

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS
IN RURAL ETHIOPIA: WIDE3 STAGE 2**

**STAGE 2 EIGHT FOOD INSECURE
COMMUNITIES
SHORT SUMMARY**

MARCH 2013

Mokoro


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
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1. Introduction

The WIDE3 research use longitudinal data to explore the long term trajectories of twenty communities representing different types of rural community since 1995 , with a particular focus on changes since 2003¹. The research was designed in three stages. Stage 1, focusing on six communities, three of which were food insecure and three of which were self-sufficient, was completed in 2009-2010. Stage 2 focused on eight food insecure communities in various parts of the country, with fieldwork conducted in late 2011/early 2012. This short summary presents the headline findings from the stage 2 research.

Map 1: The Eight Stage 2 communities²



Map 1 situates the eight Stage 2 communities in Ethiopia; the colour-coding identifies similar core livelihood systems. In the Annex we present the stories of the communities in order of their remoteness (see Table 1). Luqa, an agro-pastoralist community and Do'oma (vulnerable cereal) are very remote and both in SNNP. Harresaw (vulnerable cereal) in Tigray and agro-pastoralist Gelcha in

¹1995 and 2003 were not chosen for particular reasons; by chance they were the dates when earlier rounds of research were conducted in the communities. However 1995 was the year when the federal system was introduced and 2003, following a very bad drought, saw increases in government activity with donor support which accelerated through the following seven years.

² A brief narrative on each community is provided in Annex 1.

Oromia are remote. Gara Godo and Aze Debo'a, where there is some coffee, depend on garden-grown root crops and are remotish. Shumsheha (vulnerable cereal) and Adele Keke (chat + vulnerable cereal) are near large towns.

Table 1: The eight stage two communities: location, livelihood, ethnicities and religions

REGION	PLACE	LOCATION	LIVELIHOOD	ETHNICITIES	RELIGIONS
SNNP	Luqa	Very remote	Pastoralist in transition + small irrigation + EFA	Tsemai Some Benna wives	Customary 85% Protestant 15-20% (2 sects) Orthodox Christian 1 HH
SNNP	Do'oma	Nr wereda town but very remote	Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP	Gamo & Gofa 75% Wolayta 15% Amhara 3% From Jinka 7%	Protestants 90% (2 sects) Orthodox Christians 10%
Tigray	Harre-saw	Quite remote	Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP	Tigrayan	Orthodox Christian
Oromia	Gelcha	Near town & main road but remote	Pastoralist in transition + small irrigation + PSNP	Karrayu 85% Somali 13% Ittu Oromo a few households	Muslim 95% (customary religious beliefs strong) Protestants a few youth Orthodox Christian 1 hh
SNNP	Gara Godo	Remotish but new municipality	Highly-populated enset + migration + coffee + PSNP	Wolayta	Protestants (5 sects) 66% Orthodox Christians 32% Catholics 2%
SNNP	Aze Debo'a	Near zone town but remotish	Highly-populated enset + migration + coffee + PSNP	Kembata	Protestants (11 sects) 99%
Oromia	Adele Keke	Peri-urban near Alemaya	Chat + vulnerable cereal – irrigation + PSNP	Oromo	Muslim
Amhara	Shum-sheha	Peri-urban near Lalibela	Vulnerable cereal + some irrigation + migration + PSNP	Amhara	Orthodox Christian 97% Muslim 3%

The rest of this short summary presents headline findings focusing on these eight communities, and organised under five headings:

- Community profiles and development interventions in 2011
- Experience of government employees working in the communities
- Community contributions to development interventions
- Poor people and interventions
- Community trajectories into the future

In reading about these eight communities it is important to be aware that they are not 'representative' of Ethiopia's rural communities but rather are examples (exemplars) of important *types* of community. Taken as a whole they are examples of drought-prone/food-aid dependent communities with relatively good connections to the outside world.

2. Community profiles and development interventions in 2011

Community features

Key features

- There were reports of **climate change** effects from all sites including increases in temperature, shorter rainy seasons, more erratic and intense rains, unseasonal rains which damaged crops,

streams drying up, and decreasing levels of groundwater.

- **Urbanisation processes** had affected all sites: in one kebele a new highway was a growth point for a tiny town, in three kebeles small towns were growing fast, while four kebele centres were in commutable distance of growing towns.
- **Roads** connecting the kebeles to the outside world had improved considerably from 2008 but inside roads were not well-developed and the access gap between residents of kebele centres and remoter parts had widened.
- While **local ecologies** provided services (which sometimes failed - water, plants, and animals used by people for food, clothing, and shelter) they also provided dis-services (for example floods, baboons eating grain, lions eating cattle, human, animal and plant pests and diseases)
- **Resource-related conflicts** with neighbours involving violence had recently occurred in four communities; in one there was also an internal conflict.

Community-policy (dis)connects related to the provision of public goods

- With regard to **infrastructure** there was much appreciation of main road improvements, such investment in irrigation as there was, and schools. There were many synergies with other interventions: external roads had improved access to inputs, markets and services; electricity supported businesses, grain mills, and light improved security and study at night; mobile phones facilitated access to economic information and calling the vet and transport for health emergencies. The important 'missing' investments were in internal roads and bridges, irrigation (in six sites), and drinking water (affecting people in seven sites.)
- There was no unequivocal acceptance of a large **environmental intervention** anywhere. In the Tigray site a number of people highlighted positive results of intensive watershed management work in one site. However generally, watershed management projects were unpopular for a variety of reasons: in the flatter sites the need was not obvious; farmers were unwilling to have terraces on their land since they reduced land size; projects only benefited those living nearby; tree seedlings died due to lack of rain or care; in one site structures were quickly destroyed by livestock; and in another people were expected to provide many days of continuous labour which interfered with farming activities.
- **Generally** there was not enough PSNP PW and voluntary community labour time to cover all infrastructure needs and environmental projects promoted via the wereda. The most successful projects involved wereda contributions of resources and skills although this was infrequent.
- **Elders and other kebele volunteers** were involved in peace committees which negotiated sometimes transient conflict settlements.

Livelihoods

Community livelihoods

- All eight communities had **annual rain shortages** whose severity varied by year and all had suffered at least one severe drought since 2003; nevertheless the six agriculturalist sites had experienced **economic growth** related to improvements in roads, increases in agricultural and non-farm incomes and the PSNP.
- There had not been equivalent signs of economic development in the two pastoralist sites although there were signs of a possible take-off in the more remote one.
- Improvements in agricultural incomes were related to **agricultural productivity increases**, food price **inflation**, better road **access to markets**, and **diversification** into higher-value products, many of which depended on **irrigation**. Cash-crop production and sale had increased everywhere. Failure to maintain a road had reduced access to markets in one site.
- **Improved seeds, fertiliser and new planting techniques** had contributed to improvements in agricultural productivity.
- **Irrigation schemes** were of varying importance in the sites; they involved a variety of

technologies and their reach depended on annual rain patterns. Community demand for irrigation was high.

- **Rising livestock and livestock product prices** had increased investment and sales in all communities; fattening brought a good income in some. Improved breeds, zero-grazing and new fodder were found in some sites.
- **Landlessness** was a problem in all sites, especially for youth. Share-cropping, leasing and purchase of land 'by contract' were common allowing successful farmers to increase their land size and poorer landed farmers to get some income from their land while also working off-farm. **A richer farmer class** was solidifying in the agriculturalist sites with many diversifying into trade or other businesses.
- The pastoralist households mainly relied on family and customary workgroup labour. In the agriculturalist sites **household child and youth labour had declined** and employment of daily labourers risen. The economic activity of women and older girls had increased.
- In some sites the kebele 1-5 groups, which were composed of farmers with adjacent fields, were being encouraged to work together on each farmer's land in turn. Women and youth co-operatives were mostly unsuccessful.
- **Migration** for agricultural work on large farms and smallholdings were important survival strategies in three communities; in two sites accelerating illegal international migration was accompanied by a reduction in agricultural migration. Young men in the pastoralist sites went seasonally to distant pastures. There was also increasing urban migration by both sexes in all sites except one pastoralist site and an agriculturalist site where commuting was easy.
- There were growing **non-farm** business and employment opportunities in all sites notably in trade, wood/grass/charcoal-selling, and services. In some sites there were craftworkers and/or motorbike/bajaj transport-providers. Demand for local goods and services was greater in the three communities with growing small towns.

Community-policy (dis)connects related to livelihoods

- Some younger **pastoralists** in both sites were more interested in farming than the older generation.
- The main focus of **agricultural extension was cereals and fertiliser** and the **shift to higher-value** crops such as onions, peppers, spices, sesame, *chat*, coffee, and eucalyptus was **mainly farmer-led**. Not all locally available fertiliser and seeds were suitable for the soils and climates.
- Some pesticides had led to the death of bees.
- **Farmers resented** the pressure by government to take fertiliser and/or risky seeds on credit which happened in four sites (use of threats; in one site payment for unwanted fertiliser deducted from PSNP transfers). In other sites poorer farmers could not get credit for fertiliser or seeds.
- Model farmers and development team leaders in a number of sites resented or refused to attend **long trainings** especially if they took place in peak farming seasons. Government and party meetings were also said to interfere with farming activities and it was hard for model farmers and leaders to achieve the dual goal of leadership and economic success.
- There were very few producer **co-operatives** and most were unsuccessful. The few service co-operatives were not well-managed.
- Only two wereda agricultural offices were actively promoting **irrigation**. In one site when farmers asked the wereda to invest in micro-irrigation officials explained they had no budget because of the prioritisation of health and education said to be pushed by government and donors.
- **Livestock –rearing** was profitable but also risky. **Vet services** were generally inadequate though much appreciated when available; they could not handle epidemics. Such **PSNP-related credit** as existed was mainly for livestock which brought good returns unless the livestock died, which led to debt. In severe droughts huge numbers of livestock died leaving many people with big debts; it took some years to re-build herds.

- In three sites there was some resistance to the enclosures intended to exclude livestock from customary grazing land.
- Five of the sites had been affected in different ways by **inward investment** involving loss of community land, but also new employment opportunities.
- In at least three sites officials tried to stop **land** share-cropping and/or renting. In two sites people rented out their land to get money for international migration. Land re-distribution in one site led to conflicts between sub-kebele units and tensions between different kinds of potential beneficiary – women, youth, ex-soldiers and PLWHAs. The threat of loss of land was used to put pressure on farmers to conform with extension advice in one site. One land administration committee was exposed as corrupt and replaced. Collecting land tax was generally problematic.
- There was little government attention anywhere to non-farm activities. Credit that could be used for **non-farm investment** was appreciated. Due to the building boom a few sand and stone **youth co-operatives** were successful but competition was strong. Individuals and co-operatives wanting to set up businesses often had problems getting access to credit, premises, training and equipment.
- Some **credit** was restricted to landholders, some was provided on a group basis, and some was provided to PSNP beneficiaries who received cash with repayments made through regular deductions. Government promotion of savings had led to an increase in savings and credit organisations which had not yet started lending.
- There were mixed feelings about the **PSNP Public Works**: road maintenance and schools were particularly appreciated but there was less enthusiasm for environmental work.
- PSNP cash/food had enabled households to **improve their livelihoods** by preventing asset sale, releasing income that could be invested, providing collateral for loans and smoothing consumption.
- As a result of the cultural disconnect between national PSNP policy and local values and norms and ways of doing things local officials and recipients were creative in re-designing policy and practice on the ground.
- The threat of removal from the PSNP was used in some places to put pressure on people to cooperate on other interventions like taking fertiliser or digging latrines.
- Few livelihood interventions focused on **women** and **youth** were sustained for any length of time.

Lives

Community lives

- In all communities provision of **health services, drinking water** and **education** had expanded considerably since 2003 bringing many benefits.
- Differences in assets and lifestyle between **rich and poor households** were stark and increasing as, while poor households seemed no poorer than in the past, the 'rich' category were richer and there was a small emerging category of 'very rich'. There was a nascent 'middle class' and differentiation among 'the poor' into poor, very poor and destitute.
- Ideal households were still **patriarchal** although men's authority over women and youth had declined and in some households greater economic participation by females was paralleled with greater domestic participation by males. In the Tigray site 51% of households were headed by females. **Youth landlessness and un(der)employment** were problems everywhere.
- There were varying degrees of male opposition to **women's property rights** and achievements varied depending particularly on the relative strength and perceptions of elders and the calibre and commitment of women and their leaders in the kebele and staff in the wereda women's office.
- As a result of a greater variety of crops, improved incomes and health extension education **diets** for some babies and children had improved, though many children, particularly in poor

households, still faced hunger and poor nutrition during annual hungry seasons and prolonged droughts.

- **Malaria** regularly caused deaths in the majority of communities. Stigma meant that researching **HIV/AIDS** was difficult; the highest number of PLWHAs reported in any site was 52.
- Traditional medical practices had reduced among those who could afford formal public or private **health services** which they saw as effective.
- Parental enthusiasm for **education** for boys and girls and attendance at all levels had increased; many older children, and young and older adults were combining work and education in a long-run process involving repeated dropping out and back in. In those sites with a longer history of higher education the increasing number of unemployed G10, 12 and college graduates had led to declining expectations of what could be achieved through education.
- Richer households, migrants and youth were increasingly adopting **urban-like life-styles**: TV-watching, mobile phone use, modern furniture and clothes etc. Richer people were buying houses in nearby towns.

Community-policy (dis)connects related to lives

- **Very poor people** could not afford to use health and education services at all and poor people were restricted. There were no wereda programmes to help poor and vulnerable people apart from government health cost exemptions in one site; elsewhere budgets for this had been cut. Small NGO programmes provided help to children or PLWHAs with health and/or education costs in three sites.
- In all communities there were signs of improvement in **women's rights**. Rape, abduction, domestic violence had reduced though by no means been eliminated; poorer women and women heading households were more vulnerable. In most communities most girls were said to be choosing their own partners. In a number of communities elders involved in dispute resolution, including divorces, were said to be biased against women. Women had little political power.
- There were few special services to improve **young people's lives** apart from HIV/AIDS clubs.
- **PSNP** and **Emergency Food Aid** had saved many people from starvation over the years; however three SNNP communities had not received enough aid in the 2008 and 2011 droughts and this was said to have resulted in deaths – including around 30 in two communities. There were some occasional programmes for malnourished children associated with donors and NGOs though not all mothers followed all the instructions.
- **Health extension workers** had been effective in 'awaring' people about most of the sixteen packages and although implementation was selective and patchy there was a sense of change in all the agriculturalist communities.
- Everywhere people were aware of what they ought to do in relation to the **hygiene & environmental sanitation packages**. Officials did not seem to have considered the time, land and resources necessary for digging latrines, building a separate kitchen and livestock house, etc. There were people in seven sites **without all-year access to clean water** and they were more at risk of infections from that than the threats the packages were designed to overcome. There were one or more outbreaks of cholera in a number of communities.
- There were reports from a few communities of a reduction in **malaria** attributed by some to spraying, bednets, the removal of stagnant water and better access to pills; epidemics were more likely during droughts which were said to reduce resistance. Evidence relating to the preventive measures suggested implementation was not regular and thorough.
- ART was available for **PLWHAs** but stigma meant that those who could afford to went for treatment secretly outside the community.
- **Female circumcision** was a customary practice in six of the eight sites. It was difficult to establish what was actually going on in these communities since the practice was illegal. On the one hand some respondents, particularly men, said that it no longer existed or was only practised secretly

by a few. On the other some female respondents questioned the harmfulness of the practice and in three sites there was vocal female opposition to the ban.

- **Free contraception** was playing some role in limiting births and increasing child age gaps particularly among young couples.
- Most **deliveries** were at home with the assistance of Traditional Birth Attendants, and in some places Health Extension Workers. Since the introduction of the policy that deliveries should take place at Health Posts with assistance from HEWs training and provisions for TBAs seemed to have reduced even though there were no deliveries at any of the community Health Posts. Acceptance of child immunisation had increased.
- There was some enthusiasm for **pre-school education** and children living near the building where it took place had access to it in all sites.
- Five communities had G1-8 **primary schools**; highest grades in the others were 7, 5 and 4. Though there had been improvements shortages of teachers and textbooks were common problems. Full-day education was resisted.
- There were improvements in access to **secondary education** everywhere but a big range of difference. Only one site had a G9-10 school and none had a preparatory school. Students in some parts of six communities could walk to G9-10 schools in near kebeles or towns. Those living beyond walking distance or wanting to go to preparatory school had to live away from home which was expensive.
- Attendance at **TVET colleges and universities** had risen; all communities had some graduates and current attendees. Despite government funding of fees and accommodation there were expenses for transport, books, clothes, and bedding.

Society and government

Society and government generally

- In all communities there were **strong social networks** and numerous **community-initiated organisations**; informal social protection involved neighbours, relatives and wider kin, friends and in some places Protestant churches and/or clan/lineage structures.
- All communities had networks of cultural, economic and government elites with some overlapping memberships and family connections.
- Clan or lineage structures played roles in all the communities.
- Religious identity was an increasing focus for organisation; youth interest in religion had increased.
- Community members had access **to competing local conservative and modernising repertoires** of beliefs, knowledge, norms and values. Older people, middle-aged women with less access to information and other less educated adults were more likely to adhere to customary ideas. Modern repertoires were based on acceptance of new ideas, technologies and goods. **Cultural entrepreneurs** potentially bringing new beliefs, knowledge, norms and values into the communities included wereda officials, school teachers and extension workers, opposition party followers, organisations associated with ethnic identities, religious leaders and missionaries, returned ex-soldiers, international and urban migrants, and media actors.
- The pace of change in communities was producing stresses and strains which, combined with land shortages particularly **affected relations between youth and older generations**.
- **Women** were becoming more economically active, more aware of their rights and more assertive which was appreciated by some men but not others; they were not very active in local politics.
- **Elders** played key governance roles in all communities.
- In all communities **government-community relations** were influenced by people's appreciation of new infrastructure, improved security and services, particularly education and health, and some community-specific interventions. However, there had also been instances of conflict, refusal to co-operate, foot-dragging, and resentful conformity.

Community-policy (dis)connects related to society and government

- All communities had kebele **cabinets** and **councils** and were sub-divided into two or more 'zones' or sub-kebeles. Since the end of 2009 new **three-tier kebele structures** had been launched everywhere. In all the communities the leaders at all three levels were expected to be party members but the extent and kind of implementation of the **governance structures** varied across the communities. Government employees and voluntary workers were mainly held to account through *gimgema*.
- There were allegations that some voluntary **kebele officials favoured relatives**, friends and/or members of their clan or lineage in all sites.
- Across all the communities many people in **voluntary government positions** said they wanted to resign but, due to pressures from above and below, felt that they could not. Levels of absenteeism and lateness among voluntary government workers for cabinet, council and committee meetings were high.
- In most sites there was pressure on people to join **the ruling party** or at least not promote opposition parties. More pressure to join the party was put on successful and richer household heads.
- All communities were said to be **safer** as a result of the work of militias and community and wereda police.
- The power of elders in making justice decisions had increased following the reduction of the role of social courts, some of which no longer functioned; in some places government was trying to restrict their roles.

3. Experiences of government employees working in the communities

- **Kebele managers** were all in their later twenties or early thirties; seven out of eight were men. Six had diplomas, one Grade 10 and one in a pastoralist site Grade 4. Salaries ranged from 742 to 1300 *birr* a month. Reported problems included disagreements with the kebele chair, no kebele budget and in the pastoralist sites general problems with the performance of the cabinet. Six wanted to upgrade their education and seven wanted to leave the job soon.
- Kebeles were divided into three zones in which one of the **Development Agents**, who had specialised in Crops, Livestock, or NRM, worked on all specialities. This had affected the motivation of some of the DAs who were keen to make more use of their professional knowledge.
- 21 of the 22 DAs in post were aged between 23 and 30; the other was 43 and there were two vacancies. Four were women, three of whom were based in one of the pastoralist sites. Nine had been recently appointed. Salaries were mostly 1427 (diploma) and 2151 (degree) *birr* a month. A few said they had adopted the profession 'for survival' not out of interest. Asked about their aspirations only four (2 women) referred to the wellbeing of the community. Only one of the Crops DAs wanted to continue in working in the community and four wanted more education. None of the Livestock DAs aspired to further education, seven wanted to leave the community and three to leave the profession. The NRM DAs were the most discontented; community co-operation was problematic and there was little support from the wereda.
- There was no **vet** service based in five of the kebeles, including one pastoralist site. The three resident vets were 20, 22 and 26 and one was a woman; she was based in the other pastoralist site and said most did not accept her advice because she was a woman. Only one had a three year diploma.
- Five of the seven **head teachers** interviewed were in their twenties; salaries were better than those of the DAs and kebele managers ranging from 1571 to 2934 *birr* per month. There were two women: one was acting as head but still paid as a teacher while the other felt unfairly

criticised by the wereda and had presented her resignation. Three were committed to improving the school in the longer-run; four wanted more education.

- There were two **Health Extension Workers** everywhere except one pastoralist site which only had one. Ages ranged from 19 to 34. Two of the older women had Grade 12 + 1 education and received higher salaries (1427 *birr* per month) as did the untrained wife of the kebele manager in one site. Most had Grade 10+1 and were paid 908 *birr* a month. Asked about their aspirations only two (in the same community) wanted to improve community health. The majority wanted to leave their jobs, most to upgrade their health education. A common complaint was lack of co-operation from community, kebele and/or wereda.

4. Community contributions to development interventions

Government volunteers

- Two **kebele chairs** were around 60, two in their 40s, three in their late 30s, and the youngest was 34. One had been in the position since 1992 and another since 2002; two had been appointed in 2005/6, two in 2009, and two in 2010. All were simultaneously party chairs or vice-chairs. The chairs in the pastoralist sites had no education; education levels of the others ranged from Grade 6 to 10. All had multiple roles involving different committees associated with being kebele chair and all complained of lack of time to do their farmwork and/or lack of any reward for their community work. While most said they wanted leave the post to concentrate on their private lives this did not seem to be possible until they had been given permission or removed through the *gimgema* process, which had recently happened in two communities.
- One pastoralist site did not have a **vice-chair** and the vice-chair in the other was 24; he had completed Grade 10 and was 'appointed without his wish'. In the other sites three were in their 30s and three in their forties. They usually had responsibility for security and party organisation and some were party chairs. Of the six responding to a question about their aspirations five wanted to stop doing the role; the other aspired to performing kebele responsibilities without nepotism.
- **Cabinets** usually contained three other government volunteers responsible for security, party organisation, and information.
- Two of the seven responding **kebele Council leaders** were in their fifties, four in their forties, and one in his thirties. The pastoralist leaders had no education while the others had between Grades 5 and 8. Six had been in place for less than two years. Most reported absenteeism to be a problem
- Old **sub-kebele structures** had been disbanded and replaced with Development Teams/party cells organised into 1-5s but the sub-kebeles were often still in use for co-ordination and for the allocation of DAs. Those kebeles settled in numerous villages often organised Development Teams on a village basis.
- The roles of the DAs in the new planned hierarchical structures of Development Unit → Development Team → 1-5s were not clear.
- Leaders at the different levels reported a number of problems chief among them that the work, which one said 'was tiresome and time-consuming' interfered with farming activities and was not rewarded.
- Leaders of **Women's and Youth organisations** faced problems getting help from kebele and wereda and participation from community members.
- There were numerous **kebele committees** responsible for organising different activities. For **livelihood development** there were committees/organisations separately responsible for development, NRM, land, and irrigation. There was some diversity across the communities in the way these activities were organised although kebele chairs played leading roles in most cases. There was little government involvement in the organisation of irrigation.

- In some places there seemed to be **Education Committees**, School Boards and PTAs, while in others there seemed to be two or one committees. Communities in seven sites responded well to mobilisations to improve and upgrade schools.
- The **organisation of health development** varied. Some communities did not have health committees and the functions of those which did varied and included a committee to organise health promoters, an epidemic committee, and a committee monitoring health services in the community headed by the health centre head. There were health promoters/volunteers who made house-to-house visits in all sites. There seemed to be a move to use women's Development Teams and 1-5s to promote awareness which only seemed to be operative in the Tigray site. People had heard of the Health Army in all but the two most remote sites but it meant different things in different places. Committees to eliminate **Harmful Traditional Practices** were active in four sites and in some places had made a difference.
- The **organisation of safe drinking water** left much to be desired everywhere. The way **food aid** was managed varied.
- Five communities had **security committees** of varying sizes and two had **peace committees**; all had militias organised more or less along military lines. There were complaints from the **militia** that they had no incentives 'not even a cup of tea' for work that prevented them from doing personal work; some community members said they were biased when dealing with relatives.
- **Social courts** had lost power to elders and wereda courts in most sites. In one community the court had not operated for a long time and in another it appeared to be fizzling out but at the other extreme one court held trials twice a week. Time spent by elders in resolving disputes and judging cases was considerable.

Contributions required of ordinary community members for interventions to work

- Ordinary community members make two kinds of contribution without which interventions will not work: (1) input-contributions - resources and time to participate in meetings and training and construct public goods and (2) beneficiary-contributions - resources and time necessary to implement the particular intervention.
- In all sites most **interventions to improve infrastructure and the environment** involved input contributions of meeting time, labour, cash and resources such as wood. To benefit from the different public goods available people needed different kinds of resources. For example, to benefit from electricity people needed to have houses near the source and cash to pay for connections and to benefit from schools they needed to have children and sufficient resources to cover the opportunity and direct costs of their attendance.
- In all communities social courts/land administrations/kebele administrations and elders invested considerable amounts of time to resolving multiple **land** issues.
- The main immediate beneficiaries of **agricultural and livestock interventions** were wealthier farmers who were targeted because they had the land, livestock, and access to cash needed for implementation of the different projects. Middle-wealth farmers also could benefit, sometimes with a lag, as work was put in to percolate new ideas, techniques, seeds and sometimes livestock breeds.
- As described above government interest in developing the **non-farm sector** was very small and most activity was developed through investment of resources and time independent of interventions. There was evidence of a growing interest in **licensing** and **taxing** the sector.
- Anyone using **savings and credit organisations** needed to be generating regular cash. Most government credit not related to savings required land or group membership (social capital).
- Everywhere there were smallscale interventions which only **females or young men** could access but most potential beneficiaries did not have the resources, skills or time to use them to establish sustainable livelihoods.
- All **PSNP/Emergency Food Aid** households had to provide labour at times decided by the organisers; the planning and implementation of Public Works required inputs of time from

kebele officials and Development Agents, and in some places the kebele Council, Development Team and 1-5 leaders, and/or militias.

- People receiving **food aid** needed time and a donkey or strength to carry the food. For **nutritional interventions** to work mothers had to contribute time listening to teaching from HEWs, volunteers and/or 1-5 leaders. To implement advice on better diets they had to access the new foods from their own production or in the market. Mothers had to resist pressures to sell or share the food supplements and invest time and resources to take the malnourished child to the TFC.
- To benefit from **hygiene and environmental sanitation interventions** the women who were targeted required time to be 'aware' and time, sufficient land and resources to construct latrines, waste disposal pits, separate kitchens and livestock houses, and kitchen cupboards. Hand-washing depended on carrying home sufficient water and soap and chemicals to control pests and insects had to be bought.
- **Disease prevention** packages were more dependent on supplies from the wereda and less dependent on household inputs apart from time to have awareness raised and on activities like vaccination, HIV/AIDS and TB tests, removing stagnant water, getting everyone in a large family under a single bednet.
- Use of **mother and child** services required time and sometimes resources for travel from pregnant women and women giving birth.
- In all sites people spent time and sometimes resources to get to **health centres** and **hospitals**, wait to see a health worker, and pay for services and drugs. Those with good organisational participation and social networks could often get assistance in covering health costs.
- Beneficiaries of **pre-school interventions** had to have a child of the right age and live close to the school. **Primary school** parents or the pupils themselves had to contribute *cash* for registration, stationery etc and children had to have enough *food* to provide energy to get them to school and learn. Children had to commit *time* for learning and parents had to replace lost labour. Parents and daughters had to resist pressures for early marriage which were stronger in communities where bridewealth was paid. Costs for secondary and tertiary education were higher.
- The pursuit of **women's rights** demanded time to attend meetings from ordinary women. Those pursuing legal cases needed courage, time and social support to go to elders, and/or the social and wereda courts.
- **Youth** seemed to have more duties than rights.
- Time and resources were needed to pursue **justice** and success was related to the ability to invest time and money and having supportive connections.

5. Poor people and development interventions

- The previous section shows how difficult it is for poor households and people to benefit from development interventions; at the same time many of them contribute time, labour and resources for the implementation of some of these interventions.
- Inequality in these communities is considerable: different types of household rely on different mixes of income sources.
- Landed households fall into four categories:
 - those involved in big farming and maybe big business;
 - those who are mostly self-supporting on the farm but also rely on contributions by different household members from other activities (see below)
 - those who do some farming but rely more heavily on other activities
 - those renting or share-cropping their land out and working on other activities
- Landless households fall into four categories
 - farming through renting/share-cropping plus other activities
 - those only involved in non-farm businesses or employment


- daily labour; wood/grass selling; petty trade
- destitute relying on informal social protection
- Other activities which were on the rise included daily agricultural labour; wood, grass and charcoal selling; petty, retail and larger-scale trade; brokering; skilled and manual work and service activities in small towns in some kebeles; and agricultural, urban and international migration for periods of varying length.
- In an ideal-typical rural community in terms of livelihood assets around 15% would be rich or very rich, roughly 40% middle class, and 45% poor which could be further sub-divided into poor, very poor and destitute.
- In the eight communities poor households, particularly those with land obliged to pay tax and other contributions, on average **contributed more to public goods interventions than they received in benefits** since they faced barriers resulting from their lack of resources. They could not afford transport, electricity, mobile phones (and some said they had no-one to call). If they had no land they could not benefit from farming-related buildings and some could not afford to send their children to the schools they had helped to build.
- Most poor people derived little benefit from **livelihood interventions** and the poor people having to buy fertiliser they could not use (in three communities) were harmed by the intervention. Some poor people in four communities benefited from livestock interventions targeted at poor people but only if the livestock did not die.
- In many places poor and vulnerable people said that **PSNP** had saved their lives. However, lack of food, time, cash, space and low social status prevented many poor people from benefiting from interventions to improve nutrition and hygiene, prevent diseases, and provide mother and child services, curative health services, and education.
- In relation to **governance** there was less pressure on poor people to participate in long meetings but access to justice was difficult. Poor tax-paying households were subject to the same flat-rate contributions as rich ones.

6. Community trajectories into the future

- *Communities as cases*: Looking at the short-run futures of the fourteen communities studied so far³ it seems that in 2010/2012 six were continuing on a path which they had been following for a while. These included four drought-prone and aid-dependent sites and two with self-sufficient livelihood systems. Three were experiencing good economic growth.


³ The fourteen include the six Stage 1 communities, studied in 2010, and the eight Stage 2 communities that are the focus of this short summary.

Communities on the same path 2010/12



- The remaining eight communities were on the edge of structural change as a result of a mix of external and internal factors.

Trajectory examples - communities on the edge of change 2010/12



- Looking ahead to the end of the GTP period in 2015 and beyond we have identified some wider less predictable forces for change with the potential to affect the WIDE communities. On the economic front they may be affected by further investments in infrastructure, by commercial investment in large-scale farming, by small and larger scale industrial investment, and by formalisation of the informal sector aimed at increasing the tax base. In the political arena, there are competing trends between further micro-institutionalisation of the government/ party structures on one hand, and on the other hand the emergence of other actors such as relatively wealthy farmers, traders and business people who might try to pursue a market-led route to prosperity, and organisations with

local roots including religious and ethnic networks, which might get more active in the political arena. Women’s voices should continue to grow stronger while the responses of the growing group of more and less educated youth to their difficult economic prospects may include a commitment to political change. International migration is likely to increase exponentially creating diasporic linkages to some considerably different cultures.


- *Parameters as cases:* Towards the end of the analysis we identified ten key aspects/parameters of communities interactions among which guide their trajectories. They are sub-parameters of four ‘big’ parameters: **place, the state of the local economy, political settlements, and wider context.**

Control parameters guiding rural community trajectories

Place		The state of the local economy			Political settlement		Wider context		
Terrain, settlement, climate	Remoteness	Agri-technologies	Farming system	Livelihood diversification	Community fault-lines	Govt – society relns	Relations with neighbours	Cultural imports	Strategic location

- The ten aspects can be further deconstructed into constituent parts which can be considered and analysed as cases across the communities. In this short summary we provide as an example a preliminary analysis of the case of international migration – one of the constituent parts of the state of local economies in the communities.
- There are three routes which have been taken by international migrants. The map shows where people had gone from the Stage 1 sites (green) and the Stage 2 sites (blue).

Map showing international migration routes from the fourteen sites



Annex – Summary information on the eight Stage 2 communities in 2011

This Annex provides a very brief narrative of what each community looked like in early 2011 with a focus on general community features, livelihoods, lives, and society and government.

Luqa kebele, Bena-Tsemay wereda, South Omo, SNNPR

The agro-pastoralist Luqa *kebele* is bisected by the recently asphalted Jinka-Arba Minch main road. The administrative centre is located along that road at 21 km from the *wereda* capital Key Afer (public transport) and developing into a roadside settlement (a few shops and 'modern houses', one café). There is no electricity. The mobile network covers some areas but it was faulty during the fieldwork. Access to safe water is uneven (2-3 functional water points). Most of the 566 families live in the *kebele* flat, lowland part. Residents are Tsemay (80%) and Bena (20%). There are about 25% female-headed households. Livestock can graze anywhere (bar for 260 ha recently enclosed) so some say there is no landlessness; others mention 120 landless youth. About 20% of the community is Protestant and Protestantism is said to rapidly gain grounds among the young generation.

There is a history of drought with recently serious livestock and crop losses in 2008/9 and 2010/11. Food aid has regularly been provided and is shared following the community's norms (the *wereda* is not in the PSNP). There is a strong perception that climate change (erratic shorter rains, increasing temperature) undermines both pastoralism and the slowly expanding rainfed agriculture. There is ground water but the irrigation potential in the *kebele* is unknown. A few households obtained irrigable land along the Woito River, outside of the *kebele*, but their rights are not legalised and it is unclear whether this could further expand. A few families grow cash crops alongside subsistence crops, including sesame introduced recently (privately) and vegetables and fruits on irrigated land, and do quite well. The bulk of the community depends heavily on livestock/ product sales to buy food. The *wereda* with NGO support has introduced hybrid breeds (camel, cattle, shoats, poultry) on credit; there is a (partly trained) mobile vet, and drug supply seems to be reliable. These initiatives are generally appreciated, though limited in scale and the DA believes in caution as the community would lose trust if one mistake occurred. A few men engaged in farm product trade and livestock fattening and trading; a few successful ones have further diversified (grain mills) and employ a few people, in spite of various constraints (production, storage, weak bargaining position against non-local traders with trucks) and reportedly high taxation. A few women raise an income with some success (shops, the café, food/beverage sale on market days). The *wereda* with NGO support is trying to establish youth and women production cooperatives but it is early days. Credit is available through local cooperatives and has helped some people. Omo MFI is preparing the ground to start working in Luqa.

There is a health post and one HEW, but little take-up of health services still provided mainly through monthly outreach by *wereda* workers or at the *wereda* health centre. There is greater interest in all forms of education available in the *kebele* (Gr1-4, ABE, 0-grade, adult education). But few parents agree to send post-Gr4 children to Key Afer hostel (needing boys to herd, favouring early marriage bringing bride wealth for girls, fearing urban influences). However, the community contribute to upgrade the school to full cycle and role models of educated male and (very few) female youth are emerging. Under the joint influence of the government and Protestantism there are some changes for women. A few have resisted widow's inheritance and obtained divorce with their family's support and a few women are economically, socially and politically active. Government initiatives attract various types of response but no outright opposition; the (overlapping) government/party and customary and religious elite 'mediate' the government requests. Tension arises rather from strong Protestant stances against some of the customary rituals. In other cases all three forces (the government, the Protestant and some progressive elders/customary leaders) join hands with success (e.g. eradication of *mingi*, the custom of abandoning children thought to bring bad luck).

Do'oma kebele, Dera Malo wereda, Gamo Gofa zone, SNNP

Do'oma is a lowland mostly flat kebele with 450 households in two villages originally settled in the 1980s. Do'oma village lies between Wacha the wereda town and Womalo; in 2011 Wacha was connected to Morka (12 kms) by an allweather road and two bridges allowing external access during the rains to Wolayita Sodo (95 kms) and Arba Minch, the zone capital, (223 kms). Over 70% of residents are Gamo or Gofa; the rest from three ethnic groups. 85% are Protestants; the remainder Orthodox Christian. Irrigated land is insufficient and pressure on once-abundant grazing land developed after an investor leased 20% of kebele land from 1997 to 2005 and the Maze National Park took land on establishment in 2005. The investor's land which was never officially returned to the kebele was re-auctioned to SNNP and Tigray government officials in 2011.

Rains are sparse and erratic; the community would not survive without river-fed irrigation. 70% have some irrigated land though 35% never get enough water and others are affected in severe droughts. While most irrigated land is owned by first-settler families, buying, renting and share-cropping are common. River-flooding frequently damages crops. One-third of households have received cash PSNP aid since 2005 with Public Works beneficiaries eligible for cattle credit; cattle and fertiliser debt repayments, taxes and other contributions are deducted and debt is not a big problem. Emergency food aid is inadequate with reportedly drought-related deaths in 2008 and 2011. Cattle die annually from trypanosomiasis; deaths increase dramatically during severe droughts.

Traditional subsistence crops include maize, *tef* and sweet potatoes; bananas, sugarcane and fruit were sold mostly for petty cash. Increased production following improved seeds and fertiliser, rising food prices and improving roads have led to growing export of maize, *tef* and bananas to big cities. Cattle fattening has started though there are no improved breeds. Since 2005 Amhara in-migrants have introduced new high-value crops on irrigated and rainfed land and more efficient crop and livestock farming techniques. Increased productivity of traditional crops is attributed to the extension programme, though taking of fertiliser under pressure and some inappropriate new technologies and advice were criticised. There are daily labour opportunities for males and females on irrigated land and seasonal migration for agricultural work to Abaya, Jimma and Weyto.

Increased farm production has increased trading opportunities in external markets, between markets in the wereda, and from the kebele to Wacha market. The growth of Wacha town has generated opportunities in shops, restaurants and other services, skilled work, and daily labour. OMO credit with no strings is available for landholding households. A proportion of young men and women migrate to towns for work and/or education and settle there.

Malaria kills people every year. Many resist spraying and doubt the efficacy of bednets; the HEWs have problems mobilising work to clear stagnant water. The supply of free pills in the kebele is unreliable and pills everywhere run out during epidemics. There is education up to Grade 5 in the kebele and Grade 10 in Wacha and plans for a preparatory wing. There is new interest by parents and adults in (lifelong) education up to Masters' level. Poor households cannot afford to use the Health Centre, private clinics, hospitals, and preparatory schools. Those who pass Grade 10 seek government-funded TVET courses. The wealth gap between rich (14 very rich households) and poor (25% of households) is increasing. Parental control of choices related to education, work and marriage has reduced; children en route to adulthood follow different combinatory trajectories.

Government infrastructure, credit, education, health and some farming interventions are appreciated; big gaps include irrigation development and seeds and livestock suitable for the local climate. The new kebele structure is not implemented and support for party jobs and meetings is unenthusiastic. The influence of elders has increased. There is little government action for women, youth and poor people.

Harresaw *tabia*, Atsbi Womberta wereda, Eastern Tigray

Harresaw *tabia* comprises three *kushets*⁴: two lying on the Eastern Tigray highland plateau and one remoter, overlooking Afar, full of ups and downs and facing acute water scarcity. A very small town is emerging around the *tabia* administrative centre, with electricity and mobile network since 2008. The *tabia* centre is 20 min walk off the small all-weather gravel road linking Atsbi, the centre of the *wereda* (17 kms), to Dera (a small town adjacent to the *tabia*) and Afar, with nearly daily but costly public transport. All 6,000 residents are Orthodox Christians and Tigrayans. More than 50% of the 1,150 households are female-headed and there are hundreds of landless, mainly young households (more than 350)⁵. Available land is reallocated but is vastly insufficient; generally land and related actions are a source of tension and conflict.

Harresaw suffers from recurrent drought and has been included in PSNP/FSP programmes since 2005. In 2011/12 all households were getting some of the PSNP and emergency food aid pooled resources. In the last severe drought (2008/9) 30 people died and mass livestock losses prompted a sharp increase in illegal migration in Saudi Arabia as the only option for many households to repay their debt. This migration, continuing to rise, is becoming a strategy for households to pay debt, reach a higher level of welfare (health, education, nutrition) and invest, in mixes varying from one family to another, and has multiplier effects at community level including urban migration and investment in business linking urban and rural areas. Irrigation is another change factor. All schemes depend on the rains; in good years about a sixth of the households irrigate some land. Many have discovered the benefit of producing for the market (beans, pulses, vegetables, wheat and barley) given the high prices for farm products. A few landless young farmers invest on sharecropped/rented land. Views are mixed on the usefulness and effects of modern inputs and of DA advice (e.g. early planting while farmers fear frost). High market prices also prompt many to invest in livestock production in spite of the high drought-related risks, as hybrid breed and vet services are available nearby (Dera), and fattening and dairy production can be very profitable. Honey is said to have potential although exactly how much is unclear. Irrigation and migration offers trade-related and daily labour opportunities on irrigated and migrants' farms. A number of people (youth and women especially) run small shops, teashops and bars and offers services in the *tabia* centre. Graduation only starting to take effect is considered favourably by some richer households wanting to focus on their own more lucrative activities though assistance would be needed in drought years. Credit is widely available to help people to seize opportunities, and has been important in some successes, though the level of bad debt of the *tabia* is high. For poor or labour-poor households taking credit is risky and many avoid it when they can.

There is a Health Post and one full-cycle and one Gr1-4 primary school in the *tabia* as well as a health centre and new general secondary school in the neighbouring *tabia* at about 45 min walk from the *tabia* centre and a preparatory school in Atsbi but no TVET in the *wereda*. Expectations from education are mixed: the better access can 'lead nowhere' (exam failure, high costs, un(der)-employment) and migration lures many. The community appreciates many of the development initiatives but resents some aspects of the government drive (e.g. enforcement to take fertiliser, lack of individual choice and of space to challenge development ideas - which is taken as political opposition), and fails to reconcile the emphasis on focusing to improve one's livelihood with the many time-taking meetings and for the 'community volunteers', the demands of their many responsibilities⁶.

⁴ A *tabia* in Tigrigna is like a *kebele*; a *kushet* is a part of a *tabia*, like a *got* for a *kebele*.

⁵ Data on population is not consistent across sources.

⁶ Community volunteers are the community members serving on the many *tabia* government/party structures.

Gelcha kebele, Fentale wereda, Eastern Shewa, Oromia

Gelcha is bordered by the Metahara sugar factory, the Awash national park, the Addis-Dire Dawa main road and the expanding salty Lake Beseka. All negatively affect the pastoralist livelihood of the 75% Karrayu population (taking land and reducing mobility). The Lake is also flooding land and buildings, cutting off paths and roads, affecting water and causing malaria. 80 Somali and 50 Harar Oromo families form the rest of the population, entirely Muslim. About a third of the households are female-headed; 50 households are landless (8%) although it is not quite clear what this means in an economy dominated by pastoralism. There is no electricity. The mobile network arrived in 2009. A road passable by vehicles connects the centre to Metahara (the *wereda* centre) and to Addis Ketema (another small town) both at 5 km. Most people drink unsafe water or buy water in town at high cost. The *kebele* is flat, lowland, arid and hot, with shorter rainy seasons.

There were four droughts in the last ten years; in 2010 a lot of livestock died. Pastoralism is under threat. Agriculture is heavily government-promoted. Yet in a good year rainfed production covers two to four months of food needs; livestock products and sale make up the rest. People therefore heavily depend on terms of trade for livestock, which are negative for both those selling livestock (high price but not enough to offset high costs of everything else) and those trying to buy some (price too high). There is irrigation on a limited scale (40 households use water from the factory discharge canal; 20-30 use a pump on the Awash, after a large 300-household cooperative failed a few years ago; a few young men sharecrop in irrigated land in neighbouring *kebeles*). People have high expectations from a plan to extend to Gelcha the spate irrigation scheme already covering some other *kebeles*. This has started to affect the way in which people relate to land rights. There are no agricultural packages. The *wereda* while promoting improved breeds does not provide them. Some PSNP beneficiaries got livestock packages in 2005/6 over which they were not consulted and, allegedly, not told that it was on credit. Some women engaged in shoat production (NGO credit) and in petty trade with success. The sugar factory provides permanent jobs for a few (mostly guards) and daily labour at harvest time. Other daily labour jobs can be found in nearby areas. The government and NGOs tried to organise various production cooperatives but most failed due to poor management and weak follow-up. 40% households have been assisted through the PSNP. This has been important for many but fuelled tensions vis-à-vis the *kebele* leadership accused of nepotism and between ethnic groups in the community, unresolved by the end of the fieldwork. Officials expect that the community as a whole will graduate when irrigation will be fully developed.

The health post is often closed as the HEWs (and most government employees) live in nearby towns. There is a recently constructed full-cycle school which is said to please the community. Other health and education services are available in Metahara and Addis Ketema. There is more behaviour change related to education than to health although even this is mixed as people see (Gr10 and above) graduates sitting idle or having to take anyone's daily job. There is little change for women in relation to circumcision and polygyny, emerging change in relation to early marriage, and some women have started resisting widow's inheritance and obtained divorce in these and other cases with their own family's support. The community appreciates the infrastructure and service developments but feels that the government is not doing enough to help them cope with the deteriorating pastoralist livelihood. There are ambiguous relationships, tense at times or on specific issues, between ethnic groups in the community, the government and the community's clan institutions, those following customary religious practices and some less accommodating Muslims, and between these stricter Muslims and the others and the government.

Aze Debo'a kebele, Kadida-Gemela wereda, Kambata/SNNPR

The 750 households (5,004 people) of Aze Debo'a are almost all Kambata and Protestant (mainly Kalehiwot and Mekaneyesus)⁷. The *kebele*, flattish with a part climbing to higher grounds, is among the most densely populated in the zone. Land is acutely scarce; hundreds of mainly young households are landless. The recent establishment of women's rights through laws and certification is likely to further raise the pressure. The *kebele* centre (public buildings and a few 'modern houses') lies alongside the main road linking Durame, *wereda* and zonal capital (at 4 kms) to the outside world. Links with Durame are dense. There is public and private transport. The area got electricity (serving about 20% of the population) and mobile network coverage in 2009/10, which many interpreted as an electoral pledge. The small distant villages are unlikely to be connected any time soon but access to safe water is good everywhere.

Traditionally livelihoods rely on enset-based mixed farming with some coffee and small-scale livestock rearing, with trade and outmigration. Today one third of the population is on the PSNP. While there are recent instructions to start graduating people, drought seems to become more frequent. In 2008 all crops failed; 30 people died as the *wereda* allegedly delayed reporting the emergency. Cash crop production has increased in response to high demand and good market prices (coffee, eucalyptus). A dozen farmers started irrigating (fruits, vegetables). Irrigation is thought to have potential but the *wereda* has been unable to invest in it due to budget constraints. Modern inputs are available. Views on their effectiveness and practices vary. High market prices, availability of hybrid breeds and vet services nearby lead farmers to invest in livestock production. The potential of these activities is limited by high input costs and lack of credit for poor farmers and land scarcity generally. Trade of farm products ranges from small- to fairly large-scale activities. Larger-scale coffee trade is a source of wealth. There are a fair number of people employed (53) or registered as businesspeople or skilled workers (32), about 40 adult men and many young people living as daily labourers, a few people offering transport services, 3-4 month seasonal jobs for about 300 mainly young women on a coffee washing plant established in 2009 on land given to an investor. Outmigration continues to be important, with reduced male seasonal agricultural migration, new and growing female migration in cities, flower farms etc., fast rising mainly illegal migration in South Africa for males and recently in Gulf countries for females. Successful migration in South Africa made a few individuals very wealthy (by local standards). They invest in trade and businesses based in Durame or in the area.

There is a Health Post, a full-cycle and a Gr1-4 primary school in the *kebele*; two health centres (government and NGO) and a hospital, and a good government full secondary school and private education (KG to secondary level) in Durame. But Kambata's longstanding tradition of valuing education is under threat. Many are discouraged by the high rate of exam failure and high and rising un(der)employment (more than a hundred Gr10 and above youth from the *kebele* are unemployed), which makes migration all the more attractive. There is change for women (due to combined action by government, NGOs and protestant churches), with greater freedom (schooling, migration, choice in marriage and contraception), initial success in combating female circumcision and more and better established rights (though denied by the conservative stance of Protestantism on divorce). People dislike the domination of politics in government. Strong farmers think that government and party meetings are too many and not very relevant, and feel free not to attend them. Everyone in the community is concerned by the lack of opportunities for youth and highlights the government insufficient action. Somewhat in contrast, Protestantism exerts a deep influence on the community, including the young generation. Clans remain important too and interact relatively little with government.

⁷ Data on population is inconsistent across sources.

Gara Godo kebele, Boloso Sore wereda, Wolayita zone, SNNP

Gara Godo is a mostly flat densely-settled highland kebele with a recently established municipality at its centre. There are 1248 households in three sub-kebeles, 22% female-headed. It is 12 kms on a recently-upgraded allweather road to Areka the wereda town; there are buses three times a week. It is 28 kms on an asphalted road from Areka to Wolayita Sodo the zone capital. All residents are Wolayitan; 60% are Protestants in five sects, 36% Orthodox Christian and 4% Catholic. There are more than 25 clans divided into 130 lineages. Houses about the farms which ideally have a home garden for coffee, root crops, vegetables and spices, family grazing land with eucalyptus, and a main field for maize, *boloke*, and *tef*. 34% of households are landless and many have plots of less than ¼ hectare and no grazing land or field.

The area is becoming hotter and rain patterns changing. There is no irrigation. Drought caused deaths of people and livestock in 2008 and 2011; emergency food aid and the veterinary service were not sufficient. There are regular water shortages in dry seasons and while many households lack food in the hungry season only 11% are PSNP beneficiaries. The major livelihood activities are crop production, animal husbandry, Cash/Food-for-Work, agricultural labour, trade, non-farm businesses in the town and seasonal migration. Coffee is the biggest source of cash, followed by *tef* and maize. Due to rising prices, improved seeds and seedlings, fertiliser, new farming techniques, oxen-fattening, an increasing focus on cash crops, more trading and agricultural daily labour, and business and employment opportunities in the growing town, the economy has experienced growth despite two major droughts. There are two coffee-shelling plants employing 150 or so people seasonally. A third of male youth migrate for seasonal work on large private farms and youth of both sexes migrate to towns. Government contributions to growth include road access, electricity, mobile phones, improved seeds and fertiliser for selected crops, credit, and PSNP. The community has accumulated 700,000 *birr* of debt over the last two years. Service, youth and a women's co-operative have not performed well. Young people successfully establishing small businesses are doing it independently.

Investments in health and education services are slowly changing attitudes, behaviour and wellbeing. Malaria significantly affects work though health extension preventive activities are said to have reduced it. Co-operation with health extension workers was higher on malaria prevention, latrines, vaccination and family planning. Because of stigma PLWHAs try to keep their condition secret; there have been three known deaths and two people get ART from the health centre. There is education up to Grade 10 in the kebele; the preparatory school is in Areka. Poor households cannot afford to use it or post-secondary education, the Health Centre, private clinics, or hospitals. Around 10% of households are 'very rich' while more than half are poor.

Young people and adults combine work and education in various ways. Young people and children are not following old ways of thinking; they get information via TV and internet sources downloaded to mobile phones. Abduction has reduced and girls can decide when and who to marry; underage marriage is common for those not in education. Young men are marrying later. Women's lives are changing. They can cultivate farmland, participate in trade, daily labour, construction and government work, spend money as they wish, and borrow from OMO MFI. Some are politically active, and there are role models like the school director. Many women are aware of their property rights but elders and officials are not keen to implement them.

Government and party structures are increasingly inter-twined but there are only 272 party members. Most people do not want to spend time doing the many unpaid development/party leaderships jobs at kebele, development team/cell, and 1-5 levels, especially in peak seasons, but the EPRDF is appreciated for interventions in education, health, infrastructure development and peace and good governance. Youth and women's organisations are very weak.

Shumsheha kebele, Lalibela wereda⁸, North Wollo, Amhara

Shumsheha lies on a hot low/middle altitude plain and rugged hills with little vegetation left. Shumsheha *got* near Lalibela airport is a small town around the *kebele* administration with electricity (25-30 TVs) and piped water; in more distant *gots* people still rely on unsafe water. The mobile network reached in 2007/8 and was improved in 2010/11. The *kebele* centre is 9 km distant from Lalibela through an unpaved road, abandoned when a new Lalibela-airport road was built which is 24 km. There is no public transport. The population is Amhara and Orthodox Christian in majority with about 80 Muslim families (6%). A third of the households are female-headed and 384 are landless (28%). Communal land is dwindling due to reallocation and illegal encroachment.

Shumsheha is in one of the most drought-prone areas of the country. Rains are said to have become more erratic although there was no serious drought since 2005. In 2011 28% people (40% families) benefited from PSNP. Graduation (meant to reach half of the public works beneficiaries in 2011) has started. While officially most are voluntary people reportedly are 'being convinced' or made to sign without knowing. Irrigation has been a major positive development in the recent years. 10-27% households, including entrepreneurial sharecroppers, grow irrigated cash crops alongside subsistence crops. There is (unevenly distributed) potential for more, but actual capacity depends on the weather. Farmers strongly resent the heavy pressure exerted for them to take fertiliser that even DAs reckon is unsuitable to the local soil. Honey production also has potential. High market prices are an additional and important factor in explaining better agricultural incomes in the community. Government and NGOs have actively supported the development of youth and women production groups (sand and cobblestone, honey, cotton spinning, stove production), some of which are fairly successful. But there is a large number of un(der)employed youth with very little to do, said to be a 'burden' for the *kebele*. The airport took away some of the *kebele's* most fertile land when it was modernised (2004/5). But it is a driver of local non-farm economic activity: jobs, customers for the shops, cafés and bars and other services offered in Shumsheha *got*, and 40-50 people who learned skills and have engaged in construction-related businesses. Daily labour and agricultural migration are options too. There are a few successful businessmen, four of whom have paid employees (wholesale/retail grain/goods trade, grain mills). All local activities would greatly benefit from better access to markets. The taxation policy may be discouraging some of the non-farm activity. Given the poor debt recovery record of the multiservice cooperative formal credit is now available only through ACSI, which people strongly dislike (group modality, reportedly harsh debt recovery practices, case of embezzlement which had people having to repay loans twice).

There is a Health Post and a health centre though the latter does not offer full service, for which people have to go to Lalibela. There is much better access and a fundamental change with regard to education, with a full-cycle, a Gr1-4 and 2 satellite primary schools. However, the wereda failed to open a Gr9-10 school for which the community built classrooms so students continue to have to go to Lalibela, where there also is a TVET. 4-5 students reached university in 2010/11. But people see that even university graduates may not find jobs or only after several years. The community appreciates some of the government interventions but has major grievances too (coercion with fertiliser, inaction about road, transport and secondary school, multiple contributions decided from above, zero-grazing policy, insufficient support to irrigation, ban on underage marriage leading to premarital pregnancies, and long meetings bringing 'a perfect plan but zero implementation').

Adele Keke kebele, Kersa wereda, East Hararghe, Oromia

Adele Keke is a wide, hilly midland *kebele* near the salty Adele Lake along the main road to Dire Dawa and Harar. The centre along that road is connected through asphalted roads to Haramaya (closest),

⁸ In 1995 Shumsheha was in Bugna wereda; since then it became part of Lasta wereda, then Lalibela, returning to Lasta during the second fieldwork period.

Adeway (major chat centre) and Kersa (*wereda* centre). There is continuous public transport in all directions. Most of the 25 villages have safe water, 12 have electricity and the others are ready to pay the connection to EPCO. 80% people benefit from the mobile network available since 2006. With the chat boom (see below) every bit of arable land is cultivated, no communal grazing land is left and housing land has high value especially along the main road (for housing and shops). The population is almost entirely Oromo and Muslim; 11% households are female-headed and 11% are landless.

There is a strong perception that rains are less predictable and delayed (4 crop failures in 10 years, severe drought in 2004/5 and 2010). Even in good years rainfed production may feed a household for eight months maximum. A fourth of the households are on the PSNP though this is decreasing with graduation, which some people try to resist while others are fine with it. The big upward economic change is the booming chat production and trade, greatly facilitated by better access to markets and information and fast-expanding irrigation since Chinese road works showed that groundwater is easily reached in parts of the *kebele*. There is also some irrigated vegetable production. The *kebele* has been identified as high irrigation potential but the *wereda* support has been limited so far (awareness-raising, DA advice, limited credit for pumps and drips, fertiliser and improved seeds to be paid cash). The community wants the *wereda* to develop irrigation on a large-scale so that all farmers have access to water (rather than PSNP support). The *wereda* has identified the *kebele* as potential specialist milk producing area but similarly support has been limited. Improved breeds expand through people selling offspring to each other. A women milk production cooperative is 'on the way' of becoming operational (NGO support). A number of women are already engaged individually in milk trading, others in commodity shops. Some of those initially pushed by necessity have become quite successful. Landless/land poor people do daily labour or engage in chat trade. There is little migration of any type. Some successful businesspeople and farmers are young entrepreneurs but youth generally face difficulties in establishing an independent livelihood. The *wereda* has recently got them to organise in groups and choose an activity but there reportedly is delay in the promised credit.

The health post is unfinished and low priority as the community has easy access to public and private facilities in nearby towns. People's attitude to education is mixed. Religious and formal education compete in low grades. Many children dropout early or when reaching Gr9 as the nearest school is 90 min walk, girls to marry and boys to work in chat and raise an income. There are students in preparatory and university but few role models yet. Trends for women are mixed: little change and little action in relation to early marriage, female circumcision and political empowerment but some success in terms of economic empowerment and resistance to widow inheritance and some support to this – though these women are unable to remarry. The *wereda* has acted to lessen clans' influence allegedly leading to nepotism in the *kebele* administration. The latter is said to be weak which is also down to the fact that leaders are more concerned by their thriving economic activities. There is no sense of a strong like or dislike of government, although model farmers bitterly complained about the 15-day long training on GTP they were forced to attend during harvest time.