

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT
IMPACTS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA**

STAGE ONE ANNEX 4

**FINDINGS 3: THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT
OF INTERVENTIONS**

August 2010

Mokoro


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In this Annex we explore the longer-term roles of government interventions, many of which were donor-funded, in steering the communities to their current states. The evidence base can be found in Evidence Base 3.

Geblen

Community public goods interventions

A process of administrative **urbanisation** was under way. In 2003 three grinding mills were in place; the Health Post and Farmers' Training Centre were built in 2005. In 2004, 2007 and 2008 small plots of land were allocated to landless married youths to build houses; so far 65 (out of 107) have built houses. In 2008 three shops opened and there were six women (household heads) selling drinks contributing to the creation of a small town (Mishig) around the kebele administration office.

In 2004 the status of the **road** to Geblen was improved; lorries could drive there. The road has been maintained since through FFW and a Catholic NGO. In 2009 minibuses began to provide **transport services** to Edaga Hamus leading to easier access to markets, daily labour and jobs, and health and education services.

Electricity was made available in Mishig in 2008; it was used in bars and the 56 households living in the town, though not in the Health Post or the school as the transformer was too expensive. As a result people have access to **TV** services in bars and some homes. A wireless community **telephone** was installed in 2006 while in 2008 people with mobile phones got reception at one spot near Mishig. Recently the wireless service improved; it used to fail during the rainy months.

With regard to the **environment** there has been **tree planting**: in 2004 mostly eucalyptus trees (15% survived); in 2005 20 hectares of land were planted with indigenous trees associated with the celebration of the millennium (few grew up). All grazing, and cactus and fuel collection on an area of non-cultivable land used by groups and individuals was banned in 2009 and in 2010 more such land owned by individual farmers was added to the **conservation programme** known as zero-grazing programme. Under the PSNP programme public works include **terracing** and other environmental conservation work, which was also done under 'free labour' in 2010 as part of the Soil and Water Conservation Programme being implemented throughout rural Tigray.

***Conclusions:** There have been considerable changes in public goods since 2003 notably the emergence of a very small but growing town, an improved road and transport services, electricity, and access to TV and phone. Environmental works probably checked degradation; it was too soon to assess the conservation programme.*

Livelihoods interventions

Geblen has been **drought-prone** for many years and since 2002 reported only one relatively good year (2008) and severe droughts in 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2009 – 'not one rain drop'. Accordingly in the past seven years crop production (main crop barley) has been poor or failed. In 2009 even the cactus (eaten by people and livestock) died. Geblen has regularly received food aid and became a

PSNP site in 2005. In bad years **emergency food aid** has been provided to non-PSNP households and to PSNP households with more members than the maximum PSNP aid was provided for (6). Targeting, desirable for impact, has been defeated by informal social protection social norms of sharing and reciprocity; no household graduated. There were disputes over access to PSNP2 and the aid was late, with serious effects for poorer households.

In 2004/5 every farmer was ordered to dig a water reservoir on their plots. In 2006 there was spring development for **irrigation** in three sub-kebeles with the community provided labour and government materials such as cement and iron. In 2008 120 people were using irrigation on small plots (5m x 5m) to grow tomatoes, onions, cabbages and potatoes and some fruit, some planted grain crops.

Wereda officials said that the **OFSP** package in Geblen was not focusing on agriculture because of its poor potential; this did not seem to be reflected in what went on at kebele level, although there was no Crops **Development Agent** at the time of fieldwork. New seeds of barley, wheat and maize were introduced in 2003 and in 2005 the extension package was strengthened as a family package as part of the food security programme. Farmers were provided with **fertilisers** and **improved seeds**. Fertiliser was used in small amounts and some reported improved outputs from improved seed and fertiliser use but most were reluctant to use it as they fall into debt if drought affects the crops. Even so farmers were pushed to take fertiliser under threat of removal from PSNP and even people without land had to take it. Farmers were trained in compost-making at the **Farmers Training Centre**. Extension workers worked with **Model Farmers** to whom different levels of award could be made.

Geblen's OFSP package put in place in 2005 focused on honey production and **goat and sheep** rearing. However, the continuous drought affected these **livestock** programmes due to shortage of fodder and there were epidemics of livestock disease in both 2007 and 2009, with more than 800 deaths in 2009. Though a **vet clinic** was built in 2004 it has no personnel or medicines. In 2009 a Livestock DA was assigned to Geblen and 250 modern **beehives** were distributed on credit (some were broken) but few people successfully placed bees in the modern hives including because of the additional cost to get bee colonies for the many who did not have one, and few kept them alive as an estimated 500 colonies died due to the drought. In 2010 a further 300 hives were distributed with some people having to take a second before they had paid back their debt for the first. People were told that if they did not take the hives they would be removed from the PSNP. Many had to sell animals to repay the debt.

Land certification took place in Tigray in 1997. In 2003 there were reports that separated women got half the land and of increases in the number of **landless**. By 2010 there was 'acute landlessness' (at least 1/3 of households) which was a major factor driving youngsters to migrate.

There have been a few **employment** opportunities in Mishig, for example in the grinding mills. NGOs occasionally provided employment, for example, through funding road maintenance, and the construction of canals and water points. In January and February 2010 farmers worked on an orange farm attached to a monastery at a distance of a 6 hours walk; in 2008 they were paid 30 *birr* a day plus food. Since 2003 young women from Geblen have worked in restaurants, tearooms and bars in Adigrat, Edaga Hamus and Mekele (earning up to 250 *birr* a month) while young men not skilled in construction activities earned 'meagre incomes' as daily labourers. There were reports of increased income which was likely to have been earned outside Geblen.

Offered the opportunity to **resettle** in 2004 only 3 households went (a quota of 100 had been offered for the kebele). In 2006 some young women **migrated** to Saudi Arabia and some sent **remittances** to their families. By 2008 young women and men were migrating 'massively' to Saudi Arabia though not many sent remittances, and the increase in numbers accelerated in 2009. The Youth Association reported that in just one year at the end of the period more than 60 youth had migrated in various locations and this is likely to be an underestimate.

A respondent in the 2003 reported that a **service co-operative** had started in 1999. 'It was useless – items are easily available in private shops'. In 2010 respondents reported that in 2004 Geblen Farmers Association Co-operative was set up with 249 members. People bought cereals, cement, and other goods on credit and commodities at a fair price, though kebele officials said that the Co-op did not have enough 'financial power' and the latter stopped in 2007. There were also some outstanding debts. Honey Producers' Co-operatives were set up, including one for youth with support from World Vision but as described there was no production.

Geblen residents benefited from a **credit** programme before 2003; this started in 1999 and covered 5 tabia. Loans were on a group basis: at first 7 people with loans between 50 and 2,500 *birr* and an 18% interest rate, and then 3 people, loans 50 – 50,000 *birr* and 15% interest. Dedebit Microfinance provided credit for the family package from 2005; 518 people in Geblen participated though elderly people were excluded. Young people persuaded their parents to get loans to cover the cost of migration and later many ended up in debt. In 2009 loans in cash were stopped to prevent their use for youth migration and related debt. The Service Co-op also provided credit for fertiliser – at times against people's interest in taking fertiliser as noted earlier. Muslim leaders were opposed to credit.

***Conclusions:** Between 2003 and 2010 there was economic decline rather than growth in farming apart from the establishment of small amounts of irrigated vegetable and fruit production made possible by government and NGO investment in springs. Agriculture failed most years and bees and livestock were affected by drought and disease. Residents were forced to take inappropriate loans for fertilisers and beehives to meet targets leading some into debt and aggravating the debt cycle in which many poorer households were involved, borrowing to pay debts. Poorer and female-headed households depended on PSNP. Youth with no farming land increasingly left for work in Ethiopia and beyond. Those with increased incomes able to buy the modern equipment described in the next section likely earned it outside Geblen.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

Houses in Geblen are made from stone with wooden roofs and may last 100 years. From 2008 people started building better houses in Mishig with corrugated iron roofs and plastered walls; some have electricity. **Lifestyles** have begun to change. In 2005 traditional equipment was being replaced with plastic and wooden beds becoming more common in richer households. People started using batteries and bulbs in 2008, there were reports of young people wearing expensive suits which parents found hard to afford, and beer and soft drinks were being consumed in the town.

in 2009 there was an expansion of people buying beds, mobile phones, DVD players and TVs 'due to an expansion of income'. Young women recently began to wear jeans.

A **Health Post** was built in Mishig in 2005; it provides first aid, family planning, other packages and safe delivery through a trained HEW. There was only 1 HEW in place in 2010.

The population structure of Geblen was unusual with over 40% of household headed by women and what seems like a rapid exodus of youth, particularly males. Family planning education and **contraception** were available before 2003 though people in Geblen 'were not using it' and researchers observed in 2010 that women bear many children. Pills can be given by health promoters, injections have been available for some time, and implants were made available in the Health Post in 2010. The kebele leader estimated that no more than 5% of women used pills. The HEW mentioned 50 women using contraceptives of one or another kind (out of 750 households).

With regard to **pregnancy and childbirth** the HEW started to follow pregnant women and provide simple delivery services in 2007 since the wereda provided equipment and training. However not many women choose to deliver at the post and there was a problem at night due to lack of light. Vaccination has been available since 2002 though there was a shortage of vaccine in 2010; vitamin A tablets for mothers and children have been provided since 2009.

In 2006 and 2008 there was provision of nutritious food for (a few) children with **malnutrition**; famex was provided for moderately under-nourished children and plumpinut for severely undernourished children. OTP food was provided for 9 under-fives in 2010; there were reports that households share the food around.

There have been a number of **water** development projects in Geblen with community labour and supported by NGOs. Three springs were developed in 2008 and two **water** catchment structures built in 2009. A further spring was developed in 2010. There was an estimate that together they supplied fewer than 10% of households, and some did not hold water the whole year round. Drinking water sites were cleaned in 2007, 2008 and 2010 while in 2009 chlorine was distributed to each household.

It was said that most households in Geblen built **latrines** in 2003 though wereda officials thought use was limited. While the HEWs said there was 90% use the research team noted that most houses in Mishig did not have latrines. Respondents said that other **sanitation** measures introduced through the Health Post, such as waste treatment and hand wash rooms, were useful but the researchers observed thrown waste in Mishig.

Several respondents, including wereda officials, said that there was no **malaria** in Geblen and people affected contracted it elsewhere. Nevertheless there was spraying of anti-malarial insecticides in every house in the kebele in 2009 and 2010.

In 2003 there was a campaign to encourage people to use health centres instead of traditional medical practitioners, though there were reports that in 2010 many were still going to traditional practitioners. There was a **health centre** 45 minutes from Mishig which was supposed to give 24 hour service since BPR but has problems due to staff shortage. In 2009 an ambulance came for a man injured in a fall within 30 minutes. In 2005 annual diarrhoea outbreaks between September and November began. In 2007 a woman suspected of living with **HIV/AIDS** died. There were awareness creation campaigns related to HIV/AIDS in 2004 and 2005. In 2006 there was also VCT service and since then it has been provided at other times, with some people having conducted the test five times in a few years but the effects overall limited and official said that 'those who are living with HIV/AIDS are not exposing themselves'.

In 2008 more than 100 adults enrolled to attend **basic education** in an evening programme but it did not last long as most gave it up. In 2009 **pre-school** education started in Geblen primary school organised by the community hiring a teacher who didn't stay.

In 2006 Geblen **primary school** expanded to Grade 1-8 by co-ordinating community and UNICEF resources. In 2007 new schools opened in far kushets. There was a shortage of teachers and absenteeism related to the harsh conditions including water scarcity. Schools lacked educational materials, seats, separate latrines, water and electricity but there has been a big increase in enrolment and attendance such that by early 2010 almost all children were going to school. In 2008 and 2009 children dropped out of school due to hunger.

Boys and girls have been attending **secondary school** in the two nearest towns; in 2009 Grade 9 started in a nearby village which was easier and cheaper for most students. TVET was available in the nearest towns but most students dropped out after Grade 10 as their grades were not high enough to join preps for university or TVET due to the high pass marks linked to shortage of places and they could not afford private colleges. Children from more than 5 families have joined **university**. Several have graduated and have jobs.

Conclusions: *Urban lifestyles have reached the centre of Geblen. The growing small town had started to provide preventive health, contraceptive, pregnancy and childbirth services and vaccination when vaccines were available, although take-up was not high. Water shortage was a big problem and NGOs and the community have been involved in spring development and water catchment although over 90% of the residents have not benefited. Latrines have been built but likely*

most were unused and other sanitation measures were probably not practised by most households. Despite agreement that most of Geblen was not malarial all houses have been twice sprayed with anti-mosquito chemicals. PLWHA were not admitting to it. There has been a huge increase in enthusiasm for education with most children reportedly attending primary school and at least 5 recent university graduates from the community and interviews showing others attending university in 2010.

Social re/pro/duction interventions

There were no formally organised **iddir**; people contribute for mourning (usually 2 *birr*) and commemorative feasts (up to 1000 *birr*) at the time of death. Contributions were also made for weddings. There were *mehber* to which members of richer households belong.

In Geblen there were Erob and Tigreans and Orthodox Christians, Muslims and a few Catholics.

Ethnic and religious relations were complex and harmonious with both Erobs and Tigreans holding leadership positions and a sense that ethnic identity has become fuzzier.

With regard to **Harmful Traditional Practices** affecting women it was said that early marriage had been abandoned long ago though the idea of mutual consent was still new. Since the TPLF era during the Derg women have had equal **inheritance** rights and divorcees have had equal **rights to land** and property. **Female circumcision** was reportedly abandoned in the 1980s following years of TPLF campaigning. Recent campaigns have focused on **reducing extravagant spending** on weddings and commemoration ceremonies, **reducing the number of non-working days** for Orthodox Christians, and traditional practices such as milk teeth removal; the evidence was without much success with regard to the reduction of extravagant spending in particular; some people still had mixed feelings about the (government-Church) 'agreed' reduction of non-working holy days to four in a month.

People have strong relationships with neighbours, family and relatives and there was no sign that the **informal social protection** system has been affected by PSNP; rather there was an increase in relatively reliable resources to circulate in the system.

Conclusions: *Ethnic relations were harmonious. Customary practices considered harmful to women were said to have been eliminated before 1991. The Government campaigns to reduce extravagant feasts have fallen on deaf ears. The informal social protection system remained strong although there was concern that if it continued to increase, migration of the community's younger members could weaken it significantly.*

Community management interventions

Wereda de-centralisation, started in 2002, moved power from Zone to wereda. In 2006 a new wereda structure was put in place. In 2004 the kebele **Cabinet** membership increased from 7 members to 9 and in 2007 to 13 with focal members for all important sectors. The kebele **Council** became better organised with standing committees, including a recently established 'stream committee' which follows up on service delivery performance. In 2009 there was a strengthening of the self-criticism and evaluation process; people's views on the administration's effectiveness were considered every three months. In 2008 a **kebele manager** (civil servant) was appointed so that government services would be easily accessible to the community. Geblen has had 2 **kebele chairmen** since 2003: the first resigned and the second was recently promoted to the wereda Youth Affairs' office.

There was a well-organised network of sub-kebele structures (4 kushets, development teams); their role and accountability has been clarified since 2005. Each sub-kebele has a cabinet and within them 5 **development groups** of 30 households and **cells** of 4 to 5 households. Sub-kebeles were important in the selection of model farmers, models for awards and beneficiaries of PSNP. Some community

members interviewed talked of corruption, mainly around food aid. Young boys talked about bias in selecting model farmers, which was done for 'political consumption'.

Reported **good governance** measures included the strengthening of the criticism and self-evaluation process, the sub-kebele structures and the suggestion box, introduced in 2006, which no-one had used. For the past two years Geblen was noted as second best kebele in the wereda in terms of governance.

A **Women's Association** was established in the 1990s'; it provided women with goods and services at lower prices and bought a grinding mill. A **Youth Association** established in 2003 to organise youth was 'dominated by males'. Since 2007 there has been a strong push to increase membership in both. In 2009 the Women's Association had 462 members but the leader said there was no support from the wereda and the Association was useless to its members. The Youth Association recently started trying to organise youth in co-operatives but interviewed youth said there were promises but nothing was done (although one youth honey production co-op was organised but there had been no production yet due to drought).

TPLF was the only party standing in the 2005 **election** and in 2008 elections were held 'for the ruling party – EPRDF'. Following the 2005 election the TPLF had a **party** recruiting drive and by 2010 there were 270 TPLF members in Geblen. The role of the party was to be at the vanguard of development. The party has its own kebele level structure with 15 members including mobilisation and propaganda co-ordinators for each sub-kebele. Development groups also have such co-ordinators. Almost all kebele cabinet members were members of the party structure which has an office in the kebele building.

An official said that attempts **to achieve development** were frustrated by the 'backwardness' of the people who were not keen to take packages. Notable mobilisations for development since 2003 included farmer training (2004), awards to model farmers starting in 2007, and cross-kebele experience-sharing activities. Most difficulties with regard to mobilisation arose in relation to the package programme.

Wereda officials said that Geblen was an outstanding kebele with regard to **tax** payment. There were also labour and additional cash contributions including for the Red Cross. All community members over 18 must contribute free labour for community work on conservation. In 2009 the duration increased from 20 to 40 days though people were allowed to work harder to complete 40 days work in 20 days.

Security has been threatened by youngsters quarrelling in Mishig bars and burglary and theft by disillusioned youth were said to have become a big issues. In 2007 there was an increase in the number of **militia** in each sub-kebele to 70. A **policeman** was stationed in the village in 2008. In 2007 **peace committees** were established in each sub-kebele bringing some formalisation to the customary mediation. If they fail to resolve a dispute it was referred to the **social court** which, as a result of the BPR, was reportedly making decisions on cases within a month. Unresolved disputes over land go to the **land management committee**.

Conclusions: *Since 2003 there have been considerable changes to the community management field including wereda de-centralisation and consolidation, re-organisation, deepening and clarification of kebele structures and sub-structures, use of training, targets, extension workers, models, and awards, and increasing melding of party and government structures. People have also been mobilised to adopt government packages by threats of withdrawal from PSNP. Customary justice processes have been incorporated in a security/justice system which includes local militia, a peace committee with local elders, government police, and kebele social courts. Attempts to invigorate Women's and Youth Associations have not been supported with resources.*

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

Despite having been subject to TPLF ideology and change management processes since the 1980s the local customary cultural repertoire was still strong in Geblen, though inroads have been made by some elements of revolutionary/developmental democracy (equal rights for women, criticism of government performance) and by a local modern repertoire suggesting livelihood opportunities beyond agriculture.

***Conclusions:** After many years the government has still not yet managed to align local ways of thinking with the party ideology, although the new penetrative structures have not been in place for long.*

Inequality interventions

Important **structures of inequality** involve wealth-poverty differences, and older adult control of land. Gender differences were less than in other sites and inequality between ethnic groups was not notable. The two far sub-kebeles were said to be very poor in infrastructure and access to services.

Free medical services were said to be provided to **poor** people, most of whom were elderly women but ordinary respondents said that exemptions didn't work in practice. Also they applied to categories of people who were not all (relatively) poor (female-headed households, families of 'martyrs' and veterans). Poor and very poor households were not exempted from contributions of cash and labour, e.g. for the school. There were reports that in disputes between rich and poor the rich people used bribes while poor people had 'no-one to listen'.

Interventions for **children** include schools, vaccination and small provision of nutritious food for malnourished children. Due to the drought children were absent from school due to hunger; this particularly affected children from very poor households.

Many **youth** were unemployed but, apart from improved access to primary and secondary education, there have not yet been large-scale effective interventions to tackle the problem of landlessness and local shortages of employment opportunities. There were reports of a few young men who had used credit programmes to become relatively rich, although the one most notable case had initially engaged his own savings (made whilst he was employed for several years in a local mill) as start-up capital before being able to take credit with some further success.

43.5% of households were headed by **women**: about a third of them were widows, a third divorcees, and a third abandoned by their partners. Officials said that all women were given the opportunity to participate in PSNP; they were exempted during pregnancy and for nine months after giving birth. The Women's Association leader, supported by the kebele leader, have presented a report to the wereda arguing that the PSNP should take women's extra workload into account and not ask the same tasks from them as men. Women heading households have access to packages. Some women have accessed credit to establish shops, teashops and bars in Mishig. There have been measures to recruit more women into the TPL grassroots structure.

The local social protection system includes group activity to help **elderly people**. There were no government interventions for elderly people except for PSNP Direct Support for those unable to work. Elderly people were excluded from taking part in the credit programme on the argument that they were unlikely to be able to repay.

***Conclusions:** Government actions in the past have led to less gender inequality than in other parts of the country. The categories which have not received effective focused interventions were the youth and very poor people. Children and elderly people in this last category were in considerable need.*

Dinki

Community public goods interventions

There has been some **urbanisation** of Chibite, the administrative centre of Hagera Selam Kebele in which Dinki Got (sub-kebele) was found, with the building of kebele offices, a Health Post and Farmers' Training Centre (built 2005) and primary school, a few kiosks for trade and new houses built by wealthy farmers from the kebele. The **road** from Aliyu Amba to Chibite passes through Dinki and it was due to be upgraded with gravel. Internal roads to all five got's have been built through food for work.

There was no **electricity** in the kebele. There was a wireless **phone** in Chibite which does not work well and mobile access in Ankober with some very recent limited reception in a few places in the kebele.

The main **environmental** problems were soil erosion due to the steepness of slopes and deforestation, and river erosion. Since 2003 there have been attempts to promote **terracing** and tree-planting using food-for-work. In 2005 attempts to move people from hillsides to be designated for tree planting were successfully resisted. Another source of resistance to **tree-planting** was that the land was crucial for grazing. In 2008 seedlings of different indigenous trees were planted in nurseries for future use and recently kebele officials banned youth groups from making charcoal.

***Conclusions:** The main changes in community public goods since 2003 were the urbanisation of the kebele centre and the beginnings of a mobile phone service. There has been resistance to tree-planting and lack of enthusiasm for terracing.*

Livelihoods interventions

In the past livelihoods depended on **rainfed agriculture** though irrigation has become increasingly important for about a third of the households with access. Farmers produced *tef*, sorghum, maize, pulses and oil seeds but the years 2006-10 saw poor rainfall and productivity reduced dramatically. Inhabitants received Direct **Food Aid** in 2005 and 2006 and **FFW** from 2007 although there was also Direct Food Aid in 2009.

The **irrigation** channels which served 10 people in 1995 serve over 50 farmers in 2010; it has enabled the production of vegetables, especially onions and tomatoes, and fruit (bananas, mangoes, avocados), coffee and chat. Increased market access, has allowed users to increase their income and improve their diet. There was an Irrigation Users' Committee which organises turn-taking for water and canal clearance activities. The amount of water in the river has decreased in recent years and there was a problem of leakage which needs cement and stones to repair. There were reports that the wereda had failed to keep a promise to provide cement. In 2008 **motor pumps** were introduced although there were problems when they break down. There was a **seedlings nursery** which has provided onion, coffee, fruit tree and eucalyptus seedlings and experimented with spices (cardamom has potential) and cassava.

During the fieldwork period there were no NRM or livestock **Development Agents** in the kebele; there was a DA Crops and a veterinarian. The Farmers' Training Centre was not doing much. The Crops DA was concentrating on encouraging the use of fertiliser and improved seeds and promoting row planting and following a crop calendar. In 2004 some farmers followed extension advice to plant maize in a line with good results. In 2008 the DA distributed **improved shorter-maturing maize seeds** though only a few farmers used them. More were distributed in 2009 though there were reports that, due to shortages at wereda level, women heading households and those not related to those in power had problems getting them. **Fertiliser** use was still limited despite an increase partly attributed to resistance and partly to the price increase. Kebele use increased from 35 quintals in 2008 to 162 in 2009.

It was reported that the **Service Co-operative** in the kebele has been recently revived; it provides quality fertilisers and seeds to members for cash at the same prices as the market as it was still too small to join the co-operative union to obtain cheaper supplies.

Animal husbandry was not widely practised as the hilly topography and vulnerability to drought limits access to fodder; the number of cattle decreased in the last four years because of the drought. **Livestock extension interventions** were not successful: improved chickens died (2004); no-one benefited from modern beehives (2007); and no-one bought a milk cow (2005) or invested in bull fattening (2009). Livestock disease killed many cattle, sheep and goats between 2006 and 2009; in 2009 a (much appreciated) veterinarian was assigned to Chibite.

There was access to **credit** from ACSI but few from Dinki have taken it; the group-modality was not liked and people fear debt.

There has been no **land** re-distribution during the EPRDF regime resulting in a lot of share-cropping. Increasing population has increased landlessness and resulted in a reduction in land size. Land certification has established rights to land, including inheritance by children, then other relatives. In 2008 there was new legislation allowing renting of land for 3 years with permission from the kebele and for 25 years with the agreement of the wereda. There has been talk of giving land to the youth but little action apart from some space for kiosks in Chibite, and an attempt at giving hillside land to a group of 100 youth to start forestry, which was successfully opposed by some farmers claiming the land.

The increase in irrigation has increased opportunities for **daily labour** and people also work at the nursery. Market opportunities in the area related to building, trading and increased demand for services have increased since 2003. There was seasonal **migration** by both men and women to Afar and people also migrated to big towns in search of work. The only **non-farm extension** activity was the organisation of some young men in Dinki to dig out stones for construction in 2009 which so far has come to nothing. Food-for-Work seen as very important for poor and female-headed households and landless households enabling them to survive.

***Conclusions:** Dinki has seen some economic growth since 2003 as a result of the increase in irrigation farming which directly benefited about a third of the community and provided increased daily labour opportunities. Government extension advice to use fertiliser and improved seeds and plant maize in lines led to improved yields for those who followed it. Rainfed farming and livestock keeping declined due to successive droughts and poor and female-headed households without irrigated land became dependent on food for work and/or daily labour. Opportunities for agricultural and building work and trade in the area attracted some individuals while others migrated to big towns and Addis Ababa in search of work.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

There have been modernising changes in **lifestyles** since 2003 partly dependent on the local economic improvement described above. Increasing numbers of **houses** have corrugated iron sheet roofs, some people have started using beds made of wood, while a widespread use of torches started in 2006 was affected by the introduction of 'battery bulbs' in 2009. Wearing shoes became common, even in the most remote areas and by 2010 everyone was wearing modern clothes. There has been some improvement in diet in Dinki due to irrigated vegetable and fruit growing.

A **Health Post** was built in Chibite in 2006 with two HEWs and a nurse was provided in 2008. The Health Post now offers first aid and provides a family planning service, mother and child services, and preventive health and sanitation packages. In 2010 it had a delivery kit (donated by UNICEF), fridge and vaccination but no curative drugs and no table and chairs.

In 2003 respondents said that **family planning** was not available when wanted; though others said it was opposed by their religions. One of the tasks of the HEWs was to go door-to-door teaching about family planning; in 2010 this was task allocated to **Health Promoters**. Five- and ten- year contraceptives became available in Aliyu Amba Health Centre in 2008. There was still some resistance to FP but people of different sorts reported a change in attitude and increased usage of contraceptives, especially among the younger generation.

Health Promoters were been trained to teach about **pre-natal and post-natal health care** and give a handbook to women while making frequent home visits. Delivery training was provided to HEWs in 2009.

In 2005 mothers suffering from **malnutrition** were sent to Debre Berhan and there was a campaign for giving iodine and vitamin A to mothers and children. A school feeding programme was introduced in 2007 but it only lasted one year. In 2009 under the Outreach Treatment Programme selected mothers and children were given plumpinut; there was a plan to do this every six months. There was regular **vaccination** of children at the Health Post though there was some resistance.

There have been no drinking water interventions and there was **no safe water**. In 2009 cholera reached Dinki and one man died. The HEW in the kebele has been mainly involved in **preventive health** measures; in 2009 the focus was the building of latrines, improved stoves, and making a cupboard for household utensils to keep them clean. There has been some change in awareness and many **latrines** dug though most households were not using them, or only occasionally. The Health Extension Workers also have tried to promote pits for **household waste** which do not seem to have caught on, and hand washing which was difficult with water shortage. There was distribution of a chemical for **water purification**. However, children mentioned the danger of not having the correct dosage and the case of a woman who became ill from drinking water with too high a dose.

Malaria was reported as reduced in 2007 but it increased again in 2009. **Bednets** were distributed in 2007. They were considered effective when they were first distributed for preventing not just mosquitoes but also flies and cockroaches , but they were now considered old and often used as curtains. There were very few cases of suspected **HIV/AIDS** deaths, PLWHA and orphans, mainly due to men having relations with women in Aliyu Amba or migrants returning home for care or children of deceased migrants being sent to live with relatives. It still seems to be considered an urban problem. The health centre provides VCT services and awareness training.

With regard to **curative health services** the Health Centre in Aliyu Amba was reported to be improved, though some said a private clinic in Aliyu Amba gave better treatment. In 2006 free medication for malaria was provided and in 2007 Rapid Detection and Treatment (RDT) of malaria was introduced, though Dinki respondents reported an 'epidemic' of malaria in 2009 when many became bed-ridden (rather than treated). In 2009 Directly Observed Treatment (DOT) for TB started.

There has been improvement in educational facilities since 2003. In 2004 an **Alternative Basic Education** school was opened in a neighbouring Got; in 2006 it became a satellite school but in 2007 reverted to using ABE teaching materials. In 2010 the number of teachers went from one to two. In 2003 the wereda started providing a budget for **primary schools** and in 2005 started training parents to send their children to school. The Chibite primary school was extended to include Grades 7 and 8 with assistance from an NGO. Community members provided materials and labour for building teachers' homes and digging latrines but no cash contributions. In 2009 two satellite classes opened in Dinki. Generally enrolment increased and girls' enrolment reached 50% though drought reduced attendance in those households which could not afford stationery and other costs. In 2010 there were 9 people in the got, 3 from each *Hiwas* responsible to go from house to house to enrol new children in school. As a result of increasing proximity of schools enrolment improved. However the schools lack equipment, materials and qualified teachers and absenteeism and dropout were issues. In 2006 a high school opened in Ankober and in 2010 grades 9 and 10 were added to Aliyu Amba school. TVET s not available in the area and there was no local university access. There was one

graduate (a male doctor) from the locality and another man was due to graduate from university this year.

***Conclusions:** There have been improvements in living conditions and lifestyles, especially for richer households. There have been steady improvements in preventive, mother and child and curative health services, especially since 2006. There were shortages of equipment and no drugs in the Health Post and some community resistance to recommendations and services provided under the first two headings. As a result of government interventions, NGO contributions and community provision of labour and materials primary school enrolment has increased considerably. Education to Grade 10 was now available in Aliyu Amba.*

Social re/pro/duction interventions

Iddirs were involved in dispute resolution and can impose sanctions. After the 2005 elections the government has wanted to work closely with **iddirs** and since 2009 the main iddir committee had had a role in dispute resolution and preventing drunken behaviour. There was a report that almost all members of the community became members of the iddir when it started working with the government and that non-members were excluded from social life and activities.

Since 2003 there has been regular teaching against female circumcision, abduction and early marriage. In 2005 a HTP Prevention Committee was established. By 2006 some people apparently accepted that **female circumcision** was bad but still practised it; others though it natural and necessary. Regular campaigns have continued but there was still no change in practice. The government has introduced severe penalties against **abduction** but reportedly elders tend to convince the family not to take the matter to the police but settle it with compensation and an agreement that the woman should live with the man. **Early marriage** was considered the norm from about the age of 15. Recently some young men and women have **chosen their marriage partners**. The New Family Law (which was not mentioned by name) established that **inheritance** rights were equal for all children.

There has also been regular teaching against **excessive consumption** during funerals, memorial ceremonies and weddings and shooting at crop heaps after harvest. Apparently in 2006 people wanted to stop expensive ceremonies on the 40th day after death 'but no-one was daring to cease following this tradition'. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was brought in to persuade people to reduce commemorative ceremonies in 2008 while one view was that sumptuous wedding ceremonies were rare due to the drought. Though adults tended to acknowledge that excessive feasting could be wasteful, they also justified their actions in relations to custom and as expressions of their commitment to their families. A community elite held a conspicuous wedding not long after the fieldwork. There were reports that in 2007 Orthodox Christians had reduced the number of saints' days on which they did not work but teachings have continued.

While no major changes in **informal social protection** were reported one respondent said that friendship and kin relations had weakened over the years.

***Conclusions:** Attempts to eliminate most Harmful Traditional Practices seem to have met with little success, although a reduction in abduction seems likely and some young people had chosen their own marriage partners. Informal social protection networks still function although some weakening of friendship obligations was suggested by one informant. Government has been using iddir as arms of government.*

Community management

In 2003 **wereda de-centralisation** was seen as particularly beneficial for women, and old and disabled people as it brought things nearer though at that time the wereda did not have offices. In

2004 there was an evaluation of wereda employees which was reportedly not objective and hurt many people; kebeles were affected as employees were frightened and not sure what to do. In 2007 there were disputes among wereda **Cabinet** members which disappeared when the wereda administrator left. **BPR** was operational in 2009 and reported as effective in improving services to kebeles.

In 2003 60 **kebele council** members were elected ('ultimate power resides here' including the appointment of the kebele chairman). In 2008 Council membership rose to 300 and the number of women members was increased. A **kebele manager** was appointed in 2007; he provides important technical inputs, report-writing and administration. He can consider complaints about the kebele administration. In 2008 the Got-Mengistawi Budin system was replaced with Got, Hiwas (party cells) and Limat Budin (development teams). In 2009 '1 for 5' household groups were set up.

There have been 2 **kebele chairmen** since 2003. The first was removed in 2005 allegedly for 'lack of justice, authoritarianism, not financially honest, used his power to retaliate against personal enemies.' Reasons given for the removal of chairmen between 1998 and 2003 were selfishness, lack of leadership capacity, bribery, unfairness and lack of discipline.

Sub-Kebele organisation was dominated by the Party, and sub-structures have been put in place (Hiwas cells, Development teams, One for 10 and one for 5 cells).

The 2005 **election** was full of tensions with both ruling party and CUD telling people about their ideologies and trying to win votes. All was smooth until 3 months before the election when EPRDF reportedly started intimidating CUD supporters. At the wereda level CUD won. Wereda and kebele elections in 2008 'were smooth' as there was no opposing party. In February 2010 the upcoming 2010 election 'did not appear to be an election' with no opposing parties in the area.

Until 2005 people were forced to attend meetings, which were commonplace, and they were fined and sometimes imprisoned if they did not. In the post-election meetings the main grievances raised were meetings and obligatory undertakings like digging water harvesting wells for individuals and moving from hilly areas designated for tree-planting. Since the 2007 **good governance** package **non-participation was seen as a right**. In 2010 **suggestion boxes** were put near the kebele office for complaints and comments.

The **Women's Association** started in 2010 but was not doing anything. The **Youth Association** was set up in 2005 and the campaign to include all young people in it has continued every year.

After the election the EPRDF considered why it had lost and held conferences 'to amend the gaps'. It was reported that good reforms were made after people had voiced their concerns and needs. Former CUD supporters were approached in a special way. By 2007 changes started to be seen as a result of the election and post-election meetings and in 2009 Hiwas (**EPRDF party cells**) were formed. Hiwas were groupings at the got level; in 2010 Dinki Got hiwas had 42 taxpaying members though there were also 23 landless members. They were trained in Chibite about the party and 30-50 people who were party members with their own leadership were involved in promoting campaigns such as the latrines, natural resource management work, student enrolment, collecting taxes and contributions for the party, women's rights and mobilising people for the elections.

In 2007 the government started to use the **iddir** to **mobilise community members**; if a person fails to comply with kebele expectations they told iddir leaders to ban the person and iddirs were used to disseminate government views. In 2008 committees were organised in each neighbourhood to discuss pressing issues and prioritise things to be done. Wereda officials said that now when **new development approaches** were introduced, first appropriate wereda officials were trained, then they trained the appropriate kebele extension workers who informed the leader of each Limat Budin (development group – there were 25 in the kebele) and these disseminated the information to individual farmers maybe using Model Farmers. One problem was lack of inputs and technologies.

Hiwas (cell leaders) mobilise people for **community work** and collect tax and other contributions though participation in meetings and community work was still very low in Dinki's kebele.

In 2008 land **tax** was increased after ten years; this tax was reportedly used by the wereda to maintain and improve roads. Households have been called on to contribute cash to kebele and wereda projects, for example: 24 *birr* in 2004 for construction of the Health Post (wereda covered 50% and kebele members the rest); 50 *birr* so the wereda could buy an ambulance; and in 2009 up to 50 *birr* for road maintenance. There were also annual contributions for guards at school and health post (2 *birr*) and sports (3 *birr*). Labour and materials were also contributed for school construction.

Peace and security within the community was not a big problem though there have been regular disputes over common property and between households on farming and domestic matters; murders and revenge attacks still occur and there were 'secret' tensions and competition between Amhara and Argobba; for example it was said that during the census both lied about household numbers to 'outnumber the other' in the belief it would help in winning authority. In 2008 community policing started and though the awareness level was low there was more co-operation with the police to prevent crime. Since 2010 there have been **militia** in every Hiwas.

Tensions in Dinki reflect wider tensions in the area among Amhara, Argobba and Afar (who have stolen livestock from Dinki households in the past). Since 2008 an elders' **peace committee** with members from three adjacent weredas (Amhara, Argobba and Afar) have been working to improve peace conditions in the area. From 2007 there were fewer conflicts on market days as people stored their guns while at the markets. There have been some changes in the **justice** system with more structures in place and more formal-informal collaboration including the involvement of an iddir. Responsibility for land questions was moved from the **social court** to the kebele and the court stopped seeing family cases.

Conclusions: *Considerable changes since 2003 in community management including wereda decentralisation, increasingly dense kebele structures involving development teams (and '1 for 10') and party cells (1 for 5), new security and justice structures, and increasing mobilisation through campaigns, targets and quotas, extension workers, packages, models, graduation, 'awareness creation', experience sharing, using local organisations such as iddirs and building women's and youth associations and, recently, party-embedded leagues. Lack of extension workers, inputs and community 'lack of awareness' have been reported as impediments to development progress. There has been attempted management of inter-ethnic tensions in the area through a peace committee.*

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

After the 2005 election there were conferences to initiate and encourage people to get involved in development activities. Since then attempts to convert local people to 'developmental revolutionary democracy' have not made much headway against local customary, and religious and non-socialist modern repertoires.

Conclusions: *There was a cultural disconnect between elements of government ideology and community cultural repertoires.*

Inequality interventions

Structures of inequality involve wealth-poverty differences influenced by access to irrigation land, gender differences, age differences (adults, children, youth, elderly) and ethnic and religious differences. Inequality has increased as rich households have become relatively richer though there were no signs of poorer people becoming poorer.

There was no suggestion of a **poverty focus** for the food aid / food for work though very poor households were said to be hit hard by the drought and dependent on food aid. There were suspicions that kebele leaders have benefited personally or favoured relatives in access to food aid. There were no reports of health cost exemptions for very poor people. The model farmer and household system, which focuses on successful farmers, has led to a **wealth focus** for agricultural and livestock interventions.

Interventions for **children** include schooling which has increased considerably, vaccination which was not taken by all, and the introduction of a programme to deal with child malnutrition. There have been no systematic interventions for very poor children.

The wereda has promised credit and land to **youth** in the kebele for a range of agricultural and non-farm activities but none have come to fruition. In one case the kebele gave a youth group a small plot of mountain land on which they planted trees; but the land was claimed by 3 individuals who cut down the trees and kept the land due to lack of support from wereda and kebele. In 2008 a youth representative was added to the cabinet and in 2009 an area in Dinki for youth sport activity was fenced off.

The potential for changes to **women's** lives was visible in the interventions related to education, mother and child health services, the campaign against HTPs which affect women, and rights to land, though there was a way to go to achieving that potential, especially for Argobba women. Argobba female-headed households were particularly vulnerable and reportedly hit hard by the long-term drought. Though 20% of food aid could be given as direct food aid in practice only a few **elderly** and destitute women heading households received direct food aid and some complained it was less than those who worked for food received. The importance for the elderly of owning land was stressed since that would bring them care from those who wanted to inherit it; although this may be affected by the New Family Law giving children and relatives the right to inherit. Before people could give land 'to anyone they thought worthy'.

With regard to **ethnicity** and **religion** in Dinki the Amharas (mostly Orthodox Christians) were, on average, slightly richer than the Argobba (Muslims) in 2004. While the Argobba were politically dominant in the kebele there was no suggestion that this affected access to development interventions.

***Conclusions:** There was some government activity to improve the status of women and there were interventions to improve the human capital of children but otherwise there were no interventions focused on very poor or low status members of the community and no action to improve the livelihoods of landless and land-poor youth.*

Korodegaga

Community public goods interventions

There has been a recent step in the direction of **urbanisation** with the building of a number of new administration buildings in Sefera, the administrative centre of the kebele which was organised into nine villages. These include a Farmers' Training Centre used for meetings and houses for teachers and DAs in 2007; a kebele and Medium & Small Enterprise office in 2008; a health post in 2009; and a veterinary clinic and house under construction in 2010. However Sefera remains 'remote' as access to the outside world was either by a raft pulled across the Awash or by 18 kms of dryweather **road** which was first constructed in 1984. Once across the river there was access to a grinding mill and shop by a private entrepreneur in 2006. Two satellite schools have recently been built in two other villages.

There was no **electricity** in early 2010 although there was a restricted supply from 1973 to 1994 and in 1997 to power an irrigation system which stopped due to theft of key parts. There has been

considerable change in communications due to government provision of mobile infrastructure and market access to **mobile phones**.

Despite regular terracing and tree planting through Food for Work and free community labour there has been little improvement to an **environment** which has suffered from erosion and de-forestation since at least 1984 because terraces and trees were destroyed by livestock.

Conclusions: *The main changes in community public goods since 2003 were a concentration of buildings in which community services can be provided and the mobile phone service. Environmental work has not endured.*

Livelihoods interventions

Korodegaga's **rainfed agriculture** grows maize, *tef* and chickpeas but the kebele was drought-prone. Rainfed agriculture was affected by very serious droughts in 2003 and 2009 and a serious one in 2005. **Food aid** was reportedly provided annually between 1998 and 2003. There was none in 2004. Korodegaga became an NGO-supported PSNP site between 2005 and 2009; as a result of developments in irrigated farming the kebele's status in PSNP2 was not clear in February 2010. Since PSNP food aid had ended in September 2009 emergency food aid was provided as a result of the 'total crop failure' reported to have resulted from the 2009 drought.

The work dimension of **FFW** has involved the environmental work described above which seems not to have made much long-term impact and the maintenance of roads and building of schools, school latrines, houses for teachers and extensions workers and administration buildings.

A Producer Co-operative irrigation system established by the Derg in the mid-1980s was damaged in 1992 and a larger Government scheme was never completed. In 2000 an NGO supported the establishment of an **irrigation** co-operative of 130 farmers on 60 hectares of land which was still operational. Since 2003 the Government has organised rehabilitation of the large Government scheme (with donor support), allocated communal irrigable land to inward investors, including 27 hectares to an Australian using drip irrigation, provided irrigable land to a number of youth co-operatives, and (with NGO support) provided pumps on credit to individual farmers and co-operative groups.

In 2004 there was one **Development Agent**; in 2007 and onwards there were 3 – for agriculture, livestock and NRM. Extension agents work with Model Farmers but the Farmers' Training Centre was not operational. There was no Service Co-operative; a number of small producers' co-operatives have been set up.

In relation to **agriculture improved seeds** were provided:

- for rainfed land – *tef* and wheat 2003; maize 2004, maize and chickpeas 2005; grain and sweet potatoes (failed) 2006; maize and chickpeas 2007; wheat, maize, chickpeas, cassava; *tef* 2010 (free).
- for irrigated land - vegetables 2004, vegetables 2006, onions, tomatoes, green peppers 2008.

Usually the supply of seeds was considerably lower than the demand leading to rationing. Model farmers were usually prioritised and, when credit was involved, those who did not have outstanding debts. Rising prices for **fertiliser** starting in 2005 were partly offset by parallel rises in output prices. However in 2009, when prices reached their peak in a situation where regular government credit had stopped, respondents reported that some farmers had to stop using fertiliser.

Various NGO-supported **livestock** provision was made mostly with credit: oxen for Model farmers (2004); Sheep for youth; sheep and chickens for (poor) women (2005); oxen for (poor) household heads (2005); oxen for active poor people; sheep for youth and (poor) women (2006); sheep for youth (2007); oxen for poor households and sheep for youth (2008); some women bought sheep

through the new credit-saving association (2010). Respondents reported that some richer households with good connections had received livestock meant for poor households. Over the years livestock diseases killed animals bringing **debt** problems to those who had taken credit to buy them. While a veterinary clinic was under construction during the fieldwork there has been no regular veterinary service in the community.

Access to **credit** has increased, particularly for women. An NGO helped a group of women to set up a savings and credit association in 2005 and since then two more women's credit associations have been set up since 2009; one lent 179 women 500 *birr* for seeds and livestock. Many fell into debt as the seeds failed due to the 2009 drought and some livestock died of disease. Members of the Irrigation Association can borrow to buy fertiliser and improved seeds. The Oromia Credit and Savings Co-operative has provided funds for pumps in the wereda.

The Derg **land** re-distribution in 1975 officially provided eligible residents with up to 3 hectares. Some grazing land was owned individually and some communally. There seems to have been no new distribution of land to individuals until 2004 when about 2 hectares of irrigable communal land was given to youths. In the following years more and more land was allocated to youths individually and organised in co-operatives, one woman's co-operative and 2 inward investors. In 2003 respondents reported a high proportion of landlessness which they said had become low by 2010 due to the re-distributions.

The increase in irrigation opened more **daily labour** opportunities for both male and female residents and led to a reduction in **firewood sale** from communal woodland which has been a leading coping strategy for poor landless people and for all during droughts since at least 1984. In 2007 wereda officials started to encourage young people to organise **co-operatives** and get a plan approved by kebele and wereda with the promise of kebele land and support with resources. There has been initial success with youth co-operatives involved in irrigation and lorry-loading. Sand-selling and stone-splitting co-operatives failed due to poor road access.

There has been no tradition of seasonal **migration** for labour or longer-term migration but in 2005 a young woman went to Saudi Arabia to become a domestic worker and in 2008 two young men went to Saudi Arabia. In 2009 a young woman went (illegally) to Sudan to work and in the following year she was joined by her husband and 4 young men and 1 young woman.

***Conclusions:** This analysis suggests that there has been 'economic growth' in Korodegaga since 2003 as a result of NGO-supported safety-net and livelihood interventions in conjunction with increased use of irrigation, land re-distribution and improved market opportunities. This was borne out by the findings of improvements in household and individual lifestyles described in the next section.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

The people of Korodegaga were descended from pastoralists and until recently their houses have been small and not very strongly built. 2008 was a good year for rainfed production and given high food prices many farmers got a good income reflected in an increase in the number of **houses** built of 'blockets' with corrugated iron roofs. Other recent changes in **lifestyle** include a shift from leather to wooden beds, the use of 'battery bulbs' for lighting, the use of improved stoves introduced by an NGO by some households, and a gradual change to plastic house equipment. Young people wear urban style clothes and hairstyles. In 1994 only a few households had radios; now most do with people listening to Afan Oromo programmes and buying tapes of Afan Oromo singers.

The most important change with regard to health was the building of the **Health Post** and appointment of two **Health Extension** workers in **2009**. However, they were still not living in the kebele as the latrine for their house had yet to be built and they spent a lot of time commuting to the site. The nine villages of Korodegaga were far from each other requiring a lot of walking (often in very hot sun) making it impossible for the HEWs to make home visits to everyone to follow-up on

the sixteen packages they were charged with implementing (target 96 households per month). HEWs should provide family planning services, introduce various sanitation measures (e.g. latrines, animals not living in houses at night, waste disposal, water purification etc), prevent malaria, and provide mother-child health advice and eventually delivery services. Many of these services have been irregularly provided in the past with support from NGOs. The Health Post did not yet provide **pre-natal and post-natal health care**.

There were few signs of a **population** slowdown in our 2004 data with over half of the population under twenty, though respondents recently said that family sizes in 2003 were lower than usual which they attributed to the civil war during the Derg but that by 2010 they had become larger. In 1995 respondents said that while people knew about **contraception** it was not practised because it was 'against the will of God'. In 2003 asked how many babies a woman would have in a lifetime on average the response 12 to 13 with an average survival rate of 7 to 8. Pills and condoms were made available in the community from 2000 by an NGO but supplies were unreliable. The HEWs advise people to use family planning and could provide Dipo injections when the contraceptives were available. Kebele officials said one reason the birth rate had not fallen was the unreliability of contraceptive supplies at the Health Post.

There have been the beginnings of interventions to counteract **malnutrition** in children and pregnant mothers: nutrients were provided in 2006 while in 2008 there was education on feeding habits by the kebele and wereda. In 2010 7 Health Promoters were trained on mother-child health conditions and how to screen for malnourished mothers and children; the quota provided was insufficient to cover the number in need. There was an accusation that HPs were taking oil and fafa intended for malnourished children.

Polio and anti-six **vaccinations** were reported as provided in the kebele in 2004; HEWs now provide them when they have the wherewithal. One HEW has been trained to provide delivery service but there was no equipment. They had been teaching on **improved childcare**, particularly keeping them clean and feeding them better; respondent women were well aware of what they should do although the researchers had doubts about whether practices had started to change.

In 2003 a respondent reported that no measures had been taken to improve the drinking water and that was still the case. Nearly everyone gets **unsafe drinking water** from one of the rivers: in 2003 a considerable number of children died from giardia while Acute Watery Disease, probably cholera, killed 4 people in 2008 and 3 in 2009. In 2003 wereda officials came and told people to **dig latrines** in 2003 'but there was no follow-up .. the river banks are serving as latrine'. There was more advice about latrine digging in 2007 and the HEWs have been following-up since 2009. All household and individual respondents said that they had dug and used latrines but it was difficult to establish the reality since the HEW warned those who did not that if they did not they would be excluded from other advantages such as food aid unless they dig latrines. Separate latrines for girls and boys were built at the school in 2005. The kebele office does not have a latrine.

HEWs reported giving education in 2010 on **separating animals and smoke from residential rooms**; some of those building new 'modern' houses had apparently done that.

People have been trained at various times on how to reduce malaria. In 2004 the wereda started to provide **bednets** with a plan to change them every four years. Officials said that low awareness led to people using them for other purposes and that rectangular nets did not fit easily into round tukuls. **DDT** spraying was planned to take place every 6 months. A number of community respondents said that the rate of **malaria had decreased**. There have been few changes in **curative health services** since 2003, although TB treatment seems now to be easily available. In 2003 a respondent said that considering the cost of transport and lack of medicine it was better to go to **private clinics**. Household respondents who had used health services had all (but one woman with a stingy husband who himself had used the private clinic) used a private clinic which was nearer than

the Health Centre, which was said to lack medicines and have staff who were rude to rural people. At the time of fieldwork there were no drugs or contraceptives available in the Health Post.

In 2007 an Alternative Basic Education school opened but closed within a few months for lack of teachers. Korodegaga **primary school** was built in 1990 providing Grades 1-4. It was considered as a satellite school but does not get supervision from the centre. In 2003 the school's operating expenses, apart from teachers' salaries, were covered by community contributions (10 *birr* per household) and the school had been given 5 hectares of land to plough to generate an income. Expansion of 2 classrooms and an office begun in 2005 with cash and labour contributions from the community was completed in 2009 and the school started Grade 5. A pre-school has started with no special teacher. The community has a plan to open up to Grade 8. The school does not seem to get good support from the wereda having a shortage of teachers, facilities and equipment and is still dependent on annual community contributions and rent from its land. There were more girls than boys in the school. There was a shift system and an unpopular self-contained system; the main concern of teachers was quality of education and having to chase absentee children and give them extra teaching in order to meet quotas. **Absenteeism** was high on market days and at harvest time. Drop-out was also high; for example in 2009 19 students dropped out including those who migrated to Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

In 2009 a new **satellite school** (Grades 1-2) was built in another village which reduced the numbers in Sefera school; overall the number of students attending primary school increased. Permission for re-entry of students who dropped out for herding was given and there was high re-entry; also reduced absenteeism and dropout.

Most students do not go to **secondary school** (in the wereda town) and those who start usually drop out. TVET was not available though there were at least two households with sons with university degrees. One of these recently got a government job giving parents and students an incentive.

***Conclusions:** The Health Post came later to Korodegaga than elsewhere and the HEWs face considerable challenges given the terrain and settlement pattern, the demand of the community for preventive rather than curative services, and the absence of drugs for simple diseases, contraceptives, and nutritional supplements for malnourished children and mothers. HEWs have created considerable 'awareness' in relation to preventive health but have yet to make most of it operational. Most people use a private clinic for curative health care and were critical of the quality of service in the government health centre.*

As a result of government and community investments primary school attendance has increased considerably since 2003 while absenteeism and dropout were reported to be lower. Only those with relatives in town or whose parents can afford rent can currently attend secondary school.

Social re/pro/duction interventions

There was no evidence that government has yet attempted to incorporate the community's **iddirs** (11 in 2003) into local government governance structures as has been happening elsewhere. Nor were there reports of involving local **Islamic religious leaders** in political mobilisations.

As elsewhere the government has a programme to eradicate '**Harmful Traditional Practices**'. Customary institutions in Korodegaga which have come under ideological and legal fire include a number of particular relevance to women: early marriage, marriage by abduction and exchange, polygyny, widow inheritance, marriage to a dead wife's sister, and the circumcision which ought to precede a first marriage. Training at wereda and zone levels took place in 2003 and 2004 and in 2005 religious leaders and elders, both men and women, attended a Conference at the Zone and then returned to train the community.

In 2005 the **New Family Law**, which made these practices illegal, was introduced and there was training on it in the ensuing two years. Kebele officials described what happened when local women had been trained to take action against the practice of female **circumcision**. 'They seized both the practitioner and female-harmed households at Sefera. Then the community became afraid of the action and abolished it.' A conflict among the 'Harmful Traditional Practitioner', the kebele officials and the women who had been trained ensued which was resolved by elders. In 2009 each kebele selected 7 people to control HTPs: an administrator, deputy, militia, elder, female teacher, school director and woman. It seems likely that the practices have reduced though respondents said there was hidden resistance to the laws relating to circumcision, inheritance, marriage and polygyny.

The new Family Law also gave women equal rights to land through **inheritance** from parents and during divorce. There were cases of both being implemented after appeals to the wereda.

There was no evidence that regular food aid through PSNP has reduced the efficacy of **informal social protection systems**.

***Conclusions:** Government has been active in trying to eliminate customary practices which they consider harmful and had some success though there was hidden resistance. Interventions do not seem to have affected community-initiated organisations such as iddirs or local social protection systems.*

Community management

Wereda de-centralisation was under way in 2003; most Korodegaga residents asked about it in 2003 said they knew nothing or little about it. Kebele leaders hoped it would lead to faster decisions. In 2005 the wereda was split into two 'at the request of the people' to make the administrative structures more accessible. Changes were reported in 2007 ('a reshuffling of the offices' hierarchy') and 2008 ('establishment of permanent committees in the wereda council'). Wereda officials were concerned that a structure that made 29 offices accountable to the wereda administration could prove inefficient. In 2009 women became members of the wereda cabinet.

Kebele structures also changed between 2003 and 2010. In 2005 the Got or **sub-kebele structure** was introduced; now 4 or 5 Geres (27-32 households) were responsible to each of the 3 Gots whereas before they were all responsible to the Chairman and the accountability 'was tiresome'. In 2008 as a result of the BPR process new committees were set up in health, education and development and membership of the **Cabinet** changed; three community members were replaced with a Development Agent, an HEW arrived 2009), and the school director. In 2009 a **kebele manager** was appointed 'to solve the complaint problems'. He was currently the Secretary of the EPRDF in the kebele.

There have been five **kebele chairmen** since 2003. Asked in 2003 why there had been changes in the last five years the responses included structural changes, 'not working properly', not attending kebele meetings and personal problems. Two chairmen left because of the 2005 election; the first apparently because the wereda didn't trust his political mobilisation and the second because he failed to mobilise the community to vote for the EPRDF. Chairman 3 left because he did not spend enough time at meetings. One of the earlier chairmen returned for a short period but left because the wereda changed its decision to give irrigable land to a Youth Co-operative and gave it to a foreign investor instead. Chairman 4 was removed in 2009 because of corruption; he gave irrigable land to his relatives and took some for himself. Chairman 5 was still in place at the time of the fieldwork.

Before the 2005 **election** there was considerable discussion about which party to vote for. In the kebele the winning party was called 'OBCO', which later became the Oromia National Congress, although many women voted for the EPRDF believing them to be in favour of women. By contrast in early 2010 there were no election-related discussions and no opposition party, although there was

reported anticipation that it would come and male respondents were keen that it be elected. As in 2005 many women were pro-EPRDF.

Following the 2005 election some respondents said that the government's policies had become 'flexible and available' and that there have been various trainings in the kebele to make people aware of their rights. One **good governance** step was towards greater involvement of women and youth in development through **government-linked organisations**. The kebele was involved in the establishment of the **Women's Association** with help from wereda trainers/ 200 members joined and were eligible for government credit for different business like irrigation, buying livestock, seed and fertiliser on credit. Community informants said that all women residents were members of the Association; non-members cannot get an identity card and cannot be included in interventions. Women who don't participate in meetings and community work will be excluded from community interventions. The kebele was also involved in setting up the **Youth Association** in 2007 but it became inactive when the members organised themselves into co-operatives to run different businesses. The leader has a role in bringing youth ID cards but otherwise the association was not important.

There were **EPRDF party cells** in the community with 20 members; one respondent said that at got level there could be about 45 cell members. Cells have a leader, vice-leader, co-operatives person and accountant. At the time of the research there was only one party (EPRDF) in the kebele. The kebele manager was the secretary and there were 14 organisers in the nine villages. Almost all landowners were members of the party; the numbers increased since 2008 as there has been strong mobilisation. Members contribute 9 birr a year: 6 birr for membership contribution and 3 birr for magazines and pamphlets. The two party organisers work with each cell which read the party literature to the members and control 'who participates in this or not'. Since last year the leaders check that this was done in each cell and report to the kebele manager. A key informant said that the propaganda was supervised every 15 days while he sends other people to teach, advise or exert external pressure in the locality every two or three days. In the meetings they talk about community development and criticise each and every institution and individual work performance.

The government was using a variety of means to **mobilise community members** to participate in development which include the use of extension agents, model farmers and model households and, particularly in the run up to the 2010 election, many kebele, association and party meetings for **awareness creation**. In 2010 they organised a **Festival of Experience-Sharing** in the kebele to which they invited people from other kebeles. They were hampered by the lack of sufficient resources to assist with the implementation of the ideas they were advising people to adopt. A number of respondents at all levels reported being 'fed up' with meetings and would rather spend the time working.

In addition to land **tax** community members were expected to make cash contributions on a regular (e.g. Red Cross) or one-off basis. Cash contributions were required for the construction of the school in 2004, the kebele office in 2006, the school expansion and health post in 2007, and the new school in 2008. In 2010 the land tax was waived because of the 2009 drought.

In 2007 there were changes in **security** management. The **peace committee** was introduced to change the role of elders so they participate in security issues with the militia and cabinet at got and gere levels. They claimed to have theft under control. In relation to **justice** in 2007 there was also a change in the role of social courts and elders. Land-related issues were given to the Cabinet though elders still participate in dispute resolution. The social court now only deals with civil cases; they have close relations with kebele leaders and traditional dispute resolvers.

Conclusions: *Since 2003 there have been considerable changes in the community management field. Wereda de-centralisation, increasingly dense kebele structures, and the merging of government and party structures have established a structure for development and change which in 2010 was mobilising ideas but with insufficient resources to put the ideas into practice. It was likely that male*

members of the community would not have voted for the EPRDF had there been an opposition candidate, although women were reported as supporting the EPRDF, as they had done in 2005, because of improvements in their rights and opportunities.

Community members contributed considerable amounts of labour and cash for infrastructure for service development and, in the case of the schools, have taken the lead in trying to upgrade the school.

There were changes in security and justice structures to incorporate elders into government structures.

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

Following the drought in 2003 government officials were said to have 'initiated a programme of economic reform'; the community was made aware that they had to work hard to survive natural events. In the ensuing years wereda officials have put a lot of emphasis on 'awareness creation' and, more recently, conversion to the revolutionary democracy/developmental state ideology. There was resistance from community members with respondents suggesting that government should consult and get farmers' consensus before implementing policies.

Conclusions: *There was a cultural disconnect between elements of government ideology and community cultural repertoires.*

Inequality interventions

Structures of inequality involve wealth-poverty differences, gender differences, age differences (adults, children, youth, elderly), clan differences and residence status in the community.

There was a **poverty focus** in the PSNP and accompanying NGO-supported OFSP provision of livestock. However 70% of households in the community accessed PSNP including rich households 'with connections' while some poor households were excluded; and the same was true for the pro-poor OFSP interventions. There were no interventions targeting very poor and destitute people and no report of access to free health care. There were also no interventions to provide a voice for poor people.

Interventions for **children** included schools, vaccination, and the introduction (though inadequate implementation) of a programme to provide nutritious food to malnourished children. No interventions for very poor children.

Youth - about a quarter of Korodegaga's population was aged 17-29, over half of these being male. Government distribution of communal land described above has reduced landlessness among young men and some organised in co-operatives have accessed resources.

The government has been active in trying to eliminate HTPs which affect **women's health** and **economic security** and provided considerable training to make women aware of their **rights**. They have facilitated NGO **credit** provision (see above) and included women in **wereda and kebele roles**: 50 of the 100 members of kebele council were women (since 2006), women joined the wereda cabinet (2008), and a woman was assigned to each wereda sector to 'control gender equality' in 2009. While women do not hold powerful positions in the kebele they seem to be able to get things done (e.g. inheritance of parents' land, land for a women's co-operative) by appealing to the Women's Affairs office at the wereda level. Six women were identified as active in the community: SC (42) the Women's leader; TA (32) educated and a model family on health about to start working as a Health Promoter; BL (40) a wealthy model farmer; CG (42) respected, a good speaker, Kebele Women's Affairs, Wereda Councillor; TH respected and a good speaker who was on the PTA committee and KL (18) educated and a good speaker.

PSNP 'direct support' was provided for those unable to work, including **elderly** people; for some it was their only income. One elderly woman claimed her recent emergency food aid was taken by an elite farmer.

There were thirteen **clans** in the community with different degrees of economic power and social networks with some being disliked and excluded. People **not considered as kebele residents** were not allowed to participate in any organisations or access development programmes, though they may be included in PSNP if they live in the house of a resident.

***Conclusions:** The government was active and had some success in reducing general gender and inter-generational inequality although power still remains firmly in the hands of older adult men. There were interventions to improve the human capital of children. Little was done by the wereda to stop community elites from diverting food aid and packages meant for poor people to themselves and their connections, though one kebele leader was removed for allocating irrigable land to himself and relatives. The vulnerability of elderly people, despised clans and those deemed to be non-residents was not addressed through any intervention.*

Yetmen

Community public goods interventions

Rural Yetmen, which was villagised during the Derg, was adjacent to the small town of Yetmen through which runs an allweather **road**. **Electricity** and a new piped **water** service reached the town in 1997 and some nearby rural households have had access to these, although reportedly less since relations between the rural and urban communities deteriorated following disagreement about the siting of a planned new high school.

In 2008 a **Health Centre** was built in the town and the centre in a neighbouring kebele was demoted to a Health Post, though it retained a nurse following community complaints. The town has a junior school (Grades 1-8) and a **high school** was planned.

The mobile network reached some places in 2005 and people can easily access **mobile phones**. Most houses have radios and one household has a TV; there were TVs in tea-shops and bars in the town.

The NRM package for **environmental protection** included watershed development, terracing/gully treatment, seedling preparation and distribution, and reforestation through garden/field tree planting. The NRM target for 2009/10 was 300 ha of terracing/gully treatment to be carried out through 45 days community work involving all males and females over 18. Equipment (spades, hoes etc) was made available and training conducted. However, since the good governance package stopped fines and imprisonment in 2005 people were reluctant to participate in community labour and mobilisation through party cells and development teams declined following the imprisonment of the kebele chairman in October 2009. The land was flat so there was little erosion and people have resisted making terraces. They were involved in constructing check dams and gully work in 2008. There was no communal forest; people grow trees, mainly eucalyptus, in their backyards. Party members planted trees for the Ethiopian Millennium in 2008 though almost all disappeared due to lack of proper care.

With regard to **watershed management** in 2008 three community ponds were dug for cattle, but only one household reservoir exists.

***Conclusions:** Yetmen residents have easy access to urban services and modern communications. Agricultural production was not affected by environmental degradation.*

Livelihoods interventions

In 2003 a group of 80 people supported by the wereda agricultural office, started **irrigation** via a river dam on grazing land; farmers wanting to use the land for grazing appealed to the Regional agricultural bureau and the irrigation was stopped. In 2004 extension workers again introduced the idea of irrigation and in 2006 a few individuals bought motor pumps and started producing using irrigation. Now there were more than 25 pumps in the kebele, credit available to buy them and support and advice from the DA Crops. Now being wealthy was associated with having irrigated land.

In 2003 the extension service was 'introducing market-oriented production' for **rainfed agriculture** providing education on methods of cultivation, sowing and the application of **fertiliser**; the productivity of selected seeds was reported to be higher. The DA introduced the ideas of planting twice on the same land using the Broad Bedmaker (BBM) plough, inter-cropping and planting in rows. In 2004 the ideas of **compost** and **water harvesting** were introduced. In 2005 the Good Governance package prevented officials from forcing farmers to do things they did not want to do. In 2008 some farmers produced compost and started producing twice from the same land growing barley in June followed by chickpeas, using the BBM plough. In 2008 the use of bio-fertiliser and watershed management were introduced. In both 2008 and 2010 very high volumes of tef were harvested with most being traded. Fertiliser credit was removed last year; there were reports that poor farmers did not use enough credit and this was exacerbated by the removal of credit.

In 2003 the **livestock** extension service introduced improved breeds, fattening, forage development and modern and transitional beehive packages and many farmers started fattening. In 2005 and 2006 there were outbreaks of anthrax and increased use of the vet clinic. In 2008 the vet introduced cattle breeding by insemination and external parasite treatment to keep animals healthy and produce quality skins for the market; he also provided internal parasite treatment to improve fattening. There was a claim that more than 70% of farmers had breed cows by using their own or other farmers' bulls. Fattening and milk-selling decreased recently due to shortage of forage.

In 2004 the idea of a **Farmers' Training Centre** was introduced. It was completed in 2007 but was not operational as it had collapsed, there were no training materials and no trained Crop and Animal DAs in the kebele. Some **model farmers** and a few others were interested in the demonstrative aspects of the FTC but most were not. In 2008 World Vision trained extension workers and farmers in irrigation and animal husbandry and provided improved seeds and irrigation equipment.

Landlessness and shortage of **land** was reported as a big concern in 1995 and things were now worse. There was re-distribution in 1997 when former Derg bureaucrats lost land and none was given to their children; the latter was rectified in 2004 when land confiscated from dead people with no children was distributed among the children. In 2006 a new inheritance law was implemented entitling people to transfer their land to their children or any of their relatives; land measurement for certification was introduced. In 2008 a land desk was established and in 2009 a land arbitration court to settle land-related disputes. In 2009 land rights certificates were issued. There were currently many landless young couples in the community and a lot of land leasing and renting.

The irrigation farms have brought increased opportunities for **daily labour** and petty trade (women selling vegetables in the market). There were not enough opportunities for young people who dropout after Grade 10 and some **migrate** to look for work elsewhere.

Amhara Credit and Savings Institution was the main source of credit for farmers for fattening, grain/vegetable trade, and buying irrigation pumps. In 2003 the Service **Co-operative** was still providing inputs on **credit** but this was terminated in 2008. In 2003 a Farmers' Savings and Credit Association was formed with 56 members; it currently has 172 members; at the moment most of the savings were lying idle as members borrow only a small proportion. Micro-**credit** was provided to organised youths organised in 5 **co-operatives** in Yetmen town but 4 dissolved and the fifth was

being run by one woman. A Dairy Co-operative was set up in 2004 for milk marketing; membership recently declined to 12 due to lack of marketing opportunities and forage problems.

Conclusions: *There has been considerable economic growth in Yetmen since 2003 associated with increased use of irrigation, good tef harvests and rising grain prices, the introduction of new technologies such as the BBM plough and planting in lines, and new cattle breeds, fattening and milk production. There were few employment opportunities for landless youth even when they have completed Grade 10.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

There have been considerable **lifestyle changes** associated with increased incomes and copying of urban lifestyles. For example, in 2004 people started doing their washing at home using well water rather than going to the river and among men the wearing of modern trousers became common. In 2005 a new **house** type called *temelash* started to be built and people started to use factory oils for cooking. In 2006 jerrycans became common for water-fetching and clothing improved. In 2007 'battery-bulbs' were introduced and factory made areke and soft drinks became popular; people were buying better quality household goods. The following year a new kind of torch which could be hung from the ceiling was introduced and some women started using improved stoves.

The health clinic in a neighbouring *kebele* was demoted to a **Health Post** but retained its nurse. Services were free. The extension programme was launched in Yetmen in 2007 and now there were 16 packages. There were 2 **Health Extension Workers** in the *kebele* and a number of Health Promoters. Wereda officials said that **sanitation** targets have not been achieved due to 'awareness problems' and the cost of making the changes. These packages were first implemented by *kebele* officials who said they had benefited but that no more than a quarter of residents had made and used the things recommended. Most residents get **water** from wells in their compounds or nearby taps. There was occasional use of the river if wells dry up in the dry season. There was no government intervention.

Family planning was available in 2003; in research at that time women said the number of babies a woman had on average had reduced to 7 with 5 surviving. The 2004 survey showed that Yetmen had a lower population proportion of children than three other sites. In 2010 contraceptives were said to be widely used in pill or injection form and since the Health Centre was built in Yetmen in 2008 access had improved.

The new Health Centre, opened in 2008, provides a better service for pregnancy and delivery. It was estimated that around half of **pregnant mothers** go for checks at the clinic; there was no payment for follow-up but there was for drugs. Poor women only go if they get sick. The centre provides delivery at any time.

In relation to **nutrition** in 2008 HEWs started teaching that children should eat the same quality of food as their fathers (not so usually) and some had started this. From 2006 children started to eat vegetables. Vaccination for newborn infants was available monthly and many respondents said that children were regularly taken for vaccination. Childcare was said to have improved as people were having fewer children.

The first outbreak of **malaria** occurred in Yetmen in 2005. The following year stagnant water places were cleaned and mosquito nets distributed. Since then it was thought by most, though not all, that those few people who have had malaria have contracted it elsewhere. There was still some use of traditional medicine and for **mental illness**, which was reported to be on the increase, people use 'holy water'. The new **Health Centre** which theoretically has five sections with responsible people had a shortage of human power and drugs. People were sent to buy medicine from the **private clinic** and significant numbers of people go to it in preference to the Health Centre. One informant said that the (demoted) health clinic in Zebch used to have better drugs than the new Health Centre.

World Vision was supporting a kindergarten in urban Yetmen. Yetmen has had an elementary **school** (Grades 1-8) since the 1960s. The self-contained system was introduced in 2006 but parents complained and it was eventually stopped; automatic promotion was stopped in 2007 following parental complaints. In that year the number of girls at school equalled the number of boys. Also many students had to repeat Grade 7 because of the change of medium of instruction to English. In 2010 officials said that only 10 children were not enrolled in school; mostly they were poor.

Absenteeism was reported to be common in those attending Grades 1-4 as children did not resist when parents kept them for work; those in higher grades would resist. **Drop-out was** a problem; in 2010 80 children enrolled in September 2009 had dropped out. Teachers expected 50 to return. The opening of satellite schools in neighbouring kebeles improved the teacher-pupil ratio.

High school attendance in nearby towns increased between 2002 and 2010 leading to increasing numbers of unemployed Grade 10 completers. Only those who can cover the costs of living in town can send children to high school.

In 2007 new **TVET** Centres in the wider area led to increased attendance; in 2009 TVET Centres opened in the nearby towns leading to further increases in attendance, although people complained about the choice of subjects and poor quality of the education. A university recently opened in Debre Markos; there were a number of **university graduates** from Yetmen.

***Conclusions:** The standard of living of many people in Yetmen has risen since 2003 reflected in improved housing, household assets, consumer goods, and nutrition. Health and education services have improved. People have resisted implementing the HEWs' sanitation packages.*

Social re/pro/duction interventions

Desh in the kebele mobilised the community twice to resist government decisions. In 2004 the kebele leader tried to abolish lavish commemorative feasts by arresting those who held them (which happened in Yetmen). Following fighting and arrests at a ceremony in a neighbouring got the kebele leader was expelled from his Desh and ostracised by everyone; he had to resign, apologise and compensate those who had been imprisoned.

In 2008 in order to mobilise community members to dig cattle ponds the kebele leadership used iddir who threatened fines for non-attendance. Also more widely urban iddir and rural Deshs were telling people to resist World Vision interventions and attempts to convert people to Protestantism. Later that year Yetmen Desh mobilised a demonstration against the location of the new high school on rural communal grazing land. After this wereda officials told kebele leaders they were no longer to use iddir and Desh to mobilise the community for development activities. Government tried to use religious leaders to try to persuade people to comply with some interventions.

The government was active in trying to abolish Harmful Traditional Practices affecting women. In 2003 they banned marriage between people with a big age gap. Training against female **circumcision** was provided by kebele officials and in school in 2005 and 2006. In 2010 a number of mothers said it was possible to choose whether or not to circumcise daughters and that the custom would eventually die out. The Women's Association followed up on the question of **early marriage** in 2007 and in 2008 couples intending to marry had to come to the wereda for age checks bringing photos to prevent parents from sending older daughters to the check. Teachings about the **new family law** were better attended by men than women.

The community has resisted abolition of expensive death ceremonies and extracting milk teeth was still common.

There seems to be little change in the local informal social protection system though one respondent suggested that reciprocity had become more important – 'tomorrow would be on me'.

Conclusions: *The community has mobilised through community-initiated organisations to resist some government policies and actions; these relate to death ceremonies and control of sub-kebele communal land.*

Community management

Since 2003 nine new sectoral offices were added to the wereda structure. It was said that BPR had a high potential for achieving good governance.

In 2008 the kebele **Cabinet** was re-structured; 3 farmers' representatives were replaced with kebele sector experts – school director, DA and HEW. The role of **kebele manager** was added in 2008; he was a full-time employee from outside the community and has no vote though he can make suggestions.

There were three **sub-kebeles**; Yetmen was one. There was daily communication between Yetmen sub-kebele leaders and the **kebele** leaders. Each sub-kebele has sub-committees with duties: for example the education committee convinces residents to send their children to school while the health committee inform about vaccination and assist in the construction of latrines and improved stoves. The relationship with the sub-kebele administration was not strong. There were 10 **development teams** in the got each supervised by a principal and an assistant leader. There were 15 arms-bearing members of the got militia, although their arms were taken away following the confrontation over the siting of the new high school.

There were four changes in **kebele chair** between 2003 and 2009. One was removed by the community following his attempt to abolish death ceremony feasts while the last one was imprisoned for murder in September 2009 and hadn't been replaced by February 2009.

There were informal reports that the CUD won the 2005 **election** in Yetmen; in 2010 it was reported that ANDM 'finally won'. Following the election the ANDM called an intensive Farmers' Conference to identify public grievances and correct mistakes which led to the **good governance package**; participation in community work and meetings was made voluntary and dependent on persuasion rather than coercion. There was a programme of 'mass political indoctrination' of farmers. The political exclusion of the Derg bureaucrats was ended and in the 2008 kebele and wereda election they were presented as ANDM/EPRDF candidates and won, as there were no opposition parties. Voter registration for the 2010 election was slow at the time of fieldwork.

While there were attempts to make the youth and women organise themselves in co-operatives the **Youth Association** and **Women's Association** were not active and becoming weaker and weaker. In 2009 a **youth league** was set up which only party members can join. It has 42 male and 10 female members. So far no benefit has been obtained but they believe it will help them to get land and credit in the future to enable organised youths to run their own irrigation, fattening and dairy businesses.

EPRDF party structures have become increasingly entwined with kebele structures. Before the 2005 election mainly poor and young people were recruited as members but after it the party recruited only those who managed their households and families well, had more than two oxen, and were respected by the community. Until 2006 there was only kebele level party organisation but in 2007 it was organised at got levels in Hiwas (cells). At the time of fieldwork there were 4 party cells in Yetmen got: 3 for farmers and 1 for government workers. The kebele party organisation has 4 leaders; from 2009 the kebele chairman and vice-chairman were also the party chairman and vice-chairman. The main activities of party members were recruiting new members, helping all cells hold regular study meetings to read newspapers and discuss party policies and development packages, and becoming exemplary in the implementation of party/government policies. Members were required to be the first users of new interventions. Party members said that no-one had joined the party due to 'devotion'.

New information and ways of working come from the wereda; sometimes they call people for training and sometimes they visit the kebele. Since 2009 assigned wereda Cabinet members come without warning to evaluate kebele performance and give directives. Each DA prepares weekly, monthly and yearly plan implementation schedules and submits them to the DA supervisor who in turn submits them to the kebele. It was expected that implementation will be more than the planned quota. The manager monitors and evaluates the weekly implementation performance.

Land **tax** and other cash contributions have grown, particularly in the last two years. In early 2010 farmers paid land tax plus contributions of 5 birr for the Red Cross, 5 birr for sports, 13 birr for highway security watchers, 12 birr for the church, double of their current land tax for Amhara Development Organization (the highest land tax in Yetmen was 170 birr for 6 Timad of land holding); also party members pay 8 birr, and youth association members 3 birr per year. There were also demands for contributions for capital expenditures such as the TVET centre in Bichena. Community members complained that tax was collected during harvest when grain prices were at their lowest

Wereda officials said Yetmen had worse than average **security** problems including highway robbers, crop thieves and violent inter-personal fights. Security activities were co-ordinated by a kebele advisory committee consisting of all Cabinet members, one religious leader, one elder, and the policeman. The **militia** were generally involved in security maintenance including watching the crops to prevent night theft. There were 3 dispute mediators (**Peace Committee**) in each got to arbitrate inter-person and inter-household disputes and report to the community police though they were not functional as a committee.

In 2008 the role of the **social court** was reduced to arbitration; they no longer had jurisdiction over land-related cases or marital disputes. An independent land arbitration court was set up in 2008.

***Conclusions:** Since 2003 the number of wereda offices has doubled and sub-kebele structures have deepened. Kebele and party activities were hard to disentangle, although there was lack of enthusiasm for the party. Given economic growth and a history of opposition to government, wereda officials have not been able to mobilise community members to do things they do not want to do despite using the usual methods including extension, models, development teams, and party cells. Taxes and contributions have increased recently. Changes to security arrangements have not yet reduced theft and violence.*

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

Following the 2005 election there was a concerted effort to convert farmers to a 'developmental state' approach to development which involves following instructions from above; this effort has not had much success. Wereda officials said that Yetmen resists persuasion efforts 'and was much worse than other kebeles in this regard'. **Revolutionary democracy** as practised in Yetmen has two aspects: goals and means. The overall goal for the peasantry was to develop the human resources of peasants and improve their living standards. The main activities were infrastructure development, modernising smallholder agriculture and livestock rearing including irrigation, a preventive health service to reduce diseases, primary, secondary, TVET and university education all with production-oriented curricula, and developing a modern security and justice sector. The rights of the people were important, including the rights of women; the rights of individuals were associated with inequality.

The means for achieving these development goals were a mix of authoritarian and top-down (targets, evaluations and demotion), collective (particular emphasis on co-operatives and leagues) and indoctrination through meetings, training development team leaders, calling door-to-door, and party cell discussions based on newsletters, policy papers and newspapers sent to cells.

Inequality interventions

The average wealth of farmers in Yetmen grew during the period but it was likely that **inequality** increased which seemed to have happened between 1994 and 2004. The ERHS data showed an average increase in wealth of 25% together with an increase in the proportion of households in consumption poverty of from 7% to 15%. During the 2005 research people talked of 'class formation'. Also, the policy of focusing resources on Model Farmers who were richer and more successful, was likely to have increased their wealth.

There were some interventions targeted at **poor people**. From the government side only landless youth or very poor people were entitled to micro-enterprise credit. Dormitories for 22 poor female students were constructed in Bichena. World Vision provided breed cows and sheep to some poor households who said this had improved their lives. They also provided educational materials to poor children. There were a few children who did not attend school: from poor households or who had been sent to work in other households as herders. One official said such parents should be fined.

Interventions for **children** included schools and vaccination. The new wereda programme to provide employment opportunities for **youth** through co-operative organisation and micro-credit had no impact on Yetmen's youth and was reportedly facing problems in surrounding areas.

Attempts to bring **women** into power to increase their participation in development have not been that successful. Land registration to include wives in certification began in 2008; men who tried to exclude their wives were told they would not get a certificate unless they did. The land distributed to bureaucrats' children included daughters. There has been considerable teaching that girls should attend school and currently they were the majority in the elementary school. Numbers attending secondary school increased and there was positive discrimination in access to TVET; female students need less points than males.

Most of the **elderly** have land so do not become totally dependent on others though some give the land to their children. Dependent old people reportedly do not get good access to food, clothing and health care. There were no government or community institutions for looking after old people; it was up to relatives. On the way to the church there were around 20 beggars some of whom were old. **Mentally ill** people do not have access to modern services and there were no programmes for **disabled people**.

'Slaves' and craftsmen who were customarily **excluded** now have access to land and some of them were wealthy; however they were still considered inferior by many farmers.

***Conclusions:** Since 2005 development interventions have been targeted at the richer members of the community as they were more likely to be successful in responding to them. Interventions aimed at poor people include micro-credit, provision of livestock and educational materials, and school dormitories. The programme to help unemployed youth has not yet met with success. The government has been active in promoting the equality of women through education, legislation on land rights and HTPs, and bringing women into government and progress has been made. The government takes no responsibility for the wellbeing of elderly, mentally ill or disabled people. They have continued the Derg policy of equal rights for previously excluded 'castes'.*

Turufe

Community public goods interventions

Rural-urban linkages with Kuyera and Shashemene have increased since 2003; they involve employment, sale of crops, areke, milk etc, health and education services. In 2010 a very small bit of the northern part was made part of 01 town kebele of Kuyera. There was a dirt **road** from Turufe to the main road with carts drawn by horses or donkeys and bajaj for transport. During the rains the

road can be difficult; recently the roads were not regularly repaired through public works. A cement and stone bridge was built over the river to give access to a neighbouring kebele where the Orthodox Church is.

There has been an increase in **public buildings**: new school, health post, grinding mill (2007); 2 new mosques, Farmers' Training Centre (2009). **Electricity** reached Turufe in 2007 and was distributed to people's homes in 2008; only those who can afford to pay have it. In 2009 the community started to get electric light. The **mobile phone** network reached Turufe in 2005. The water points were expanded to 5 in 2006.

Communal **forest** land was allocated to a youth-co-operative in 2008; it was expected that this would protect the forest area and enable planting of new seedlings. During the Derg there was construction of terraces to prevent erosion; this stopped in 1992 and there was no mention in 2010 of such work.

***Conclusions:** Part of Turufe has become a suburb of Kuyera town which in turn has become a suburb of Shashemene. Town linkages have provided growing employment and trade opportunities and access to services. Public buildings in Turufe increased since 2003 and now those who can afford them have access to electricity and mobile phones. Community work for infrastructure and environment maintenance decreased during the period.*

Livelihoods interventions

Starting in 2006 farmers got access to new output markets and the community sold more of its products, some said in order to pay land tax and other regular contributions. Even more was sold in 2007 said to be for payment for fertilisers. Agricultural extension work, including new crops, was introduced in 2006. In 2007 improved wheat seeds were used by 8 Model Farmers who got about double their usual product. In 2008 the wereda began training farmers, sending them to farming centres. By 2010 widespread use of selected seed had increased yields and profits.

Erratic rain in 2008 brought drought and cholera to Turufe and **food aid** was provided for the first time to 156 households who received 100 kgs per month per household plus oil for 4 months. There were allegations that not all registered for aid received it and that some had been given to those 'close to the kebele'. Seed was distributed the following year to those who needed it.

In 2010 Turufe had no DA for natural resources and the livestock DA was assigned to a neighbouring area. The extension workers worked through **Model Farmers** to promote ideas and practices in particular packages with the idea that there will be a demonstration effect. Most model farmers were male and among the wealthier, literate and better connected. Some other farmers complained they had privileged access to inputs provided freely or on credit and even that the extension services were aimed only at them. However DAs have recently started relying on demonstration plots rather than visiting model farmers and stopped providing credit for **fertiliser** and **seed**. In 2008 Model Farmers made compost which was taken up in 2010 as fertiliser prices rose. Turufe's **Farmers' Training Centre** was built in 2009 but it lacks materials and equipment and was not currently in use. Also in 2009 a new manual thresher was used by Model Farmers who rented them on an hourly basis.

In 2008 bull fattening was started by a few farmers and, through encouragement from the DA with help from wereda ARD experts, a selected breed of milk cow was sold to 4 farmers who feed them at home. These farmers have contracts to sell milk in Kuyera which provide a lot of money.

There has been no **land** re-distribution since the Derg and landlessness of youth was a serious problem. Some communal and grazing land was allocated to youth co-operatives on instructions from the wereda and against some community resistance. The kebele management allocated 15 hectares to an **investor** for a private farm to produce vegetables and fruit; he was seeking final

permission from the wereda investment department at the time of fieldwork. Land registration and certification was completed in 2006 and the Oromia Family Law was implemented with some successful claims related to female inheritance and equal rights on divorce at the wereda. New rules for renting/leasing were introduced: contracts for 3 years can be agreed via the kebele and for longer via the wereda.

Off-farm opportunities for landless youth began to rise in 2007 as a result of commercial investment in Shashemene, which accelerated in following years. Girls began roadside selling of tea and sugarcane for people visiting markets in 2007. Seasonal **migration** began in 2006 and has accelerated since; some young women worked in the Ziway flower farms. A few youths have gone to the Middle East and the US through the DV.

Three youth **co-operatives** (155 youths in total) were given communal land for forestry, seedlings and vegetables and fruit. In 2007 a Savings and Credit Association (Edo Lencha) was organised by a local NGO for the household heads they had supported. In 2008 a micro-credit institution started to provide credit to women on a group basis. There was a **marketing co-operative** that joined the Shashemene Farmers' Union in 2010 by paying 5,000 *birr* giving them access to buy fertiliser on credit for sale to the community.

***Conclusions:** Turufe has seen economic growth as a result of the use of selected seeds and fertiliser by many farmers, breed cattle for fattening and milk production for a few farmers, new employment opportunities, including migration for work in flower farms for women, and access to new output markets. New income opportunities for landless young men were provided by commercial investment in Shashemene, limited overseas migration, and government-supported youth co-operatives.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

In 2003 fewer houses (40% in 2004) had **corrugated iron roofs** and only employees of Shashemene hospital had access to **electric light**. By 2010 many houses had corrugated iron roofs and many had started to use electric light at night. In 2009 a few people started to use electricity for TV and radio. Making dungcakes decreased since 2009 as households began to make compost due to fertiliser price increase. Other **lifestyle changes** included the introduction of new-style stoves, wooden furniture, modern household utensils and mobile phones. Young men and women spend money on fashionable clothes and sneakers while children buy sweets and powdered soft drinks.

Informants said that the **population** size had increased a lot since 2003 though household sizes were thought to have decreased as many youngsters left to marry they started having their own children. By 2008 many wives were said to be using **contraceptives**, sometimes not telling their husbands; some resistance from Muslims was reported. In 2009 the HEWs mobilised about 50 households in a campaign to use Dipo.

The **Health Post** was built in 2006 and because Turufe was a big kebele had three **Health Extension Workers**. In 2010 the HP had no scales to weight children, no fridge to store vaccines and no electric light making night-time deliveries problematic. There were also no painkillers or malaria pills and a shortage of contraceptives; apparently some farmers said that without medicine the post should be closed. HEWs began health education in 2007 on – HTPs, sanitation, FP, STDS, HIV/AIDS. NGOs which had been providing education were involved; now their programmes were phased out.

During the 2008 drought **nutritious** infant food was provided after screening; about half the households benefited. Vitamins were provided every six months at the Health Post starting in 2007. There was a wereda campaign against the practice of feeding husbands first with reports of some attitude change.

The Health Post started to provide **pre- and post- natal health care services** in 2007; pregnant mothers started to go to the HP if they felt ill. Vaccination was said to be appreciated. Childcare was

said to have improved since 2003. In 2005 a women and **child rights'** committee was established to receive reports of violation of rights. The committee has an office at the kebele and were available twice a week. Also, if they observe or hear of child violation or negligence they take measures. One reported outcome that children were resisting herding cattle claiming it was against their rights.

There was **piped water** in the centre of Turufe but others were still using the **river** in 2010. Turufe was struck by cholera in 2005 and this became an annual event. Water treatments were distributed free at times. There were also cases of giardia and typhoid in 2009 but many community members refused to buy water treatments to avoid these illnesses. HEWs claimed that by 2008 they were more integrated into the community and that **sanitation** awareness had a deep root. **Latrine** construction began in 2006 as a result of the cholera epidemic and continued. In 2009 the wereda organised a campaign involving iddir and religious leaders, elders and other community representatives and an NGO assisted with awareness-raising and provided wood for some households. In Turufe there were said to be only two households that had not dug a latrine; evidence on use was not provided.

There were reports of increased use of **modern medicine** by 2004; the number of traditional medical practitioners had decreased, though not the use of holy water. Those who went to the clinic with **cholera** were cured and the community became more aware of the importance of seeking health treatment immediately. The number of people taking **anti-TB** drugs increased in 2008; in that year there was a belief that there were **PLWHAs** in the community though no-one admitted it. In 2010 wereda data showed that the number had increased but only 6 had disclosed their status. While there were cases of **malaria** in the community the Health Post had no malaria drugs as the wereda had not categorised the kebele as malaria-prone. In 2008 the HEW tried to get drugs from the wereda but failed.

In 2006 the nearby Shashemene Hospital became a **referral hospital** when a new hospital was built in the town. Plans to turn the old hospital into a nurses' school were changed following a local petition to Regional officials. In 2010 the kebele set aside some communal land for a **Health Centre** and were planning to ask the wereda health bureau to start construction soon. People have been using the hospital and mission health centres (2) in Kuyera where the service was said to be good but crowded. Wealthier households can afford to use **private clinics** in the towns said to provide better quality care. The system of **exemptions for the poor** became problematic with the introduction of cost recovery and a related increase in bureaucracy.

In 2009 grade zero for under 7s started though there were no additional teachers. Richer parents were sending children to kindergartens in town. In 2009 a new primary school was opened using ABE text books produced by PACT (USAID).

Some parents sent children to **primary school** in 1995 and numbers had increased by 2003. In 2007 two new schools constructed by NGOs started operation and Wetera primary school expanded to Grade 8 with some assistance from a Catholic mission. The quality of Kuyera school was said to be better. In 2008 residents were asked for a contribution to pay salaries of teachers and guards; this was now an annual contribution. In 2008 full-day learning was introduced but stopped after a week following parental complaints. In 2009 the government took over the NGO schools; there were more girls than boys in primary schools. By 2010 there were reports that children were going to school at the right age.

In 2007 Kuyera school started Grades 11 and 12 yet a relatively small number of children enrolled after Grade 8, and a lot dropped out in Grades 9 and 10, despite proximity, notably because of late age at entry they were adults by the time they reach Grade 10. Some richer children went to **private school** in Shashemene.

In 2003, when TVET was introduced, there were no students at technical colleges or universities. In 2007 a few kebele officials and teachers started to attend **private colleges** at weekends at their own

expense. In 2009 there were a few boys attending **TVET** in Shashemene, two (male) university students, and at least one girl attending a private college in Shashemene. An NGO which supported selected children through school paid for them to go to private colleges if they did not get a good enough Grade 10 result.

Conclusions: *In 2003 Turufe lifestyles were already relatively modern due to its proximity to Shashemene. Nowadays most people were living an urban rather than rural lifestyle. Curative health services were relatively good in 2003 and have not changed much though there was said to be a greater demand for them from Turufe residents. Wereda statistics showed considerably more people living with HIV/AIDS in the kebele than the six who had revealed their status. The Health Post, opened in 2007, lacked equipment and simple medicines in 2010; its main impact has been on mother-child health services. The use of contraceptives has increased and almost every household was said to have a latrine. Nearly all children attend primary school, many of the younger ones have enrolled at the 'right age' making it more likely that they will complete secondary school. There were a number of TVET and university (male) students in 2010.*

Social re/pro/duction interventions

The number of **iddirs** increased between 2003 and 2010; government involved iddirs and **religious leaders** in campaigns against HTPs and to build latrines.

The wereda was involved in awareness raising and implementation of government policies against **Harmful Traditional Practices** affecting women. **Polygyny** was discouraged in the Oromia family law put in place in 2004 and there were reports that some Muslim men were agreeing to having only one wife. However, informants said that polygyny was still in existence in 2010, though there was said to be a reduction in abduction, girl exchange between families (preventing choice of marriage partner) and forced widow inheritance. 'Eloping' had become common. By 2008 early marriage was only practised secretly and rarely. By 2009 it was said that bridewealth had decreased a lot becoming a matter of formality with the family of the girl not insisting that the promised amount be paid. The law stating that on divorce wives should share the property and claim additional land for children staying with her has been implemented in the court.

In 2007 **female circumcision** was denounced by 'the government and the community' and traditional circumcision practitioners were outlawed. An HTPs Prevention Committee was set up and legal advisers were trained. The establishment of the committee frightened many people from doing what they think right for cultural reasons. One retired health professional was imprisoned for 3 months and fined for circumcising a girl. Medical practices involving cutting were also said to have decreased. In 2009 circumcision for Oromia girls, which takes place a month or so before her wedding, was said to be reduced because it was difficult to conceal and also girls were themselves refusing. Kembetas and Wolayitas circumcise girls at a younger age and were said to be still doing it secretly. Amharas circumcise girls when they were 7 days old 'so it was not possible to follow'.

In 2003 the HTPs of not working on saints' days, lengthy funerals, and conspicuous consumption for feasts were in place. In 2004 there was awareness raising in the mosque of the problems lavish death-related expenditures cause for the remaining family. In 2008 some improvements in these areas were reported with iddir apparently agreeing to limit the number of day service to individual members to 3.

The informal social protection system was reported to be little changed since 2003: kin, neighbours and iddirs and mehabers also played roles. However, in 2003 people said that support from wider kin had been reducing over time with people depending on closer family and money during illness. Unemployment was a burden on the family and supporting the destitute becoming 'unthinkable'. Religions were not much involved. The Orthodox Christians contribute cash / food during the Christmas, Easter and new year and feed the disabled and aged people around the church. The

Muslims also do the same during Id Alfeter. No support was given to the destitute and unemployed youth. Following drought and cholera the government distributed NGO-provided food aid in 2008 and seed support in 2009.

Conclusions: *Government has been involving community-initiated organisations in its campaigns. There has been some success in reducing HTPs perhaps more due to fear of punishment than change of attitudes, though the latter was more likely among young people. Informal social protection seems little changed since 2003 although by then the customary system had already been affected by 'individualism'.*

Community management

There was reportedly not much change in the **wereda structure** between 2003 and 2010. There was a Council, Cabinet, Standing Committees, and Sector Bureaus. A change from 2003 was that sectors now have vice-heads. The 2009 BPR process led to division of the Administrative and Finance Office into two. Also, parallel to the wereda Administrator was the Political Branch Office.

Changes made in 2007 include the appointment of a **speaker** to the kebele **Council**, appointment of a **kebele manager** and an increase in the number of **Cabinet** members from four to seven (2007). Five of the Cabinet positions were named: kebele chairman, DA, HEW, school representative, and the manager. In 2003 there were only three committees. Now there were five: health, education, development, peace and security and political organisation.

The kebele has had four **chairmen** since 2003. The first was promoted to be a government employee in 2005. The next resigned in 2006 'for personal reasons'. The third left in 2009 due to inefficiency and the first chairman was brought back temporarily 'to pacify the tension in the kebele' but then was further promoted so a fourth Chairman was installed who only lasted a couple of months. Then in July 2009 Chairman 3 who had left 'due to inefficiency' was re-installed and was still in place at the time of the fieldwork. Chairmen in place for the five years before 2003 were reportedly changed due to 'performance, competence and education.'

The kebele has 3 sub-kebeles, one of which was Turufe. In 2010 Turufe had 20 geres. Within each gere there were cells with about ten households in each.

Before the 2005 **election** the OPDO-EPRDF ideology was explained by the political cadres from kebele and wereda; no opposition parties came to the area but the community voted for the opposition. In 2010 EPRDF-OPDO members were instructed to agitate the community to register and vote for the front 'that brought change to their livelihood'. No opposition party had appeared early in 2010.

Prior to the 2005 election 'the peasants were neglected and grievance not heard'. Drawing a lesson the wereda administration and kebele officials began to strengthen the farmers', women's and youth organisations. In 2010 the **Youth Association** was not active though there was a structure and the **Women's Association** had not been very active and the plan to get loans from the wereda had failed. In addition to the membership contribution of 3 birr the Women's Association was requested to make one-off contributions assigned by the wereda for various development activities in the kebele leading to some resignations. In 2009 women and youth **leagues** were organised; they were closer to the ruling party than the associations and members were thought to be potentially reliable for development endeavours. They employ the party programme in their kebele.

Before and after the 2005 election there was little recruitment for political party membership. In early 2010 recruitment was 'a non-stopping process'. At sub-kebele level **party structures** have been important for mobilising people for campaigns, for collective labour and raising resources, though an attempt in 2005 to use the gere structure to organise collective labour for harvesting was resisted.

The wereda had tried to **engender development** in Turufe through the standard EPRDF approach: campaigns, community meetings, DAs, promoters, targets and graduation, training, champions, models – certificates and prizes, and sub-kebele structures including party cells. Given the problems that extension workers had to meet targets there was said to be a move for plans to start at kebele level and be negotiated with the wereda

Causes of insecurity included theft and intolerance between Muslims and young, newly converted Protestants. When Muslim leaders asked for a discussion the Protestants apparently refused and they subsequently refused requests from kebele and wereda officials for discussion.

In 2005 a **Peace Committee** was established with 8 members: kebele chair, 2 militia, 1 person each from Women's and Youth Associations, 1 from the social court and 2 elders. In 2008 the wereda installed a 'traditional' institution with 50 *geda* members; it was active in Turufe against theft problems and conflicts. In the same year the efficiency of the **social court** was considerably improved. In 2009 the peace committee began to work with **community policing**; when 'theft began to accelerate' in the kebele, security zones were established in each gere. Convicting individuals of theft was said to be difficult due to lack of witnesses and there were allegations that some of the thieves were protected as they had connections and were let off lightly, or that there were informers in the social courts so that the identity of people denouncing thieves was leaked and they could be threatened.

Conclusions: *As elsewhere there have been considerable changes in the community management field since 2003: wereda de-centralisation and structure development, increasingly dense kebele and sub-kebele structures and the merging of government and party structures. The average 'life' of a kebele chairman was less than 2 years. The community elected an opposition party in 2005 but in 2010 OPDO/EPRDF party membership was rapidly increasing. The usual means of mobilisation for livelihood and human capital development were applied: campaigns, community meetings, DAs, promoters, targets and graduation, training, champions, models – certificates and prizes, and sub-kebele structures including party cells. While security and justice structures had been developed to include elders it seemed that theft had increased which many attributed to youth landlessness and unemployment. There were also allegations that the thieves were well-connected and therefore not prosecuted and that they would take revenge against people giving evidence against them.*

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

There were reports that people's attitude to development had changed between 2003 and 2010. In 2003 development was thought to be the government's task and people gave little thought to how the community should contribute. By 2010 people had come to see that development had to be a joint effort. The community's idea about development was to bring improvement in their livelihood, to involve in activities that directly or indirectly bring change in the community, in the wereda and the country in general.

Given the ethnic mix the community was said to be 'not coherent in sharing customs values and beliefs'. Differences in customary cultural repertoires persist based on religion and ethnicity while customary religious practices have been challenged by more fundamentalist religious ideologies and the growth of Protestantism. Government ideology focuses on developing the human resources and smallholder practices of peasants to escape poverty and improve their living standards. The collective rights of people were important including the rights of women. Participation was often equated with following directives, becoming 'aware' and emulating models of achievement. Local people were keen to improve living standards but also wish to retain elements of their customary cultures which clash with some of the government's principles.

Inequality interventions

There were historic **status differences** between the ethnic groups in Turufe. In 1995 it was said that Tigrayans feel superior to everyone while Oromos want the others to leave the area so they can own all the farmland. Welaytas and Amharas consider themselves hardworking; claiming that only since they came to the area have the Oromos learned how to plough land and make themselves wealthy. Being in the majority the Oromos were the most powerful in kebele structures; different clan-based factions compete for office.

With regard to **economic inequality** in 2003 people said that the rich did not 'shine out' while poor and destitute people did labour work. Various changes in the ensuing years improved people's wealth: those whose children went to work in the Middle East and sent remittances increased their wealth with some building houses in Shashemene town. The wealth of those with daughters working on the flower farms in Ziway have also increased. Some women heading households started hiring labour rather than share-cropping their land giving them a greater share of the output. Those who accessed credit through their iddirs, the private micro-finance institution or the NGO scheme were able to undertake business activities that increased their wealth. Farmers who used selected seeds and fertiliser had greater productivity but those who had shared land with sons or brothers had smaller plots.

Respondents said that class distinctions began to be noticeable around 2008 and since then had become more noticeable. While the poorest have remained much the same the rich have increased their wealth and improved their living standards. The changes outlined were more the result of responses to market forces than government policies. Recent migrants form an underclass of labourers who came to Turufe to improve their lives, many sponsored by earlier migrants. Some employers turn into patrons while others treat their employees very badly.

There were limited pro-**poor** interventions. The health fee exemption scheme was no longer working due to more cumbersome procedures linked to changes in health financing strategy. Destitute people did not have to pay the 10 cents water charge. Landless households did not pay tax or community contributions. NGOs provided some assistance for education to poorer households with children and one set up a savings and credit scheme for them. Government agricultural interventions, which have recently been targeted at richer and successful farmers, were not suitable for most poor farmers.

Interventions for **children** included schools, vaccinations and a committee to prevent negligence and violation of children's rights. NGOs helped some poor families with children.

Since 2003 **youth** unemployment has become an increasingly significant problem as the number of educated people has increased. It was said that by 2007 most youths were not getting further education opportunities as their results weren't good enough; some said it was because of the low quality of local schools. Some dropouts turned to theft, chat and drink; others to income-generating activities. It was not until 2005 that young women got the right to inherit land. It was suggested that youth today were less respectful of adults than in the past.

As described earlier government has been active against HTPs affecting **women** and begun to implement policies and laws to improve their property rights. Access to credit has improved through NGOs but there were not real women's development packages in place. The fact that some men have started fetching water and firewood was attributed to government awareness creation about women's rights. There were no quotas for women to take wereda or kebele posts and they did not play a significant role in kebele structures.

Elderly people, particularly women rely heavily on support of neighbours and their children, particularly when they become less mobile. No government or NGO interventions for elderly, **disabled** and **chronically ill** people were described.

Results from the 2004 RANS revealed differences in farming wealth between **the ethnic groups** who ranked as follows, wealthiest group first: Amharas, Tigrayans, Hadiya, Welayta, Oromo, Kembata.

Conclusions: *The government was active and to a degree successful in reducing general gender inequality though their interventions to assist unemployed and landless youth had yet to prove their worth at the time of the fieldwork. The government focus on richer farmers since 2005 has likely increased their relative wealth. Otherwise changes in economic inequality had more to do with the market than government interventions. There were no systematic Interventions to assist poor and vulnerable people.*

Girar

Community public goods interventions

Some villages of Girar were as **urbanised** as the town of Imdibir which became a municipality and increasingly urbanised now having hotels, banks, shops, and all-weather **road** to the Zonal town. There were several boundary changes including in 2006 some kebele land transferred to Imdibir town from several kebeles surrounding it. These villages accessed **electricity** in 2008 and have piped water and service proximity which were not available to the 'inside' villages. People from these villages charge re-chargeable batteries in the houses of those with electricity. Community labour has regularly been used to build and maintain seasonal roads and bridges to connect the inside villages.

Mobile phones came to the area in 2006 and by 2007 were available to most. In the same year a wireless telephone service was put in place connecting the kebele to the wereda though it was not functional in 2010.

In 2003 and 2004 many **trees** were planted, including indigenous ones, and more were planted in 2007 to celebrate the Ethiopian millennium. Of those planted 50% were said to have survived. The community is supposed to do soil and conservation work on wereda advice; checkdams and gully filling to prevent flooding was done in 2004 and in 2010 training in soil and water management was being given to 70 Model Farmers. However, the DAs explained that due to the town proximity many people do not cooperate with them including on NRM activities – it is not an issue of acceptance but they prefer work in town.

Both the administration and the Catholic experimental station promoted **water harvesting** but it was not successful (see below). The station also trained farmers in watershed management.

Conclusions: *Residents in some villages live urban lifestyles while those in others lack electricity, piped water and easy all-year road access. Many trees were planted since 2003 with a reported 50% survival rate. Some community work to prevent flooding has been done.*

Livelihoods interventions

Starting from 2003 a disease affected enset production which was still causing problems. Also in that year the wereda agriculture office introduced an inter-cropping system and distributed vegetable seedlings, and most people were said to have started to produce vegetables, including potatoes, and chat, coffee and enset in their gardens; wheat and other crops were produced in larger amounts. In 2004 the **agricultural extension programme** was introduced and all were shown how to produce grain, crops, fruit, including avocados and coffee and the previous total dependence on enset began to change. There was some resistance to fertiliser use and some credit repayment problems.

Production in 2005 and some of 2006 was disrupted by political activity following the election. In 2006 **Development Agents** distributed fertiliser and selected seeds for potatoes, tef and maize, and attempted to introduce 'farmer plans' so that they requested the right amount of fertiliser. In 2007 DAs started closer follow-ups of farmers and increased productivity was reported. In 2008 a new

coffee disease arrived; farmers started to use fertilisers willingly and there was an increase in crop and vegetable production. The following year improved seeds allowed production three times a year and production was very high. In 2010 DAs provided training on fertiliser use and compost. Rich farmers could rent tractors from the wereda at a cost of 200-300 birr per day. While the DAs were encouraging the production of vegetables and crops many farmers were doing well selling eucalyptus trees and chat. There was no consensus on the real potential of horticulture and grain production.

In 2004 there was a water harvesting initiative but people refused to dig **reservoirs** for fear of malaria. Then in 2006 six were dug for four **Model Farmers**, a youth group with 30 members and in the primary school. They cost 5-6000 birr each and were dug with community labour. Community members made various criticisms: 'why should we work for model farmers?'; the wrong sites were chosen; some were forced against their will while others who wanted didn't get; the technology was not suitable for small plots; and the malaria risk. In 2010 only two of the reservoirs (including in the school) were functional. A few farmers were reportedly producing vegetables and fruit during the dry season. In 2010 the first water pump was introduced.

Livestock interventions have been patchy. In 2000 cattle fattening was launched but it was the government/OMO scheme was still 'in its infancy' in 2010 – with small quotas linked to budget shortages and credit repayment issues. Beehives were distributed to Model Farmers but reported to be too expensive. There was an animal epidemic in 2009 and oxen died; experts from Nazreth established what the disease was and came and vaccinated all the cattle. The vet service changed so that a farmer could call the vet directly on a mobile. There was also some activity by the Catholic mission organisation, providing livestock on credit through the iddir to poorer households.

A Farmers' Training Centre was established in 2005 and was used for some training programmes. Women heading households had access to training but not farmers' wives. DAs worked mainly with Model Farmers with large landholdings.

When fertiliser was introduced kebele officials helped farmers to plan how much they wanted and about a quarter of the 456 households who participated in this got **credit** as they could not pay cash. Credit was not available for the selected seeds distributed in 2006 and credit for fertiliser has not been easily available causing some farmers to stop using it. In 2010 formal microfinance schemes included the government-related Omo Credit institution, an NIB branch and Meklit credit association in Imdibir town, a Women's Savings and Credit Co-op established in 2003 though active mainly since 2007, and NGO schemes. Wereda officials said that one of the challenges in Girar was the inability of people to repay their loans.

In 2010 200 Girar **women** were said to be organised in different **producer co-operatives** which some people said, resembled customary work groups. Through these co-ops women got access to credit for income generation but also benefitted from adult literacy programmes and information. **Youth** have also been organised in co-operatives to engage in farming and non-farming activities. Communal land was given to groups of unemployed youths in 2007 and 2008 who opened tea-shops and cafes in 'container shops', and to a group of youth for agricultural activities (a late start meant that they could not plough in time and engaged in fattening of oxen bought on credit, with some success). Problems related to the youth co-operative programmes were said to include budget constraints, a repayment period that was too short, and mixing of members who did not have shared interests. There was also a need for skill training.

Land measurement started in 2004 and land certificates including women were issued to 636 households in 2005; 120 households refused to participate. In the same year community land was leased to 150 farmers with very small plots for 3 years with a possible extension. In 2005 the policy forbidding land sale was implemented and land renting and leasing became possible. In 2007 a revised rural land proclamation was issued said to ensure that taxes were paid properly. In the same year 1 hectare of land was allocated to a Catholic NGO with no charge (the kebele can reclaim it

whenever it wishes) for an experimental site related to food security. In 2008 a new kebele rule was introduced - no land shall stand idle – and 5 hectares of communal land was given to 15 people organised in 3 groups on a contract basis for 3 years. The following year land was given to a Catholic organisation to construct a pre-school and a quarter of a hectare of land allocated for a mother-tongue instruction site. Communal land was measured in 2010; a youth group was refused land to plant eucalyptus trees as they 'cause drought'.

***Conclusions:** It seems likely that Girar saw economic growth between 2003 and 2010 but, given the diversified nature of household activities as landholdings were so small, it was not clear how much government development interventions aimed at diversifying farming contributed, especially since they took no interest in two of the more profitable farming activities of chat and eucalyptus production. Recently there have been efforts to ensure that land was used efficiently.*

Human re/pro/duction interventions

Garage traditional **houses** were big and well-built with grass roofs but in 2007 people started building with corrugated iron roofs as grass became scarce. There were some **lifestyle** changes, although residents had experience of urban styles due to their proximity to Imdibir town and the Garage urban migration tradition. In 2006 HEWs demonstrated locally made improved stoves and some people began to use them. In 2007 youths were making and selling battery-bulbs but demand fell in the following year when electricity came. Even non-rich households were buying mattresses and some had sofas. One middle-wealth household interviewed in 2010 had a TV. There were changes in dress. By 2003 people were wearing shoes rather than going barefoot and in 2004 some women in rural areas started wearing jeans and sneakers. People in richer households were eating more balanced diets including injera and bread.

The **Health Post** was built in 2006 and two trained **Health Extension Workers** put in place to apply 16 packages including family planning, mother-child health and sanitation. They were also meant to be a link following up patients referred to the Health Centre though the feedback system from the health centre was not strong which meant HEWs could not really help people. People wanted curative services at the HP but it did not even have painkillers at the time of fieldwork. Following the BPR process in 2009 the HEWs were told that continuous support from the wereda would end. Health Promoters were sporadically trained by NGOs. In 2010 the Health Post was rehabilitated but had no water or electricity and was too small.

The wereda statistic for **contraceptive** use in 2003 was 60% and in 2010 80%; HEWs said that in 2010 75% of mothers used contraceptives. While family planning services were available in 2003 and at the Health Extension level in 2007 these figures appear to be on the high side. There was resistance to family planning from conservative forces in the community and the local Catholic Church was not convinced by the family planning campaign.

HEWs provided **ante-natal care** with the help of trained volunteers; there were home-to-home visits and immunisation. In 2009 UNICEF donated a **delivery kit** but HEWs were **not trained** in how to use it and anyway lack of water and electricity makes a delivery service problematic. They assisted in home deliveries and **vaccinated** babies.

HEWs provided **nutritional** education in 2007 going house-to-house. CRS was helping with a focus on vegetables. In 2008, a drought year in parts of the south, UNICEF provided supplementary food for 6 malnourished children in four households for a month and the mothers were given training on how to feed their children better.

In 2003 there was no clean **water**; people used rivers or they could buy pure water in town for 1 birr per jerrycan. In 2004 there was a rumour that World Vision planned to develop spring water; a committee was established and farmers contributed 20 birr which was put into a bank account. Nothing happened then in 2008 deep ground water drilling started but then stopped for unexplained

reasons. In 2010 a piped spring water supply was made at the front side of the kebele but those on the inner part still have no access to clean water.

On arrival in the kebele the HEWs tried to create awareness about **sanitation**. They started a campaign in the school and other places particularly in relation to having a clean and safe **latrine**. There was a major awareness campaign in the wereda using experience-sharing among kebeles, education, community discussions, model households and assistance to help poor households. The HEWs used iddirs and religious leaders and kebele cabinet members. Following initial resistance all households were said to have latrines, and Girar was distinguished at the zonal level for its innovative waste disposal system.

In 2003 there were rumours of **malaria** due to climate change; in 2010 some people spoke of a 'malaria infestation'. In 2006 there was an attempt to clean up swampy areas where mosquitoes bred. The HEW said there was malaria in four of Girar's sixteen villages and the Health Centre head said it was not a great problem as the cases were not of the falciparum type. People were taught about the symptoms and of the importance of seeking treatment and general prevention measures such as avoiding ponds but there were no bednets.

Despite an ongoing community conversation on HIV/AIDS begun in 2007 and high testing and counselling associated with the Ethiopian millennium the kebele chairman and one HEW thought as many as 10-15% of Girar's population might be carrying the **HIV/AIDS** virus; there were various reports of small numbers of deaths and patients taking ART including a child.

In 2003 respondents said that health services were given in a good manner. There was immunisation, and education about TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS nearby but there was a lack of medicine for which they had to go to town. **The Health Centre** in town became better equipped and staffed compared with 2003 though it was said that costs stop some people from using modern medical services when needed and others had to borrow in order to do so. Safe abortion was available and put into practice at the health centre.

There has been a **kindergarten** in the Catholic church compound for many years (23 birr per month). In 2008 government said it was collaborating to build a new pre-school. There was regular mobilisation of parents to send children to school. In 2007 a mobile team to follow drop-outs was set up with the aim of getting every child over 7 into school. Later the education department interviewed all those not sending children to school. The **primary school** was upgraded from 1-4 to 1-8 in 2008 with community contributions of labour from male-headed households and cash from female-headed households as well as financial contributions from the local big iddir and from one Gurage 'diaspora' iddir.

There was a Grade 9-12 **secondary school** near the town with plasma TV. There was an educated youth unemployment problem and no TVET institution in the vicinity which was problematic for those with nowhere to go after Grade 10 and organised youth who need skill training. However, in 2010 the Catholic mission organisation was building a TVET due to start operating in the near future. In 2008 the people requested the wereda to open a **university** and in 2009 the Prime Minister laid the foundation stone.

Conclusions: *Lifestyles in Girar grew increasingly urban. HEWs had been in place since 2006 providing contraception, sanitation packages and ante- and post- natal care though the Health Post was too small and lacked facilities and there were no medicines. People wanted more curative services, particularly follow-ups of treatment after they had been to the Health Centre. Many residents had no access to clean water though all were said to have latrines. There was some malaria and worries that the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate might be as high as 15%. There was an increase in school attendance accompanied by increasing educated youth unemployment. The planned opening of a new (non-government) TVET institution in Imdibir should presumably help address some of this.*

Social re/pro/duction interventions

The Gurage social networks were dense and reportedly increased as iddirs and religious organisations became more active. Government made use of these organisation in campaigns, notably to increase use of latrines. The Gurage clan organisation Yejoka has traditionally been responsible for the wellbeing of women and in 2003 made strong efforts to abolish high brideprice and abduction. Yejoka was more widely involved in campaigns against **Harmful Traditional Practices** including circumcision, uvula cutting, and exclusion of craftworkers and involved in a community conversation on reducing mourning ceremonies. In 2010 the respected Cheha clan leader set an example by not preparing a big mourning ceremony for his mother, and also not circumcising his younger daughter.

In 2010 there was a strong campaign against **circumcision** involving the wereda, UNICEF, training Trainers of Trainers in each kebele, enlisting religious and clan leaders and using markets, churches, kebele and iddir meetings. The practice was officially banned with fines for various offences countering the ban. There was evidence of a reduction in the practice.

The New Family Law of the SNNP Region issued in 2006 covers **early marriage** which did not seem to be such an issue and **choice of partner**. Girls were encouraged to report if they were to be given in marriage without consent. Women were given equal rights of **inheritance**.

There have also been tensions between community-initiated organisations and government. For example iddirs resisted a request to collect contributions and would like to be more involved in planning while the leader of Yejoka was concerned that agitation by the Women's Affairs bureau was leading to premature divorce that would be regretted and bad for children.

Support from relatives, especially those living in urban areas, was a central part of the **informal social protection system**; children support elderly parents. Neighbours, who may be relatives, were also important. In an adaptation of a customary practice the Youth and Women's Associations sometimes mobilised to help poor and elderly people. The iddir role was increasingly important. Churches and NGOs provided clothes, food, regular small amounts of money, and assistance with housing to the most vulnerable people.

***Conclusions:** Government has worked with some success with clan, religious, and iddir leaders in campaigns to reduce HTPs though there were also tensions between local organisations and government. The informal social protection system revolves around relatives; those without have been helped by groups of women and youths and Churches and local NGOs.*

Community management

Wereda officials noted that as Girar was easily accessible interactions with the wereda were frequent. There was *'no exaggerate problem with governance'* in the kebele and as in all kebeles, the administration had become stronger with the deployment of DAs, HEWs and the kebele manager. Following wereda de-centralisation **wereda structures** have grown and strengthened; the wereda Cabinet grew from 7 members in 2003 to 28 in 2010. Following BPR justice and policing were separated. People in Girar complained that the kebele was not represented in the wereda Cabinet.

The kebele **Cabinet** had seven positions in 2010 including extension workers and the school director. The non-professional members were not paid and there has been turnover due to failure to work properly except for the kebele chairman. New unpaid kebele posts were established in 2007: speaker, head of the information department, and a PR official. In 2009 a Development Committee reporting to the Cabinet was set up and a **kebele manager** was assigned. There were tensions between the chairman and manager with the former saying that while the manager had been assigned to assist him he was 'usually dictating as a boss because he was paid'. The manager was also not popular with other kebele officials.

The Cabinet got directions on work to be done from the wereda which get them from the zone. They reported to the wereda monthly, quarterly and annually and were also evaluated in surprise visits. The Women's and Youth Associations and sub-kebele structures reported to the Cabinet and were regularly visited by them. There were eight **sub-kebeles**.

In the 2005 **election** the EPRDF was defeated by the CUD in the wereda; there was local resistance following the final result which continued into 2006 affecting agricultural production. People were reported to have chosen CUD as there had been 'bad administration' from former government officials. They demanded that kebele leaders be replaced with new and energetic ones and that wereda officials avoid favouritism.

In 2006 attention was paid to the issue of '**good governance**'. Kebele officials who had lost community trust were replaced though this was not the case in Girar where the well-liked kebele chairman was in place for the whole period 2003-10. Youth packages were introduced. Wereda officials said that over the year people came to see what they meant by good governance citing the large amount of money raised by the Gurage Telethon as evidence – though community members noted that contribution amounts were fixed by higher levels for lower levels (including the kebele administration for individual households), and wondered how this fit with 'good governance'. From the kebele came reports that through free and open discussions the government had improved its relations with the community. In the run up to the 2010 election Prime Minister Meles visited the area, laid the foundation stone for the university and promised an asphalt road.

Both **Women's and Youth Associations** had been established earlier but were re-activated following the 2005 election. Both gave credit to members, were active in education/advocacy, mobilised members to support community development activities, and under package programmes helped organise youth/women in co-operatives. Membership was said to be restricted to EPRDF members. Membership in 2010 was low: WA had 65 members from 900 households not all of whom were active; YA had 36 members not all of whom were active. The Associations did not have much interaction with the wereda.

The kebele manager assigned party-related tasks to the extension workers including organising people into **cells** and conducting election-related meetings requesting reports on these activities. Party organisation within the kebele did not seem to as far advanced as it was in other areas. Youth and women's **leagues** were established in 2008 but did not seem to be active.

Community participation in kebele meetings and activities had improved following changes introduced after the 2005 election; there were no fines. People did not complain of too many meetings as they did in other WIDE3 sites. Government has used campaigns, extension workers and models as elsewhere but there was little talk of party meetings – although DAs and HEWs reported having had to facilitate some in the run-up to the 2010 election.

There were differing views on government performance with some liking the model which was 'better than the past' and others critical with lack of safe water being a big issue. While health and education services seemed generally appreciated there were criticisms of the bureaucratic nature of the wereda, unbalanced development among the villages, lack of employment for educated youth, and unfair taxation practices (by wealthier farmers with businesses in town). There was also some male resistance to family planning and broader gender equality changes. Some, including local leaders, said that government officials 'no longer act as tyrants' though others were less convinced.

While there were no new **taxes** in recent years there were various additional contributions collected at the same time confused people and caused particular problems for poor people. Contributions to the Gurage Telethon also felt like taxation as kebele officials decided how much each household should contribute. Also male-headed households contributed labour and female-headed households cash for the development of infrastructure, school upgrading, the construction of the health post and environment conservation which

Theft and house-breaking were reported as problems throughout the period. Thefts of chat and rape were recent **security** problems in Girar while there were outbreaks of youth fighting in Imdibir town. The **militia** worked with elders some of who were organised in a '**peace committee**' and there was a wereda-led training on how all household heads should play a role in peace and security. The wereda **police** were involved in some cases with a charge of nepotism from one respondent.

The **social court** did not deal with land disputes or handle criminal cases and worked with elders who had usually tried to deal with a case before it went to court and often followed-up after the verdict.

***Conclusions:** Wereda de-centralisation structures were consolidated, expanded and slightly re-structured over the years with increasing livelihood, human and cultural development activity by government. Government-community relations broke down following the 2005 election with disturbances affecting economic activity for some months. Government responded by replacing kebele leaders who the community did not trust establishing a precedent for future changes. Since then the wereda worked with local clan, iddir and religious leaders in campaigns against HTPs and with elders in the area of security and justice and there did not seem to be problems in getting community members to participate in kebele meetings, community labour and other contributions, although this may be more to do with the popular kebele chairman and his networks than acceptance of government directives. Party penetration of kebele sub-structures did not seem very advanced though one of the tasks of the relatively new and unpopular kebele manager was to set up party cells which he was doing through extension workers.*

Cultural re/pro/duction interventions

The Gurage culture was rich, with its own values and beliefs, dense social networks, village-based organisations and clan-based government which has been active in trying to modernise some aspects of community life. Such a culture presents particular problems for those who, coming from the same culture, were trying to generate development using a revolutionary democracy model. Community members were appreciative of government interventions aimed at human and economic development and 'improving the farmer's life' but there was likely to be little enthusiasm for replacing local governance structures with EPRDF-designed structures, a process which seemed to have just started in the community in the run-up to the 2010 election.

Inequality interventions

There was considerable **economic inequality** among households in Girar; for example some households got incomes of 10,000 birr per year through chat production and the selling of mature eucalyptus trees brought good returns. Coffee was also a good income source for some. Some rich households engaged in off-farm activities; for some remittances provided useful capital. There was an estimate that 5% of the population 'lives from hand to mouth'. Inter-generational and gender inequality were also features of the society although interventions to improve the status, life chances and wellbeing of women have had an impact. The youth in Girar were also facing challenges – with access to land increasingly difficult. The government youth interventions and education addressed part of this though unemployment was an issue. Migration as is traditional among Gurage seemed to remain a very important avenue for them. There were not government programmes to assist vulnerable elderly, disabled or chronically ill people without families to support them. A campaign to reduce social exclusion of craftworkers has had some impact although respondents were still describing them in derogatory terms.

In 2010 there were no institutionalised wereda-led pro-**poor** programmes and no coherent system of exemptions for poor people, though some elderly poor were exempted from most contributions. There was no fee-free medical service. The Catholic mission NGO targeted poor families providing

such things as clothes, small sums of money, food, scholarships, small loans for sheep and goats repaid through regular contributions to iddirs. Religious congregations had social affairs committee which identified needy people and seemed to work together across religious boundaries.

Interventions for **children** included education, vaccination, and some nutrition projects. As described above an NGO supported some poor children. During education campaigns people were told that they should not send their young daughters to towns to work as domestic workers but rather send them to school and there were reports that this had led to some change.

Organisation of **youth** cooperatives began following the 2005 election. In 2006 some were allocated communal land for cultivation. There was discussion of the problems of youth with the Prime Minister during his visit in 2008. In that year more youth packages were prepared. By 2010 achievements in the kebele were not as big as the wereda had expected. One reason was the lack of electricity and water in much of the kebele.

Government interventions against HTPs affecting **women** and promoting rights including to property were described earlier. One reported outcome was that men had become a bit involved in the domestic workload in households where women were active in associations and co-operatives. Another was an increase of appeals to the wereda from women whose husbands were away from home for a long time or abused them associated with increased divorce.

Informants said that in 2003 respect for **elderly people** had declined compared with the past. Around the time of the 2005 election the government started to talk about the rights of old people, including the President of Ethiopia. In 2010 it was reported that elders still received much respect in public gathering. The Women's and Youth Associations sometimes organised members to assist elderly people with cash or labour but there was no systematic wereda programme and the Catholic organisation occasionally provided materials. One old poor woman respondent said she was exempted from all contributions except the Gurage Telethon to which she was told she had to give 60 birr which she had to beg from neighbours. Another elderly woman did not have to pay for drinking water. There were no reported interventions for **disabled** or **chronically ill** people.

In Gurageland blacksmiths, woodworkers and tanners, called **Fuga**, used to be socially excluded while playing a key role in customary rituals including circumcision. They were given land under the Derg and land certificates recently. There were campaigns against discrimination and awareness-raising about their importance to the local economy. The groups used to exclude themselves from health services but this had reduced and some have children who attended university.

Conclusions: *The gap between rich and poor households was bigger than in many rural communities given the urban migration which brings remittances from successful migrants providing funds for investment in farms and off-farm businesses. Government interventions to improve the status, opportunities and wellbeing of women made an impact though interventions for youth were less successful. There were no pro-poor government programmes for poor households or vulnerable elderly, disabled and chronically ill people while interventions for children focused on improving their human capital. The effect of a campaign to raise the status of craftworkers was not clear.*