

**Long Term Perspectives on Development
Impacts In Rural Ethiopia**

STAGE ONE FINAL REPORT

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Long Term Perspectives on Development Impacts in Rural Ethiopia – Stage 1

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. Since 2003 foreign aid to Ethiopia has grown considerably and a Government-donor dialogue has been conducted in the context of a poverty reduction strategy set out in the SDPRP (2002/3-4/5) and PASDEP (2005/6-9/10).
2. In this research project¹ our main aim was to improve knowledge and understanding of what really happened when SDPRP/PASDEP-related government and donor policies and programmes designed at macro-level were introduced into different types of rural community in Ethiopia between 2003 and 2009.
3. We set out to do this by adding new fieldwork conducted early in 2010 in six exemplar rural communities in the four established Regions to an existing longitudinal qualitative database with data points in 1995 and 2003.
4. Using a complexity social science framework and a rigorous case-based approach [see section 1] we have used the data from 1995, 2003 and 2010 to establish (1) the development status of each of the communities in 2010 [in section 2], (2) the kind of modernisation which has taken place since 1995 [in section 3], and (3) the contribution of the development interventions introduced into them during the period since 2003 to the current development status [in sections 4 to 6].
5. In the remainder of this summary we present the main conclusions [section 7].

Modernisation of the communities since 1995

6. In all sites we found increased new public buildings bringing petty urbanisation to the remoter sites, increased urban linkages and increased involvement in markets of all kinds. Diversification has led to bigger off-farm and non-farm sectors with more daily labour and petty business opportunities. Selected seeds and fertiliser have reached all communities leading to increased productivity in sites with good water availability, and breed cattle are beginning to spread. In three sites commercial irrigated vegetable production is an important element of the local economy. Compared with 1995 improved agricultural, livestock and NRM extension services and packages are in place. All the agricultural economies experienced recent economic growth except one in Tigray where incessant drought has led to decline. Women's involvement in economic activities has increased considerably and rights to land are beginning to be implemented; in all sites there is increasing and problematic youth landlessness and (under)employment.
7. There have been big lifestyle changes since 1995 especially for richer households. These have only taken place recently in the remoter sites. There is improved access to curative health services though it is still very difficult for very poor households and those in remoter kebele areas. There is a preference for private and mission facilities. New preventive and Mother and Child health services have been launched in all communities including family planning, various sanitation packages, malaria prevention, and vaccination though there are problems related to shortages and community resistance. People in four sites are still reliant on rivers and streams for their (unsafe) water. There have been big changes in primary enrolment, especially in the remoter sites and for girls. A few rich households are using private education at all levels. Secondary and post-secondary enrolment has increased, notably in the vulnerable PSNP-

¹ The project is called 'Long term perspectives on development impacts in rural Ethiopia' and also WIDE3.

dependent Tigray site. Inequality has increased because the rich have got relatively richer. Very poor and vulnerable people do not receive the support they need. While physical security for women and girls is better, and female circumcision, abduction, early marriage and widow inheritance have diminished, there is little women's political participation. There are increased inter-generational tensions related to youth landlessness with a minority resorting to theft, addictions and violent conflict.

8. Informal social protection systems are still strong and there have not been big changes in community-initiated organisations. There has been an expansion in the range of cultural repertoires (sets of ideas) available to the community though local customary repertoires have remained strong with aspects hidden, particularly some of those characterised by the government as Harmful Traditional Practices. Compared with 1995 there is much greater penetration of the communities by the state involving a sub-kebele level array of overlapping government and party structures and associated with this a wider range of institutions and people that government can use to mobilise people to respond to development policies and packages. There is also much greater interaction between community-initiated organisations and customary institutions and government systems. There are signs of class formation as land has remained in the same hands, rich farmers have grown richer, partly as a result of the Model Farmer focus on the more successful, and numbers of landless people involved in daily labour have increased considerably.

The contribution of development interventions since 2003 to the modernisation process in the six communities

9. Many of the changes described above took place after 2003 with acceleration of change after 2005. During these five years development interventions grew in scope and funding through a mix of sometimes closely entwined government and donor funding and activities. At the same time a period of annual 'double-digit' growth was entered. Our data is not of the sort that can tell us at what rate local GDPs increased annually, but they do indicate economic growth over the period in the three independent and integrated economies and the two drought-prone sites with some irrigation. In the Tigray site, while there was decline in the agricultural economy, it could be that it was counter-balanced by growth in non-farm activities and increased casual migration.
10. ADLI interventions had little impact on growth in the Gurage site which came mainly from flourishing eucalyptus and chat markets and increased chances of upward mobility for urban migrants. Eucalyptus sale was assisted by the development of internal roads, through community labour. The mobile network allowed access to information on prices. Selected seeds and fertiliser improved main crop yields in the two other independent economies. Inflated food prices accelerated the rise in marketing that was already taking place. It is not clear how important a role Development Agents played in this process. Agricultural packages of selected seeds and fertiliser for rainfed land in the three drought-prone sites did not meet with general success due to lack of rain and the same was true of the OFSP beehive and livestock packages in the Tigray site. Irrigation in two drought-prone sites and one independent economy expanded during the period, partly through the provision of credit for pumps, and became more productive with the introduction of improved seeds and sowing in lines. Donor-funded PSNP programmes in two of the drought-prone sites were shared among community members in a manner that prevent any 'graduation' from taking place; they did allow richer households to build assets or reduce asset-sale and were vital for the survival of poor and vulnerable people.
11. Land interventions followed a number of conflicting logics. The end of land re-distribution, certification, and the legalisation of extended periods for renting and leasing (with kebele or wereda agreement) was a step towards the consolidation of a 'kulak' peasant elite. 'Leasing' of

communal land to youth co-operatives in Oromia and SNNP sites was a step in a 'developmental state' direction. Leasing of land to inward investors in Oromia sites (one from Australia) was a step in a (international) capitalist direction. Implementation of equal rights for women of inheritance of parental land and on divorce launched a process of increasing land fragmentation. Neither non-farm extension packages nor the establishment of small producer co-operatives contributed much to any of these economies. Access to credit for women contributed to increased but small-scale production.

12. Improvements in curative and preventive health services and access to education at all levels were a result of government programmes and funding supported by the donor-funded Protection of Basic Services programme which also financed some agriculture-related activities in the wereda budgets (notable the DA salaries). In all sites there were gaps in infrastructure, furniture, equipment, and school materials, and intermittent provision of such things as selected seeds, vaccinations, contraceptives, basic medicines and drugs. Extension workers and teachers with targets from the wereda on the one hand, and community resistance on the other, were often over-worked and stressed. The government can take full credit for the changes to women's lives described earlier. There is scope for the same kind of commitment to improving the lives of the youth and poor and vulnerable people including people who are elderly, mentally or chronically ill, or disabled.
13. Faced with communities which resist some of the planned change by refusing, ignoring or subverting the interventions designed to achieve it the government has been implementing a 'developmental state' approach to state-building with what would appear to be the goal of a one-party state in which rural communities are penetrated through a party cell system. In the run-up to the 2010 election the EPRDF went on a recruiting drive in all the communities; in some it organised households into cells with five member household with one leader. Regular party meetings, supported by propaganda provided by the party, are designed to turn farmers and their wives into willing practitioners of government packages and advice. However, our evidence suggests that five of the communities have responded to this project in their usual (slightly different) styles – by refusing, ignoring or subverting the State-building interventions. Community members of the sixth site, in Tigray, seem more supportive of the EPRDF/TPLF approach having experienced elements of it for over twenty years – although some dissent may be emerging but in a subdued form.

Community trajectories and potential futures

14. In speculative mode we suggest that all of the communities continued on much the same course between 1995 and 2003 and beyond to 2008 or so, with minor and cumulative changes which pushed them further from equilibrium but no important changes to the key factors determining the direction of the community (control parameters). However, by 2010 internal and external changes in three of the communities had pushed them to states of disequilibrium or 'chaos' (in the language of complexity (social) science) such that they are very unlikely to remain on the same trajectory.
15. The communities we believe may be setting off in new directions are the PSNP-dependent community in Tigray undergoing rapid youth exit after repeated failure in the core livelihood system; the peri-urban site near Shashemene which is poised to become a suburb; and the drought-prone Arssi Oromo site on the banks of the river Awash which is experimenting quite successfully with a range of institutional modes for organising irrigation.
16. The communities following a course which was in place in 1995 include a tef and wheat exporting community in Gojjam which has grown richer but otherwise not changed much, a peri-urban Gurage community of whom the same can be said, and a drought-prone community near Afar which is richer as a result of some irrigation but still regularly dependent on food aid.

What might be learned from a WIDE3 Stage 2?

17. We designed the WIDE3 research project in two stages. This report concludes the Stage 1 which researched six of the twenty villages for which we have data points in 2003 for all and in 1995 for most. In Stage 2 of the research we would add new fieldwork to the fourteen other villages. [See map 1 in section 1 of the main text].
18. Remembering that there are likely to have been changes since 2003 which may have produced new core livelihood systems there are at least three new types which would extend the set of exemplars. These are (international) cash crop sites growing coffee (Adado, Somodo) and chat (Adele Keke), a (voluntary) resettlement site (Do'omaa), and two 'pastoralists in transition' sites (Gelcha in Oromia and Luqa in SNNP). There are also two sites with a big majority of Protestants (Adado and Do-omaa)
19. There are eight PSNP sites in a number of new contexts: one near a big tourist attraction (Shumsheha near Lalibela); one in a chat-exporting site (Adele Keke); 2 in highly-populated enset livelihood systems (Aze Debo'a and Gara Godo); 1 in a re-settlement site (Do'oma) and 2 in pastoralist sites (Gelcha and Luqa).
20. We will also be able to make some comparisons which will assist in the process of typing and the development of a typological theory. Here are some initial thoughts:
 - Harresaw in Tigray looks very similar to Geblen. Is the same youth exit process in place? If not why not?
 - Shumsheha in Amhara can be compared with Turufe and Imdibir (peri-urban); Yetmen (Amhara); Geblen, Dinki and Korodegaga (vulnerable cereal, food aid).
 - Debre Berhan rural kebele is similar to Yetmen in livelihood system but under threat of suburbanisation like Turufe.
 - Sirba na Godeti compares with Yetmen in livelihood system and location on a major road.
 - Somodo shares some features with Girar (SNNP, cash crop) and Turufe and Odadawata (a number of different ethnicities and religions).
 - Oda Hara can be compared with Yetmen and Somodo.
 - Adele Keke grows chat (Girar, Somodo) but is also PSNP vulnerable cereal site (Geblen, Harresaw, Shumsheha, Do'omaa, Korodegaga).
 - Gelcha and Luqa, the pastoralist sites, can be compared with each other, but also with sites which were settled by pastoralists in the past (Do'omaa, Korodegaga, Turufe, maybe others in Oromia).
 - Aze Debo'a and Gara Godo, food-deficit enset sites, can be compared with each other, and also with Girar and Adado which are both enset sites.
 - Adado, also exports coffee and can be compared with Somodo (coffee), Girar (chat) and Adele Keke (chat).

Long Term Perspectives on Development Impacts in Rural Ethiopia – Stage 1 Final Report

Purpose and Methodology

Background and research questions

In the early 2000s the MDG-focused donor programme, with its promise of financial and technical aid, began to influence government policies and sector programmes, initially within limits arising from the slowly subsiding tension that had prevailed during the Ethio-Eritrean war. In 2003 the government produced its first poverty reduction strategy paper setting out a three-year Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP) with a focus on poverty reduction led by the pre-existing Agricultural Development-led Industrialisation strategy (ADLI) and human capital investment in education and health services (ESDP, HSDP). Government-donor dialogue intensified and the successor PASDEP (designed to be replaced with PASDEP 2 in 2011) built on the SDPRP adding a new focus on the commercialisation of agriculture, and additional governance aspects. Since 2003 aid to Ethiopia has grown considerably, increasing from almost US\$2 billion in 2005 to US\$3.3 Billion in 2008 as part of a 'Big Push' to meet the MDGs.

In this research project our main aim was to improve knowledge and understanding of what really happened when donor and government policies and programmes designed at macro-level were introduced into different types of rural community in Ethiopia between 2003 and 2009.

As described below we had access to a longitudinal community database with data points for fifteen sites in both 1995 and 2003. Five new sites were added in 2003. In 2009 we designed a research project to re-visit the 20 sites to explore the longer-term impact of all development interventions introduced since 2003 using the 2003 baseline and gained funding from J-GAM to enable us to undertake a Stage 1 project in six of the sites.

Before we started the fieldwork we identified four broad research questions to guide the research design, fieldwork and analysis:

1. What have been the impacts on rural communities and their members of the various development interventions implemented since 2003?
2. What similarities and differences can we identify in these impacts? How do they vary among different types of community and what are the reasons?
3. How does what really happened fit with government and donor models of how development should happen?
4. What do the longer-term trajectories of these communities look like? Where have they come from and where might they be going in the next few years?

As we got into the analysis we decided we needed to contextualise the development interventions in longer-term modernisation processes and developed five empirical questions to put to the database, around which this report is structured:

1. In each community what were the key features of the development situation in early 2010?
2. In what ways have the development situations of the communities changed since the mid-1990s? What modernisation processes were involved in the (potentially different) trajectories we are identifying?
3. What differences were made to the trajectories and the communities by development interventions and the connections between them between 2003 and 2010?
4. In what ways have recent social interactions, relationships and processes across the

development interface affected the implementation and achievements of the various government and donor programmes?


5. What have been the impacts of modernisation as a whole, and recent development interventions in particular, on the lives of the different kinds of people who live in the communities?

The longitudinal database and the new research

Fifteen rural communities in Ethiopia, selected in 1994 by economists at the University of Addis Ababa and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (Oxford, UK) as exemplars of the country's main agricultural livelihood systems, have been the subject of longitudinal study through:

- the **Ethiopian Rural Household Survey**², involving seven rounds of household panel data between 1994 and 2009
- the Ethiopia **Longitudinal Community Study**, involving
- fieldwork in fifteen sites in 1994/5 funded by the Overseas Development Administration, UK (WIDE1 - Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996)
- the ESRC Wellbeing in Developing Countries Programme at the University of Bath (UK): the same fifteen plus five new ones in 2003 (WIDE2) plus sixteen months of in-depth fieldwork in four of the fifteen in 2004/5 (DEEP).

Map 1: The Twenty WIDE3 sites



Map 1 shows the twenty sites for which we have data from 2003; six have been revisited during Stage 1 fieldwork and there is a plan to study the remaining sites in a Stage 2.

WIDE3 Stage 1 began in November 2009 with the production of Community Baselines 2003 for the twenty communities (Evidence Base 6), trajectory reports from 1994 for the six selected for Stage 1,

² See www.ifpri.org and www.csae.ox.ac.uk

a paper on the methodological approach and fieldwork plan (since replaced by Annex 1), and a Policy paper describing the macro-level policies, programmes and models, some donor-funded³, which entered rural communities between 2003 and 2009 (Evidence Base 5). Related presentations were made to donors and fieldworkers to get feedback on who was particularly interested in which aspects of the project and specific intervention-related questions they would like us to ask. Following this we set up a worknet of people to whom we sent three Briefing Notes as the project proceeded. Between 12 and 26 June 2010 the team met a number of donor stakeholders in various agency- or programme-based groups, which were presented selected sets of findings and emerging conclusions tailored to the groups' specific interest and asked for feedback to assist in writing the final report. The team also presented six papers at the 8th International Conference of the Ethiopian Economics Association.

Why a longer-term view on the impact of development interventions?

There are currently two main ways in which the impacts of development interventions within one country are assessed for local policy-making purposes⁴. On the one hand, individual sector development programmes and projects are subjected to detailed monitoring and evaluation within their short lifetimes, being judged in terms of success in achieving goals set at the outset of the intervention. On the other, differences in administrative and survey-generated statistical measures between different years are used as indicators of general economic development and sector progress over time. While the first provides a view of the immediate impacts of a particular intervention and the second some very simple conclusions about long-term progress (which may be challenged if country statistical office capacity is not so good) there are a number of practical policy-related questions that cannot be answered using these two standard and institutionalised approaches to development impact assessment. In particular there seems little awareness that interventions in one domain interact with others and that for some outcomes to be achieved there must be parallel changes in other domains. For example, are education policies synchronised with economic development and employment policies, and if not what are the consequences? Or, at a more mundane level what are the consequences of wildlife conservation policies for agricultural productivity?

Using a longer-term perspective on development interventions it is possible to explore the unfolding through time of real, rather than measured outcomes, and to assess whether interactions through time between interventions in different sectors have produced synergies promoting valuable development or interfered with each other, with antergies leading to new problems for one or other of the development fields. It is also possible to locate (ensembles of) interventions in the context of wider modernisation processes such as the spread of modern communications, the thickening of markets, and the building of the state.

Why a focus on communities?

We have adopted a focus on communities as we believe that this is the level at which much of development does or does not happen in poor rural societies. While recent donor-funded development interventions have been aimed at developing households (economic development) and protecting and developing individuals (food security, health and education)⁵ these interventions are all delivered by government structures through the prism of the local community in which different kinds of household and person exist in relationships and interactions with each other. The Government is aware that development requires changes in community-level social organisation and cultural practices and has been acting to produce such changes using a mix of ideological persuasion

³ Over a third of the government budget is currently aid-funded.

⁴ Cross-country comparisons of interventions are increasingly being used to draw general conclusions about General Budget Support and individual Sector Programmes.


⁵ This focus on households and individuals is related to ease of measurement for monitoring and evaluation rather than a theory of how development happens.

and coercion. The donor community is not active in this area, partly because it does not have much knowledge about it and evaluation and monitoring seldom goes below wereda level.

Development interventions and rural communities as complex social systems

This research uses a complexity social science perspective which is described in Annex 1. Development interventions and rural communities are conceived as co-evolving open and dynamic complex social systems.

Figure 1: Development interventions: complex systems entering complex systems



Support for the current aid and development ‘industry’ is predicated on a belief that planned interventions supported by resource transfers can initiate and accelerate development processes in less developed parts of the world. Development interventions are designed to induce changes which, it is assumed, will sooner or later result in a change in the trajectory of the country or community being targeted. Figure 1 shows that any single intervention enters a field where other interventions and changes are likely to be in play and which contains the legacies of prior interventions.

Simplifying the complexity using a purposively-designed complexity social science framework

The real world is complex and social scientists have to simplify in order to get any purchase on it. Until recently the dominant scientific ideal in empirical development social science has been the application of 'Occam's razor' to formalised mathematical models to make them as simple as possible. Recent improvements in computing technology have facilitated the handling of complex multi-method data allowing for a more realistic and policy-relevant social science. However, there still has to be simplification and in order to organise the making of useful data to answer particular research questions theory-based conceptual frameworks must be developed.

We used two main frameworks to help us to design the fieldwork plan and research instruments: one showing linkages between aid-funded macro programmes and rural communities and the second setting out seven perspectives from which to observe the communities under study. During the data interpretation process we developed four analytic frameworks.


Two conceptual frameworks used in the fieldwork design

How aid-funded macro programmes become community-level development interventions

Figure 2 shows how most development interventions are transmitted to rural communities and how information about their progress is relayed back to them. A few donors have had interventions which go straight to Regions around which there is a dialogue, and there are some wereda visits. Linked to regionalisation in 1994/5 and accentuated with wereda-level decentralisation in 2002/3, as part of 'building consensus' there has been dialogue between Federal and Regional governments. For example in 2010 Regions were developing their PASDEP 2 as an input in the federal PASDEP 2.

There is also meant to be dialogue between weredas and kebeles to enable the latter to make suggestions relating to interventions though we found only two references to this during the fieldwork.

Figure 2: Aid-funded macro programmes becoming community-level development interventions



Source: Adapted from Bevan, 2001

Seven perspectives on community systems

From complexity theory (see Annex 1) we took the notion that more than one description of a complex system is possible; different descriptions decompose the system in different ways. The 'multiple perspectives on community structures' framework involves two different holistic perspectives and five different de-compositions of the community systems. The headings in the framework have been used in various ways, for example to design the research modules and to structure the Community Situation 2010 reports produced for each community (Evidence Base 1).

Two holistic views of the community system

Perspective 1 – the community as a system adapting to its environment. This focuses on each community as a holistic system. How does each community work as a whole? How does it relate to its material and social context? How have community and context co-evolved?

Perspective 2 – the community in the broader Ethiopian context. Here the focus is on the location of, and relationship between, the community and encompassing systems (Tilly, 2008: 114)⁶: mainly wereda, zone, Region, country, globe. In order to identify communities with similar relationships to the larger Ethiopia we have developed a set of typologies which can be nested in different ways to suit the particular policy issue at stake.

Five de-compositions of the community system

Perspective 3 – community macro organisation. This involves the delineation of community structures of inequality along class, status and political power lines. How is the community structured in terms of wealth, income, poverty and extreme poverty? What forms do gender and inter-generational inequalities take? How do other community-specific status differences structure inequality. These might be differences in ethnicity, religion, clanship/lineage, length of time living in the community, and/or occupation. Finally, who are the community elites?

Using *Perspective 4* we look at a key sub-system to which (almost) everybody in rural communities belongs – *the household*. What kinds of household structures exist? What are the important differences among households? What are the local ideal household trajectories and what happens to households which never get on to these trajectories or ‘fall off’ them as a result of social shocks?

Through *Perspective 5 – intermediate social organisation* – we identify five institutional settings (fields of action) in which community members are active and which are frequently foci for sectoral development interventions. These fields are unequally structured and are simultaneously domains of power where different kinds of people have different roles and different decision-making power. The fields/domains, described in more detail below, are: livelihoods, human re/pro/duction, social re/pro/duction, community management, and ideas (cultural re/pro/duction).

Perspective 6 focuses on the *social interactions* which take place within and across the five fields of action. The community system is reproduced and changed through the day-to-day actions and interactions of its members and incomers. The actions of more powerful people usually have more impact, although everyone has the power to resist individually and collectively. For example, there are four types of response that members of a community can make in the face of planned change from above: exit, voice, loyalty and foot-dragging.

Perspective 7 views *social actors* as individuals with life histories. Each social actor has a genderage, class/wealth position, ethnicity, religion, maybe other community-relevant social statuses, a personality, accumulated human resources and liabilities, and a personal history with associated memories related to wider community and country histories. People are inventive and have aims and make choices; they are capable of behaving badly and well. In rural communities they are involved in a dense web of relationships; they are constrained and enabled by the roles open to them in the different fields of action, the density and reach of their social networks, and their relative power positions in local structures of inequality.

More on Perspective 5: intermediate social organisation⁷

1. *The livelihood field* in these rural communities includes smallholder agriculture/livestock and agricultural employment, non-farm business and non-farm employment, and migration and

⁶ Tilly C 2008 *Explaining Social Processes* London: Paradigm Publishers.

⁷ We used this perspective in previous analytic work for a paper prepared for the Empowerment Team in the World Bank (Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007)

remittances. These are the arenas in which household labour and, in some cases exchanged, shared or employed labour, is used to produce subsistence and cash income. They are also arenas for government development interventions, some of which are (partially) funded through aid programmes.

2. The *domain of human/re/production* includes all institutions and activities involved in the production and maintenance of people. Again the household is the focal unit supported by neighbour and kin networks. Areas and activities involved in the production of people include fertility, birth, maternal and infant health, child-rearing, health and education. The maintenance of people requires housing, household assets, water, sanitation, energy (firewood, dungcakes, kerosene, electricity), domestic work, food and other consumption, and appropriate caring by others. People also get 'reduced' through ageing and other processes.

3. *Social re/pro/duction* is achieved through social networks, social institutions, and social organisations. Networks are formed on the basis of neighbourhood, kin (blood-related and affinal), and friendship relationships and often go beyond the community. In some cases clan or lineage membership brings obligations. Important social institutions order life-passages including birth, in some cases transitions to adulthood, marriage, divorce, widow(er)hood, death and inheritance. Other institutions set rules for different aspects of social life, for example resource-sharing and exchanges such as work groups and share-cropping, and social exchanges such as attending funerals and visiting the sick. Social organisations include religious organisations and groups, workgroups and business organisations, community-initiated organisations providing social protection, credit and insurance, government-sponsored organisations such as service co-operatives and women and youth organisations, and community-based organisations sponsored by NGOs for particular projects.

4. In the domain of *community management* four types of structure are important: (1) community structures, e.g. for some decision-making and dispute resolution; (2) locally-specific wider lineage or clan structures, ethnic and/or religious structures, and political structures; (3) kebele structures including cabinets, councils, committees and social courts, and (4) wereda structures. More powerful people include local elites, kebele officials, kebele managers, extension agents, and wereda officials and we are interested in the overlaps among, and networks between, people occupying local and government positions. Local elites include people who are rich, elders, educated, religious leaders, and leaders of informal and some government organisations. The election of kebele officials involves factional politics based on local corporate groups (e.g. clans) and informal networks including kin. Extension agents in 2010 included Development Agents, Health Extension Workers and Health Promoters, teachers and community police.

5. In the *field of ideas* local people have access to seven types of cultural repertoires or models: (1) conservative customary ideas; (2) local modern ideas involving new life-styles and in favour of various moves towards individualism and egalitarianism; (3) repertoires of ethnic belonging; (4) externally financed religious mobilisations; (5) government modernisation models related to revolutionary democracy/the developmental state via wereda and kebele officials, party members, the media and word of mouth; (6) donor models via NGOs, the media and word of mouth; and (7) selected global repertoires. Ideas within one model are more or less contradictory to ideas in others. Some people are highly active in promoting particular models which may lead to social conflicts. People may draw on different models for different purposes and make longer- or shorter-term 'cross-repertoire' alliances.

We used this intermediate structures framework to order our 2003 societal and policy baseline data and to contribute to the calendar of macro level policies and programmes which entered rural communities in the period 2003-09 which was used in the Policy Paper. There are also 'cross-cutting' interventions designed to reduce inequality (Perspective 3) and develop community 'public goods' (Perspective 1). This is one useful way of making linkages between macro policies and processes and

outcomes at community level.

More on Perspective 2: community typologising for policy analysis

Previous analysis of the ELCD data in 2003 suggested five useful community typologies based on hypothesised 'control parameters' (see Section 1.8) which could be used for different analytical and policy purposes. *First* there were Regional variations in policy and implementation. The twenty sites come from the four big *Regions*: two from Tigray, four from Amhara; eight from Oromia; and six from SNNP.

Second, the communities fell into five main *livelihood categories* of broad relevance for policy. There were six vulnerable cereal sites regularly dependent on food aid, three highly-populated enset sites, six sites which exported food cash crops to urban areas; two international cash crop sites (chat and coffee), one site which exported food and coffee, and two pastoralist sites which were 'in transition'.

Fourth, in terms of *urban proximity* and access to markets, services and information two sites were very remote, eight remote, six relatively integrated and four peri-urban. However many of the communities considered less remote overall had remote pockets.

Fifth and *sixth* in terms of *ethnic mix* and *religious mix* across the twenty sites there were fourteen ethnic groups: Tigrayans, Amhara, Argobba, Oromo (Arssi Muslims, Shewa Christians), Wolayitta, Kembata, Yem, Kulo, Gurage, Silte, Karrayu, Gedeo, Gamo, and Tsamako. Fourteen of the communities were ethnically homogenous but only seven of these had only one religion. Three sites had two ethnic groups, while three were both ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. The religions to be found were Orthodox Christianity, Islam (Sufi and Wehabi), Protestantism (various sects), Catholicism, and customary beliefs, ceremonies and practices.

During the WIDE3 inception phase we added a *sixth* typing parameter to identify economic dependency: since 2005 ten sites have been in PSNP weredas and ten not. Table 1 shows how the twenty communities vary on these six typologising categories.

Table 1: Initial Typing of the Twenty Communities

Region	Livelihood System	PSNP	Urban linkages	Ethnicities	Religions
Tigray					
GEBLEN*	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Tigrayan, Irob	Orthodox Chr, Islam, Catholics
Harresaw	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Tigrayan	Orthodox Christian (99%)
Amhara					
Shumsheha	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Peri-urban	Amhara	Orthodox C 98%
Debre Berhan	Food cash crop exported		Peri-urban	Amhara	Orthodox Chr
YETMEN*	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Amhara	OC, few practice animism
DINKI*	Vulnerable cereal		Remote	Argobba 60+% Amhara	Islam, OC
Oromia					
Sirbana Godeti	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo	Orthodox Christian, Islam, traditional
KORODEGAGA*	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Arssi Oromo (99%)	Islam
TURUFE*	Food cash crop exported		Peri-urban	Oromo Tigrayans Amhara Wolayitta Kembata	Islam Orthodox Chr Protestantism Catholicism

Region	Livelihood System	PSNP	Urban linkages	Ethnicities	Religions
Somodo	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo (Arssi and Shewa) Yem A few Kulo, Kembata Amhara	Sufi Islam Wehabi Islam Orthodox Chr Protestantism Ritual beliefs
Oda Haro	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo	Islam, Protestant, ritual beliefs
Odadawata	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo (Arssi and Shewa), Amhara Few Gurage, Silte	Orthodox Chr Islam Protestantism
Adele Keke	International cash crop	Yes	Integrated	Oromo Few Amhara	Muslim Few OC
Gelcha	Pastoralist in transition	Yes	Very remote	Karrayu	Traditional Islam
SNNP					
IMDIBIR/GIRAR *	Highly-populated enset		Peri-urban	Gurage	Orthodox Chr Catholicism Few Muslims+ Protestants Traditional
Aze Debo'a	Highly-populated enset	Yes	Remote	Kembata	Orthodox Chr Protestants Catholics
Gara Godo	Highly-populated enset	Yes	Remote	Wolayitta	Orthodox Chr Protestants Catholics
Adado	International cash crop		Remote	Gedeo	Protestants 90% Islam., OC, Gedeo beliefs
Do'omaa	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Gamo 60% Wolayitta 40%	Protestants 70% OC 20% Syncretic
Luqa	Pastoralist in transition	Yes	Very remote	Tsamako	Tsamako beliefs Protestants

* Stage 1 sites


Four frameworks emerging from, and used for, analysis

During the analysis, through an iterative process, we developed frameworks to help us organise and understand our findings. One of these related to community trajectories and three to development interventions.

1. Community trajectories 1995 – 2010 and beyond

Figure 3 particularises the general complex systems framework of Figure 1 to present a map linking the empirical research questions described above to the structure of the remainder of the report. In Section 2 we present our findings on the community situations in 2010 which link with Annex 2 (A2) and Evidence Base 1 (EB1). Section 3 (A3 and EB2) compares modernisation outcomes between 1995 and 2010 while Section 4 considers the role of development interventions between 2003 and 2010 in producing the 2010 outcomes (based on A4 and EB3). Section 5 (based on A5 and EB4) compares impacts of interventions on different kinds of households and people while in the concluding Section 7 we offer some speculations about the future trajectories of each of the communities.

Figure 3: Community trajectories 1995 – 2010 and beyond



The frameworks related to development interventions were: cultural disconnects of top-down models with local models, social interactions in the development interface space, and the web of development interventions. These last three frameworks were used in the data interpretation and analysis for Section 5, but should also be useful for others to use in similar research elsewhere.

Figure 4: Exchanges between wereda and kebele




Figure 4 shows the interface between the wereda and the community with top-down policies and programmes entering the communities, monitoring reports being sent from the kebele to the wereda for upward transmission, and potential dialogue between community/kebele and wereda. The interchanges between wereda and community are affected by cultural differences or 'disconnects' which lead to complex social interactions in the development interface space.

2. Cultural disconnects of government and donor models with local models

Before embarking on the research we identified three ideal type cultural models of ‘development’ with potential influence on community-level social inter-actions around development interventions⁸: the government model (revolutionary democracy/developmental state), the donor model (a mix of economic neo-liberalism, western-style democracy and human rights, in proportions varying among donors) and the community local model (with variations among communities and different degrees of contestation within communities). These models contain some incommensurate aims and assumptions; in sociological language there are cultural contradictions which may be papered over for periods of time (as happened with the two macro-level models for some years) but are likely to cause problems at the social interaction level at some point.

Figure 5: Cultural disconnect between sector models and local models





Figure 5 shows the contrast between the cultural assumptions underpinning wereda-level sector programmes and those which are made by people living in rural communities. Both government and donors work with sector models and formal divisions of labour which are reflected in wereda structures. Fig 6 shows the wereda structure for Enemay wereda in Gojjam which, in 2010 had 17 offices 13 of which would have had wereda-level sector programmes of their own. Both government and donors use goals and targets, provide project implementation manuals to guide wereda officials, and have regular formal reporting procedures. Performance in relation to government targets may

⁸ These ideal-types abstract key dimensions of the different ideologies. In practice within both government and donor groups, while there was broad agreement about abstract goals, there was contestation about priorities and means of achieving goals.

be used to select people for further training and promotion. This culture is quite at odds with local community ways of doing things.

Figure 6: Enemay Wereda Structure 2010




3. Community subversion of formal programme objectives and rules: social interactions in the development interface space

The cultural contradictions between top-down and community development models have not been papered over; rather they have caused considerable problems for those in positions where they have to try to bridge the cultural divide. Figure 7 depicts the key development players in the wereda, kebele, and communities and identifies a set of ‘go-between’ who work in the development interface⁹ space and interact with wereda officials and community members. Kebele managers, Development Agents (Agriculture, Livestock and Natural Resources), Health Extension Workers and teachers mostly come from outside the community; they are employed by the wereda and given targets which, if not met, may have repercussions for their careers. A second set of ‘go-between’ – kebele and sub-kebele officials and kebele Council members are (s)elected from within the community and embedded in community networks and structures. The evidence was that many of them in the research sites were EPRDF party cadres¹⁰ with varied levels of enthusiasm for the party including some who wanted to leave office but did not dare to. Some stories of the experiences of go-between are presented in Section 6 revealing the extent of the cultural disconnect and the problems it presents to those working at the interface.

⁹ A concept which has been used and argued about by sociologists (e.g. Long N 2001 *Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives* London: Routledge) and social anthropologists (e.g. Mosse D 2005 *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice* London: Pluto Press).


¹⁰ In the build-up to the 2010 election there was a big push to increase party membership and activity in the communities; in one site it was said that almost everyone was a party member.

Figure 7: Social interactions in the development interface space



4. The web of development interventions

Figure 8: The Web of Development Interventions



Those designing, implementing and evaluating sector programmes and projects are prone to see them as self-contained.

Figure 8 presents a framework based on the argument that when a new field-focused or cross-cutting intervention enters a community it is affected by, and has consequences for, a pre-existing web of development interventions. As interventions proceed they have consequences beyond those intended by the intervention designers and implementers which may take some time to make themselves felt. We have not used this framework in this report due to lack of time.

Qualitative data-making and analytic interpretation: the scientific status of the findings

A possible charge that will be made by those who don't like or disagree for good reasons with conclusions we have drawn is that they are 'anecdotal' because (1) the data lying behind them only refer to six sites which are not representative of Ethiopia's rural communities and (2) the data have been 'collected' through procedures which have not 'controlled for' interviewer bias.

With regard to the first we fully accept that these communities are not 'representative'; they were originally chosen by economists in 1994 as 'exemplars' of six types of rural community and we have applied some well-accepted case-based methods to the data from the six sites. Through a process of case analysis and comparison we have provided narratives for each community, looked for commonalities and differences across the sites in relation to modernisation processes and the impact of interventions on the communities and people within them, and located each of them in the wider Ethiopian context through a process of typologising. As a result of this we believe we have developed a set of strong hypotheses pertaining to rural communities which can be tested and developed through more research, some of which would use existing secondary sources.

With regard to the second we would argue that empirical data are not 'given' or 'collected'; whether they are based on surveys, interviews, or participant observation they are made and recorded by people involved in a process of interaction with other people. Furthermore, all data analysis relies on processes of interpretation, including the most technical of econometrics.

During the process of making our data the fieldworkers had to translate questions and prompts in English into the appropriate local language, informants had to interpret and answer the questions in the light of their particular experiences, the fieldworkers had to engage in dialogues with the informants to follow-up on potentially interesting topics, translate the answers into notes and the notes into written narratives. Finally, we, the report writers, had to make some sense of a vast set of narratives coming from the perspectives of a range of different people involved in the development of the community including wereda officials, kebele officials, elders, militia, and women's association leaders, ruling party members, opposition party supporters, farmers and their wives, women heading households, rich, middle wealth, poor and very poor people, health centre employees, extension workers and teachers, old people, young men and women, and children.

Given this complexity how have we worked to maximise the validity of our conclusions? First we set in place a data interpretation/analysis process where we built descriptive evidence bases combining answers from all the modules and which referred back to them. Then these evidence bases were revised after the fieldworkers had read and commented on them and used in a process involving a first stage of interpretation and abstraction to construct the annexes. Drafts written by each of the report writers were read by the others; when facts or conclusions were challenged the original writer had to refer back to the data in the modules and if necessary make changes to the annex and associated evidence base. The annexes have been used to draw the empirical and theoretical conclusions presented in the main report. Any reader who doubts a fact or conclusion can consult the relevant annex and associated evidence base.

Theoretical conclusions

Community systems, contexts and control parameters

During periods when complex social systems (such as these communities) do not really change it is possible to identify 'control parameters' – dominating processes or sub-systems which may be internal to the community or elements of the community context – which, through a complex of feedback processes, ensure that the system reproduces itself in much the same way.

Exemplar community cases and the value of 'typing'

Ethiopia's rural livelihood systems are extremely diverse, even within weredas, posing deep problems for the macro- design and implementation of policies and programmes appropriate to particular local conditions, especially since there is little easily accessible information about the systems and the relative prevalence of different types. Case-based approaches such as the one adopted here can be used to establish descriptions of different 'exemplar' livelihood system types and to identify control parameters and outcomes of interest for each type or 'ensemble' of communities. With a larger number of cases it would be possible to extend the number of exemplars to include new types such as international cash crop and agro-pastoralist economies.

A sample of 20 'exemplar' cases would make it possible to develop a typological theory of rural communities by making comparisons across communities with the same outcome (e.g. rapid development or decline) leading to the identification of *different routes* (combinations of parameters) to the same outcome¹¹ each requiring a different solution.

To establish the prevalence of different community types and locate them spatially the next step would be to develop simple measures of the key parameters identified through the qualitative research to use with a larger sample of communities using community surveys and/or administrative data to generate a mapping of types of community. The data could also be used to refine and improve the emerging typological theory of Ethiopia's rural communities.

Complex system trajectories and attractor states

If data are available longitudinal comparisons can be used to explore continuities and change in communities and control parameters. For community systems on stable trajectories guided by control parameters there are a number of ways in which change may occur. One is a huge and sudden event or intervention from outside such as a war, land-grab or the discovery of gold leading to dramatic changes to the community, including its possible extinction. At the other extreme myriad cumulative small changes over a long period may, in complexity social science language, push the community further 'from equilibrium' until it is ready to be sent in a new direction by a relatively small new event or intervention. In between one or more 'meso' changes in context may lead to relatively rapid moves towards disequilibrium and change, for example green revolution changes combined with irrigation potential and activities and increasing market demand.

Identification of control parameters requires the kind of rich data traces which we accumulated in the 1995 and 2010 research. By comparing the parameters found in 1995 and 2010 for each community we have been able to draw some conclusions about the extent to which they have moved towards or beyond disequilibrium and the processes involved.

When complex systems are far from equilibrium and potentially ready to move in a new direction there is a period of 'chaos' where they seem to dither between potential alternative futures or 'attractor states' before settling for one. Accumulation of knowledge and understanding about transitions in communities that have already made them could be used to design interventions

¹¹ This analytic procedure has recently been named 'typological theorising'.

promoting potential good transitions and deterring bad ones. Using this notion it is possible to imagine that Ethiopia as a whole is currently in a chaotic phase being pulled in different directions by a number of alternative attractor states including a Chinese model, an African ethnic conflict model, and a new international-capitalist-colonial model.

Possibilism and policy

Different types of community are on different development trajectories and what may be a possible development future for one type will not be possible for another. Typologies and typological theorising can be used to identify ensembles of communities in similar situations and their control parameters and to explore what the more successful are doing that might be copied by the others, which might be something relatively simple.

Findings 1: community situations 2010

As we move on the main findings of the study in this section we consider similarities and differences in the community situations in 2010 under the headings of (1) livelihoods and community public goods, (2) lives and (3) society and government. Before doing so we provide a reminder of the typing of the six communities done in 2003 and a brief description of each community; fuller descriptions can be found in Annex 2, which is based on the detailed studies found in Evidence Base 1.

Community typing in 1995

Before moving on to the situations in 2010 it is useful at this point to consider where the communities were in 1995 in terms of the community typologies described earlier in Table 1.

Table 2: Community Typing – the Six Stage 1 Communities in 1995

Region	Livelihood System 1995	Food aid	Urban linkages 1995	Ethnicities	Religions*
Tigray					
Geblen	Vulnerable cereal	Regular emergency food aid	Remote	Tigrayan, Irob	Orthodox Christian, Islam, Catholics
Amhara					
Yetmen	Food cash crop exported	NONE	Integrated	Amhara	Orthodox Christian
Dinki	Vulnerable cereal	Regular emergency food aid	Remote	Argobba 60+% Amhara	Islam, Orthodox Christian,
Oromia					
Korodegaga	Vulnerable cereal	Regular emergency food aid	Remote	Arssi Oromo	Islam
Turufe	Food cash crop exported	NONE	Peri-urban	Oromo Tigrayans Amhara Wolayitta Kembata	Islam Orthodox Christian, Protestantism Catholicism
SNNP					
Imdibir Haya Gasha – later Girar	Highly-populated enset + urban migration	NONE	Peri-urban	Gurage	Orthodox Christian, Catholicism Few Muslims+ Protestants


* In 1995 there were customary religious beliefs and practices in all sites.

Table 2 describes the six communities as they were in 1995 in terms of six control parameters: Region, livelihood system, need for food aid, urban linkages and ethnic and religious composition.

Each of these six parameters was potentially important for the reproduction and potential change and development of the communities. Key parameters for the three vulnerable cereal sites were the regular drought which made subsistence farmers vulnerable, the remoteness which limited opportunities for other livelihood activities, and the regular emergency food aid which prevented the reduction of the communities through migration and deaths. While there was a potential for ethnic and/or religious conflict leading to change in Dinki and Geblen in 1995 these differences were not so salient in 1995 as they were later to become. Imdibir HG/Girar was a food-deficit enset site which compensated for the deficit through urban migration rather than food aid and being less remote was open to creeping change. Yetmen and Turufe shared the control parameters of surplus food production bringing in a cash income and urban linkages which opened up possibilities of change. However, in the 1990s Ethiopia's urban economies were relatively stagnant providing little stimulus to their rural hinterlands. Turufe was the one 'independent economy' with a potentially disruptive ethnic and religious mix but, while there was ethnic conflict at the time of the fall of the Derg, by 1995 a modus vivendi among the five groups was in place. Finally, while Region was to become an increasingly important factor for policy and development interventions in 1995 regionalisation was still under way for five sites. Geblen had been part of TPLF-governed Tigray since the mid-1980s.

The six communities in 2010

Map 2: The Six Stage 1 Sites in 2010



Geblen (Geblen Tabia (kebele), Saesia Tsaeda Emba Wereda, Tigray Region)

Geblen tabia comprises four kushets¹²: two of them lie on the Eastern Tigray highland plateau, the other two spread out on the steep slopes from the plateau to the Afar Region, are not easily accessible. A very small town called Mishig is emerging around the tabia administrative centre which has electricity since 2008. The tabia centre is connected through a small all-weather road to a tar road joining the zonal capital Adigrat (35 kms) and Freweini, the centre of Saesia Tsaeda Emba wereda (39 kms). In Geblen there are Erob and Tigrayans, though several people said that they could not clearly identify to which group they belong. There are two main religious groups, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, as well as a few Catholics. Geblen is a food-deficit site which suffers from recurrent drought and has been included in PSNP/OFSP programmes since 2005. Less than 10% of tabia is farmland, and landlessness affects a growing number of young households; main crops are barley and cactus and very small-scale seasonal irrigation is practised. The wereda OFSP packages are focused on goats, sheep and beehives but these have been badly affected by drought and disease leading many into debt. People engage in daily labour and a few have taken OFSP non-farm package options and are running small shops, teashops and bars in Mishig. Otherwise there are few local work opportunities and people migrate for variably long periods of time finding jobs on construction projects or quarry work in the Region, going to Humera for the sesame harvest, finding work as housemaids, waitresses or commercial sex workers, or increasingly (the males illegally) to the Gulf States with stories of hardship and failures but also successes – with a few people sending remittances. There is a Health Post and one full-cycle and two satellite primary schools in the tabia as well as a health centre and new secondary school in the neighbouring tabia at about 45 min walk from Mishig. Geblen has been under the control of the TPLF since the mid-1980s and women's rights are said to be well-established. Over 40% of the households in the tabia are headed by women.

Yetmen (Felege Selam Kebele, Enemay Wereda, Amhara Region)

Rural Yetmen is one of three gots in a kebele surrounding 'urban Yetmen', a small town with a separate kebele administration, founded around a Swedish-funded school established in the 1960s. All the rural residents are Amhara and Orthodox Christians. Yetmen is along an all-weather road going in one direction to Bichena, the wereda capital (17 kms and good transport), and in the other to Dejen, another town (same distance, transport) and from there to Debre Markos and Addis Ababa. There is good mobile network coverage everywhere. The site exports most of the tef it grows to Addis Ababa. There has been recent agricultural diversification with increased daily labour opportunities involving irrigation used to grow vegetables, two harvests (barley and chickpeas) from the same land using the Broad Bedmaker plough, and the introduction of breed cattle. Land shortage and population pressure has led to high youth un(der)employment. There is a Health Centre and private clinic in urban Yetmen and a Health Post in the kebele centre in a neighbouring got. Yetmen town has had a full cycle primary school since the mid-1990s; a secondary school should be built shortly – initial plans for its location on communal land provoked strong resistance. Most members of the community no longer participate in meetings and communal labour which they regard as of no benefit claiming a 'democratic right' to refuse established in the 2005 'good governance package'; the community also refused to go along with government plans for the siting of the secondary school on rural communal grazing land and the abolition of expensive memorial ceremonies. There have been changes in women's land rights and some cases of implementation.

Dinki (Hagere Selam Kebele, Ankober Wereda, Amhara Region)

Dinki, along the river of the same name, is one of five gots in Hagere Selam kebele. In Chibite, the kebele administrative centre 1 to 2 hours walk from Dinki, a very small town is emerging, with a few

¹² A tabia in Tigrigna is like a kebele; a kushet is a part of a tabia, like a got for a kebele.

'modern houses' built also by people from other gots including Dinki, and a small market. The kebele is located on the lower edges of the escarpment down to the Afar Region, which it borders; it is one of a few lowland kebeles of Ankober wereda in Amhara, with a rugged and hilly topography and small scattered hamlets of a few households. Two-thirds of the population of the kebele are Argobba Muslims and one third Amhara who are mostly Orthodox Christians. The community is remote, drought-prone and food-deficit; emergency food aid has been provided every year since 2005. There have been a recent expansion of the use of irrigation to grow vegetables and fruit which now involves around a third of Dinki's households. Land shortage and population pressure has led to a very large number of (mainly young) landless households. There is a Health Post with nurse at the kebele centre and a Health Centre in the nearest town (10 kms) which has recently been re-equipped. There is a full cycle primary school in the kebele centre and a satellite school in Dinki and a secondary school recently opened in the nearest town. There have been changes in women's land rights and some cases of implementation. Relationships between Amhara and Argobba are fairly good, although some people say that the community cohesion is only superficial. Although formally there are a large number of kebele and sub-kebele level structures for both government and the ruling party involvement in government and party matters is weak - Here too community people refer to the good governance package and their right not to participate.

Korodegega (Korodegaga Kebele, Dodota Wereda, Oromia Region)

Korodegaga is a collection of nine villages scattered over a large area (2 hours walk between some of them) and forming one kebele in Dodota wereda in Oromia. Sefera village, the administrative centre (and a legacy of the Derg villagisation) with some new administrative and service buildings, is located along the Awash river. The nine villages are almost encircled by the Awash and the Qelete, another perennial river. Access to Dera, the wereda centre, is either through a dirt road (25 kms) which is not passable the whole year or, crossing the Awash river on a manually-hauled raft as there is no bridge, and walking to Sodere where there is an all-weather road and transport to Dera. So on the one hand Korodegaga is remote. On the other hand, once on the all-weather road people can easily reach Nazreth (30 kms), the second or third largest city in Ethiopia, and several small towns on the way. Moreover, most people have access to a mobile phone (in addition to a public V-Sat phone in the kebele though only receiving calls). Almost all the residents are Arssi Oromo Muslims. Farmers are involved in rainfed maize and tef production but the site is drought-prone and food deficit and was a PSNP/OFSP site (NGO-implemented) from 2005. The potential for irrigation from the Awash has been increasingly exploited through an NGO scheme, a government scheme, private pumps, inward investors, including an Australian, and co-operatives. This has increased daily labour opportunities. There has been some distribution of communal land to landless youth in recent years. New migration to Sudan and Saudi Arabia started recently. There has been a Health Post since 2009 and there are a health centre and private clinic (preferred) in the nearest town (about 8 kms from Sefera). Grade 5 was recently added to the school. There has been progress on a number of women's rights issues.

Turufe¹³ (Turufe Wetera Kecheme Kebele, Shashemene Wereda, Oromia Region)

Turufe is one of three villages and the administrative centre of a larger kebele in Shashemene wereda in Oromia, not far from the border with the Southern region. The village is surrounded by two rivers and located on fairly flat terrain. It is adjacent to the town of Kuyera (3 kms), to which it lost some land in 2009, and not far from Shashemene (14 kms). Most people live in the central densely populated area of the village (legacy of the Derg villagisation) with piped water at several

¹³ In 1995 the community was known as Turufe Kecheme/a; since it became part of a larger kebele it is commonly called Turufe.

communal water points and electricity since 2008, obtained with help of an investor who installed an electric mill. The mobile phone network covers the area. The village is linked to Kuyera by a dirt road reaching the main road along which Kuyera and Shashemene are located. The proximity of Kuyera and of the booming town of Shashemene (radically transformed and attracting investors since it became zonal capital in 2006) goes a long way to explain what life looks like in Turufe – notably comparatively better infrastructure and access to a range of services (government and also big private sector expansion in Shashemene and missions in Kuyera – education and health), market opportunities for agricultural and other products and wage labour opportunities. The population is mixed, ethnically with a majority of Oromo and significant minorities of migrants from both northern and southern Ethiopia established in Turufe for many years as well as recent migrant labourers, and religiously with a majority of Muslims, and Orthodox Christian and (growing) Protestant minorities. Different groups in the community therefore have different social and family norms. Turufe is a food secure, surplus producing area, traditionally exporting potatoes and maize to Addis Ababa. Farmers also grow a variety of other crops, all based on rainfed agriculture, and rear livestock. Community members, especially the landless young, commute for daily labour to Shashemene and Kuyera towns; some women have migrated to work on the Ziway flower farms. There are also opportunities in trade, informal business, brokering, and local transport activities. There is good access to public and private health and education facilities. Women's rights have been formally established and implementation is increasing.

Girar¹⁴ (Girar na Yeferema Zigba Kebele, Cheha Wereda, Gurage Zone, SNNP Region)

In 1995 parts of Girar were in a kebele near to Imdibir town named Imdibir Haya Gasha. This kebele was split, with part joining the town and part joining with a rural community to become Girar which comprises sixteen villages surrounding Imdibir town. The villages of Girar adjacent to Imdibir are as urbanised as the town itself. Girar and Imdibir are bisected by a (gravel) all weather road with regular public transport, going to the zonal capital Wolkite (30 kms) and from there Addis Ababa in one direction, and Hoseana in the other direction. The mobile phone network covers the whole area of Girar. Rural livelihoods are organised around enset cultivation and cattle rearing, and urban migration to engage in all sorts of activities - from shoe shining to very big businesses, or joining older migrants to further develop their activity. Migration by young women to Arab countries is on the increase. Population density is high and landholdings are very small and there is a growing number of youth and young households who do not have their own farmland. Farmers grow an increasing number of complementary crops for cash, and household consumption especially for richer households, some of these promoted by the wereda and DAs (grains and vegetables and fruits), others in response to market demand (e.g. coffee). Chat and eucalyptus wood have emerged as high demand/value products and some farmers growing these are quite wealthy. People in Girar have access to non-farm daily labour opportunities in Imdibir town. People are almost 100% Gurage, a group with strong customary institutions and structures that are still very important in people's everyday lives and with which the government is increasingly trying to work. The Orthodox Christian and Catholic religions are predominant, though there are also Muslims and a growing number of Protestants. In the kebele there is a Health Post, though it lacks basic amenities, and a full-cycle primary school. There is a Health Centre and a secondary school in Imdibir town and a Catholic mission hospital within 12 kms. There is an emerging big change in women's lives, which the new regional family and land laws underpin and with actual cases of women claiming and obtaining new land rights and rights to divorce, evidence of successes in banning girl circumcision, progress in girls' education and associated reduction in the trend of young girls being sent to work as easily abused housemaids for relatives in towns, and progress in women's economic empowerment.

¹⁴ The full name of this kebele is Girar na Yeferema Zigba.

In the remainder of this section we explore the community situations in 2010, enabling us to propose a revised set of control parameters currently important for each site. We consider the situations under three headings: livelihoods and community public goods; lives; and society and governance.

Under **livelihoods and community public goods** we look at settlement, urbanisation, ecology, land availability, own-account farming, development interventions and other sources of income. **Lives** includes lifestyles, health, education, gender relations, inter-generational relations and inequality and poverty. The parameters of interest in relation to **society and government** are social capital, social integration, cultural integration, available cultural repertoires, governance and government-community relations.

Livelihoods and community public goods in 2010

Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix summarise the key livelihood and public good features of each of the communities in 2010.

Livelihoods and community public goods: common features in 2010

The six research communities were deliberately chosen to exemplify some of Ethiopia's different livelihood systems but nevertheless they have a number of common features:

- All sites have linkages with **urban places**
- At the heart of the local economies is the production of food staples and livestock by **smallholders**
- **Shortage of private land** and its control by the older generation have led to **youth landlessness** and un(der)employment
- All have important **off-farm and non-farm sectors** with daily labour and (petty) business opportunities
- All have government **extension programmes** (Development Agents and packages) for crops, livestock and natural resource management. The first two have mainly been focused on Model Farmers most of whom are the richer and more successful farmers. Farmers' Training Centres have not (yet) been at all effective for demonstrating new techniques.
- Those who used selected seeds and fertiliser and had rain or access to irrigation increased their yields.

Livelihood and community public goods: differences among the communities in 2010

- **Settlement:** Yetmen and Turufe are villagised allowing most inhabitants relatively easy access to services and nearby urban areas. Settlement patterns in the other four communities produce differential access to services and urban areas, most notably in Geblen, where two of the four kushets are very remote. There are a number of villages in Korodegaga (9) and Girar (16) while Dinki residents live in scattered hamlets.
- **Urban access:** Turufe inhabitants have easy access to the growing larger town of Shashemene. The centres of Girar, Yetmen, and Geblen are near main roads providing access to Wolkite, Debre Markos and Edaga Hamus, while once Korodegaga residents have crossed the Awash on the raft they are near a main road to Nazareth. Dinki inhabitants are the furthest from larger towns.
- There have been recent **allocations of communal land** in the Oromia and SNNP sites: to youth and women's co-operatives and in each of the Oromia sites to a new inward investor (plots between 20 and 30 hectares). Attempts to provide land to youth co-operatives in the Amhara sites failed due to resistance from landed farmers; in Tigray land was given to one youth co-op after initial resistance and lengthy meetings to convince landed farmers.
- There are signs that **modern technologies** are entering traditional systems. **Irrigation** is important in three sites (Yetmen, Korodegaga and Dinki) and has a small role in Geblen. A few people divert water to their land in Turufe and a water pump was recently taken to Girar. Some

farmers in Yetmen have used the Broad Bedmaker plough and some in Turufe a manual thresher. Tractors have been used in Girar and Korodegaga. Selected seeds, fertiliser and pesticides are increasingly used, while breed cows are spreading – though not yet widely.

- **Dependent** and **independent** economies: the three remoter sites have been drought-prone and food-aid dependent for many years while the three food surplus and market-integrated sites have been independent, although one of the latter received food aid during the 2008 drought in the south for the first time.
- Farmers in the independent economies respond to **market forces** as well as agricultural extension and packages only taking those things which they think will work. For example, in Girar sale of chat and eucalyptus is profitable and extensive, although not supported by extension services.
- Farmers in the PSNP dependent economies in Korodegaga (Oromia) and Geblen (Tigray) have been less free to refuse **OFSP packages** (to be taken on credit) identified as suitable for the area as DAs seeking to meet quotas have threatened loss of PSNP status to those who don't co-operate. In particular people in Geblen were forced to take beehive packages, and also fertiliser on credit. As a result of the 2009 drought which killed most crops and was associated with livestock deaths many people in both sites fell into **debt**. In Korodegaga the development of irrigation, also supported partly by the government, was not associated with the OFSP.
- Farmers in Dinki (Amhara) which has been dependent on emergency food aid (given as FFW since 2007) were not coerced into taking packages and there was talk of **wereda-kebele consultation** about agricultural extension which would suit the farmers in the kebele.

Lives in 2010

Table A7 in the Appendix summarises the key features related to people's lives in the communities in 2010 (including lifestyles, health and education, inequality and poverty, and gender and inter-generational relations)

Lives: common features in 2010

- **Lifestyles** in all sites have modern elements affecting clothes, hairstyles, houses, furniture, and utensils. Radios are common and mobile phones in most sites – and they are starting to appear even in sites where the network is not yet good (Geblen, Dinki).
- There is access to **preventive health services** and **primary education** in all sites, and **health centres** within 10 kms of kebele centres. Household **ease of access** varies depending on the location of the house relative to the centre. There are shortages of drugs and equipment in centres and posts and staff shortages in the health centres.
- **Family planning** in pill, injectable and implant forms is widely provided although there is (variable) resistance in all sites
- **HIV/AIDS** has affected people in all sites and testing is available. PLWHA are reluctant to reveal their status for fear of stigma and there is a worrying notion that the virus is 'an urban problem'.
- Treatment for **TB** is widely available. **Malaria** cases exist in all sites.
- Enrolment in primary school is high and gender equal. There is unmet demand for secondary, TVET and university **education** – with existing services far away and too costly for many.
- **Richer households** have better housing and more modern lifestyles and are able to use private health and education services which are reported to be of better quality.
- **Wealth inequality** exists; even in the poorer communities there are considerable differences between richer households and very poor households in housing conditions, lifestyles including diet, productive assets, and use of health and education services. Children of the poorest families or servants are less likely to be enrolled in primary school and more likely to dropout and poor families find it hard to meet the costs of education outside the site. Poor people are less likely to use modern health services due to the cost and are finding it more difficult to get exemptions.

- **Women's** land, inheritance and divorce rights are established and beginning to take effect. Access to credit and increased daily labour opportunities have increased women's economic participation. Moves against Harmful Traditional Practices affecting women have reduced female circumcision, early marriage, abduction, and widow inheritance though there is still some resistance. In all communities there is a woman wereda Councillor.
- **Youth** have emerged as a distinct social group in the community. Constraints on access to land for the younger generation have led to inter-generational and sibling tensions.

Lives: differences among the communities in 2010

Differences are linked to integration. Regional priorities may also play a role, as well as differences in opportunities and challenges related to the communities' livelihood situations.

- There is access to **TV** in the centres of four sites.
- People in Dinki and Korodegaga use river **water**. Less than 10% of Geblen residents have access to safe water and most Girar residents have to use river water. Most Turufe residents have access to piped water, while in Yetmen household water wells and taps are available.
- **Latrines** have been dug in all sites but many are not used, particularly in more rural parts.
- Distances to **curative and maternal health** and **post-primary** education services are greater for people in the three remoter communities
- Availability of first aid curative and maternal health services at **health post** level is found only in Geblen (Tigray) although the site had only 1 HEW at the time of fieldwork.
- **Malaria** is a big problem in lowland Dinki and Korodegaga; in the other four sites there have been cases among those returning from malarial areas and suspicion by some that malaria has reached the area.
- Some **poverty is** linked to community-specific **social exclusion**: non-residents in Korodegaga, landless female-headed households in Dinki, recent migrant labourers in Turufe, and homelessness in Yetmen.
- There is **women's** political representation at kebele level in Geblen but not elsewhere.
- 46% of households in Geblen are **female-headed** compared with around 23% in the other sites.
- There are some differences in the intensity of **intergenerational tension**. Roles in mitigating tensions are played by access to communal land (Korodegaga), reasonably attractive non-farm work opportunities for some (Yetmen, Turufe, Korodegaga, Girar), and migration (Geblen, Girar).

Society and government in 2010

Table A11 in the Appendix summarises the key features related to society and government in the communities in 2010. It covers social capital, cultural integration, social integration, the cultural repertoires of ideas, governance systems and relationships with the government.

Society and government: Common features in 2010

The communities exemplify different types of ethnic and religious mixes and degrees of homogeneity or heterogeneity but they also share some common characteristics

- Relationships with relatives and neighbours and **informal social protection systems** are very important
- Community **social capital** involves a range of community-initiated organisations which vary with differences in local ethnic cultures and religions.
- All communities have their particular sources of **social tension and conflict** related to economic, status and political competition. **Security** and **justice** systems in place involve interacting roles for formal and customary systems.
- Community members have access to a community-specific mix of **local cultural repertoires**: local customary and modern repertoires; ethnic identity and formal religion repertoires; government and donor/NGO repertoires; and selected global repertoires.

- There is a large array of formal government structures at kebele and sub-kebele levels and formal **penetration of government** through these structures and their role in managing government-provided local services and development interventions is strong. Government and party structures overlap.
- **Government-community relations** have been affected by government attempts to mobilise community members for development and to support the EPRDF.

Society and government: Differences among the communities in 2010

- **Iddir** (burial societies) are formally organised in all communities except Geblen and their roles have extended, for example, in providing assistance before death and providing loans. In the Amhara sites Government has attempted to involve *iddir* in mobilising for development using their sanctions system since the post-2005 election good governance package has prevented government from using sanctions. This was stopped in Yetmen following mobilisations by the *iddirs* against two unpopular policies: the abolition of memorial feasts and the siting of the new secondary school on rural communal land.
- **Clan** organisation is very important in Girar while clans play a role in local elections in Korodegaga and Turufe. Clan and sub-clan structures involve competition sometimes breaking out in fights among youth groups in Korodegaga.
- The main factors lying behind conflicts and other social tensions differ. In Dinki and Turufe, two of the three communities with ethnic mixes, community cohesion has mainly prevailed over tensions arising from the **political dominance of one ethnic group**. In Dinki Amhara and Argobba share a common enemy in the Afar. In Geblen neither Tigrayans nor Irob dominate politically and many people were not sure whether they were Irob or Tigrayan.
- There are differences in how the various **cultural repertoires** of ideas ally or clash with each other. For example while Muslim leaders in Geblen are opposed to credit this does not appear to be the case in Korodegaga, Dinki or Turufe.
- The extent of overlap between **government and party structures** varies, though where it seems to be less advanced (Girar, Turufe) other measures intended to increase it may be in place. For example during the fieldwork the kebele manager in Girar was trying to use the Development Agents to recruit party cell members. In Korodegaga it was said that 'everyone belongs to the party'.
- The form that **government-community relations** takes differs. A key factor is the extent of dependency on government resources. Officials and extension agents in PSNP sites use the threat of withdrawal of PSNP status to get people to act to meet government targets, for example digging latrines in Korodegaga and taking credit for packages in Geblen. Residents of non-dependent communities are freer to pick and choose among development interventions. Yetmen has a tradition of open resistance and poor relations with government and there is potential for conflict in Girar. Relations in Turufe and Dinki seem not particularly close or problematic.

Community typing in 2010

Using the data organised in this section we have inductively identified ten parameters of importance in determining the situations of the communities in 2010:

1. Regional variations in policies and implementation
2. Urban linkages of various kinds
3. Development services
4. Core livelihood system
5. Diversification
6. New agricultural technologies

7. Cultural differences
8. Social inequality
9. Social integration
10. Government-society relations

Comparing this with the community typing in 1995 we find three in common: Region, livelihood system and urban linkages. In the 2010 typing livelihood system is split into Core livelihood system and Diversification, while Ethnicities and Religions are replaced by the more complex Cultural differences and Social integration. Only when social relationships are bad do ethnic and religious cultural differences lead to social disarray, and such disarray can result from other relationships such as class or inter-generational conflicts. However, in the context of 'ethnic federalism', a system with the potential to encourage political entrepreneurs to use ethnicity to pursue state resources, cultural heterogeneity is a parameter which has the possibility of being triggered from outside. The 1995 parameter of 'food aid' is replaced by the broader category of 'development services'. There are three new parameters: New agricultural technologies, Social inequality and Government-society relations. Table 3, to which we will return in the conclusions section, summarises the key aspects for each of the six sites.

Table 3: Community Typing – the Six Stage 1 Communities in 2010

Region	Urban linkages	Development services	Core livelihood system	Diversification	New agri technologies	Cultural differences	Social inequality	Social integration	Government – society relns
Geblen (Tigray)	Urbanising centre. Scattered popn. Big town accessible from centre.	PSNP OFSP HP and HC Primary school	Livestock + vulnerable cereal	Daily labour; small business; migr'n: casual urban; seasonal agricult; Gulf (mostly illegal); education	Modern beehives - failed	Tigrayan, Irob OC, Islam, Catholics	Rich – poor Older adults – youth Men-women	No suggestion of ethnic or religious conflicts. Inter-generational tensions over land and youth exit.	Community dislikes forced package taking but kebele leadership unwilling to take to higher level
Yetmen (Amhara)	Small town; big town accessible; villagised	ADLI + NRM packages HP and HC Primary school	Grain export + livestock	Irrigated vegetables, more barley&chickpeas; medium and petty trade; education.	Selected seeds, fertiliser; irrigation;Two harvests BBM plough; breed cattle	None Amhara OC	Rich – poor Older adults – youth Men-women	Homogenous and tightly knit. Inter-generational tensions over land.	Post 2005 party recruitmt ex-Derg bureaucrats; refusal to be mobilised; demonstrations against decisions
Dinki (Amhara)	Urbanising centre; big town distant scattered population	Regular emergency food aid - FFW ADLI + NRM packages HP and HC Primary school	Vulnerable cereal + irrigation + livestock	Daily labour, some youth casual migration, petty trade	Experiments with spices in nursery; selected seeds + fertiliser on irrigation	Argobba 60+% Amhara Islam, OC	Rich – poor Older adults – youth Men-women Amhara bit richer; Argoba pol majority	Argobba-Amhara uneasy relation. History of conflicts with Afar. Inter-generational tensions over land	Govt mobilisation hindered by democratic right of non-participation. Kebele leaders 'between 2 fires'
Korodegaga (Oromia)	Big town accessible from growing centre (not vehicles); scattered popn	PSNP OFSP HP and HC Primary school	Vulnerable cereal + irrigation + livestock	Daily labour. Youth loading co-op. Illegal migration to Sudan.	Irrigation, selected seeds, fertiliser; investor's tractor	Arssi Oromo – clans; Islam	Rich – poor Older adults – youth Men-women Exclusion of non-residents	Historic conflicts with nearby pastoralists. Clan political competition	Government mobilisation involving threats. Foot-dragging. All are party members.
Turufe (Oromia)	Big town peri-urban, some suburban. Villagised	ADLI and NRM packages HP and HC Primary school	Potato and grain export + livestock	Commuting and casual migration for business +daily labour; flower farms; Gulf migrn; Education	Selected seeds, fertiliser; few breed cattle; manual thresher	Oromo + 6 Islam OC Protestants Catholics	Rich – poor Older adults – youth Men-women Oromo pol majority	Proximity to multi-ethnic Shashemene may assist social integration	Community able to mobilise against unwanted things: closing of hospital, full day school
Girar (SNNP)	Small town peri-urban. Big town accessible. Scattered popn	ADLI + NRM packages HP and HC Primary school	Highly-populated enset + urban migration	Chat and eucalyptus exports; daily labour; education	Selected seeds, fertiliser; tractor hire	Gurage, OC, Catholics, Protestants few Muslims+	Big gap very rich – very poor. Men - women	Inter-clan and sub-clan competition within broad Gurage mutual obligation	Post-2005 election violence. Party penetration less advanced.

Findings 2: Modernisation since 1995

In this section, using the same Tables and Tables for 1995 we compare the community situations detailed in the previous section with their situations in 1995 to establish how much, and what kind, of modernisation has taken place. We then develop a typology of processes affecting community trajectories between 1995 and 2010.

Modernisation of livelihoods and community public goods 1995 - 2010

These conclusions are drawn from comparing Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix supplemented with background knowledge from the Annexes and Evidence Base.

Modernisation of livelihoods and community public goods 1995 – 2010: common features

- New **public buildings** and **extension workers** based in communities
- Increased **urban linkages**
- Increased involvement in output and input, credit and labour **markets** including increases in output sales and use of credit, a reduction in share-cropping and an increase in renting/leasing and hiring of daily labour
- Increase in youth **landlessness** and **un(der)employment**
- Diversification producing much bigger **off-farm and non-farm sectors** with more daily labour and (petty) business opportunities
- Improved **agricultural** and **NRM extension** services and packages; increased productivity for those with access to selected seeds, fertiliser and water
- Spread of **green revolution** and **breed cattle** technologies
- Increased involvement of **women** in economic activities
- Increase in within-Ethiopia and international **migration**

Modernisation of livelihoods and community public goods 1995 – 2010: differences among the communities

- **Agricultural economic growth** in all sites except Geblen associated with agricultural diversification, green revolution technologies and high food prices
- Limited use of **modern equipment** in Yetmen, Dinki and Korodegaga
- The institutionalisation of **food security provision** in PSNP sites

Modernisation of lives 1995 - 2010

These conclusions are drawn from comparing Tables A6, A7 and A8 in the Appendix supplemented with background knowledge from the Annexes and Evidence Base.

Modernisation of lives 1995 – 2010: common features

- Big **lifestyle changes**, especially for richer households
- Improved access to **curative health services**, though still very difficult for very poor households and those in remoter kebele areas.
- Institutionalised **preventive health packages** introduced recently including: family planning, various sanitation packages, and malaria prevention, though there are problems related to shortages and community resistance.
- Some **mother and child services** through HEWs and health promoters: pregnancy checks, delivery in some, post-natal follow-up, mother and child vaccinations. Shortages are a problem everywhere and resistance (e.g. to vaccinations) in some places.
- Increased **primary school enrolment** especially for **girls**, but there is opposition to 'modern' full-day primary school because of household work needs, while the 'modern' school calendar provokes absenteeism on market days and during harvesting.
- Increased **secondary school enrolment**

- New access to government **Technical and Vocational Education and Training** and **private colleges**
- All sites with role models who attended **university**
- Increased inequality due to the **rich getting richer**.
- No institutionalised **social protection** programmes for people who are very poor, elderly, disabled, chronically sick or mentally ill; healthcare charge exemptions not working well or at all.
- Improvements in physical security for **girls and women**.
- Inter-generational tensions over **youth** landlessness leading to increased **theft**, drunkenness/ chat addiction on the part of a minority.

Modernisation of lives 1995 – 2010: differences among the communities

- Huge change in **primary enrolment** in the three remote sites.
- **More girls than boys** reported to be in **primary school** in most sites.
- **TVET** available near Yetmen, Geblen, Turufe and a college is to be constructed near Girar soon by an NGO. Residents of Korodegaga and Dinki do not have easy access to TVET
- **Piped water** in Turufe and part of Yetmen but water in Korodegaga and Dinki and most of Girar and Geblen is still **unsafe**.
- Reports from some sites of some adult **male involvement in domestic activities** such as water and wood fetching.

Modernisation of society and government 1995 – 2010

These conclusions are drawn from comparing Tables A11, A12, A13 and A14 in the Appendix supplemented with background knowledge from the Annexes and Evidence Base.

Modernisation of society and government 1995 – 2010: common features

- **Informal social protection systems** have adapted to wider changes and are still strong
- While there have been some changes to **community-initiated organisations** these have not been very big.
- Tensions between **youth and the older generation** have become less easy to dissipate given land shortages and population increase.
- There has been an expansion of the range of **cultural repertoires** available to community members, though local customary repertoire have remained strong with some aspects hidden, particularly those characterised by the government as HTPs. Some HTP instructions are not being well implemented including Government instructions to reduce expenditure on lavish death-related ceremonies.
- There is a much greater **penetration of communities by the state** involving a sub-kebele level array of overlapping government and party structures and associated with this a wider range of institutions and people that government can use to **mobilise people to respond to development policies and packages**. There is also much greater **interaction** between **community-initiated organisations** and customary institutions and **government systems**.
- **Government- community relations** have become more complex since 1995 since many community members are now, at least in theory, government actors. The main thrust of the relationship for each community has not changed much (see below) although people in 2010 were less willing to speak about it than in 1995.
- There were general processes of increasing **class formation** as land has remained in the same hands, rich farmers have grown richer, partly as a result of the Model Farmer focus on the more successful, and numbers of landless people involved in daily labour have increased considerably. In Yetmen and Turufe these processes were explicitly talked about.

Modernisation of society and government 1995 – 2010: differences among the communities

- Regular food aid has been incorporated into **informal social protection systems** in Geblen,

Korodegaga and Dinki

- In all sites but Geblen there has been increased formalisation of **iddirs** and engagement in new activities (e.g. loans to members, possibility of withdrawing some funds to treat illness which might prevent death). The Geblen *iddirs* remained informal only responding at the time of a death.
- While government penetration of all communities was much greater in 2010 there were differences in the range of **means used for government mobilisation**. For example, targets resulted in systematic coercion in the two PSNP sites Geblen and Korodegaga but not elsewhere, although there was a case in Yetmen of a HEW refusing contraceptives to women whose households had not dug latrines. Also the overlap of government and party structures seemed to be more pronounced in some communities (e.g. Geblen, Dinki, Yetmen, Korodegaga) than others (e.g. Turufe, Girar).
- There were also differences in **outcomes related to government mobilisation**. In the Amhara sites mobilisation was problematic as a result of both the Region's and the community's interpretation of the good governance package which was that people had a democratic right not to participate in meetings and community labour. In contrast the good governance package in the Oromia sites revolved around mobilising women and youth in associations, co-operatives and party-affiliated leagues and there was no democratic right not to participate. In Tigray there continued to be strong mobilisation though with emerging questioning on the side of some community members.
- There were differences in the main thrust of **government-community relations** from bolshie (Yetmen) to divided (Girar; men/women in Korodegaga) to distant (Turufe, Dinki) to easily mobilised but resentment (Geblen, Korodegaga). The tone of these relations can be traced back to 1995, with some nuances in the case of Geblen. Yetmen residents spoke openly of their hostility to the TGE in 1995 and voted for the CUD in 2005. In the Girar area the CUD also won in 2005 and the final election announcement led to riots and demonstrations which went on for some months. In 2010 political tensions remained beneath the surface reflected in the absence of a kebele chairman in Yetmen for at least six months and in Girar general dislike of the party-affiliated kebele manager and his procedures. There was little government presence in Dinki in 1995 and in 2010 engagement seemed looser than elsewhere. In Geblen there was appreciation of TPLF policies in 1995 and in 2010 there is no active resistance even to harmful policies, although a change in that there was openly stated resentment. Finally, in 1995 in Korodegaga and Turufe there were security problems and 'underground suppression' related to local support for the banned Oromo Liberation Front. In the 2005 election neither community voted for EPRDF (although many women in Korodegaga reportedly did) but there was no outcry when the final result was announced. In 2010, almost everyone in Korodegaga had joined the ruling party at least in theory, while Turufe residents showed little interest in the election.
- During the 2010 fieldwork in Korodegaga, Yetmen, and Girar **traditional beliefs** mentioned in 1995 were no longer mentioned, though they may still exist in practice.
- There are a number of factors behind **social tensions** that relate to **modernisation processes**, for example various combinations of urbanisation and youth landlessness, unemployment and dissatisfaction (Geblen, Dinki, Turufe, Girar), competition and conflict over land (Dinki, Korodegaga), and criminal behaviour linked to new economic opportunities (Korodegaga, Girar)
- In-migration associated with modernising changes has produced emerging patterns of **economic exclusion** and **adverse incorporation** linked to particular social identities: for example non-residents in Korodegaga, recent migrant domestic labourers in Turufe, and many female heads of household, particularly in Dinki.

A typology of process parameters affecting community trajectories between 1995 and 2010

Using the data organised in this section we have identified nine process parameters relevant for the community trajectories of some or all of the communities since 1995:

- Regional policy change
- Urbanisation and connectivity
- Development service change
- Agricultural technology change
- New and thickening markets
- Diversification of livelihoods
- Processes related to social dis/integration
- Class formation
- State-building
- Government-society relations

Table 4, which we will use in the conclusions section, summarises the process parameters for each site.

Table 4: Changes in Contextual Parameters Important for Economic Trajectories

Region	Urbanisation etc	Improved development services	New technologies	Thickening markets	Diversification of livelihoods	Social integration	Class formation	Governance	Government – society relns	Current economic situation
Geblen (Tigray)	Easier road access important	PSNP VI* OFSP problematic Education important	Irrigation – not VI	Urban and Arab country labour markets important	Considerable youth long- and short-term exits	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless youth	Longstanding govt and party penetration	Not much more interaction - fear of raising problems	Aid-dependent; re-structuring of economy - agricultural decline
Yetmen (Amhara)	Road maintenance and mobile phones important	Devt Agents important Education important	Green Revn technology VI Irrigation – important	National grain market - VI Local vegetable market important	Agricultural diversification; some long-term youth exits	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless daily labourers	Govt and party penetration started after 2005; some active resistance	Much more interaction - regular resistance to unpopular measures	Independent; good recent economic growth partly due to food price rise
Dinki (Amhara)	Increased marketing opportunities important	Emergency food aid important	Irrigation VI Green Revn technology VI	Local vegetable market VI	Agricultural diversification; some short-term youth exits	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless youth	Govt and party penetration started after 2005	Much more interaction - community desire to be left alone	Aid-dependent; recent growth in irrigation sector
Korodegaga (Oromia)	Poor road access problematic	PSNP VI	Irrigation – VI Green Revn technology VI 1 investor's tractor	Local vegetable market VI	Agricultural diversification	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless youth and immigrant daily labour	Govt and party penetration started after 2005	Much more interaction – dislike of frequent meetings; footdragging	Aid-dependent; recent growth in irrigation sector
Turufe (Oromia)	Rapid growth Shashemene VI	DAs not VI	Green Revn technology VI	Output and labour markets VI	Non-farm diversification	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless daily labourers	Govt and party penetration after 2005 (less than average)	More interaction - seemed to be few complaints	Independent but needed aid in 2008 drought
Girar (SNNP)	Internal roads important for loading eucalyptus	Devt Agents not VI Education important	Some tractor hire	Chat and eucalyptus markets VI Urban labour markets VI	Agricultural and non-farm diversification	No emerging serious problems	Landholders and landless youth	Govt and party penetration after 2005 (less than average)	Rioting in 2005; reduced interest in politics since. Increasing interaction	Independent

* VI = very important

Findings 3: Modernisation of the communities; the role of development interventions since 2003

Here we consider how far modernisation achievements by 2010 have depended on (which) development interventions.

The role of development interventions in the modernisation of livelihoods since 2003

Summarised data for this section can be found in Tables A4 and A5 which also draws on Annexes and the Evidence Base.

Infrastructure

- Livelihoods in Geblen and Girar were boosted by construction of **new roads**. Building of the allweather road to Mishig allowed inhabitants to travel more easily to work outside the kebele, improved the transport of inputs and outputs, and was important for developing the new small town. Construction of internal roads in Girar facilitated the sale and transport of eucalyptus – though people wanted better roads and bridges. **Maintenance of the main roads** was important for economic activity in the three independent sites.
- **Mobile networks** allowed farmers in Yetmen, Turufe, Girar and Korodegaga to access information about local prices; in Girar farmers could phone the vet directly.
- A few households in Girar used **electricity** in small business activities.

Environment

- NRM interventions faced problems in all sites. **Terracing** in the two remote hilly sites (Geblen and Dinki) may have prevented some erosion but did not make a big difference. Terracing and tree-planting using FFW and community labour in Korodegaga were regularly destroyed by livestock.
- **Tree-planting** for the Millennium faced problems in the drought-prone sites due to lack of rain and, in Dinki, successful resistance in order to keep the grazing land.

ADLI related extension and packages

- Agricultural packages of selected seeds and fertiliser for rainfed land in **the three drought-prone sites** did not meet with general success due to lack of rain and the same was true of the OFSP beehive and livestock packages in Geblen.
- **Irrigation** in two of these sites, Dinki and Korodegaga, and in Yetmen expanded during the period, partly through the provision of credit for pumps, and became more productive with the introduction of improved seeds and sowing in lines.
- **Selected seeds and fertiliser** improved main crop yields in Yetmen and Turufe. Inflated food prices accelerated the rise in marketing that was already taking place. It is not clear how important a role Development Agents played in this process.

Land interventions

- The end of land re-distribution, certification, and the legalisation of extended periods for renting and leasing (with kebele or wereda agreement) may be a step towards the consolidation of a 'kulak' peasant elite.
- 'Leasing'¹⁵ of communal land to youth co-operatives in Oromia and SNNP sites is a step in a 'developmental state' modernisation direction; in this connection Yetmen farmers fear youth co-operatives will use land inefficiently
- Leasing of land to inward investors in Oromia sites is a step in a capitalist modernisation

¹⁵ Communal land was provided to youth organised in co-ops and under some form of a contract that it would be used for productive activities; it is not clear but unlikely that there would be any payment for this use of land by the youth.

direction; the Australian investor in Korodegaga is using the land very efficiently

- Implementation of equal rights for women of inheritance of parental land and on divorce will increase land fragmentation

Non-farm extension

- Non-farm extension packages worked for a few individuals in Geblen and co-operatives in Girar

PSNP and other food aid

- In both PSNP sites the FFW was one constituent of the diversified livelihoods of the better-off households while it was vital to the livelihoods of poorer households who 'would otherwise be dead of hunger'. In Dinki it was especially important for those 'whose livelihood is daily labour'.

Livelihood interventions focused on women and youth

- Access to credit and increased daily labour opportunities increased **women's economic activities** everywhere except for the Argobba in Dinki.
- Communal land was recently 'leased' to some **youth co-operatives** in Korodegaga, Turufe and Girar. Farmers in the Amhara and Tigray sites resisted allocation of land for this purpose.

The role of development interventions in the modernisation of peoples' lives since 2003

Summarised data for this section can be found in Tables A8 and A9 which also draws on Annexes and the Evidence Base.

- Increased expenditure on **health** since 2003 has funded the introduction of Health Posts staffed by Health Extension Workers in all kebeles, the building of new Health Centres and the upgrading of existing ones. Those who can afford it prefer to use **private clinics**.
- HEWs have launched programmes to extend family planning, improve sanitation, and prevent malaria and the spread of HIV/AIDS. They are also providing mother and child health services. The HEW role is relatively new and they are hampered by lack of electricity and water in some Health Posts, lack of equipment and shortages of the simple drugs which would increase their attraction to their somewhat resistant clients.
- Rapid growth of **primary education** provision, particularly in the remote sites, has led to big increases in enrolment and more children joining school at the 'right age'. In many sites there are more girls than boys attending. There have also been increases in **secondary** and post-secondary provision although the demand for **TVET** places for Grade 10 graduates greatly outstrips the supply. Though only very few in e.g. Dinki, all sites have local role models attending or graduating from **university**. Richer parents whose children fail to get government post-secondary places send them to **private colleges**. A few rich parents in Turufe are also sending their children to **private schools**.
- There has been a strong programme to improve **women's rights** with new regional land and family laws in all Regions and signs of implementation in all the weredas, including arrests and imprisonment for offenders. Despite resistance from some people considerable reductions in female circumcision, abduction, early marriage and widow inheritance were reported and supported by many of our respondents. The idea that young couples should choose their own marriage partners was being increasingly accepted.
- The programme to improve the life chances of **young people** has been much weaker and not very effective. There has been no large-scale and effective intervention tackling landlessness and lack of local employment opportunities in Geblen, Girar, Dinki, or Yetmen. In the Oromia sites it is too early to say for Turufe while there has been some success in Korodegaga where there is less pressure from educated youth. A woman and children's committee in Turufe is taking up cases of child abuse and neglect.
- There have been no interventions which target the **poorest and destitute**, apart from PSNP which is critical for poorer households in both Geblen and Korodegaga; the same is true of food

aid/FFW in Dinki. In all three sites richer households also had access to these interventions.

- Similarly there have been no interventions targeting **elderly, mentally ill and disabled people**, apart from elderly people included in PSNP Direct Support component in Geblen and Korodegaga.

The role of development interventions in the modernisation of society & government since 2003

Summarised data for this section can be found in Tables A15 and A16 which also draws on the Annexes and the Evidence Base.

- Security structures involve **militias** organised at sub-kebele level, elders sometimes organised in **peace committees**, and **community police**. The powers of **social courts** were recently reduced with the introduction of **land management committees** and the referral of husband-wife disputes to the wereda.
- Changes to wereda structures since 2003 have increased the number of offices and given greater importance to the role of **wereda councillors** to represent their kebeles. The **BPR** process has led to some changes in procedures.
- There has been a strengthening of **kebele structures** since 2003 with some re-structuring of the Cabinet to include extension workers and the school director and the appointment of a full-time **kebele manager** paid by the wereda. **Sub-kebele structures** expanded and deepened with the establishment of **development teams** (in some places 10 households) and **party cells** (in some places 5 households). Sub-kebele structures were used to allocate agricultural packages and food aid and to mobilise people to send their children to school and apply Health Extension packages. There are systems of reporting from the bottom-up, in some places weekly, monthly, quarterly, six-monthly and annually. The kebele manager is involved in co-ordinating the reporting. He¹⁶ also receives complaints, helps people fill in application forms and services the Cabinet during meetings.
- Since 2003, and particularly after 2005, EPRDF party membership across the country has grown considerably and this is reflected in the sites. Kebele and party structures are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish and it could be argued that state-building activities in the last few years have increasingly moved the system in the direction of a one-party State.
- **Mobilisation of the community** to adopt government packages and follow new laws and directives involves action by a number of mobilisers including wereda and kebele officials, kebele managers, Extension Workers and teachers, Health Promoters, militias, development team leaders, Model Farmers and Households, Women and Youth Association leaders, and party cell leaders. Party members are expected to be in the vanguard in following development advice and adopting packages. The means of mobilisation include self-criticism/criticism, lectures in meetings, awards for models, and (often implicit) threats including of fines and imprisonment.
- A common phrase from wereda officials was 'awareness creation' and a common complaint was lack of awareness. Community respondents spoke of being 'awared'. Kebele and party cell meetings are the arenas in which most awareness creation takes place. One area of customary cultural repertoires which government has been trying to expunge is known as Harmful Traditional Practices. In addition to those affecting women described above these include traditional health practices involving cutting, extravagant expenditure on ceremonies and among Orthodox Christians not working on saints' days, of which there are many every month.
- Donor-funded governance interventions to increase **community participation** such as suggestion boxes, participatory budgeting and budget monitoring were not much in evidence in the sites. Two had suggestion boxes, one of which had not received a suggestion and there were no reports of budget monitoring.

¹⁶ There were no women in our sample, though there were a number of female Development Agents and a vet.

Findings 4: Impacts of recent development interventions on the wellbeing of different kinds of household and people in the communities

In this section, after a discussion of social inequality in the communities we describe the kinds of household and person targeted by each development intervention; we then explore the overall impacts of development interventions on different kinds of community member. Some of the data used in this section is summarised in Tables A17 and A18 while the rest can be found in Annex 5 and Evidence Base 4.

The social composition of the communities

The belief¹⁷ that there is not much **economic inequality** in rural communities in Ethiopia is not true as comparisons of photographs of rich and poor houses as well as other evidence from this research amply demonstrate. Economic inequality in the research communities has increased since 2003 because the rich have got richer, partly because of the government's extension focus on Model Farmers usually chosen because of their agricultural success or potential for success (linked to asset levels or access to resources like irrigated land). Rich households in some sites have tin roofs, plastered walls, a number of rooms, modern furniture, and some have TVs. Destitute households may have no house, building a shelter against the wall of someone else's house (Yetmen) or living in a relative's abandoned kitchen (Korodegaga) or in a neighbour's cattle house (Girar). Another telling example comes from drought-stricken Geblen where in one poor household we interviewed children could not go to school as they were (literally) starving while in others members were regularly consuming *shiro* (made of beans and spices) with their *injera*.

Some economic inequality is associated with **class inequality** between those with land and other property and those without, whose only source of income is daily labour on the land of those who have it. Increasing class formation of this kind was reported from Turufe and Yetmen and could be incipient in Korodegaga and Girar. **Status inequalities** leading to exclusion from economic opportunities were also associated with economic inequalities. In a number of sites there was evidence that kinship connections were important for access to government resources associated with packages and food aid. Female-headed households in Dinki were said to be unable to access agricultural package resources and the daughter of one of our female household head respondents was not allowed to participate in FFW. In Korodegaga 'non-residents' were excluded from accessing interventions; one case was a woman who had grown up in Korodegaga but whose husband was an outsider.

Gender inequalities interact with other differences: age differences; differences between wives and single/widowed/divorced women heading households; and wealth-poverty differences. There are a few rich female-headed households in the sites who are clearly better off than some poor wives. The same is true of inter-generational inequalities between adults and the elderly and adults and youth.

Finally interacting with all these social differences are **inequalities in political power**, in particular in access to the government resources coming into the community. In this connection becoming active in EPRDF-related structures like the Women's Association is a potential route to upward mobility for those not well-entrenched in the community networks. They also offer a battleground for competing networks.

What kinds of people have recent development interventions targeted?

Infrastructure

While the value of infrastructure improvements such as road development, electricity and mobile phone networks is often argued in terms of livelihood development it also provides other benefits.

¹⁷ Reportedly held by economists working for one of the larger donors.

For example widening of internal roads (important in improving eucalyptus sales in Girar), especially if there is also electric light, makes it harder for thieves and sexual attackers to hide, with the result that vulnerable people are freer to move about in the community. The building of new allweather roads (as from Geblen) which improved access to output, input and labour markets, also made it easier to get to health services and schools and for people to experience urban lifestyles. The construction of public buildings such as Health Posts, schools, veterinary centres and kebele offices is usually done through community labour (sometimes FFW); such buildings bring variable benefits to different kinds of community members. Phone (mobile or else) was important to keep in touch with relatives in all sites, and in Turufe, Girar and Geblen it helped people to organise medical emergency services when needed.

Environment

Most environmental interventions are meant to bring a public benefit but since they have to be located in a place they often provide private benefits or harms. The digging and lining of expensive water reservoirs in Girar was intended to benefit 6 Model Farmers, the primary school and a youth co-operative, while in Korodegaga some farmers refused to have terraces on their land. Theoretically every able-bodied person over the age of 18 is meant to participate in a number of days of free community labour, although in practice the level of activity seemed to vary across sites.

ADLI

Agricultural extension advice has mainly been focused on Model Farmers who are usually richer (though in Turufe they were said to be of middle wealth) and mostly male – though there were some female model farmers among our interviewees e.g. in Girar. They receive packages first and if there are small 'quotas' are top of the list. They may be 'graduated' from a package; for example a number who implemented planting advice on irrigated land in Korodegaga, which reportedly increased yields considerably. In Yetmen the introduction of planting in rows on irrigated land increased the workloads of wives and daughters. Offspring of farmers who had grown richer as a result of green revolution improvement or breed cows said they benefited through better food and the ability to cover educational costs.

PASDEP plans for extended training programmes in Farmers' Training Centres for literate farmers and shorter ones for the others have failed to materialise due to lack of resources and also interest on the part of farmers. Various respondents who were not Model Farmers reported benefiting from hearing the DAs advice, though poorer farmers said they could not afford to implement it.

Land interventions

The implementation of daughters' inheritance rights in Korodegaga was appreciated by their husbands who gained land but not their brothers, who lost it. One youngest brother in Korodegaga who was farming land left after his brothers had taken their share was forced to share it with 5 sisters. Women's rights to land on divorce and in sites with polygyny if her husband takes a new wife have reduced male access to land. A number of married women said the rights gave them a feeling of security even though they thought they were unlikely to use them. 'Leasing' of communal land benefited youth groups in Korodegaga and Girar, though land allocated to one group with kebele agreement in Korodegaga was re-allocated to an investor from Australia by the wereda. His presence benefited a women's co-operative whose land he ploughed with his tractor and many community members as he used the tractor to improve the road which also saved them from doing it by hand. He employs a youth co-operative for loading and unloading and some daily labourers.

Non-farm extension

There were few non-farm extension programmes in the sites, involving a few individual women and youths in Geblen and individual youth in Girar (in Dinki this was not carried through as had been promised) and youth co-operatives in Korodegaga and Girar.

Food-for-Work

FFW in all three sites was a life saver for poor landed households and landless people relying on daily labour. Due to the community networks described above some rich people were included in the PSNP programmes while a few poor were excluded. In Geblen all women were said to be included. A boys focus group in Korodegaga said that the food provided through food-for-work gave them energy to go to school and work properly but that they also had to contribute work which led to absenteeism.

Direct food aid

Direct food aid was vital for elderly people and some poor female-headed households. A number of people said it was their only income. Pregnant women and mothers with children aged less than 10 months were exempted from work in Geblen.

Health

With regard to illness members of richer households were more likely to use private clinics while poorer households could not always afford Health Centre and drugs charges. Many of the Health Extension Packages involve expenditures which are particularly problematic for poorer households; some also involve labour, presenting a problem for elderly and female-headed households with no physically active members. In Girar and Geblen youth groups provided labour for such households. Contraceptives and Mother and Child services provided by HEWs and Health Promoters benefited willing recipients when the pills, equipment and training (only 2 were trained in delivery) were available.

Education

Most children in all sites were enrolled in primary school; most (though not all) of those not enrolled came from very poor households who could not afford materials or hired sons out as herders or daughters as domestic workers. Respondents commonly reported that children liked going to school. Parents sometimes needed children to be at home all day, especially on market days and during harvesting, leading to regular absenteeism. Older children were said to resist this. The workloads of women with daughters at school increased though this was partially compensated for by the spread of grinding mills and use of bottled oil. Many parents in Yetmen, Girar, Geblen and Turufe made sacrifices to send their children to school in the hope that they would get to university or TVET and get good jobs (and in Geblen and Girar among our interviewees there were young people working and studying at the same time and financing themselves) and this possibility was becoming attractive to some parents in Dinki and Korodegaga.

Gender interventions

The details of these were discussed earlier; taken together they were leading to changes in the balance of resources and relationships in male-headed households and improving the rights and status of women heads of households. Young women could see new prospects.

Youth interventions

Small youth co-operative experiments were in place in Korodegaga, Geblen, Turufe and Girar, and a space in Dinki had been set aside as a football pitch. Some young people also benefited from the non-farm extension programme opportunities mentioned earlier. Otherwise there seemed to be few interventions aimed at youth.

Pro-poor interventions

Poor women in Korodegaga were provided with sheep and one with an ox. Some of the sheep turned up in rich households. PSNP benefited poor households. One elite rich farmer with three wives persuaded the sub-kebele to register his first wife who was old and blind as a direct PSNP beneficiary because some her cattle had died in the 2005 drought. NGO assistance to poor families

with children was provided in Yetmen and Girar, though it was recently phased out in Turufe. A dormitory for poor female students was built in the Yetmen's wereda town – Bichena. Malnourished children in some sites benefited from feeding programmes – in small or larger numbers and for different durations depending on the site; some of these children were from richer households.

Security and Justice

Despite increased security efforts theft from rich and middle household farms was reported as not much reduced. One problem was the difficulty of prosecuting the thieves if they were not 'caught red-handed' and the other that some were said to be related to kebele or wereda officials. There were reports of militia failing to arrest relatives accused by less powerful people, although there were also reports of some such people getting justice at both kebele and wereda level. Women and girls going to school were reportedly safer from the risk of rape or abduction. However, a few respondents including domestic servants and women heading households described rapes which they had not been willing or able to raise with militia, elders or courts.

Impacts of recent development interventions on different kinds of household and person

The data used in this Section was made with a small number of households and dependent adults in each site chosen to include richer, middle and poor and very poor male-headed households and richer and poorer female-headed households. These households were not selected randomly so no general conclusions about site differences can be drawn.

Male-headed households

Most of the **extension advice** from the DAs was focused on the wealthier households although in Turufe and Girar poorer farms said that they had learned from the DAs. Among our interviewees there were five Model Farmers: three rich (Dinki, Girar, Geblen), one middle (Girar) and one poor (Geblen). This last one was rewarded with a hoe and shovel at sub-kebele level for the best land and compost preparation. In Yetmen the middle-wealth farmer said that Model Farmers exaggerated their achievements. Farmers working closely with DAs benefited from advice on fertiliser and improved seeds in all sites, composting (Turufe and Yetmen), row planting and crop calendars (Dinki), soil and water conservation (Geblen) and pest control and cross-bred livestock (Turufe). In Korodegaga several farmers complained about the lack of follow-up on a new maize variety which led to its total failure. There were complaints from poorer farmers about the lack of credit for fertiliser and its high price. Where crops had failed due to poor weather (Korodegaga, Yetmen, Geblen and Dinki) farmers faced indebtedness.

Richer farmers in three sites, Girar and Yetmen and Korodegaga, expressed the view that the **extension services were not of much use to them**, and that the improvements in their livelihoods came as a result of their own efforts often in other areas, rather than because of the services provided. However, the reasons in the three sites varied. In Girar this was because the rich household was involved in non-agricultural livelihood activities and in chat and fruit production which were not the focus of the extension programme. In Yetmen it was because the farmers rely on established market-related activities and the cooperative sector has little to offer. In Korodegaga it was because the emphasis was on irrigation which DAs were not much involved in, investment in livestock, and drought had reduced the potential for improving livelihoods anyway.

There was a general appreciation of **livestock extension** services and **veterinary services** where these were available (there was no vet services in Geblen and Korodegaga, and some sites where no livestock DA was present). **Credit** was more important in some sites and in all sites more risky for poorer farmers, particularly in the drought-prone sites since the credit was mostly related to livestock. **Co-operatives** were mentioned by a number of households in Yetmen and Geblen though none seemed to find them useful.

The most important difference in relation to the use of **curative facilities** was in the ability to afford

health care and in particular to go further to obtain private health care, particularly in wealthier sites: Turufe, Yetmen and Girar. In Turufe the middle wealth household made use of the hospital and Catholic mission clinic, whereas the rich household used these as well as private clinics in Shashemene and even a hospital in Hawasa when the head injured his leg. In Yetmen the rich household went to town for treatment for the head's hypertension and the wife's eye injury. In Girar the rich household went to a Catholic Mission hospital for the treatment of a child sick with malaria and several women interviewed went there for delivery; one of the middle wealth households went to Addis Ababa for the wife's heart problem and a daughter working there also had surgery. In Korodegaga rich, middle and poor households expressed preferences for a local private clinic rather than the government service in the same town, partly due to lack of drugs but also because rural people were not treated politely in the government facility. In cases where the modern medical facilities do not provide cures or people do not believe that they could, households, particularly the poorer ones, try **traditional cures**, notably holy water as in the case of a son with a **mental problem** in a poor household in Yetmen and a daughter suffering from **chronic headache** in a poor household in Korodegaga, and several cases in Geblen.

Regarding **preventive** care there were site differences regarding the interest in the measures promoted by the HEWs ranging from enthusiasm in Girar, through interest in Turufe and acceptance in Geblen and Korodegaga to resistance in Yetmen and especially Dinki. There were also some indications of wealth playing a role in the ability to make use of soap and water in washing.

There has clearly been good access to **primary education** for all wealth categories. Children from poor households go to school – though facing more difficulties than children from wealthier households as noted earlier, and hunger is an issue for poorer children in the drought-prone sites. There are cases of children dropping out of primary school among the non-poor in three sites Geblen, Korodegaga and Yetmen. Wealthier households have sent children to better primary schools in towns in Turufe and Korodegaga. For **secondary school** the question of wealth becomes more important due to the cost of transport and living expenses, particularly in the three poorer drought prone sites. In Yetmen a daughter in a middle wealth family was made to drop out of secondary school since her parents wanted her to marry, and in Geblen a girl in a poor household stopped at grade six when she gave birth.

Regarding **good governance** the question of meetings was raised in Yetmen, Dinki and Geblen. In the Amhara sites the good governance concerns led to a reduction in meetings; whereas this was seen as positive by the rich household head in Yetmen the poor household head in Dinki did not see it as a good sign. He was also concerned about the Kebele imposing fines without providing receipts. In Geblen the head of the very rich household, who is a member of the Kebele council and militia, suggested that it would be good if the Party had fewer meetings whereas the poor household head mentioned the issue of the cost of membership. The view that **taxation** has an important role in guaranteeing land rights seems to be widely held across sites.

Views against **female circumcision** were expressed by wives from different wealth categories in Korodegaga, Turufe and Girar; in each of these sites there were cases where the older daughters were circumcised but not the younger ones. In Turufe in the middle wealth household the girls themselves were against circumcision and made their own marital choices. Wealthier men in Yetmen, Dinki and Girar were resistant to women's rights. Among the women interviewed there was generally a positive view about the principle of **contraception** but few examples of women who had practised it. The only cases were in Yetmen and Girar.

Female-headed households

Both women in Turufe had benefited from improved access to water and to electricity which permitted the establishment of a new grinding mill and one had a TV. In Geblen the older woman paid 20 birr a month for electricity.

None of the female-headed households had any interaction with the **extension services** except for one woman heading her household and who was also a model farmer, in Girar. Some had benefited from the registration and certification process which consolidated **women's land rights**. Both women in Turufe (who were not poor) won cases taken to the wereda court, one as an 'inherited widow' and the other in a dispute with a sharecropper who claimed her land. A widow in Korodegaga who kept the land was able to rent it to an investor. The elderly woman in Dinki had a certificate in her name. Both women in Korodegaga had obtained **credit** through NGO sponsored schemes in which the wereda was involved. In Girar one woman took a loan from a credit association which was repaid through involvement in food and drink production. In the PSNP sites one woman from Korodegaga with a number of small children received direct support while the other had been involved in FFW and when that finished received some emergency aid. In Geblen the older woman was exempted from work but was sharing her ration with a cousin. The other had to take fertiliser in order to be included in the PSNP but drought made it useless and delays in the PSNP payment meant she had to sell assets and borrow money to buy food. One of the women in Dinki got some grain as food aid while an elderly woman in Girar was given some oil and fafa by an NGO.

These women had more involvement with **health** interventions. They all spoke well of the HEWs except in the Amhara sites. In Girar they said they were following advice related to the sanitation package. The younger woman went to the health centre for her hypertension and the older woman got her blood pressure checked regularly. In Turufe one woman had obtained painkillers from the HP. In Yetmen one woman got a bednet and took trachoma prevention medicine which made her ill. The Korodegaga widow got food aid for her malnourished children and a check-up at the Health Centre. The cost of health services was an issue for poorer women; one in Dinki who has had a heart problem for four years cannot afford to go to the health services.

Most of the women interviewed were not of an age to have children. In Geblen one woman, not that wealthy but making good of the expansion of the small town in the tabia centre where she had a house and rented rooms for government employees, had five children in school and her oldest daughter was a university graduate. One of the women in Turufe had benefited from the recent opening of a nearby primary **school** which her younger children attended while her older children went to secondary school in the nearby town. A daughter of one of the Dinki women had dropped out of school to care for her sick mother while one Korodegaga mother had a son who was a herder and the other's son had dropped out of Grade 5.

Two elderly women in Dinki and Girar said that **governance** had improved over the long term. Both Turufe women said that they had benefited personally from the improved security and justice though one complained that there were still crop thefts. A woman in Geblen complained that exemptions for the poor were not handled transparently. Only in Geblen and Korodegaga were the women interviewed **politically active**. All four were Party members. The younger Geblen woman was on the wereda council while one of the Korodegaga women was active in the Women's Association and was involved in a women's co-operative which had been refused land by the kebele and the wereda ARD office; a decision which was over-turned following an appeal to the women's office at the wereda.

Dependent adults

Generally dependents had less involvement with **livelihood interventions** than household heads due to their dependent status and for some categories their wealth, age or migrant status. Many interventions are targeted at the household head or the household as a whole. The younger and old age male dependents were less able to take advantage of livelihood interventions, the latter due to infirmity and dependency and the former as they often did not have their own land. Likewise migrants were working for others and did not have the status of householders who could engage with extension services. The type of intervention also mattered with dependents less able to make use of agricultural extension services and benefiting more from livelihood social protection

interventions. The uptake of intervention opportunities was also related to whether the site was drought-prone and aid-dependent or market-oriented and independent, and was related to site specific interventions.

The women dependents were generally less involved in livelihood interventions based on agriculture, since the extension services were more focused on male and richer households. Some categories of women dependents, notably wives and young women living with parents, were able to benefit from interventions relating to **livestock** and certain categories from **credit** in some sites, particularly wives in Girar and women with children in Geblen. Some women dependents were involved in **non-agricultural livelihoods** notably pottery among the poor wives and girls in Girar; although some had received advice, two of them claimed that the extension services were not interested in them as potters and one suggested that the government should think of organising potters into an association. The female migrant dependents are involved in household labour in Turufe and therefore invisible to the extension services.

In the human reproduction field there were significant difference between the male and female dependents in the extent to which they were involved in **health care** interventions. Whereas the male dependents tended to have rather limited involvement with health care, being mainly single young healthy men without families of their own, the women dependents had more needs, since apart from the young women living with parents most of the others had families. Whereas only some of the male migrants and divorcees with families and some male dependents in Geblen had made use of curative services all the women dependents had sought health care.

Women dependents expressed quite positive views about the health extension services.

Contraception was particularly important for younger women, especially those living with their parents and for those who had children without being married but not wanting to have more.

Women of child-bearing age also obtained some peri-natal care, to differing extents depending on site conditions. Apart from the young women living with parents and the very old ones, women with children were involved with health care facilities for their children, notably vaccinations to varying degrees depending on site conditions. Among those interviewed two dependent young men were going to **school** while three young women had dropped out. Among the women dependents there were also a few cases who had children at school, and there was also a middle aged dependent man in Geblen with five children at school.

There were a notable number of cases of **court appeals**: a young man in Geblen appealed to the wereda court; women in Girar and Dinki obtained favourable verdicts at the wereda court; two young dependent women in Dinki won cases at the kebele court while migrant men in both Turufe and Korodegaga were able to bring cases to the kebele court. Women dependents benefitted to an extent from gender-related policies relating to land, female circumcision, access to contraception and violence against women.

Findings 5: Negotiating cultural disconnects in the development interface space: some 'go-between' experiences

There are three main sets of players who interact in the development interface space described above: wereda officials¹⁸, community members and the 'go-betweens'. As shown earlier in Figure 7 there are two kinds of go-between: kebele and sub-kebele officials (s)elected from the community; and kebele managers, extension workers, and teachers employed by the wereda. We interviewed both kinds about their work and found them to be people 'between two fires': above them the wereda was trying to follow the rules and targets coming from higher levels and beneath them the community members were willing to co-operate on interventions they thought would benefit them but otherwise were trying to get on with their lives. These go-betweens are pressed by wereda

¹⁸ Wereda officials are also go-betweens at another level.

officials, who are being pressed from above, to achieve unrealistic targets; in order to make things work at all they develop sets of 'nonconforming practices'.

Kebele chairs and vice-chairs

The kebele officials are related to community members in other ways and under pressure from their networks to pass on benefits to them. Since the appointment of kebele managers they have lost the financial compensation that used to be paid for their time and are expected to perform many functions with no official reward. Two quotes from men who are, or have been, kebele chairs reveal some of the problems.

He stressed that they (leaders) have been suffering being sandwiched between 'two fires', Wereda officials from above and the community here. He indicated that the Wereda order them to do this or that and if they couldn't do so government would suspect them of other motives, and the people would directly confront them resisting implementation. *Kebele Vice-Chair*

People refused to apply the new maize species on irrigation because they had sufficient rain fed crops and did not give attention to irrigation. Although we tried to convince them about its importance, they refused. I was busy and could not work on my own farm activities, mainly irrigation. I complained and wanted to resign and do my own tasks and finally the community accepted it. My wife was complaining about the left family tasks and this has created conflict in my family and does not leave time for leisure. *Retired Kebele Chair*

When Wereda officials come they call us and order us as they wish *Kebele chair*

Wereda employees

Development Agents

Almost all the Development Agents derived satisfaction from their professional work but said the workload was too high. There were difficulties in meeting wereda targets.

When we work on education and agriculture works that come from the Wereda, the workload is difficult to handle. There will be too much fieldwork. When Wereda officials come from the Wereda, they order us to do anything with few days. They want us to accomplish it within one to three days. We are not able to work good work due to time shortage; we will not be able to work with every farmer. If we do not accomplish as they expect, it is said that we did not work as expected. So we give false report. However, if we are given enough time, we will be able to accomplish more than this. When we are unable to accomplish some things; for example, the farmers might refuse to come to a meeting, it is taken to be our weakness and reluctance to work. *Development Agent*

Of the 11 DAs and 2 vets interviewed eight wanted to leave for better jobs, though only three complained about the salary. Six of them were living apart from husbands/wives/children. The 2 vets were most satisfied with their achievements though critical of lack of interest from the wereda. Other causes of dissatisfaction included 'too many bosses' and farmer refusal to accept advice. A few complained of being banned from pursuing education privately while three complained of having to do party work in addition to their professional work.

Health Extension Workers

The position of Health Extension Worker is a new one in the making and roles and relationships are in process of definition. At the time of the fieldwork Health Extension Workers had (unrealistic) targets which they were expected to (out-)perform. But the Health Posts in the sites were not properly set up; none had electricity and therefore no fridge or light and some no water (Yetmen, Geblen, Girar). The Dinki HP had no table and chairs; in Korodegaga there was one chair but no scissors, stationery, gloves or forceps. Three sites had delivery kits but in only one was an HEW trained on how to use it. Kebele residents saw the HPs as useful as a first point of call but only two provided a first aid service and everywhere supplies of painkillers, contraceptives and malaria pills

were unreliable. In this context, with the help of Health Promoters, HEWs were meant to meet graduation targets and thus persuade or coerce households to adopt a set of packages which involved some financial and labour costs.

To take the example of latrines statistics related to the graduation targets which were provided to the fieldworkers suggested good achievements: Geblen 100% - a model community; Turufe 95%; Dinki 83%; Yetmen 290 households; Korodegaga 22%; Girar about 40 per year – also a model community. However, wereda officials acknowledged there were problems. In the model tabia Geblen use of latrines was said to be limited. In Yetmen 'they resist even when they have the materials'. Most households in most sites appear to have dug a hole near their houses, though in Girar initially 'too far from the house', and in cases in Yetmen once the HEW has inspected and recorded the hole it was filled in again. Some threats were reported by household respondents: in Korodegaga exclusion from PSNP; in Turufe going to jail; in Yetmen there was fear of fines. Also in the Yetmen kebele there was a period when an HEW refused contraceptive injections to women with no latrine leading to some unwanted pregnancies.

Health Extension Workers appreciated seeing improvements in the health and surroundings of their clients as a result of their work but there was considerable dissatisfaction with their jobs. Most dissatisfaction related to conditions in their work environment but there were also complaints of overwork, having to walk long distances in hot sun, being separated from their husbands, low salary, no annual leave like other civil servants, lack of promotion, limited supervision, feedback and appreciation from the wereda and lack of training, particularly in maternal care and delivery. There was also frustration about relations with clients for example those who hid when they came, or refused vaccinations, or viewed them as only working with women.

School directors and teachers

Teachers were recently made responsible for school enrolment, absenteeism and dropout and are expected to go 'house-to-house' to bring dropouts and absentees back to school and provide catch-up teaching if necessary.

The focus is only on the quantity of students who did not attend school for months but are then expected to come and sit for examination. Teachers have to go and bring students from their home. Teachers do not accept this but this is what a teacher is expected to do. *Teacher*

Many of the teachers enjoyed the actual teaching and the achievements of their pupils though there was general dislike of the self-contained system and automatic promotion which was stopped 'de facto' in Girar and at the community's request in Yetmen. Multi-grade teaching in Dinki was also disliked, while running morning and afternoon shifts created a high workload. Teacher shortages in Geblen and Korodegaga led to overwork. Teachers also reported other duties including managing clubs, community discussions, party work, and report writing at the weekend. The teachers in Geblen had been told they must be in school 7 days a week.

Kebele managers

Kebele managers also worked long hours.

I am working every working day and working hours. I also work at weekends based on the community's interest. If I face any problem no one covers my work. Since apart from me other cabinet members do not have any salary they do not stay the whole day and working hours in kebele office. Due to lack of person who can cover my role I do not have annual leave. *Kebele manager*

In one site there was a developing conflict between the kebele chair and the kebele manager.

The man goes beyond his boundary and tries to take decisions by himself; he gets the reports from extension workers who previously were reporting to the chairman; he is about to take the kebele seal and decide over matters of the kebele. The kebele chair is no more influential. The manager has been assigned to assist him – and he does this in some of the tasks, but he is usually dictating as a

boss because he is paid, yet all he does is working from the office whereas the kebele chairman is the one to walk tirelessly across all the villages. *Kebele chair about the manager*

In other sites the relationship was apparently un-problematic and in one site the kebele manager was appreciated for his sense of organisation.

In the remoter sites hardship contributes to posts not being filled for sometimes long periods of time (the HEW in Geblen has been alone for two years).

Conclusions

We end by drawing some conclusions about modernisation in the communities and the contribution of more recent development interventions to that process, speculating about the communities' recent and future trajectories, and illustrating the value of pursuing a WIDE3 Stage 2 in the fourteen remaining sites.

Modernisation and the contribution of development interventions since 2003

Modernisation of the communities since 1995

In all sites we found increased new public buildings bringing petty urbanisation to the remoter sites, increased urban linkages and increased involvement in markets of all kinds. Diversification has led to bigger off-farm and non-farm sectors with more daily labour and petty business opportunities. Selected seeds and fertiliser have reached all communities leading to increased productivity in sites with good water availability, and breed cattle are beginning to spread. In three sites commercial irrigated vegetable and fruit production is an important element of the local economy. Compared with 1995 improved agricultural, livestock and NRM extension services and packages are in place. All the agricultural economies experienced recent economic growth except one in Tigray where incessant drought has led to decline. Women's involvement in economic activities has increased considerably and rights to land are beginning to be implemented; in all sites there is increasing and problematic youth landlessness and (under)employment.

There have been big lifestyle changes since 1995 especially for richer households. These have only taken place recently in the remoter sites. There is improved access to curative health services though it is still very difficult for very poor households and those in remoter kebele areas. Private and mission facilities are preferred by some people for the better quality of the services. New preventive and Mother and Child health services have been launched in all communities including family planning, various sanitation packages, malaria prevention, and vaccination though there are problems related to shortages and community resistance. People in four sites are still reliant on rivers and streams for their (unsafe) water. There have been big changes in primary enrolment, especially in the remoter sites and for girls. A few rich households are using private education at all levels. Secondary and post-secondary enrolment has increased, notably in the vulnerable PSNP-dependent Tigray site. Inequality has increased because the rich have become relatively richer. Very poor and vulnerable people do not receive the support they need. While physical security for women and girls is better, and female circumcision, abduction, early marriage and widow inheritance have diminished, there is little women's political participation. There are increased inter-generational tensions related to youth landlessness with a minority resorting to theft, addictions, and violent conflict.

Informal social protection systems are still strong and there have not been big changes in community-initiated organisations. There has been an expansion in the range of cultural repertoires (sets of ideas) available to the communities though local customary repertoires have remained strong with aspects hidden, particularly some of those characterised by the government as Harmful Traditional Practices. Compared with 1995 there is much greater penetration of the communities by the state involving a sub-kebele level array of overlapping government and party structures and

associated with this a wider range of institutions and people that government can use to mobilise people to respond to development policies and packages. There is also much greater interaction between community-initiated organisations and customary institutions and government systems. There are signs of class formation as land has remained in the same hands, rich farmers have grown richer, partly as a result of the Model Farmer focus on the more successful, and numbers of landless people involved in daily labour have increased considerably.

The contribution of development interventions since 2003 to the modernisation process in the six communities

Many of the changes described above took place after 2003 with acceleration of change after 2005. During these five years development interventions grew in scope and funding through a mix of sometimes closely entwined government and donor funding and activities. At the same time a period of annual 'double-digit growth' was entered. Our data is not of the sort that can tell us at what rate local GDPs increased annually, but they do indicate economic growth over the period in the three independent and integrated economies and the two drought-prone sites with some irrigation. In the Tigray site, while there was decline in the agricultural economy, it could be that it was counter-balanced by growth in non-farm activities and increased casual migration.

ADLI interventions had little impact on growth in the Gurage site which came mainly from flourishing eucalyptus and chat markets and increased chances of upward mobility for urban migrants. Eucalyptus sale was assisted by the development of internal roads, through community labour. The mobile network allowed access to information on prices. Selected seeds and fertiliser improved main crop yields in the two other independent economies. Inflated food prices accelerated the rise in marketing that was already taking place. It is not clear how important a role Development Agents played in this process. Agricultural packages of selected seeds and fertiliser for rainfed land in the three drought-prone sites did not meet with general success due to lack of rain and the same was true of the OFSP beehive and livestock packages in the Tigray site. Irrigation in two drought-prone sites and one independent economy expanded during the period, partly through the provision of credit for pumps, and became more productive with the introduction of improved seeds and sowing in lines. Donor-funded PSNP programmes in two of the drought-prone sites were shared among community members in a manner that prevented any 'graduation' from taking place; they did allow richer households to build assets or reduce asset-sale and were vital for the survival of poor and vulnerable people.

Land interventions followed a number of conflicting logics. The end of land re-distribution, certification, and the legalisation of extended periods for renting and leasing (with kebele or wereda agreement) was a step towards the consolidation of a 'kulak' peasant elite. 'Leasing' of communal land to youth co-operatives in Oromia and SNNP sites was a step in a 'developmental state' direction. Leasing of land to inward investors in Oromia sites (one from Australia) was a step in a (international) capitalist direction. Implementation of equal rights for women of inheritance of parental land and on divorce launched a process of increasing land fragmentation. Neither non-farm extension packages nor the establishment of small producer co-operatives contributed much to any of these economies. Access to credit for women contributed to increased but small-scale production.

Improvements in curative and preventive health services and in access to education at all levels were a result of government programmes and funding supported by the donor-funded Protection of Basic Services programme which also financed some agriculture-related activities in the wereda budgets (notable the DA salaries). In all sites there were gaps in infrastructure, furniture, equipment, and school materials, and intermittent provision of such things as selected seeds, vaccinations, contraceptives, basic medicines and drugs. Extension workers and teachers with targets from the wereda on the one hand, and community resistance on the other, were often over-worked and stressed. The government can take full credit for the changes to women's lives described earlier. There is scope for the same kind of commitment to improving the lives of the youth and poor and

vulnerable people including people who are elderly, mentally or chronically ill, or disabled.

Faced with communities which resist some of the planned change by refusing, ignoring or subverting the interventions designed to achieve it the government has been implementing a 'developmental state' approach to state-building with what would appear to be the goal of a one-party state in which rural communities are penetrated through a party cell system. In the run-up to the 2010 election the EPRDF went on a recruiting drive in all the communities; in some it organised households into cells with five member household with one leader. Regular party meetings, supported by propaganda provided by the party, are designed to turn farmers and their wives into willing practitioners of government packages and advice. However, our evidence suggests that five of the communities have responded to this project in their usual (slightly different) styles – by refusing, ignoring or subverting the State-building interventions. Community members of the sixth site, in Tigray, seem more supportive of the EPRDF/TPLF approach having experienced elements of it for over twenty years – although some dissent may be emerging but in a subdued form.

Community trajectories

Figure 9: Community trajectories?




Figure 9 shows an extract from Figure 3 which raised the question of whether any of these communities have set off in a new development direction and if so what it might be. In speculative mode we suggest that all of the communities continued on much the same course between 1995 and 2003 and beyond to 2008 or so, with minor and cumulative changes which pushed them further from equilibrium but no important changes to the control parameters. However, by 2010 internal and external changes in three of the communities had pushed them to states of disequilibrium or 'chaos' (in the language of complexity (social) science) such that they are very unlikely to remain on the same trajectory.

Three communities setting off in new directions?

Not far from half the households in **Geblen** are headed by women and in the last few years there has been an acceleration in youth exits involving a number of migration strategies. Given poor land quality and recurrent drought most remaining residents are reliant for survival on work outside the kebele and/or PSNP food aid. The two control parameters from Table 3 responsible for the shift in direction are the failure of the core livelihood system and diversification as a result of new opportunities available outside the kebele. In extremely speculative mode, in imagining an 'attractor state' towards which Geblen might be heading parts of rural France spring to mind: de-population, an ageing population, many fewer farmers. A possible new parameter that might enter the scene and could be encouraged through development interventions is the development of tourism, although Geblen is uncomfortably close to the Eritrean border.

Very recently a small part of **Turufe** was removed and added to Kuyera town which itself has

become part of Shashemene town and it seems unlikely that the rest will not follow in the next few years. Average landholdings are very small and in the last few years landless youth have increasingly commuted to work in Shashemene or casually migrated for work elsewhere. The important change had been to the control parameter of 'urban linkages' and the imagined attractor state might be one of the suburbs of Shashemene.

The landlord in **Korodegaga** in the 1960s made use of the irrigation potential of the river Awash by getting local tenants to water his orange trees using buckets and the Derg Producer Co-operative grew vegetables and fruit in the later 1980s using a donor-provided pump. There was little irrigation activity during the 1990s but in 2000 an NGO provided a pump to irrigate 60 hectares and assisted in the establishment of an irrigation association which was still in place in 2010. Drought-prone Korodegaga became a PSNP site in 2005 but in the ensuing years various cumulative changes related to the use of irrigation increased local incomes to the point where wereda officials said that they were graduating the whole community from PSNP with the exception of 77 households. In 2010 farmland was being irrigated in six modes: the NGO pump run by diesel; a pair of government pumps run by electricity (if it had been repaired as promised during the fieldwork); farmers using privately-owned small pumps; youth and women co-operatives using government-subsidised small pumps; an inward investor using a larger pump on 10 hectares of land; a foreign inward investor using drip irrigation on more than 20 hectares. There was also talk of bringing spate irrigation to part of the kebele. Here we have several potential attractor states and it is unlikely that they will co-exist side by side for very long (co-op/communal irrigation, small-scale private irrigation, inward investment). The control parameter changes which have led us to conclude that Korodegaga is in a state of 'chaos' and ready to move in a new direction are a change to the core livelihood system to include irrigation and the end of PSNP.

Three communities still on the same course

In 1995 **Yetmen** was a relatively wealthy community as a result of food cash crop exports and these are still at the heart of its livelihood system with increased productivity as a result of green revolution technologies. One small change which may have pushed the community further from equilibrium is diversification into irrigated vegetables but the main effect seems to have been to increase the wealth of those whose land is irrigable without inducing further changes. Looking to the future if the small town of Yetmen expands rural Yetmen will shrink and if large commercial farms take off in the area (as some expressed fear of) the whole community is under threat.

While inhabitants of **Girar** are better off than they were in 1995 the shape of community is not very different from how it was then. The core livelihood system of enset plus urban migration remains in place. Migrants now have more opportunities for upward mobility than they did in 1995 and the small chat and eucalyptus sales of that time have grown considerably as markets have expanded. The site of Imdibir Haya Gasha which was researched in 1995 disappeared when part of it was incorporated into Imdibir town and the rest joined with another kebele to form Girar. Now part of Girar is indistinguishable from Imdibir town and it is likely that the process of gradual incorporation will continue as the town grows bigger.

While there have been a number of changes in **Dinki** there has been no change in direction. The biggest change is an increase in the use of irrigation from less than 10 households to more than 50, with improved agricultural technologies which have increased productivity and greater market demand. Even so the Dinki community is still dependent on emergency food aid, a service which was first provided in 1985. Looking to the future new parameters which could bring change to the community are the development of a commercial route along the road through Afar and/or development of tourism in the area.

None of the three diverted communities have changed direction as a result of government-initiated development interventions (although the government was one of the actors in the development of irrigation in Korodegaga), which is not unexpected given that ADLI is designed to produce more of

the same more efficiently. This has worked in Yetmen although it is hard to establish how great a contribution was made by government extension; if there had been none would Yetmen farmers have responded to market forces anyway?

What could be learned by follow-up research in the remaining fourteen WIDE2 sites

In this section we provide an idea of what could be learned by taking the methodology developed in Stage 1 to the remaining fourteen WIDE 2 sites. Table 5 reminds of the 1995-style parameters although five of the communities were not included in WIDE1 being studied first in 2003.

Table 3: The Fourteen WIDE Stage 3 sites

Region	Livelihood System	PSNP	Urban linkages	Ethnicities	Religions
Tigray					
Harresaw	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Tigrayan	Orthodox Christian (99%)
Amhara					
Shumsheha	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Peri-urban	Amhara	Orthodox C 98%
Debre Berhan	Food cash crop exported		Peri-urban	Amhara	Orthodox Chr
Oromia					
Sirbana Godeti	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo	Orthodox Christian, Islam, traditional
Somodo 2003	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo (Arssi and Shewa) Yem A few Kulo, Kembata Amhara	Sufi Islam Wehabi Islam Orthodox Chr Protestantism Ritual beliefs
Oda Haro 2003	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo	Islam, Protestant, ritual beliefs
Odadawata 2003	Food cash crop exported		Integrated	Oromo (Arssi and Shewa), Amhara Few Gurage, Silte	Orthodox Chr Islam Protestantism
Adele Keke	International cash crop	Yes	Integrated	Oromo Few Amhara	Muslim Few OC
Gelcha 2003	Pastoralist in transition	Yes	Very remote	Karrayu	Traditional Islam
SNNP					
Aze Debo'a	Highly-populated enset	Yes	Remote	Kembata	Orthodox Chr Protestants Catholics
Gara Godo	Highly-populated enset	Yes	Remote	Wolayitta	Orthodox Chr Protestants Catholics
Adado	International cash crop – coffee, plus enset		Remote	Gedeo	Protestants 90% Islam., OC, Gedeo beliefs
Do'omaa	Vulnerable cereal	Yes	Remote	Gamo 60% Wolayitta 40%	Protestants 70% OC 20% Syncretic
Luqa 2003	Pastoralist in transition	Yes	Very remote	Tsamako	Tsamako beliefs Protestants

Remembering that there are likely to have been changes since 2003 which may have produced new core livelihood systems there are at least three new types which would extend the set of exemplars. These are (international) cash crop sites growing coffee (Adado, Somodo) and chat (Adele Keke), a (voluntary) resettlement site (Do'omaa), and two 'pastoralists in transition' sites (Gelcha in Oromia

and Luqa in SNNP). There are also two sites with a big majority of Protestants (Adado and Do-omaa).

There are eight PSNP sites in a number of new contexts: one near a big tourist attraction (Shumsheha near Lalibela); one in a chat-exporting site (Adele Keke); 2 in highly-populated enset livelihood systems (Aze Debo'a and Gara Godo); 1 in a re-settlement site (Do'oma) and 2 in pastoralist sites (Gelcha and Luqa).

We will also be able to make some comparisons which will assist in the process of typing and the development of a typological theory. Here are some initial thoughts:

1. Harresaw in Tigray looks very similar to Geblen. Is the same youth exit process in place? If not why not?
2. Shumsheha in Amhara can be compared with Turufe and Imdibir (peri-urban); Yetmen (Amhara); Geblen, Dinki and Korodegaga (vulnerable cereal, food aid).
3. Debre Berhan rural kebele is similar to Yetmen in livelihood system but under threat of suburbanisation like Turufe.
4. Sirba na Godeti compares with Yetmen in livelihood system and location on a major road.
5. Somodo shares some features with Girar (SNNP, cash crop) and Turufe and Odadawata (a number of different ethnicities and religions).
6. Oda Hara can be compared with Yetmen and Somodo.
7. Adele Keke grows chat (Girar, Somodo) but is also PSNP vulnerable cereal site (Geblen, Harresaw, Shumsheha, Do'omaa, Korodegaga).
8. Gelcha and Luqa, the pastoralist sites, can be compared with each other, but also with sites which were settled by pastoralists in the past (Do'omaa, Korodegaga, Turufe, maybe others in Oromia).
9. Aze Debo'a and Gara Godo, food-deficit enset sites, can be compared with each other, and also with Girar and Adado which are both enset sites.
10. Adado, also exports coffee and can be compared with Somodo (coffee), Girar (chat) and Adele Keke (chat).

Appendix: Tables supporting Findings 1 to 3

TableA 1: Community Features: Livelihoods and Community Public Goods 1995 – All Communities (features disappeared by 2010 highlighted)

	Settlement	Urbanisation	Ecology	Land availability	Own-account farming	Development interventions	Other sources of income
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	4 large kushets apart from each other; 2 very remote.	No urbanisation. Dirt track to town. 3 ½ hours walk to nearest market.	Drought-prone, steep slopes, erosion, deforestation	Serious shortage crops land. Individual grazing land. Little communal grazing land	Vulnerable cereal, barley, cactus + livestock (not re-stocked after 1980s droughts). Labour-sharing; share-cropping.	MoA, CRS and REST active: loans in cash for trade, seeds, fertiliser, oxen, and chickens, goats and sheep for old people. Extension advice re terracing, farm activities, keeping trees and using less fuel.	Seasonal migration including to Eritrea and Saudi Arabia FFW building water reservoir (45 people). Daily labour in town (a few)
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Settlement dispersed in hamlets	No urbanisation	Drought-prone, hilly. Land needs much ploughing and manuring.	Communal grazing land; not a lot of animals. Shortage of private land due to topography.	Vulnerable cereal: sorghum and tef and some maize, soya beans, chickpeas, sunflowers, sesame, cotton, oilseed. Less than 10 growing fruit, vegetables, coffee, chat, using irrigation. One report of land-renting for cash; share-cropping; labour-sharing.	MoA started to function 1994: nurseries with daily labour. Extension agents taught use of fertilisers, herbicides and other inputs.	Weaving, spinning, brewing. Migration / food aid in bad years. Mekane Yesus gave food aid 1994.
Koro-degaga <i>Oromia</i>	Nine villages	No urbanisation	Drought-prone, mostly flat, sandy soil	Relatively large private holdings; plenty communal land	Vulnerable cereal + livestock: maize, tef, sorghum, beans, chickling peas. Share-cropping important for getting wealthy; labour-sharing.	Old irrigation failed 1993; new irrigation construction failed to work at all	Fuelwood sale Migration/food aid in bad years. Food aid in 1994.
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Villagised	Urbanised: small town – services incl grinding mill	Flat, no forest	Increasing landlessness. Some re-distribution of cultivable land and small allocation of grazing land. 15 has common grazing land	Surplus cereal: tef+wheat much sold in Addis (fertiliser used), chickpeas, vetch, maize. Share-cropping and labour-sharing.	Agricultural extension advice; veterinary services	Local drinks, petty trade, dungcakes; seasonal wage labour
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	Villagised. 4 shops.	Distant peri-urban	Flat, community forest, drought 1985	Too many cattle for communal grazing land Reducing private landsize.	Surplus cereal/potato. Secret land-selling; land-renting, share-cropping. Labour-sharing	Construction of terraces ended 1992 due to change of government. MoA disbursed improved seeds, trees and fertiliser and used model farmers.	Numerous non-farm own-account activities performed locally
Imdibir HG <i>SNNP</i>	No of villages	Peri-urban	Slightly hilly	Small private plots and grazing land. Reducing grazing land.	Enset, chat and eucalyptus sometimes sold. Traditional labour parties; some wage labour usually relatives.	Tree seedlings, medicine for cattle, new types of crops (not used) MoA pesticides recently stopped.	NGO FFW. Urban migration

TableA 2: Livelihoods and Public Goods 2010 – Dependent, Remoter Economies and Drought-Prone Communities (changes highlighted)

	Settlement and roads	Urbanisation & public goods	Environment	Land availability	Own-account farming	Development interventions	Other sources of income
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	4 large kushets apart from each other; 2 very remote – 'road' in place; allweather road from Mishig, minibuses	Administrative urbanisation in Mishig: mill, FTC, youth houses, mobile network in one spot.	Drought-prone, steep slopes, erosion, de-forestation. Interventions not led to much improvement.	Private land very scarce; considerable communal land much steep, stony, degraded. Grazing land conservation. No re-distribution of private land. Recent allocation of communal land in town. 3 households re-settled.	Vulnerable cereal, cactus + livestock; very small seasonal irrigable plots for 120 since 2008. Severe droughts 2003, 2004, 2007,2009	FFW Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages Small non-farm package.	Seasonal migration. Daily labour - commuting. A few small enterprises. Youth migration to towns for manual labour/café and bar work. Youth to Saudi – not seasonal PSNP since 2005 + emergency food aid sometimes
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Scattered hamlets; dryweather road due to be upgraded.	Administrative urbanisation; no electricity; mobile network in a few spots	Drought-prone, hilly, soil erosion, de-forestation., increasing charcoal burning. Interventions resisted	Mean private land 2004 1.2 has. Communal land scarce. No re-distribution of private land or allocation of communal land. Attempt to give land to youth group failed.	Vulnerable rainfed cereal; irrigation - ½ households – vegetables, fruit.	FFW Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages	Weaving, spinning, brewing. Daily labour on irrigation and nursery. Food aid since 2005/6; FFW since 2007
Koro- degaga <i>Oromia</i>	Nine villages; dryweather road	Emerging administrative urbanisation – return to Derg situation; no electricity; mobile network	Drought-prone, mostly flat, sandy soil. Interventions not much impact.	Mean private land 2004 2.3 has. Ample communal land with irrigable potential. No re-distribution of individual land. Women accessing land including thro inheritance. Recent allocation of communal land to investor and youth.	Vulnerable cereal + livestock; irrigation – veg + maize – big association of private landholders, small co-operatives, individual pumps, inward investors	FFW Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages	Daily labour on irrigation farms PSNP since 2005 Fuelwood sale reduced.

TableA 3: Community Features: Livelihoods and Community Public Goods 2010 – Independent, More Integrated and Food Secure Communities (changes highlighted)

	Settlement and roads	Urbanisation & public goods	Environment	Land availability	Own-account farming	Development interventions	Other sources of income
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Villagised; on allweather road	Growing small town - market & admin action; electricity in town, mobile network	Flat, no forest. Interventions to prevent floods.	Mean private land 2004 1.6 has. Communal land scarce.	Most tef sold to towns, improved seeds increased productivity and increased sales. Diversification – rainfed + irrigation Improved livestock	Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages	Grain trade – large and small traders. Local drinks, petty trade including vegetables, dungcakes, small business in town – e.g. ironing, tailoring.
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	Villagised; dryweather road to nearby allweather road	Partial suburbanisation; electricity; mobile network	Flat, community forest, drought 1985 and 2008. Interventions not much impact.	Mean private land 2004 0.9 has. Communal land scarce.	Surplus cereal/potato: increased marketing of outputs; use of selected seed increased yields and profits. A few started bull fattening; a few improved dairy cows fed at home.	Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages	Numerous non-farm activities performed locally, daily labour in towns, migration to flower farms
Girar <i>SNNP</i>	No of villages; near allweather road	Partial suburbanisation; some electricity; mobile network	Slightly hilly. Interventions not much impact.	Private land very scarce. Communal land scarce.	Enset – problem with disease, chat, eucalyptus, coffee (also some disease). Increased vegetable, fruit and grain production.	Agricultural and livestock extension and packages NRM packages	Daily labour, business in town; urban migration. Youth and women's co-operatives. Female migration to Gulf – remittances.

TableA 4: The Role of Development Interventions in the Modernisation of Livelihoods since 2003 – Dependent, Remoter and Drought-prone Sites

	Infrastructure	Land interventions	NRM interventions	ADLI interventions	PSNP/FFW
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	Allweather road made an impact on access to daily labour; mobile phone network	Land certification including for women in 1997. Grazing land conservation. No re-distribution of private land. Recent allocation of communal land in town. 3 households re-settled.	Eucalyptus planting 2004 (15% survived); 2005 20 has planted with indigenous trees for Millennium (few survived). People banned from using communal and private land for grazing, cactus and fuel since 2009, though kebele said to have sold grass to get funds. Terracing through FFW – not led to much improvement.	No Crops DA in early 2010. OFSP via Dedebit Microfinance – focus on livestock and beehives - unsuccessful; a few successful micro-enterprises. DAs worked with Model Farmers. Vet clinic but no vet. FTC used to teach farmers how to make compost. Fertiliser loans forced on people; improved seeds have been available.	Prevented some asset sale by richer, though lots of livestock sales following the 2009 drought. Used as collateral for informal credit by poor.
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Not yet improved road or general mobile phone access.	No re-distribution of private land or allocation of communal land. Attempt to give land to youth group failed.	Tree-planting resisted as the land is crucial for grazing. Terracing through FFW. Kebele officials banned youths from making charcoal. No NRM DA in Feb 10.	Experimental crops in govt nursery. Improved maize seeds distributed though not to FHHs and those without networks; fertiliser increase but still small. ACSI credit but little take-up – dislike of group mode; fear of debt. Motor pumps introduced 2008 but problems when they break down. Improved chickens and beehives failed; no-one bought a milk cow or invested in bull fattening. No livestock DA in Feb 10; vet who was appreciated. Service Co-operative recently revived but too small yet to join the union to get cheaper supplies.	FFW
Koro-degaga <i>Oromia</i>	Some dryweather road maintenance through FFW . Mobile phone network.	No re-distribution of individual land. Women accessing land including thro inheritance. Recent allocation of communal land to investor and youth.	Regular terracing and tree-planting through FFW and free community labour but destroyed by livestock.	Three DAs working with Model Farmers. FTC not operational. 'OFSP' – regular improved seeds for rained land; selected seed and fertiliser loans through irrigation association. Not enough seeds – quotas prioritising MFs. Credit for livestock interventions for MFs, women, poor households, and youth. Some did not repay in the past. Some in debt recently due to diseases; vet clinic under construction – no vet.	Prevented some asset sale by richer, though lots of livestock sales following the 2009 drought.

TableA 5: The Role of Development Interventions in the Modernisation of Livelihoods since 2003 – Independent, More Integrated and Food Secure Communities

	Infrastructure	Land interventions	NRM interventions	ADLI interventions	PSNP/FFW
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Maintenance of main allweather road and mobile network important.	Re-distribution of Derg bureaucrat private land in 1997. No allocation of communal land.	Reduction in community labour	Support for irrigation using pumps, two crops per year using BBM plough, breed cattle	None
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	Maintenance of main allweather road and mobile network important.	No re-distribution of private land. Recent allocation of communal land to investor and youth. New rules for renting/leasing – up to 3 years with kebele agreement, more via wereda.	Reduction in community labour	Agricultural extension since 2006. Focus on Model Farmers: training, improved seeds (Model Farmers got double usual output), cattle breeds. DAs recently using demonstration plots rather than MFs. FTC not in use. Food aid (some diversion to kebele relatives suggested) and seed following 2008 drought.	None
Girar <i>SNNP</i>	Maintenance of main allweather road and mobile network important.	No re-distribution of private land. Allocation of communal land to farmers with very small plots and youth groups. Land certificates including for women in 2006	Community said to do soil and conservation work on wereda advice.	Agricultural extension since 2004 promoting diversification to vegetables, fruit and grain, cattle fattening and beehives (unsuccessful). DAs worked mostly with Model Farmers with large landholdings. FTC in 2005 used for some training. Six water reservoirs dug with community labour for 4 MFs, school, youth group.	None

TableA 6: Community Features: Lives 1995 – All Sites (features disappeared by 2010 highlighted)

	Lifestyles	Health	Education	Inequality and poverty	Gender relations	Inter-generational relations
More integrated sites						
Geblen Tigray	Houses made of stone, wooden roofs. Higher status have bigger houses. Rich have radios, wooden furniture.	Nearest clinic 22 kms – 4 hours on foot. Water from streams. No latrines.	A very few children attended primary school. No educated person in the community	Self-sufficient, medium and poor categories. Richest have more livestock incl oxen and beehives. Since TPLF controlled the area inequality decreased.	Recent changes – electable. Frequent divorce: distribution by contribution.	No land for those reaching allotment age after 1991
Dinki	Few houses with tin roofs; largest 2 rooms. Wild foods eaten during drought.	Government clinic 10 kms; no doctor or nurse; irregular supply drugs; nearest pharmacy 70 kms. River water; no latrines	2 hours walk to nearest primary school	All said to be poor. Someone is wealthy if he can sustain family through drought and help other households.	Argobba: women stayed at home; divorce – clothes + 30 birr. Amhara: women did marketing; divorce property division equal or according to contribution	No mention
Koro-degaga	Small tukul lasting 10 years	River water. No latrines. Nearest government clinic 8 kms; some medicines.	41 children at GR 1-4 school. 1 person completed 12 th grade	Difference between rich and poor is no of livestock. Poorest are first victims of famine and drought.	Divorce rare; polygyny – if she leaves without consent gets zero.	No re-distribution.
More remote sites						
Yetmen	55% houses tin-roofed.	Nearest clinic 3 kms – lacks drugs No doctor or nurse. Private clinic in town. Waterwells. 15 latrines used.	Grade 1-8 school in Yetmen town. 4 at university. 5 trained teachers.	Wealthy have large livestock and big grainstore. Poor – daily labour: landless; descended from poor family; widows etc.	Divorce frowned on: property shared equally.	Landless youth and unemployed school graduates.
Turufe	39 houses with tin roofs; largest 3 rooms. Richer have 2 houses. Rich have wooden beds, carpets, sheets, radios etc	Shashemene General Hospital 2.5 kms provided general health services. NGO health clinic 6 kms. River and stream water. No latrines.	GR 1-8 2 kms (Kuyera). 2ary school 12 kms (Shashemene). 60 unemployed school leavers. 1 - university 6- colleges	Poor lack oxen and agricultural implements or cannot work – old age, ill health etc.	Oromo: divorced wife no assets – only clothes and parental gifts. Northerners – wife gets half assets.	Landless youth and unemployed school leavers
Imdibir HG	Most have thatched roof huts. Wealthy have big tin-roofed houses, iron bed, radio etc.	1 health clinic; inadequate service and medicine No clean water supply	Kindergarten, Grades 1-12 in Imdibir town. 75% of children said to go to primary school, students at colleges and universities.	Poor have small land and cattle. Wealthy have more, grow cashcrops, migrate for trade, business, remittances.	Divorce culturally condemned; if not cause of divorce gets half property.	Unemployed school leavers. Serous land disputes between brothers.

TableA 7: Community Features: Lives 2010 – More Remote Sites (changes highlighted)

	Lifestyles	Health	Education	Inequality and poverty	Gender relations	Inter-generational relations
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	'Better houses' (tin roof, more rooms, plastered walls) in Mishig, some with electricity. Jerrycans, beds, plastic utensils in some families, TVs in Mishig bars. Some youth 'wearing expensive suits' (bought with migration income).	Health Post – 1 HEW. Health Centre 45 minutes from kebele centre. Ambulance services (community contribution). A few water structures (fewer than 10% households benefitting). Latrines dug tho not all houses in Mishig had one.	Gr 1-8 primary school 2 satellite schools Grade 9 45 minutes' walk Limited TVET in near towns At least five graduates and five families having children at college/university.	No notable inequality between the two ethnic groups. Inequality increased as rich households richer than they were; poor people badly affected by drought, especially in 2009.	Gender differences less than other sites 46% households are female-headed Women 30% kebele council seats	Tension over access to land as older generation is reluctant to pass land to the youth (including communal land, and private land within families) Generational change in education level
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Increased number of tin-roofed houses, many in Chibite, also in Dinki, mainly by those with access to irrigation. Richer households: bed, tape recorder or radio, jerrycans, some plastic utensils.	Health Post in kebele centre with nurse – no drugs. Health Centre Aliyu Amba (2-3 hr walk) upgraded River water; latrines dug but rare use.	Full cycle primary school in kebele centre (1.5 hr walk). Satellite school in Dinki. New secondary education in Aliyu Amba (2-3 hrs walk). No TVET in the area. One graduate and one soon graduate men from community.	Inequality increased as rich households richer than they were. Very poor households hit hard by the drought.	Younger generation (girls and boys) keener on need for more change Women's land and inheritance rights Circumcision still practised Women not involved in local politics/ admin, beyond WA leadership	Inter-generational tension over access to land (including communal land, and private land within families); tension between siblings over heritage
Koro-degaga <i>Oromia</i>	Some better houses (tin roofs, separate space for animals, 'blockets'). Wooden beds, plastic and metal household equipment increasingly common; radios common.	Health Post 2 HEWs but not yet on site Many use cheap private clinic 8 kms. River water; latrines dug but rare use.	Gr 1-5 school (plan to gradually expand to Gr8) Satellite school in one village Full cycle school across river (no bridge) Secondary school wereda centre: 25 kms difficult access, few go	Community as whole hard hit by 2009 drought (perceived wealth decrease). Considerable inequality between households' productive wealth (2004) Irrigation benefits different groups including poorer (daily labour)	Women's land and inheritance rights, rights of 1 st wife Circumcision said to have disappeared Women not involved in local politics/ admin, beyond WA leadership	Inter-generation over access to land mitigated by access to communal land for groups of youth and non-farm work opportunities linked to irrigation

TableA 8: Community Features: Lives 2010 – More Integrated Sites (changes highlighted)

	Lifestyles	Health	Education	Inequality and poverty	Gender relations	Inter-generational relations
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Most houses iron roofs. Some electricity connections to urban Yetmen, others using battery-run bulbs. One household has TV. Wells in most compounds. Vegetables, fruits consumed	Health Post - 2 HEWs + nurse 3kms New Health Centre in town Preferred private clinic in town Water wells and taps. Resistance to digging (and use) of latrines.	Grade 1-8 in urban Yetmen; girls outnumber boys. Secondary school to be built. New (recent) government TVET in Bichena (17 kms). Richer households continue to send children to Debre Markos and elsewhere. Access to private education in towns for rich. Greater importance attached to education (lack of land for youth).	Wealthy strong farmers afford sending children e.g. to nursing college Debre Markos 13,000 birr/year Destitute: still very poor housing, hand-to-mouth life Irrigation opportunities for better income for many groups though richer with land benefit more	Women's land, inheritance rights Women little involved in administration/ politics	Dependent old people reported to have poor access to food, clothing & healthcare. Older generation refused to give communal land to youth. Large no unemployed educated (Gr10) youth
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	More iron roof houses (40% in 2005, upward since then). Additional rooms and several houses for richer. Better household furniture (sofa, table) for richer. Radios and even TVs for some. Water points and electricity accessible to most	Health post Easy access to curative services in referral hospital in Kuyera (nearby town), and private and mission facilities in Kuyera (3 kms) and Shashemene (14 kms). Latrines dug and reportedly some us.	Gr1-8 full cycle in kebele, and Gr1-4 in Turufe village, but richer households continue to send children to Kuyera older/better school. Full 2ary school (general + preparatory) in Kuyera, tho still few children enrol as have started education late and reach secondary too old. Private colleges in Kuyera and Shashemene - Only rich households can afford. Almost those in post-secondary are boys.	Richer households use private health and education facilities Recent migrants sponsored by established migrants form an underclass of labourers Established migrants, including from the north and SNNP, got access to land, ID, and economic opportunities	Women's land, inheritance rights Women little involved in administration/ politics Oromo customary institutions allied in campaign for reduction of HTPs	Older generation reticent to give communal land to youth Large number of unemployed educated youth
Girar <i>SNNP</i>	More iron roof houses. Electricity, separate kitchen and space for animals in some houses. Access to safe water still a problem for most. Men spend time in town, women 'go out', rural girls wear modern clothes. Jerrycans, beds; some have sofas, or even TV.	Health post + HEWs in Girar. Health centre in Imdibir town (1 km) – newly improved (staff, range of services). People also go to Catholic Mission hospital (12 kms). Households with relatives in big cities (e.g. Addis) may go there for treatment. Latrine campaign said to be successful. Spring water for few; others river.	Greater attention to and expectations from education. School recently expanded to Gr1-8, helps especially for girls. No change re: secondary school. Felt need of TVET for Gr10 leavers and in support to youth packages. Catholic Mission constructing one in Imdibir. Post-election promise university in wereda; now a few students elsewhere.	Considerable inequality; e.g. some households making > 10,000 birr from chat sale and/or business/shops in towns. Very poor housing for poorest (e.g. in cattle's room of other household) and poorest (hand-to-mouth, girls dropping from school to support family), some dependent on NGO charity	Women's land, inheritance, divorce rights, 'economic empowerment' – considerable departure from customary Gurage repertoire. Customary institutions allied in campaign for reduction of HTPs	No tension reported between older and younger generation although land very scarce; many young households do not have own farming land; migration of youth (Gurage tradition)

TableA 9: The Role of Development Interventions in the Modernisation of Peoples' Lives since 2003 –More Remote Sites

	Health	Education	Wealth and poverty	Women	Youth	Children
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	Health Post 2005 – 1 HEW: first aid, family planning (50 women use), other packages and delivery (HEW trained). Shortage of vaccine. Safe water for less than 10% (NGO, community, not government). Latrines said to be built (used?); few in Mishig. Health Centre 45 mins from Mishig; staff shortage. Annual cholera. HIV/AIDS VCT but not all exposing selves.	Geblen primary school expanded to grade 8 (2006). 2007 satellite schools in far kushets. Shortage of teachers; absenteeism due to hunger during drought and chronically for children from poorer households. Shift system except Gr7-8 full day. Shortages of materials, seats, separate latrines, water, electricity. Big increase in enrolment – almost all go to school. 2009 Grade 9 started in nearby village. TVET in nearby towns (20-35 kms) but limited places mean few students qualify. Some university grads.	PSNP vital for poorer households though a few not included. Some richer with access. No other intervention systematically targeting poor/vulnerable people - raised notably re: health costs (exemption for war veteran families and FHHs – not necessarily poor) and costs of education. People’s failure with (forced) packages makes them poorer/indebted.	Women's rights to land since TPLF rule during Derg TPLF active against HTPs. No early marriage now; idea of mutual consent still new. Family planning and maternal health services; slow change in uptake; distance disincentive for far kushets. Girls educated including post-primary. EPRDF drive: women 35% party members and tabia councillors (better represented, raise issues, not yet decision-making power equal to men). All women participate to PSNP; FHHs given priority. FHHs also access to OFSP (forced like men); some doing well from non-farm packages(tea shops, bars in Mishig).	Further education (some) incl self-financed. No large-scale intervention tackling landlessness and lack of local employment. Residential land for young households in Mishig. OFSP non-farm packages; support to groups to engage in productive activities with credit. Limited success: one group, beekeeping, no production (drought). Non-farm packages ok but limited budget and range of opportunities (youth lack skills). Youth said to 'lose hope' and migrate.	Food supplements for malnourished U5 shared with other family members. School an important change. Vaccination.
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Kebele health post + 2 HEWs and nurse in kebele centre. Door-to-door family planning teaching, some uptake. First aid, maternal health services (kit + trained HEWs) but no drugs. Bednets now old. River water. Some latrines dug but not used by most. Household waste pits not caught on. Aliyu Amba Health Centre recently upgraded	Full cycle primary school in kebele centre (1.5 hr walk), recent upgrading (community contribution). Satellite school in Dinki. Increasing attendance at all levels and by girls – facilitated by smaller distances and shift system. Schools lack many things incl qualified teachers. Dropout/absenteeism. Poorer households' and labourers/servants' children less likely to attend. New secondary education in Aliyu Amba (2-3 hrs walk). Still few go. No TVET in the area.	ADLI resources (agriculture and livestock interventions) focused on richer Model Farmers. Food aid and FFW vital for poorer households. Some richer with access.	Women’s rights to land (Land and Family laws) enforced. Greater access to family planning; campaign against circumcision and early marriage resisted; abduction and rape reduced due to tough measures (poor FHH still vulnerable). Female wereda councillor: some influence over wereda decisions re: services in kebele. Girls at school (primary).	Football field fenced off. Much promise, little action re: organising groups to engage in productive activities. Some land given to youths in Chibite (kebele centre) to open shops but no credit so only a few succeeded, raising funds elsewhere. Older generation actively opposed to communal land being given to youth groups.	Schooling Very small malnutrition interventions Vitamins Vaccinations

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	Health	Education	Wealth and poverty	Women	Youth	Children
Koro-degaga Oromia	<p>Kebele health post, 2 HEWs though not yet on site. Family planning, some uptake though irregular supply. No maternal health services at HP. Resistance to teaching re: latrines.</p> <p>Government health centre 25 kms; many go to private clinic (8 kms, affordable). Malaria medicine often lacking at HP.</p> <p>Bednets distributed, not adapted to house shape, some not used as intended – but malaria said to have decreased.</p> <p>Unsafe water from river, some water purification tablets.</p> <p>Waterborne diseases killing people (2003, 2008, 2009)</p>	<p>Primary school recently upgraded to Gr5 (community contribution); plan to gradually expand to Gr8. Satellite school in one far village. Full cycle school in Sodere (across river). Girls outnumber boys at school (dedicated kebele committee). Absenteeism. Shift system. Concerns: lack of inputs, low quality.</p> <p>Secondary and TVET education far away. Few go, though a few households have graduated (and employed) children or children attending university (at least 3)</p>	<p>PSNP vital for very poorer households though a few not included. Some richer with access. Irrigation development (supported notably by government) provides opportunities to various groups including poorer households (daily labour, land leasing). No report of health fee exemption system.</p>	<p>Family and land laws; lots of training. Progress notably with stopping circumcision (stopped/ 'hidden'), partners' choice (maybe less for richer girls), land rights, rights of 1st wife. Increased 'voluntary abduction' marriages.</p> <p>Girls at school reduced help for mothers, absenteeism market days/new baby in family.</p> <p>Women do daily labour linked to irrigation; one women co-op.</p> <p>Unlike men women support EPRDF because it brought them rights</p>	<p>Wereda and kebele administrations active in supporting youth (largely male) to organise in co-ops and engage in productive activities; some successful or potentially (rainfed/ irrigated agriculture, loading/unloading); others failing due to market/product quality issues.</p> <p>Some communal land given to youth co-ops.</p>	<p>HEWs teaching led to greater awareness (practice?) re: small children/ infants care (food, cleanliness) Nutrition programme. Vaccination</p>

TableA 10: The Role of Development Interventions in the Modernisation of Peoples' Lives since 2003 –More Integrated Sites

	Health	Education	Wealth and poverty	Women	Youth	Children
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	<p>Health Post (2 HEWs + nurse) in kebele. Nurse as response to community complaints, still ongoing, re: lack of curative services. Resistance to HEP teaching: e.g. latrines built then destroyed, fewer than 1/4th implementing packages. Younger generation less opposed. No/unclean latrines at school/HP.</p> <p>New Health Centre in town: delivery services (not at HP) but shortage of qualified personnel and drugs (people prefer private clinic). Family planning widely used, better access with HC. Water from wells, no government interventions.</p>	<p>Gr 1-8 in urban Yetmen. More girls than boys at school; only very few children said not to be at school (poverty, children working as herders) tho absenteeism, drop out: teachers (not liking it) go door-to-door. Quality issues tho some improvements e.g. 1 textbook/ student. Community successfully resisted change from shift system and pushed for automatic promotion to not be applied. Secondary school to be built. Children from families who can afford go to Bichena (17 kms). New government TVET in Bichena though poor quality and less attractive options than older/ more distant e.g. Debre Markos.</p>	<p>Focus on model farmers often rich likely to have helped increase their wealth. Poor farmers constrained by lack of credit for fertilisers. Only landless youth and very poor people entitled to micro-enterprise credit – but urban focused. Dormitories for 22 poor female students in Bichena. World Vision provision for some poor households.</p>	<p>New family law tho training attended by men, poorly by women. Teaching (female circumcision, early marriage, choice of partners): some success. Land rights, property division upon divorce, enforced by woreda court (women go there preferably to elders). Positive discrimination in access to post-secondary education. Political empowerment limited. Community's view: not common for women to participate in meetings; politics and admin are men's matters.</p>	<p>More access to TVET with new TVET in Bichena, though options considered as not attractive. Unemployment of educated youth also a concern. Only landless youth and very poor people entitled to micro-enterprise credit. Wereda and kebele administrations trying to organise youth groups to engage in farming and non-farming activities. Little success (community's opposing to giving communal land to groups.</p>	<p>More insistence on school attendance Vaccination – some resistance</p>
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	<p>Health Post + 3 HEWs: no medicine ('better to be closed' for one respondent). Teaching on prevention, sanitation, FP, HTPs - seen as 'for women' by men. Family planning uptake said to be good (proximity of towns). Hospital in Kuyera – kept on community's insistence (elders going to Regional President). Health centre in Shashemene. Non-govt services in towns. TB increasing, HIV/AIDs more of a problem. VCT (2009). AWD outbreaks (twice in five years) helped convince people about use of latrines, washing hands etc. Good access to safe water for most.</p>	<p>Gr1-8 full cycle in kebele, and Gr1-4 (NGO-built taken over by government) in village but richer households continue to send children to Kuyera older/better school – including better qualified teachers. Successful resistance to change from shift system. Dropout said to be a problem, though no stats. Relatively low enrolment in 2ary due to late start in 1ary. Government TVET in Shashemene together with many other private institutions.</p>	<p>Lack of credit constraint for poorer farmers (e.g. improved breed cows). Health fee exemption system said to have broken down (cumbersome procedures linked to health financing strategy). Locally decided water fee exemption for some. No intervention targeting vulnerable servant households' members (children, women).</p>	<p>Land and Family laws. Active promotion by wereda WA and NGOs. Certified land rights for FHH, inherited widows and second wives, and divorcees; successful cases in wereda courts. Elders' support (oath against widow inheritance). Measures against abduction and female circumcision leading to decline. Limited change re: political empowerment. Young women migrate to flower farms; women's co-op (NGO).</p>	<p>Youth unemployment seen as significant issue. Youth being organised in groups to engage in productive activities (forestry on communal land). Initial resistance by community, now happened but too early to show results.</p>	<p>Vaccination valued Wereda campaign against practice of feeding husbands first, some change</p>

	Health	Education	Wealth and poverty	Women	Youth	Children
Girar SNNP	<p>Health post (poor condition, no water) + 2 HEWs. No curative and maternal health services (HEWs not trained tho Unicef delivery kit). Some people said to 'get mad at HEWs'.</p> <p>Big push on sanitation, HEP teaching + involvement of iddirs, equbs, religious leaders, latrine in pre-school, YA and WA mobilised to build latrines for poor/elderly families. Apparently successful. Also significant uptake of FP.</p> <p>No safe water in inside villages: wereda allegedly stopped interventions for unclear reasons.</p> <p>Health centre in Imdibir town (1 km). Improved (better drug supply, HC keeps sale revenues) tho shortage of qualified staff and no ambulance service.</p> <p>Feedback system for patients referred to HC by HEWs not strong, frustrating for HEWs.</p> <p>People also go to Catholic Mission hospital (12 kms).</p>	<p>School Gr1-8 recently upgraded (community, iddir, Gurage 'diaspora' contributions).</p> <p>Proximity, kebele door-to-door campaign, EPRDF gender equality agenda, wereda affirmative actions (+ greater attention to education): girls 50% enrolment. School 'better than rural schools' (teacher) + GEQIP grant.</p> <p>Absenteeism market days, dropouts when family hardship – seems more girls.</p> <p>Secondary Gr9-12 in town though said lack many things and qualified teachers. Low quality seen as obstacle to access further education opportunities.</p> <p>Felt need of TVET for Gr10 leavers and support to youth packages. Catholic Mission constructing one in Imdibir.</p> <p>Post-election promise university in woreda; now a few students elsewhere.</p>	<p>No coherent system of pro-poor exemptions or interventions. Some elderly poor exempted from most contributions but not the Telethon. Catholic NGO targeted some poor households. Faith-based communities also active.</p>	<p>Family and land law: land rights, right to divorce, campaign against women-related HTPs, economic rights. Actively led by wereda WA office, NGO support (incl UNICEF), and kebele WA leader. Political empowerment more difficult: politics & community management male issues (Gurage norms).</p> <p>Notable progress (circumcision, arranged marriages, girls' exploitation as servants, land and divorce rights, economic empowerment – women co-op) though stiff resistance from some. Support from customary institutions for parts of the agenda (e.g. against circumcision), not all (e.g. modern justice re: divorce).</p>	<p>Youth unemployment and lack of prospects after some education raised as a big issue. Appeasement of ethnic tensions following 1994/5 regionalisation facilitates return to and increase of (internal) migration.</p> <p>Youth organised in groups to engage in productive activities. One group got land and some success though concerns with credit conditions and lack of common interest among members. Land given to other youth for small shops. Lack of access to more lucrative activities due to lack of water and electricity in inside villages.</p>	<p>KG (Catholic Mission) used by many. Sanitation and better nutrition benefiting children. Some NGO support. Vaccination.</p>

TableA 11: Community Features: Society and Government 1995 – Ethnically Homogenous Communities (features disappeared by 2010 highlighted)

	Social capital	Social integration	Cultural integration	Cultural repertoires of ideas	Governance	Government-community relations
Korodegaga <i>Oromia</i>	Four big iddirs, some belong to two Whole community contribute if someone loses a lot of property	Clan distinctions operative during and post-Derg in PA elections Social interaction at village level rather than kebele No problem of theft	<i>Ethnicity</i> -: Oromo – clan structure – 1 dominant <i>Religion</i> – Muslim; some traditional beliefs (sacrifices)	Local customary repertoire influenced by Islam (misfortunes attributed to Allah) and traditional beliefs (prayers for rain)	Clan distinctions operative in PA elections Respected elders representatives of people No consensus whether PA leadership serves people or government People said forced to elect someone they did not want on regional administration	Security problems and 'underground suppression' related to OLF People suspicious of all political exercises and questions; unhappy with policies (favour Tigrayans, not helpful to people) and politics (no democracy in practice, killings, imprisonment)
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Dense social capital Several iddirs and equbs, some very large; four desh established in imperial times; Church important (mehbers) Group/mutual agricultural work	Tight-knit orderly community Bewitching used to solve conflicts 2003: no consensus about level of criminality (there is some) and effectiveness of police and justice	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Amhara – two lineages – Important for marriage, blood feuds and access to land in the past <i>Religion</i> – OC, some traditional beliefs	Local customary repertoire: land is sacred; obligations to the Church, community norms very important; sorcery associated with devil though may help in disputes Weakening ritual ceremonies	In 1995 people concerned with livelihood issues In 2003 mixed views on decentralisation (proximity of services a good thing; will not work because leaders not directly elected and wereda controlled from above)	Hostility to TGE, said to favour one ethnic group - local leaders imprisoned People unhappy about tax amount (too high) Ex-leaders/Derg bureaucrats excluded, risk of splitting community
Imdibir HG (Girar in 2010) <i>SNNP</i>	Strong inter-household relationships Equb (many) and Iddirs Family and lineage very important Mutual/group working parties	Double-edged relation: economic and political rivalry between clans but bound by ties of obligatory goodwill – joking relationships. Gurage institutions around kin relations in family and village/lineage, entailing obligations to group (social and economic e.g. land sold/leased first to family/lineage)	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Gurage – clan structure. Most villages lineage-based. <i>Religion</i> - OC, Muslim, Catholic; Conversion to Catholicism because CRS activity. Tolerance but people hate conversions. Some traditional religion and beliefs.		Village headmen and elders make economic and political decisions. Since 1991 PA lost power; elders more powerful Fourteen elders' councils for different villages; monthly village assemblies	Mobility restricted due to Regionalisation and 'ethnic cleansing'. Two camps: one pro-EPRDF and one against

TableA 12: Community Features: Society and Government 1995 – Ethnically Heterogenous Communities (features disappeared by 2010 highlighted)

	Social capital	Social integration	Cultural integration	Cultural repertoires of ideas	Governance	Government-community relations
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	Mehbers, senbetes (religious) One iddir involving Muslims and Christians One equb (quarter of residents are members) Labour-sharing arrangements	Argobba and Amhara allies against the Afar. Blood feuds, handled by elders; unsuccessful campaign against it by wereda. No religious tensions	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Argobba, Amhara <i>Religion</i> - Muslim, OC; Some intermarriage; Traditional beliefs practised	Local customary repertoire: male leading household, strict gender and age hierarchy, stricter in Argobba community where women do not farm/go out; reciprocity and sharing much valued	Political cadres for EPRDF introduced in 1993 Community problems first considered by elders, then PA then wereda	Peace and stability attained in area attributed to TGE Discontent among landless farmers, rumour of new reallocation of land (occurred in 1997 in some other parts of Amhara but not Dinki)
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	Mehber (many), 4 iddirs Kinship obligations not so strong, to individuals and not corporate group Strong neighbour reciprocal obligations; friends important. Group work though already rarer	Community not tightly knit (4 villages far apart, religious diversity) or coherent – though lots of social interaction and networks of relations	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Tigrayans, Irob <i>Religion</i> - OC, Muslim, a few Catholics	Local customary repertoire under evolution: now a crime to say evil spirits cause illnesses and accidents; cultural prejudices (women weaklings, despised occupations) changing	Decision made by general assembly of all people (all development and policy matters), which elects Council and Council elects executive committee members.	Elites compete for government positions (privileges, other advantages); work for government so people do not trust them. Many meetings, free work service – disliked by people.
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	Many iddirs Kinship and lineage entail strong social and economic obligations; also unwritten group friendship 'contracts'	Many Kembata expelled in 1991. In 1995 community said to be tight-knit, people mix in small circles Many youth turning into robbers and gangsters	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Oromo – 3 clans – 1 dominant; long-established migrants Tigrayans, Amhara, Wolayitta, Kembata <i>Religion</i> - Muslim, OC, various Protestant. No conflict between groups, though differences of opinions among ethnic groups re: TGE regionalisation policy	Different values, customs and beliefs Local cultural repertoire already changing: individualism over community belonging; education and wealth importance; however, feeling that everyone equal	PA lost power to elders at Derg fall then this reverted in some aspects (tax, arresting people, implementation of political decisions, organising people). Elders still important. No consensus on PA leadership (government spies vs. trusted by people and hardworking vs. dictators, linked to clan domination	'Ruling party' OPDP think any opposition means sympathy with OLF so no choice for people Tigrayans and Oromo support TGE regionalisation policy; others fear has encouraged ethnic differences at all levels

TableA 13: Community Features: Society and Government 2010 – Ethnically Homogenous Communities (changes highlighted)

	Social capital	Social integration	Cultural integration	Cultural repertoires of ideas	Governance	Government-community relations
Koro-degaga <i>Oromia</i>	Clan structure. Non-resident excluded. Ample evidence of strength of informal social protection system (relatives, neighbours, friends)	Different types of conflict over land notably linked to access to irrigation Targeting processes (PSNP, packages) creating tension	<i>Ethnicity</i> -: Oromo – clan structure – 1 dominant <i>Religion</i> – Muslim	Government and alternative modern repertoires (including more fundamentalist Islam) available and challenging many aspects of old customary repertoires	Large number of kebele and sub-kebele structures: development and political activities. 20-member cells. Some talk of corruption (food aid). One kebele leader removed for alleged corruption though clan competition may also explain part of the change in kebele leadership.	Government mobilisation via meetings, extension workers, targets, some threats. Women apparently support EPRDF (women’s rights); men formal members but unimpressed.
Yetmen <i>Amhara</i>	Tightly knitted community. Iddirs, mehbers and very important desh regulating compliance with social norms through in/exclusion in addition to role in social protection	Serious incident souring relationships between rural and urban communities. Quite high level of theft, banditry and male fighting though hard to get people to participate in community policing	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Amhara – two lineages <i>Religion</i> – OC ¹⁹ Tension with urban Yetmen, same ethnicity and religion, linked to use of rural communal land	Individualism influencing things in practice (e.g. unsuccessful youth group-based activities): influence of donor/NGO repertoire combined with local cultural and modern repertoire (independent household ideal, reaction to Derg).	Large number of kebele and sub-kebele structures and close match between EPRDF and government structures. ‘Derg bureaucrats’ who had been banned from political participation included in party campaign to recruit rich and influential people in community	Bolshy community mobilising against unwanted things from government and generally selective, using ‘democratic right’ of not participating and building on community’s history of rebellion against government. Kebele leadership between two fires.
Girar <i>SNNP</i>	Iddirs, equbs of various sizes, relationships with neighbours, relatives and lineage all important. Strong links with distant relatives/ migrants (Gurage ‘diaspora’ investing in Girar and Imdibir; urban relatives helping family members in Girar)	Violence among youth in town (chat trade, quarrels in bars). Apparently not squarely checked by existing security/ policing measures	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Gurage – clan structure. Most villages lineage-based. <i>Religion</i> - OC, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant. Good relationships though some dislike of conversions to Protestantism	Gurage belonging repertoire strong. Mix of alliance (e.g. re: fight against HTPs) and tension (e.g. jurisdiction over divorce) with government repertoire. Local modern repertoire strong too, long-standing influence of Gurage migration and urban proximity.	Kebele and sub-kebele structures in place though no mention of micro (party/ government) structures. Well-liked, long-serving kebele chairman seems to be critical player, little mention of other structures. Kebele manager is party link with wereda. Gurage institutions important; government attempt of working with them (e.g. Gurage high court law against lavish mourning spending)	Complex relationship following wereda vote for CUD in 2005 and protracted process of return to calm through ‘good governance’ discussions. Government mobilisation seemingly less intense than elsewhere. Diversity of opinions about government performance.

¹⁹ OC stands for Orthodox Christian

TableA 14: Community Features: Society and Government 2010 – Ethnically Heterogenous Communities (changes highlighted)

	Social capital	Social integration	Cultural integration	Cultural repertoires	Governance	Govt-comm'y relations
Geblen Tigray	No formal iddir. Mehber for richer households. Strong relations with neighbours, family and wider kin. Informal social protection system still working. Fears of it weakening if trend of younger people leaving the community continues.	Burglary, theft and town fighting by some youth. Increased policing and some formalisation of customary mediation.	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Tigrayans, Irob – Little salience <i>Religion</i> - OC, Muslim, a few Catholics – No tension	Despite TPLF propaganda since the 1980s and some inroads (e.g. women's rights) local customary repertoire still strong; modern repertoire linked to growing importance of non-agricultural livelihoods.	Wereda de-centralisation started in 2002; local wereda, kebele and sub-kebele structures expanded and re-organised since then. Party and government structures intertwined. Some talk of corruption mainly around food aid.	Government mobilisation via training and propaganda, targets, extension workers, models and awards, threats of removal from PSNP. Community unhappy about forced package taking but kebele leadership under pressure and unwilling to raise at wereda level.
Dinki Amhara	One common iddir in spite of externally suggested (Muslim/ OC) split. Common ceremonies. Mutual assistance important also between neighbours and relatives (in-kind)	Occasional conflicts (land disputes, land owners/ sharecroppers) or men drinking on market days and becoming violent. Instances of blood feuds. Inter-generational conflicts and fights between fathers and sons over land.	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Argoba, Amhara <i>Religion</i> - Muslim, OC Large overlap between ethnic and religious identities. Community cohesion though some say 'superficial'	Local customary and ethnic/ religious belonging repertoires strong; younger generations draw on local modern repertoire (e.g. women's rights, sanitation), linked to government repertoire	Wereda, kebele and sub-kebele structures reorganised and expanded; 1-for-5 and 1-for-10 cells (one household oversees others' performance in development activities, mobilises etc.). Strong overlap govt and party structures. Argobbas have upper hand in kebele admin/politics (not wereda). Some talk of corruption around food aid	Government mobilisation efforts said to be hindered by people's 'democratic right of non-participation' (post-2005 good governance package). Kebele leadership 'sandwiched between two fires'
Turufe Oromia	Relationships with neighbours and relatives important. Iddirs, churches, equbs, customary associations (women's butter association, cattle iddirs) some of those ethnically demarcated. Migrants keep links outside the community and with home area in various ways.	Turufe known for thefts and gang banditry (youth). No consensus whether this is being addressed or not, contradicting reports on effectiveness of militia, justice and community policing systems.	<i>Ethnicity</i> - Oromo – 3 clans (1 dominant); long-established and recent migrant Tigrayans, Amhara, Wolayitta, Kembata. Ethnic networks important for migrants <i>Religion</i> - Muslim, OC, various Protestant. Some dislike of conversions to Protestantism	Several coexisting ethnic/ religious belonging repertoires entailing different social norms. Largely tolerant of each other. Modern repertoire linked to proximity of, and links with Kuyera and Shashemene (market, education).	Positions in kebele administration controlled by Oromo. Same large number of kebele and sub-kebele government and party structures as elsewhere. Government tapping customary institutions: Aba Gada (Oromo dispute resolution) formalised as a committee	Nor particularly close or problematic. Community able to mobilise against unwanted things (e.g. loss of access to nearby hospital services, involving iddir)

TableA 15: The role of development interventions in the modernisation of society and government since 2003– Ethnically Homogenous Communities

	Effects on/use of community-initiated organisations	Security	Cultural integration	Cultural modernisation	Local government	Government-community relations
<i>Koro-degaga Oromia</i>	No evidence of effects of food aid through PSNP on informal social protection system. Unlike in some other sites, no reported government attempt of using iddirs or religious leaders	New structures and changes in role of others. New peace committee: elders participate to security with militia and cabinet. Said to be effective against thefts (e.g. role in getting back irrigation pump parts stolen); also see land cases before kebele, and disputes before social courts.	No related intervention.	Campaigns against HTPs especially related to women (early marriage, abduction, widow’s inheritance, circumcision, polygyny). Two years of training on new family law. 9 people selected at kebele level to ensure law enforcement. Some success though hidden resistance.	Little awareness of decentralisation in 2003; now present through kebele and increasingly small sub-kebele structures (gots in 2005, now 20 household-cells) involved in development and political activities. Kebele manager (2009), known and recommended by kebele leaders, also party secretary.	Govt mobilisation incl. many meetings esp in run-up to elections. Training on good governance (post 2005 elections, won by opposition in wereda), yet, although many said to be fed up by meetings, people attend. Almost everyone party member, men un-convinced. Five kebele chairman since 2003 (mix of community and wereda decisions). WA and YA established recently (YA in 2007), WA important for access to interventions (non-residents excluded). Youth co-ops more important than YA.
<i>Yetmen Amhara</i>	Community mobilised through community-initiated organisations to resist some government policies and actions relating to mourning ceremonies and control of sub-kebele communal land.	Militia disarmed for having sided with community in incident (which turned violent) with wereda, related to communal land use. Security said to be worse than average (wereda officials); government interventions un-successful thus far. Formal Peace Committee inactive tho elders active outside it.	No related intervention. Dersh said to tell people to resist World Vision interventions and conversion to Protestantism.	Concerted efforts to convert farmers to ‘developmental state’ approach (through top-down targets, emphasis on collective activities, meetings, training, party documentation sent to cells etc.). Mixed success: people take what suits them and resist the rest.	Recent cabinet restructuring (2008), sub-kebele and development teams, intertwined with EPRDF structures. Same leadership, on instruction from above.	Following 2005 election (informal reports of CUD victory tho ANDM ‘finally won’), good governance discussions/package. Party reaching out to Derg bureaucrats (hitherto banned from local politics). Drive to recruit rich farmers as party members and vanguard in development. Lack of enthusiasm and usual mobilisation means (incl. those described in cultural modernisation) ineffective without ‘positive coercion’ banned under good governance package,

	Effects on/use of community-initiated organisations	Security	Cultural integration	Cultural modernisation	Local government	Government-community relations
Girar SNNP	Informal social protection system not changed by interventions. Some faith-based and NGO activity tho not new. Some mobilisation of WA and YA to help poor/ elderly. Iddirs, religious organisations, Gurage customary institutions all involved in various government interventions re: women’s rights, campaigns against HTPs and for family planning and sanitation/ prevention, and at times mobilising contributions. Overall successfully tho some tension over approach and demarcation of jurisdiction.	Increasing number of formal structures (militia, elders, peace committee, community police) and interventions (e.g. wereda training on everyone’s role in security). Unsuccessful to curb recent problems of crop thefts and outbreaks of youth fighting in town. Wereda police involved in some cases, with one allegation of nepotism.	No related interventions. Officials involved with elders in resolving disputes between churches about land for building	SNNP family law, intense activity of wereda WA office and locally present NGOs, working with community-initiated and customary organisations, against HTPs and re: women’s rights – with significant resulting change.	Usual structures in place tho little apparent activity apart from kebele chairman. Kebele manager recently posted, competing with kebele chairman (‘who is boss’, relations with wereda. Kebele manager also party link with wereda. People convinced kebele not represented at wereda cabinet explains lack of prioritisation in e.g. water supply interventions.	Complex relationship following wereda vote for CUD in 2005 and protracted process of return to calm through ‘good governance’ discussions. Government mobilisation seemingly less intense than elsewhere, little talk of party activities. Good governance resulting in reshuffling some kebele cabinet members but not leader, in post since more than 8 years. YA and WA activated following 2007 resolution of 2005-provoked tensions, youth packages seen as linked to good governance agenda.

TableA 16: The role of development interventions in the modernisation of society and government since 2003– Ethnically Heterogenous Communities

	Effects on/use of community-initiated organisations	Security	Cultural integration	Cultural modernisation	Local government	Government-community relations
Geblen <i>Tigray</i>	No sign that informal social protection system, still strong, has been affected by PSNP; rather, increase in relatively reliable resources to circulate in the system (sharing, use of rations in informal credit system). YA at times mobilised to support poor and elderly (e.g. latrine digging). Fears that if migration of younger community members continues to increase (lack of prospects) could weaken the system considerably.	Increased policing: government-organised community police, recruitment of militia (large, armed but unpaid). Some effect e.g. night patrols (kebele instruction) effective to check youth drinking and quarrels in Mishig bars. Some formalisation of customary mediation, including elders on sub-kebele committees. Unresolved disputes go to social court (said to handle cases faster since BPR) and land management committee for land cases.	No related intervention	Inroad in women’s rights: strong EPRDF agenda continuing TPLF. Campaigns to reduce extravagant spending (weddings, mourning) – not much success; and for fewer non-working days (agreed with OC Church) - still some mixed feelings. Modern repertoire (re: non-agricultural livelihoods) influenced by non-farm packages intervention and broad modernisation processes (education-job hopes, migration). Muslim leader opposed to credit (incl packages).	Lead role of inter-twined government and party interventions in change: decentralisation, party recruitment drive, expansion and re-organisation of wereda, kebele and sub-kebele structures; most recently kebele standing committees and kebele manager. Sub-kebeles important in selection of model farmers, models for awards, and PSNP targeting. Some allegations of corruption by some kebele officials, around food aid.	Government mobilisation – incl. threats linked to PSNP, 20-40 days/year free community work, key role of vanguard party members. WA and YA in place though lack of resources/support from above. Good governance: community’s views on kebele admin effectiveness supposed to be taken into account in strengthened wereda follow up. Yet, community’s unhappiness about forced package taking not relayed upward – reportedly due to strong party pressure on members.
Dinki <i>Amhara</i>	No sign of effects of (non-PSNP) food aid/FFW on informal social protection system. Government has been using iddirs (e.g. dispute mediation); report of increased iddir membership as it matters for inclusion in activities. Iddirs said to be asked to ban members not complying with kebele expectations.	New government-related security and justice structures: community police, use of iddirs. Role of social court reduced – land cases seen by kebele, family cases by wereda. Seemingly not much effect on increasing inter-generational land conflicts.	Attempts to manage inter-ethnic tensions (mainly with Afar) through inter-wereda peace committee with elders from communities, including Dinki	Attempts to eliminate HTPs (re: women’s rights, lavish spending, non-working holy days) - Little success, although some reports of fewer holy days since 2007, and drought may reduce spending on ceremonies. Reduction in abduction likely; some young people had chosen their marriage partner. Family Law not mentioned by name.	Since decentralisation gradually increasingly dense kebele and sub-kebele government and party structures; larger (2008) kebele Council tho little mention of activity. Lack of extension workers (hardship post) and inputs said to hinder development progress. Kebele manager: turn over, current one well organised – appreciated by community. Some allegations of corruption linked to food aid.	EPRDF minority rights policy: upper hand to Argobba in kebele administration (not wereda). Government mobilisation incl. use of iddirs. WA, YA; recently, party-embedded leagues. Limited activity: no resources in spite of wereda promises to youth in particular. Community ‘lack of awareness’ (officials) vs. people’s democratic right to not participate (community members: post-2005 election, CUD victory in wereda, and ‘good governance’ to win people back).

	Effects on/use of community-initiated organisations	Security	Cultural integration	Cultural modernisation	Local government	Government-community relations
Turufe <i>Oromia</i>	Informal social protection system little changed since 2003 though said then to be affected by 'individualism'. Government use of iddirs and religious leaders in campaigns against HTPs and to build latrines; and Aba Gada in formal security/justice system and against HTPs.	Security and justice structures developed: improved efficiency of social court; peace committee involving elders at kebele level and incorporating Aba Gada (Oromo customary institution) at wereda level; community policing. Limited success (increased thefts, allegations of protection through 'connections').	No related interventions – though long established migrants had access to land and ID cards in the same way as native Oromo.	Oromia family law, HTP prevention committee, fines, imprisonment (one case): said to have some effect re: women's rights. Iddirs and mosque involved in campaign against lavish mourning spending. Generational effect also at play. Some success with 'development as a joint (community/ government) effort' – to bring changes in people's lives.	Regionalisation policy: kebele positions all Oromo (tho four changes in kebele leader in eight years). Same kebele, sub-kebele and small cell structures as elsewhere.	Government mobilisation as elsewhere, converging with people's keenness to improve their lives, though participation often equated with following directives, being aware and emulating models. WA and YA in place but little activity. Party recruitment in run up to 2010 election (following community voting opposition in 2005); sub-kebele structures active in mobilisation though occasional community resistance.

Table A17: The Impact of Livelihood and Public Goods Interventions on Wellbeing – Some Examples

HH/Person	Infrastructure	Environment	ADLI	Land interventions	Non-farm extension	PSNP FFW
Richer MH households	Grain and vegetable prices lower if access is problematic (Korodegaga).	A few Model Farmers (likely to be richer) had water reservoirs dug for them. Requirement for community labour	More likely to be Model Farmers and assisted by DAs. Increased productivity when sufficient water. May have to take risky packages (e.g. Geblen).	Daughters' inheritance – implemented in Korodegaga - good for husbands, bad for brothers.	NA	Some included in Geblen and Korodegaga
MiddleMH households	"	Maybe requirement for community labour	Those with 'networks' more likely to access credit and packages. May learn new things.	"	NA	A few excluded
Poorer MH households	"	Maybe requirement for community labour	Poor household in Yetmen got credit for bull fattening; ex-Derg bureaucrat. May learn new things.	"	NA	A few excluded
FH households	"	FHHs in Girar asked to contribute cash rather than labour	A few richer women are Model Farmers. Most don't get access if quotas are small. May learn new things.	Widows, divorcees and daughters have rights; some implementation	Some participation in Geblen & Girar	All FHHs included in Geblen
Men including dependents	Mobile phones helped thieves. Roads & lighting make getting about easier	May have to participate in community labour	Depends on status of household head.	Women's rights reduce divorced men's land – examples from Yetmen.		Immigrants working for FHHs admitted in Koro
Wives/mothers	"	May have to participate in community labour	Depends on husband's status	Land rights increase ontological security	Co-op in Girar	
Young men	" Robbery harder	May have to participate in community labour	Depends on father's status and land access	Communal land distribution to individuals; allocation to co-ops (Koro, Girar). Distribution of land without inheritors to sons of bureaucrats in Yetmen	Co-ops in Korodegaga & Girar.	
Young women	Roads & lighting - getting about easier	May have to participate in community labour	Planting in rows (on irrigation farms) is tiresome	Daughters of bureaucrats also got land	Some participation	
Children	"	Some children drowned in water reservoirs and latrine holes	Depends on father's status: households getting richer can provide better food and educational expenses	Depends on household	NA	Food: school attendance; FFW: absenteeism
Elderly people	"	NA	Landholders may	Those with land rights are more independent	NA	
Mentally ill, disabled, chronically sick	Road access - easier to get to holy water	NA	NA	NA	NA	May benefit from household allocation

Table A18: The Impact of Life and Governance Interventions on Wellbeing – Some Examples

HH/Person	PSNP Direct Food Aid	Health	Education	Gender interventions	Youth interventions	Pro-poor interventions	Security	Justice
Richer MH households	Korodegaga elite got senior wife registered	Family illnesses private medicine Health packages	Children	Changes to the balance of resources & relationships in MHH; improving FHH rights	May benefit sons; youth chosen likely to have 'networks'	Some diversion – e.g. Korodegaga sheep Sheep for wives K Sheep; ox for 1 K	Theft of crops in Turufe and Yetmen not reduced	Problems due to need for evidence
MiddleMH HHs		Family	Children					
Poorer MH HHs		Expense problem	Some					
FH households		Family	Children					
Dependent Men			NA					
Wives/mothers	Pregnant women + new mothers excused work in Geblen	Closer to HEWs M&C pregnancy, delivery, and follow-up	Children	Land rights	May benefit sons;	NGO assistance in Yetmen and Girar; phased out in Turufe.	Safer to go to public places	Cases taken to wereda successful
Young men	NA	Health Centres Health packages	University, TVET	Young men interviewed were supportive of changes	Co-ops in Koro Girar, Turufe Football field in Dinki	No case	Improvements bad for young thieves	Need for evidence helps young thieves
Young women	NA	Contraceptives HP M+C service Other packages Health Centres	University, TVET	Marriage rules, rape laws, other HTPs	A few young women in Girar co-ops and 1 in Koro	Dormitory for poor female students - Bichena	Safer to go to school and in public places	Rapist imprisoned in Geblen
Children	Children of FHH – e.g. in Korodegaga	Health services generally, vaccination, malaria. Latrine drowning	Primary and secondary schools. Very poor children working.	Schooling for girls; early marriage law	NA - yet	Short feeding programmes - few malnourished children – some rich. NGO help	NA	Turufe committee for child abuse
Elderly people	In three sites direct food aid provided the only income for a number	Distant, expensive health services problematic	NA	Only land rights	NA	PSNP	Improves mobility	No case in the data
Mentally ill, disabled, chronically sick people	Some benefited	2 mentally ill in Yetmen – holy water	Children chronically ill missing school	May assist chronically sick	NA	No case	No case	No case

Annexes

All Annexes are provided separately. Annex 6 is on the website www.wed-ethiopia.org.

Annex 1. Methodology

Annex 2. Findings 1: community situation reports 2010

Annex 3. Findings 2: modernisation processes in the six communities since 1994/5

Annex 4. Findings 3: The cumulative impact of development interventions 2003 – 2010

Annex 5. Findings 4: Impacts of recent development interventions on different kinds of household and people

Annex 6. Suite of protocol instruments for exploring development impacts in rural communities (in Ethiopia) over the longer-term

Evidence Base

Evidence Base 1. Community situation reports 2010

Separate Evidence Bases in six Volumes

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 1: Community Situation 2010 – Yetmen, Amhara

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 2: Community Situation 2010 – Dinki, Amhara

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 3: Community Situation 2010 – Turufe, Oromia

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 4: Community Situation 2010 – Korodegaga, Oromia

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 5: Community Situation 2010 – Girar, SNNP

Evidence Base 1 – Volume 6: Community Situation 2010 – Geblen, Tigray

Evidence Base 2. Modernisation processes in the six communities since 1994/5

Evidence Base 3. The impact of development interventions in the six communities 2003 – 2010

Evidence Base 4. Impacts of recent development interventions on different kinds of household and people in the communities

Evidence Base 5. Macro Level Policies Entering Rural Communities 2003-09

Evidence Base 6. Comparative Societal and Policy Baselines for Twenty Exemplar Rural Communities, 1995 and 2003