers to discuss challenges.

Consequences

- Head teachers have very high workloads
- Parents have to cope with a reduced workforce and some had to finance their children's education; in all communities there were children financing all or part of school costs.
- More children attained higher levels of education than in the past; it was said to combat early marriage in several communities.
- In most communities financing education costs was one of the reasons children wanted to work; in some they started younger and worked more than in the past.
- In all communities parents and students were concerned about the lack of prospects for somewhat educated youth; there was a sense government was not doing enough to address the un(der)employment they faced.

Crop extension

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: grain - farmers' work plans, recommended amounts and application of fertilisers and improved seeds, use of BBM plough, planting in line, inter-cropping, crop rotation, compost, techniques; coffee - improved seed(ling)s, compost, good harvesting practices; crop diversification; promotion of vegetables and fruit using irrigation.
- *Implementation* : In the two coffee economies DAs focused mainly on coffee to improve quality; unproductive improved maize seeds 'forced' on reluctant farmers who could not use fertiliser when planting maize in coffee gardens.
- Agricultural Research Institutes were conducting experiments with various-sized groups of farmers in the other four communities.
- In all communities there was advice on planting in line, inter-cropping, crop-rotation, amounts of seed and fertiliser to use etc. Some model farmers followed the advice, often on small plots of land, and if successful there would be copying by those with enough resources and labour. Farmers were using improved inputs and working harder on their farmers though it was not clear how many were following the recent advice on techniques.
- In most communities DAs had started to promote irrigation and provide some advice on management and production; there was no input (apart from fertiliser) or infrastructure provision though they had facilitated access to pumps by a few farmers. They did not advise on marketing. In-migrant experts had leased land in two communities and were being copied.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Improved coffee seedlings were produced for future free distribution

- New things were given first to model farmers though sometimes they had to pay for them.
- In line with government policy the main focus until recently had been on richer model farmers; attempts to use Development Teams and 1-5s to reach middle and poorer farmers and promote co-operative working in 1-5s had had little success.
- Advice to model farmers was still the main mechanism used; there were also demonstrations on farmers' plots and FTC land in some areas recently and cross-kebele learning visits.

Consequences

- Farmers in the livestock-led economy were dissatisfied with the improved seeds and not convinced the new techniques would work on their waterlogged soil.
- Advice on coffee was appreciated in the coffee communities but forcing of poor improved maize seeds resented.
- More support in relation to irrigation infrastructure, inputs and marketing would have been welcomed.
- According to the DAs in Sirba those who have properly applied the packages have accumulated wealth: bought houses in Debre Zeit and cars, rent additional land for more production, use tractors etc.

International migration regulation

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: international migration as practised is harmful to the migrants.
- *Implementation*: All international migration, legal as well as illegal, was banned by the Government in October 2013 for at least 7 months; the final fieldwork ended early in November and it was too early to establish anything about implementation.

Consequences

- If the ban continued five of the communities who sent young women legally to the Gulf would be considerably affected. There had been considerable illegal migration of unemployed educated young men and some young women to the Sudan from Somodo and youth were very concerned about the ban.
- While government officials stressed the risks and harms associated with illegal migration, the harms that young girls migrating legally faced, and the loss to the community of educated, energetic and skilled labour, many community members considered the impact on women, families and the community to be more positive than negative.
- Many young women had sent remittances and returned with savings to invest in income-generating activities and new confidence, attitudes to work etc. Some young men had accumulated resources for investment on return, mostly through illegal migration.
- Some young people had 'returned empty handed' and a few had had bad experiences.

Credit and savings

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: access to credit from regional MFIs backed by kebele authorities and requiring prior saving, to facilitate investment in farming and other activities through group lending. Promotion of rural savings and credit cooperatives (RUSACCOs) alongside MFIs.
- *Implementation*: Credit was available from regional MFIs in five communities; in the 6th it had temporarily stopped as there was a (relatively small) bad debt but the MFI had been active in the recent past. RUSACCOs mentioned in only two communities.

- Local policies varied with regard to access to credit for inputs. In most communities credit was not available for fertiliser but in one it was for selected poor farmers and in another it had been arranged by the Service Co-operative as local farmers had had poor income from coffee the year before. Credit was available for improved seeds everywhere.
- Some form of credit for non/off-farm activities was mentioned everywhere.
- The saving obligation was specified in four communities.
- Credit against savings for organised youth or women groups was specifically mentioned in four communities.
- Access to credit from MFIs/under government interventions (e.g. youth groups) always involved the kebele (Cabinet decision (1), letter (most), or dedicated committee (1)).
- In two communities reliable borrowers got better conditions for their next loan(s) (decreasing interest rate in one, bigger loan in the other).

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Group collateral was used as a peer pressure mechanism everywhere.
- Savings were often required to access credit, in an attempt to promote a saving culture. This was accompanied by 'education about the importance of savings', specifically mentioned in one community.
- Some kind of 'initiation' to organise youth/women groups was mentioned in one community; in two communities there was wereda-organised training for those getting loans (including skill training for women's groups in one).

Consequences

- In all communities formal credit schemes coexisted with continued informal systems (family, neighbours, shop-owners, *iqqubs* sometimes of considerable size, trading network), seen to have desirable features that formal systems lacked. In three communities a number of respondents indicated a preference for non-formal sources (less red-tape and access to bigger loans for wealthy borrowers; less red-tape and no control on use of funds for others).
- Credit was said to have helped poor people in one community; access to specific kinds of credit was reserved for poor people and households helping orphans in another. In one community five people were said to have had to leave the community as they could not pay back.
- There did not seem to be major effects (yet) for the youth and women groups mentioned.
- Formal credit provided some stimulus to local economic activity, but likely small compared to needs, other forms of credit, and remittances from international migration in a number of communities.

Taxes and contributions

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: Farmers pay (low) land taxes, through the kebele administration to the wereda; and market taxes when selling/buying products on local markets. There had been a recent government campaign to register and license all kinds of SME and get them to pay income tax to the wereda. Kebele administrations mobilised communities to contribute cash and in-kind resources to development projects and their own running costs, in addition to a fixed number of public works each year.
- *Implementation*: Land tax was collected in all communities; in one it was deposited at the bank and the wereda informed. All land sizes were taxed in two communities (including housing land in 1); in one, small land plots were exempted; in another grazing and tree plots were not taxed.
- In two communities Development Teams had a role in the collection of the land tax.

- Other taxes were paid to wereda-level authorities. The kebele administration had to authorise businesses before they could open and registered them in one community.
- Market taxes were mentioned in all communities.
- Licenses and income taxes were paid by few people, ranging from nobody or one person in three communities, to a few more in the other 3. Instructions aimed to expand the tax base (e.g. registering small shops, recording eucalyptus sale) had recently been given to the kebele or were implemented by the wereda in three communities.
- In most communities people mentioned some 'anomaly' (e.g. no tax on lucrative trade such as coffee or eucalyptus in three communities); or complained about bias (in 1) or lack of standardisation allegedly due to nepotism at wereda level (1) leading some to be heavily taxed competing against others not paying any tax for similar or even higher incomes, or about unfairly high estimates on which taxes are estimated (1).
- There were Public Works in all communities, organised by the (sub)-kebele structures as mentioned above under 'watershed management'; focus on environmental protection (all); roads (4); safe water (scheme construction or cleaning, 3); school construction (3).
- People were asked cash for regular annual contributions and one-off contributions in all communities; annual contributions included Red Cross, sport and the regional development association in all, guard salaries in 2, kebele administration expenses in 2; school contributions were sometimes included in the list of regular contributions sometimes listed separately.
- One-off contributions for local projects included cash for roads and/or safe water in five communities; in the 6th the priority was the reconstruction of the health post that had burned. Rates for one-off contributions were usually 'depending on households' capacity', unlike flat rates for annual contributions.
- Cash was also contributed for wereda or regional projects in one community and in 4 people also mentioned contributions for the Renaissance Dam.
- Patterns of exemption varied a lot, with exemptions generally limited except in one community in which landless households were said to be exempted from all contributions including public works, and another in which a large number of poor and in-crisis households had been exempted from the (rather high) cash contribution for an inter-kebele all-weather road.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Information on federal/regional tax regulations as the basis for taxes was often quite confused; a number of contributions were related to specific programmes (e.g. URRAP) or local *fiat* (e.g. for kebele expenses).
- Some coercion or threats were said to be used in four communities, including directly by wereda officials for traders in 2 cases. In three communities kebele officials explained that they used these means because themselves were under pressure from the wereda, including threats of being imprisoned in 1.
- In all communities the kebele administration was expected to collect a fixed amount as land tax. In two communities they had received instructions regarding other taxes.
- Contributions for the Renaissance Dam were fixed as a target for the kebele in one community.

Consequences

- Taxes and contributions represented a burden for poor and more vulnerable households, with varying, seemingly locally discretionary practices determining exemption and amounts paid.
- In one community a number of youth-run small shops had had to close due to heavy taxation; in another there was a fear that the instruction that all businesses, including very small ones, had to be licensed, would discourage people from trying.
- Tax collection put pressure on kebele leaders; in one community DT leaders refused to put pressure on their DT members, leaving it to the kebele leaders.

- Part of the taxes and contributions were used for place-specific public goods, but far from all.
- In most communities some difficulties were mentioned in relation to the tax system; an emerging sticky point in the community-government relationships was the perception of bias especially re licensing and income tax.
- In one community there was gossip about officials diverting some contributions for their own personal use.

Interventions to change ideas of communities

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: Each intervention is designed to change particular aspects of people's behaviour. In addition to 'learning-by-doing', government actively seeks to change how people think through meetings and training, models, the party newsletter, and radio and TV programmes.
- *Implementation*: In all communities Government messages through wereda and kebele officials and employees on a wide range of topics related to environment, livelihoods (hard work, raising production, self-employment and group formation), human and social re/pro/duction; mix of longstanding issues such as latrines and women's rights, and newer campaigns such as enrolment at 7, adult education, and skilled deliveries.
- In one community there was mention of continuity with Meles's undertakings; in another, perceptions of lesser commitment by government officials and employees since his death.
- Meetings were used everywhere but general meetings were less frequent and replaced by meetings at sub-kebele levels and information through DTs and 1-5s in several communities.
- Training once or twice a year for model farmers was mentioned in three communities; in several others models were selected to implement interventions first.
- There was access to radio everywhere; TV was widely watched in four communities but not in those 2 in which there were no or very few connections to electricity.
- A wide range of topics were addressed in radio and TV programmes (women and children's rights, harm of female circumcision, successes in environmental protection or agricultural production, savings, family planning, HIV etc.); in several communities TV was said to be a window on other Ethiopian cultures and traditions, business opportunities, market information, and provide news on regional and federal issues including corruption.
- Other means for changing people's ideas included school clubs in a couple of communities and the activities of the wereda women and children affairs' office in a couple of others.

Consequences

- In all communities there were mixed views on government messages.
- On the one hand, some messages were appreciated by most, especially when linked to tangible changes such as improved infrastructure
- On the other, there were views of 'nothing much new' (1) and that training and advice lacked practical support (2); some messages were perceived as not useful (not necessarily the same in all communities) or even actively resisted (ban on female circumcision in one community); and some messages proving to be contentious within the community (e.g. gender relationships and urban values in most communities)
- In one community people explained that the kebele administration had no means of following up whether what is taught in meetings etc. is being implemented.
- In all communities women were less well reached: female sub-kebele structures were not functional, women's organisations were weak or non-existent, and participation in kebele structures and meetings was weak though said to be improving in a couple. This seemed to be the case for youth as well. In one community it was openly acknowledged that women were not

expected to attend meetings, and that youth were not invited to meetings as they raised difficult questions that the kebele administration could not respond to.

Interventions affecting local government organisation

Comparison of ideal-type intervention and implementation

- *Ideal-type*: The local government structure expected to maintain security and implement development interventions in rural communities is a mix of government and party structures, in principle separate although staffed by officials playing roles in both types. From 2003 onwards, new cadres of government employees were deployed at the kebele level (and supposed to live there), joining teachers and head teachers stationed in rural schools: DAs (agricultural extension service) and HEWs (health extension service) were followed by kebele managers in 2007 as part of the post-2005 election 'good governance' package. Together with the deployment of kebele managers, kebele leaders elected from within the community stopped being remunerated for their services. In the 2008-2013 period the following key reforms were rolled out: enlargement of kebele Councils, establishment of party cells in the run-up to 2010 elections, introduction of sub-kebeles (or zones), development teams (DTs) and 1-5 networks (1-5s).
- *Implementation*: Expected workloads of voluntary Cabinet members (meetings, support to intervention implementation, model and leading by example) were impossible to fulfil; most kebele officials prioritised their livelihood activities; there were varying levels of activity by Cabinets, and varying degrees of continuity in the kebele top leadership. In three communities the kebele chair had been replaced in the last 2 years for poor performance, including 2 in the months following the April 2013 local election. In another, the kebele chair was in place since 1992 even though he was rarely seen in the office.
- In all communities kebele leaders said that paying people is the only way to make sure people carefully carry out their responsibilities.
- The distinction between party and government structures was far from clear for lay people in all communities, and even for some government employees, e.g. in one community the HEWs said DTs and 1-5s were created to 'amalgamate' development and politics. In three communities government employees reported getting party work.
- In one community DAs and HEWs were said to now be accountable to the kebele manager instead of the wereda and this to be a better system, although one manager complained that HEWs and DAs did not cooperate.
- In four communities the kebele Council comprised 50% women; in at least one it was evident that they did not usually participate to meetings. In most communities Council meetings were taking place a lot less frequently than intended, e.g. 3-4 times a year instead of monthly; in one of these a policy had been agreed to address absenteeism but its harshest measure (dismissal after 3 consecutive absences) was not implemented as 'everyone would like to be dismissed'.
- Councils carried out *Gimgema* of various officials and structures in five communities, and evaluated performance in implementing interventions in the sixth. *Gimgema* led to demotion in several cases, including of kebele chairs although in such cases the wereda was always involved.
- In practice the sub-kebele structures (zones, DTs and 1-5s) were introduced in a staggered manner from 2010 onwards and had reached varying degrees of institutionalisation across communities but were nowhere fully operational. Among others, meetings seemed to be quite a lot less frequent than intended and described by officials.
- Separate female structures seemed to have been introduced later and were generally less well established in all communities. In one community a woman supposed to be DT leader said she had never called a meeting ('to do what?' she asked).

- Between April and November 2013 in all communities there was evidence of a push to get the structures to work properly but it was too early to draw conclusions as to whether this would yield results.

Social mechanisms used to encourage conformity

- Party and sub-kebele structures were put in place by administrative fiat.
- Government employees were moved by administrative decisions.
- High work burden for voluntary kebele administration members and government employees, for no or low salaries is an issue that has not been addressed.
- Government employees' salaries were considerably lower than the incomes of richer farmers and businesspeople in the kebeles. In some cases employees were not paid their due, e.g. in one case no salary increment every 2 years as per the policy for HEWs.
- Further training was an incentive to meet targets and score highly, but these training opportunities were seen as being too limited, not applicable for kebele managers and in some cases unfairly allocated; government employees reported being forbidden to study privately in two communities. This system also provided incentives to inflate reported achievements and hide challenges, leading to hard-to-believe statistics in some cases.
- In one community the conflating of development issues and politics in meetings of supposedly development structures led to the politicising of development policy; those wanting to discuss local development issues could be accused of supporting opposition parties.
- In several communities there were key posts (e.g. DA crops or HEW) left vacant for months without replacement when someone had been transferred or was on long-term training, or prolonged illness or maternity leave.
- In three communities many government employees (teachers, DAs and HEWs) did not live on the site but in nearby towns/cities, leading to a low level of 'time-on-task'. This issue and in several communities what some people described as 'lack of commitment' was noted; in one community people had complained about the concerned employees but the latter (DAs) had tried to retaliate against those who had complained.
- In three communities DAs were unhappy about their role in enforcing solutions they knew were not adequate (faulty improved seeds), the lack of realism of wereda plans, the fact that they did not have enough time to implement the many strategies spread down from government, and unrealistic promises eroding farmers' trust in them.
- In one community the wereda had started having regular discussions with all DAs inviting their inputs on challenges and way forward.
- In the education sector school supervisors were welcomed by head teachers seeking advice and reporting issues.

Consequences

- Generally people in 1-5s were neighbours, with pre-established relationships which shaped the way their 1-5s functioned. What happened therefore varied a lot within each community. In several communities people disliked the 1-5s as a means of mutual control and follow-up, as they said this was creating hatred among neighbours.

6. Considerations for the future

In this section we focus on two important areas: suggestions for future government strategies for already successful rural agricultural economies, and the design and implementation of future development interventions.

Future government strategies for Stage 3 type communities

The past government strategy appears to have been based on the assumption that almost all rural economic production is agricultural and produced by smallholding peasant farmers. While this is a good description of many rural communities in 1995 and 2003 it does not apply to communities of the type studied in Stage 3 in 2013; they are well-integrated into markets, increasingly involved in non-farm activities including trade and business and have a reserve of educated labour with little to do if they stay in the community apart from those in communities in commutable distance of small factories.

Smallholding farmers are currently expected not only to drive agricultural growth but also to contribute a considerable number of days to Public Works labour and participate in many hours of meetings and trainings. At the same time nearly all government's investment in rural economic development has gone to adult male farmers; most of it to the richer ones. This strategy has been successful in getting the communities to their positions in 2013 but this group may be now sufficiently well-established and aspiring that it does not need focused nudging any more. The time may now be ripe to shift some government investment to activities that respond to changes in the division of labour that have already taken place, for example small rural industrialisation and very small local town development.

Design and implementation of future development interventions

Drawing on the findings on community trajectories into the future and the implementation of interventions in 2013 in this section we identify some issues of importance for the design and implementation of future development interventions.

Tailoring interventions to anticipate and work with forces for change happening independent of Government actions

'To achieve what it sees as a sustainable transition to developmental capitalism, the Ethiopian government's policy is designed to sustain its influence over a panoply of key economic and business levers *throughout* the transition., i.e. through the medium term. It seeks to establish and maintain: close economic regulation by government, particularly in the financial sector; a strong State Owned Enterprise profile, particularly in a range of strategic infrastructure-related sectors; a high degree of state control of the provision and availability of credit to strategic sectors, both at the macro (CBE, DBE) and micro-levels (multiple MFI including DECSI and others); increasing involvement of co-operatives and mass associations in economic activity at local levels in line with its national vision..' (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011: 60)¹⁰

- Given the changes in economic structures and institutions outlined in sections 2 and 3 above one question for consideration is whether the government should modify the strategy described in Vaughan and Mesfin's quote (assuming it is accurate). The evidence from the six Stage 3 communities, which have all experienced fairly continuous economic growth in recent years with most simultaneously undergoing economic re-structuring, is that the engine of the growth is the hard work of private farmers, traders and businessmen 'trying to change their lives' and that most co-operatives and mass associations had not worked efficiently or effectively.
- The Service Co-operatives and coffee-co-operative mostly lacked funds for buying farmers' outputs; one could not afford to buy the basic goods provided at cheaper prices by its Union; there were two cases of disappearing funds; fertiliser and improved seed were not always

¹⁰ Vaughan, S. and Mesfin G. *Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia: the role of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray* Africa Power and Politics Research Report, London: ODI. <http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110822-appp-rr02-rethinking-business-politics-in-ethiopia-by-sarah-vaughan-mesfin-gebremichael-august-2011>

available on time; two SCs were storing spoiled seeds/fertiliser which farmers did not want to buy but which the Unions would not remove; and the service at one was extremely slow.

- The only producer co-operatives that were flourishing were the stone co-operatives in two communities which depended on the local building boom; three in another site where there was also a boom had not survived more than a few years. No women's co-operative with a life of more than a few months could be found and apart from the stone co-operatives those few youth co-operatives that did exist had very short lives or were only recently established and it was too early to judge their performance. Problems with youth cooperatives included an annual supply of 'youth' in transition conducting a mix of livelihood experiments over a few years until they 'settled down' in various ways in the community or migrated, a legacy of past failed cooperatives, difficulties of accessing credit and land, weak financial management, and issues with leadership and cooperative ethics. Youth associations did not exist or were doing nothing active in five of the communities and the report on the sixth came from a youth leader and was not backed up by any other evidence. Women's associations were not actively involved economically at the time of the research.
- On the other hand there were examples in all communities of very successful individual women, farmers /traders /business-people and young male entrepreneurs, one example being provision of transport on motorbikes and carts.

Missing interventions

- Many different kinds of people and the community as a whole would benefit from improvements in internal roads, including more of them and some all-weather roads.
- Irrigation infrastructure in all communities has thus far been the responsibility of individual farmers working together. In most communities people are eager to expand their irrigation farming but the infrastructure can only be developed further with inputs from the wereda, zone or Region. However, only in one was there any such investment through the development of a large-scale deep well-based scheme, and the local farmers were unsure about how the scheme would be run.
- For coffee-producing communities there need to be effective agricultural extension packages with market connections which promote diversification to provide a safety-net for periods when international coffee prices are low. In both communities the falling coffee price had led to increased investment in *chat* which was not supported by extension services; there were signs of potentially harmful over-use of *chat* in one community.
- There were few livelihood interventions for poorer farmers, landless people, women, youth and children.
- Although some of the frontline workers were aware of the potential arising from the greater local physical integration of rural and urban communities, little was being undertaken by government to assist rural communities to intensify economic links with urban areas as markets for products but also labour markets. Changing this would require some joined-up thinking and planning by rural weredas and town administrations.

Designing more efficient intervention packages

- There did not seem to be much wereda-level planning about appropriate intervention mixes for different kinds of community. There seemed to be limited 'listening' to priorities and challenges in plan preparations – with variations; for example in one community the wereda seemed to be trying to be more consultative in agricultural extension. Many interventions arrived as campaigns which had to be done 'now' causing officials to drop what they were doing before.

There were complaints about plans announced in meetings but not implemented and projects started but not followed up. One of the reasons was that far too much was expected of wereda and kebele officials in terms of actions, meetings and reports. This was compounded by the need for party meetings separate from kebele meetings.

- An efficient system would use cost-benefit analyses, consider opportunity costs and learn from past implementation experiences. For example, how efficient was it to devote many farmer days each year for several years on watershed management activities which had not achieved a lot, partly due to lack of follow-up.
- There also is a case for plans to better integrate lessons learned locally on constraints and challenges that arose from earlier implementation.

Tailoring interventions to suit the seasonal rhythms of rural life

- The school year does not fit with demands for child labour during the main harvesting season.
- Annual meetings on kebele achievements and plans are currently held just as harvest seasons in many communities get under way. A locally appropriate seasonal calendar for all kebele mobilisations would prevent some of the current clashes.

Tailoring interventions to suit different kinds of local circumstances

- Agricultural and livestock packages were remarkably similar in all communities; the priority given to standard improved seeds and fertiliser packages in communities where coffee and livestock led the livelihood system distracted DAs and farmers from focusing on more effective ways of increasing agricultural growth.
- Farmers in all communities attributed declining soil fertility to continuous use of the same fertiliser(s) over many years; in two communities Agricultural Research Institute tests found acid soil which could easily be improved with lime. Testing of soils by DAs and provision of locally appropriate fertilisers would supplement ongoing efforts to persuade farmers to use compost, inter-cropping and crop rotation with legumes.
- Currently there are policies for urban areas and policies for rural areas but many thriving farming communities close to urban areas are losing tranches of land to expanding towns which is associated in some places with illegal land sales. In areas where change is rapid re-structuring of weredas and kebeles can be a fairly continuous process. Ordinary community members are often not informed or consulted about land allocation and investments decided at higher levels. Where land was given for investment promises of employment and other benefits were not always kept. Clear guidelines and procedures for compensation for loss of land and more participatory land use planning and negotiations on investment benefits involving local communities would go some way in addressing these issues.

Community-level human resource planning for efficient implementation of interventions

- Job descriptions for DAs, HEWs, and voluntary kebele officials are impossible to implement in practice as a result of far too much to do and lack of incentives, and this is coupled with weak monitoring and a lack of clearly articulated and attractive career prospects. This leaves a wide area of discretion in which at one extreme some people struggle to do their best for the community and at the other some people focus on personal interests.

Choosing effective social mechanisms for changing people's minds and behaviour

- The description of how selected development interventions were working in 2013 contains complex stories about the use and effectiveness of different kinds of social mechanisms for

changing the minds and behaviour of different kinds of people. This is an area where consultation and research with experienced practical psychologists and sociologists might produce dividends¹¹.

7. A future for WIDE?

From the onset of WIDE3 we assumed that our community-level research could be policy relevant by filling an information gap for government and their development partners. We found that in some areas, donors and the government had quite different mental models of how development should be pursued, making dialogue between them complicated. It therefore seemed preferable to engage mostly separately with government and donors on the research findings. Our main vehicles were regular small workshops and meetings with Addis Ababa-based stakeholders and presentations developed for these as well as research reports for each stage, and academic papers and presentations. As part of this interaction we seized opportunities to have dedicated meetings with government officials and we also sent shorter outputs to those who were interested.

Towards the end of Stage 3 in discussions with JGAM we considered how our evidence might be used to inform policy-making and implementation more directly. This led to the preparation of five topic-focused discussion briefs¹² drawing on the WIDE3 evidence by three consultants from a government think-tank and two UK-based consultants which were discussed at a High Level Discussion Forum with senior Government officials in March 2014. This was followed by a meeting with the donors funding the research.

In this context and as the WIDE3 project is closing we see three main streams of work emerging for the near and longer term future, as follows:

- More could be done to draw on the existing data to make the research findings more easily accessible to policymakers and practitioners in Ethiopia. This holds both in terms of content (e.g. discussion briefs on other topics) and process (joint GOE-donor discussion, involvement of regional governments etc.).
- Both the GOE and donors expressed interest in the longitudinal nature of the research. This brought us to think about a subsequent round. We have suggested in earlier discussions that it would be interesting and useful to do a rapid round of going back to all 20 villages in as short a period of time as possible, in 2015/16, with a view to producing a dataset to establish changes during GTP1 and provide a baseline for GTP2.
- Thinking further ahead, we hope that the WIDE research can find an Ethiopian home and, in its current or in a simplified form, become institutionalised as one of the ways in which Government and its development partners follow up on the long term impacts of development interventions and broader modernisation processes in Ethiopia.

Finally, our rare but important interactions with government officials in the course of the WIDE3 research highlighted that one of the major strengths of the WIDE3 research, as they perceived it, was its independence from donors' agendas and policy discourses. Going forward we believe that further thoughts should be given on how to strengthen independent, policy-relevant research in Ethiopia – including but not limited to WIDE.

¹¹ This might be part of larger Ethiopia-relevant governance social science laboratory.

¹² These briefs focus on: Unlocking agricultural growth; Farming and value chains; Work creation for the rural youth; Equitable service delivery and; Models and realities of transformation.