

**LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS  
IN RURAL ETHIOPIA**

**YOUTH ON THE PATH TO ADULTHOOD  
IN  
CHANGING RURAL ETHIOPIA**

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**Mokoro**  


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## Part I: Introduction and conceptual framework


### Introduction

#### *Motivation for the paper*

1. In most countries in ordinary times youth are not a powerful political constituency and few governments have implemented long-term coherent youth policies. In particular in many low and middle income countries there has been little evidence of any social compact between governments and youth. However, recent events in the Arab world are evidence of the political problems which accumulate when the aspirations of young people are frustrated over a long period of time. As a consequence there is a growing awareness among international leaders of a **global youth 'timebomb'** linked to lack of economic opportunities and, in poorer countries, rapid population growth. On the other hand there is also awareness that large youth populations offer the chance of a **'demographic dividend'** once the fertility rate has fallen sufficiently.

2. Ethiopia has a large **youth population** 81% of whom lived in rural areas in 2007; there were 25.2 million rural young people aged between 10 and 29 amounting to **41% of the total rural population** equally divided between the sexes. In rural areas in the past most young males worked on smallholder farms with a few part- or full-time in the informal sector. For most young females the priority was domestic work first in the parental and then the marital home, perhaps supplemented by female agricultural work and/or work in the informal sector. Rapid population growth in the context of land shortages and insufficient employment opportunities has been pushing increasing numbers of young people to migrate and also delaying the transitions to adulthood of those who stay, particularly the young men.

**Figure 1: Gendered youth passages to adulthood in rural Ethiopia: 13-15 boundary-crossings**



3. **Passages to adulthood** in rural Ethiopia involve between thirteen and fifteen personal and social transitions or boundary-crossings of varying types and durations. There are six personal transitions though two of these are not universal. They are physical maturation, youth circumcision

in some cultures, sexual initiation, acquiring of work skills, the end of formal education if any, and the development of a personal/social identity. Work-related transitions for both sexes include, though with different emphases, establishing home-related<sup>1</sup> work careers and 'income'<sup>2</sup>-generating work strategies and gaining economic independence. There are three family-related transitions: getting married, establishing an independent household, and having children. The final transition, which depends on the crossing of the other boundaries, is community recognition as a social adult. For those who stay in the community, or return to settle after migration, this involves participating in social network exchanges and community-initiated organisations and accepting the duties and rights attached to local religious and political 'citizenship'.

4. There are **complex linkages between** within-gender **transitions**. For example a young man cannot set up an independent household unless he has a house, a reliable income and is married. A young woman who gets the ordering of child and marriage the wrong way round will find it hard to get married at all. There are also cross-gender linkages. If large proportions of young men take a long time to be in positions to set up independent households young women will marry older men.

5. Changes affecting these transitions and the desired and real shapes of rural youth passages are related to wider transformations in rural communities associated with modernisation processes. These include a considerable increase since the mid-2000s in public investment, some aid-funded, in infrastructure, economic and human development, social protection, gender equity and district-level governance structures. Some of these **development interventions** have been designed to bring changes to specific transitions, for example the raising of the age of marriage to 18 and the push to universal primary education. These interventions are likely to have had unanticipated consequences for other transitions in the passage to adulthood. Other interventions, designed to meet objectives not specifically related to youth, such as the consolidation of land 'ownership' and the increasing availability of contraceptives, are likely to have had unanticipated consequences for youth passages.

6. The recent penetration of rural communities by new government ideologies, opposition party ideas, modernising religions, increased education and radio access, and mobile phones combined with easier road access to nearby towns and closer linkages with growing numbers of urban and international migrants has brought some **chaos to local cultures**. While these changes have been more marked in integrated<sup>3</sup> rural communities they have also begun have impacts in remote areas. With local customary repertoires under assault from numerous directions young people growing up can imagine different adulthoods passage to some of which involve changes to the customary transitions.

7. While there are cross-sectional statistics and qualitative papers on some of the individual transitions in male and female youth passages to adulthood in rural Ethiopia, there seem to be no studies that consider how all the transitions which constitute the passages of each gender work together in different local cultural and economic contexts. Nor are there studies that look at how these multi-dimensional passages have been affected by recent modernisation and development processes. This paper provides some evidence about both these important issues and considers some implications for future government and donor policies and their implementation.

### ***Young people in Ethiopia***

8. Policymakers usually define '**youth**' in terms of age, not always agreeing on start and end. The Ethiopian Government Youth Policy covers the ages 15-29. UN and World Bank reports recently focused on ages 15-24. WHO has used 10-24 and sometimes refers to adolescents as teenagers (13-

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<sup>1</sup> Includes what is usually known as 'domestic work' (washing, cooking, cleaning etc) and providing fuel and water, childcare, care of sick and old, hospitality, house-building and maintenance, making/mending furniture/utensils and anything else that is unpaid and related to home-making.


<sup>2</sup> Includes own production which is consumed.

<sup>3</sup> Closer to towns and roads and more integrated into wider markets.

19). In contrast, in a context where precise age is not so important and often not known, in rural communities a youth is someone who has not completed the gendered milestones described above.

9. One thing that is clear is that there is considerable **diversity within the 'youth' category** related both to gender and to age<sup>4</sup>. Most of the statistics in the paper distinguish between four gendered age cohorts: 10-15 when puberty starts; 15-19 when puberty ends; 20-24; and 25-29.

**Figure 2: The gendered youth passage to adulthood**



10. Table 1 shows that in 2007, according to the Census, roughly **41% (25.2 million)** of the rural population were aged between 10 and 29. **15% (9 million)** were aged 10-14, this cohort constituting 36% of the 10-29 youth category. Further evidence of the sheer size of the youth population is found in the Government estimate that in 2008 an additional 1.2 million people joined the national workforce (GoE 2010:116).

**Table 1: Rural youth population 2007**

	Both sexes		Male		Female	
	Numbers	% popn	Numbers	% males	Numbers	% females
10-14	9,042,572	15%	4,754,041	15%	4,288,531	14%
15-19	6,800,767	11%	3,519,480	11%	3,281,287	11%
20-24	4,892,742	8%	2,347,626	7%	2,545,116	8%
25-29	4,431,644	7%	2,026,466	6%	2,405,178	8%
Population 10-19	15,843,339	26%	8,273,521	26%	7,569,818	25%
Population 20-29	9,324,386	15%	4,374,092	14%	4,950,294	16%
Population 15-29	16,125,153	26%	7,893,572	25%	8,231,581	27%
Population 15-24	11,693,509	19%	5,867,106	19%	5,826,403	19%
Population 10-29	25,167,725	<b>41%</b>	12,647,613	40%	12,520,112	41%
Total population	61,888,111		31,321,214		30,566,897	

Source: Census data 2007

<sup>4</sup> Throughout Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan there are references to women and youth with no recognition that these are overlapping categories. There is also ambiguity about the use of the term 'youth' in the international development literature with many usages seeming to refer only or mainly to young men. This fits with the historic use of the term in the UK: a youth is a young man<sup>4</sup>. To avoid confusion in the paper I use the term youth to refer to both sexes and various terms to distinguish between them, for example, young women and men, adolescent boys and girls, male and female youth.

11. **Looking to the future**, Ethiopia's median age (the age that divides a population into two numerically equal groups) was estimated as 16.8 in 2010<sup>5</sup>. The UN has predicted that by 2025 21.3% of Ethiopia's population will live in urban areas, compared with 17% in 2008, and that this figure will rise to 37.5% by 2050<sup>6</sup>. Currently, as Table 2 shows, youth aged 10-29 constitute a higher proportion of the urban population (51%) than of the rural (41%) with a slightly higher proportion of females than males.

**Table 2: Urban youth population 2007**

	Both sexes		Male		Female	
	Numbers	% popn	Numbers	% males	Numbers	% females
10-14	1,369,665	12%	658,283	11%	711,382	12%
15-19	1,947,281	16%	935,230	16%	1,012,051	17%
20-24	1,509,343	13%	750,712	13%	758,631	13%
25-29	1,230,544	10%	596,293	10%	634,251	11%
Population 10-19	3,316,946	28%	1,593,513	27%	1,723,433	29%
Population 20-29	2,739,887	23%	1,347,005	23%	1,392,882	23%
Population 15-29	4,687,168	40%	2,282,235	39%	2,404,933	40%
Population 15-24	3,456,624	29%	1,685,942	29%	1,770,682	30%
Population 10-29	6,056,833	<b>51%</b>	2,940,518	50%	3,116,315	52%
Total population	11,862,821		5,895,916		5,966,905	

Source: Census data 2007

### **Youth and policy in Ethiopia**

12. The Ethiopian government has expressed concern about the prospects for the burgeoning youth population for some years. The **first National Youth Policy** was put in place in **2004**.

Since the youth are not only receptive to new ideas but also have the potential capacity for creativity and productivity, they can play a major role in all sectors of development. In order to translate their potential energies and capabilities into fruitful action, however, they need a favourable environment. If these conditions are not satisfied., they can immediately fall into the abyss of desperation, neglect everything and can become passive observers of the activities undertaken in the society. Not only that, they will be exposed to social evils.' Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture, National Youth Policy 2004: 5

13. The government also sensed that their poor showing in the 2005 elections was in part an expression of youth discontent and since then have made a deliberate attempt to address them and try to cater to their needs, particularly through the promotion of Youth Associations. Youth organisations were consulted during the development of the Growth and Transformation Plan (2010/11-2014/15) and the last of the seven strategic pillars of the plan is 'Empowering women and youth and ensuring their benefits'.

The objectives of the GTP can only be achieved when the multidimensional problems faced by women and youth are addressed. To this end, the government will scale up its efforts to

<sup>5</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_median\\_age](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_median_age)

<sup>6</sup> <http://esa.un.org/wup2009/unup/p2k0data.asp>

implement its Women's and Youth Policies and Programmes. These policies contain essential initiatives that will contribute to the participation and effective utilisation of the untapped potential of these key social groups. (GoE 2010:27).

While donors in Ethiopia are active in areas with major consequences for youth, particularly education and HIV/AIDs, unlike women youth do not seem to be not recognised as a category with particular needs. The small amount of direct interest in youth that exists is recent and focused on one aspect of girls' lives, namely 'early marriage'. A government request to the Development Assistance Group to expand their 'gender equality' thematic area and pooled fund to include youth was turned down. Donor lack of interest in problems facing young men is reflected in the 2010 WBCAS in which under the heading 'Strategic and Longer-term country outcomes' the following was included as an issue/obstacles: 'With rapid growth GoE is aware of the social risk of certain groups being left behind, including women and youth'. In the next column describing CAS outcomes the Bank expects to influence there was no mention of youth; core outcome 18 was 'Increased voice of women within communities'<sup>7</sup>.

14. Taking a longer view on development policymakers should be interested in youth from three perspectives: wellbeing, economic development and social cohesion. With regard to **wellbeing**, viewing general development problems, such as food insecurity, illness, violence, employment, exclusion, etc, through a 'youth wellbeing lens' would enable them, first, to identify existing policies, programmes and projects which are not working well for young people, and, second, to establish whether there are 'missing' interventions.

15. In relation to **economic development** there are 'now' perspectives and future perspectives. To what extent have youth benefitted from recent economic development? What have they contributed to it? What else might they contribute to it? Young people are open to new things, often willing to take risks, and can act as conduits for new ideas and practices and a source of energy. There are potential creative roles for young men and women in development activities. Youth is also a time of (in)formal learning with implications for the kinds of adult who will be active in future development contexts. Policymakers need to invest in youth with an eye to both shorter and longer-run futures.

16. Finally, the main policy concern related to young people and **social cohesion** is the potential that they have for disrupting it. Young people, mostly male, play key roles in violent conflicts, whether it be urban uprisings affecting the Arab world, big 'ethnic' conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, drug wars in Latin America, or smaller conflicts between or within communities. In some contexts the most attractive livelihood option for a young man is to join a militia or a gang. Other concerns include the positioning of male and female youth in terms of material inequality, social exclusion, social order and cultures of violence and fear, social participation and exclusion and social (in)equality.

### ***The structure of the paper***

17. The paper explores the changing nature of youth passages to adulthood in rural Ethiopia using the complexity social science methodological approach (Bevan 2010) underpinning the Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Study (ELCS). Most of the evidence base comes from survey and protocol data made as part of that study in six rural communities<sup>8</sup> between 2003 and 2010. Where available national survey data are used to contextualise the findings from these six exemplars and suggest which important community types are missing. Quantitative and qualitative data are viewed as

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<sup>7</sup> By getting more of them to attend social accountability interface meetings related to the Protection of Basic Services programme.

<sup>8</sup> Referred to throughout the paper as the WIDE3Stage1 communities.

traces of the trajectories of the community, household, person and country systems through the period under consideration (mid-2000s – 2010).

18. The process of producing the paper can be compared with that of making a tapestry; one which started with an initial rough framework but no fixed template. Through a process of weaving different bits of the data in a set of inter-linked theorised niches and 'learning by writing' a picture is emerging. This picture is not an endpoint but opens up new ways of thinking and feeling about youth passages to inform policy and further research.

19. The paper has six sections in addition to this one. Studying male and female youth passages and transitions in evolving household and community contexts marked by inequality over a period of years is conceptually and methodologically difficult and some of the problems and solutions used here are described in **Section 2** of the paper.

20. **Section 3** summarises conclusions from analysis of a mix of community-level and national-level data to provide a snapshot of male and female youth experiences in different parts of rural Ethiopia in the mid-2000s. There are sub-sections on personal transitions, and transitions related to work, family and community status. We looked for commonalities as well as key differences across the communities associated with livelihood and cultural contexts and household wealth, status and structure. An important theme is that a fundamental element of male and female youth passages to adulthood is relations with members of the opposite sex. As a consequence many of the youth-related institutions should be seen as coins with two gendered sides. The section concludes with a discussion of Linkages among the transitions are considered and the section concludes with an assessment of connections between transitions and outcomes in terms of youth ill/well-being, economic development and social cohesion in the mid-2000s.

21. **Section 4** summarises changes in the communities since the mid-2000s and how they have affected the transitions described in Section 3. Of particular interest is the extent to which personal transitions and opportunities and constraints in the areas of work, family and community have changed for male and female youth in the last five years. Based on analysis of the data made in 2010 community changes are described with a discussion of their impact on the trajectories of younger and older youth cohorts. Changes in linkages among the transitions and in development outcomes in each of the six communities are described.

22. **Section 5** provides a look to the future and some empirically-grounded speculation about the future trajectories of each of the six communities and the implications for future youth passages. Given that an increasing number and proportion of youth passages to adulthood will partially or totally take place in urban contexts the section concludes with some data relating to youth passages in urban contexts in 2004.

23. **Section 6** describes the direct and indirect impacts on young people in the six communities of government policies, some donor-supported, which have been introduced since the mid-2000s and speculates about the impacts of future government policies outlined in the Growth and Transformation Plan. Again the discussion is organised in relation to gendered personal transitions and gendered transitions related to work, family and community. We adopt two perspectives, first from the top-down looking at the first and subsequent order impacts of each sectoral policy on all those transitions affected. Then from the bottom-up taking each transition in turn to identify all the policies of relevance and how they interacted. The section concludes with a ideal-type construction of the government mental model informing youth policy.

24. **Section 7** concludes by exploring ways in which donors in Ethiopia might intensify the focus on youth in their intervention portfolios. What has happened to youth in relation to development since the mid-2000s is considered. There is a brief discussion of donor mental models concerning youth followed by a comparison of the main elements in donor, government and local customary and modern models pertaining to the 15 youth transitions. Some ideas relevant to new thinking about

youth issues are described. The section concludes with a discussion of aid strategies for youth in rural developing contexts.


## Research methods: evidence and conceptual frameworks

25. This section covers the research approach underpinning the paper's findings. The evidence base is briefly described and this is followed by sections covering five main conceptual frameworks. These provide ways of thinking about (1) cultural and ideological repertoires available in rural communities, (2) gendered youth passages, (3) the contexts of rural youth passages, (4) policy and youth transitions, and (5) youth transitions and development outcomes at particular points in time.

### *Evidence base for the paper*

26. The bulk of the evidence base has been provided by the Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Study which, to date, covers the period 1994-2010. Other evidence used comes from Government statistics and relevant Ethiopian studies. Rapid discourse analyses of the Growth and Transformation Plan and selected donor literature provided data for the construction of ideal-type government and donor mental models related to the transitions in rural youth passages.

**Map 1: ELCS communities referred to: six rural and two urban sites**



\*Abbreviated to Girar in the remainder of the paper.

27. The Ethiopia Longitudinal Community Study (ELCS) began in 1994 when economists at the Universities of Addis Ababa and Oxford selected fifteen rural communities exemplifying different livelihood systems in which to conduct the first of seven panel rounds of a household survey which became internationally known as the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey. In 1994/5 research for the

first community profiles, which became known as WIDE1<sup>9</sup>, was conducted (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996). A second round of qualitative research in the fifteen communities was undertaken in 2003; this research was also conducted in five new communities exemplifying pastoralist and new agricultural livelihood systems (WIDE2). Over a period of seventeen months in 2004/5 intensive in-depth research was conducted in four of the WIDE1 communities plus two urban sites (DEEP<sup>10</sup>). In 2007 research on local governance and food security took place in two of the DEEP sites and another WIDE1 site. The third WIDE round started in 2010 in the six WIDE1 communities about which we knew most (see Map 1)<sup>11</sup>. The WIDE3 Stage 1 sites are the six rural sites. The DEEP sites are Yetmen, Dinki, Korodegaga and Turufe.

28. In this paper we make selective use of data from the three WIDE rounds (1995, 2003 and 2010) and the DEEP studies (2004/5) in four of the rural and two urban sites (see Map 1). The DEEP phase of the ELCD included two urban sites: Arada, the market area of Shashemene and Kolfe in Addis Ababa. Data from the Resources and Needs Survey conducted in each of these sites in 2004 are used in Section 5, to give an idea of some aspects of the structures of youth transitions in urban contexts.

29. Ethiopia's Central Statistics Agency conducted Demographic and Household Surveys in 2000 and 2005 and data from these are used in Sections 3 and 4. Results from the 2010 survey<sup>12</sup> are not yet available so it is not possible at the moment to trace macro level changes in youth transition contexts since 2005.

30. The Census that should have been conducted in 2004 was postponed until 2007. Data from it has been used in Section 1 to establish the size and gendered age-structure of Ethiopia's rural and urban youth.

31. In Section 6 we consider the past and potential future longer-term impacts on young people of government and donor policies between the mid-2000s and 2015 using ELCS data and information from other relevant studies. We also use the Growth and Transformation Plan to assist us to construct a description of the youth mental model with which the government appears to be working. In Section 7 we use the Ethiopia DAG website and selected donor reports and studies related to youth in other countries to construct a picture of the youth mental models used by donors.

### ***Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideological repertoires***

32. In an influential paper Denzau and North (1994) argued that **institutions** provide people with formal and informal rules which are used to bring some order to interpersonal relationships. At the same time **mental models** provide them with explanations of how things work and why they happen which they can use to guide choices and behaviour in situations with some ambiguity due to lack of knowledge or uncertainty. Linked institutions and mental models provide **cultural repertoires** for social actors to use in their particular **lifeworlds**. In this paper we touch on three lifeworlds: in rural communities, government offices and donor circles.

33. In most social situations there is more than one cultural repertoire. Particular individuals may depend heavily on one of them or they may select elements from a number to suit particular situations or purposes. Some people act as cultural entrepreneurs incentivising, persuading or forcing others to conform to the institutions they are promoting and to buy into associated mental models to understand, explain and act on local happenings. Cultural repertoires may become a focus for political struggle.

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<sup>9</sup> Wellbeing and Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia


<sup>10</sup> in-Depth Exploration of Ethiopian Poverty.

<sup>11</sup> More information on the ELCS can be found on [www.wed-wthiopia.org](http://www.wed-wthiopia.org).

<sup>12</sup> The fieldwork reportedly ended in April 2011.

34. Rural communities in Ethiopia have never been totally cut off from external influences though the degree to which such influences have entered over the years is related to levels of remoteness. Since the arrival of the Derg local cultures have been increasingly penetrated by modern ideological repertoires (mental models plus institutions) which as time passed fed into local repertoires in re-iterative processes of cultural 'bricolage', a term that describes 'the muddle' that happens when new rules and ideas meet long-standing ones (Pain and Cantor 2010: 34). Local cultural muddles include mental models and institutions developed over many years as a result of path-dependent interactions among internal and external actors during which repertoires are adapted in a continual process.

**Figure 3: Rural customary repertoires under pressure**



35. It is possible to look into the muddle and identify two ideal-type cultural repertoires available at any point in time: local customary repertoires and local modern repertoires. Local customary repertoires do adapt but they are slow to change. Given Ethiopia's cultural heterogeneity rural customary repertoires are diverse; however all contain traces of external values and beliefs which entered them to differing degrees during the Imperial era which ended in 1974, the military socialist regime of the *Derg* in power from 1974 to 1991, and the current EPRDF regime which came to power in 1991. Local modern repertoires contain the most up-to-date mental models and institutions accepted by change-leaders in the communities.

36. Local customary and modern repertoires are promulgated by cultural entrepreneurs. Some people, more likely to be older (and more powerful in the community), use more of the ideas from the customary repertoire, while others, more likely to be younger, may take more from the local modern repertoire, although they may also be influenced by currently incoming ideological repertoires described below.

37. Ideological repertoires are developed externally and inserted into the community (1) directly by 'ideological entrepreneurs' who come to the community, (2) via inhabitants, often young, who have learned about them on journeys outside the community, or (3) by radio, and increasingly television. They include new religious doctrines, ideologies of belonging to 'imagined communities' based on ethnicity/clanship, government ideology, donor/NGO ideology, and various global repertoires. Some ideas and proposed institutions in these ideologies resonate with customary repertoires while others appear foreign.

38. The process of penetration by external ideologies has accelerated since the mid-2000s with the government and *wahabbi* Islam missionaries being particularly active. In this paper we are mainly

interested in the competing local cultural repertoires in the six rural communities which are the main focus of the paper, and in the ideological repertoires implicit in government and donor approaches to youth-related development issues as revealed in published documents

## ***Youth passages to adulthood***

### **Fifteen boundary crossings in youth passages to adulthood**

39. Figure 1 depicted fifteen boundary crossings, two not universal, which young people have to make on the passage from childhood to adulthood. Table 3 lists them and the earliest ages at which the transition could take place. Then they are described in more detail.

**Table 3: The passage to adulthood in rural Ethiopia: transitions and boundary crossings**

	<b>Transitions/milestones/boundary crossings</b>	<b>Female: potential ages of transition</b>	<b>Male: potential ages of transition</b>
<b>Personal (embodied) transitions</b>	Puberty	10/11 to 15/17*	12/13 to 16/18*
	Identity formation - emotional & social maturity	17 up	19 up
	Circumcision	Amhara at birth; Oromo before marriage; some Southern groups aged about 9	Amhara at birth; others Don't Know
	Sexual initiation	13ish and up	Possibly 14ish and up
	School education (if any) completed	Probably before 30	Probably before 30
	Work skill learning completed	Domestic work – around 11	Agricultural work – around 14
<b>Work-related transitions</b>	Long-term productive work role(s) in place		14 up
	Long-term home-related work role in place	13 up	17 up
	Economic independence from household of origin	13 up	17 up
<b>Family-related transitions</b>	Marriage	13 up	17 up
	Independent home and household	13 up	17 up
	Child(ren) - legitimate	13 up	17 up
<b>Community-related transitions</b>	Adult social network participation	13 up	17 up
	Organisational participation	13 up	17 up
	National 'citizenship'	13 up	17 up
<b>Community-related passage</b>	To full adult status in the community	The 15 transitions completed	

\* 'typical ages' which may be affected by nutrition

40. **Puberty** involves a set of physical changes through which a child body becomes an adult body; it is initiated by hormone signals and its conclusion is reproductive maturity. Potential fertility reportedly usually precedes completion of growth by 1-2 years in girls and 3-4 years in boys. The typical ages of puberty for girls are around 10/11 to 15/17 and for boys 12/13 to 16/18.

41. As they enter puberty youngsters undergo a great many physical changes; in size, shape, and hair growth. Hormones also produce development in the brain and these years see mood swings including increased anxiety; emotions often seem exaggerated. Respondents in Yetmen talked of the 'age of fire'. There are also mental changes during this period with adolescents better able to think through problems and see the consequences of different points of view or actions.

42. These mental changes lead adolescents to consider who they are and who they may become in a process of **identity formation**. Given the chance most will try to explore a range of possible personal and social identities. In recent years clothes have become an important way for young people to express identity. In the contexts of small rural Ethiopian communities where everyone

knows everyone and gossip and labelling (particularly of women) is a key way of enforcing norms experiments with identity can be risky. For example male and female homosexuality are outlawed.

43. **Circumcision** is not a necessary boundary crossing for everybody in all communities due to cultural diversity and modernisation processes. However, both male and female circumcision are common in Ethiopia though there seems to be little policy interest in the former apart from references in the literature to evidence that it reduces risks of HIV infection. In some Ethiopian cultures male circumcision takes place during infancy; in others it is a milestone to adulthood involving ritual and ceremony.

44. Timing and type of what has become known as female genital cutting (FGC) is also different in different cultures. Amhara girls are circumcised as babies usually seven or eight days after birth; in some communities the day is different for boys and girls. In the Oromo cultures in the research communities circumcision should take place shortly before marriage while among the Southern Region ethnic groups in Turufe it takes place for groups of girls around the age of nine and involves ritual and ceremony. Depending on cultural context uncircumcised females have been seen as bringing shame on their families, been unable to get married, and in some places reportedly cannot be buried in churchyards. Some respondents said that circumcision brought freedom – from being mocked and insulted.

45. Sexual interest develops with pubertal changes with most boys and girls wanting to have contact with members of the other sex. Girls are at risk of forced **sexual initiation** through rape; if they unwillingly or willingly have unprotected sex before marriage they are at risk of becoming pregnant, with enormous consequences for their future life given the customary value placed on virginity at marriage and the tendency to blame the victim of rape rather than the rapist.

46. **Informal work skill learning:** Children start work for the household by running errands sometimes before the age of 5. Customarily boys first task was herding and as they grew the learned men's work including harvesting, ploughing, visiting the crop in the field. Girls are expected to do household chores including fetching water and wood (or making dungcakes). They have to learn cooking, brewing, spinning, and how to take care of children, and according to culture spinning, making baskets, making pots etc. They should also learn female farming activities such as weeding and carrying the harvested grain where these are culturally condoned. A young female who has not acquired these work skills may not get married.

47. **Formal education** is not a necessary experience to become a social adult in a rural community but its ending is usually necessary. Schooling is a path to literacy and numeracy and in some directions open up new ways of thinking. On the other hand schools take on aspects of surrounding cultures and may perpetuate old ideas; for example in urban schools in Addis Ababa studied by Poluha these included hierarchical and violent relationships and gender biases (Poluha 2004). Schools and colleges are also sites of sociality and networking where young people can interact in a space independent of parental influence and make friends and networks which they can take into the future.

48. The ideal educational transition starts at seven. Completion of eight years of primary education is seen as producing better farmers who can be trained in the use of new technologies in Farmers' Training Centres. Secondary education was reformed in 2004 so that Grades 9 and 10 provide general education and Grades 11 and 12 education preparatory for university. Those who passed Grade 10 but not well enough to continue to Grade 11 should be eligible for Technical and Vocational Education and Training. There are thus three potential ideal boundary crossings: completion of Grade 8; completion of TVET; completion of university education.

49. In reality there are still young people who never enter formal education and many who drop out before completing Grade 8, TVET or university. Some see dropping out as failure with implications for their personal identities.

50. Parents and working children are involved in a cycle of mutual dependence. Some households reported that boys and girls as young as six contributed as much to the household economy as they received from it. Adolescent girls are often reported as doing the bulk of the household's domestic work which is a daily task year-round. The contribution of boys to farming, a more seasonal activity, can be considerable, particularly once they have started ploughing at around the age of 14.

51. However, during adolescence boys, and increasingly girls, are expected to start working for themselves as well as the parental household in a move towards **economic independence**. They can generate their own income from such activities as livestock keeping, daily labour, petty trade (girls), and in some sites intermediary grain trading. This income may be used to buy clothes and/or school materials, or saved in preparation for marriage. In poorer households youngsters may use it to make contributions to the household budget. On the other hand young men may use it to visit drink and/or chat houses and prostitutes in local towns and young women to buy clothes and make-up.

52. **Young men** have been facing increasing problems in establishing **long-term income-generating roles** with many having to adopt coping strategies mixing different activities. When there was not such a shortage of land most youth could aspire to be smallholder farmers or wives. In addition to farming they built their houses with help from neighbours, maintained them and made fences, and many of the tools and implements that they needed. Increased need for cash led many to diversification into off-farm activities to supplement the farm output and in some areas to seasonal migration. More recently increasing land pressure and in some places irrigation have increased participation in local daily agricultural labour

53. **Young women** who are trained in domestic and other home-related work potentially have a **long-term home-related work role** which they can perform in any household, though the ideal goal is a marital household. Many women also do some part-time 'income'-generating work which may be agricultural (on and off –farm) and/or non-farm. Thus for most people planning to stay in the community long-term integrated male-female work roles in the household revolve around farming plus locally-appropriate income-generating activities which fit round local seasonal agricultural work demands. Young men do not usually achieve long-term home-related work roles until they are married and have houses of their own, although they are likely to assist parents and other household heads in this work.

54. There is also a category of servants who work for richer households doing herding, agricultural work, or domestic work for shorter or longer periods. And there are people who specialise in locally-available off-farm occupations including for example weavers, carpenters, blacksmiths, stone masons, areki producers, kebele work.

55. **Marriage** in rural Ethiopia has customarily been used to make connections between families and communities thereby strengthening both. To achieve this marriage decisions were made by parents. In the Amhara and Tigrayan bilineal systems marriage involves a contract setting out what each party has brought to the marriage which is used if there is a divorce which is relatively frequent. In the Oromo patrilineal system the husband's family gives bridewealth to the wife's family, sometimes in tranches over a period of years. In this context divorce is problematic and rare although serial polygyny can provide a partial substitute

56. The customary age at which marriage should take place varies according to culture. In some places the desirable age of marriage for girls is in the mid-teens or earlier. Following Camfield and Tafere (2011) and definitions of 'early marriage' included in a leaflet published by the National Committee on Traditional Practices in Ethiopia in 2001 we are distinguishing three types of early marriage: *promissory marriage* through which a betrothal is agreed between two families during infancy; *child marriage* where the bride is less than 10; and *adolescent marriage* where the bride is aged 10-15.

57. Both parents and girls have incentives for early marriages. Parents gain honour, new social networks and in some cases material resources. Girls over-burdened with domestic work and confined mainly in their households and those working full-time as daily agricultural labourers or in petty trade may find marriage increases their status, autonomy and resources and reduces their workload.

58. Young males unable to negotiate a satisfactory marriage via their parents may resort to abduction. Usually with assistance from friends the girl of his choice is kidnapped and raped. There is then a process whereby his parents negotiate with the girl's parents to arrange a marriage which usually succeeds eventually since communities do not usually accept marriages to which the families have not consented. Non-arranged or free will marriages have been relatively unusual in rural areas but there have been a growing number of 'voluntary abductions' involving sexual intercourse which are secretly agreed to by the partners. There is a risk that the girl will be cheated as there will be less pressure on her partner if he changes his mind and marriages contracted in such a way can easily be discontinued.

59. The main customary route to an **independent home and household** for both sexes is marriage. Parents provide a piece of land for the son to build a house for wife and later family. In some cultures the couple initially live in the parental house for periods of months which may extend to years if land is very short.

60. Other ways to establish an independent home include inheritance following death of parents, obtaining land from the kebele, migrating to towns and renting.

61. Having a healthy **child** is almost the last step on the road to social adulthood. Customarily all males and females are expected to have children though only within the confines of marriage. Attitudes to parenthood outside marriage are different for females and males. Females should be virgins at marriage while this is not the case for males who do not seem to be expected to take any responsibility for such offspring.

62. The status of adults with households and children is different from that of those dependent on household heads. In different ways household heads and their spouses are expected to play adult roles in the community, **taking responsibility in social networks** in which they are enmeshed, **participating in community-initiated organisations** such as *iddir* and in local religious, political and cultural activities. Becoming a full community adult depends on completion of the other transitions to adulthood. There is a further step towards becoming a full 'citizen' and that is paying tax which depends on owning some land. **Taxpayers** are also expected to contribute cash and household labour for government-organised projects in the community or *wereda* such as building a school or TVET centre. They may be prioritised in accessing (sub) kebele positions and some services including agricultural development services and resources.


### **Locally-grown customary and modern ideal youth passages**

63. Customary and modern repertoires provide people with different perspectives on when and how youth transitions to adulthood should be conducted. And customary repertoires differ across different parts of rural Ethiopia. Here we provide two ideal-type examples drawn from Amhara/Orthodox Christian (mostly northern) and Oromo/Muslim (mostly southern) cultures as represented by Yetmen in Gojjam and Korodegaga in Oromiya.

64. Figure 4 shows the (ideal-type) ideal customary youth passage for the Amhara/Orthodox Christian culture. Circumcision of both boys and girls takes place a few days after birth and very early betrothal forms part of the customary passage though not for all sections of the population. In these cases some transitions which occur in the youth period in other cultures are completed in childhood. The ideal age for consummation of promissory or child marriages and other marriages is 14 or 15. Before marriage girls are expected to have acquired all necessary domestic and female


agricultural skills. Girls should be virgins on marriage. It is acceptable for boys not to be. Houses are usually built in or near the father's compound though initially the couple may live in the parental house. There should be no delay in producing children.

**Figure 4 Sequencing of gendered youth transitions: ideal customary – Amhara Orthodox Christian**




65. Figure 5 shows the ideal-type ideal customary youth passage for the Oromo Muslim culture. There are a few differences compared with Amhara marriage norms. Female circumcision takes place shortly before marriage and there is no early betrothal. Some first marriages are with men who are already married. The expected age of marriage for girls is slightly later than for Amhara girls.

**Figure 5: Sequencing of gendered youth transitions: ideal customary – Oromo Muslims**



66. Figure 6 shows the sequencing of gendered youth transitions in an ideal-type ideal modern transition which influences all rural areas. This has no circumcision, no early betrothal or early marriage and pregnancy risks associated with female sexual initiation before marriage are reduced through contraception. This is also used to delay and reduce the arrival of children in marriage.

**Figure 6: Sequencing of gendered youth transitions: ideal modern (ideal-type)**



Completion of formal primary and secondary education is an ideal goal for both sexes and education may continue after marriage. Female economic independence is possible before marriage, examples being Health Extension Workers, teachers, and some Development Agents, and there is an expectation that income-generating girls will contribute to the family of origin.

### **Potential recent influences on youth passages from external repertoires**

67. Since the mid-2000s penetration of rural community cultures by external repertoires has increased considerably the most important player being the government.

68. **Government ideology:** Circumcision is now outlawed and current laws have set the age of marriage at 18, banned forced abduction and polygyny, and given females the right to choose their marriage partner. Another major influence is the spread of education at all levels. Youth policy introduced following the 2005 election has focused on collectively organised 'productive youth' with an emerging discourse on 'new generation leaders'.

69. **Modern religious ideologies** with potential for influencing ideas about youth passages include in different areas Protestantism, Catholicism, and *wahabbi* Islamism from Saudi Arabia. There does not seem to be a modern Orthodox Christian ideology with any influence in rural areas although local versions of Orthodox Christianity are central to customary repertoires.

70. Attempts have been made to mobilise **ethnic** groups and sub-groups to preserve ethnic identity, resist some government policies and pursue group interests, including through opposition parties. Such activity is discouraged by the government and people do not speak freely about it. It would not be surprising if some young people were attracted by ethnic identities. Some of these groups have support among **diasporas** in the US and Europe.

71. External ideologies with potential impacts on rural communities include those associated with **donors** and international NGOs. These have led to some incorporation of ideas related to 'rights' and 'democracy' into local discourses.

72. In a less organised way information technologies have provided an opportunity for '**global**' cultural ideas and youth identities to reach rural communities via mobile phones, radio, TV, and internet, although the government has tried to control which ideas are allowed through.

### **Actual youth passages to adulthood**

73. To achieve full **customary adult status** in the community young people should have passed through all transitions in the right local order although in some places formal schooling is not necessary. Those whose transition has **modern elements** should also have passed through these transitions (some at older ages) with the possible exception of circumcision. In one site in 2010 there were reports that circumcision was optional and in this and other sites there were women who said their daughters had not been circumcised. Those aiming for **modern passages** via education are likely to emigrate from the community.

74. **The transitions are not independent.** Personal transitions that affect **male youth** work transitions are the acquiring of relevant work skills, completion of formal education (if any), and the establishment of personal identity. An important question is how relevant are the outcomes of these personal transitions in relation to the current and prospective local supply of work opportunities.

75. Personal transitions important to complete family transitions are the end of puberty, the establishment of personal identity, sexual initiation and the acquiring of work skills associated with house and household management.

76. Until a young man has established a sustainable productive work strategy and achieved a sufficient level of economic independence he will not be in a position to establish his own

independent household. This might not stop him marrying if he can bring a wife into his current household. This is usually only possible if it is a parental household or one headed by a sibling. He also needs to locate a younger woman with whom a marriage can be arranged.

77. Until a young man has established an independent household he will find it difficult to participate as an adult in most community affairs. To participate in some areas he will need to be a taxpayer; in other words a landholder. Landless household male heads and young men who live as 'dependents' in other people's households are not full 'citizens' though they may participate in religious and political activities.

78. Personal transitions affecting female family-related transitions are puberty, sexual initiation, the acquiring of domestic and locally appropriate productive work skills, and in some cases circumcision and completion of formal education. Sequencing of the transitions is extremely important. Marriage should precede sexual initiation and, most importantly, childbirth.

79. Once women are married their main task is usually home-making. Some of the productive work they do is linked with their husband's occupation, for example farmers' wives do agricultural work like weeding and weavers' wives are usually spinners. There are an increasing number of young women in less remote rural areas who want to pursue productive work strategies such as flower-farm employment, areki making or formal employment via education before they get married and start a family. In most cases they migrate from their home communities.

80. Until a young woman is married and living in an independent household she will find it difficult to participate in community affairs at all.

81. There are cross-gender effects: changes to male transitions have knock-on effects for female transitions and vice versa. For example young women may be hindered from marrying young men in the community by a number of male transition failures including failure/delay in establishing a local work career and achieving economic independence. Their chances of marriage may be affected by young men's initiation of irresponsible sex interactions. Interactions with prostitutes may lead to HIV infection which is passed on to subsequent female partners.

82. Young men may be hindered from marrying young women by marriage delays experienced by prior age cohorts. As a result young females may marry older male youths. They may also marry much older male adults who have been widowed or divorced or are polygynous. Increasing entry of young females into daily labour and local grain trading may reduce male work opportunities. Young females who initiate sex before marriage may infect subsequent male partners with HIV.


83. There is marginalisation of those who go **catastrophically off-track** including young males who fall into the 'abyss of desperation' and succumb to 'social evils.' Women and girl gender-based-violence survivors are a socially excluded group because the experience of physical and/or sexual abuse conflates with poor bargaining power as a result of poverty, low education levels, lack of language skills and pregnancy to form a cycle negatively affecting their well-being. (Teferra and Gebremedin 2010: 17)

### ***Contexts of youth passages: communities and households***

#### **Co-evolving communities, households and youngsters**

84. Fig 9 provides a picture of a community co-evolving with its households and young people in the context of co-evolving country-level reproduction and change. Communities do not have life cycles as households and people do. They are self-organising but dynamic open social systems which have to respond to changes in their environments/ contexts (Room, 2011). The trajectory followed by each community system is the result of (1) a stream of external activities and material and social events to which people organised in household sub-systems have to respond (exogenous) and (2) creative activities generated from within the community (endogenous).

Figure 7: Co-evolution of communities, country, households and young people



85. Using the metaphor of rural communities as 'evolving ecosystems' households, led by their heads, can be seen as involved in a 'struggle for existence' through which they occupy an economic niche for longer or shorter periods. Households with greater wealth, status and political connection are likely to do better in the competition for positional advantage and leverage; those that are poor, socially marginalised, and politically irrelevant are likely to remain excluded or adversely incorporated. However, given the uncertainties of rural life, customary institutional arrangement for co-operation, and the important contribution to success of individual character, motivation and skills, there are varying levels of intra-generational and inter-generational social mobility both upwards and downwards.

86. The choices made by households in their different niches will respond not only to the incoming activities and events but also to what other households do in a process of self-organisation involving negative and/or positive feedback loops which may keep the community on the same path or set it off in a new direction.

87. Young men and women 'co-evolving' with their communities and households are affected by what happens to each. The consequences for individual youth will depend on community trajectory, household trajectory, genderage, class-wealth, status, political connection, education, and health. As with households the choices made by emerging cohorts of young people will have implications for the future trajectory of the community and potentially for the country.


88. The next three sections detail some ways of thinking about young people (1) in their community contexts, (2) in their household contexts, and (3) as gendered individuals differently located in community and household structures.

### Young people in their communities

89. Inequalities between communities affect young people's life chances. Communities as a whole are more or less developed, wealthy, cohesive, contented, and dynamic at any point in time and as time passes these parameters may change.

90. Young people participate in the community as individuals. Figure 8 shows the networks and organisations to which young people may belong. The extent and kind of participation in these varies by gendered age and cultural norms.

**Figure 8: Youth relationships beyond the household**



91. Male youth are also collectively a status group which is in competition with the older male generation for access to land, livestock, use of water, and access to agricultural packages. In polygynous societies they also to a degree are in competition for wives. Female youth are more likely to be identified as 'women' than 'youth'; a status group in competition with all men for access to resources.

92. Young people of both sexes are also modernisers. Older generations are more likely to adhere to customary cultural repertoires, established religions, and, given some similarities between Derg and EPRDF ideologies have had longer training in some aspects of government's ideological approaches although this does not mean that they have accepted all the content. School attenders among the younger generation currently follow civic education courses but they may also be attracted to unorthodox religions and foreign cultures be they Western, Oriental, or Arabic. Through school attendance and migration for work young people experience urban ways of life bringing new information, norms and fashions into the community. The ensuing struggle over ideas which is partly inter-generational is played out in various community spaces.

93. In the years leading up to the 2005 election the EPRDF focused its attentions on the younger generation (with education) in preference to those who had participated in kebele office during the Derg. This strategy was deemed to have led to the problematic voting patterns in the 2005 election and was subsequently revised. In many places ex-Derg officials were rehabilitated and encouraged to stand for local office. Since the Derg era Youth Associations have been denoted as the space for the political participation of young people. Recently party-affiliated Youth Leagues have been promoted.


### **Young people in their households**

94. The circumstances, household-related events and strategies of the young person's household of origin are important influences on his/her opportunities, choices and activities. The trajectories of the youth and the household co-evolve. The type of household(s) in which a young person grows up provides a context for the path to adulthood that s/he follows. In looking at how households affect the life chances of young people there are three important questions. Answers to all three questions are likely to change during the twenty years of passage to adulthood

- Is the youth living in the parental household, their own household, or as a dependent in another type of household?

- What is the relative wealth, status and power of household head?
- Where is the household located in relation to the ideal local household cycle?

Figure 9 depicts the ideal customary household cycles in Amhara/Orthodox and Oromo/Muslim cultures. The differences is that Oromo/Muslim cultures allow for polygyny.



95. At any point in time not all households are on the ideal track; some have 'deviated' usually as a result of the death of the head or wife, divorce or separation, or rarely infertility. In 2004 62% of households in the RANS sample were on their local ideal customary track; 38% were off-track as a result of deaths and divorce.

96. In Section 3 we describe patterns of residence of young people in relation to these three types of household in the DEEP sites in the mid-2000s. In Section 4 we consider whether there have been any changes.

## Youth passage careers: the effects of community and household inequalities

### *Webs of discriminators affecting youth transitions*

97. In these communities there is a complex web of discriminators differentially affecting the life chances and transitions of young people. They include


- **Gender:** male-female inequalities; overwhelming discrimination against sexual minorities
- **Health:** important discriminators here are disabilities, HIV/AIDS, other chronic illnesses, and access to services
- **Skills, personality and beauty (female):** these have evolved from birth in an interaction between heredity and environment
- **Education:** some and no education; employed educated and unemployed educated
- **Household situation:** role, quality of relations
- **Access to informal social protection networks:** family, wider kin, neighbours, patrons
- **Class-wealth:** relation to means of production; wealth distributions; access to services; inheritance; status associated with wealth; discrimination against poor people
- **Status:** age; elite status of parents; ethnicity, clan/lineage, kin networks; religion; resident/immigrant; occupation – 'castes' and descendants of 'slaves'
- **Political connections:** via kin and patron networks; party commitment

### *Inequality dynamics: snakes and ladders and buffers and passports*

98. As young people negotiate their youth transitions they are faced with choices and opportunities which vary according to where they stand as time passes in relation to the nine types of inequality

listed above. If something goes wrong those well placed on at least some of these dimensions have 'buffers' to protect them until they are back on track. And when an opportunity arises these same dimensions can act as 'passports' enabling the youth to seize the opportunity. Young people who are less well placed are more likely to succumb to snakes and less likely to be able to climb ladders (Room 1999) though individual differences in competence and ambition are also relevant.

**Figure 10: Snakes and ladder and buffers and passports mechanisms affecting youth**



99. The movement of a young person through the fifteen transitions which constitute their youth passage can be seen a 'career'. Careers may be onward, upward, downward, or punctuated in the sense that something goes wrong or stagnates for a period but then is rescued. We are interested not only in whether young people are able to complete local passages to adulthood in a culturally acceptable way, but also in the quality of the adult outcome, and in what happens to those who fail.

100. Table 4 describes the transition-related risks and vulnerabilities faced by young males and females en route to adulthood. They also face general risks and vulnerabilities which are not age-specific and may arise from events affecting the country as a whole (e.g. rapid inflation, rationing, political violence), the community (e.g. drought), the household (e.g. death of head) or the individual (e.g. an accident).

**Table 4: Passages to adulthood in rural Ethiopia: transition-related risks and vulnerability**

	Transitions/milestones	Females	Males
<b>Personal (embodied) transitions</b>	Puberty	Inadequate diet	Inadequate diet
	Identity formation - emotional & social maturity	Mental illness Non-conformity	Mental illness; Substance abuse - fighting (injury/death);
	Circumcision	Infection; Injury; death; long-term problems related to childbirth	Infection; death
	Sexual initiation	Rape; pre-marital loss of virginity; pre-marital pregnancy; abortion; STIs and HIV/AIDS	STIs and HIV/AIDS; male rape; homosexuality - risk of being fined or imprisoned or pushed into early marriage.
	School education (if any) completed	Failure to attend school; absenteeism (household work; poor results; drop-out) sexual harassment at school; unmet aspirations beyond marriage; unemployment	Failure to attend school; absenteeism (household work; poor results; drop-out); unmet aspirations beyond farm work; unemployment
	Work skill learning completed	Bad at domestic work	Bad at farming; no other work available
<b>Work-related transitions</b>	Long-term work role(s) in place	Becoming a servant; harmful work - prostitution	Becoming a servant; living from hand-to-mouth
	Economic independence from household of origin	Not married; leaves home; no work; prostitution	Living from hand-to-mouth Forced to migrate
<b>Family-related</b>	Marriage	No offers of marriage;	Living from hand-to-mouth

	Transitions/milestones	Females	Males
transitions		abduction; arranged marriage; big age gap with husband	
	Independent home and household	Not married; living with in-laws;	Not married; no housing
	Child(ren)	Infertility (one of the couple); miscarriages; baby(ies) die;	Illegitimate children Infertility (one of the couple); miscarriages; baby(ies) die;
Community-related transitions	Independent community participation and contribution		
Community-related transitions	To adult participation and status in the community	Passage postponement or failure	Passage postponement or failure


101. Males and females have different potential downward careers described in government documents as 'the abyss of desperation' and 'social evils'. For young females one downward route involves pregnancy outside marriage through choice, rape or the grey area between. Customary abortion is a possibility though highly risky. Given the stigma attached to Illegitimacy if the daughter delivers the baby parents may disown her and evict her from the household. This may lead to migration to town and the risk of getting into female sex work. A second route is migration to town to avoid an arranged marriage. The main jobs on offer for young women are domestic work with risks of exploitation and/or sexual abuse and sex work. Sex work brings the risk of HIV/AIDS infection.

102. Some young males with downward careers get into a lifestyle involving addictive substances (alcohol, chat, other drugs) often linked with fighting which may lead to prison, disability or death, and relations with female sex workers, which may lead to HIV/AIDS infection. Addicted youths and others with limited opportunities to work may use theft as a livelihood strategy.

**Policy and youth transitions**

**Community trajectories and policy**


**Figure 11 Community trajectories 1995 – 2010 and beyond**



## Cultural disconnects between local repertoires and government ideology

Figure 12 depicts the **cultural disconnects** in aims and assumptions related to the mental models and institutional design associated with top-down policies and programmes and those implicit in local cultural repertoires related to the fields of action targeted by the interventions. The disconnect between customary and sector mental models and institutions is more pronounced than that between local modern and sector mental models and institutions but as our evidence shows the latter is still significant. In Sections 3 and 4 we compare the ideas and norms/laws in local customary and modern repertoires and government ideology.

**Figure 12: Cultural disconnect between top-down and local repertoires**




103. Developing the analytic approach further we are now suggesting that interventions should be seen as top-down attempts to change the technological, institutional and 'ideas' landscapes within which community systems are working. Communities respond to the disturbances introduced by the interventions in a **'self-organising' process** (Room: 2011) involving interactions amongst supporters of the customary and local modern repertoires and sequenced periods of path-dependent bricolage during which local modern repertoires may change fractionally and support for them rise or fall depending on the local circumstances.

## Development interactions at community level and youth transitions

104. Figure 13 shows the top-down people involved in **intervention-related interactions** and that not all community members are involved in such interactions with the go-betweens. The empirical questions of interest is what interactions between different kind of go-between and wereda officials

and community members around sector interventions officials involve male and female youths of different ages.




105. More broadly we are interested in the **consequences of all policy interventions** for the quality of youth transitions. Policymakers in conventional top-down mode would be interested in the impact of each sector intervention. Community members getting on with their lives would be interested in how each transition was affected by policy interventions and what the knock-on effects were for other transitions.

106. This analysis suggests the need for two perspectives on the relation between policy programmes and projects and youth transitions. Looking from the **top-down** the question is what intended and unintended impacts has each intervention introduced to communities since the mid-2000s had on youth passages. Looking from the **bottom-up** the question is how has each transition been affected by the mix of interventions which has entered each community.

107. Using a **top-down perspective** the development interventions which entered the rural communities during the period are classified under eleven headings which emerged as important during the WIDE3 Stage 1 research. They are:

- **Health, water and sanitation**
- **Education** – primary, secondary, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), universities
- **Agriculture** – land access, extension advice, packages – seeds, fertiliser, credit etc
- **Other rural livelihoods** – Food for Work, land access, credit
- **Environment** – watershed management, erosion, de-forestation
- **Infrastructure** – roads, electricity, communications, kebele buildings,
- **Propaganda** – meetings, media
- **Governance** – security, justice, kebele organisation, co-operatives, women and youth associations and leagues



- **Gender** equity – Harmful Traditional Practices
- **Poverty** and exclusion – food aid, health services, land access,

108. Education, health, food aid, ideas-related, gender equity and poverty-related interventions potentially change the landscape in which young males and females are making the personal embodied transitions related to puberty, identity formation, circumcision, sexual initiation, informal skills and formal education. Other possible contributions come from the cross-cutters of infrastructure and governance.

109. Agriculture, rural development, FFW, environment, and infrastructure interventions potentially change the local landscape in which work-related transitions are made: the establishment of a long-term work role and economic independence. Education and some gender equity and poverty-related interventions may also contribute.

110. The landscape of family-related transitions - marriage, independent household and child(ren) - is potentially changed by health and gender equity interventions. Poverty/exclusion, education, and ideas-related interventions may also contribute.

111. Governance, gender equity and poverty and exclusion interventions have the potential to change the political landscape allowing young men and women to participate in and contribute to community affairs even if they have not completed the local passage to adulthood.

112. The **bottom-up perspective** focuses on youth transitions, itemising interventions which made a positive and/or negative difference to those involved in them and speculating about the possible impacts of GTP policies.

- **Puberty** is potentially affected by nutritional intervention and gender equity
- **Identity formation** is potentially affected by all interventions
- Interventions under the headings of health, education, propaganda, governance and gender equity may all be relevant to reducing **circumcision**
- Age and mode of **sexual initiation** are potentially affected in complex ways by interventions in the fields of governance, gender equity, education and ideas
- The acquisition of **locally-relevant informal skills** may be negatively affected by education interventions
- Interventions in the fields of education, infrastructure, ideas, and livelihoods, including Food-for-Work in some sites, are all relevant to the ways in which young people undertake and end their **formal education**.
- The achievement of **economic** independence is related to the long-term **adult work roles** which are locally available. These may be affected by a mix of local interventions involving agriculture and rural development, infrastructure, education, health, Food-for-Work, environment, governance and poverty & exclusion. They may also be affected by macro-economic policy decisions.
- The achievement **of independent community participation and contribution** by young adults is potentially affected by governance interventions.
- The timing and social quality of **marriage** responds to interventions related to employment, gender equity, education, governance and poverty & exclusion.
- The ability to establish an **independent household** is potentially influenced by land and kebele town development policy and poverty & exclusion interventions.
- The timing and number of **child(ren)** and the quality of the childbirth experience are potentially affected by health, education and infrastructure interventions.

## ***Youth and development***

113. Earlier in the paper we proposed that development policymakers should be interested in youth from three perspectives: wellbeing, economic development, and social cohesion. In the concluding section we draw some broad conclusions about the recent and prospective experiences of rural youth in Ethiopia in relation to these three development dimensions.

114. Understandings of what wellbeing is or should be are multifarious. Here we are concerned with the well/ill-being of youth as they try to make the fifteen boundary crossings on the way to adulthood. Personal transitions can be judged in relation to the development of four aspects of **personal efficacy**: competence, autonomy, relationality, and meaning. There are also judgments to be made about the **achievement and quality of work-, family- and community- related transitions**.

115. In relation to economic development there are three questions. To what extent and in what ways have male and female youth **contributed** to Ethiopia's recent economic development and could they make greater contributions in future? To what extent did they **benefit**? How are the **investments made in youth** in recent years likely to pay off and could they be improved in future?

116. The concept of **social cohesion** has been used in the UK in the analysis of urban contexts affected by racial conflicts. Dimensions considered included

- **material conditions**: particularly employment, income, health, education, and housing; relations between and within communities suffer when people lack work and endure hardship, debt, anxiety, low self-esteem, ill-health, poor skills and bad living conditions.
- **passive social relations**: social order, peace, security, safety, freedom from fear, tolerance,
- **active social relations**: positive interactions, exchanges and networks between individuals and communities; mutual support, information, trust, credit
- **social inclusion**: extent of integration in mainstream institutions of civil society, sense of belonging to a place
- **social equality**: levels of fairness in access to opportunities and material circumstances

## Part II: The WIDE 3 Stage 1 findings in the country context

### Transition experiences of gendered youth in rural Ethiopia: snapshots from the mid-2000s

117. This Section uses evidence from the WIDE2 and DEEP projects to draw conclusions about key aspects of male and female youth transition experiences in the mid-2000s. It establishes the extent of inequalities among the households in which gendered youth reside and among individual youths themselves and goes on to look at personal, work-related, family-related and community-related transitions. The WIDE3 communities in the mid-2000s: livelihood and cultural drivers

118. Table 5 describes the main livelihood drivers, degree of remoteness and livelihood system, for the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities in the mid-2000s.

**Table 5: The six rural communities – local economic drivers in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Korodegaga
	<i>Integrated and self-sufficient communities</i>			<i>Remote and drought-prone sites</i>		
Wereda	Enemay	Shashemene	Cheha	Saeisa Ts/Emb	Ankober	Dodota
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
Remote-ness	On <b>allweather main road</b> ; villagised; neighbouring very small town	3 kms from main road Addis-Shashemene; villagised; <b>peri-urban</b>	Adjacent to small town; hamlets; <b>on allweather main road</b>	<b>Remote</b> with parts very remote	<b>Remote</b> ; hamlets	<b>Poor vehicle access</b> ; 9 villages; varying degrees of remoteness
Livelihood system	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>tef &amp; wheat exported to Addis</b> ; maize; livestock; grain trade; some migration	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>potatoes &amp; grain exported to towns</b> . Off-farm activities; some commuting and migration	Rainfed mostly hoe agriculture: <b>enset</b> , coffee, eucalyptus. <b>Urban migration &amp; linkages</b> .	<b>Drought-stricken</b> plough agriculture: livestock, bees; agriculture; cactus; stone masonry. Regular emergency <b>food aid</b> ; <b>PSNP</b> in 2005. Migration to Humera and towns.	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; seedling nursery; livestock. Regular <b>emergency food aid</b> . Some <b>migration</b> .	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; livestock. Regular emergency food aid; <b>PSNP</b> in 2006.

119. The communities in the first three columns were self-sufficient and relatively integrated in terms of service provision and access to markets in the mid-2000s. Residents of Yetmen and Turufe, which were villagised, grew grain/potatoes as cash crops while households in Girar relied on enset as their staple, sold small amounts of coffee and eucalyptus, and supplemented income via urban migration and linkages. The communities in the last three columns suffered regular droughts and depended on food aid to supplement harvests in most years. Two were remote. In 2005 the Productive Safety Net Programme and Other Food Security Programmes were gradually being introduced in Geblen and Korodegaga. Ankober wereda was not included in PSNP but Dinki was in regular receipt of emergency food aid which had started to involve Food-for-Work.

120. Table 6 describes ethnic mixes, types of local customary repertoires and the balance between customary and local modern repertoires in the six communities. It also details the incoming ethnic, religious and modern ideological repertoires.

**Table 6: The six rural communities – local cultural drivers in the mid-2000s**

	<b>Yetmen</b>	<b>Turufe</b>	<b>Girar</b>	<b>Korodegaga</b>	<b>Geblen</b>	<b>Dinki</b>
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Oromia	Tigray	Amhara
<b>Ethnic mix</b>	Gojjam Amhara 99.6% <sup>1</sup>	Arssi Oromo 57% Tigraway 10% Amhara 8% SNNP 25% <sup>1 2</sup>	Gurage almost 100%	Arssi Oromo 99.6% <sup>1</sup>	Tigrayan Irob Roughly equal?	Argobba 64% Amhara 36% <sup>1</sup>
<b>Religious mix</b>	Orthodox Christian - all	Muslim – mostly Oromo Orthodox Christian – mostly Northerners Protestant – mostly SNNP	Orthodox Christian Catholics Protestants Muslims	Muslim – almost all	Orthodox Christian Muslim c 40% Catholic 3 hhs	Muslim 66% Orthodox Christian 34%
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Amhara East Gojjam Orthodox Christian	Arssi Oromo Muslim Immigrant s: northern Orthodox Christian Southern Mixed religions	Gurage Mixed religions	Arssi Oromo Muslim	Tigrayan-Irob Mixed religions	Argobba Muslim Amhara Orthodox Christian
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Integrated modern repertoires (see below)			Remote modern repertoires (see below)		
<b>Incoming ideological mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	Government models Opposition party models Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Wahabbi Islam Protestantism Western media - radio TV in towns	Government models Opposition party models Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio
<b>Balance</b>	Hybrid of customary and modern; quiet resistance to government ideology	Hybrid customaries and modern; government ideology weak	Hybrid of customary and modern; resistance to government ideology	Customary pre-dominant; women more supportive of government ideology	Customaries pre-dominant; acceptance of government ideology	Customaries pre-dominant; government ideology ignored

<sup>1</sup>From RANS 2004. <sup>2</sup>Wolayitta 10%; Gurage 6%; Kembata 5%; Hadiya 3%; Sidama/Silte/Sodo 1% each.

121. The balance between promotion and usage of local customary, local modern and incoming government ideology varied across the sites. In the remote sites local customary repertoires were pre-dominant in the mid-2000s. In the PSNP sites, Geblen and Korodegaga, government ideologies were not publicly challenged though there was 'foot-dragging' in Korodegaga. In both Dinki and Geblen there were reports of minor tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Dinki residents appeared to ignore incoming government repertoires. In the self-sufficient integrated sites there was a hybrid of local modern and customary repertoires. There was resistance to government models in Yetmen and Girar. Following the 2005 election Girar residents joined protests which continued for some months. In Turufe the implementation of government repertoires was weak.

### ***Government structures to implement policies***

122. Wereda de-centralisation began in 2002 and the process continued through the mid-2000s. Kebele leaders and members of the Cabinet were elected from within the community and there was some payment for the Chairman. Kebele Councils had started working and kebele sub-structures

were put in place. in terms of go-betweens there were teachers and Development Agents who visited from the wereda.

### ***Inequalities potentially affecting youth and their transitions in the mid-2000s***

123. In this section we rely on data made during the DEEP phase which covered two integrated sites (Yetmen and Turufe) and two remote drought-prone sites (Dinki and Korodegaga). Young people's transitions were affected by community inequalities, household inequalities and individual inequalities.

124. **Inequalities between communities:** The **drought** which affected Ethiopia in 2002-3 was so bad that the macro economy declined rather than grew. Geblen, Dinki, Korodegaga were all badly affected. During bad droughts households sold assets with knock-on effects for production in subsequent years. Drought affected young people of different ages differently. Those in the middle of their growth spurt may have been affected in a long-run way by malnutrition. Some young people were taken out of school while others were unable to concentrate due to hunger. The cash to take people to health centres was not be available. Marriages may have been delayed and babies born dead as a result of malnutrition.

125. The integrated communities Yetmen and Turufe were self-sufficient in that they did not need food aid. The main liabilities of the remote sites were scant and unreliable rains and problems in transporting outputs to markets though both Dinki and Korodegaga had some irrigated agriculture. In terms of household assets owned in 2004 findings from the RANS show that Yetmen was considerably **richer** than the other three sites. Turufe was the next richest but the gap between it and Dinki was small. Korodegaga was the poorest community by some degree. Youth and others in the integrated sites had better access to services; in this regard Turufe was better off than Yetmen and Korodegaga better off than Dinki.

126. **Inequalities** in productive and consumer assets, income and consumption, access to services, status and political clout **among households** within communities were also considerable.

#### **Box 1: Household wealth differences 2004**

##### **From Yetmen**

The wealthiest people in the community are the merchants who have cars to transport the grain to towns and bring consumer goods to supply their own or other's big shops. Other wealthy people are owners, moneylenders and those with special skills such as weavers, potters, blacksmiths, tailors, carpenters and masons – especially if they also own farmland. The wealthy have large amounts of livestock and more than one *gotta* of grain in store. They may rent additional plots of land to increase their income. The poorest are hired to work for others for a daily wage; few livestock. They may be landless, descended from a poor family, labourers – especially farmworkers, handicrafts men who own no land, widows, prostitutes, those who collect firewood and sell dungcakes, those who make and sell alcoholic drinks and food, those who are disabled and unable to work, especially old people with no one to look after them. WIDE1 and DEEP.

A few rich people have refrigerators, TVs and video players. In rich households there are big barrels and up to four big pots in which to make *tella* (local beer). The availability of *tella* throughout the year is one indicator of status in the rural part. Rich and some middle households have beds, chairs and a table. Poor households may not have pots and other household furniture. A destitute household may lack even the basic assets and be forced to borrow from neighbours.

127. The relationship between some **rich and poor** was reciprocal. 'The rich may have enough land and may rent to have more land, and hire those who have no immediate livelihood. They may have also a large number of livestock and sheep then again hire some one to look after them.' (Yetmen). The poor engaged in subsistence activities while the rich were involved 'in making a profit and improving their livelihoods'. One rich farmer said 'It is not a heavenly destiny that decides for some

people to remain poor, but unfair distribution and access to resources.' Servants regularly reported exploitation by employers.

128. The main sources of **household status** in these rural communities were genderage of household head, social origin, and wealth/class. In all communities there were elites who played key roles in decision-making and influencing and leading the community.

129. In the DEEP sites 22-24% of households were **female-headed**. For Geblen we have no information for 2004 but in 2010 a surprising 44% of households in Geblen were said to be female-headed. The figure reported from Girar was 11% but this probably included migrant husbands, many of whom spent most of their time in urban areas often with another wife and family. Those in their 20s heading households were, on average, poorer than those in their 30s, 40/50s, and 60+, having less average rainfed and irrigated land and livestock. In the Oromia sites the over-sixties were the richest, while in the Amhara sites it was those in their 40s and 50s.

130. Status markers related to social origin of household head varied by site; they included ethnicity, religion, clan, lineage, occupation (marginalised craftworkers, former 'slaves') and length of residence ('natives' and 'immigrants') These distinctions have long histories and in communities where they exist have created fault lines with potential consequences for social cohesion.

131. Historic conflicts with neighbouring ethnic groups were reported from Korodegaga and Dinki, although the regular Korodegaga conflicts with Jille pastoralists were said to be a thing of the past. In Dinki both Amhara and Argobba considered the Afar to be traditional enemies and there were regular armed conflicts in market places such as Dulecha, Zuti and Senbete and some theft of cattle and camels.

132. The productive wealth of a household not only determines life style and the life quality of members in the reproductive field, but it is also a status marker. The **relative status of poor people** was low. This was confirmed more generally in a UNICEF study in which 62% of young people aged 9-17 said that society treats children from poor families unfairly. There was also an important distinction in terms of rights between **landed and landless** households. The latter did not pay tax and as a result did not have the same rights or duties as taxpayers

133. Young people whose parents were members of **the elite** were better-placed than others to experience a non-problematic passage to a good adulthood. Eliteness involved not just greater wealth but also influence, notably through local informal and formal organisational positions. Ability to influence external agents was also important and for that literacy and education could be useful, though limited opportunities in rural areas for high school graduates have pushed them to look for work in urban areas.

#### Box 2: Local elites 2005

##### From Yetmen:

In 2005 the local elites were identified as those people who have political power, wealth and education. Priests are also considered to be elites. And their eliteness is based on their wealth and their capacity to influence other people. Those people who are wealthy and who have political position may get status in the community. But a wealthy person cannot get political power just because of his wealth, and equally, those with political power cannot obtain wealth just because of their political position. In addition people who have education are accorded good status: teachers, development agents, health workers and priests.

134. Women, younger uneducated men, and poor men had **little say in community affairs**, although female relatives of powerful men may have had informal influence and there were official positions for women in *kebele* structures who took a lead in organising women for collective activities.

135. **Local politics** were important in the selection of *kebele* leaders who were elected by the people. Factional politics were involved but difficult to discern as they were based on informal networks and could change rapidly. Sometimes they seemed to be follow ethnic or clan lines and could have been important in the election or replacing of *kebele* representatives. However, these elections were also subject to influences from the *wereda* authorities, and occasions when directives instructed leadership changes offered opportunities for changing unpopular leaders and could alter the power balance and lead to shifting alliances and allegiances including those of young people.


136. Before the Derg brought socialist ideas including equality for women to Ethiopian rural communities starting in the mid-1970s the status difference between males and females was enormous. The EPRDF ideology also promotes **gender equality** with related legislation and policies. By the mid-2000s gender status differences had somewhat reduced in the DEEP sites although it was still a strong discriminator. The group most committed to maintaining gender inequalities were the older Argobba men, though some women and young people were beginning to resist them.

137. The status salience of historic **age hierarchies** was also lower by the mid-2000s. Older people reported a decline in respect from young people. In daily life status attached to gendage taken together. Young males in their twenties were seen as superior to all female youth and males in their teens. Young females in their twenties were superior to female teenagers. However within households age sometimes trumped gender in the internal status hierarchy.

138. 'There is an extreme taboo surrounding any sexuality that deviates from the norm and most **gay people** live in hiding ' (Teferra and Gebremedhin 2010:28).

139. As discussed above households headed by those under 30 were on average poorer than the others. There were also considerable **economic inequalities among the 2064 young people** living in parental or their own households some related to household wealth (see Figure 14) and others to the distribution of resources among household members about which we have no statistical information (though see Box 3)

**Figure 14: Household wealth distribution of youth aged 10-29 in the DEEP sites in 2004**



### Box 3: Allocation of household resources to young people


#### From Dinki

In discussing problems related to food shelter and clothing, the middle-wealth respondent assisted that these are not common problems to all young adults. He argued that the type and quantity of food, the type/quality of clothes each could have differs from house to house depending on parent's behaviour. Others agreed with him and added that some used to eat *ful* and get meat and milk. Others may depend on beans and couldn't get enough *injera*, some may have good jackets, shorts, or shoes, and others wore *Abujedy* clothes never replacing worn out and torn clothes in four years.

YL2 FGD

140. In the mid-2000s there were considerable differences in access to education in the six ELCS communities notably between the integrated and remote sites. Figure 15 shows the extent to which wealth affected school attendance at the national level. The Gross Attendance Ratio measures participation at each level of schooling among those of any age. In 2005 for those whose households were in the highest wealth quintile the chances of attending primary school were more than double those in the bottom quintile. The gender gap in the top quintile was also smaller than in the others.

**Figure 15: Gross primary attendance ratio by wealth quintile and gender 2005**  
(Source DHS 2005)



141. **Secondary school attendance** was even more unequally distributed among the wealth quintiles and genders. In 2005 only 3% of females in the lowest quintile attended secondary school compared with 62% of males in the top quintile.

142. Achieved education was also a status discriminator in itself creating three currently important categories: those who had experienced no education; those who had experienced some education

but not enough that it was useful for employment or other work purposes; and those whose education was being used in their work.

143. There was a perception in 2003 that changes to the post Grade-10 system would increase wealth-related inequalities in access to higher levels of schooling consolidating an unequal class structure.

144. The **health inequalities** which affected the transitions of young people included, on the demand side diseases, accidents, disabilities, HIV/AIDS, and other chronic illnesses. The following health risks were reported from at least one of the WIDE3 Stage 1 sites in 1995: respiratory illnesses, trachoma, intestinal parasites, skin infections, diarrhoea, malaria, STDs, toothache, amoebic dysentery, severe headache, eye diseases, liver diseases, TB, mental illness, blood pressure, anaemia, backpain, earache, 'sharp pain', heartburn, abdominal pain, childbirth problems, kidney problems, haemorrhoids, German measles, gastritis, anthrax, meningitis, arthritis, elephantiasis, rabies, leprosy, malnutrition, sunstroke, evil spirits diseases, snake bites and fighting.

145. During the qualitative research we encountered a number of chronically ill young people (see for example Box 4).

**Box 4: Chronically ill adolescent**

**From Korodegaga**

She feels a severe stomach pain, she couldn't take fat foods. When she take it, her abdomen becomes swelled. She has gotten medical treatment and medicine, but she has not improved from illness. Because of illness she dropped out her education in 1996 from grade one. Now she has become mentally weak and dizzy and also she couldn't perform a lot of works. She has no friends and doesn't swim or play. 13 year-old girl. YL2 2005

146. Household deaths and illnesses, especially of head and senior woman, can knock households off the ideal track with consequences for the young people living in them and their chances of a smooth transition to a good adulthood. Table 7 shows that 5-9% of RANS households reported at least one death in the previous year.

**Table 7: Households reporting deaths in the last year in mid-2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen
One or more deaths in the last year	6%	9%	5%	7%

147. In all sites a considerable proportion of households sold important assets to cover the costs of illnesses and deaths in a five-year period.

**Table 8: Human diseases and deaths leading to considerable asset losses 1999-2004**

	Amhara		Oromia	
	<i>Yetmen</i>		<i>Turufe Kecheme</i>	
Integrated	Serious illness of family member	25%	Serious illness of family member	47%
	Death of family member	27%	Death of family member	29%
	<i>Dinki</i>		<i>Korodegaga</i>	
Remote	Serious illness of family member	23%	Serious illness of family member	16%
	Death of family member	14%	Serious accident to family member	2%
			Death of family member	31%

148. There were inequalities supply side in access to, and use of, preventive, curative and reproductive health services. Access was affected by the remoteness of the community, internal community spatial patterns, household wealth and allocation of expenditures. Use was affected to varying degrees by local cultural repertoires; for example Dinki respondents reported immunisation and health education 'which were not accepted' and only 14% of households had sought treatment for recent illnesses compared with 50-65% in the other three sites. Box 5 describes health service provision in the DEEP communities in the mid-2000s.

#### **Box 5: Health services in the DEEP sites in the mid-2000s**

##### **From Yetmen:**

There was a private clinic but it was expensive. Most had to go to a nearby *got* to a public health centre; it cost less but there was a meagre supply of medical necessities. The construction of a health post was under way in 2005. People went to Dejen and Bichena for serious illnesses. There were a number of traditional medical practitioners using herbal medicines.

##### **From Turufe:**

The site was 2.5km from Shashemene General Hospital; there was also a private clinic. Nearby there was a Catholic mission health centre which gave food and shelter for handicapped children suffering from polio and other bone-related problems. The centre delivered treatment for eye infections twice a year. In 2005, some rich or medium people preferred to go private clinics at Shashemene and Awassa (if the disease was serious) because the Kuyera hospital was poor in facilities and there was also a shortage of medicine. Some rich people went to Wondo Genet to get customary treatment holy/spring water to prevent coughs..

People tried to treat their illnesses themselves, bleeding the joints of their arm by slightly pricking the blood vessel with a blade and burning swellings with heated iron. There was no Kaleecha (ritual healer) or equivalent in the kebele; the nearest was about two hours' walk away. There were three traditional doctors for bone-setting and herbs in the kebele. People also tried to prevent illnesses by cleaning their bodies, compounds, clothes, food and the water they drink.

HM, AF (female representative of the village), TB (health representative of the village), and another three people were trained by NGOs (Catholic, Compassion, and Africa Human Action). Anyone could get condoms from them. The health representative of the kebele was trained by the MoH; he vaccinated children when there was a polio vaccination.

##### **From Dinki:**

The people of Dinki treated their health problems mostly by practising ritual celebrations or visiting a spirit possession specialist. There were individuals known as wogasha who treat bone fractures, joint dislocation, and the dislocation and swelling of muscles. There were also people who knew how to treat headaches, eye and ear problems, and had snake-bite medicine (Yeebab medhanit). Spirit healers (especially for Muslims) were important providers of traditional treatments against illness locally categorised as bad spirit-related diseases. The same people or others also served as herbalists curing illnesses related to wounds and skin diseases.

##### **From Korodegaga:**

It was possible to get medical treatment in Awash Melkasa and Dera. In addition to the health centres in these towns, there were many private clinics. People went to Nazret hospital only for serious illnesses. The major problem with regard to health service was that the medical cost was too high for the poor and destitute people. Many rich and medium people prefer the private clinics to government health centres because the private ones were efficient both in time and quality of service.

People used different kinds of traditional medicine for various kinds of diseases. The medicines were obtained from plant leaves and roots. They were used for problems such as toothache, headaches and snake bites. One person gives traditional treatment in Bofa in Eastern Shewa by making cuts on a patient's tongue. It is believed many people have been cured from stomach, kidney, liver and lung diseases. A large number of women and a few men visited this person's house in 2005. People also bathe in hot springs to get treatment from some diseases. The presence of Sodere hot spring creates a favourable opportunity for the people. Since they cannot afford the entry fee of 8-15 birr, people bathe in the hot waters which were found outside the recreation centre. There was also another hot spring in Korodegaga just parallel to the Sodere recreation centre. They use traditional medicine available in Itaya for cancer.

149. According to the Welfare Monitoring Survey in 2004 67% of households were at least 10kms from the nearest Health Post.

150. Quite a high proportion of the households we studied in the DEEP research contained young people with **disabilities** including lameness, deafness, and mental disabilities. No data on disability was included in the 2007 Census. A recent report funded by DFID concluded that

'Women and men with disabilities are a socially excluded group because disability is considered a marginal issue. Negative attitudes towards disability have intersected with weak policies to divest people and children of their rights to access basic services. Prejudice against people with disabilities leads to discrimination and to their scant participation in the social and economic arenas.' (Teferra and Gebremedhin, 2010: 14)

151. One risk potentially facing young men in the mid-2000s was **conscription**. Under Ethiopian law the minimum age of recruitment into the armed forces is 18 years old. During the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000) there were reports of forcible recruitment of teenage boys into the Ethiopian army. More than 100 men from Geblen were recruited to join the army most of whom were ex-TPLF fighters. Most of them were de-mobilised between 2002 and 2005; many of them were injured. In 2008 they received pensions and access to free medical services but they were not given land. In the mid-2000s there was an incident in Dinki where a number of young men who had joined the local militia were rounded up at gunpoint in the local town market and taken to join the army. It was reported that many of them escaped and returned home.

152. While the various inequalities described above had potential consequences for young people's life chances in terms of access to buffers to protect from bad shocks and passports to seize opportunities other factors were reported as affecting **inter-generational social mobility** including quality of upbringing and parental choices. Poorer young males could improve their wealth status by hard work and saving for investment in productive assets; poor young females with good reputations for hard work could marry up, especially if they were beautiful. Sons and daughters from richer households who did not work hard would be downwardly mobile.

### ***Rural youth: personal transitions in the mid-2000s***

153. In this section we summarise evidence on identity formation, circumcision, sexual initiation and subsequent relations and practices, informal work skill learning, and formal education.

#### **Puberty**

154. Parents in Yetmen described those passing through puberty as living in 'the age of fire' which brought mood swings and unpredictable behaviour. Otherwise we have found no reference to it in our data from communities, government or donors<sup>13</sup>.

#### **Identity formation**

##### ***Local cultural and ideological repertoires affecting youth identity formation: mid-2000s***

155. In the remote sites young men were expected to go into farming and young women to get married and have children. There were two ideal-type local work-related identities on offer to young people in the integrated sites described by respondents as farmer/education for males and married/educated for females.

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<sup>13</sup> Development-relevant issues relating to puberty include nutritional needs related to growth spurts, availability of sanitary towels and privacy at school for girls starting menstruation, and sex education from parents and schools.

156. Young men were expected to be aggressive and ready to defend their family and its honour while young women should be shy and quiet. However, education was thought to increase tolerance and patience. Another element in the local modern repertoire concerned religious beliefs; those which held back economic production and investment were viewed as problematic.

157. The macro-level Youth Policy description of desirable youth identities did not seem to have reached rural communities in the mid-2000s.

**Table 9: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: identity formation in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Young males should be aggressive and prepared to defend their family. They should learn from their fathers and follow in their footsteps to become farmers. Young females should be shy, not talkative and keep their virginity until they are married. Homosexuality is taboo; everyone should marry an opposite sex partner. As they become adults young people should identify themselves as followers of the customary local religion.					
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Young males and females should be educated; it helps them to get office work and marketable skills and knowledge and also to be obedient. Educated people are tolerant, patient, problem solvers with the necessary important knowledge and skills and are useful to the people and the country Young people should not accept religious beliefs that hinder development					
<b>Government ideology in the mid-2000s</b>	Youth should be 'citizens with democratic outlook, professional competence, skills and ethics so that they can actively, efficiently and widely participate in and benefit from the country' ongoing activities that are aimed at attaining a democratic system and accelerated development'. National Youth Policy 20004 Preface Homosexuality was illegal					
<b>Incoming religious ideology</b>	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires	More missionary work by Sunni <i>wahabbi</i> Islamists – 3 mosques built around 2005	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Maybe <i>wahabbi</i> missionaries - no details Protestantism and Catholicism – no details	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Maybe <i>wahabbi</i> Islamism – no details Catholicism, Protestantism – no details	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Wahabbi missionaries sent away	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires <i>Wahabbi</i> missionaries Protestantism – no details

158. Incoming modernising religions were Protestant/Catholic in three sites although they did not seem to be very active in trying to change young people's identities in the mid-2000s. The opposite was the case in respect of the *wahabbi* Islam missionaries from Saudi Arabia who were active in Korodegaga and Turufe and possibly Geblen and Girar which had Muslim populations.

159. Box 6 presents a perspective on the *Wahhabi* Islamic project<sup>14</sup> in Ethiopia in the 1990s from a Muslim who had converted to Protestantism. He described a 'five-fold' ministry the fifth being that

<sup>14</sup> Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) was the first modern Islamic fundamentalist. The central point of his reform movement was the principle that every idea added to Islam after the third century of the Muslim era (about 950 CE) was false and should be eliminated. True Muslims must adhere solely and strictly to the original beliefs set forth by Muhammad. The reason for this extremist stance, and the focus of Wahhab's reform efforts, was a number of popular practices which he believed represented a regression to pre-Islamic polytheism. These included praying to saints, making pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, venerating trees, caves, and stones, and using votive and sacrificial offerings. Wahhabists oppose the 19th and 20th century Muslim reform movements which reinterpreted aspects of Islamic law in order to bring it closer to standards set by the West, particularly with regards to topics like gender relations, family law, personal autonomy, and participatory democracy. <http://atheism.about.com/od/islamicsects/a/wahhabi.htm>

of religious teachers sent into rural communities and attached to mosques to teach local people. Visits from such teachers were reported from Dinki and Turufe in the 1990s and Korodegaga in the mid-2000s following the building of a number of mosques financed from Saudi Arabia.

#### **Box 6: The growth and influence of Islam in Ethiopia from 1989 to 2000**

There has been a tremendous growth in the spiritual lives of Ethiopian Muslims in the past ten years. Before 1989 the majority of Muslims were just followers of Islam. They did not have a deep knowledge of the *Qur'an* (Koran), *Hadis* (authoritative traditions), and Islamic Doctrines. Besides this there were no strong, modern *Sheikhs* (Muslim religious teachers) in most parts of the country, especially in the rural areas. Many Muslims were worshipping other deities than *Allah*. Offering sacrifices to lesser spirits or at Muslim saints' tombs was a common practice. Of course there were some Muslim people who were strong and faithful to their religion. However, after the fall of the Dergue (government), a great paradigm shift came out in Islam in Ethiopia.

The *Wahabbi* (reformist/fundamentalist) Sect has taken the initiative to bring changes in the lives of all groups of Ethiopian Muslims. Furthermore, they are teaching that every Muslim has a responsibility to Islamize the world, and especially Ethiopia, the Christian nation. They have started to mobilize Muslims by teaching that every Muslim should be involved in a "five-fold ministry". This five-fold ministry means that all Muslims by group should be involved in one of five ministries to Islamize Ethiopia. The first group is the scholars. ....The second group is the ministry of the mystics. The mystics try to do miracles, wonders and signs to influence people in other religious groups to acknowledge that Muslims have divine power and experiences from almighty God. .... The third group is that of the merchants. .... Every merchant who loves Allah is required to share his/her wealth and life for the Islamisation of Ethiopia. Besides this they are encouraged to support mosque building and the *Dawa* (Muslim mission) ministry (see group five below). ...The fourth groups are the ordinary people in Islam. People in this group are encouraged to marry Christian women as much as possible. This by itself is to Islamize Christians.

The fifth and major area of ministry is the group of the religious teachers. The religious teachers are to mobilize the Muslim community through teaching, discipline and training. In addition they form witnessing teams among them. These teaching, discipline, training and witnessing teams are called "*Dawa* groups." These *Dawa* groups make Addis Ababa their centre, out from which they send their members out to all parts of the country. The members are young, educated Muslims. Before going out to do ministry they take time for learning in the mosque about the *Qur'an*, *Hadis*, and all Muslim doctrines – how to defend their faith and how to challenge Christianity. After their period of study, they will go out to rural or town mosques. When they reach their target area, they are divided into groups of two (or more), and attached to different mosques. During their stay of several weeks or months, they are to visit all the Muslims living around the mosque and call them for prayer and teaching. They deliver a series of teachings on how Muslims should live and act as a true follower of Islam. They also train volunteers who have decided to move with them and experience "*Dawa*" mission. In this way they produce many devoted, young Muslims in different parts of the country. Moreover, they teach "folk Muslims" (those seen to have syncretised their religious practice) to reject pagan and Christian practices and return back to the "true way" of Islam....

Tsegaye 2002:1

#### ***Actual rural male and female identity formation in the mid-2000s***

160. 'Farmer adolescents' in Yetmen were reported as facing problems related to lack of land to work on because of population pressure; 'these children worry and sometimes become emotionally unstable'. The problem facing 'student adolescents' was the possibility of failing exams and not achieving their 'goal accomplishments and expectations'; those who did fail 'got angry' and sometimes 'emotionally unstable'. In Turufe a similar distinction between students and others was drawn. One woman speaking of young women in their later teens said 'unless she is learning if she is not married she may worry'.

161. This respondent also reported that even worse for poor girls was the possibility of not getting married and being labelled *komoker*. 'This results in low self-esteem and social abuse or ostracisation'. Denigratory labelling of young women who were not conforming to local customary norms was common across the communities.

162. Young people becoming aware that they are gay faced particular identity problems since, given local taboos, their feelings cannot be discussed. The AIDS Resource Centre in Addis Ababa reported that the majority of self-identified gay and lesbian callers (75% male) asked for help in changing their behaviour to avoid discrimination. Many of them reported anxiety, confusion, identity crises, depression, religious conflict and suicide attempts<sup>15</sup>.

163. In all the communities personal reputation was an important aspect of youth identity.

164. Adolescence and young adulthood is a period when people develop a view of the world, their place in it and often how one or the other or both might be changed. This worldview is imaginatively constructed over time in the light of historically-located experiences drawing on local repertoires and possibly larger religious and political ideologies. There is a considerable variety of opinion in these communities and in contexts where they feel safe people are willing to express themselves and argue about ideas.

165. In Yetmen religious ideas about livelihoods and religious ceremonies preached by Orthodox priests were part of local customary ideas and were in direct conflict with some government policies and directives which were accepted in local modern repertoires and resonated with donor and NGO repertoires. In Korodegaga Islamic ideas about livelihoods and religious ceremonies were modern in that they contradicted local customary repertoires. However, some of the ideas ran counter to government repertoires and donor/NGO repertoires, for different reasons. In both sites religious repertoires were more symbolically powerful than government ideology.

166. In the heterogeneous sites people lived with models of different ways of thinking, particularly in religious terms. There were contradictions at a number of levels in the ideas and narratives of the different religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, various versions of Protestantism, and Catholicism. The increasing influence of religious fundamentalists in all religions was making these logical contradictions more visible leading to a heightening of religious identity and a decline in religious tolerance. Religious differences were associated with ethnic differences and consequently affected and were affected by inter-ethnic competition for scarce material resources and local political influence.

167. In all sites political identities associated with opposition parties were available.

168. Young people in the integrated sites had more regular interactions with urban dwellers and greater access to the media which were contributing new dimensions, such as clothing fashions, to local modern repertoires.

## **Circumcision in the mid-2000s**

### ***Cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies relating to circumcision***

169. Female circumcision is a necessary transition in the passage to adulthood in all the customary repertoires except for Geblen where the TPLF introduced a successful campaign against it in the 1980s. For example from Turufe came a report that uncircumcised Orthodox Christian females could not be buried in churchyards and that uncircumcised Oromia women could not get married. We did not ask any questions about male circumcision though learned it should be performed on Orthodox Christians male babies shortly after birth.

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<sup>15</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT\\_rights\\_in\\_Ethiopia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Ethiopia)

**Table 10: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: circumcision in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Female circumcision is a necessary transition in the passage to adulthood. So is male circumcision in the Amhara sites. No information for the other sites.			Female circumcision has ended due to long-term TPLF programme	Female circumcision is a necessary transition in the passage to adulthood. So is male circumcision in the Amhara sites. No information for the other sites.	
	At 7 days	Before first marriage			Amhara – 11 days Argobba - child	Amhara – 7 days  Oromo before first marriage
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>		Awareness of disadvantages		Female circumcision is in the past		Awareness of disadvantages
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	Female circumcision is a Harmful Traditional Practice which is bad for the health of women and their babies and a violation of Human Rights					


**Actual male circumcision in the mid-2000s**

170. We have no information in the ELCS about male circumcision as we did not ask about it. Risks of infection associated with the process must be the same as for females. Nationally 93% of men aged 15-59 were circumcised in 2005. Regional differences were small except for SNNP (80%) and Gambella (47%). Some studies have shown that male circumcision may reduce the risk of contracting STIs including HIV.

**Actual female circumcision in the mid-2000s**

171. Figure 16 shows that there were considerable Regional differences in the practice of circumcision in the mid-2000s. Gambella had the lowest proportion of women circumcised (27%) followed by Tigray (29%) where the TPLF had been actively campaigning against the practice since the 1970s.

**Figure 16: Percentages of women circumcised by Region 2005**



Source Boyden *et al* 2011 p35 using DHS 2005 figures

172. By the mid-2000s the government campaign to eliminate female circumcision did not seem to have made much impact on behaviour in the WIDE3 Stage 1 sites except in Geblen. While people may have opposed circumcision in theory it was hard to resist the cultural pressures to perform it on their daughters as Box 7 shows.

### Box 7: Female circumcision goes underground 2005

#### From Turufe:

Third respondent: *(Note from researcher: It is difficult to find women who would say that they have been harmed by circumcision as it is difficult to find women who have not been circumcised. This respondent is a woman who opposes circumcision, a nurse.)*

They believe that a woman would not be able to get a husband if she is not circumcised; they believe that she would have a bad reputation. From the vantage point of health, however, it is clear that circumcision causes a number of problems. For instance, it makes labour during birth very painful and protracted. The risk of contracting deadly diseases including HIV/AIDS is also great due to the unsanitary condition of the instruments that are used for the job. There is no benefit at all in circumcision. In fact, it is a very harmful practice in terms of health.

*Note from researcher: It is difficult to find women who would say that they have been harmed by circumcision; even women who might have been harmed by it would find it difficult to state that openly; they would, instead, find some other explanation for their difficulties. Even though circumcision has been outlawed recently, the public still looks upon it positively as a good cultural practice. Nobody benefits from the circumcision of girls, except may be the expert woman who gets paid for the job.*

Q: Are you circumcised yourself?

A: Yes, I am. My parents had me circumcised in my infancy. Since we are Amhara it happened on the seventh day of my birth.

Q: Have you had your daughter circumcised?

A: Yes, I have. The reason is, as I said to you, both my parents and relatives would not give me peace if I had not done it. As I said to you, despite the legal prohibitions, the public has not as yet understood the benefits of abandoning the practice. It is still practised secretly.

## Sexual initiation and subsequent relations and practices

### *Modes and age of sexual initiation*

173. In the **customary repertoires** female sexual initiation should follow marriage, hence this should take place at a young age, while young men were free to experiment. In local modern repertoires it was not losing virginity before marriage but avoiding giving birth that mattered. The risk of contracting HIV/AIDS meant that young people of both sexes should avoid promiscuity.

**Table 11: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: sexual initiation in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - Male</b>	Males may experiment with sexual relations before they are married					
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - Female</b>	Females should be virgins on marriage; to ensure this is the case they should be married young					
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Females should not have had a child before they are married; they may use contraceptives to prevent this and if necessary abortion. Neither sex should experiment with sexual relations before marriage because of the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS					
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	It is illegal to get married before the age of 18. It is illegal for an adult to have sex with someone younger than 18. Rape is illegal.					


174. The most important government action affecting this area was the family law which made marriage before the age of 18 illegal with an implication for the minimum age of sexual initiation for those concerned that it should take place after marriage.

175. Results from the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey showed that for all women aged 15-49 who were married the median (50% above and 50% below) age of first intercourse was 16.1. There had been a reduction in age of first sexual intercourse: the median age for 15-19 year-olds was 18.2 compared with 16.1 for the whole sample. Also only 11% of 15-19 year-olds had had first sexual intercourse before the age of 15 compared with 22% of 20-24 year-olds and 37% of those 45-49.

176. Figure 17 shows there were considerable regional differences of reported first intercourse before the age of 15 by women aged 15-24 in the DHS 2005. This had happened most frequently in Amhara (32%), Tigray (20%) and Gambela (24%).

177. Median age for first sexual intercourse for men was 21.2 and for first marriage 23.8 suggesting considerable pre-marital sexual activity. The Survey found that 1.7% of 15-19 year-old males had had first sexual intercourse before age 15. Again there were Regional differences notably in Gambella where 19% of young men reported intercourse below the age of 15. The median age of first intercourse for all males aged 25-29 was 22. There were no figures for younger cohorts.

**Figure 17: First intercourse before 15 for 15-24 year-olds by Region 2005**



178. Results from the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey showed that for all women aged 15-49 who were married the median age of marriage at 16.1 was the same as for first sexual intercourse suggesting that **for most women sexual initiation had been associated with marriage.**

179. However, a report in 2010 stated that:

'According to reports from the Girls Focus Groups, a high level of **incest and rape** is taking place in homes by brothers, husbands and uncles and is also being frequently experienced in relation to domestic work, often resulting in early pregnancy, serious health problems and interrupted schooling. There is also substantive evidence of abuse in educational institutions at all levels, by unethical teachers asking for sexual favours in exchange for good grades and by "Sugar Daddies" around schools who lure poor girls with money and then trap them in a cycle of dependence.' (Kumela *et al* 2010)

180. **Marriage by forced abduction** was a way for a young man to get a wife when he was unwilling or unable to do so through the accepted institutions, for example due to poverty. A young woman would be chosen, kidnapped and if unwilling raped. Opportunities for such abductions arose when the girl/woman was fetching water or en route to school. She was usually taken to his home and in Oromo cultures would be circumcised in anticipation of the marriage. In most cases in the mid-2000s the parents and girl eventually accepted what had happened and, with the help of elders, appropriate local arrangements with regard to exchanges between the families and gifts to the couple were made.

181. Parental views about forced abduction depended on whether they were considering their sons or daughters.

**Box 8: Marriage by forced abduction: different attitudes re daughters and sons**

**From Dinki**


Risks for young females – 'capture marriage'

Goals for young males – 'Marriage should be arranged for the boys, even through capture, so they can initiate their households. *YL1*

*Poor father with eight children*

182. In the 2005 DHS survey 7.8% of women had been married by abduction. Figures for the youth cohorts were aged 15-19 = 2.5%; aged 20-24 = 7.3%; and aged 25-29 = 9.5%. The Regional differences are shown in Figure 18 with the highest proportion in SNNP and the lowest in Tigray and Amhara where there is no bridewealth, which is an incentive for abduction.

**Figure 18: Women ever married by abduction in Ethiopia 2005**



183. **Male rape** is rarely discussed. Of the more than 10,000 rape cases last year, 22 percent involved young boys, some even as young as two, according to government figures (Global Gayz: 2009)

## HIV/AIDS

184. Infection with HIV/AIDS is a risk related to sexual initiation and subsequent promiscuity. The DHS 2005 found that 1.4% of adults aged 15-49 were infected with HIV: nearly 2% of women and just under 1% of men. People living with HIV/AIDS and HIV orphans suffered from stigma and discrimination which contributed to the secrecy that surrounded the issue in rural communities. In the UNICEF study young people aged 9-17 were asked for their perceptions of how society treats children affected by HIV/AIDS the response was : fairly 17%; unfairly 57%; Don't Know 26% (UNICEF 2006:39)

### Box 9: HIV/AIDS mid-2000s

#### From Yetmen:

Most people are convinced of the need to use condoms due to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Yetmen. Many people have died of HIV/AIDS. This is recent and now people are becoming afraid of it. There is a change in knowledge and attitude towards HIV but there is no significant change in the people's practice.

#### From Turufe:

The hospital reported that there were about 50 HIV positive people in Turufe and Wetera Sake in 2005.

#### From Dinki:

By 2005 a few people have lost their lives as a result of HIV/AIDS. For example, 'AT' told the female research officer that her 27-year-old son had died of HIV/AIDS. There are also people who are suspected of being HIV/AIDS patients.

185. In 2003 respondents in both Dinki and Turufe said that the first suspected AIDS-related death in the community was in 1999. By 2003 there were reports of increasing infections. In 2005 women in Korodegaga were told by wereda officials that four men from the community had positive HIV test results.

### Informal work skill learning

186. There was no disagreement between local customary and modern repertoires on the informal work skills which young people needed to learn. In customary repertoires household work was prioritised over education; the opposite was the case in local modern repertoires.

**Table 12: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: informal work skill learning in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	These are the most important livelihood skills learned while contributing to the household economy					
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	The learning and practising of farming and domestic skills should be fitted around attendance at school					
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	No recognition; in favour of full school day					
<b>Donor repertoire in the mid-2000s</b>	No recognition; in favour of full school day; against 'child labour' though not very loudly					

187. In the mid-2000s **women and girls** were the main household actors in the family domain, although young boys sometimes contributed reproductive labour and adult males built and maintained the houses, contributed material resources for reproduction, and participated in the raising of children. Young girls were being groomed to be wives and were expected to be qualified to run their own households by the time they had reached their mid-teens. Wives managed domestic

labour and were responsible for ensuring that the household had water and fuel and for grain grinding, shopping, baking, cooking, brewing, cleaning and maintaining the house inside, and managing domestic labour if there were daughters and/or housemaids. They may also have been involved in craft production, off-farm income activities, and agricultural work.

188. Those who were mothers were simultaneously responsible for becoming pregnant, carrying the pregnancy, giving birth, childcare and its management, and involved in the socialisation of their children, and the training of their daughters in home-making skills and management. They also had to manage the care of the sick, and of disabled and old dependents, who may not have lived in the household. Wives also had additional important roles in working with their husbands to cope with life's problems and providing hospitality, particular during ceremonies and feasts. They also participated in kin and neighbourhood networks and community organisations.

189. Daughters began to help mothers at the age of 5 or 6 and by the time they were 12 or so they may have been doing the bulk of the household's domestic work. Other skills to be acquired included agricultural work, crafts, and in some cases those related to local women's income-generating activities.

#### **Box 10: Domestic work and its management**

##### **From Turufe**

A successful farmer's wife respects what her husband says, is morally brave enough to withstand any life problems with her lovable husband, is satisfied with what they have rather than living a dreaming life, and volunteers to help out and do farm activities when she has time. She should be able to manage and handle the household and furniture, be good at receiving and accommodating guests, be able to make home made furniture such as sifet and fetal, and be good at home decorating and able to spin. She should be good at home economics and at managing and economising on consumption goods. Social skills most respected include engaging in off-farm activities to support the household economically, preparing for the ceremonies of death (including iddir), weddings, and the different feasts. The housewives' responsibility are evaluated by the community.

190. **Boys** in smallholder households began herding on the farm from an early age. As they grew up they 'learned by doing' working alongside their fathers at farm work and other male household work, gradually developing skills and taking on more responsibility. By the age of 14 or so they should be strong enough to plough. Boys in landless houses might have been sent to work as herders or agricultural servants where they also learned farming skills.

#### **Formal education**

191. Local customary and modern repertoires were similar in all sites except among the Argobba Muslims of Dinki who were hostile to modern education, particularly for girls, and supportive of religious education.


192. In the mid-2000s a major restructuring and expansion programme was implemented. The **education sector** was opened to private investment and a new three-tier system was introduced: eight years of primary education, followed by four years of secondary school and tertiary education. In 2005 several preuniversity colleges and various institutions operated by the government and the private sector offered vocational, technical and professional training in different parts of the country. The number of government universities, and private universities and vocational and technical schools increased tremendously in various parts of the country (CSA 2006: 17)

**Table 13: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: formal education in the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
Local customary mental models and institutions - Male	Formal education is not important	Formal education is not important Religious education is important	Formal education is not important	Formal education is not important	Argobba: Formal education disrupts local cultures. Boys should attend religious education Amhara: formal education is not important	Formal education is not important
Local customary mental models and institutions - Female					Argobba: females should not go to school Amhara: formal education is not important	
Local modern mental models and institutions	All children should be educated for as long as possible					
Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s	All children should complete primary school (Grade 8) which will equip those who live in rural communities to co-operate fully with local extension workers and contribute to Ethiopia's development. Those who qualify should go on to secondary school where the most successful will have the chance to proceed to university or technical and vocational education and training in preparation for employment that will also contribute to Ethiopia's development.					
Donor repertoire	All children should attend primary school					

193. Figure 19 shows the **education status of males** aged 10 to 29 in 2005. These data are quite hard to interpret but given that access to schooling rose as these boys grew up the pattern suggests that many schooling careers were irregular. For example, that 63% of the 10-14 cohort had experienced some education compared with 73% of the 15-19 cohort could be explained by the fact that some males delayed entering education until after 15.

**Figure 19: Male education attended or completed 2005 (%)**




194. Evidence from the DEEP sites confirms that schooling was regarded by many as an activity to be fitted around other important things in life, particularly work. For example a respondent from Korodegaga said:

'There is no fixed age at which pupils start their education. As generally they start formal education from the age of seven to forty / fifty years old. So they have different age groups in different classes.'


195. Figure 20 using DHS 2005 data shows a considerable general improvement in **female access** to education in the years leading up to 2005. In the cohort aged 25-29, which was born between 1976 and 1980 and would have been 10-14 in 1990, 68% had no experience of education compared with 41% of the cohort aged 10-14 in 2005.

**Figure 20: Female education attended or completed 2005 (%)**




196. Figure 21, which compares all male and female education experience by age cohort in 2005 shows a **decreasing gender gap**.

**Figure 21: Some education experience by gender and age cohort 2005 (%)**



197. There were considerable **regional differences** in both primary and secondary enrolment rates. A striking feature of Figure 22 is the extremely low gross primary enrolment rates in Somali and Afar. A second notable feature is the high attendance ratios reported from the other two 'emerging states' Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz.

**Figure 22: Regional differences in gross primary attendance ratios 2005 (%)**




198. By 2004 the government's expansion of educational opportunities had had an effect in all the **DEEP sites** although attendance in the remote sites was still low standing at around 40% for males and 20% for females (see Table 14). Korodegaga had a primary school Grades 1-4 and there was a junior school within walking distance for some at Sodere. Junior and high schools could be attended in Dera by renting a house. The nearest primary school to Dinki was a walk of around 30 minutes and provided Grades 1-3. Students could pursue education up to Grade 8 in the town of Aliyu Amba (around 9 km) but had to go Debre Birhan for high school (60 km). There was easy access to primary and secondary schools from Turufe. Yetmen had a junior school (Grades 1-8). For secondary education they went to town (Dejen or Bichena) which involved hiring accommodation.

**Table 14: Gendered education experiences reported in 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen
% boys under 20 attending school now	42%	43%	72%	51%
Average age of males in Grade 4	17	15	16	15
% girls under 20 attending school now	19%	20%	68%	52%
Average age of females in Grade 4	12	15	13	14


199. Given that many people of non-official school age were keen for an education the ages of those attending schools were widely dispersed. The average ages of the RANS sample of males in Grade 4 in mid-2004 were 17 in Dinki, 16 in Turufe Kecheme, and 15 in Korodegaga and Yetmen (see Table 15). This may partly be attributable to increased opportunities enabling older children to catch up, but may also relate to the need for child labour to support household livelihoods. In Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme there seemed to be no gender bias in early primary school attendance: in Yetmen school in 2005 there were more girls than boys in Grades 1-3 and no difference in numbers completing Grade 8. One explanation was that at least one son was required all day for herding while daughters could help before and after school.

**Table 15: Education in the DEEP sites in 2004**



200. In Dinki 64% of those aged 10-29 had had no experience of education in 2004 compared with 14% in the peri-urban site of Turufe.

**Figure 23: Regional differences in gross secondary attendance ratios 2005**



201. In 2004 only 32% of all rural households had a **secondary school** within 10 kms (WMS - DFID 2010 p40). For the whole of Ethiopia the rural male gross attendance ratio in 2005 was 20% which was double that of females at 10% (CSA 2006). In Figure 23 the **gender gap** in secondary attendance

was bigger in urban (Addis and Dire Dawa) than rural areas, though a higher proportion of urban girls were attending. Male attendance in Gambela was relatively high (52%) and while female attendance was higher than it was in Amhara, Oromia and SNNP it was less than half of that of males.

202. In all DEEP sites apart from Turufe children attending secondary school had to move to nearby towns. This was expensive and it was also difficult to control the behaviour of the young people.

### Box 11: Secondary education and beyond 2004

#### From Yetmen:

All boys should go to secondary school but they face problems which are lack of money for house rent or shortage of affordable rental houses, food shortage, food spoiling and the risk of STDs. Girls should also go to secondary schools and face the same problems plus the risk of unwanted pregnancy.

#### Korodegaga:

After completing primary school in the kebele, some parents do not volunteer to send their daughters to towns to continue their education. They believe they may establish special relationship with boys and give birth to illegal children which is not acceptable..

#### Turufe

A few rich households send their children to Addis to attend school. Some community members of Turufe send a child to Awassa to attend college education, covering the expense for college education, house rent and consumptions.

203. In the RANS sample across all the sites only two male residents had completed **higher education**: a teacher in Yetmen (aged 42) and a man from Turufe (aged 32) who had completed a non-university course. He was farming but also looking for a job. There was one 24 year-old woman in Turufe who had completed a non-university course.

204. There was no-one from the Dinki and Korodegaga samples in higher education in 2004. There were 15 higher education students from 11 Turufe households (2 from 4 households) and 4 from Yetmen. Five of 15 Turufe students were female while in Yetmen there were two of each sex.

205. **Religious schools** were found in all sites. There had been a flourishing of Islamic education in Korodegaga related to the recent building of three mosques with finance from Saudi Arabia. In Dinki there was a woman who taught the Koran to children; 11% of youth had attended religious school but not formal school. A few young men were being educated in *madradas* in Saudi Arabia. In Yetmen attendance at the local priest school had declined.

### ***Rural youth: work-related transitions in the mid-2000s***

#### **Three work-related transitions**

206. Youth in transition to adulthood in rural Ethiopia have three goals to achieve: a productive work strategy; a reproductive work career; and economic independence. For males the emphasis is on a productive work strategy, although they may also contribute to household reproduction through for example house-building and maintenance. Productive work strategies may include a mix of activities including migration. Social adulthood for females depends on a reproductive work career as a wife although many women also have part-time productive work strategies. Young women may achieve economic independence before marriage; sometimes this might involve migration. Young people may also be required to contribute work in and for the community. Also some have a strategy of mixing work with the pursuit of education.

207. This section describes work undertaken by youth under the headings: smallholder and other agriculture; domestic and other household reproductive work; non-farm local work; work in and for the community; and migration. The section concludes by summarising the various routes to

economic independence and the work strategies being pursued. It begins by describing local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies relating to work in the mid-2000s.

208. Young people had to make their work-related transitions in the livelihood contexts whose key features were summarised earlier. The Table is repeated here for ease of reference. In most respects agricultural production practices in the three drought-prone sites and Yetmen and Turufe were similar, the only difference being that the former required regular food aid to supplement what grain and other production there was which depended on levels of failure of annual rainfall. The staple crop in Girar was *enset* (false banana) which was grown in house gardens using hoe cultivation. Girar was self-sufficient as a result of the sale of coffee, chat and eucalyptus and high levels of urban migration.

**Table 16: Livelihood context of youth work-transitions**

	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Korodegaga
	<i>Integrated and self-sufficient communities</i>			<i>Remote and drought-prone sites</i>		
<b>Wereda</b>	Enemay	Shashemene	Cheha	Saeisa Ts/Emb	Ankober	Dodota
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Livelihood system</b>	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>tef &amp; wheat exported to Addis</b> ; maize; livestock; grain trade; some migration	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>potatoes &amp; grain exported to towns</b> . Off-farm activities; some commuting and migration	Rainfed mostly hoe agriculture: <b>enset</b> , coffee, chat, eucalyptus. <b>Urban migration &amp; linkages</b> .	<b>Drought-stricken</b> plough agriculture: livestock, bees; agriculture; cactus; stone masonry. Regular emergency <b>food aid</b> ; <b>PSNP</b> in 2005. Migration to Humera and towns.	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; seedling nursery; livestock. Regular <b>emergency food aid</b> . Some <b>migration</b> .	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; livestock. Regular emergency food aid; <b>PSNP</b> in 2006.

### Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies related to work-related transitions

209. Table 17 compares local and incoming repertoires. There was no evidence of incoming religious repertoires affecting livelihoods in the mid-2000s.

**Table 17: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: work-related transitions**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Men should farm producing traditional crops and livestock using the labour of wife/wives (except among the Argobba of Dinki) children and others in customary arrangements. Sons should become farmers and daughters farmers' wives. Sons should live near to parents. Other income-generating work can be fitted around the agricultural calendar. Economic relationships are based on social exchanges and inter-personal contracts. Labour should be provided by the household by members according to genderage, work groups or exchanges, or the employment of servants, and contracts should govern land/oxen/input/labour exchanges. Credit should be sought from kin and rich men. There is not a moral obligation to repay credit from government. Apart from government employment off-farm work is undesirable: a coping strategy for poor households or undertaken by excluded occupational 'castes'. Kebele leaders should help their families and kin to improve their livelihoods.					
<b>Customary religious models and institutions</b>	Both Orthodox Christian and Muslim religions have rules prohibiting people from working at certain times which are related to fasting/feasting rules. Farm outputs are in the hands of God. Religious leaders have an important role in praying for rain. Obligations related to funerals and other death ceremonies also affect work. If religious rules are broken God will punish the community by, for example, not sending rain.					

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	<p>Farmers should use modern inputs since fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds and credit increase local grain and potato yields and are worth the investment in the cash-crop sites. Irrigation using motor pumps to pump water from rivers, channels in hilly areas channels, or tap water, should be used to grow vegetables and fruit for sale, and grain for home consumption in drought-prone sites. Daily labour should be used for weeding and harvesting. Women should be involved in cash-producing activities, for example through rearing chickens. Credit should be sought from NGOs, government, and collective savings groups. Religious holidays should be reduced.</p> <p>Farm work and life is hard; viable non-farm activities in urban settings are desirable. For children education should take priority over farm and domestic work. Young women can put education and work before marriage. The goal of education is government employment or international migration although it is useful for other activities. Young men and women can earn money acting as brokers between farmers and larger-scale traders. One way to become rich is to become a large-scale trader. Young men and women can migrate to urban areas or even internationally for work and should not be expected to live near their parents, although they should support them with remittances.. Daughters sent to the Middle East as domestic servants should send remittances home to the family.</p>					
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	<p>Wereda level agricultural services and kebele level Development Assistants should introduce new technologies motivated by targets to be met. Women should be encouraged and assisted to develop their own farming activities.</p> <p>People should be mobilised for community work to improve infrastructure and rehabilitate the environment through 'campaigns'; these take priority over the other activities of community members. Labour markets are not necessarily to be encouraged since they are not under government control. A full land market is not currently an option. Land certification is seen as a compromise that can promote tenure security and investment. Output markets provide an opportunity for taxation but do not need government regulation.</p>					
	<p>Farmers in cashcrop sites using modern inputs are contributing to the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation Agenda.</p>			<p>Government should assist people in drought-prone sites by introducing water technologies by any means possible.</p>		
<b>Donor models</b>	<p>Donor policy and practice was focused at macro level with little attention to meso-level livelihoods. In the discourse there was an assumption that development was being held back by the absence of markets and the informality of activities. People would respond to the incentives offered by (competitive) markets and a programme of privatisation was being advocated although there was disagreement as to whether a full land market should be established.</p>					

## Smallholder and other agriculture in the mid-2000s

### *The complexity of smallholder farming*

210. While in most years smallholder farming in the drought-prone sites met with little success due to lack of rain, the farming systems in these three sites were similar to those in the two grain-producing rain-secure sites. In these sites smallholder farming required land, seasonally appropriate labour, two oxen, other livestock, farm implements and inputs, and markets for outputs. In two of the drought-prone sites irrigable land was a key resource In Girar the staple was enset cultivated using hoes rather than ploughs.

211. . Livestock played important roles in the economic activity of all the communities. Cattle herds generated oxen for ploughing, cows producing milk and butter, dung for manure (Girar) or fuel (Yetmen), meat, skins and hides, and cash. Goats and sheep could be eaten or sold and their wool used. Pack animals provided transport. Bees produced honey which could be used to make the local mead *tej*. Hybrid chickens which produce quantities of eggs for sale were been recently introduced to women in Korodegaga. Farming activities were affected by Government development services and mobilisations for collective work to support and improve the farming environment.

212. Farmers who could afford them combined modern technologies including fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds, irrigation pumps, and livestock vaccination with local knowledge. In each community successful farmers were recognised as being extremely skilful and knowledgeable.

### Youth access to land in the mid-2000s

213. Table 18 shows the **complexity of ideas and institutions** related to access to land in rural Ethiopia.

**Table 18: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: access to land**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Diverse customary practices in terms of which children inherited land varied across the sites - and were sometimes contradictory.					
	In the past the Amharic inheritance norm, which was not always practised, was equal shares between brothers	Oromo Arssi norms favoured primogeniture			<i>Amhara</i> : In the past the Amharic inheritance norm, which was not always practised, was equal shares between brothers	Oromo Arssi norms favoured primogeniture
<b>Incoming religions models and institutions</b>		<i>sharia</i> laws of inheritance			<i>Oromo</i> : <i>sharia</i> laws of inheritance	<i>Oromo</i> : <i>sharia</i> laws of inheritance
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions</b>	Land belongs to the state; Regional governments can formulate land policies in accordance with federal law. Farmers have use-rights and rights to pass land on to youth.					

214. In 2004 there had been **no official redistribution** in any of the sites except Yetmen. In 1997 there was a re-distribution during which holdings of Derg 'burocrat' farmers were reduced. In 2004 land of heads with no dependents was distributed to 60 young men and women who were children of the burocrats who had lost land in 1997.

215. There was an unofficial redistribution in Turufe Kecheme in 1991 when the Derg regime fell and most Kembata were violently expelled. In Dinki the last official redistribution was in 1987 and in Korodegaga there has been no official redistribution since the original allocation in 1975. Over the years since 1975 informal use-rights solidified. In 2004/5 land measurement took place in all the sites. This was associated with changes in land taxation to introduce a graduated system; farmers were also promised land certificates.

216. By the mid-2000s it seemed that families had **rights in land** with parents able to allocate parcels of their land to children before their deaths. Widows and divorcees had formal legal rights to the ex-husband's land and these were being exercised to an extent. There was no official land market but local institutions had evolved to match supply and demand including sharecropping, renting and leasing land. There was occasional illegal land-selling involving the bribing of *kebele* leaders.

**Table 19: Youth household head land access in the DEEP sites in 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen
	Mean no of hectares (those with land access)			
All household heads	1.2	2.3	0.9	1.6
Household heads aged 20-29 (includes a few female heads)	1.0	1.5	0.7	1.4
	% landless household heads			
All household heads	8.9	2.0	13.5	2.0
All young men aged 20-29	55.8	56.8	77.4	73.1

217. Table 19 compares access to land (including ownership, renting and/or share-cropping) of household heads aged less than 30 with that of all household heads. In Korodegaga sites the size of land used by youth was around two-thirds that of all household heads; in the other three it was a bit smaller. It is likely that there were more **landless households**, many headed by young men, which did not appear on official lists from which the samples were drawn. On the other hand the survey did not cover those who were not household heads so any young men living at home but share-cropping or renting in land were not included.

218. There were no household heads in the remote sites who did not have access to land and only 5% in Turufe and 11% in Yetmen. However, considering all males aged 20 to 29, roughly 56% did not have access to any land in the remote sites and around three-quarters in the integrated sites. Even in the remote sites respondents said that the **land problem was leading to delays in marriage** and diminishing the role which young men could play in community development (Box 12).

### Box 12: Consequences of land shortage for young men and their potential brides 2005

#### From Dinki:

There is a lag in the household development cycle because many boys have not yet married due to the problems of land.

#### From Korodegaga:

Land is owned by the state with peasant households being given use rights. Land has not been redistributed in Korodegaga since the first allocation in 1975 creating a class of landless young men dependent on their parents (*jirata*).

The age for marriage starts from 15 to the female and 18 to the male. In recent times, due to the scarcity of resource it exceeds to 20-25 for many in the community.

There are many landless young men in the kebele. Though they are members of the Korodegaga community, they are not considered to be members of the Korodegaga *kebele* administration. This is because they have no land, and do not pay land tax to the government. To be a member of the *kebele* administration requires a person to have land. Thus, most of these members of the community aspire to the redistribution of farmlands. They believe that getting farmland may help them not only to ensure *kebele* membership but also to play significant roles in the developmental activities of the people

219. Table 20 shows a considerable differences in **how young male household heads accessed land**. Around half in the Oromia sites 'owned' all of it while this was the case for 32% in Dinki and only 16% in Yetmen. In the Amhara sites there were higher proportions who owned some and share-cropped or rented some in. The proportions of those using land with some land owned were around 80% in Dinki, Korodegaga and Turufe and 60% in Yetmen where 36% sharecropped or rented in other people's land but had none of their own. Not all young men used the land themselves. In Korodegaga 10% rented or share-cropped out their land while in Turufe the proportion was 21%.

**Table 20: Use of land by male youth household heads with land 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen
Owens and uses	0.32	0.51	0.47	0.16
Owens some & sharecrops and/or rents some	0.42	0.29	0.29	0.44
<i>Some land owned</i>	<i>0.78</i>	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.76</i>	<i>0.60</i>
Sharecrops or rents only	0.21	0.10	0.03	0.36
Sharecrops out	0.05	0.06	0.13	0.04
Rents out	0	0.04	0.08	0
Total	1	1	1	1

**Table 21: Youth female-headed households in Yetmen**

Age	Land	Marital status	No of children	Economic activity	Wealth
19	1 ha	Divorced	0	Domestic work	Upper middle
25	0.38	Widowed	1	Small trader	Poor
23	0.25	Divorced	0	Selling dungcakes	Poor
25	1.5	Divorced	2	Selling dungcakes	Lower middle
25	0.5	Divorced	2	Small trader	Upper middle
26	0.5	Divorcee remarried to a priest in prison	2	Small trader	Lower middle

220. There were 13 **female heads of households** aged between 19 and 27; eleven of them owned some land which they share-cropped out. All but one 19-year old were in their 20s. There were two with land and two without in Dinki, two with land in Korodegaga, and one with land in Turufe. Six of them lived in Yetmen; they all had land which they share-cropped out (see Table 21).

221. In the **relation between landowner and sharecropper or renter** the powerful partner in terms of the division of the crop was the latter who brought the scarce resource of oxen and often provided seeds, fertiliser and pesticides as well. This often worked against the interest of women-headed households. However, in conflicts related to land registration over who owned the land, the original holder or the farmer who had been sharecropping or renting it for some years, there were reports that social courts ruled in favour of the (weaker) landholder.

222. **Re-settlement** to Humera was offered as an option to people from the **Geblen's** wereda between 2003 and 2005. After this the programme was stopped as the land had become over-exploited. Geblen was allocated a quota of 100 households but only 9 households registered and only 3 of these went. They did well but still came back for half the year and kept their land in Geblen so their land had not been re-distributed. Very few people from **Dinki** and **Korodegaga** went for re-settlement.

### ***Smallholder farming***

223. Farming, including on own farm and for others, was the **main activity** of 55-60% of all **male youth** 10-29 in the remote sites but only 27-30% in the integrated sites.

**Table 22: Male youth involved in farming: main activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All male youth
Dinki	42%	49%	90%	79%	60%
Korodegaga	43%	42%	63%	88%	55%
Turufe	11%	16%	34%	60%	27%
Yetmen	24%	18%	39%	57%	30%

224. Within cohorts the difference was greatest in the 20-24 cohort: Dinki 90% compared with Turufe 34%. In the oldest cohort the difference was narrower: Korodegaga 88% compared with Yetmen 57%.

**Table 23: Male youth involved in farming: second activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All male youth
Dinki	49%	34%	14%	14%	32%
Korodegaga	49%	64%	34%	16%	44%
Turufe	61%	60%	53%	24%	52%
Yetmen	20%	26%	18%	16%	21%

225. Household heads were asked about the **second activity** members undertook in the last month. It is not possible to add the figures since some youths did two farming activities and across all sites and age cohorts 41% only did one activity. The figures suggest that for teenage youth in Turufe farming was more likely to be a secondary activity (61%).

**Table 24: Female youth involved in farming: main activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All female youth
Dinki	30%	5%	0%	3%	11%
Korodegaga	15%	1%	4%	2%	6%
Turufe	2%	1%	5%	0	2%
Yetmen	4%	2%	0	0	2%

226. More **female youth** had farming as their **main activity** in the last month in the remote sites than the integrated where the figure was only 2% compared with 11% in Dinki and 6% in Korodegaga. In all sites but Turufe most of the farming young females were engaged in herding. Except in Turufe higher proportions of the 10-14 youth cohort were involved in farming.

**Table 25: Female youth involved in farming: second activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All female youth
Dinki	13%	5%	0	0	5%
Korodegaga	12%	31%	38%	54%	32%
Turufe	16%	14%	11%	12%	14%
Yetmen	6%	2%	0	0	3%

227. Farming as a second activity was more common in the Oromia sites Korodegaga (32%) and Turufe (14%) than in the Amhara sites. No females in their twenties in Yetmen did any farming at all.

### ***Agricultural labour***

228. There were considerable status differences between smallholder farmers and full-time employed agricultural labourers and herders. There were **a number of arrangements** for employing farming servants

#### **Box 13: Types of agricultural servant contracts 2005**

##### **From Yetmen:**

There are a number of arrangements:

- Farm servant works for a predetermined wage + board and lodging
- Servant takes one quarter of yield + board and lodging
- Wage labourer or married son takes one-third of harvest

Some households together hire a herdsman at the cost of 20 *birr* per household plus meals.

229. There were 47 male **servants** in the RANS sample 33 of them between the ages of 10 and 29.

**Table 26: Male youth employed as servants 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen
Farming	3	8	11	0
Herding	0	7	1	3
Also attending school		2		

230. There were complaints from some agricultural labourers and employed herders of bad treatment by employers, although there were also good employers.

#### **Box 14: Servants: exploitation and support from employers 2005**

##### **From Dinki:**

He revealed that his early appearances as a servant in individual household, taught him that most employers (masters) would try to cheat their workers, or even they could fire them with out any compensation. He believed his last migration experience was the best as he was able to make good bargains with his master and obtained the fruits of his labour. And he considered all others experiences as bad in terms of obtaining a fair wage for his labour.

##### **From Turufe:**

For instance an individual from Gojjam had worked for 10 years in the same household and saved 8000 birr, when he left Turufe 4 years before. The employers gave him 1 Timad of land for his benefit, in addition to the salary and allowed him to work as a share cropper with other farmers.

There were also some who were forced out by the employer without collecting their salary.

231. Richer farmers also employed **daily labourers** for particular seasonal tasks. This was common in Turufe and on the irrigated farms in Korodegaga. Daily labour was a relatively low status activity usually performed by community members who were landless and/or had very small landholdings, although it was relatively acceptable in Korodegaga as a part-time activity among young people and women in search of cash. In Turufe ploughing at piece rates (using their own oxen) was acceptable while ploughing at a daily rate would make 'them inferior to others'.

### Box 15: Agricultural employment 2005

#### From Yetmen:

There is a shortage of labour for harvesting in January and February, and for ploughing in July. There are migrant workers coming from neighbouring *kebele* to perform these activities (except ploughing). People in Yetmen also migrate to the neighbouring *kebele* for wage labour. Labour is hired for herding, ploughing, harvesting and building

#### From Turufe:

For employees that come from outside the *kebele*, employers provide 180 or 200 *birr* annually if they are given shelter and food, but 5 *birr* per day if they do not demand shelter and food. For seasonal migrants harvesting one *timad* of farmland, the employers pay 35 *birr* if they do not demand shelter but 30 *birr* if they do. If it is weeding and digging during cultivation they are paid from 25 to 30 *birr* if there are few weeds and from 30 to 40 *birr* if the weeds are thick. One person can finish weeding one *timad* of farmland in two and half days and the maximum period it takes is three to four days for one person. The payment for weeding decreases if the labourer demands shelter from the employer. No one in the *kebele* wants to work ploughing at a daily rate since this will make them inferior to others. *Kebele* residents will plough for piece rates. In this case they must bring their own oxen which few can afford. There are a few poorer households in the *kebele* who work weeding, collecting potatoes and harvesting at a daily rate.

Wage labour is practised on individual farms. Most households employ weeders and harvesters. The wage labourers come from inside or outside the *kebele*. Those from inside the *kebele* are landless or peasants who only have small pieces of land. Migrant labourers usually come from Wolayta though there are also individuals from Wello, Gonder, Gojjam in Amhara and other Oromo groups from Kofele and Shewa who are working as wage labourers. However, these others did not come specifically to be wage labourers as the Wolayta did. Previously the Kembata used to come for wage labour but since many Kembata were expelled following the fall of the Derg they no longer do so.

#### From Korodegaga:

The majority of the daily labourers are young boys and girls followed by destitute and female-headed households. Since cash crop vegetables are grown in lines of 5m long by 15cm wide, labourers are paid from 0.10-0.15 *birr* per row. They can get from 8-10 *birr* per day. Active and strong daily labourers can get up to 120 *birr* monthly. Our poor diary respondent said that he and his wife can get 10 *birr* each per day. Most of the native daily labourers are from the nearby villages of Sefara, Buko, Olati and Shelota. Distance and high temperature hinder women and children from coming to the irrigation scheme.

### Home-related work

Women in rural Ethiopia had important and time-consuming home management, domestic, child production, childcare, child socialising and training, other care, and hospitality responsibilities (Table 27) which were not recognised in Government and donor ideologies.

**Table 27: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: home-related work transitions**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	<p>Wives should managed domestic labour and take responsibility for ensuring that the household has water and fuel and for grain grinding, shopping, baking, cooking, brewing, cleaning and maintaining the house, and managing domestic labour if there are daughters and/or housemaids. They should also provide hospitality during ceremonies, feasts and for work groups.</p> <p>At the same time women should give birth regularly. They should become pregnant, carry the pregnancy, give birth, look after and socialise children, and train their daughters in housework skills and management. They must also manage the care of the sick, and of disabled and old dependents, who may not live in the household.</p> <p>Men should build and maintain houses, contribute material resources for reproduction and participate in the raising of children.</p>					

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Women should be responsible for home management, domestic work, etc. Men and boys can help with some tasks.					
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	'Gender' agenda more abstract.					
<b>Donor models</b>	'Gender' agenda more abstract, Drinking water interventions.					

232. The ideal wife in Turufe is described in Box 16.

### Box 16: Domestic work and its management

#### From Turufe Kecheme:

A successful farmer's wife respects what her husband says, is morally brave enough to withstand any life problems with her lovable husband, is satisfied with what they have rather than living a dreaming life, and volunteers to help out and do farm activities when she has time. She should be able to manage and handle the household and furniture, be good at receiving and accommodating guests, be able to make home made furniture such as *sifet* and *fetil*, and be good at home decorating and able to spin. She should be good at home economics and at managing and economising on consumption goods. Social skills most respected include engaging in off-farm activities to support the household economically, preparing for the ceremonies of death (including *iddir*), weddings, and the different feasts. The housewives' responsibility are evaluated by the community..


233. Daughters began to help mothers at the age of 5 or 6 and by the time they were 12 or so may have been doing the bulk of the household's domestic work. Wives also had additional important roles in working with their husbands to cope with life's problems and providing hospitality, particular during ceremonies and feasts.

234. For two-thirds of female youth in the remote sites the **main activity** in the month before the survey had been home-related work; this compared with 37/38% for the integrated sites. In Dinki the proportion for the 10-14 year old group was much lower than for the other three cohorts. In Korodegaga.

**Table 28: Female youth involved in home-related work: main activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All female youth
Dinki	28%	86%	89%	83%	67%
Korodegaga	40%	60%	86%	94%	67%
Turufe	8%	20%	56%	81%	37%
Yetmen	19%	37%	58%	57%	38%

**Figure 24: Female youth involved in home-related work: main activity previous month**



235. For young females in the integrated sites home-related work was more likely to be their second activity.

**Table 29: Female youth involved in home-related work: second activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All female youth
Dinki	63%	64%	74%	74%	69%
Korodegaga	62%	42%	40%	32%	45%
Turufe	77%	71%	56%	63%	67%
Yetmen	55%	71%	67%	74%	64%
No second activity	23%	18%	21%	14%	20%

236. There was also involvement by young males in home-related work. The survey in Yetmen was conducted at the time of the year when house-building was done and a few were involved in this. Most had a main activity of fetching wood or water while a few others processed food and did other domestic work including childcare.

**Table 30: Male youth involved in home-related work: main activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All male youth
Dinki	0	0	0	0	0
Korodegaga	3%	1%	0	0	1%
Turufe	3%	3%	1%	0	2%
Yetmen	6%	5%	4%	5%	5%

237. Considerably higher proportions of young male teenagers contributed home-related work as a secondary activity though in Korodegaga the contribution of older teenagers was approaching that of men in their twenties which was zero. There is an interesting question as to whether these

generational differences represent a reduction in gender stereo-typing or whether it is the result of an age-effect. The fact that only in the integrated sites did (a few) men in their late twenties provide some home-related work maybe suggests a little change at work.

**Table 31: Male youth involved in home-related work: second activity previous month**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All male youth
Dinki	29%	17%	17%	0	19%
Korodegaga	18%	2%	0	0	6%
Turufe	28%	20%	11%	4%	17%
Yetmen	21%	12%	7%	0	12%
No second activity	29%	35%	51%	61%	41%

## Non-farm local work

### *Own account non-farm activities*

238. The opportunities for **non-farm own-account** activities in or near the sites included:

- **Fuel** - collecting firewood and making dungcakes and taking to town to sell (usually done by females); firewood sale was a coping strategy for poor people and during drought in Korodegaga; dungcakes sold in Yetmen.
- **Manufacture** – blacksmithing and weaving (males) and spinning and alcoholic drinks (females); weaving and spinning common among the Argobba of Dinki
- **Services** (mostly in the integrated sites) petty trading from home (females), shop-keeping and petty trade in town (males and females), selling alcoholic drinks in town often associated with prostitution, cash-crop trading to Addis Ababa and other large towns (males) and brokering between farmers and larger traders (males in Turufe Kecheme, males and females in Yetmen).
- **Business** - 'Investing in anything thought to be profitable' (a few males in Turufe Kecheme)
- **Begging** (particularly in Yetmen)

239. In the mid-2000s most off-farm own account activities were coping strategies or small- cash-raisers conducted in the '**informal sector**'. For most households they were supplementary to farming livelihoods although for some, mostly female-headed, they were their main means of livelihood. In Korodegaga during droughts the collection and selling firewood was widespread.

240. Table 32 shows how relatively few young people were involved in own-account activities in the mid-2000s. In all sites female youth were marginally more likely to have been so as both main and second activities. In Yetmen 11% of female youth were engaged in own-account business: 7% in trade, 3% in making and selling dungcakes, 1% elsewhere.

**Table 32: Young males and females engaged in own-account non-farm activities in the DEEP sites 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen	All sites
<b>MALES</b>					
Main activity	1%	1%	4%	5%	3%
Second activity	0	1%	2%	2%	2%
<b>FEMALES</b>					
Main activity	6%	1%	2%	11%	4%
Second activity	11%	5%	3%	3%	3%

### **Non-farm employment**

241. The incidence of **non-farm employment** was so low in the sites that we did not get much information. Males in the integrated sites, particularly Turufe, which is within commuting distance of a relatively large town, had opportunities for manual work, either unskilled (e.g. loading, taxi attenders) or skilled (e.g. carpenters, plumbers, mechanics). A few had jobs in the service industry or were employed by government or NGOs. In the mid-200s *kebele* leaders were paid part-time.

242. Proportions of young males in non-farm employment were the same as in own-account business but those of young females were lower

**Table 33: Young males and females in non-farm employment in the DEEP sites 2004**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen	All sites
<b>MALES</b>					
Main activity	0	2%	6%	5%	3%
Second activity	1%	1%	2%	5%	2%
<b>FEMALES</b>					
Main activity	0	0.4%	3%	0.4%	2%
Second activity	0	0.4%	1%	0.4%	2%

243. **Formal employment** with government was a high-status activity and one of the main goals of education for males and females; the small number from the integrated sites who had achieved it had moved out of the communities.

#### **Box 17: Education and employment in the integrated site 2005**

##### **From Yetmen:**

Out of 27 high school graduates (15 females and 12 males) only 1 was employed in a govt organisation while 2 were farming. 4 people graduated from universities and colleges – 3 were govt employees and the other was employed as a grain trader under his father. 4 males and 1 female graduated as teachers – 3 employed but one died. 4 in higher education in Ethiopian universities and a European institute. 'It was reported that it had become common for students of the *kebele* to become school drop-outs because many graduates were unemployed

##### **From Turufe:**

More than 15 youngsters had gone to different places in Oromia as employees of government institutions.

In 2005 most unemployed school leavers are dependent on families, some are married and have got land from their family but, according to the local people, they are not hard workers, they waste their money by chewing *chat* and drinking local drinks. Some do not plough their land, instead they give it for sharecropping and they like wandering around the village and recreation in Kuyera. At the time when most farmers sell potatoes (in August) they work as brokers and get commissions.

244. There were presumably rules governing access to jobs in the formal sector but with so few involved we had no information about them nor how people got access to skilled jobs. Much recruitment for work in Shashemene was done by *delala* (brokers). Networks of relatives and friends were also likely to be important. Where no institutions have developed to govern how work is allocated there may be **conflicts** For example, in Korodegaga there were fights between young men from different villages over who should load the lorries with vegetables from the irrigation farms.

### **Work in and for the community**

#### **Community work**

245. People also invested time in building and maintaining their 'social resources': interacting with relatives, friends and neighbours and participating in organisations such as burial societies, and religious ceremonies, for mutual support in times of difficulty and enjoyment and self-fulfilment. Household members also had to respond to demands from the government for community work.

Before the 2005 elections fines and threats were used in all sites to get people to participate in community work.

### Box 18: Community work in the mid-2000s

#### From Dinki:

There are some activities in the construction of village to village road, stream development activities, ditch preparation for storing rain water. There is food for work involving road construction, making terrace, fencing the Muslim graveyard etc.

November 2004 : *Kebele* leaders ordered people to participate in road maintenance campaign. December 2004. People participated in road maintaining work campaign terracing and contributed wood for school construction. *Dinki Community Diary*

**From Korodegaga:** There were campaigns every Sunday against the partinium weed in September and October. Community work was also used for digging and clearing canals, improving the road, fencing, building the school toilet and mending the boat.

Elders are involved not only in mobilisation but also participate personally in community development programmes. The most notable community works in the past three years include: water harvesting which was part of the FFW, environmental rehabilitation such as terracing and reforestation, campaign against unwanted weeds like partinium weed, roads works and digging irrigation canals. During most of the year, people participated in these works once a week on Sunday. All individuals over the age of 18 should take part in the programme. In the case of FFW/safety net programme, however, any individual who can work may participate in the programme. Thus, even children as young as 12 are involved in it. But very old people as well as physically handicapped are exempted from community works; they are also not forced to participate in meetings.

#### From Yetmen:

As far as campaign work was concerned, the road to Zebch was maintained, terraces were built near the church where flood eroded the soil very much, and the compound of the police station was maintained. These things were done by coordinating each *Mengistawi Budin* whose representatives have the obligation to check who was present and who was not.

### Food-for-work

246. We do not have quantitative data on youth participation in food-for-work programmes which, before the introduction of the PSNP in Geblen (2005) and Korodegaga (2006), was provided on an 'emergency' basis. There was an NGO programme in Geblen which started in January 2003 and employed 45 people for 6 hours a day to dig a water reservoir. Table 34 describes features of the programmes in place in Dinki and Korodegaga before 2003.

**Table 34: Reports on the food-for-work programmes in place before 2003**

	FFW Programme?	Benefits	Negative aspects	Fair?
Dinki	Every week two times, in the morning, from 7.00 to 10.00. People involve in terrace, road, ditch construction to protect the soil or the crop from erosion Road construction	People involve in the community's development activities. The distribution is not free of charge therefore it gives a sort of confidence because people render their labour services.	People work 8 times in every month but they get only 12 kilos if they have no other household members. Besides, they give up their work to cover the times so as to get food aid. People forced to give up to participate on their tasks whenever there is community development work.	No, I have mentioned the reasons above. Yes, because the work is for the community.
Koro-degaga	In 1977 when UNICEF organised the people to engage in 'food for work' programme. They used to get 35 -60 birr according to the number of family members. From UNICEF to the regional RRC in 1981 - in building the irrigation canal up to 1984 E.C. Starting from 1991 up to now we are working on eradicating the partinium weed. The coordinator is the DA. Mostly we pull out the weeds which have covered the community. We make terracing, we maintain roads.	The people will develop the attitude of working for a better life. Work before food type attitude will develop. The positive aspect of this is that the people think that whatever they get as food is the outcome of their labour. This positive aspect is for the whole community.	Some people hate the work. They want to collect the food without any labour. These lazy peasants don't come to work with different excuses. They simply seek that their quota of food comes every month There is no negative aspect of 'food for work'	No, some people don't appear for work. The duration for the work is very small. Those absents should not have their food aid. But they get their quota every month. No, those who are absent from work with lame excuses get the food aid because the <i>Kebele</i> are not firm on this.

## Migration for work

### *Outward migration for work*

247. There were two main kinds of outward migration for work in the mid-2000s: poorer people with no local prospects migrating seasonally or permanently and people with higher levels of education looking for formal employment. The second group were to be found in the integrated sites.

248. **Remote sites:** Outward migration for work was reportedly rare in Dinki. There were cases of poorer people migrating permanently to work as housekeepers, barmaids, and manual workers in nearby towns and Nazret and Addis Ababa. Those who worked outside the community as daily labourers on other people's farms did not need to stay away for more than a few days. Argobba weavers sometimes migrated to work seasonally where prices were good and some stayed permanently. A few individuals from Korodegaga migrated to nearby rural areas for seasonal manual work, farm work and domestic work and there were a few longer-term migrants to towns who had returned. Distress migration was practised at times of bad harvest though this had reduced due to opportunities for daily labour on irrigation farms. There is a tradition of military service in Korodegaga and a number fought in the war against Eritrea.

249. **Integrated sites:** There was not a huge amount of migration from Turufe. Some youth went to Kuyera, Negele, Shashemene, Jimma, Bale, Bekoji and Addis Ababa for shorter and longer periods of time. From Yetmen migration was increasing due to land shortage. Young males migrated to plantations in the south for 3-6 months or for longer periods to work as daily labour or guards. Young men and women migrated to Addis Ababa and other major towns.

#### **Box 19: Female out-migration from Yetmen 2005**

##### **From Yetmen:**

The rate of migration has increased over the past five years. Every young female's dream is go to urban places and live there working different things that are not related with agriculture. The reason for increase of rate of migration is that the production many people get from their land is not enough to full fill the household members need other than food, this time household members like to migrate into urban areas even the household heads support this idea. The advantage of migration to individuals is many if they get the chance of getting good job. Those who have been working in urban areas have better clothing, they are good looking physically, they have modern thinking and good understanding for people.

250. Women worked as servants in hotels or houses or in petty trade and men as daily labourers. There were also examples of a few successful people with their own businesses. Poor women usually migrated to the nearby towns of Bichena or Dejen and in rare cases to Addis Ababa to make and sell local drinks by renting a house. While a few had reportedly made a good living most were not successful as they worked as prostitutes and contracted HIV.

### *Inward migration for work*

251. In all sites there was inward migration for daily labour. For example, in Turufe Kecheme in November and December poor people come from a nearby area for harvesting work, and in April and June people come from Wolayita for potato hoeing. There was also some urban in-migration in Yetmen town. There were three types of migration for work into Korodegaga: kin of residents who eventually became permanent settlers; herders and agricultural labourers; and Amharas who came for seasonal work on the irrigated land of the inward investors.

## Work-related youth transitions in the mid-2000s: a summary

### *Comparison across the sites*

252. Table 35 summarises the work opportunities described above and assesses their potential

contribution to the important male youth transitions of economic independence and long-term work careers. In the mid-2000s in Yetmen the only reliable route to locally-based economic independence and a long-term career was smallholder farming. There were some long-term urban-style opportunities in Turufe. In Girar farming could be combined with urban migration.

**Table 35: Work opportunities and transitions: male youth in the integrated sites in the mid-2000s**

Type of activity	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Economic independence?	Long-term career?
<b>Smallholder farming</b>	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented land and raising livestock though few young men had their own land and share-cropping and renting in land requires access to two oxen.	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented land and raising livestock though few young men had their own land and share-cropping and renting in land requires access to two oxen.	Farming parental/own land and raising livestock – enset plus coffee, chat, bananas, oranges for sale	yes	farmer
<b>Home-related work</b>					
<b>Agricultural labour</b>	Daily agricultural labour	Daily agricultural labour		insecure	not in most cases
	Being a servant – herding / agriculture – could start very young	Being a servant – herding / agriculture – could start very young		no for herders–contributing to parental household's income agricultural servants – could save if employer trustworthy	could be - skills learned and savings
<b>Fuel</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Manufacture</b>		Some weavers	Some weavers	usually supplementary to farming	could be
<b>Services</b>	Seasonal grain trade – bringing grain from rural areas to Yetmen town – donkey needed	Seasonal grain and potato broking Working in one of the few small shops Driving a donkey and cart	Trade	crop trade – seasonal income shops – could be transport - usually supplementary to farming	given opportunities to scale-up
<b>Business with employees</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Non-farm employment</b>	Manual labour in (very small) town – restricted opportunities	Commuting to relatively large town (Shashemene) for unskilled work (loading, taxi attenders) and skilled work (carpentry, plumbing, mechanics)	Carpentry Manual or service labour in nearby small town	possibly	possibly
<b>Food-for-work</b>	NONE	NONE	NONE	NA	NA
<b>Migration</b>	Seasonal migration for agriculture A little urban migration – manual work, business, formal employment	A little migration: rural and urban; shorter and longer term	Urban migration – shoe-shining, street-selling, working for relatives with established businesses – often from the age of 10	sometimes sporadic economic independence; may contribute to household income	yes for Gurage yes for a few Yetmen and Turufe urban migrants

253. Table 36 sets out work opportunities for males in remote drought-prone sites. Again the only long-term career on offer was farming but in these sites it did not provide economic independence as evidenced by the presence of emergency food-for-work activities.

**Table 36: Work opportunities and transitions: male youth in the remote sites in the mid-2000s**

Type of activity	Korodegaga	Geblen	Dinki	Economic independence?	Long-term career?
<b>Smallholder farming</b>	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented rainfed or irrigated land and raising livestock though few young men had their own land and share-cropping and renting in land requires access to two oxen.	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented land and raising livestock though few young men had their own land and share-cropping and renting in land requires access to two oxen. Frequent droughts.	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented rainfed or irrigated land and raising livestock though few young men had their own land and share-cropping and renting in land requires access to two oxen. Rainfed agriculture frequently affected by drought.	only potentially for those with irrigation	yes
<b>Home-related work</b>					
<b>Agricultural labour</b>	Daily agricultural labour on irrigated land		Daily agricultural labour on irrigated land including seedling production	insecure	not in most cases
	Being a servant – herding / agriculture – could start very young		Being a servant – herding / agriculture – could start very young	no for herders–contributing to parental household's income agricultural servants – could save if employer trustworthy	could be - skills learned and savings
<b>Fuel</b>	Fuelwood selling – though mostly females			usually supplementary to farming	no
<b>Manufacture</b>		Handicrafts – wooden tubs, grinding stones etc Masonry	Weaving (Argobba) Blacksmithing – a few	usually supplementary to farming	could be
<b>Services</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Business with employees</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Non-farm employment</b>	1 life-guard employed at Sodere swimming pool		1 farmer part-time employed to run seedling nursery	NA	NA
<b>Food-for-work</b>	Emergency food-for-work	Emergency food-for-work	Emergency food-for work	coping strategy	no
<b>Migration</b>	A little migration for seasonal agricultural and manual work Military service	Migration for seasonal or casual wage employment or trading	A little migration for seasonal agricultural and manual work	not in the community for long-term migrants others –sporadic	middle-term career for soldiers

254. Female youth in the integrated sites could make long-term careers out of domestic work if married or working as a dependent or servant in another household. Women heading households with land could get some income by share-cropping or renting it out. Women heading households

could make an income-earning career out of making and selling local drinks, handicrafts, pottery or dungcakes depending on the local economy. Long-term urban migration was also an option.

**Table 37: Work opportunities for female youth in the integrated sites in 2005**

Type of activity	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Economic independence?	Long-term career?
<b>Home-related work</b>	Domestic work in parental or own household	Domestic work in parental or own household	Domestic work in parental or own household	from parental household if married	yes
<b>Smallholder farming</b>	Female activities on parental or own farm	Female activities on parental or own farm	Female activities on parental or own farm	from parental household if married; to a degree from husband if own production if female head	yes
<b>Agricultural labour</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Fuel</b>	Making and selling dungcakes for fuel – poor women	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	yes for some poor women heading households	yes
<b>Manufacture</b>	Making and selling local drinks	Spinning Making and selling local drinks and baskets	Spinning Making and selling local drinks, handicrafts and pottery	yes for some women heading households some if wife of farmer	yes
<b>Services</b>	Petty trade Seasonal grain trade Working in tea and tella houses in Yetmen town; possible prostitution	Petty trade Traditional hairdressing Working in one of the few small shops	Petty trade	part-time work – reduced dependence work in Yetmen town – yes	part-time – not alone town work – yes
<b>Business with employees</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Non-farm employment</b>	NONE in sample	Domestic servant	NONE in sample	depends on employer	probably not
<b>Food-for-work</b>	NONE	NONE	NONE	NA	NA
<b>Migration</b>	A little urban migration –domestic/hotel servants and petty trade; bar work	A little urban migration	Urban migration for domestic work – often as a young child	not in the community	maybe

255. Work career options for women in the remote sites were similar to those in the integrated sites except that there were fewer choices of off-farm income-earning activity. In Korodegaga the main activities were firewood sale or agricultural daily labour. Amhara women in Dinki could do daily labour on irrigation farms or in the nursery or brew local drinks. Argobba women could spin.

**Table 38: Work opportunities and transitions: female youth in the remote sites in the mid-2000s**

Type of activity	Korodegaga	Geblen	Dinki Amhara	Dinki Argobba	Economic independence?	Long-term career?
<b>Home-related work</b>	Domestic work in parental or own household	from parental household if married	yes			
<b>Smallholder farming</b>	Female activities on parental or own farm	Female activities on parental or	Female activities on parental or		from parental household if married;	yes

Type of activity	Korodegaga	Geblen	Dinki Amhara	Dinki Argobba	Economic independence?	Long-term career?
	Some micro-credit for women from NGO	own farm	own farm		To a degree from husband if own production	
<b>Agricultural labour</b>	Some daily labour on irrigation farms		Some daily labour on irrigation farms		coping strategy or small-cash-earner	not alone
<b>Fuel</b>	Selling firewood in nearby towns (very important during droughts)				coping strategy or small-cash-earner	not
<b>Manufacture</b>			Brewing	Spinning; weaving (1 woman)	coping strategy or small-cash-earner	not alone
<b>Services</b>	Petty trading from home: coffee, cigarettes etc; buying onions and tomatoes and selling in town	Traditional hair-dressing	Petty trade		coping strategy or small-cash-earner	not alone
<b>Business with employees</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Non-farm employment</b>	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NONE in sample	NA	NA
<b>Food-for-work</b>	Emergency food-for-work	Emergency food-for-work	Emergency food-for-work		coping strategy	no
<b>Migration</b>	A little urban migration for domestic and bar work	Urban migration for domestic and bar work	A little urban migration for domestic and bar work		Not in the community	potentially

### ***Rural youth: family-related transitions in the mid-2000s***

256. The transition of both young males and females to their marital household involves an exit from another household which may or may not be a standard parental household. This section first describes the different types of household found in the DEEP sites in 2004 and the distribution of young people among them. Next is a section on living in and leaving the parental household covering inter-generational relations, female-headed households, step-families, sibling relationships and modes of exit from the parental household. The next four sections explore the data on getting married, having children, setting up an independent household and the collapse of marriages involving young men and women as a result of death or divorce.

### **Ideal household structures**

257. Box 20 describes ideal household structures in the homogenous Amhara site which were not dissimilar from those in the mixed Oromo site (Box 21).

### Box 20: Household structures among the Amhara

#### From Yetmen:

The basic unit of Amhara social life is the household (*beteseb*). The term *beteseb* also stands for family. A family consists of parents, children, and others such as adopted children who reside in the house and ex-members who are no longer resident. To be a member of a household through adoption is very rare. The Amhara household has two distinguishing characteristics: members are expected to carry out specific tasks allocated according to sex and other criteria, and they are all under the authority of a single senior male. Men are assigned such tasks as ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, cattle and grain trading, slaughtering, herding, driving pack animals, building houses, and cutting wood. Women are responsible for cooking, making butter, carding and spinning, cutting, and carrying water and wood. Major decisions are mostly made by husbands. Sometimes wives discuss things with men and they argue raising points but ultimate decisions are mostly made by men. A main household task is the allocation of resources. WIDE1

People who were hired for a given period of time in a household and were not relatives of the members of the household were regarded as members of the household until they finished their contract. No distinction was made regarding dwelling, food and the like. But clothing might not be bought for him, unless he agreed that it will be deducted from what he would get at the end of the contract.

Young and old households were considered to be lacking self-sufficiency, because the younger households were recently formed and older households were declining. So both households needed support from middle-aged households. And thus middle-aged household were considered as fully-fledged households. WIDE2

258. Respondents for both stressed the authority of the household head, ideally a male. In customary repertoires the gendered division of labour in the household was seen as good. Men should lead the household and control the behaviour of members using persuasion, incentives and sanctions including violence. Wives should obey husbands; sisters should serve brothers; youngers of both sexes should obey elders. A couple should have as many children as possible to provide household labour and because it is God's will.

### Box 21: Household structures among the Arssi Oromo

#### From Turufe

A household is a group of people living under one roof, eating and working together, sharing income and governed under the authority of a head. In Turufe Kecheme, as in *kebele* all over Ethiopia, control over the operation of agricultural holdings and major decisions regarding the use of resources, is predominantly the right of the household head, usually the husband. Women participate in weeding, harvesting, *enset* scraping, cooking and going to the market to buy food items and cloth. Men are responsible for the remainder of the agricultural productive activities and buy cattle, donkeys and clothes. Men sell grain and cattle and women food items. Children help the father (if males) or mother (if females) in the field and around the homestead or herding cattle in the pasture areas.

The husband is responsible for providing food for the household, building the house, school fees, clothing, investment in goods, such as farm equipment, health expenditure, furniture, fuel etc and he also controls the income from the household. Fetching water, collecting wood and buying necessary food materials to be cooked for the household is the woman's responsibility. WIDE1

### Young people in households in 2004

259. In Section 2.4.1 a distinction was made between households on and off the ideal track. Table 39 shows that 68% of youth aged 10-19 (both sexes) lived in on-track households as did 70% of women aged 20-29. A lesser proportion of men, 62%, lived in such households. Most of those living in off-track households lived in female-headed households or in sibling households where both parents had died.

**Table 39: Types of lifecycle household lived in by individual youths**

	Individual youth in households							
	Male 10-19		Female 10-19		Male 20-29		Female 20-29	
Total on ideal track	436	68%	398	68%	259	62%	300	70%
Total off-track	201	32%	184	32%	163	38%	124	30%
	637	100%	582	100%	422	100%	424	100%

260. For all ages 31% of female youth and 14% of male youth lived in their own households Table 40). Only 1 girl under 15 was married and lived in her own household. Only 2% of males under 20 headed their own households compared with 18% who were heads of wives and this difference continued in the older cohorts: 52% of 20-24 year old women were wives in independent households while only 19% of men the same age headed households. In the oldest cohort just over half the men headed households compared with three-quarters of the women; 36% of males aged 25-29 were living in the parental household.

**Table 40: Gendered youth cohort by youth household type**

	Parent household		Own household		Other household	
	Male %	Female %	Male %	Female %	Male %	Female %
10-14	84%	86%	0%	0.3% (1)	16%	14%
15-19	84%	67%	2%	18%	14%	17%
20-24	66%	37%	19%	52%	15%	10%
25-29	36%	17%	51%	75%	13%	8%
All	72%	56%	14%	31%	15%	13%
Number	751	561	142	308	155	126

261. Table 41 compares percentages of males and females with their own households across the four sites. Comparing all male youth 19% in Korodegaga (maximum) headed households compared with 11% in Turufe. With regard to female youth there was a much clearer difference between remote (46% and 45% were wives in their own households) and integrated sites (25% and 21%). This distinction held for male heads in the 20-24 cohort (31/32% compared with 10/13%) but disappeared in the oldest cohort where around 60% of males in all sites but Turufe (40%) were married and headed households. In Turufe and Yetmen 40% of 25-29 year-old men were living in a household headed by a parent.

**Table 41: Male youth cohorts by youth household type in the DEEP sites**

	Own household				
	Dinki	Koro	Turu	Yetm	All
All males	14%	19%	11%	12%	14%
All females	46%	45%	21%	25%	31%
Males 20-24	31%	32%	10%	13%	19%
Females 20-24	77%	76%	38%	43%	52%
Males 25-29	57%	61%	40%	60%	51%
Females 25-29	82%	92%	61%	73%	75%

262. The difference between remote and integrated sites was larger for female youth. Taking all female youth together 42% (Dinki) and 45% (Korodegaga) lived in a parent household compared with 61% (Turufe) and 68% (Yetmen). Only 2% of the 25-29 cohort lived in a parent household in Korodegaga compared with 25% in Yetmen while 92% had their own household compared with 61% in Turufe (where 18% lived in an 'other' household).

263. Across the DEEP sample in 2004 16% of males and 14% of females aged 10-14 had already left the parental household, at least temporarily. On the other hand 72% of males and 56% of females were living in a parent household, although some of these may have left and returned. Table 42 shows that in 2005 14% of rural and urban young people aged 10-14 and 21% aged 15-17 were not living with either parent (DHS 2005: 15). These national figures include both rural and urban young people.

**Table 42: Living arrangements of young people aged 10-17 in Ethiopia in 2005**

Age	Living with both parents	Mother	Father	Not living with either	Total	Missing info
10-14	65%	14%	6%	14%	99.5%	0.5%
15-17	52%	17%	7%	21%	97.7%	2.3%

## Living in and leaving the parental household

264. Parental relationships with the children living in their households change as they move through adolescence and very young adulthood into their twenties

### *Teenagers*

265. Young people of this age were frequently contributing to the household economy with some going to school, maybe sporadically, while also starting to try to establish themselves as adults in an environment with insufficient farming opportunities for all. As Section 3.4 demonstrated in the remote sites there were few off-farm opportunities and in the integrated sites great competition for the opportunities that existed leading to un(der)employment, particularly for males. The onset of puberty introduced the possibility of sexual activity with greatly increased risks for girls and young women of abduction and rape. They also faced the risks of forced marriage on the one hand but on the other failing to find a husband at all. Young men might engage in premature sexual behaviour exposing them to HIV/AIDS. They also might be tempted by *chat* and/or alcohol and as a result get into fights leading to injuries and sometimes death. Those who became addicted might take up thieving to feed their habits.

266. Parents appreciated the young people's contributions to the household economy but they worried about them, and at the same time were prone to get into conflicts with them. Uneducated parents may have had particular problems in understanding the mindsets and ambitions of educated children.

### **Box 22: Parent-child relationships 2004**

#### **From Yetmen:**

In their relationship with adolescents fathers and mothers face problems of disobedience and from the demands they make, though they generally find something good in the relationships such as being helped with their work.

#### **From Turufe:**

Older people regard the behaviour of some young men as undesirable. These includes, chewing *chat*, drinking local drinks, and smoking, which waste their time and affect their economy. These in turn may have a major impact on their work. An undesirable trait for a young man is to have interest in sexual intercourse. It is because of such interest that they get married and begin to lead a new life before becoming self-sufficient economically.

267. Relations between parents and sons even before adolescence were sometimes problematic as a result of the training of boys to be aggressive. There were reports of insults and acts of violence by sons against their mothers if their needs were not met particularly when they were hungry and of fathers getting angry with sons who refused the food or clothes they were given. Boys growing up in female-headed households might get 'out of hand'. Few relational problems were reported with girls of this age who were trained to be obedient and submissive. While adolescent boys asserted their independence by acting aggressively the equivalent reported for girls was 'murmuring' when asked to do something.

268. Parents used both sticks and carrots in attempts to influence adolescent behaviour. Adolescent boys in Dinki were said to be 'beyond the age of beating' as they may rebel, whereas girls could still be beaten for misconduct. Young men could be promised or given land as well as animals as rewards, whereas young women could be given animals, clothes or jewelry. They could also be blessed or cursed and if all failed they could be evicted from the household.

**Box 23: Intra-generational conflicts in Geblen 2003**

The parents may get angry, beat children; tie up for moments, forbid food, chasing out, etc. It happens many times. If they disagree with a son he can go out of home and become street-boy. But if a girl she can't go wherever, she must be led by her family. If not she is beaten. But the boy can dwell where the sun sets, and can go to another city.

269. In sites with daily labour opportunities in 2005, such as Korodegaga some girls had domestic work conflicts with their mothers (Box 24). Some sons in Korodegaga also reportedly had 'a tendency towards private works'.

**Box 24: Domestic work conflicts with daughters 2005**

**From Korodegaga:**

Sometimes, daughters refuse to perform housework because they prefer daily labour than housework, as it helps them to get income. As a result, conflicts may arise between the mother and daughter; some households solve the dispute through discussion; fathers may also be involved in the discussion. In addition to salary, daily labour helps daughters to get free time with their friends (both females and males). The involvement of daughters in daily labour creates a heavy housework burden on their mothers because they have to perform and manage all the above mentioned tasks. IGPD

**Table 43: Parental perspectives on problems faced under-20s reported from Yetmen 2004**

	<b>Common</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
<b>Adolescents</b>	At risk of contracting STDs including HIV/AIDS; emotional instability resulting from potential lack of opportunities or educational failure	At risk of problem behaviours including gambling, drinking, stealing, fighting and getting easily upset.	Girls from poor families face the prospect of not getting married leading to low self-esteem and social ostracism. Threat of rape and unwanted pregnancy.
<b>Very young adults</b>	Problems for them are primarily related to shortage or lack of land, unemployment and AIDS. Also conflict in the household as they don't accept advice and their 'needs and interests are always strange and difficult to meet'.	Poor young men employed as labourers in other people's households are at risk of labour abuse and exploitation.	

270. Parental activity relating to older teenagers living in their households was geared to getting them married and set up in independent households. A potential problem was conflict with parents with one respondent saying that their 'needs and interests are always strange and difficult to meet'. One solution to reported problems was to make them marry a wife or husband.

271. Box 25 provides some young male perspective on household life in Dinki in 2005. A very important issue, which is taken up later, is their problematic location between parents who want them to do one thing and the government who wants them to do another: 'their parents may hold them out of school seasonally or per money for work and teachers could beat them for each absence from school or if they don't do homework.'

### Box 25: Young male perspectives on household life in 2005

#### From Dinki:

**FGD adolescents** The rich boy considered parents / adults interruption / orders work assignments while children are playing games as a disappointing problem children at his age face. Others agreed with him and he added that illness, death of parents and thus dropping out of school are the risks. The poor revealed and others agreed that poor children have the risk of critical food shortage, clothes, inability to go the school or buy exercise books. School children may face problems during rainy seasons as they could not cross the full rivers and their parents may hold them out of school seasonally or per money for work and teachers could beat them for each absence from school or if they don't do homework. The middle wealth adolescent raised the problem of work burdens imposed by his parents and others supplemented him that a lot of work assignments / orders are given, especially to carry heavy bundles of firewood or big jericans of water from the river.

**FGD Young Adults** In discussing problems related to food shelter and clothing, the middle said that these are not common problems to all young adults. He argued that the type and quantity of food, the type / quality of clothes each could have differs from house to house depending on parent's behaviour. Others agreed with him and added that some used to eat *ful* and get meat and milk. Others may depend on beans and couldn't get enough *injera*. Some may have good jackets, shorts, or shoes, and get new clothes to wear and others wear *Abujedy* clothes and never change / replace worn / torn out clothes in four years.

#### **Female-headed households**

272. There were some claims that those brought up in female-headed households were more prone to go off the rails. Across the four sites the proportion of female-headed households was 23%; there was little difference between the sites. We have no 2004 information for the other two sites but in 2010 a 42% of households in Geblen were reportedly female-headed households explained by participation in the Eritrea-Ethiopia war and male migration for work. Only 11% of Girar's households were said to be female-headed although, given the migratory tradition of the Gurage, many of the husbands are likely to have been absent in urban areas for long periods with many living with urban female partners.

273. Most women heading households were widows. Some would have been able to get back on to the ideal household cycle by remarrying while others would remain female-headed, some by choice, until either a son who had grown up took over the household, or the woman died or was taken into a younger household as a dependent. Among the Arssi Oromo and Argobba divorce was frowned on and marriage with a divorced woman unwelcome. Divorce and the rejoining of the ideal-type cycle through remarriage were common among the Amhara.

#### **Step-families**

274. Step-children of both sexes were often, though not always, discriminated against (Box 26).

### Box 26: Step-children

#### From Yetmen

Respondent 2: I had disagreement with my step mother. Due to this I left my father house and started living with my sister. She didn't willing to give me food when I needed and gave me lot of work to do beyond my ability. Then I preferred to live without her. I am living with my step mother. She always nags me. She doesn't satisfy with what I do. She usually gives me food 2 times a day-in the morning, and at the evening. I don't have the right to take food as I like. I have to get her permission or to wait till she gives me. I don't want to tell my father about my step mother behaviour. Because if he, divorces her he again gets married other woman's who have the same kind of behaviour since she is not my mother. YL Female FGD Adolescents 2005

Some younger girls are living with step mothers who give for them lot of works to do. Most step mothers don't treat them real as mothers. Some are good for step girls. They give good care like their mothers. They can able to learn education. YL Female FGD Young Adults 2005

#### From Dinki

He believed that his parents were partly the cause of his failure because he was compelled to form his own household separately at an early age, before he could prepare the required resources /assets; he revealed that his step-mother was very hostile against him so that he decided to separate in order to avoid the bitter conflicts he was involved with her. Young man IGPD 2005

### ***Sibling relationships***

275. Relationships within households were hierarchical involving both gender and age.

'I am the last born, and I had to take orders from all my elders.' Seventh child – son – 28 Yetmen  
IPGD

276. Box 27 shows that these relationships involved considerable violence in Dinki.

#### **Box 27: Young male perspectives relationships with other age groups in 2005**

**From Dinki:**

##### **FGD older teenagers**

As to relationships with younger children, other adolescents and adults, they argued that they used to beat younger ones for any disagreement. But they may later complain to parents and the adolescents also could receive punishment. In their relationships with other adolescents (male or female) it was agreed that they used to quarrel and beat / insult each other, even they could inflict injuries by throwing stone against each other. In their relationship with the young adults (male / female) they believed themselves as victims. They argued that adolescents are always harassed, beaten, loaded with work burdens in their relations with adults. On the other hand, the young could involve in disputes with parents if the victimized adolescents report the case.

277. Siblings may be involved in struggles to access scarce household resources including the chance to go to school and avoid as much work as possible. For example one female adolescent respondent in Yetmen said she could not refuse when her older sister sent her to the shop as she had threatened to stop protecting her from 'boys beating' and another that she did chores that her mother had assigned to her older brother for the same reason.

278. There was evidence that older sisters can be powerful. For example:

'My elder sister used to tell me that helping parents is good since I was a child. And she was the one who decided that I should help my father so that my younger siblings would go to school.'  
Man 24 married a couple of months living with parents; no education Yetmen IGPD (He regards himself as a failure).

279. Once older sisters have married and left home they lose power in the household.

'I have more power next to my parents because my elder sisters left home when they got married and now I am the eldest in the house.' Man 24 Yetmen IGPD

### ***Exits from the parental household: modes of departure***

280. The ideal customary way for children to leave the parental household was through marriage with the son setting up nearby as a farmer and the daughter moving to a nearby community and becoming a farmer's wife. The ideal modern way was via education leading to formal employment and urban or even international migration. Given lack of secondary schools in rural vicinities those following this route had to migrate for education with some living in towns with relatives and others renting rooms.

281. There were many examples of children following the customary route while a few over the years in the integrated sites had followed the ideal modern route. However, given pressures on land, scarcity of employment opportunities and the risks described earlier many children had left the parental household on neither route; some became servants, while some moved in with relatives or unrelated people. Around 15% of male youth and 13% of female youth lived in households which were neither parental nor their own. Table 44 shows the pattern of relationships which these young people had with the heads of the households they were living in.

**Table 44: Relationship with household head of those in non-standard households**

Relationship with HH head	Male	Female	Total
Sibling	20%	23%	21%
'Son/daughter'*	8%	7%	8%
Grandchild	20%	25%	22%
Niece/nephew	11%	5%	9%
Son/daughter-in-law	1%	15%	8%
Brother/sister-in-law	2%	3%	2%
Other relative	13%	13%	13%
Adopted relative	2%	2%	2%
Servant	20%	5%	13%
Other unrelated person	2%	2%	2%
<i>Debal</i> - lodger	1%	0%	0.3% (1)
Total	162	133	295

\* Not possible due to age of putative 'mother'

282. The figures in Table 45 do not include young people who left the community when they left the household, including females migrating for marriage.

**Table 45: Proportions of youth in each of the DEEP sites**

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe	Yetmen	All
Female	36%	41%	44%	45%	42%
Male	34%	46%	48%	45%	44%

## Marriage: getting married

### *Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies related to marriage*

283. Before considering customary cultural marriage repertoires there is a need to distinguish between different types of 'early marriage'. A leaflet published by the National Committee on Traditional Practices in Ethiopia in 2001 listed the following kinds:

**'Promissory marriage':** is an oral agreement between two families to give their children in marriage to one another before or right after the birth of the children

**Child marriage:** is usually arranged for girls under 10 years of age and the bride is usually placed under the custody of in-laws

**Early Adolescent Marriage:** it is contracted between the ages of 10 and 14. It is the most common marriage for the majority of rural girls. The bridegroom is usually within the late adolescent age bracket.

**Adolescent marriage:** generally takes place when the bride is around the age of 15 years.

**Late Adolescent marriage:** indicates marriage for girls after the age of 15 years. Late marriage for boys is considered to be after the age of 20.' (Mekonnen and Aspen, 2009: 1001).

284. **Customary marriage repertoires** (Table 46) varied to some degree among Orthodox Christian and Muslim cultures as evidenced by comparing the homogenous sites Yetmen (early marriage; monogamy; divorce acceptable) and Korodegaga (abduction; polygyny; divorce not acceptable). In the dual ethnic/religious communities customs were less different: Christians in Geblen could be polygynous (which was also true in Girar) while the Amhara in Dinki did not practise promissory or child marriage. In all sites marriages were seen to link families while it seemed acceptable for sons to have some input into the decisions of when and who to marry this was not the case for daughters.

**Table 46: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: getting married**


	<b>Yetmen</b>	<b>Korodegaga</b>	<b>Girar</b>	<b>Geblen</b>	<b>Dinki</b>	<b>Turufe</b>
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - females</b>	Arranged marriage Promissory marriage Child marriage Early adolescent marriage Adolescent marriage Monogamy Divorce OK	Arranged marriage Adolescent and late adolescent marriage Abduction Polygyny Marriage with dead husband's brother / dead sister's husband Divorce not OK	Arranged marriage – about 15 - adolescent marriage Some polygyny among Muslims and wealthy Christians	Arranged marriage Dowry marriage – girl about 15 – adolescent marriage Polygyny by Muslims and Christians	Arranged marriage – union of families; proposal comes from groom's family <i>Argobba</i> : Polygyny possible	<i>Oromo</i> Arranged marriage Abduction Polygyny Marriage with dead husband's brother / dead sister's husband <i>Others</i> Not sure
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - males</b>	Promissory marriage Child marriage Arranged marriage Divorce OK	Arranged marriage Abduction Polygyny Marriage with dead husband's brother / dead sister's husband Divorce not OK	Arranged marriage – about 18 – some choice Some polygyny among Muslims and wealthy Christians	Dowry marriage – groom about 25 Polygyny by Muslims and Christians	Arranged marriage – union of families; proposal sent from groom's family <i>Argobba</i> : Polygyny possible	<i>Oromo</i> Arranged marriage Abduction Polygyny Marriage with dead husband's brother / dead sister's husband
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Couples should have choice	Couples should have choice	Couples should have choice	Couples should have choice	Couples should have choice	Couples should have choice
<b>Incoming religious repertoires</b>		Polygyny acceptable under Shari'a law	Polygyny acceptable under Shari'a law	Polygyny acceptable under Shari'a law	Polygyny acceptable under Shari'a law	Polygyny acceptable under Shari'a law
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	Marriage illegal until 18; couples should have choice; abduction illegal; polygyny illegal 'except under religious or traditional law recognised by the Constitution'					

285. The **Government family code** introduced in 2001 criminalised early marriage and abduction. The stance on polygyny was that it was illegal' except under religious or traditional law recognised by the Constitution' (UN Human Rights Committee 2011). One religious law recognised in some areas was **Shari'a law** which Islamist missionaries were promulgating.

**Early marriage in practice**

286. Figure 25 compares the Regional differences in median age of marriage of women 20-24 and 45-49 in 2005. Amhara stands out for its median age of 15.2 for the 20-24 cohort in 2005 compared with 19.5 in SNNP. For the cohort 45-49 the highest median ages were found among Somali and Afar women (19.6 and 17.8); these Regions, unlike all the others saw a fall rather than a rise in median age of marriage over the 25 year period separating the two cohorts. SNNP saw the biggest increase in median age (almost 3 years) and Gambela the smallest (less than 5 months).

**Figure 25: Median age of marriage of women 20-24 and 45-49 in 2005**



287. Median age of first marriage for men was 23.8.

288. Data on age residence and marital status from the Resources and Needs Survey 2004 suggests that few under-16 year-old girls in the WIDE3 sites were married except in Yetmen (Amhara Region Gojjam) where there were 12 (10% of 10-16 year-olds in the sample). These figures may not have included betrothals where the daughter had not yet moved out of the parental household. There were no girls under 18 reported as married in the Turufe sample and small proportions in the other sites.

**Table 47: Early marriage in the DEEP communities in 2004**

	Females married		Males married	
	Nos aged 10 - 16 married	Nos aged 16-17 married	Nos aged 10 - 16 married	Nos aged 16-17 married
<b>Dinki</b>	0	4	0	0
<b>Yetmen</b>	12	6	1	1
<b>Korodegaga</b>	0	8	0	0
<b>Turufe</b>	0	0	0	0

289. Child marriage has long been a feature of the Amhara culture in Yetmen although there were some signs of change in 2004 (Box 28).

**Box 28: Some insights into Amhara child marriage 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

Child marriage: parents of children propose they be married when 8 to 12 years old and a feast is held. They stay in parents' houses until they receive resources to start their own family. Marriage often does not last long as the children do not want to live together. Then they can marry again by their own choice or their parents'.

The age of marriage in previous times was as low as 7-10. But now it is on the rise because parents are giving emphasis in educating their children. And the first daughter can be married as early as twelve, while that of the first son can be sixteen or seventeen. And there is a government rule not to marry little children but to teach them. And because of many problems the people are now accepting this proposal. .. These days the trend of change is that the age of first marriage is rising for both boys and girls. HHDevtCycleMale:3

Secondly, a grown up couple may propose their own marriage, which is now the ideal type of marriage. And start their household by themselves, especially when they are educated. HHDevtCycleMale:6

290. Box 29 describes the early marriage of a 28-year old woman in Yetmen who was still married to her husband in 2004 .

### **Box 29: The case of a woman married as a child who was still married Yetmen 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

#### **Woman aged 28**

- In 1973 E.C she moved to Yetmen getting married at age of 4. She was very kid so she went back to her parents after staying one month there. I was only 4 years old when I got married. I didn't know even that I was married.
- It was marriage made between two children who had no idea about what marriage is. The marriage is locally called 'Yemadego Gabecha' which literary means 'Adoption marriage'. Normally there was a kind of rule that forbids the bride and the groom from sleeping and making sexual intercourse because the bride is usually kid, couples may sleep together it depends on their age. The groom has to wait until the bride reaches age of 11. I didn't know about my case. I was only 4 years old and my husband was 8 years old at that time. Making decision as to when the couples are going to sleep together is locally called 'kitir'.
- In 1973 E.C she went back to Zebech. She stated elementary school. She learned up to 8<sup>th</sup> grade coming on day time to Zebech
- My family of origin was harmed because they made a lot of expenditure for my marriage. I didn't permanently stay at my husband's house because I was kid. I was going to my husband's house every winter and on holidays. All the time I was taking 1 quintal of flour and salt to my husband's house. I did this for 4 consecutive years. This was great harm to my parents.
- In 1985 she come back to Yetmen to live with her husband. She gave birth to two children
- Now (1997 E.C) she is living in Yetmen with her children and husband

Source: DEEP Migration\_Individual

291. In Box 30 a woman describes her strategy as a nine-year old child bride which led to her divorce aged 11.

### **Box 30: Married at 9 and divorced at 11 Yetmen 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

#### **Woman aged 35**

- I was 9 years old and my husband was 30 years old. I was going to marry him. I was crying all the time I hated to see him so he decided to divorce me and marry a lady who can share responsibilities as a wife who can manage every thing I stayed 2 years with him.

Source: DEEP Migration\_Individual

### ***Choice of marriage partner***

292. Customarily parents or close kin decided on when and who a young man or young woman should marry selecting families with which they wanted to be connected (Box 31). However, as the initial move was made by the potential bridegroom's family there was the possibility that he would be consulted.

### **Box 31: Parental choice of husband Yetmen 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

#### **Woman aged 30**

- I knew that I was going to be married to my husband on the wedding day
- My parents decided that I would marry
- I didn't say a word I was about 9 years old
- I didn't know my husband before the marriage
- I had no information about him
- **From Dinki**

#### **Woman aged 23**

For the first time I know as I get marriage a week before the wedding. My father was decided that I would marry. At that time I was not happy, but nobody accept my rejection to marry. I was know him before, but I didn't expect he will be my husband. ... I was girl (virgin) but the wedding was not look like a virgin's wedding. Because of the poorness of my family they couldn't prepare even the necessary things for wedding. And also my husband didn't give me enough gifts as other girls would get... I was suffered since I have been here since my husband is poor and nobody give respect for our wedding and still I am not happy for this type of life. Argobba woman 23 married at 15

Source: DEEP Migration\_Individual

293. Parental choice of marriage partner applied in many cases in the mid-2000s although there was a process of change under way with an increasing number of young couples involved in 'voluntary abduction' (see Box 32) or being consulted by parents.

#### **Box 32: Government marriage policy in the communities 2005**

**From Korodegaga:**

The government policy on marriage is based on the voluntary consent of couples. By this principle, two youngsters (female and male) may get married without the parent's agreement. This marriage may happen between the same clan or different wealth status so this breaks the cultural norms of the society. As a result elderly and middle age people oppose this policy.

294. Arranged marriages could work out well in the longer-run (Box 33).

#### **Box 33: A happy arranged marriage 2005**

**From Dinki::**

Nobody announced as I am going to married. But when my parent prepared the wedding and bought cloth for me I expected that I am going to married. My parent were decided that I would marry without asking my permission. In addition I had never seen my husband before we married. Nobody told me about him, and I hadn't information about him. ... I faced harm since I have been here that was I lost my first child by death. And I was sick for about two month. My friends now are my neighbours... I am satisfied for my married because my husband is so kindly. Amhara woman married at 17 to husband 24

295. Young people were increasingly choosing their partners, sometimes breaking the customary rules including intra-clan marriage. The incoming Islamic and government ideologies supported this change (Box 34) but there was resistance from the community.

#### **Box 34: Local marriage institutions v government and shari'a law 2005**

**From Korodegaga:**

In the past, they married by parents' choice, but now by themselves. YL1F woman 35

Our children began to marry each other across the same clans and lineages. The expansion and strengthen of Islamic law (Shari'a) greatly contributed to this change because Shari'a allows intra-clan and intra-lineage marriage relationship. Moreover, in the past, wealth was a very important criterion to establish marriage. The rich mainly marry with another rich. It was uncommon to see marriage relationship between rich and poor families. Today this is changing. Now, physical beauty, behaviour and activities (hard working) etc are the main criteria for marriage. *HHDevCycleF*

The government agitates about individuals' private right to marry who he/she likes to marry. It teaches that individuals should marry whom they wish to marry. In short, it encourages voluntary marriage. This, however contradicts with cultural rules - marriage should be established through mutual agreement between the parents of the groom and bride. Of course there is no contradiction on access to land between government and cultural rules. The participants strongly argue that the people's culture should be preserved and protected. The government's education regarding marriage should take into account of the best cultures of the people and discussions should be made between the people and the government. *HHDevCycleF*

296. Both forced **abduction** and voluntary abduction remove the girl's virginity which puts pressure on her parents to accept the 'marriage' since she is no longer a good customary marriage proposition. Parents of the young man may be complicit in the abduction as it also reduces the bridewealth passed from husband to wife's family.

#### **Box 35: Voluntary abduction 2003**

**From Geblen:**

A case happened recently is as follows. Both youngsters were students of junior high school. They have agreed to marry. But the parents of the girl were not ready because they want her to continue her education. Then the friends of the boy took her when she was on her way back home with her friends. They took her to his parent's house. They next day they send shimagile to her parents. The parents reluctantly agreed, because she is useless once she has lost her virginity. It ended this way because the girl has agreed to marry him. Then they arrange simple marriage ceremony. But if a girl is not voluntary, the boy and his family will be imprisoned and punished heavily, though this is really a rare case.


### **Failing to get married**

297. From a local perspective failing to get married is **very problematic** for young women. A mother of a 19-year old in Korodegaga described how her 19 year old daughter prepared herself for marriage by making different household equipment but she was very worried since Zeinabe was neither 'education' or 'marriage'. In Yetmen it was reported it was harder for girls in poor households to get married. There were also reports that this was the case in Dinki.

### **Polygyny**

298. DHS 2005 found that **12% of married women** in Ethiopia were in **polygynous unions**: 7% with one co-wife and 5% with 2 or more co-wives. Among rural women the proportion was 13%.

**Figure 26: Polygynous marriages in Ethiopia 2005**



299. Figure 26 shows how the prevalence of **polygyny varies across Ethiopia's Regions**. In 2005 it was least common in Tigray and Amhara while almost 10% of men in Oromiya and SNNP were in polygynous marriages. More women and men in the four developing Regions were in polygynous unions apart from men in Gambela. This Region had the highest proportion of women in such unions – 27% - suggesting that polygynous men in Gambela on average had a higher number of wives than elsewhere.

300. Polygyny was practised by the Muslim Oromo in Turufe Kecheme and Korodegaga and by some of the Muslim Argobba. Polygyny may be the result of Oromo custom of **inheriting wives**. Customarily when a husband dies the wife should be inherited by a brother or other male relative, and when a wife dies the husband can claim one of her sisters to honour the obligation resulting from the bridewealth payment. Polygyny was also practised in Girar where most polygynous husbands were reported to live in Addis Ababa or Jimma.

### Box 36: Inherited wives 2004

**From Korodegaga:**

*Dalla* (inheritance of widows) is one of the important types of marriage applicable in Korodegaga until now. If a husband's wife dies, the man can inherit his wife's sister. He does not make any payment (such as *Gabara* or clothes). Equally if the husband dies, the wife may be inherited by her husband's eldest brother. If the eldest brother is too old, he transfers the responsibility to the second eldest but takes a cloth (*bulluko*) from his younger brother as an exchange for the inherited woman. This type of marriage is done a year after the death of the head: this year allows her to forget her dead husband and is called *gufufa* (bad year). After a year the dead man's brother calls a meeting of his and her relatives and elders to fix the day on which he will be her formal husband called *kaya-oga* which means the last day of sadness and the beginning of a new life.

**From Turufe:**

A younger brother can inherit the wife and property of a deceased older brother and bring up the latter's children if the wife has not reached the menopause. This is to prevent the transfer of property to a non-kin group and bad treatment of the children by another husband. If the first younger brother of the dead husband is not willing to inherit the wife he goes to the *shanacha* (elders), tells his problem, and the next younger brother can inherit the wife and property of the elder brother. If the dead husband has no brothers one of the sons of the dead husband's paternal uncle can inherit.

**From Dinki:** For Argoba male having more than one wife is considered as honourable and the "Kuran" (Muslim religious book) allowed them to have almost of seven wife. HHDevCycleFp7

301. In some cases polygyny may function as a substitute for divorce when it is condemned in the local culture (see Box 37).

### Box 37: Polygyny as a substitute for divorce? 2003

**From Korodegaga:**

When the husband has a second and third wife, he refuses the first wife and she lives with her children in a separate house. He does not help in labour or finance. The properties (cattle and land) are shared by elders and mediators. The children live with their mother. Religious law does not allow divorce and the husband must care for all wives equally, but in reality this does not work.

**From Girar:** There is some polygyny. Divorce is rare and condemned; marriages are stable. It can happen for barrenness and laziness.

### Patterns of youth marriage in the DEEP sites 2004

302. Across the four DEEP communities 16% of male youth (173 of 1060) and 40% of female youth (403 of 1003) were or had been married. Table 48 shows the differences among the sites. The highest proportion of married males were found in the richest site Yetmen, and the lowest in the peri-urban site Turufe. The highest proportion of females was in Dinki and the lowest in Turufe.

**Table 48: Proportions of male and female youth ever married in the DEEP sites in 2004**

	Male		Female	
	%	No	%	No
Dinki	15%	18	53%	67
Korodegaga	17%	50	49%	116
Turufe	12%	46	26%	94
Yetmen	23%	59	46%	126
Total	16%	173	40%	403

303. Table 49 shows reported marriages of female youth by age cohort. Only 2.8% of the 10-14 year olds were reported as ever having been married and 0.6% (2 girls) were already divorced. Household heads described 64% as too young and 34% as unmarried adults. Three respondents said that girls in the 15-19 cohort were too young. Marriage rates rose with age: 20% of the 15-19 cohort; 54% of the 20-24 cohort and 65% of the oldest cohort. There were polygynous marriages in the three oldest age groups amounting to 9% of the women in the oldest cohort.

304. There were differences in marriage rates across the sites. Turufe had considerably lower marriage rates for both males and females in their twenties. Yetmen had the highest rates of those

widowed or divorced who had not married again including 14% of all females. Of all women in their twenties 25% had been married but were no longer.

**Table 49: Proportions of youth ever married by site**

	Ever married				
	<i>Dinki</i>	<i>Koro</i>	<i>Turu</i>	<i>Yetm</i>	<i>All</i>
All males	15%	17%	12%	23%	16%
All females	53%	49%	26%	46%	40%
Males 20-24	28%	25%	13%	46%	26%
Females 20-24	100%	86%	48%	80%	71%
Males 25-29	71%	63%	44%	78%	59%
Females 25-29	91%	96%	75%	91%	87%
	Widowed or divorced				
All males	2%	0.3%	1%	6%	2%
Males 25-29	7%	2%	3%	8%	4%
All females	8%	3%	2%	14%	6%
Females 25-29	14%	6%	6%	25%	12%

305. There were 6 widows one in the 15-19 cohort, 2 in the next cohort and 3 in the oldest cohort. 5.6% (56) were separated or divorced, mostly those in their twenties. Eight women in their twenties were reported as living with a partner but not married and one unmarried mother was identified.

**Table 50: Female youth marriage in the DEEP communities in the mid-2000s**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All
<b>Too young</b>	63.7%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	20.9%
<b>Unmarried adult</b>	33.5%	73.2%	29.3%	12.8%	38.7%
<b>Separated/divorced</b>	0.6%	3.9%	10.7%	10.2%	5.6%
<b>Widowed</b>	0.0%	0.4%	0.9%	1.5%	0.6%
<b>Married - only wife</b>	2.2%	20.2%	54.2%	64.8%	30.7%
<b>Partner - not married</b>	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	1.5%	0.8%
<b>Polygynous marriage</b>	0.0%	1.2%	2.7%	8.7%	2.6%
<b>Unmarried mother</b>	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Number</b>	325	257	225	196	1003

306. Considering the female cohort 25-29 in the remote sites in Dinki 74% were married and in Korodegaga 92% including 22% married polygynously. In Yetmen and Turufe 66% were married ; in Turufe 9% were married polygynously. The highest divorce rate was in Yetmen (23%) followed by Dinki (14%). The figures for the Oromo sites were 5% in Turufe and 4% in Korodegaga.

307. Adolescent boys were all said to be too young for marriage except for one in the Yetmen site who was married; 41% of 15-19 year-olds were regarded as too young to marry and only 1.2% were married. Only 27% of 20-24 year-olds were married, one polygynously. Of the oldest cohort 55% were married, 2 polygynously. The highest divorce rate (5%) was in the 20-24 cohort. Only 2.3% of the oldest cohort were divorced while 1.7% (3) were widowed. It is likely that there were more widowers and divorced men who had re-married.

**Table 51: Male youth marriage in the DEEP communities in the mid-2000s**

	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	All
<b>Too young</b>	99.7%	40.7%	.0%	.0%	42.6%
<b>Unmarried adult</b>	.0%	57.7%	74.3%	41.2%	41.0%
<b>Male 1 wife</b>	.3%	1.2%	26.6%	53.7%	13.5%
<b>Separated/divorced</b>	.0%	.3%	4.9%	2.3%	1.6%
<b>Widowed</b>	.0%	.0%	.8%	1.7%	.5%
<b>Polygynous marriage</b>	.0%	.0%	.4%	1.1%	.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	326	312	245	177	1060

308. Differences among the proportions of the oldest cohort married: were Yetmen 70%, Dinki 64% Korodegaga 60%, and Turufe 41%.

309. Table 52 estimates the **average marital age gap between husband and wife** in the youth cohorts and across the sites. Youth wives were on average 8.3 years younger than their husbands while youth husbands were 4.3 years older than their wives. The lowest age gaps for both sexes were in Turufe. The highest average female marital gaps were in the remote sites Dinki and Korodegaga. The female standard deviations, a measure of the spread of the gaps, were all between 6 and 7 years for each age cohort.

**Table 52: Average marital age gaps by youth cohort and by sites**

	Male years	Female years		Male years	Female years
Dinki	4.8	9.6		15-19	1.0 [2]
Korodegaga	4.2	9.2		20-24	3.0
Turufe	3.1	6.6		25-29	4.9
Yetmen	5.4	7.8		Total	4.3
Total	4.3	8.3			8.3

310. A number of young wives had husbands who were 20 or more years older than they were (Table 53).

**Table 53: Female marital age gaps of more than 20 years**

	% with husbands 20+ years older	Largest female marital age gap
Dinki	7.0% [10]	35 years
Korodegaga	9.3% [10]	43 years
Yetmen	4.5% [3]	27 years
Turufe	3.7% [3]	41 years

## Having children

311. This section covers infertility, fertility, age at first birth, illegitimate children, contraception and abortion. Table 54 compares local customary, local modern and government repertoires on all these areas.

**Table 54: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: getting married**

	<b>Infertility</b>	<b>Fertility</b>	<b>Age 1<sup>st</sup> birth</b>	<b>Pre-marital pregnancy</b>	<b>Contraception</b>	<b>Abortion</b>	<b>Pregnancy</b>	<b>Delivery</b>
<b>Local customary repertoires</b>	Women's problem	God gives children; hhs need more as a source of labour	To follow marriage so for adolescent marriage 16 and younger where marriage age younger	Pregnancy outside marriage totally unacceptable. Fathers no responsibility	Lack of knowledge or contraception is against the will of God	Traditional practices	Work until delivery; no special care	Home births sometimes with Traditional Birth Attendants
<b>Local modern repertoires</b>	Could be either male or female problem	Reduce numbers to 4-5 using birth control	Women can choose	No evidence of one	Contraception should be used to limit family size	No evidence of one	No evidence of one	Serious problems should go to Health Centres or hospitals
<b>Incoming government repertoires</b>	No evidence	No evidence	Minimum marriage age of 18 suggests 19	Illegitimate children have rights if father recognises them	Family planning sporadically available but not promoted	2004 progressive abortion law – not reached communities	No evidence	No evidence

### ***Infertility***

312. In all sites but Turufe Kecheme infertility was commonly reported as a woman's problem. If a couple proved to be infertile an Amhara man was likely to divorce his wife while an Oromo man was likely to marry a second one. However, richer couples who were happily married could solve their labour problems by hosting relatives or employing servants, as was the case with one of our Household Diary Households in Dinki who had no children.

#### **Box 38: Infertility 2003**

**From Yetmen:**

Infertile women are despised because they are considered to be cursed. Women who do not have children go to holy water and traditional healers. Women's infertility sometimes leads to divorce. There is no identified infertile man in the community.

**From Turufe Kecheme:**

She would go to the hospital to know if the problem is with her or her husband. If the latter is true nothing will be done. But if the former is true the husband will marry another woman.

**From Korodegaga:**

Women who are not getting pregnant pray and beg Allah.

### ***Fertility***

The DHS 2005 reported the Total Fertility Rate (ages 15-49) for the three-year period 2003-5 as 6 per woman. Overall fertility in rural areas had declined during the previous few decades from 7.3 children per woman.

313. In the DEEP sites high fertility rates were explained by the need for family labour and religious beliefs (Box 39).

### Box 39: Explanations of high fertility 2003

#### From Dinki:

The division of labour within the household affects the number of children a given household may have. There is a need for more children as sources of labour. Children are a burden only until the age of five or six. The number of children a given family has is affected by traditional attitudes towards fertility. It is believed that God is the one who gives children and whether one has more depends on his will. Although there is a demand for more births, women realise the difficulty of close births. Close births affect farming activity and the wellbeing of the mothers.

#### From Korodegaga :

Old people believe that having more children is an asset. Children support their parents in labour especially in old age. Having more children means replicating kin/relatives; children also protect their households from outside enemies, especially during conflicts with powerful individuals. In short, children help their parents to get respect and a proper position in the community. This is particularly true if the parents have more sons because sons always live with or around their parents. Girls move to their husband's home after marriage. Even female-headed households can get proper respect if they have more children. On the other hand, young people do not support the idea of having more children. Both young boys and girls told us during the interview on 'young lives' that the increase of population through natural increase is one of the main reasons for the impoverishment of many households. They said that they would make sure they have fewer children than their parents. Poverty itself made them change their attitudes. Some informants realised that because of having many children, they could not fulfil their basic needs (food, clothing, education, sanitation, etc) and their wealth status has decreased.

314. In 2003 we asked women in the twenty WIDE sites how many babies a woman could expect to have in a lifetime and how many would survive to be children. Table 55 shows some responses from the WIDE3 Stage 1 sites with numbers expected ranging from 6 to 15. Some reduction was reported from the Yetmen and Turufe. Infant deaths were expected in all sites and said to be more likely in poor families. In Turufe a respondent said that vaccination had reduced the numbers of deaths.

**Table 55: Total fertility rates & infant deaths: reports from the WIDE3 Stage1 communities 2003**

Site	How many babies in a lifetime	How many will survive to be children
Geblen	Average 7 -12 children, in some cases 15.	Average 5 out of 12, 4 out of 7. Mostly, 1 or 2 die.
Yetmen	It depends in recent years/regimes most families have had 8-12 children. But nowadays most families have 7 children on average	5 of them will survive on average
Dinki	They have about 8 - 10 children	They may all survive but on average 5. It may survive all, or it may die all.
Turufe	Between 6 and 8 In the past up to 10-13 babies. But after women start to use birth control the number of babies that are born is reduced to 4-5 babies.	On the average about 4. In the past many babies used to die, but now with vaccines this has changed.
Korodegaga	Up to 12/13, some give birth to more. Up to 10 (she also has 10 children)	8 or 7 (one woman who gave birth to 18 now has only 2 left) It depends upon the standard of living of the family. Children of poor families are more likely to die.
Girar	About 9-15.	This depends on the family's income level That is God's will, all may survive sometimes.

#### Age at first birth

315. Table 56 shows that across Ethiopia in 2005 almost 2% of female youth (rural and urban) aged 15-19 had given birth before the age of 15. A comparison of proportions across age cohorts doing this shows a regular decline over the last 15 years; 10% of women aged 30-35 had reported giving birth before the age of 15.

**Table 56: Age at first birth (rural and urban) DHS 2005: 54**

	% who gave birth < age 15	% who had ever given birth
15-19	1.7%	13.6%
20-24	5.4%	60.3%
25-29	8.5%	87.2%
30-34	10.0%	94.1%

316. In **rural areas** 15.6% of females aged 15-19 had had at least one live birth while 3.7% were pregnant with their first child making a total of **19.4% who had begun child-bearing**. The median age of first birth for women aged 25-29 was 19.2 years, slightly lower than those for older cohorts (*ibid*).

317. The level of parenthood among (rural and urban) teenagers with no **education** (29%) was nearly 3 times that of those with primary education (10%) and over 10 times that of those with secondary education (2.3%). There were also **wealth** differences: 24% of (rural and urban) teenagers in the bottom wealth quintile had started child-bearing compared with 8% in the top quintile. The figures for the middle quintiles were not very different: from the bottom 20.8%, 19.8% and 18.3%. There were also considerable differences among the established **Regions**<sup>16</sup>: Amhara 20%; Oromiya 19%; Tigray 14.7% and SNNP 11%.

318. The DEEP survey did not produce reliable data across the sites on numbers of children born to youth.

### **Contraception**

319. Current use of contraception by married and sexually active unmarried **rural women** (15-49) in 2005 was 10.9% with 10.6% using modern methods, compared with 46.7% of urban women (DHS 2005: 63). Figures for (urban and rural) youth cohorts are provided in Table 57.

**Table 57: Use of contraception by youth cohorts (urban and rural) in 2005**

Age	Current use - any method	Current use - any modern method	Ever used
15-19	2.5%	2.5%	4.7%
20-24	11.4%	10.4%	18.9%
15-49	15.2%	14.4%	25.6%

Source DHS 2005: 60 and 65

320. There were Regional differences. Compared with average use of 14.7% Tigray 16.5%, Amhara 16.1%, Oromiya 13.6% and SNNP 11.9%.

321. Use of contraceptive methods tripled in the 15-year period between the 1990 and 2005 from 5 percent to 15 percent. The increase was especially marked for modern methods in the five years between 2000 and 2005. This increase was attributed primarily to the rapid rise in the use of injectables from 3 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2005.' (DHS 2005: 64)

322. Attitudes towards contraception in the six sites all changed between 1995 and the mid-2000s (Table 58). There is a reminder that the Derg regime had continuous campaigns promoting family planning in at least in some rural communities.

**Table 58: Changes in attitudes to contraception between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s**

	Family planning 1995	Family planning mid-2000s
Yetmen	Family planning not used apart from a few prostitutes	Family planning available
Turufe	During Derg continuous campaigns re family planning – has not continued under current government. Some women use them secretly. Men fear it gives them opportunities to have secret sexual intercourse with other men. Muslims who follow their religion seriously are prohibited from using contraception.	NGO provides family planning services. Demand for contraceptives is increasing and the service has improved.
Girar	High social status attached to high fertility rates among Gurage. Family planning not widely known.	Family planning at family level.
Korodegaga	Use of contraceptives seen as going against the will of God.	
Dinki	No service mentioned in – people against the idea although traditional abortions mentioned.	Family planning not available when wanted

<sup>16</sup> Numbers interviewed in the emerging Regions were too small to rely on.

	Family planning 1995	Family planning mid-2000s
Geblen	Inherent opposition to family planning in the teachings of the Ethiopian Orthodox church and the Koran. However TPLF taught about family planning during the war and a few women have started to use contraceptives.	Family planning available

323. There was a considerable difference in use of contraceptives in mid-2004 between the remote and the integrated sites. Around a third of households in Turufe and Yetmen had ever received contraceptives compared with 5% in Korodegaga and 1% in Dinki. In 2003 a Turufe respondent said that Muslims who followed their religion seriously were prohibited from using contraceptives and that 'the need for male labour on farms made husbands disagree with the use of contraceptives by their wives' (WIDE2). A woman in Dinki said that those who did want to use contraceptives couldn't get them at the right time.

**Table 59: Proportion of households receiving contraceptives and other health resources 2004**

Has anyone in the household ever received?	% of households receiving health resource in 2004			
	Remote		Integrated	
	Korodegaga	Dinki	Turufe	Yetmen
Vitamin A	15%	21%	69%	47%
Oral Rehydration Salts	12%	18%	55%	11%
Chloroquine	89%	3%	20%	14%
Bednet	0	1%	1%	0
Contraceptives	5%	1%	32%	33%
Condoms	0	1%	6%	0

### ***Abortion and miscarriages***

324. In some places women who miscarried were denigrated. 'She is not worth to marriage. She is called 'stupid'. (Geblen)

325. Using Ministry of Health reports from the 1990s Onsembe claimed that abortion was one of the leading causes of maternal mortality in Ethiopia causing 56% of fatalities and that almost 70% of women seeking medical attention for incomplete abortions in the 19902 were under 24 (Onsembe 2005: 38). Traditional abortion practices exist in all rural communities (see Box 40).

#### **Box 40: Abortions**

##### **From Turufe:**

Not all pregnancies are wanted. Traditional drugs are taken to terminate unwanted pregnancies. There are some who drink bleach. There are some who drink soup solution. Others consume large quantities of anti-malaria pills. There are some who come to hospital for help after they have started bleeding. *Woman health worker WIDE2 2003*

Some women use traditional medicines to abort the baby. Others go to individuals in Shashemene who can help with the abortion. Pregnancies in less than 5 years after abortions could run into complications i.e. if the abortion is carried out privately without medical attention. Many women become sick and go to the hospital, but there are women who are not affected by it.' WIDE2 2003

##### **From Geblen:**

No, not all pregnancies are wanted. It is not acceptable to give birth out of marriage. Parents always advise their daughters. But if it happens many of the girls migrate to nearby towns, or they kill the baby by drinking some medicines (some die, some are sterilized).

##### **From Dinki:**

No, if the pregnant woman doesn't have money they simply born but they are willing the born child becomes dead but they didn't use any other traditional means. WIDE2 2003

Since they [adolescent girls] might be at "fire age" they might be faced with a problem of abortion and even for death because of abortion. YLF 2004

##### **From Girar**

Nowadays women use contraceptives and if it any chance they unintentionally get pregnant, they usually accept it rather than getting rid of it. WIDE2 2003

326. There were personal consequences, some of them long-term

#### **Box 41: Some consequences of abortions 2003**

**Dinki:** She becomes sad, even crying. And she becomes dead.

**Shumsheha, Amhara:** She becomes terrified because she thinks "I am infertile".

**Shumsheha:** Psychological disturbance because of the occurrence of an unexpected situation

**Turufe:** Many lose weight and are exposed to a variety of illnesses. Many women come to hospital after damage has been done and efforts to clean them up may not always succeed. Therefore, some women die.

**Gara Godo, SNNP:** This may cause death for the woman may bleed and she may not get enough food to recover. Moreover, it may cause sterility and different disease like anaemia and uterine infections.

#### ***Pre-marital pregnancy and illegitimate children***

327. In all sites pregnancy outside marriage was highly disapproved of, with the blame attached to the woman who was likely to be socially excluded.

#### **Box 42: Illegitimate children 2003**

**From Yetmen:**

In earlier times men used to have illicit children, but now the economic situation and fear of HIV/ AIDS have significantly decreased its prominence. However, there are some men who still go to the urban site and continue to have illicit sexual relationships with women who work in local drinking houses.

**From Turufe:**

Pregnancy out of marriage is discouraged in the community. Youngsters who get pregnant and give birth before marriage are excluded. Many drop out of school and migrate to other areas, leaving their child behind. No one will want to marry them thus they remain dependent on their parents or migrate to other areas.

**From Dinki:**

It is taboo to have children without having a legal husband. Women who become pregnant outside marriage are undermined by others. They are insulted by the others who feel shame if women have become pregnant out of marriage.

**From Korodegaga:**

Pregnancy outside marriage is totally unacceptable and leads to stigmatisation. It is believed that every female child should marry at the proper age (15-19). Pregnancy before marriage is culturally illegal. Even widows should be inherited by the brother of their husbands or relatives. If they do not do this, they should keep themselves from having illegal children. A case in point is that one of our diary respondents gave birth to illegal children twice within the past four years. The local people always blame her for spoiling their culture. They generally have no good attitude towards her.

#### ***Pregnancy***

328. Most pregnant women worked until they gave birth and did not receive any special care or food. Diet during pregnancy depended on seasonal timing, rainfall, and the wealth and knowledge of the woman's household<sup>17</sup>. Box 43 contains selected quotes from research in all twenty WIDE sites in 2003.

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<sup>17</sup> There is more on the pregnancy-infancy cycle and the mother-baby couple in the twenty WIDE sites in Bevan 2004.

#### Box 43: Pregnancy 2003

**Oda Dawata Oromiya:** Pregnancy requires a lot of care, but during pregnancy they face problems because of anxiety and picking up over-loaded things

**Adado SNNP:** There are many problems; pregnant women do not rest. She works to the day and gets problems to deliver that night. Pregnant women go to the market at Bule which is far and difficult to reach, they also cut wood. Sometimes even death occurs to the woman.

**Gara Godo SNNP:** During times of pregnancy women face many problems e.g. fetching water from distances, shouldering all household responsibilities.

**Luqa Oromiya – pastoralist:** The problem begins in the pregnancy period. At this period women are expected to work hard as they do usually. (Luqa)

**Debre Birhan environs Amhara:** I used to do any type of work. I stopped working the day I gave birth. I remember that the day I had my child I came to Debre-Birhan to sell firewood.

\* These quotes come from research in the twenty WIDE sites in 2003 (WIDE2)

329. Young mothers generally suffered higher levels of pregnancy complications because of physiological immaturity (DHS 2005: 55).

#### *Delivery*

330. In the 20 WIDE sites in 2003 most births took place at home although if there was a serious problem women might be taken to the health centre or hospital, which was easier in the more integrated sites. There was a high maternal mortality rate. Problems reported included pain, bleeding, the position of the baby, the narrowness of the birth canal, a stuck placenta, unspaced births, death of the baby before birth, immaturity, and circumcision.

#### Box 44: Delivery complications reported 2003

**Korodegaga:** Many die due to birth complications

**Harresaw Tigray:** Underage girls face a severe problem during delivery.

**Somodo Oromiya:** Women face problems at birth giving. Those who have been circumcised and young girls.

Women of **Do'oma** (SNNP) have a big problem while they deliver the child. This is because they should circumcise before they get married.

331. Reasons respondents gave for babies being born dead included physical stress, malnutrition, illness during pregnancy, inadequate ante-natal care, use of medical drugs or harmful substances during pregnancy, damage from abortions or previous deliveries, delivery problems, prematurity, hereditary factors, God's will, witchcraft and superstitions.

#### Setting up an independent household

##### *Setting up a new household*

332. The setting up of an independent household is an important step in the passage to adulthood (Box 45).

#### Box 45: Independent household as a boundary crossing for adulthood 2004

**From Yetmen:**

'After I got married and started to live independently, my parents are treating me as adult, so their relationship with me also changes with that. And now we deal with things more seriously.' Man 28, farmer, living in same compound. IGPD

'Even if I am married, my parents still consider me as child because I am living with them.' Man 20, farmer.' IGPD

333. For young people to set up independent households they need land. A combination of land shortage and consolidation of landholdings associated with a reluctance among the older generation to cede land to youth has reduced youth opportunities for independent married lives (Box 46).

#### **Box 46: Shortage of land for housing for young households 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

People get access to land for housing during land distributions; however since land distribution has not taken place since 1997 there is no access to land for housing for young people. They build houses in either of their parents' compound, usually that of the parents of the bridegroom. Because there is a shortage of land in the community there is no scheme for allotting land for housing. Young people with new households may live with the husband's parents for a long time.

#### ***How independent? Relations with the parental household***

334. New young households are usually relatively economically weak, particularly once babies start arriving. They may receive help from parents and relatives but, as described in Section 2.4.3 they also have an obligation to help their parents after they have set up their own households (Box 47)

#### **Box 47: Obligations to parents on leaving their household 2004**

**From Yetmen:**

'Parents are expected to grow up their children by feeding, buying clothes and sending them to school during the children's childhood. Parents are also expected to give land, livestock and household goods when their children establish their own household by marriage. Children are expected to help their parents by their labour as long as they stay with their parents. Children are also expected to take care of their parents when parents get older and become helpless.' Divorced woman living with parents, 25 IGPD

'Yes, my children who are living in the neighbourhood provide labour to the family. One of my daughters who live in the neighbourhood comes and supports her mother in every household chores. My son also lives near by and helps me in farming and other related activities.' Farmer, Yetmen IGPD 2005.

**From Dinki:**

A father (65) of middle wealth with 9 children who has a daughter with a college diploma who got a good job in Awasa recently expects her to provide financial support. The other children provide labour. IGPD 2005

335. While we have evidence of many instances of mutual support between inter-generational households in 2005 not all children were meeting their obligations.

#### **Box 48: Children not meeting obligations to parents**

**From Yetmen:**

'One of the respondent's daughter took 5 ox in the past. This was in the Derg. At this time she is living good life. She lives in the nearest urban place called Dejen. She was given 2 cows and 2 oxen which she got married. She got married to rich merchant. Now she has two children and she has mill house. She got married to a rich husband because her parents could give her many cattle. The woman do not support her family that much. IGPD 2005

The respondent was sending her daughter to a school found in a place called Dejen. Her daughter was going to school in Dejen for five years. The respondent was covering her daughter's expenditure on housing, clothing, food, school materials and transportation. The respondent made all expenditures hoping that her daughter will get a job' (Daughter and baby now living with her – 'husband doesn't support her'). IGPD 2005

336. Some children felt the obligations while disapproving of the parent.

#### **Box 49: Son has parental obligations despite disapproval of his father's behaviour**

**From Dinki:**

He disapproves of his fathers non-flexible / conservative behaviour; he noted that his father considers "ancient norm / values first and acts / makes decisions even if the consequences were to be disadvantageous to his family. He believe he has the obligation of providing security as they become older and weaker to help themselves. IGPD son aged 29

337. Fathers may have co-operative or conflictual relationships with married sons which often depend on wider family relationships and histories. For example, an elderly rich and polygynously married man in Korodegaga worked co-operatively with two older married sons, one of whom had a minor *kebele* post, but argued constantly with another married son, who was in the army, while one

of the elder's wives lived with and cared for one of the soldier son's small daughters. While sons have the main responsibility for the care of parents in old age there may be close personal relationships between mothers and daughters. It was reported that fathers living with daughters may not be looked after properly.

### ***Disintegration of the parental household: inheritance***

338. Table 60 shows customary inheritance practices in the WIDE3 Stage 1 sites as reported in the mid-90s. Amhara in Yetmen and Dinki and Tigrayans in Geblen (and probably both in Turufe) shared an ambilineal system in which women brought their own property to a marriage and kept rights to it through divorce and death. In the Arssi Oromo sites there seemed to be a contradiction between the custom of widow inheritance through which one of the dead man's brothers inherited family and property and the report that male offspring inherited. In any event women in these sites had no inheritance rights and the same was true in Girar. Only in Dinki were wills reported; here fathers could (promise to) reward those who were closest who presumably met their filial obligations of care.

339. The 1975 Land Reform and subsequent legislation and redistributions in some places brought new rules about land inheritance which it seems were implemented selectively.

**Table 60: Customary inheritance norms 1995**

	<b>Inheritance norms</b>
Geblen	Ambilineal inheritance of land but due to the land reform and civil war descent ceased to be important in accessing land. A household may break up due to death, divorce, or economic collapse. When male head dies property is divided into three; children get one third, wife gets one third and the remaining third covers the death rituals.
Yetmen	Bilateral descent: individual inherits property from father and mother. Before the land reform land was inherited by all children equally. After the reform no-one had any right to inherit it. House and livestock inherited equally; sons inherit father's goods (e.g. plough) and daughters mother's goods (e.g. mill).
Dinki	Muslims: if husband has written a will it will be followed; if not division such that males get two-thirds and females one-third. Christians: when husband dies ¼ wealth used for death ceremonies; the rest goes to wife and children. Share of child depends on closeness to parent reflected in the will.
Korodegaga	One respondent - If male head dies one of brothers inherits family and after 1 year takes all the property including land. If husband has no brothers widow (eldest wife) becomes head and controls property. If she dies next eldest son living in the household manages and control property and family. Another respondent: Only male offspring are entitled to inherit; land shared equally and remaining property to unmarried sons since the married ones have already obtained their share.
Girar	Main items of property – land, houses, livestock, farm equipment, etc are transmitted from father to sons. Land equally divided except eldest son takes an extra share including his father's house. Male elders divide property among the sons. Daughters can only inherit if they have no brothers.
Turufe	During pre-Islamic period only elder children inherited father's wealth. After conversion rule of inheritance influenced by <i>shari'a</i> which allow every child to inherit a portion. However traditional rule still predominant; an unmarried son is a legitimate heir and daughters can only inherit if there is no son. Married sons have taken their share. Inheritance of land prohibited by the Derg but people practised local tradition though PA officials could re-distribute to other households. Now the family can use the land after death of head. Younger brothers can inherit wife and property of a deceased older brother; if no brothers one of the sons of the husband's paternal uncle can inherit.

340. Research in the mid-200s did not produce any greater clarity on how inheritance worked in practice.

### **Marriage: divorce, death of spouse, second marriages and step-children**

341. In the 2004 DEEP sample most women heading households in the four sites were **widows**. Some would be able to get back on to the *ideal household development cycle* by remarrying while others would remain female-headed until either a son who has grown up took over the household, or the woman died or was taken into a younger household as a dependent.

**Table 61: Proportions of youth in the DEEP communities widowed and divorced in the mid-2000s**

	Widowed		Divorced			Widowed		Divorced	
	Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
Dinki	0.8%	0.0%	0.8%	8.0%	10-14	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
Korodegaga	0.0%	1.2%	0.3%	1.2%	15-19	0.0%	0.4%	0.3%	3.9%
Turufe	0.0%	0.3%	1.0%	1.7%	20-24	0.8%	0.9%	4.9%	10.7%
Yetmen	1.6%	0.7%	4.4%	13.5%	25-29	1.7%	1.5%	2.3%	10.2%

342. In 2004 the proportion of young widow(er)s was considerably lower than the proportion of **divorced youth** (Table 61) which may, or may not, be due to more re-marriage of widows than those divorced. One interesting finding is that over 10% of women in their twenties were divorced and that most of these were in Amhara Yetmen and Dinki which had an Amhara population. The qualitative evidence from all the sites (Box 50) confirmed that divorce and remarriage were common among the Amhara, but rare in the Arssi Oromo sites. It is interesting that the explanation for low divorce rates from Turufe was focused on the bridewealth payment, while that from Korodegaga was couched in terms of Islamic *shari'a* law.

**Box 50: Divorce 2005**

**From Yetmen:**

If there is a dispute between husband and wife they usually get divorced. In 2005 respondents said that divorce is becoming common. People are getting divorced without any apparent reason. Either of the spouses can appeal to divorce and the elders who were involved in the marriage try to reconcile them. But if one of the spouses is resolute in getting divorced, the property is divided equally and children also go equally for both. The father is supposed to pay a fixed amount of money each month, (it might be in kind) for little children who will stay with their mother till they reach the age of six. There is no difference of opinion between government, religious leaders and elders regarding divorce. All of these do not want spouses to get divorced, but if they do not want to live together, no one can prevent it. The people who got divorced will marry again soon. A divorced woman especially is sought out because she has resources which were divided from her previous husband. The man also gets married even if his resources decline. In some rare cases a divorced man marries another divorced woman to create jealousy, leading to the marriage of the husband's former wife and his new wife's former husband.

**From Dinki:**

Christian women can divorce their husbands if they do not want to live with them. Bridewealth and dowry are divided in proportion to what each contributed. Christian women also have a right to a share of the land or household property. It was reported that Muslim women do not have the right to divorce; if her husband does not want a divorce she cannot get the divorce document and if she leaves home without this she cannot remarry. In the past if a Muslim couple divorced the woman would take only her clothes and 30 *birr* (about £2). In 2005 it was reported that she can get 200-500 *birr*. However, a Muslim woman does not have the right to land on divorce, even if she counted as a household member during the distribution of land. 'This is because of the Islamic law on marriage'

**From Turufe:**

The divorce in which a wife gets half the assets including land applies only to marriages among Tigrayans and Amharas. The amount of land each has depends on how many children they take with them. If a woman (Arssi Oromo) is married under *gabera*, some people believe that she has no right to share all the properties. This is because her husband paid more (as *gabera*) to her parents to marry her. But she can take her clothes, house equipment and other properties that she got from her relatives as a gift during the marriage. If there are children, especially sons, who live with the woman, he shares land for bringing up the children. Later on the land belongs to the children. Both the widows and the widowers have a right to remarry if they can.

**From Korodegaga:**

Divorce is rare because of the religious influence of shari'a law; couples may separate. In 2005, divorced women have rights to share land with her husband. WIDE2

**From Girar:** If the husband claims for divorce the wife can ask for a share of the property. In the past husbands even kept the wife's old dresses (and gave them to the next one). WIDE1 2003

343. A number of women heading households in Dinki said that they had not remarried to avoid the situation where their children became **stepchildren** in the new household which might lead to exploitation and/or neglect by the new husband (see Section 3.52 above). Table 62 uses cases where the number of children reported by youth husband or wife differed from that reported by the spouse to estimate numbers of youth involved in second marriages. The figures are likely to be an

under-estimate since some spouses may have had the same number of children in previous marriages and there were gaps in the data on number of children.

**Table 62: A minimum estimate of youth remarriages in the DEEP sites 2005**

% of those married with a different number of children from spouse		
	Male	Female
Dinki	0.0%	13.4%
Korodegaga	0.0%	4.3%
Turufe	2.2%	5.3%
Yetmen	5.1%	4.8%
Total married	173	403

### Family-related transitions in the mid-2000s: a summary

344. Table 63 shows that 78% of males 25-29 in Yetmen had been married compared with 44% in Turufe. 60% in Turufe were not heads of households; this was true for around 40% in the other three sites.

**Table 63: Family transitions: Males 25-29**

Type of activity	Yetmen	Dinki	Geblen	Turufe	Korodegaga	Girar	All
Been married	78%	71%		44%	63%		59%
Divorced/widowed	8%	7%	DK	3%	2%	DK	4%
Independent household	60%	57%	DK	40%	61%	DK	51%

345. 87% of all women aged 25-29 had been married while 75% were living as a wife or female head in an independent household. Women were much less likely than men to re-marry after divorce or widowhood and could not if they were abandoned polygynous wives.

**Table 64: Family transitions: Females 25-29**

Type of activity	Yetmen	Dinki	Geblen	Turufe	Korodegaga	Girar	All
Been married before 2004	91%	91%		75%	96%		87%
Married in 2004	66%	77%		69%	90%		
Divorced/widowed in 2004	25%	14%		6%	6%		12%
Independent household	73%	82%		61%	92%		75%

### ***Rural youth: transitions to community adulthood in the mid-2000s***

346. Before considering youth transitions to community adulthood a broader summary of local and ideological repertoires related to community management is provided. The section on youth transitions includes participating in community-initiated networks and organisations,

### **Repertoires and ideologies affecting community-related transitions to adulthood**

#### ***Community management***

#### Local customary repertoires

347. Wise and experienced elders should guide the community as to the values they should follow, the knowledge that they need, and the beliefs which are correct in each of the fields of action. Elites (male elders, influential wealthy, educated, religious leaders) should make the important community decisions. Social order should be maintained with reference to traditional and religious values. The values, knowledge, advice and instructions of long-standing religious leaders should be strictly

followed since they knew God's will. Failure to conform would be punished in this life or the next. Communities must protect themselves against neighbouring enemies. Disputes should be resolved by elders and other traditional institutions such as *gada* and spirit possession wherever possible. The aim should be the restoration of harmony among people who have to live in regular face-to-face interactions. Community relations should be organised through social networks and local 'formal'<sup>18</sup> organisations such as burial associations and savings clubs and regular community and neighbourhood festivals. Customary ceremonies were important, especially those related to burial of the dead. All members should contribute work for ceremonies and other co-operative community work. People or groups should assist poor and destitute old, sick and young people with resources and care.

348. Household and personal security should be sought and provided through self-help, intra-household sharing, family obligations, particularly of children to parents, long-term social exchanges with families and wider kin, neighbours and friends, and seeking patrons. Land should not be marketable as it provided security for those who could no longer work. People should seek health treatment appropriate to their illness; which might have involved self-treatment, traditional health practitioners, visiting holy water sites, going to pharmacies, or using government or private for-profit health services. The customary gender and family policies including female circumcision, should remain in place. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with corporal punishment; it was necessary to maintain discipline within the household.

349. It was only to be expected that *kebele* officials would favour their relatives and kin networks since, as members of kin networks, they had long-term moral obligations. The government's development agenda and governance styles were problematic since they interfered with farming calendars, collective land use, and took little account of local preferences.

#### Local modern repertoires

350. Those who were successful in business and people with education, and model farmers who applied modern inputs were the community leaders who should be listened to. People should be open to new ideas from outside the community and even outside the country. Local groups of men and women should organise to pursue development assistance from government and NGOs. People should use modern institutions for saving and borrowing. Household and personal security could be sought through local formal organisations such as *iddir*, NGOs and through government food aid, although long-term development aid would be preferable. People should use cosmopolitan health services. Government should not exploit grass-root organisations. Some aspects of Government gender policies should be implemented. People should not sell their oxen and go into debt to finance customary celebrations such as child marriages and expensive and repeated burial ceremonies.

#### Incoming religious ideologies

351. In Muslim sites *wahabbi* Islamism missionaries should teach local people the Koran and associated institutions and beliefs. The *Wahabbi* version of Shari'a law should be followed in those areas of life where it applied.

#### Incoming ideologies of ethnic/national belonging and identity

352. Repertoires/ideologies of belonging and identity should be accessible to all community members. During government clamp-downs this has to be done secretly.

#### Locally-available government modernisation ideology

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<sup>18</sup> In that they have rules.

353. *Kebele* officials should disseminate and implement government directives, policies and other information. They should gather taxes and mobilise community members for group development work. The best ways to mobilise peasants were through local government *encadrement* structures with cells of 10 households or less for which one household head had responsibility and making them 'aware' through meetings where they were given lectures. Lack of participation should be avoided through threats and punished with fines and the carrying out of threats. Officials were accountable through the system of *gimgema*: meetings during which community members could raise criticisms and request removal of the official. Social order should be maintained through instructions coming from the Region and *wereda* to the *kebele* administration; local security was to be maintained by local *kebele* militia who were armed.

354. Government should provide economic and human development services, and food aid to drought-affected communities, although this should be used as payment for community development work. Agricultural extension services should be provided to land-owning households. Tax-paying households should contribute cash and labour on demand to improve local services, such as education, health services, sanitation, piped water, roads, and should pay a small fee for the use of some of these services. Customary gender and family policies should be replaced with modern policies. Local grass-root organisations should be at the service of government. In elections local people should support the government party as it has been successfully mobilising them for development.

#### Locally-available donor/NGO modernisation repertoires

355. In the mid-2000s the donor's believed that 'information' had the potential to increase market and political efficiency. Local government officials should be accountable to community members through participatory state structures rather than to higher government levels, to ensure a voice for 'the poor' in development activities and to reduce corruption. Local officials should be regularly elected in secret ballots. Opposition parties should be allowed freely to contest regional and national elections. Customary institutions should be increasingly replaced by formal ones.

#### ***Community-related transitions to adulthood***

356. In order to become customary social adults in rural communities young people had to participate in adult social networks and organisations and assume the rights and duties of local 'citizens'. In the mid-2000s full social adulthood was not generally possible unless the male or female youth were, or had been, married, and were landholders and living in independent households. Wives had different community roles from women heading landowning households.

357. Table 65 outlines the local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies which provided institutions and ideas with potential influence on community-related transitions. In the remaining section we describe participation in locally-initiated networks and organisation, community-level relationships between youth and the older generation, and youth participation in government organisations and institutions.

**Table 65: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: community-related youth transitions**

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - males</b>	<p>Male youth must build friendship networks with others in their cohort laying down foundations for adult networks</p> <p>On marriage young men should join locally-initiated organisations for men such as <i>iddir</i> and maybe <i>equb</i> and <i>mehaber</i>.</p> <p>Young men with land who pay tax will have government-related rights and duties. Young men living with (a) landholding parent(s) may perform some of the duties (e.g. community work) and benefit from some of the rights (e.g. agricultural extension advice and resources).</p> <p>Young men should follow the religion of their forefathers.</p> <p>Young men should participate in ethnic/clan activities where they exist. For example in Girar young men should participate in Gurage clan activities as instructed.</p>					
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions - females</b>	<p>Before marriage female youth should mostly stay at home (Dinki and Yetmen). Orthodox Christian girls could go to church if there was one in the vicinity as there were in Yetmen and Turufe. In Korodegaga adolescent girls could swim in the Awash river and play 'ballyball' with friends.</p> <p>Female youth will move to another community on marriage and should build new networks with neighbours and any kin living in that community and join locally-initiated organisations for women (<i>iddir</i> and maybe <i>equb</i> and <i>mehaber</i>).</p> <p>Female youth marrying into the community should do the same and should join locally-initiated organisations for women.</p> <p>Young women should follow the religion of their forefathers.</p>					
<b>Local modern mental models and institutions</b>	Young people should set up gendered networks and groups to support each other in work and resources.					
<b>Incoming religious repertoires</b>		After mosques were built in the mid-2000s women could go to them and young people could go for religious education.	Protestant and Catholic NGOs organised some activities involving youth			Mosques were built in the vicinity. Protestant NGOs organised some activities involving youth
<b>Incoming government mental models and institutions in the mid-2000s</b>	<p>Young men and women who become landowners have rights and duties associated with their tax-paying status. Duties include delivering work and cash contributions for 'public goods'; landowners can access agricultural extension advice and resources.</p> <p>All young men (and young women?) should join the kebele Youth Association and participate in its activities - or women should join the Women's Association and do the same.</p>					

### Participating in local networks and community-initiated organisations

358. Friendship was an important relationship for all regardless of sex and age although tended to be organised by genderage (Box 51).

359. Male youths were freer to spend time with friends playing games and resting and maybe going to town to go to teahouses or bars. In Korodegaga groups of male and female teenagers separately swam in the river and played football or ballyball. Older girls would meet their friends to chat. Young people could enjoy mixing and dancing at weddings and other community occasions.

#### Box 51: Social networks: friends 2005

##### From Korodegaga:

Most of the time, friendship is established at village level. Sometimes, immediate neighbours are also friends. For old people, living together for a long time is the cause for forming friendship. The community elders, in particular, move together to solve community problems like conflicts and disagreements. Young people establish friendship based on their age and gender. School children form friendship with their school mates. They walk to and from the school together; they play football and swim in the river with their friends.

Generally, friendship is age and gender oriented. It is not common to see friendly relationship between boys and girls. Even in the school boys and girls play separately; again boys and girls do not swim together. People say that this kind of distinction has been practised for many years and recently, the strengthening of the Shari'a law has tightened it.

360. Interactions with members of neighbouring households may be frequent and supportive (Box

52) though they may also get into quarrels.

### Box 52: Social networks: neighbours 2005

**From Korodegaga:**

After the death of my wife, one of my neighbours (female) gave me a lot of support (childcare, financial, material, moral, etc). Adult Lives Male wealthy 52

**From Turufe:**

Neighbours are very important. A number of interactions and relations take place between neighbours. If any problem happens to a neighbour, it is the nearest neighbours that first help him/her. He told me one proverb (amharic proverb, written out in script) translated as: "A neighbour is better than a relative who lives far", which means it is the neighbour that always support each other in every matter. Everybody benefits but poor neighbours benefit more from their rich neighbours.

We take care of each other during maternity. We exchange labour services for agricultural work. We help each other at times of illness. We stand together both in sorrow and in happiness,

We have been neighbours for the last 17 years. The relationships involves all members of our two families, not just me and her. I am on a relatively better standing in terms of resources; it is therefore often me who provides the material support to her; however, there is a relationship of mutual support among the various members of our families (my husband has such a relationship with her husband; our children also have a similar kind of relationship).

**From Dinki:**

Old man, 78: His neighbours are so important to him as they were helping him in preparing his food since he became old.

**From Yetmen:**

In this network friends help each other at the time of need. The transactions take place in the form of labour sharing, resource exchange and borrowing. His network on the basis of friendship has been started 16 years ago with the implementation of the villagisation programme. It links men who are poor and rich. They have been an important person since the friendship has been started. They discuss problems and issues together both personal and communal and they arrange loans and marriages. There are 3 people important in the story of the network. The network structure depends on the selection of kingroups and non-kin groups who have common interests regardless of age and wealth. As a matter of chance, this network structure assume residential pattern who are neighbours.

If a house burns down people will help rebuild and give crops if stores destroyed as gift or loan to be repaid next harvest. If livestock are lost friends, neighbour and relatives will search; if not found will lend oxen for ploughing and contribute money to buy replacements.

361. A third important principle for organising social networks is kin relationship (Box 53). In some cases relatives are also neighbours and friends.

### Box 53: Social networks: kin relations 2005

**From Turufe:**

In our community, if a person has a big kin, he/she is respected. There is blood relationship with your kinsmen. Therefore the problem of a kinsman is your problem. We help each other in everything. Everyone of us have the responsibility to help if one of our relatives is in any kind of problem, in his farm work, in money, in kind, etc.

Weak and poor members of the kinship benefit from their rich relatives. Kinship ties involve economic and social obligations to both mother's and father's kin. Kin groups have to help each other and cooperate for example during marriage, quarrels with other ethnic or kin groups, mourning, and have to practice the same religious beliefs (Islam). Kin members are expected to contribute when members are fined by a court or unable to repay borrowed money.

**From Dinki:**

Destitute man, 65: His sister has played an important role in helping him establish his life in Dinki. She hosted and provided him land for house construction when he moved from Awash to Dinki.

**From Korodegaga:**

My relatives have always helped me in times of problems. They provided me money or food crops during the years of drought and hunger.

Economic and social obligations are more to father's kin than to mother's kin since descent is reckoned through the father's line. Most of the time mothers come from distant areas for marriage. Therefore children do not have close affection for the mother's kin and they give priority to father's kin for all things. Kinship in Oromia is very wide, because they consider relatives, clans and adoptions to be in kin group.

**From Yetmen:**

The networks among kin groups exists all the time. But, it has become significant and reciprocal, after he has formed his own household. It links both men and women. Of course, it has no leader, but a notable person in kin group can manage and support the intimacy of kin relationship. The main purposes are to exchange labour, and resources; to have a common security; to protect their wellbeing; to help each other in time of crises and happiness.

Affinal kin: This network started when he married – it links wife's parents, sisters, brothers, uncles and aunts. The network has been developed since the time immemorial by forefathers. The wife and husband's close relatives are the most important people in the story. The membership stability depends on the stability of marriage and their relationship. If there is divorce, the network will all disintegrate.

*Gulma* is labour to help elderly and disabled people – usually relatives – no payment.

362. Patrons of different kinds may also play supportive roles in young people's lives; they may be relatives, neighbours or people in official positions (Box 54).

#### **Box 54: Social networks: patrons 2005**

##### **From Korodegaga:**

The other important person in my life was a man called Ayalew Asfaw, my teacher while I was at Wonji. Once up on a time, my mother went to her parents in Guraghe leaving me alone. My teacher took me and helped me for seven months.

363. In the mid-2000s to join local community-initiated organisations such as *iddir* or *mehaber* a youth had to be the head or spouse in an independent household.

#### **Youth relations with the community**

364. Uncomfortable relations and conflicting norms and ideologies between older people and youth were evident in the four DEEP sites.

##### **From Yetmen**

The relationship between the older people and the youth is generally characterized by misunderstanding, disagreement and conflicting norms and ideologies. And also, a sense of disrespect, getting disappointed and not being accepted each other are also there to characterize their relationships. YL1 male – Kebele Chairman

##### **From Dinki**

The youth considers older people as backward and themselves as knowledgeable. They don't respect elders and reject their advice as useless.

Older people say the youth do not accept advice because they don't respect tradition. But the youth are very clever and know about modern things better than old people. Educated man

As parent and educator interviewees, community leaders also insist that inter generation value conflict prevailed in their society. They accuse the young of non – conformity to norms and religious values.

##### **From Korodegaga**

My parents thinks in terms of old generation and old ideas, and opposed new ideas. The reason is that they want to preserve the traditions and customs of the people

He disapproves his fathers non-flexible and conservative behaviour; he noted that his father considers ancient norms and values first and makes decisions and acts even if the consequences were to be disadvantageous to his family.

365. In Korodegaga dependent landless young men (*jirata*) strongly complained about having no access to land. One 22-year old man said '*they get little help from their parents, lack of money to satisfy their needs and negative interpretation of positive things.*'

366. Some decline in the customary respect for age by young people was evident.

##### **From Yetmen**

Generally the relationships between the older people and the youth is characterized by disrespect of the youth to the older people as the youth feel and think that the older people are with low educational achievement or with no education and on the other hand the youth consider itself as knowledgeable, and educated. As a result the youth won't give greetings and respect to the older people. The youth has also violated some cultural norms as for example they cross the older people when they pass by each other in the cross road while normatively the youth should stop for a moment let the older person pass across. The other thing is that the youth complain that they are not listened and accepted by the older people and as a result the youth tend to disrespect the older people, and hence creating high gap between them.

It was also pointed out that the youth undermined its culture and as a result especially the female youth dress itself trousers and because of this the older people hate these guys because of this cultural change and the older people are unhappy of this and feel that their culture is violated and disrespected. YL1 male – Health Assistant

367. In Korodegaga adults reported that children were refusing to be beaten. '*Yes, in the past children accepted the instructions from parent and children were punished for mistakes. But now,*

children don't accept the punishments. Punishment is considered legally as violating the rights of children'

## Youth relations with government

### Youth landowners

368. Young people who owned land and therefore paid tax (Box 55) also had full government citizenship with the associated duties and rights described above.

#### Box 55: Land tax 2005

##### From Yetmen:

Land holdings in rope	Tax payment in birr
1,2	20
3,4	25
5,6	30
7,8	35
9,10	40
11,12	45

##### From Dinki:

Land tax and all other types of government imposed taxes and contributions are collected by the *kebele* leadership using the social courts and the militia to force people who do not co-operate. All household heads who have land, acquired through distribution or inheritance, pay taxes. The minimum tax rate is 20 *birr* paid on *Dikuman* land (garden plots), and up to 70 *birr* being paid on the largest landholdings of thirteen *timad* or three to four hectares.

##### From Korodegaga:

The amount of land tax is determined by the amount of land occupied by the household, and by the economic status of the household. It ranges from 30 to 100 *birr*. It is collected immediately after the harvest season. Landless peasants do not pay land taxes.

##### From Turufe:

In the years before June 2005, every farmer was expected to pay 20 *birr* regardless of the size of their land, but after the end of the recent measurement of land, a new taxation system was imposed, which considers both the size of their land holdings and the quality of their land. At the time of land measurement (2004) the land was classified in to three categories A, B and C, corresponding to lands which yield good, average and low harvests respectively.

369. In the RANS sample in both remote sites 34% of young men aged 20-29 owned some land; in Turufe the figure was 18% and in Yetmen 21%. Looked at another way in the remote sites almost two-thirds of male youth were not taxpayers while this was the case for around 80% of young men in the integrated sites

### Youth Associations

370. While theoretically there were Youth Associations in rural sites before the 2005 election they did not feature in reports from Research Officers living regularly in the DEEP sites over a period of sixteen months.

### The 2005 election: educated youth keep rural communities informed

371. In Yetmen, Dinki, Turufe, Korodegaga and Girar parties affiliated with the EPRDF lost the 2005 elections. There was no opposition candidate in Geblen (Tigray). Before the elections the EPRDF was confident of winning massive support in rural areas, a view which was reinforced at meetings where people lied about what they were going to do and by *kebele* officials who were under pressure to deliver the vote. Frequent meetings and radio programmes meant that people in the communities were very much aware of the upcoming elections. However, campaigning was limited and opposition presence within the sites almost non-existent. When *wereda* officials held meetings those who attended expressed support for the government. In Korodegaga in one instance when an

official asked if anyone would vote for the opposition one man put up his hand and when he was asked challenged he said he had only put up his hand to ask a question. In Dinki an opposition supporter had stones thrown at night on his roof a few days before the elections.

372. In Turufe it was reported that the EPRDF officials did a survey dividing people into those who were going to vote for them, those who were undecided and those who were in opposition. Anxieties were expressed by migrants that they might be evicted if the EPRDF lost and if there was ensuing disorder, as the memories of the evictions of the Kambata in 1991 and of Eritreans in 1999 were still fresh in people's minds.

373. In Dinki campaigning issues included the question of money that had apparently been sent by diaspora Ethiopians the help farmers in their area. Government officials collected the money that had been distributed and were challenged by opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) supporters arguing that proof should be provided as to whether the fund was given as a loan or a gift. Unemployed youths in Aliyu Amba were allegedly recruited to campaign in favour of the EPRDF and given per diems from government offices. EPRDF cadres argued to Argobba Muslims that the CUD was Amhara and Christian.

374. In all sites local people told *wereda* officials that they would be voting for the EPRDF, partly out of fear of reprisals. In Korodegaga most people were planning to do this in February/March 2005, with women being particularly supportive on the grounds that the government had improved their rights to land and other property. However, there was a change of mind among the men as national and local political discussions developed partly instigated by young people who were attending school or working in the nearby town. One element in Korodegaga was a view that most of the high ranking politicians 'belong to one ethnic group (the Tigrayans)' and as a result the role of other ethnic groups in national politics was small. There was also a belief that the distribution of government resources and income to different regions of the country was unfair. 'As one farmer said in the last fifteen years the government built three airports and more than fifty factories in the Tigray Region, which is one of the smallest regional states both in size and population.'

375. People in Yetmen, which is in an area where clashes with government can be traced back to the 1960s, were so worried about the potential for disorder that there was a considerable amount of 'panic buying'. In the event the election was held peacefully.

#### **Box 56: Election tensions in Yetmen**

##### **From Yetmen:**

In 2005 there were no manifest political conflicts, but there was tension between administrative officials who are supporters of the ruling government and other people who support other political parties. According to people in administrative positions the election was very democratic and fair starting from the agitation period. They cite the CUD victory in Yetmen by a significant margin as proof of this. However, many people and those who were active supporters of CUD do not accept this. According to this group of people the election was not fair starting from its agitation and the CUD victory was in spite of its unfairness. The people were told to vote for candidates of the ruling party on many occasions, and were asked who they were going to vote for. The people had no choice but to conform to their expectations in meetings. However, it turned out to be the opposite on the Election Day. In addition, candidates of other parties were interrogated and harassed. And according to them what was amazing was that after the election people from the *wereda* came and asked the people at a meeting why they did not vote for their candidates and if there were any reforms they wanted to be made. But these things must be done regularly and not after they have lost the trust of the people.

376. On the election day in Dinki the Argobba had a separate ballot box for the house of representatives to chose an Argobba party. Almost all Argoba voted at the Federal level for the recently formed Argoba People's Democratic Movement (APDM) rather than the EPRDF-sponsored Argoba National Democratic Organisation (ANDO); the CUD obtained 25 of the Argobba votes which were supposed to be for the ethnic-based parties. The majority of the Amhara voted for the for the CUD in parliament at both Federal and Regional levels. Only 12 Amhara voted for the EPRDF at the Federal Level. For the regional council the EPRDF won in Dinki due mainly to Argoba support, although it lost to the CUD at *wereda* level.

377. In Dinki after the election people listened to both national and Voice of America and German Amharic radio services, so they were aware of the post-election crisis and feared unrest after the violence in Addis Ababa. After the elections there was very little government development activity which on the whole the community seemed pleased about as it meant that they did not have to go to meetings, participate in community labour campaigns etc and were left to their own devices. However, there were meetings to discuss the elections at which EPRDF cadres were said to have admitted mistakes and promised to redress them. Fairly soon after some 200 people were sent for a couple of weeks to discuss how government could improve its policies.

## Changes in the communities since the mid-2000s: consequences for youth transitions

378. This section uses data made in the WIDE3 Stage 1 communities to trace changes affecting the male and female youth transition experiences between the mid-2000s and 2010. Important changes in livelihood and cultural drivers and youth inequalities that have taken place since the mid-2000s are described. Then conclusions about changes affecting youth transitions are organised in sub-sections on personal, work-related, family-related and community-related transitions.

### *The WIDE3 communities in 2010: changes to livelihood and cultural drivers*

379. Both integrated and remote sites experienced considerable infrastructural, economic and political change between the mid-2000s and 2010. All were affected by **urbanisation**. In the **integrated sites** this was **economically-driven**. **Turufe** lost a piece of land to the adjacent town of Kuyera which was on the way to becoming a suburb of rapidly-growing Shashemene. Areas of **Girar** adjacent to the small town of Imdibir were indistinguishable from the town. The growth of urban **Yetmen** was kept in check by resistance from rural Yetmen where there was a serious conflict over construction of a secondary school on rural grazing land. Urbanisation in the **remote sites** was **administratively-driven** as very small kebele towns began to emerge around new administrative and service buildings. In **Geblen** young landless households were given residential land and in **Dinki** a few youths were given land for kiosk shops.

380. By 2010 the centre of **Geblen's** kebele town was linked by an all-weather **road** to a major tarred road and more transport was available. Donkey paths to remote kushets had been improved. Near **Dinki** *got* the road from the kebele town to a main gravel road was widened and about to be further improved to facilitate planned irrigation developments in Chibite. Internal roads had been built to all *gots*. **Korodegaga** was still in need of road improvements. In **Turufe** horses and carts were being replaced by three-wheeler Bajajs, while there had been minor improvements in **Girar's** internal road network to allow lorries to load eucalyptus. The **mobile phone** network was available everywhere in Yetmen, Turufe, Girar and Korodegaga (due to its proximity to Sodere Resort). In Geblen there was reception in one location. **Electricity** had been available in Yetmen town and Imdibir town near Girar for some years and was extended to the areas of dense settlement in Turufe Geblen's kushet town, and Aliyu Amba town fairly near Dinki. Electricity was connected to the government irrigation pumps in Korodegaga shortly before the Stage 1 research and could be extended to kebele buildings.

381. Table 67 shows key changes in local economic drivers since the mid-2000s and there are more details in the section on work-related youth transitions. Five of the sites saw some agriculture-based economic growth between the mid-2000s and 2010. In Yetmen, Turufe and Girar this growth was related to increased demand, higher prices and improved techniques. Increased production via irrigation contributed to growth in Yetmen, Dinki and Korodegaga. The latter two sites also received regular food aid. There was agricultural economic decline in Geblen as a result of consecutive droughts which was partially offset by increased migration for agricultural and urban work and PSNP opportunities. Numbers of young people migrating to the Gulf, mostly illegally, increased rapidly over the three years leading up to 2010.

**Table 66: The six rural communities – changes in local economic drivers since the mid-2000s**

	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Korodegaga
	<i>Integrated and self-sufficient communities</i>			<i>Remote and drought-prone sites</i>		
Wereda	Enemay	Shashemene	Cheha	Saeisa Ts/Emb	Ankober	Dodota
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
Remote-ness 2005	On <b>allweather main road</b> ; villagised; neighbouring very small town	3 kms from main road Addis-Shashemene; villagised; <b>peri-urban</b>	Adjacent to small town; on <b>allweather main road</b>	<b>Remote</b> with parts very remote	<b>Remote</b> ; hamlets	<b>Poor vehicle access</b> ; 9 villages; varying degrees of remoteness
Changes	Some town expansion	Rapid expansion of Shashemene; part of kebele taken for town	Some town expansion; main road and internal roads improvement	Small kebele 'town' developing; improved roads	Electricity in nearest town; otherwise little change	New kebele buildings; otherwise little change
Livelihood system 2005	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>tef &amp; wheat exported to Addis</b> ; maize; livestock; grain trade; some migration	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>potatoes &amp; grain exported to towns</b> . Off-farm activities; some commuting and migration	Rainfed mostly hoe agriculture: <b>enset</b> , coffee, eucalyptus. <b>Urban migration &amp; linkages</b> .	<b>Drought</b> -stricken plough agriculture: livestock, bees; agriculture; cactus; stone masonry. Regular emergency <b>food aid</b> ; <b>PSNP</b> in 2005. Migration to Humera and towns.	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; seedling nursery; livestock. Regular <b>emergency food aid</b> . Some <b>migration</b> .	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; livestock. Regular emergency food aid; <b>PSNP</b> in 2006.
Changes	<b>Irrigation</b> for vegetables; selected seeds and fertilisers use up two crops using <b>BBM plough</b> ; <b>bull fattening</b> . Increased daily labour and petty trade. Increased migration	Drought and <b>food aid</b> in 2008. Increased work opportunities in <b>Shashemene</b> from 2007 and petty trade. Seasonal migration started. Migration to Ziway <b>flower farms</b> . Female migration to Gulf.	Increased demand for chat and eucalyptus - <b>increased cash crop income</b> . Female migration to Gulf.	PSNP and OFSP institutionalised. OFSP ineffective. <b>Easier road access for work outside Geblen</b> . Increased <b>income from migration</b> : for agricultural work, and work in towns. Steadily increasing numbers pursuing mostly illegal <b>migration to Gulf states</b>	Increased though still limited use of irrigation, better growing techniques, <b>increased market demand</b> . Growing <b>migration</b> for work.	<b>Considerably increased irrigation usage</b> – co-ops, govt scheme, individual farmers, inward investors. Increased daily labour. In 2010 future of <b>PSNP</b> in doubt. <b>Illegal migration to Sudan</b> growing,

382. Table 68 summarises broad changes in cultural and ideological repertoires between the mid-2000s and 2010. The details of changes affecting personal, work-related, family-related and community-related youth transitions are described in the appropriate sub-sections below.

383. One conclusion is that, particularly in the lead-up to the May 2010 election, government was implementing a party-led plan to penetrate rural communities with more pervasive governance structures and propaganda designed to persuade local people of the validity of the government's ideological approach to development. Community responses varied, partly dependent on the extent of their livelihood dependence on government resources. Islamist ideology also seemed to be having some impact on religious ideas and norms in at least four of the five sites with Muslim populations which in the past subscribed to a more culturally-rooted form of Islam.

384. In 2010 it seemed that in Yetmen the increasing penetration of top-down government and party governance structures and ideological activity, which had been met by active resistance, had reinforced some aspects of customary local repertoires. A similar but delayed process was underway in Girar not long before the election. In Turufe the impact of government ideology seemed weak. On the other hand in all three sites local modern repertoires which incorporated palatable ideas from earlier ideological penetration were increasingly used. The policy of increased government penetration in the aid-dependent sites met with passive rather than active resistance: minimal tokenism in Dinki; deceit in Korodegaga; and historically established endurance in Geblen. At the same time some elements of government ideology were incorporated into local modern repertoires whose salience increased somewhat during the period.

**Table 67: The six rural communities – changes to local cultural drivers since the mid-2000s**

	<b>Yetmen</b>	<b>Turufe</b>	<b>Girar</b>	<b>Korodegaga</b>	<b>Geblen</b>	<b>Dinki</b>
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Oromia	Tigray	Amhara
<b>Local customary mental models and institutions</b>	Amhara Orth Christian customary ways & services	Oromo Muslim Northern Orth Christian Southern mixed religions customary ways & services	Gurage Mixed religions customary ways & services	Oromo Muslim customary ways & services	Tigrayan-Irob Mixed religions customary ways & services	Argobba Muslim Amhara Orthodox Christian customary ways & services
<b>Local customary drivers 2010</b>	No change	No change	No change	Bricolage of Islamist mental models/norms with Sufism – or replacement?	Some Islamist effect? Concern about credit	Some Islamist effect – Argobba?
<b>Local modern drivers 2005</b>	Integrated modern repertoires (see below)			Remote modern repertoires (see below)		
<b>Local modern drivers 2010</b>	Closer to urban modern repertoires			Closer to integrated modern repertoires of 2005		
<b>Ideological drivers 2005</b>	Government models Opposition party models Donor/NGO models Wahabbi Islam models Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Donor/NGO models Wahabbi Islam Protestantism Western media – radio TV in towns	Government models Opposition party models Donor/NGO models Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Donor/NGO models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio	Government models Donor/NGO models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio	Government models Opposition party models Donor/NGO models Wahabbi Islam Western media - radio
<b>Ideological drivers 2010</b>	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Religious missionary activity Western radio less reliably present; though more foreign TV	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Religious missionary activity Western radio less reliably present; though more foreign TV	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Religious missionary activity Western radio less reliably present; though more foreign TV	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Religious missionary activity Western radio less reliably present; though more foreign TV in towns	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Western radio less reliably present; though TV in Mishig	Some revision to Government models: Opposition party models silenced or underground Religious missionary activity Western radio less reliably present

	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Korodegaga	Geblen	Dinki
<b>Balance 2005</b>	Hybrid of customary and modern; quiet resistance to government repertoires	Hybrid customs and modern; government ideology weak	Hybrid of customary and modern; resistance to government repertoires	Customary pre-dominant; women more supportive of government repertoires	Customaries pre-dominant; acceptance of government ideology	Customaries pre-dominant; government repertoires ignored
<b>Changes in the balance of cultural drivers since 2005</b>	Greater penetration of government ideology; active resistance to aspects. Any political opposition underground. Protestants recruiting in urban Yetmen. Claim of democratic right not to 'participate' Increased access to ICTs	Apparent greater penetration of government ideology but deceit. Any political opposition underground. Wahabbi Muslim missionaries; some migration for religious education Increased access to ICTs	The policy of greater government penetration was delayed. Any political opposition underground. Increased access to ICTs	Long history of party penetration; little change. Any political opposition underground. Increased access to ICTs	Increased penetration of government ideology met with minimal tokenism. Increased migration for religious Muslim education. Claim of democratic right not to 'participate' Increased access to ICTs	Not much change apparent. Any political opposition underground. Some conversion of Muslims to Protestantism. Increased access to ICTs

<sup>1</sup>From RANS 2004. <sup>2</sup>Wolayitta 10%; Gurage 6%; Kembata 5%; Hadiya 3%; Sidama/Silte/Sodo 1% each.

### ***Changes in inequalities potentially affecting youth transitions since the mid-2000s***

385. **Inequalities between communities:** The three remote sites suffered considerably from **drought** between the mid-2000s and 2010. Dinki reported drought in every year between 2006-10. Korodegaga had serious droughts in 2005, 2009 and 2010. Geblen reported severe droughts in 2005, 2007, and 2009 ('not one raindrop'). There was drought in 2006 while in 2008 and 2010 rainfall was relatively good. In 2008 Turufe experienced drought for the first time since 1984 and food aid was distributed.

386. We do not have quantitative data from 2010 to compare wealth and changes in it across the DEEP communities. The qualitative research in 2010 established that on average all communities were somewhat wealthier than they had been in the mid-2000s. This was visible in improvements to housing, household assets and consumer goods as well as increased expenditure on education. The integrated sites, Yetmen, Turufe and Girar, had seen market-led economic growth. Increased community wealth in drought-prone Geblen and Korodegaga were partly the result of PSNP/OFSP interventions and partly related to increased irrigation in Korodegaga and increased migration opportunities in Geblen. Dinki's wealth improvement came partly from regular emergency food aid/OFSP interventions and partly from some expansion and more efficient use of irrigation.

387. With regard to wealth **inequalities among households** the evidence suggests that in all sites the rich households got richer while the poor people who stayed in the communities did not get poorer. However, there were increases in migration from all sites and it may be that the migrants included very poor people in search of new livelihood opportunities.

388. There was qualitative evidence of economic improvements among **female-headed households**. For example there were number of examples of women who had stopped share-cropping and renting out their land and were employing young men under arrangements which provided strong incentives to the youths. Others had seized opportunities for setting up businesses such as tea-shops in the emerging kebele towns. There was a rumour not yet tracked down of at

least one household survey in which female-headed households were better-off than male-headed ones.

389. There were no notable changes in status inequalities among **ethnic categories** in the mixed site Turufe, Dinki and Geblen, or clans in Korodegaga and Turufe. There was a violent incident during which a gang of Korodegaga youths attacked some Jille pastoralists; in 2005 conflicts with these old enemies were said to be a thing of the past. With increasing pressure on land and more inward migration in some sites the distinction between **residents and immigrants** was becoming more salient reflected, for example in problems faced by migrants trying to get identity cards.

390. There were some indications of the potential that **religious status** has to become an important status differentiator in some contexts. For example, the Arssi Oromo of Korodegaga actively discriminated against the few resident Orthodox Christian Oromos, while both Muslims in Turufe and Orthodox Christians in Yetmen were extremely hostile to Protestantism which had the potential to attract their children.

391. The distinction between **landed** and **landless** continued to consolidate as a result of land registration and institutionalisation of the right, or even duty, to pass on land to offspring. There were increased opportunities for share-cropping and renting land and landless young men with access to oxen could do well. Other landless people who stayed working in agriculture either worked as servants or daily labourers. Some adult women and young people in landed households also did daily labour to bring in extra cash. Some people in all three categories were also involved in non-farm activities, mostly on a self-employed basis. The distinction between formal and informal employment became more obvious with the increase in personnel employed at wereda and kebele levels.

392. Table 69 shows the kind of people identified as **elites** by respondents in one of the remote WIDE3 sites in 2010.

**Table 68: Notable people living in one WIDE3 site in 2010**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Social positions</b>	<b>Main activities in the community</b>
Male 70	Wealthy, elder The 1st model farmer in the community; wealthy, respected elder	Settling disputes in different situations He served the community as Chairman during the Derg period for a long time; now participates in conflict resolution
Male 69	Wealthy, respected community elder	He is involved in conflict resolution
Male 42	Wealthy, good speaker	Kebele chairman; controls overall activities in the kebele
Male	Medium wealth	Known speaker
Male 45	Educated, medium wealth Wealthy, purchaser in irrigation co-operative	Ex-chairman of the Kebele; recently, Kebele cooperative head. He serves the community as purchaser
Male 38	Knowledgeable, medium wealth	Chairman for long time – now ex
Male	Speaker, educated	Acting as elder, Ex-Kebele secretary
Male	Medium wealth, good speaker Religious leader, respected	Head of Mosque He gives advice to follow the Muslim religion and controls the mosque's security.
Male 65	Community elder, respected	Participates in conflict resolution
Male	Wealthy, respected	Contributed money when requested
Male 40	Kebele manager, respected, religious	He facilitates all activities in the community and serves as secretary for all sectors. Introduces new things to the community
Male 27	Social court leader	From 2002EC until now he has served the community – he has an ability to solve the problems.
Male 48	Wereda councillor; respected	He controls the overall political issues in the kebele, gives advice etc

Name	Social positions	Main activities in the community
Male 70	Respected, wealthy elder	He participated in the school committee, resolves problems etc
Female 32	Educated; model family (on health)	Before 2001EC she distributed pills, condoms, malaria tablets (Facider and chlorophine); now she is a health promoter.
Female 42	Women's leader	She organises the women and tells what she heard from the wereda
Female 40	Wealth model farmer	The community learns work skills
Female 42	Respected, good speaker; Kebele Women's Affairs, wereda councillor, speaker	School parents committee She gives training for women
Female	Respected, good speaker	School parents committee
Female 19	Educated, good speaker	Head, Kebele credit and saving

393. There were **only two youths** included in this list: the male social court leaders aged 27 'who has an ability to solve the problems' and a 19-year old female with education who was women respondents said was a good speaker and Head of the credit and savings organisation which provided loans to women. Generally women, younger uneducated men and poor men continued to have little say in community affairs.

394. Since the mid-2000s many of those whose elite status was linked with wealth grew richer. Elites with informal and formal political positions found their status and roles affected by incoming government structures, rules and personnel which reduced the formal roles of (and payments to) kebele leaders and attempted to incorporate customary institutions. From 2007, at times which varied across the communities, kebele managers recruited externally were appointed and some extension workers and the headteacher replaced three farmers in the kebele Cabinet. However new government and party structures and sub-structures offered opportunities to local elites to improve their positional advantage in the communities which some did by joining the structures usually temporarily and others by boycotting them.

**Connections with wereda officials** became increasingly important. For example in Turufe it was reported that nothing was done to deal with some thieves who were identified in a kebele meeting by 'secret ballot' (everyone wrote down the same names) because they had relatives high up in wereda structures. Korodegaga's women leaders had good relations with the head of the women's bureau who interfered to overturn decisions or mobilise resources from other wereda departments.

395. In Girar a highly respected elder had been kebele leader for many years and had little respect for the new kebele manager. The same man had been kebele leader in Dinki since 2005. In Geblen there had been two chairs since 2005 the first having been promoted to the wereda office. The two sites with clan structures had seen most **change in the kebele leadership**: Korodegaga had had five kebele chairs since 2005 while Turufe had had four:

CJ is a government employee who got promotion and left the kebele responsibility. Then G served for 19 months and resigned for personal problems. SH was suspended because of inefficiency. Then CJ was called back to pacify the tension in the kebele. He was further promoted and DW served as a chairman for three months. Then he resigned and SH who was removed because of inefficiency was put in power in 2009 and he is still in power. Turufe WIDE3 Module 2

In early 2010 Yetmen had no kebele chair as the incumbent had been imprisoned since September 2009 accused, along with a security official, of murdering a prisoner in his cell. There had previously been two other chairs since 2005.

396. Everywhere, except perhaps among the Argobba of Dinki, **women's relative status improved** although there was a long way to go to gender equity. Respondents associated improvements with the implementation of government legislation and increased income-generating activities. The relative status of **older people** continued to decline with young people reported as even less likely to behave deferentially towards adults, particularly old people.

397. In December 2008 leaders of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches adopted a resolution against **homosexuality** which they described as 'the pinnacle of immorality'. They urged lawmakers to amend the Constitution to ban it<sup>19</sup>.

398. Easier access to school **education** as a result of the building of new satellite, primary and secondary schools was especially beneficial for children from poor households who lived in their vicinity. Secondary schools serving Dinki, Korodegaga, and Yetmen were too distant for any daily attendance from home. In the remote sites wealthier parents were building houses in the expanding local towns which could be used by children attending schools. Other parents sent their children to live with urban relatives. Access to higher grade primary and secondary schools was still problematic for poor young people unable to walk to the school or to cover the costs of rent and food in the town where the nearest school was. Many young people took responsibility for earning cash to cover their own education-related costs from an early age.

399. The big change in **health service provision** was the placing of Health Extension Workers in all communities charged with implementing sixteen preventive health packages relating to personal and environmental hygiene, contraception and reproductive and mother and child health, nutrition, disease prevention and control, health education and providing first aid and basic curative services. Health Posts and HEWs were in place in all six sites in 2010 and there did not seem to be any systematic inequalities in what was available.

400. **Health Posts** were built between 2005 (Geblen) and 2009 (Korodegaga) and Health Extension Workers appointed to implement 16 packages. The HEWs were not introduced to Korodegaga until 2010 and they did not live in the community as their house was not completed. In Geblen, in the years after 2005 people cleaned their houses and drinking water sites and chlorine was distributed for water purification. Government health education in Turufe started in 2007 covering to HTPs, sanitation, Family Planning, STDs and HIV/AIDS. NGO activities in these areas were phased out. People were mobilised to build latrines in all sites though the extent to which they were used was not clear. There were activities to reduce the incidence of malaria in Yetmen, Korodegaga, Dinki, Geblen, and Girar. In Geblen anti-malarial insecticides were sprayed in every house in 2009 and 2010.

401. No systematic changes were reported in the **illnesses** prevalent in the mid-1990s. There were two illnesses which had arrived by 2010. All sites had people living with **HIV/AIDS** and there had been some deaths. Outbreaks of 'acute watery diarrhoea' (**cholera**) involving deaths were reported from Korodegaga from 2008 and Turufe and Geblen from 2005. AWD arrived in Dinki in 2009 and one man died. In 2010 **malaria** was reported as not locally present in Geblen Yetmen and Turufe. In Girar there were rumours that it had arrived due to climate change. There was an epidemic in Dinki in 2009 which affected many people. Although there were cases of malaria including the kebele leader in Turufe no malaria drugs were available in Turufe or Yetmen since the wereda did not regard the kebeles as malaria-prone even though preventive activities had been carried out.

402. There were reports from numerous sources of increased numbers of people being treated for **TB** though it was not clear whether that was because there was more TB or more treatment or a mix of these. In 2010 an ambulance came to Geblen to fetch a man injured in a fall within 30 minutes. There was no reported change in visibility of, or support for, people with **disabilities**.

403. Respondents in Yetmen reported an increase in **mental illness** among young people. There was no mental health service where they could be taken and the fieldworkers came across two cases of mentally ill people tied up in their households' compounds.

404. By 2010 the **health centre** in Girar was better equipped and staffed. Yetmen had a new Health Centre in 2008 and in Turufe in 2010 communal land was allocated for to build one. No changes to

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<sup>19</sup> [http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2008/12/22/ethiopian\\_clerics\\_seek\\_constitutional\\_ba](http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2008/12/22/ethiopian_clerics_seek_constitutional_ba)

the nearest Health Centres were reported in the remote sites Korodegaga, Geblen and Dinki. In 2010 reduced use of health centres was reported from Korodegaga due to increases in payments. Elsewhere high costs were reported as stopping some people from using modern medical services when needed.

405. In the sites **payment exemptions for poor people** attending health centres were non-existent or scarce and ineffective particularly after changes to the system meant that the cost fell on the health centre rather than the wereda. Many poor people reported being unable to use curative health services due to the cost. Wealthier people In Dinki, Korodegaga, Yetmen, and Turufe used **local private clinics** which were said to provide a better service..

406. With increasing numbers of young males from landed households having to seek their fortunes off the family farm and beyond the immediate community there was potentially some reduction in **inequality of opportunity**. And while local kin-based networks of power-wealth-status were still important party membership and committed activity offered a chance for upward mobility to those with poor access to such networks. However, young people coming from poor households still faced unfair treatment which affected the quality of their passages to adulthood.

407. There were no reports of **conscription** during the 2010 fieldwork.

### ***Rural youth: changes in personal transitions since the mid-2000s***

#### **Puberty**

408. There was no mention of puberty in the WIDE3 Stage 1 research although it was not a topic of focus.

#### **Changes in identity formation**

409. Table 70 sets out not much change in local customary and local **modern repertoires** with influence on personal identity over the period although there was a shift in the relative influence of each in all sites in favour of modern repertoires a result of the 'fetishisation' of education (Parker and Neill, 2011).

**Table 69: Local cultural repertoires and incoming ideologies: changes related to identity formation since the mid-2000s**

	<b>Yetmen</b>	<b>Korodegaga</b>	<b>Girar</b>	<b>Geblen</b>	<b>Dinki</b>	<b>Turufe</b>
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local customary repertoires mid-2000s</b>	Young males should be aggressive and prepared to defend their family. They should learn from their fathers and follow in their footsteps to become farmers. Young females should be shy, not talkative and keep their virginity until they are married. Homosexuality is taboo; everyone should marry an opposite sex partner. As they become adults young people should identify themselves as followers of the customary local religion.					
<b>Local customary repertoires 2010</b>	Content similar but probably fewer strict adherents					
<b>Local modern repertoires mid-2000s</b>	Young males and females should be educated; it helps them to get office work and marketable skills and knowledge and also to be obedient. Educated people are tolerant, patient, problem solvers with the necessary important knowledge and skills and are useful to the people and the country Young people should not accept religious beliefs that hinder development					
<b>Local modern repertoires 2010</b>	Suggestion that Amhara girls in the 10-14 cohort are weak and vulnerable, and sad. Girls in Girar had started wearing jeans and sneakers (in the past they would have been stopped and insulted).					

	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Government ideology in the mid-2000s</b>	Youth should be 'citizens with democratic outlook, professional competence, skills and ethics so that they can actively, efficiently and widely participate in and benefit from the country' ongoing activities that are aimed at attaining a democratic system and accelerated development'. National Youth Policy 20004 Preface Homosexuality was illegal					
<b>Government ideology 2010</b>	"to see youth generation whose whole personality is fulfilled, that has active and organized participation, is also a beneficiary in the process of nation building, and who will receive the development started and ensure its continuity" Ethiopian Rural Youth Development Package 2006					
	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Turufe
<b>Incoming religious ideology mid-2000s</b>	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires	More missionary work by Sunni <i>wahabbi</i> Islamists – 3 mosques built around 2005	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Maybe <i>wahabbi</i> missionaries - no details Catholicism from 1984 famine; Protestantism from 2000	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Maybe <i>wahabbi</i> Islamism – no details Catholicism, Protestantism – no details	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires Wahabbi missionaries sent away	No incoming modern Orthodox Christian repertoires <i>Wahabbi</i> missionaries Protestantism – no details
<b>Incoming religious ideology 2010</b>	One priest said church was working with government to reduce non-working holidays and extravagant commemorative feasts. Hostility to Protestantism and World Vision	Continued missionary work by <i>wahabbi</i> Islamists; a few young men went to a madrasa in Bale	Protestantism expanding fast	Young migrants back from Arab countries bringing stricter Islam; e.g. persuading Muslims they should not take credit	A few young males went for Koranic education	Rise in fundamentalisms: mosques with sponsorship from Arabia and Protestant churches with mission assistance

410. In a recent study in Addis Ababa and Amhara Region for Girl Hub which focused on what 'girls think, want, hope for, and believe' Parker and Neill (2011) concluded that, while gender distinctions were deeply embedded in Ethiopian culture, there were signs of change evidenced in a clear difference between generations. Even so '(t)here is a commonly held belief in Ethiopian society that girls are weak and vulnerable and this perception pervades all levels of society'. The girls they interviewed had 'an enormous sense of duty to their family' making it 'hard for girls to find time or justification' to focus on themselves. Girls interviewed by Girl Hub saw education as an opportunity for a better future and a chance for them to prove themselves relative to boys. 'Girls are motivated by their ability to achieve well in education, and boys are forced to reappraise the image of girls that they receive elsewhere in life as the weak and lesser sex.' P 10

411. With the considerable increase in school attendance a growing number of youth in the 10-14 cohort (and their parents) saw themselves as facing a choice between two future occupational identities one related to farming and the other to education. The ideal farmer/farmer's wife would have a smallholding while the ideal educated person would go into one of the professions<sup>20</sup>. The girls in the Girl Hub enquiry though being a doctor or teacher would provide status, financial independence and fulfillment through helping people in the community (p20). Having achieved independence the girls hoped to marry and have children. They would choose the time to marry and the husband and imagined a more equal relationship where household tasks would be divided equally and wives would have time to work (p21).

<sup>20</sup> Whenever young people in school are asked about future hopes most say they want to be doctors or teachers.

412. In practice while for some young people decisions about school attendance and, more in the case of girls, marriage were made early by their families an increasing number of young people kept their options open working in agriculture and acquiring farming or domestic skills in parallel with attending school, often on an irregular basis involving delayed entry, intermittent attendance, and grade repetition. Apart from farming and formal employment there were relatively few established career paths for either sex. Young men who dropped out of education but had no future in agriculture due to landlessness or lack of commitment faced potential identity crises as a result of failing in both avenues. This also applied to young women who dropped out of education but did not get married. A number of young men interviewed in 2010 described themselves as 'failures'.

413. However, there were many young people who had never attended school or had dropped out, and who had no chance of becoming smallholders in the foreseeable future, who had constructed local livelihoods made up of different diversified portfolios of activities (Box 57)

#### **Box 57: Some examples of diversified livelihood portfolios in 2010**

##### **From Dinki**

DD who was 30 lived with his parents who were rich Amhara Christians. He farmed onions, provided transport services with camels and had bought a house in Zego.

GT was an 18 year old Argobba woman living with her mother who headed the household. She did domestic work, raised chickens, looked after a cow, worked in the nursery, and sold bananas. When her father died apparently from spirit possession, they incurred a lot of expense for the celebrations and thereafter had to give their land to a sharecropper. Her mother started living with another man, who had visitors and incurred expenses, so GT separated her room and grain, and did not do any of the housework. She had worked on terracing but did not know its use. She received 1kg of corn flour as food aid but it was too little so she baked it and gave it to her dog. Her ambition was to become a successful banana and *tef* merchant, breed goats, and build a house for rent in Aliyu Amba. She hoped for better transport service for selling produce, and would like credit to make her dreams come true.

##### **From Geblen**

GB, 30 and poor, studied to 2<sup>nd</sup> grade then dropped out and went to work in Erob wereda as an unskilled labourer on construction projects for three years. He came back in 2004 and since then lived with his mother. As she had a large plot of land his request to get a plot of residential land was rejected; also he was not married and residential land is given in priority to landless young households with children. The kebele administration proposed that he should give a part of his mother's land in exchange but 'he rejected their unlawful proposal'. He was farming her land but the soil was infertile, so he also worked in a quarry as a stone chiseller. In 2005 he also went for three months to Afar to work and had a relatively better income. His income from the quarry work varied depending on the construction market. It was good from 2004 to 2006 but went down in 2007/8 which was hard as buying grain was also very expensive. In such conditions, even with cash he couldn't feed the family. The PSNP food ration was their only chance. He mentioned that at times PSNP was paid in cash but this was much less good. But when it was food, the quantity may vary because there were losses during the transport and this was not compensated. The market for his quarry work picked up again in 2009. One problem was the many holy days.

414. One avenue to a new identity was migration. Box 58 describes two examples from Turufe.

#### **Box 58: Choosing to be a 'migrant' 2010**

##### **From Turufe**

MG (male aged 26) left his parental household in another community in 2008 and came to work as an assistant farmer. He earned 600 birr and bought (rented?) 1 timad of land to add to the half timad provided by his employer. He hoped to work for two more years in Turufe and then return to his parental community and build a house, get married and work on his own land.

TM (female 23) lived in Wolayitta doing domestic work at home. When she was 20 she came to Kuyera town to live with her uncle. She stayed there for two years helping her aunt make areki. In 2008 she moved to Turufe to live with her sister and family and prepared and sold areki sending remittances to her family in Wolayitta. Someone asked her to marry him but she refused as she wanted to marry later.

415. Some youth adopted criminal livelihood strategies, Many residents in Turufe complained about youth gangs stealing crops and livestock and robbing people going to market. Young men in Girar were attracted to the town of Imdibir in search of daily labour and entertainment and were at risk of getting addicted to chat. There had been a case of violent conflicts between youth groups competing for chat trade in the town.

416. More broadly **government ideology** was being disseminated in twice monthly meetings of party members at sub-kebele levels in Korodegaga. Cell leaders were circulated with propaganda materials which they presented to the meetings. Yetmen respondents also reported that the main activities of party members included helping all cells to hold regular study meetings to read newspapers and discuss party policies and development packages.

417. People in the communities were aware of the concepts of democracy and **rights** which were part of donor and NGO discourses in the mid-1990s. By 2010 'rights' were being claimed for women (e.g the Gurage Clan leadership in the Girar area from 2004) old people (speech by the President of Ethiopia), children in Turufe (resistance to herding cattle) and Korodegaga ('refusing to be beaten') and citizens (right not participate in government meetings or community labour in Yetmen and Dinki).

418. 'Fundamentalist missionaries 'in all sites attempted to convert people to *wahabbi* Islam or Protestantism. A few young men from Korodegaga went to study at a *madrassa* in Bale; fieldworkers spoke to one who left as he did not agree with what they were being taught. Strong hostility to Protestantism was expressed by Orthodox Christians in Yetmen and Muslims in Turufe. In a recent paper Abbink has suggested that more generally in Ethiopia relations between Christians and Muslims 'show a new dynamic under the impact of both state policies and global connections. **Religious identities are becoming more dominant** as people's primary public identity and more ideological' (Abbink 2011: 253).

419. Turning to incoming ideologies the Ministry of Youth 'vision' for youth became more holistic with the goal of the fulfillment of the whole personality set out for the Youth Development Package which was drafted in 2006 (FDRE 2006). As shown below there were attempts to implement the package in all sites so young people may have heard about the vision. The message for youth implicit in the package was that they needed to become agents of change taking a leading role in implementing the package.

### **Changes in relation to circumcision**

Given implementation of government policy against female circumcision customary repertoires were more underground than they had been in 2010 except in **Dinki** where there did not seem to have been any action to implement the ban. People had heard of the campaign against it on the radio but many in the community considered it to be natural and found it difficult to conceive of women not being circumcised as girls would be considered unclean without it, it would bring bad luck, they would not find husbands, and might not be able to conceive or give birth. However, among one of the boys focus groups opinions on the matter were split with some opposing the practice and others unable to conceive of it not happening.

420. In **Girar**, circumcision which customarily took place between 8-10 years of age was officially banned. There were fines of up to 600 birr for those breaking the ban and for those exerting pressure on parents and the girls themselves for example by using the insult 'uncircumcised'. Some people said that circumcision was no longer a problem as a result of the ban. Others believed that it was still practised secretly and that those who knew did not report them to the police. One respondent said that being uncircumcised is unnatural, another that uncircumcised girls can grow up without being stigmatised.

421. There were stories of girls who had not been circumcised including the Cheha clan leader's daughters and several families interviewed who had circumcised their older daughters but said they were not doing so for younger ones. One grand-mother interviewed has stopped her daughter from having her daughter circumcised. Some of the younger women interviewed, in their 20s and 30s, said they were not circumcised.

422. In **Korodegaga** local women were trained to take action in implementing Government anti-circumcision policy. Kebele officials reported that 'they seized both the practitioner and the female-harmed households. A number of female respondents said that they supported its abolition and that relatives of theirs had not been circumcised. A number of girls married by 'voluntary abduction' were reportedly not circumcised. Wereda officials said that there was some resistance but 'it was hidden'.

423. In **Turufe** as part of the wereda campaign women who had not been circumcised were identified and held up as role models. Also those involved in circumcising girls were condemned and in at least one case fined and imprisoned for three months. A number of women reported that only their oldest daughters were circumcised though older girls in a Focus Group Discussion mentioned that some parents are still circumcising their daughters secretly. This is apparently notable among Kembata and Wolayitta families. Girls from the north are circumcised shortly after birth and this was harder to monitor.

424. In **Yetmen** where circumcision should take place a few days after birth there some women respondents said that they had not circumcised their younger daughters. One woman said that she had not circumcised any of her daughters for fear they might die. She believed that circumcision would be avoided completely in her grand-daughters time. Again there were reports of circumcision being practised secretly and wereda officials said that 'while people have the knowledge they do not practice it'.

425. Confirming reports from 2005 the younger female Youth Focus Group (YFG; aged 11-14) in **Geblen** said they were not circumcised: 'there is no tradition'.

426. The evidence suggests that it is likely that in those rural communities where there have been active campaigns against it the practice of circumcision has declined, although there are still some who arrange it secretly.

## **Changes in relation to sexual initiation and subsequent relations and practices**

### ***Changes in modes and age of sexual initiation***

#### Changes in the age of sexual initiation

427. Generally we did not get any information about the age of sexual initiation in 2010 . The younger male YFG in Turufe said that there were a lot of young pregnant girls in the kebele and that childbirth was getting very common among the youth. In cases of pre-marital pregnancy some males denied their involvement and the girl became dependent on her family. Some couples got married to avoid the insult *deqala weledech* and they mostly dropped out of school. The marriage would probably be unstable and end in divorce.

428. Respondents from Girar, Geblen, Yetmen and Turufe gave example of girls going to secondary school becoming pregnant, having babies and becoming dependent on their parents. One example was a 19-year old who became pregnant in Grade 9 but did not marry the father who was a student at the school. She was living in Geblen with her parents and baby doing domestic work and working on the PSNP.

#### Changes in sexual initiation within marriage

429. The older female YFG (aged 15-19) in Yetmen said that early marriage was still being practised in Yetmen. However it was common for young women to take a contraceptive injection before

getting married so they could continue their education and 'she can decide on her life the way she want'.

430. The younger male YFG said that it was reduced because the bride and groom were required to go to the wereda to be checked whether they were mature enough to get married. However if kebele officials agreed to be silent over the case early marriages could still happen and one informant knew of a case in 2007 where older siblings of the couple were sent to the wereda to pass the checking to allow them to get married officially. The motivation for this was apparently that the father wished to prepare a wedding ceremony for his oldest son while he was still alive. Other informants said that young people were not getting married so young because there was no land and some wanted to continue their education.

#### Changes in rape and abduction

431. There were reports from all sites of efforts to enforce the law against abduction and rape which were reported as having some effect. In **Dinki** elders tended to convince the family of an abducted girl to agree that she should marry him and not take the matter to the police but settle it with compensation which would be less than the courts required and would not involve imprisonment and an agreement that the woman would live with the man. There was a case of a woman who received money by filing a rape charge.

432. Abduction was not a customary marriage practice in **Yetmen** and though there were occasional rapes people said it was reduced due to fear of fines and imprisonment. Box 59 includes the case of a vulnerable woman living in a female-headed household who was raped by a neighbour. The Head of the Women's Association in **Turufe** said that though abduction and rape were no longer prevalent domestic servants were at risk of abuse and did not report cases.

#### **Box 59: Rape of powerless women**

##### **From Yetmen**

The respondent gave birth to a baby boy after she was forced to have sex with someone who is her neighbour. She said that he raped her after knowing there is no one at home. The man is married and she is not getting any kind of support now. He even tells her to go somewhere else; he insults her. Since they are sharing the same border he insults her at any possible reason. She said that she had also another child from the same person. She is not happy about giving birth; she said it is because he forced/raped her. She said that if she was prepared she would have taken contraceptive to prevent pregnancy. Bringing up a child became a burden to her. The household head (her aunt) is not happy with her giving child but there is no other consequence on her aunt.

##### **From Turufe**

TW, a migrant domestic servant, stated that the fathers of the children are the sons of the household head in whose house she is living. The father of the first daughter is a son who married out and still lives close by, while the father of the second child is the son who is not married and is living in the house. She mentioned that he still wants to have sex with her, and sometimes tries to rape her. She is too frightened to accuse the men and try to get support from them for the children since she has no relative to support her and is still living in their home. She believes the household head and family know but want to keep it a secret.

433. In **Korodegaga** forced abduction was reportedly reduced but there had been an increase in 'voluntary abduction' or consensus marriage. The couple would 'elope'; the parents usually accepted the fact and in due course arranged a ceremony called *mels*. There were occasional rapes which were more likely to happen to vulnerable women. Some of the women heading households who were interviewed said they had been raped. An observer said that generally men now consider abduction and rape as crimes and if they encounter it are ready to take the perpetrators before the law.

434. Rape in **Geblen** was said to be frequent though the law had made a difference as previously no attention was paid to the problem. Most cases presented to the kebele administration were solved

by traditional mediation although a woman heading a household said her son had been imprisoned for two years and three months for rape. A group of girls said that a male civil servant had tried to show them a pornographic film.

In **Girar** cases of rape were said not to be widespread; one case involving an 'old guy' and a 5-year old girl was said to have shocked the whole community. One woman, talking about the case of one poor girl working as a housemaid, raped, and not supported by her 'madam' employer in bringing it up, was of the view that the legal structure still favoured males. She said that perpetrators were said to be minors and set free even when they were not. Also, girls exposing acts of sexual abuse could be socially excluded (treated as 'broken clay'), there was no psychological support and as most of these girls were poor they didn't have the means to engage with the procedures and so remained silent. She concluded that there should be a free legal aid service for the poor.

435. There was a suggestion that fear of HIV/AIDS had reduced the attraction of rape for some. A decline in forced abduction was said to have been accompanied by an increase in voluntary abduction.

### **Changes in HIV/AIDS**

436. Table 71 summarises information on HIV/AIDS in the sites in 2010. The **integrated sites** all had numbers of cases of people admitting to or suspected of having HIV/AIDS though people said that with the advent of ART it was more difficult to identify cases. Stigma and discrimination reduced the numbers of people volunteering for tests, revealing their status and taking ART which was freely available. Some reduction in risky sexual behaviour was discerned in Yetmen and Turufe though there were exceptions. In these communities people were reluctant to use condoms fearing to be seen taking them from public places and not liking the idea. In Turufe an increase in pre-marital sexual relations among young people was reported while in Girar it was difficult to establish how young people were behaving although some were taking condoms from the Health Post and they were also being distributed more discreetly. Government and NGOs were active in awareness-raising and Turufe was in an area covered by NGO programmes assisting AIDS victims and orphans.

**Table 70: HIV/AIDS in the WIDE3 sites in 2010**

	<b>Incidence of HIV/AIDS</b>	<b>Knowledge, attitudes, behaviour</b>	<b>Testing and treatment</b>
Geblen	Kebele chairman estimated 7% of population; most haven't made status official. Six PLWHAs One known AIDS orphan.	Problem of lack of willingness for open discussion. Common in the community to have three or more sex partners. Particularly young people practice unsafe sex. Condoms in Health Post; some use as a contraceptive. Stigma and discrimination	Most people using Voluntary Counselling and Testing – some more than 5 times since 2007. Four people using ART. HEW hindered in treating infected people as they do not want to expose themselves.
Dinki	A sick people returned to be cared for and die. Know of people in local towns. Three men who used to visit women in town who have died – but no symptoms – two married. One AIDS orphan probably.	Know about sexual transmission and sharp utensils but little care. No tests before marriage. Young people more at risk; overcome by their emotions. Fear of greeting and eating with infected people. Desire by children and parents for early marriage to avoid infection. Belief that infected woman could be cured by transmitting the virus to lots of men (1 mention). Only people in towns use condoms.	People infected in Aliyu Amba receive drugs and money. Iddir and Hiwas considering cases of 2/3 promiscuous people; people say they should be punished or imprisoned before transmitting the disease to many people. Some teaching from wereda/NGOs. VCT testing in kebele centre and town.

	Incidence of HIV/AIDS	Knowledge, attitudes, behaviour	Testing and treatment
		Rape decreased - fear of infection.	
Korodegaga	No identified carrier (though see mid-2000s report from wereda...).	Awareness increased via school, radio, NGOs; people know how it is transmitted; parents and children discuss. Sexual behaviour changing; some youngsters use condoms but shortage	No general blood tests. No-one being treated.
Yetmen	Five people suspected of having AIDS Some AIDS orphans Difficult to know the number infected due to secrecy.	Good awareness of how HIV is transmitted. Secrecy by those infected. Some change in sexual behaviour but not everyone Access to condoms but people don't want to use them or be seen taking them	Retro-virals from Bichena and Debre Markos Also given money
Turufe	Six PLWHAs who have disclosed their status. Two young women died previously. Home-Based Care worker suspects 15 PLWHAs who have not revealed their status. Evidence from hospital shows there are more than 6. One HIV positive AIDS orphan.	Plenty of awareness education and people's knowledge enhanced. Reduction in extra-marital relationships, polygyny and visiting commercial sex workers in towns. Unintended consequence – reduction in marital conflict. Access to condoms at Health Post; don't want to be seen taking them or use them. Community concern re increase in adolescent pre-marital sexual relationships	Annual VCT in centre of kebele. Retro-virals available free of charge in Kuyera hospital. Two people taking ART Home-Based Care providers visit bed-ridden PLWHAs at least twice a week: wash their clothes, prepare food; psycho-social advice. PLWHAs given one sheep; grinding mill bought for association (NGO)
Girar	Two people declared their status; one died last year. Difficult to know the number infected: secrecy. HEW estimated 10-15% of people living with the virus. Eight AIDS orphans.	In fear of stigma and discrimination people prefer to use health facilities elsewhere where people can't identify who they are. Challenge to figure out how adolescents and youth are behaving. Some youth get condoms from the Health Post. No shortage – good attitude.	ART available with no payment. May be many HIV positive people who won't take test or ART. May be people who are taking ART. Some wives make migrant husbands take a test before sleeping with them. Some husbands require wives to be tested.

437. Incidence of infection and illness were probably less in two **remote sites**, Dinki and Korodegaga, although again secrecy, related to stigma and discrimination, surrounded the topic. Dinki residents were expecting three men to succumb to the disease as a result of regular sexual interactions with women in town who had died of AIDS.

#### Box 60: HIV/AIDS awareness and VCT in towns in one wereda

##### From a wereda official

The warm temperature has a great contribution in the bored attitude people show during the training and discussions held to create HIV/AIDS awareness the have used a music as a way to refresh and teaching them at the same time. The VCT is provided in market places to convene many people as possible. In market places drinks are available people will be going to the VCT service being drunk. When problems like this occur officials from the HIV/AIDS secretarial office will calm them down. Most women could not be included – domestic burden and children.

438. Stigma and secrecy prevented open discussions of the problem in the other remote site, Geblen, where the kebele chairman estimated that 7% of the population were affected. It was reportedly common for men and women to have three or more regular sex partners and young There have been awareness activities in the vicinity of these communities for some years (though see Box 60 ) and in both respondents said that people were aware that the disease was transmitted through sexual interaction and sharing sharp blades. The researchers in Dinki found some wrong beliefs. There was a gap between knowledge and practice and the impression that people thought of it as an urban problem. people were said to practice unsafe sex. Voluntary Counselling and Testing was available and four PLWHAs were using ART. While Geblen is as remote as Dinki and Korodegaga high levels of regular migration which are not found in those two sites have led to higher levels of infection.

439. The main conclusions of a survey of young adults in seven Regions conducted by the Population Council in 2009 were:

- Over 90 percent of both males and females had heard of AIDS (91 percent of males and 92 percent of females). Awareness levels increased with age; among young people over the age of 20, 98 percent of boys and 95 percent of girls had heard of AIDS.
- Awareness levels were lower among young people with no education (80 percent) compared with those with higher levels of education.
- The majority of respondents knew that HIV can be transmitted through sexual intercourse, then injections with unsterilised needles, and circumcision with unsterilised tools. Mother-to-child transmission was mentioned less often; few respondents mentioned transmission through breast milk and other transmission during childbirth. Only two percent of young people did not know any mode of HIV transmission.
- The most widely held misconception - commonly held in Ethiopia - was that most people contracted HIV from accidents with sharp objects. A considerable proportion of young people believed that one can contract HIV from eating utensils. Relatively few young people believed one could get HIV from mosquito bites or that there was a cure for AIDS.
- Only about 60 percent of young people knew about anti-retroviral therapy (ART). While only 49 percent of rural youth knew about ART, 76 percent of urban youth knew about it, perhaps reflecting differential exposure and access to the therapy.

### **Changes affecting informal work skill learning**

440. **Girls** living at home continued to acquire domestic skills through doing a lot of domestic work, in many cases fitted around school attendance. There was evidence from Yetmen that what children were learning about hygiene at **school** was having an effect on practices at home; for example one household was using soap to wash themselves and their clothes and Ajax for washing up on the insistence of the children.

441. The increase in **irrigation farming** in Korodegaga, Dinki and Yetmen offered more work and skill-learning opportunities for young people of both sexes. Planting in lines and weeding were being done by girls whose parents had irrigation land in Yetmen and girls were also employed to do 'daily labour' as they were in Korodegaga and Dinki. Depending on the site young women learned how to make dungcakes, local beer and areki, or pottery, cut wood for sale, buy grain to sell to traders, hairdress, etc.

442. Most **boys** continued to learn farming skills (agriculture and livestock) by helping smallholder fathers or employers or doing 'daily labour'. A few learned skills such as carpentry (Turufe) and stone masonry (Geblen). Daily labour in towns usually involved unskilled work taught on the job.

443. Young people observing and sometimes participating in the introduction of new technologies and products were absorbing new ideas. Those who migrated learned new skills in other agricultural areas and towns.

### Changes affecting formal education


444. Attitudes to education saw some changes in the three remote sites as the power of local **customary repertoires** faded in the face of the increased educational opportunities described below. In the integrated sites there was increasing acceptance of the idea that children should go to school 'at the right age'; many of those dropping out from secondary school were said to have done so because they were 'too old'.

445. At national level since the mid-2000s there has been a big push by government, supported by donors, to increase the quantity and quality of primary education. There were also plans to increase secondary school attendance and university education and TVET training. The national strategy for alternative basic education (ABE) was put in place in 2006 and has increased enrolment of children who would otherwise not be in school. In 2008 a National Adult Education Strategy was introduced for adults and youth aged 15 or over (Jennings, 2011<sup>21</sup>).

446. In Geblen in 2008 more than 100 adults enrolled to attend **basic education** in an evening programme but it did not last long as most gave it up.

447. At the national level there was a big increase in **primary school** enrolment between the mid-2000s and 2010. Net enrolment rate (NER) in Primary 1-4 increased for boys from 70% in 2004/5 to 90% in 2008/9 and for girls from 65% in 2004/5 to 87% in 2008/2009.


**Figure 27: Changes in NER for Primary 1-4 between 2004/5 and 2008/9**



448. Statistics showing changes in the gross enrolment rate plus enrolment in Alternative Basic Education show that many 'overage' people had been catching up with their education.


**Figure 28: Changes in GER for Primary 1-4 plus ABE between 2004/5 and 2008/9**

<sup>21</sup> The national-level findings in this section come from Jennings and the Education Statistics Annual Abstract 2001E.C.



449. The GER Primary 5-8 increased for boys from 38% to 44% and for girls from 29% to 44%. Gross enrolment rates were higher (Fig 29)


**Figure 29: Changes in the GER Primary 5-8 between 2004/5 and 2008/9**



450. Completion of Grade 5 in 2008/9 was 79% for males and 78% for females. Completion of primary school beyond Grade 5 was low for both males and females. Completion of Grade 8 – females improved from 26% to 41% and males 42% to 48% (same dates) (Jennings, 2011)

451. As in the mid-2000s there were significant regional disparities in primary enrolment (Figure 30).

**Figure 30: Regional differences in gross enrolment rates Primary 1-8**



452. The big push on primary education mainly affected **the remote sites**. The **Geblen** primary school expanded to Grade 8 by co-ordinating community and UNICEF resources. In 2007 new schools opened in far kushets. There was a shortage of teachers and absenteeism related to the harsh conditions including water scarcity. Schools lacked educational materials, seats, separate latrines, water and electricity but there has been a big increase in enrolment and attendance such that by early 2010 almost all children were going to school. In 2008 and 2009 children dropped out of school due to hunger.

453. In **Dinki** an ABE school was opened in a neighbouring got in 2004. It became a satellite school in 2006 but reverted to the ABE teaching materials in 2007. In 2010 the teachers went from 1 to 2. The school in the kebele town added grades 7 and 8 with help from an NGO. In 2009 two satellite classes opened in Dinki. In 2010 there were 9 people in the got, 3 from each *Hiwas* responsible to go from house to house to enrol new children in school. As a result of increasing proximity of schools enrolment improved. However the schools lacked equipment, materials and qualified teachers and absenteeism and dropout were issues.

An ABE school opened in **Korodegaga** in 2007 but closed after a few months due to lack of teachers. Korodegaga primary school was built in 1990 and provided Grades 1-4 until 2009 when it started Grade 5. Expansion of 2 classrooms and an office began in 2005 and with cash and labour contributions from the community was completed in 2009. The community had a plan to open up to Grade 8. The school did not seem to get good support from the wereda having a shortage of teachers, facilities and equipment and was still dependent on annual community contributions and rent from its land. There were more girls than boys in the school. There was a shift system and an unpopular self-contained system; the main concern of teachers was quality of education and having to chase absentee children and give them extra teaching in order to meet quotas. Absenteeism was high on market days and at harvest time. Drop-out was also high; for example in 2009 19 students dropped out including those who migrated to Sudan and Saudi Arabia. In 2009 a satellite school was built in a sub-kebele.

454. Primary schools in the **integrated sites** also improved. **Yetmen** has had a Grade1-8 school since the 1960s. In 2007 the number of girls in the school equalled the number of boys. In 2010 officials said that only 10 children were not enrolled in school; mostly they were poor. By early 2010 80 children who had enrolled in September 2009 had dropped out; teachers expected 50 to return. Parents in Yetmen were unhappy with both the self-contained system (teaching students in Grades1-4 with only 1 teacher) and automatic promotion and the community requested they be changed, which eventually they were.

455. In **Turufe** two new schools built by NGOs started operation in 2007; they were taken over by the government in 2009. Wetera primary school expanded to Grade 8 with assistance from a Catholic mission and local community contributions. The quality of Kuyera school improved. By 2010 there were reports that children were going to school at the right age.

456. The primary school for **Girar** was upgraded from 1-4 to 1-8 in 2008 with contributions from the community the local big iddir and one Gurage migrants' iddir. There were cases of absenteeism and dropout.


### Box 61: Absenteeism and drop-out in Girar

#### From Girar

Some girls go to the market to sell things so are absent on market days. Boys and girls may have responsibilities in the customary (male and female) agricultural rotating group works (*gezie* and *wusacha* respectively), which take them away from school for lessons/parts of the day. There are also still cases of girls dropping when sent to work as housemaids with relatives in urban areas. Both boys and girls may drop because of family problems or illnesses. In the current year they counted 20 cases of drop outs out of an enrolment of 448 students (227 male and 221 female). WIDE3 Stage 1

457. A very small proportion of children at primary school level in rural areas seemed to proceed to secondary school (14.7%). Gross enrolment in Grades 9 and 10 rose somewhat between 2004/5 and 2008/9 but still only amounted to 44% of males and 32% of females.

**Figure 31: Changes to the gross enrolment ratio at secondary level 2004/5-2008/9**



458. In rural areas in 2008/9 for 68% of households the closest secondary school was at least 10 kms away. A minority could finance accommodation, food, costs associated with educating children in towns; others went to relatives but may not be given time off work. (Jennings 2011: 18).

459. In the **remote sites** in the WIDE2 Stage 1 study interest in secondary education had increased rapidly since the mid-2000s. Some young people from **Geblen** attended secondary school in the two nearest towns. In 2009 Grade 9 started in a nearby village. For **Dinki** in 2006 a high school opened in the wereda town and in 2010 Grades 9 and 10 were added to the school in Aliyu Amba. Most students in **Korodegaga** did not go to secondary school and those that did usually dropped out. There were no women in the community who had completed Grade 10.

460. In the integrated sites more young people completed more years of education than they had in the mid-2000s. In **Yetmen** high school attendance in nearby towns continued to grow leading to an increasing number of unemployed Grade 10 completers. Only those who could cover the costs of living in town or had relatives who would host them could send children to high school. However a high school was about to be built in Yetmen in early 2010.

461. In **Turufe** a relatively small number of children continued after Grade 8 in Kuyera school and a lot dropped out in Grades 9 and 10. This was explained by their late age at entry to school which meant that by the time they reached Grade 10 they were adults. Some richer children went to **private schools** in Shashemene.

462. In SNNP generally large numbers of students from Grade 5 upwards went to towns for education so that town schools often had more rural than urban students (Jennings, 2001:18). Young people from Girar could attend a Grade 9-12 school near Imdibir town which had a plasma TV.

463. As Table 72 shows while there were increases in admission to **Preparatory Grade 11** for both males and females targets for 2008/9 were not met.

**Table 71: Changes to Admission for Preparatory Grade 11 2004/5-2008/9**

	2004/5	Target 2008/9	Status 2008/9
Male	45,671	181,915	118,289
Female	31,582	110,165	83,257

Source: Education Statistics Abstract 2001 E.C.: 6

464. **TVET admissions** between 2004/5 and 2007/8 rose by less than 1000 and were way off target; actual admissions for both sexes of 95,563 compared with a target of 304,058. Female admissions, which exceeded those of males by over 2000 in 2004/5 fell by around 900 with the result that the male admission rate was very slightly higher than the female in 2007/8.

**Table 72: Changes to admission to TVET (including non-government) 2004/5-2007/8**

	2004/5	Target 2008/9	Status 2008/9
Male	46,161	148,380	47,997
Female	48,481	155,678	47,566

Source: Education Statistics Abstract 2001 E.C.: 6

465. TVET was available in towns near **Geblen** but most students dropped out after Grade 10 as their grades were not high enough to join the preparatory schools for university or TVET due to the high pass marks linked to shortage of places and they could not afford private colleges. TVET was not available for young people from **Dinki** or **Korodegaga**.

466. In 2009 there were a few boys from **Turufe** attending TVET in Shashemene and at least one girl attending a private college. An NGO which supported selected children through school paid for them to go to private colleges if they did not get a good enough Grade 10 result.

467. In **Yetmen** in 2007 new TVET centres in the wider area led to increased attendance. In 2009 centres were opened in nearby towns leading to further increases in attendance although people complained about the choice of subjects (masonry, carpentry, electrical household appliances) and

poor quality of the education. Richer parents could send their children to TVET in Debre Markos where subjects such as surveying were taught. One rich young woman was attending a nursing school at the cost of 13,000 birr. There was a suggestion that the children of poorer parents would follow the courses at Bichena consolidating class differences.

468. There was an educated youth unemployment problem in **Girar** and no TVET institution in the vicinity which was problematic for those with nowhere to go after Grade 10 and there were youth organised into co-operatives who needed skill training. However, in 2010 the Catholic mission organisation had started building a TVET due to start operating in the near future. Many young people were said to have taken the exam to train as HEWs, DAs and teachers.

469. National admissions to degree programmes in 2008/9 were 110,850 and not so far from the target of 116,097. The gender gap was reduced but women still constituted only just over a third of the total intake.

**Table 73: Changes to admission to degree programmes (including non-government) 2004/5-2007/8**

	2004/5	Target 2008/9	Status 2008/9
Male	27,522	71,980	70,397
Female	8,883	44,117	38,070

Source: Education Statistics Abstract 2001 E.C.: 6

470. Among the **drought-prone** sites **Geblen** had most young people who had attended universities. Children from more than 5 families had joined universities and several had graduated and had jobs. No-one from **Dinki** had been to university although there were two examples in the area. In **Korodegaga** there were at least two households with sons with university degrees and one of those recently got a government job.

471. For young people from **Yetmen** a university had recently opened in Debre Markos and there were a number who had already graduated from other universities. Two male students from **Turufe** were at university. In Cheha wereda (**Girar**) 2008 people requested the opening of a university and in 2009 the Prime Minister laid the foundation stone.

472. Despite a target of 21,138 people to be admitted to post-graduate degree programmes the number admitted fell from 3,884 in 2004/5 to 3,772 in 2008/9.

473. **Religious education:** Two students from Dinki were studying in Saudi Arabia in 2010 and at least two from Korodegaga had gone to study at a madrasa in Bale. One of these had dropped out.

### ***Rural youth: changes affecting work-related transitions since the mid-2000s***

#### **Changes affecting the three work-related transitions**

474. Table 74 shows there were increased cash-earning opportunities but in the work was casual and precarious, not providing secure economic independence or a long-term attractive work career.

**Table 74: Changes to the livelihood context of youth work-transitions**

	Yetmen	Turufe	Girar	Geblen	Dinki	Korodegaga
	<i>Integrated and self-sufficient communities</i>			<i>Remote and drought-prone sites</i>		
Wereda	Enemay	Shashemene	Cheha	Saeisa Ts/Emb	Ankober	Dodota
Region	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
Livelihood system 2005	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>tef &amp; wheat exported to Addis</b> ; maize; livestock; grain trade; some migration	Rainfed plough agriculture: <b>potatoes &amp; grain exported to towns</b> . Off-farm activities; some commuting and migration	Rainfed mostly hoe agriculture: <b>enset</b> , coffee, eucalyptus. <b>Urban migration &amp; linkages</b> .	<b>Drought</b> -stricken plough agriculture: livestock, bees; agriculture; cactus; stone masonry. Regular emergency <b>food aid</b> ; <b>PSNP</b> in 2005. Migration to Humera and towns.	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; seedling nursery; livestock. Regular <b>emergency food aid</b> . Some <b>migration</b> .	Rainfed plough agriculture vulnerable to <b>drought</b> ; some <b>irrigation</b> ; livestock. Regular emergency food aid; <b>PSNP</b> in 2006.
Changes	<b>Irrigation</b> for vegetables; selected seeds and fertilisers use up two crops using <b>BBM plough</b> ; <b>bull fattening</b> . Increased daily labour and petty trade. Increased migration	Drought and <b>food aid</b> in 2008. Increased work opportunities in <b>Shashemene</b> from 2007 and petty trade. Seasonal migration started. Migration to Ziway <b>flower farms</b> . Female migration to Gulf.	Increased demand for chat and eucalyptus - <b>increased cash crop income</b> . Female migration to Gulf.	PSNP and OFSP institutionalised. OFSP focused on livestock & bees ineffective. <b>Easier road access for work outside Geblen</b> . Increased <b>income from migration</b> : for agricultural work, and work in towns. Steadily increasing numbers pursuing mostly illegal <b>migration to Gulf states</b>	Increased though still limited use of irrigation, better growing techniques, <b>increased market demand</b> . Growing <b>migration</b> for work.	<b>Considerably increased irrigation usage</b> – co-ops, govt scheme, individual farmers, inward investors. Increased daily labour. OFSP Future of <b>PSNP</b> in doubt after 2010. Illegal <b>migration to Sudan</b> growing,

### Changes in cultural repertoires related to work-related transitions

475. **Customary repertoires** related to work did not change: men should farm, women should become farmers' wives, and children should contribute labour to the household economy. Religious rules regarding working times should be followed.

476. **Modern repertoires** expanded with appreciation of green revolution and other new technologies, new crops, and new livestock breeds in the rain-secure sites and of irrigation and green-revolution technologies in the drought-prone sites. Not all young men could become successful smallholding farmers; some might achieve formal jobs via education while the remainder would have to seek their fortune through a mix of informal farm/non-farm activities including commuting, and shorter and longer -term migration within Ethiopia and international migration. Individual responsibility in work and for credit was seen as better than being made to join a group. In the drought-prone sites there was some concern about dependency on regular food aid and OFSP packages which required rain.

477. **Government ideology**: the introduction of PSNP and OFSP in selected drought-prone weredas reflected a recognition that agricultural policies for drought-prone and rain-secure areas needed to be different, though there was concern about creating 'dependency' through PSNP. However ideas about providing packages to suit particular livelihood systems did not seem to have reached weredas. In Girar attempts to introduce a standard agriculture package in the enset-coffee/chat-eucalyptus site were not successful while the OFSPs in drought-prone sites were agricultural

packages which could not succeed in a drought. There was an emphasis on co-operatives rather than markets and re-settlement rather than migration. There were different kinds of packages for rural and urban youth.

478. **Donor ideology:** support for PSNP was based on ideas about social protection; there seemed to be less interest in OFSP and opposition to re-settlement. Internationally the poverty reduction and MDG approach involved no action on economic development other than calling for market development and privatisation. From 2006/7 there were more explicit statements of the need for government to develop rural-urban linkages, promote/facilitate mobility, and promote non-farm activities in rural areas.

## **Changes to smallholder and other agriculture affecting youth transitions**

### ***Changes to access to land***

479. If anything ideas and institutions relating to access to land grew even more complex. Investors and women's youth co-operatives were added to the list of those with potential rights to land. Women's rights to land as daughters and on divorce/widowhood/addition of a polygynous wife also added a new set of claims. These new claimants did not have much sympathy from kebele officials but could make their claims at wereda level which many were doing successfully.

480. There was no individual land distribution in Dinki, Geblen, Turufe or Girar. In **Yetmen** land from people deemed to have no heirs was **distributed** to sons and daughters of farmers who had had land taken in 1997 because they had been Derg 'burocrats'. In **Korodegaga** in 2006 60 hectares of land to be irrigated by the new government pump was distributed to 240 households who already had land. A lottery system was used to determine which plots people got. In 2008 40 hectares of communal rainfed land were distributed to landless youth on an individual basis and in 2009 5 hectares of irrigation land were distributed on an individual basis.

481. In **Turufe** wereda officials described **youth landlessness** as one of the three main development challenged. In **Yetmen** most youths were said to be landless apart from those who had received a small plot from their parents and those who had received some in 2004 when land deemed to have had no official inheritors was distributed (see below). Respondents from **Girar** said that landlessness was not known in the 1990s but was a growing issue in 2010. In **Korodegaga** in 2005 there were many complaints from a large group of landless youths known locally as *jirata* or dependents. In subsequent years there was some distribution of communal land to mostly male youth on both individual (see above) and group bases (see below). In **Geblen** landlessness was reported as a very serious issue and a younger landless generation was identified; in the past they would have been considered as 'dependents' on their way to getting access to land whereas for some in 2010 this may never be the case. There had been some official response in the provision of plots of residential land in the kebele centre Mishig to 38 young households with children. **Dinki** respondents said that young men were less easily able to form their own households as there was limited access to land. Most continued to work for their parents in the hope they would gradually be given some land to exploit for themselves.

482. **Women's access:** In **Yetmen** the land registration process to include wives in registration began in 2008; those who tried to exclude their wives changed their minds when told their land would not be registered at all unless they were included. When asked men usually complained that women had more rights, for example some said they could get married to a man just to take land when divorced (even if they didn't have a child) and they could insist on divorce even if the husband did not want it. One poor man said husbands forced to give half their farmland to divorcing wives face critical shortage of land. On the other hand ensuring women's land rights will help men to marry women with land. Young men seemed more in favour of the law while a rich man and a poor woman pointed out that women had these rights during Derg times although now they are being fully implemented.

Women usually said that the registration had made no difference to their lives; some were grateful for the guarantee and thought it would increase respect between married couples.

### Box 62: Wife asserts divorce rights in Yetmen

#### From Yetmen

After two years of separation and a court dispute he was forced to accept a formal divorce. The court decided to equally divide his property with his wife. This was unfair caused him poverty as half of his small land (1 *timad*) was taken by the wife. Now his land was so small he could not afford to re-marry and form a family. ... the court always gave decisions against men and in favour of women so that 'women simply get married and leave dividing and taking land when they want.' Divorced ex-priest 42

483. In **Turufe** women's land rights had improved; single women and second wives had been able to argue they had rights to land and many had obtained land certificates. There was an example of a married daughter who came back from where she was living when her father died and asked for her share of the land. When the family refused she went to the wereda court and won the case. An elderly woman said that one indication of progress was that nowadays a husband does not contract out land without the consent of his wife. If she does not agree that contractual agreement will not be binding. One woman was able to take her case to the wereda when her husband married a second wife. Her daughter insulted the new wife and her husband tried to beat the daughter. He refused to give her a share of land and the social court did not give a prompt solution on the grounds that he wanted to continue the relationship with her. The wereda decided in her favour and she obtained a larger share of the land than him since the children are living with her whereas he is with his second wife. In 2009 a widow who was inherited and had two children by her husband's brother but was neglected by him took her case to court and was granted the right to obtain one *timad* of land to raise the children.

484. The law and registration system in **Girar** realised women's rights to land as certificates for private land had to be in the two spouses' names in male-headed households, and some female-headed households got access to land (e.g. of their deceased husband or upon divorce). The two-spouse registration was resisted by some husbands and polygamy raised difficulties.

In **Korodegaga** cases taken to the wereda by women being replaced by subsequent wives led to some distribution of property to the original wives. The rights of daughters to inherit parents' land was implemented in some cases. In **Dinki** women's potential access to land had improved. The land registration and certification process had entitled not just female-headed households but also wives to land rights and a share of the land in the case of divorce. There was resistance particularly among the Argobba to having the names and photographs of their wives on the land certificate on the grounds that the Sharia law does not entitle women to an equal share of land but rather to a payment on divorce. Those who did not produce photographs were not given certificates. Some men suggested that attitudes of men towards women were changing since they fear having to divide their land in case of divorce. Some women pointed out that divorce is not that easy and claimed that asserting land rights for women who have married into the community and did not have kin may be difficult.

485. In **Geblen** people said that women's right to equality has been respected since the area was liberated in the 1980s by the TPLF so women had equal access to land when it was re-distributed by locally-elected *baitos*. When land certificates were issued in Tigray women's land was certified under their names as individuals. Since 2002 there has been a rule that women, demobilised soldiers and youth should have priority access to any land becoming free.

**Yetmen** respondents reported quarrels with siblings and parents over **land inheritance**. In **Turufe** they said that the right of girls to inherit may have made the situation more difficult for male youths. Daughters in **Geblen** have had equal inheritance rights since the TPLF era. In **Korodegaga** there was opposition from men refusing to share their parents' land with their sisters until the wereda court

insisted. There was a report of 'corruption in the court and archive'. A wereda official said that the court was not making decisions on the division of property quickly and when a woman took her case to the Women's Affairs they intervened and found that the archivist had hidden the file to delay the court appointment. Men were supportive of the law when the household land increased when their wives got parental land, but opposed it when their sisters come to claim a portion of parental land. One woman who had benefited said that her brother refused to share her parents' land with her and five other sisters but was forced to when they went to the wereda. A rich respondent said his wife had inherited land from her parents in another area so the family had benefited. In the long-run he said 'Oppression will be reduced in the community and equality promoted; that makes Allah happy'. However a number of other respondents said that the law was 'creating disappointment between brothers and sisters and in the long run would loosen the social bonds of the community'.

486. **Share-cropping and leasing:** Land legislation introduced in 2007 allowed people to rent land for three years with the agreement of the kebele and 25 years if the contract was made at wereda level. In **Yetmen** there were a lot of land-leasing, renting and equal share-cropping interactions in the community. Young men said this was the main way in which they could get access to land. The main land leasers were women household heads, old people with a labour shortage, and some 'lazy to deal with farming'. Farmers with oxen and money were the main lessees. Accessing land this way was reportedly harder as the price of land had risen. In 2010 lease price for rainfed land was 700 *birr* and for irrigable land 1300 *birr*. In **Girar** one element of the campaign to leave no land idle was a move to increase renting. Youth in **Geblen** could only get access to land by share-cropping or using their parents' land. During droughts in **Korodegaga** some farmers some rented out their land in order to buy food or pay debts leading to less income in future.

487. No land in Yetmen, Dinki, or Geblen had been given for **youth co-operatives** though this was the case in both Oromia sites and Girar.

#### **Box 63: Youth co-operatives in Yetmen unable to access land**

##### **From Yetmen**

He was a member of a youth co-operative formed by 10 land seeking young men in which he was serving as chairman. He explained the group was like an Iqub or iddir having the objective of starting some business after obtaining farmland or urban working place. For this they have been paying 1 birr monthly contribution fee each so that they have about 300 birr collected as contribution and through fines. Young divorced man living with mother aged 24.

He had heard that the government would provide credit and land to help the youth run group development activities. He said he and other young people didn't even like taking land in group, which he thought would be difficult to manage collectively. He noted that if the land could be given individually even the community would be voluntary to provide from the grazing land. Another divorced young man living with mother aged 24

488. There were no **inward investors** in **Geblen, Dinki** or **Yetmen** though in the Yetmen a concern was expressed about potential attempts to take land for them. In **Turufe** the kebele management had granted an investor about 15 hectares of communal land but he had not started to plough as he had not received the final permission from the wereda investment department. He was an Ethiopian from Canada who had returned to Canada assigning a representative to follow-up on the case. **Korodegaga** had had some land investors at least since the time of the 4<sup>th</sup> Derg. In 2010 there were some who came to rent land from farmers on a short-term basis, three who were established, and a recently-arrived investor from Australia who was using drip irrigation. A flower farm had opened near **Girar** but closed due to quality control issues raised by the ILO and financial difficulties related to inflation.

### **Changes to youth involvement in smallholder farming**

489. In **Yetmen** irrigation farming of vegetables increased considerably. In the mid-2000s there were 2 farmers using irrigation; in 2010 there were 25 pumps in the site. Young women and men whose parents have irrigated land work on it, digging, watering plants and protecting the fields from animals and potential thieves. The older male youth Focus Group said that the introduction of irrigation had greatly motivated young people to work hard and produce twice a year. Some young men produced their own crops using land and pumps from parents enabling them to save money. Irrigation farming had also increased in **Korodegaga** and **Dinki**. In 2009 5 hectares of irrigation land were distributed to landless male youths.

490. In **Geblen** and **Korodegaga** young people could get credit for sheep, goats and other livestock from the extension and package service. In Geblen the Development Agents were meant to supervise use of the loan but there were many case of misuse of the money.

491. The younger male FG in **Korodegaga** said that before their parents got irrigated land they '*were playing the whole day with their friends*' but '*now we are working on our parents land to get money when we go to market.*'

### **Changes in youth involvement in agricultural labour**

492. There were better employment opportunities during harvesting and weeding in **Yetmen** than in the surrounding area though unlike in other kebeles many people in Yetmen were reportedly not willing to engage in daily labour and non-farm activities considering them low status. In the past owning land provided a full livelihood but by 2010 newly-formed households did not have enough land to support their expenditure so women were looking for work. They could work as daily labourers on other people's farms for 15-25 birr a day (males paid better for the same work); working on irrigation was an emerging activity.

493. In **Turufe** recent migrants formed an underclass of agricultural labourers who had come to Turufe hoping to improve their lives. Many were sponsored by previous migrants though in some cases brokers in Shashemene arranged for them to find employers. If they were hard-working and lucky to have an employer who became a patron they could improve their lives. The employer would register the labourer as a dependent with the kebele which would enable them to get an ID card. Males might be allowed to sharecrop some land on their own account enabling them to buy oxen. Some employers helped arrange for male migrants to marry, set up their own households, and farm on their own account. Migrant men tended to marry women who had migrated from the same region. Some migrants suffered abuse with little recourse. They could be sent away by employers if there was a quarrel and could even be denied wages. In one case a migrant had been working for an employer for five years and was sent away empty handed but fortunately fared better with subsequent employers.

#### **Box 64: Agricultural labourer in Korodegaga**

##### **From Korodegaga**

MH (24) worked elsewhere for his parents until they died in 2005 and then needed to find work. He came to Koro in 2006 to work for a woman head of household (BF) as a farmer. He was not paid but had been given a plot of land 'for me to use as a salary'.

*Since I started to work on her farm she has benefited. Her wealth is increasing and she could buy oxen, construct corrugated iron house, pay debt from irrigation, plant vegetables and buy other livestock as I am working strongly on her farm. I have improved her living standard to a great extent. This also helps me to improve my life and accumulate wealth in the future. I worked on 0.75ha of teff last year but failed due to the drought. I also had bought 2 sheep from 2000 harvesting season that were sold to pay the punishment.*

While he was working on BF's irrigation land one of their neighbours came and told him not to work on the land as it belonged to him and not BF. '*This conflict aggravated and we quarrelled*'. The neighbour took the case to the

wereda court with false witnesses. *Most people supported him as I originally come from another area. The court decided I was a criminal and I had to pay 2300 birr. The punishment highly reduced my wealth. BF helped me in contributing money for the punishment and was a guarantee for me.*

Like others MH got good production in 2007/8; this was sold to pay the punishment. He had recently bought a goat and it had a kid. In 2007 BF asked the kebele to include him as a member of the family to be registered for food aid and they agreed. As he was not a member of the kebele participation in community organisations was not allowed for him.

494. A similar growing underclass of agricultural labourers could be found in **Korodegaga**. Some came as seasonal migrants from Amhara Region while others came from nearby areas to work as agricultural labourers. Box 64 describes the ups and downs in the life of one such labourer. There were some opportunities for agricultural daily labour in **Girar** and **Dinki**

### ***Youth co-operatives and development packages***

495. Youth development packages were introduced in **Yetmen's** wereda in 2006; they included athletics projects, group organisation for agricultural development and credit to engage in micro-enterprise activities. Youth could only receive land in groups and on a contract basis to work collectively. Wereda officials said 474 young men and women had organised, received unused land and started group agricultural production through pump and canal irrigation. In 2007 kebele leaders and DAs in Yetmen announced that landless young people could get land for collective agricultural production if they formed group associations consisting of 10 or more members.

496. By the time of the research there were 13 land-seeking youth group associations in the kebele, 4 of them being in Yetmen got. The chair of one of these groups with 10 members explained that they operated like an iqub or iddir with the objective of setting up a business after obtaining farmland or an urban working place, though he expressed doubts about trying to manage it collectively. They had been paying 1 birr per month and accumulated 300 birr. However the community ('our fathers') had refused to give any communal land to the youth groups and many youth had refused to organise in groups saying the land should be given individually. There was also concern that youth who share-cropped/rented land or worked on their parents' land would not be considered as landless or jobless. The bureaucrats had argued that communal land should only be given to their children. One man suspected that it was a ruse to give communal land to investors suggesting the youth would use it inefficiently giving the wereda an excuse to take it away.

497. A spinning co-operative was established in 2009, initially for young women but then adult women joined. They contributed 3 birr a month each; the kebele gave them an office, the women spun cotton and sold it and produced 55 kg of *teff* from a small plot of land given by the kebele. However the leader said that some plants had been destroyed by people in the community.

498. Many urban unemployed youth had been involved in small businesses with credit. About 2 million birr was reportedly given to micro-enterprises but much of this had not been repaid as expected. Common problems were low repayment rates and the use of loans for quick profit-making rather than the agreed development oriented activities. Urban Yetmen was reported as doing much worse than other kebeles. Five micro-enterprise groups were set up involved in cafeteria/food preparation, metal work, poultry, fattening activities, but all had disappeared due to mismanagement and disagreements among members. Only one food preparation business had survived as the responsible wereda office allowed one of the group members to run a private hotel, using all the resources left and gradually re-paying the group loan.

499. In **Turufe** the **youth association** had 600 registered members in 2010 but few paid the contributions of 3.25 to the wereda. One young man in his late 20s said that the wereda came to register the landless youth and hold elections, but since nothing much happened thereafter and there were no regular meetings or teaching the youth leaders began to leave to look for work. For instance three elected members in 2009 left seeking jobs. Members do not come to meetings since

there is no place for them to meet and the association shares a room. Allocation of communal land to youth came after the wereda instructed the Kebele to register landless and jobless youths. Around 155 youths were ascertained to be really landless and jobless and they were organised into three associations: one for forestry, one for seedlings and the third for vegetable and fruit production. Most were male. Against opposition plots were taken from the communal grazing land and allocated in 2008. A woman respondent said it would prevent youths from engaging in anti-social behaviour but she was concerned that apart from the land there had been no further support and the groups were slow in getting organised. She felt that not all group members were fully committed and it would take time for the group to develop a sense of responsibility and a good collective working spirit. The **Youth League** was formed in 2009 to involve dedicated youth to be the vanguard in implementing development interventions prioritised by the OPDO party.

500. In **Girar** young households lacking land were organised in co-operatives to engage in farming and non-farming activities. This was a recent trend: communal land was being parcelled out and given for use under contracts to those groups and for other usages as part of a recent big push for 'no land to remain idle'. Activities included cultivation, livestock production, and opening small shops and tea-chops. The kebele could take the land back if they did not start their activity immediately. While wereda officials were upbeat about the long-run youth package programme the story from Girar was mixed. Wereda officials said that the kebele administration and community were willing to provide communal land but the performance of the Youth Association was 'not as expected'. Kebele officials reported budget constraints, repayment problems as it was due too soon, and the fact that the co-operatives were rarely established on the basis of shared interest and understanding among their members so often faced problems. There was no support for activities that didn't fit the pre-determined package options; for example women's pottery. One gap reported was skill training.

501. In **Korodegaga** after 2008 62 hectares of rainfed land was distributed to 157 youths in five co-operatives, four all male and one of mixed sex while 33.5 hectares of irrigable land had been distributed to 111 youths and women organised in co-operatives. Two groups of 7-8 youths had been given 2 hectares of land while a third co-operative of 35 youths was producing maize and green peppers. Wereda officials said the stone-crushing and splitting co-operative failed as the stone was of low quality and the sand production co-operative failed because the poor road access created a transport problem. Participants in the co-operative which loaded lorries with vegetables from the irrigation production said that they had deposited 8000 birr in the bank and shared the rest of the income so far. One youth co-operative was allocated 26.9 hectares of irrigable land by the kebele leader with the agreement of the wereda but subsequently wereda officials asked him to give it to an investor. When he refused he was insulted by the officials and resigned before the issue was settled. The land was given to an investor from Australia. Adults in the Irrigation Association had also refused to hand over a pump intended for an irrigation Youth Co-operative which they had been lent to use until the youth received land. The case was not resolved at the time of the research as 'there seem to be differences of allegiance within the wereda'.

502. Some members of the older male youth Focus Group said they had paid the debts of their parents from the money they earned through the co-operatives. They no longer had to sell firewood and theft was reduced. They also said they are a cause of school drop-out as students are not allowed to be members of co-operatives.

503. In **Geblen** a bee-keeping youth co-operative which also included youth from a neighbouring tabia was organised with help from World Vision but due to drought it met with little success. In 2009 the administration had collected lists and promised to send young women to Mekelle to learn skills such as woodwork and pottery but nothing had happened.

504. In **Dinki** there was a strong sense that not very much had been done to address the problems youth face with regard to lack of opportunities for access to land or employment. The chairman of the Youth Association said there were 400 members registered in 2007 starting at the *got* level and

fees of one birr were collected in 2008 but that the association was not very active because nothing was done after the meetings. In 2009 discussions were held with the wereda and kebele officials for the youth to transport sand to market and quarry red stone for construction, but nothing happened. According to the former Kebele chairman they were not given a permit. The Wereda promised credit for beehives, chickens, bull fattening, sheep and goats but none of these ideas were put into practice. When the association asked the wereda for land for trees they told them to go to the Kebele that gave a group of 100+ people a small plot of two *timad* on the mountain. However, three individuals claimed the land was theirs and cut down the trees. The association took the case to the wereda; the trees were returned to them but the three men got the land and the Kebele leader would not support the youth association. So the association abandoned the case.

505. Recently the kebele gave space for shops for seven youths in Chibite. They were promised credit to buy commodities but that did not materialise. Only those who could borrow from relatives were able to open shops. If the rest did not use them the shops would be taken away. The youth association chairman was disillusioned and would like to see land on mountains for tree planting given to the youth and the promised credit to be provided. However, he said that when the youth asked for land, people said it was needed for their livestock. Likewise a group of older boys expressed scepticism about interventions for the youth because of broken promises. They mentioned another suggestion that they would be organised to become involved in silk worm breeding but nothing came of it. Both male and female youth expressed a sense of frustration that the various suggestions had not resulted in any concrete action.

### **Changes affecting domestic and other home-related work**

506. Time spent on domestic work is reduced where electricity is used to power grinding mills and drinking water points are easily available. In 2010 women in villagised **Yetmen** and **Turufe** had relatively easy access grain mills which was only a change for Turufe. Three grain mills had been set up in **Geblen**'s kebele centre although these were still a long way from the remote kushets. There was a private water mill in **Dinki**. Women in **Korodegaga** had to walk a long way to reach a mill. Women for **Girar** had to go to Imdibir town with their grain.

507. There was not much change in access to drinking water. In **Girar** and **Geblen** access to clean water was a big issue for many people. In **Korodegaga** everyone used river water as did most people in **Dinki** where there was one renovated spring. There was reliable piped water in the centre of **Turufe** from 2008. Urban **Yetmen** had had piped water and a few rural residents who lived nearby could use it, although a dispute between the urban and rural communities had led to a reduction in access for a time. Rural **Yetmen** had a borehole and people used their own hand-dug wells and communal water points.

508. In the 2010 fieldwork there were some reports of greater domestic work contributions from adult and young males, particularly in fetching water and wood, although in **Dinki** the younger Focus Group said that increased daily labour opportunities on irrigated land meant that young males had reduced their contribution.

### **Changes in non-farm local work**

509. **Korodegaga** saw a reduction in wood-selling as a result of increased opportunities for daily labour on irrigation farms and FFW. Otherwise there were no non-farm opportunities in the site apart from one resident who worked as a Life Guard at the Sodere Resort.

510. In **Dinki** a some young people started charcoal burning but it was stopped for environmental reasons. Otherwise there were few non-farm opportunities for youth. Promises from the wereda had mainly come to nothing except for the provision of space for a few who could raised the credit to open kiosks in Chibite.

511. In **Girar** researchers came across only one youth (a trained woodworker) with a permanent job (guard for an NGO).

512. In **Yetmen** new opportunities for women included temporary work on the construction of Yetmen Health centre for which the wage was 7 birr a day; there would be more building work once the construction of the new secondary school got under way. Women were also more active in trade, buying from wholesalers and selling in small amounts and/or bringing grain and other agricultural products from other places to sell. Women of lower economic status were involved in the preparation of areki, mainly in the rainy season, which they sold in the market. A few ironed clothes in the market, some made and sold dungcakes. In Yetmen town there were reportedly many prostitutes from different places.

513. In **Turufe** many women migrants worked as domestic household labourers, which provided them with lodgings and food and a meagre salary, or on a daily basis which was better paid but more unreliable. If they were hard-working and lucky to have an employer who became a patron they could improve their lives. The employer would register the labourer as a dependent with the kebele which would enable them to get an ID card. Migrant men tended to marry women who had migrated from the same region. Women with children found it very difficult to find employment as employers resented the food given to the children and time spent looking after them. One such migrant from Wello who had two children was first employed for 15 birr by an employer who then sent her away. She relied on charity and begging during the threshing season for food and for money to take her child to hospital. Women also faces risks of rape by men in the household (see above). There was also a risk that the status of migrant domestic worker would be inherited. One migrant worker had a 10 year old daughter who did not go to school. Another was the daughter of a former migrant from Gurage who was also a domestic worker. She had a child from a son in the household and tried to poison herself. Women domestic workers with children were often desperate and one said she was thinking of giving her children for adoption.

514. A few women earned income from **petty trading**, including road-side trading or running or working in small shops and cafes which have emerged in the village. Some prepared areki for sale in local towns and there were a few who worked as traders, sewing clothes, or hairdressers.

515. **Turufe** has been known as a place where groups of youth **steal** crops and livestock and people going to market have been attacked. **Girar** respondents said that when people were working away from home it 'was easy for snoopers to steal *chat*'. In **Geblen** '*teenagers have the bad habit of stealing from relatives and neighbours*', though improved security had reduced this activity.

516. Yitbarek (2010) studied youth employment in small and micro-enterprises in Jimma town and concluded that the major problems faced included lack of regular working and income, poor managerial and control systems, lack of job security and conflict among co-workers. Young people found it hard to start and expand enterprises due to lack of access to finance, raw materials and markets. Local institutions and culture as well as administrative and regulatory frameworks were not supportive. An earlier study in Addis Ababa (Mekonen 2006) found that the main barriers young entrepreneurs faced were lack of business infrastructure, financial problems, lack of demand, a '*less encouraging societal attitude towards young entrepreneurs*' and being less favoured by government promotional activities.

### **Changes in work in and for the community**

517. The PSNP was in place in Geblen and Korodegaga from 2005. In **Korodegaga** assistance was usually provided for 6 months of the year from February through July. About 70% of the community were said to have benefited. The work included road maintenance, cleaning irrigation channels, removing the partinium weed, and fencing official buildings but mostly terracing which a kebele official said had been destroyed by cattle. Members of the younger male Youth Focus Group saw mixed benefits in the programme: '*The food protects us from disease and enables us to learn at*

*school without hunger. In contrast it harms us when we are absent from school to participate in terracing'*. Some, though not all, community work which had been conducted on a 'voluntary' basis was done through FFW.

518. Most people in **Geblen** participated in PSNP. Of the 185 Youth Association members 70 worked on the PSNP and 115 were dependent on their parents.

519. In **Yetmen** people participated in work considered to be beneficial to the community; this included gully work which prevented erosion and the digging of ponds to water livestock. They did not respond to calls to participate in community work in which they saw no value. There was community work for road construction and environmental conservation in **Girar** which respondents seemed to support.

520. In **Geblen** since 2009 people were expected to contribute 40 days of free community work for environmental protection and re-habilitation but in later 2009 the community decided to allow people to work harder so as to reduce the number of days needed to carry out the '40 days' to 20. At the same time people mobilised 'on their own initiative' to work 6 additional days (done in 3) in memory of a local notable TPLF member.

### **Changes in migration**

521. From **Yetmen** linkages with Metema in the lowland of North Gondar were reported; some migrants had used land there to produce sesame. There were people living in Addis Ababa, Bahirdar and Debre Markos who sent remittances; most were engaged in trading with some educated with jobs. Most of them had migrated some while ago.

522. Migration had become important for younger women in **Turufe** particularly with the emergence of the flower farms in the Rift Valley. In **Korodegaga** there has been regular recruitment into the army for many years; in 2010 a few young men and women had migrated for work in the Gulf and Sudan (probably illegally).

523. Urban migration has been a long-standing tradition in Gurage **Girar** (*'they flee to the towns in search of fortune'*) including girls sent to work as housemaids, a practice which was reported to have decreased. Starting in 2007 young women, including Grade 10 leavers and earlier dropouts) have been migrating to Arab countries (Dubai, Lebanon, Beirut and Saudi Arabia) to work as housemaids. They contacted their employers through agencies in Addis, sometimes just by sending a photograph and talking on the phone.

524. There has been a long history of temporary migration from **Geblen** including to Eritrea, which stopped being possible in 1998. Until then some went to Saudi Arabia via Eritrea. In 2010 there was male migration to Humera and Afar for daily labour. Some women migrated to Arab countries legally. Recently numbers of youth (mostly male) illegally migrating to Gulf states via Yemen increased year by year with some journeys financed by credit provided for other purposes. One woman paid 10,000 birr, made a long, tiring and very dangerous journey on foot and by boat through Djibouti and Yemen and spent 20 days in prison in Saudi Arabia before being flown back to Addis. Yet she planned to try again. Another was successfully settled in Saudi Arabia and regularly sending remittances to her parents. Also more women were migrating *'to look for a better life'*; to towns to work as housemaids or commercial sex workers and to the Gulf. Some left their children with their parents..

525. No notable changes in migration were reported from Dinki where in 2005 it was reportedly rare (see Section 3.4.8).

526. Desta (2010) investigated the causes and consequences of irregular migration of young adults from the Kembate-Tembaro and Hadiya zones to the Republic of South Africa. Over 80% of migrants in his study who came from randomly selected household in four randomly selected weredas were

male and 57% were aged 20-34; 73% were from rural areas. 95% were literate and most had secondary education. The movement of young adults was facilitated by a network of human smugglers with bases in Addis Ababa, Hosaena, Dilla and Nairobi. Most of the return migrants were unemployed before they migrated but on return 92% were employed. Most were earning a higher income than before and than non-migrants. However, many migrants reported that their journeys were harsh with unexpected negative consequences and they had experienced robbery and theft while in South Africa.

**Table 75: Changes in local and migration opportunities for youth 2005-10**

	<b>Yetmen</b>	<b>Turufe</b>	<b>Girar</b>	<b>Geblen</b>	<b>Dinki</b>	<b>Korodegaga</b>
<b>Region</b>	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia
<b>Local youth work possibilities 2005</b>	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented land <sup>3</sup> ; daily agricultural & manual labour; servant – herding / agriculture; tea houses etc; grain trade; petty trade.	Farming parental/own /share-cropped/rented rainfed & irrigated land*; daily agricultural & manual labour; servant: herding / agriculture. Petty trade.	Farming parental/own land; daily agricultural & manual labour.	Farming parental/own/share-cropped/rented land*; FFW	Farming parental/own /share-cropped/rented rainfed & irrigated land <sup>3</sup> ; daily agricultural & manual labour; servant – herding / agriculture; weaving/spinning; petty trade.	Farming parental/own /share-cropped/rented rainfed & irrigated land*; daily agricultural & manual labour; servant: herding / agriculture; FFW
<b>Local youth work possibilities 2010</b>	Family and daily labour on irrigated vegetable plots	Urban work in booming Shashemene; Three youth co-operatives given land	Increased demand for chat and eucalyptus;	No change – youth co-operatives but no land and drought	Manual work opportunities in new town in nearby Argobba special wereda	Distribution of rainfed land to landless young men; increased irrigation so more daily labour; a few youth co-operatives
<b>Established migration opportunities 2005</b>	Seasonal agricultural migration	Commuting rather than migration.	Regular urban migration linkages well established	Stone masonry Seasonal to Humera	Seasonal migration for agricultural work;	During severe droughts migration to relatives in less-affected communities
<b>Migration opportunities 2010</b>	More youth attending post-secondary looking for service work	Legal female migration to the Gulf. Ziway flower farms.	More opportunities in expanding urban areas Female legal migration to the Gulf for domestic work. More youth attending post-secondary looking for service work	More opportunities in expanding urban areas; Rapid expansion of mostly illegal male migration to the Gulf through brokers. Legal female migration to the Gulf.	Seasonal migration for agricultural work; urban migration for unskilled work	Legal female migration to the Gulf; A few young women and men have illegally migrated to Sudan through brokers

### **Changes in youth work roles**

527. **Mixing livelihood portfolios:** available work being precarious increasing numbers of landless young men were surviving on a mix of agricultural labour, other daily labour, trade and perhaps

migration of different durations. Most un(der)employed young women who were not married could live as dependents performing some home-related work.

528. **Taking longer to get locally established:** the older male youth Focus Group in **Yetmen** said that young men given land by their parents could save good money by producing and selling grain from their own land while living with their parents which they could invest in animals and renting additional land. One example was a young man who was able to save enough to start buying grain from farmers and selling to wholesale traders and then to become a wholesale grain trader himself. An example from Turufe was a 28 year-old Tigrayan who used to live with his father. He began as a labourer but moved on to renting and share-cropping and was gradually able to build a house on land given to him by his sister, get married and acquire livestock including two oxen, a cow and a donkey. His first marriage ended in divorce but re-married to a woman from Tigray who was brought through relatives. He was hoping to improve his livelihood as he had enough livestock and a wife to help.

529. **Unemployment of educated youth:** In **Girar** the Women's Association's leader explained that in their meetings all women expressed deep concern about their unemployed children, primary or even secondary school leavers who could not get land, had become less attracted by farming and were also not interested in jobs like shoe shining, yet there were no employment opportunities as there was no industry or big business in the area. In **Geblen** there were many unemployed youngsters who had no chance of education after Grade 10. *'The youth are left without any positive vision and lack motivation to use their potential to create or engage in productive activities'*.

530. **Migration** was on the increase among young people in all sites though individual stories varied a lot. Motivations included lack of land and local employment opportunities, drought and people giving up hope on agricultural activities, education failure, and the pull of urban life.

### ***Rural youth: changes affecting family-related transitions since the mid-2000s***

#### **Changes affecting living in and leaving the parental household**

531. While we do not have quantitative data the qualitative evidence from 2010 suggests that in all sites a number of changes must have impacted on the behaviour of young people living in parental households and the relationships they had with their parents. These include (1) decreasing chances of getting access to land, (2) increased participation in education in and beyond the community, (3) greater economic independence as a result of daily labour opportunities, (4) increased opportunities to migrate, (5) more mixing with the opposite sex, (6) increased opportunities to 'go off the rails'.

532. Some of these changes improved parent-youth relations, for example in Yetmen the school was teaching pupils how to communicate with their parents. Others were problematic, for example scarcity of household land leading to quarrels with parents and siblings over its allocation and use. The implementation of daughters' rights to inherit the land of parents who had died had increased tensions between siblings.

533. We came across a number of examples of youth who had migrated for work without consulting their parents, probably because they would have tried to stop them.

#### **Changes affecting getting married**

534. There were no changes to the local **cultural repertoires** and incoming **ideologies** relating to marriage except perhaps, as the marriage laws were increasingly implemented, the idea that a lower marriage age of 18 was too high for girls was entering local modern repertoires. When people in the communities talked of 'early marriage' they were likely to mean under 16 rather than under 18.

535. There were changes in **actual marriage practices** related to land pressures, increased education and petty income-earning opportunities for both sexes, and implementation of the Family Law. In all sites failure by a young woman to get married unless she was successfully pursuing education was still a big concern.

536. In **Dinki** the problem of early marriage had not been so serious as in some parts of Amhara, although it was not uncommon for parents to give their daughters in marriage between 14 and 16. Parents were often keen to marry their daughters in part to broker good relations with potentially desirable in-laws and to protect their daughters from possible abduction, unwanted pregnancy or the risk of not finding suitable partners; if challenged parents simply claimed their daughter was older than she was. Girls from wealthier families were likely to be sought after earlier although wealthier parents were beginning to value girls' education. Some women suggested that attitudes were changing whereas some men said there was no change and a group of young men thought the law should be enforced.

537. Talking of **Yetmen** wereda officials said that implementing the law against **marriage before 18** had provide difficult. The success of their interventions was 'small compared with the endeavours' though there some kebeles had become good examples. Before marriage girls were sent to Bichena health centre where an estimate of their age was made. Recently they had been asked to take pictures when their as some parents were sending older daughters to take the place of the under-age girl to be married. The kebele used to punish people involved in early marriage but that had been changed to the wereda; the punishment has become eight months. They said there was still a problem in rural Yetmen though there had been some improvement. This was partly attributed to difficulties in establishing a household and living an independent life due to lack of land and higher levels of education. Youths who had recently married were involved in trading.

538. In the community respondents said there were now two kinds of 'early marriage': the first was where two families made an agreement that their small children would marry but waited until the children had reached the age the law allowed— 18 (promissory marriage); the second was when girls married under the age of 18. Both kinds were reportedly practised by some but not others. Teachers and other officials including Women's Affairs told parents to send their female and male children to school equally and to send female students to school rather than making them marry. Some girls whose parents were trying to force them to marry told the teachers who tried to stop it. In most cases when a girl married she ended her education although the young women's focus group argued it was having children that mattered rather than marriage.

539. Early marriage was said to have been abandoned long ago in **Geblen** and it was said to be not such a big issue in **Girar** as elsewhere in the country though wereda officials had focused on it. People in **Korodegaga** said that early marriage was not practised though this did not mean that no girls married before they were 18. 'Early marriage' was not common in **Turufe**.

540. According to wereda officials compared to the past the chances of **choosing a marriage partner** in **Yetmen** were increasing, particularly for educated girls. Most girls' marriages were initiated by parents but depended on the consent of the children and there was a tendency to get to know each other before the wedding. However there were still some girls who were married to a man they had never met. Households interviewed in 2010 talking about marriages in recent years included a girl who had been promised as a child who had recently married, a daughter in secondary school who 'was made to drop-out for marriage' while a second daughter continued in Grade 9, and a poor household whose son and 15-year old daughter were married at the same time to the daughter and son of another household in a customary arrangement.

541. In **Dinki** choice of marriage partner was usually arranged by parents taking into account the family's reputation and there were still cases of abduction. However, very recently some Amhara and Argobba young men and women had chosen their own partners though parents were not happy

about it. Most girls did not reject their parents' suggestions as their parents' house remained their second home. Unlike in the past women married against their will could leave their partners.

542. In **Gebien** marriages were still commonly arranged by families, although the idea of marriage by mutual consent had emerged among the young generation and educated women. Choice of partner was an issue in **Girar** forming part of a broader campaign around gender equality. Girls were encouraged to report to teachers and other officials if their family wanted to marry them against their will. In **Korodegaga** forced abduction was no longer common but there had been an increase in voluntary abduction which did not involve bridewealth; the couple eloped and the parents usually accepted the fact and in due course arranged a ceremony called *mels*. One observer suggested that at least half young women who married now chose their own partner though it was less likely if they were rich. Young men did not accept parental choice. In **Turufe** forced abduction was no longer prevalent and couples were increasingly making their own decisions about getting married.

543. People in **Korodegaga** reported not much change with regard to **polygyny** although a rule had been introduced that the first wife should agree to the second marriage or he should give the first wife her share of property before marrying the second. There had recently been a case where an abandoned first wife 'accused' her husband at the wereda and refused to leave the house. The problem was resolved by community elders and she received a share of the property. Widows had the right to refuse to be **inherited** by their dead husband's brother. The older female Focus Group said that *welgera* marriage which involved exchanging women between different families had been abolished.

544. In Turufe recently women finding their husband marrying a second wife had taken their cases to the legal advice committee and on to the wereda women's affairs office. Women who found their husband staying with another woman needed to report the case before three months had elapsed, since the new Oromia Region Family Law gave rights to a woman who has been living with a man for three months to be confirmed as his wife. There were campaigns against **widow inheritance**.

545. In all sites evidence suggested that limited access to land to set up an independent household and economic life had led to some postponement of marriage particularly for young males.

## **Changes affecting having children**

### ***Conception failure, contraception, abortion, extra-marital conception***

546. No change reported in attitudes to **infertility** or services to deal with it.

547. There were reports from **Yetmen** that many people understood the benefits of **contraception** mainly as a result of increasing shortages of land to give children. It was particularly important for poor households and young people. Religious leaders who were questioned were in favour of it. The Muslim leaders in **Dinki** opposed contraception but respondents said that contraceptives were readily available and used including by teenage girls who were able to have pre-marital sex; they were also said to have disguised extra-marital affairs. Most husbands agreed with their wives taking contraceptives but even if they did not women could obtain them from the Health Post when they went to Chibite for meetings or markets. The HEW claimed that usage had risen from 10% to 95% and that only some Argobbas were resisting. Discussions with older youths and girls suggested they were keen on family planning as fewer children would mean better care, and girls would not have to look after younger siblings to the same extent, or have to migrate to look for work. Girls also suggested that an abducted girl would use contraception if she was planning to run away from the man to marry another.

548. In **Girar** HEWs could provide pills, injections and condoms. For 'Norplant' implants women were referred to the health centre as the wereda plan to train HEWs on implanting the 'Norplant' device had not yet started. The HEWs believed that 75% of the mothers in Girar used the family planning programme (around 560 households) and a number of younger women said they used

**contraception** and appreciated that the HEWs reminded them to take it. However there was still stiff resistance to family planning from the Catholic Church and some husbands who had nicknamed the HEW '*you are drying our race*'. One woman said that in response to this HEWs stopped the service even though her husband knew that she was using contraception and that as a result she fell pregnant.

549. In **Turufe** though there was improved access to family planning first through volunteers trained by NGOs and then through the HEWs young women may fear being seen taking contraceptives and some husbands were against it. In **Korodegaga** the supply of contraceptives was unreliable and kebele officials said that this was one reason why the birth-rate had not fallen. Some husbands had refused to allow their wives to use them but it would be easier for them to do so secretly when injections were given at the Health Post rather than the wereda which would soon happen. The older female YFG said '*most youths have too many children and give birth with one or two year gaps because there was not a regular contraceptive service in the area. Currently almost all are using it but get pregnant during the gap in provision*'.

550. Family planning has been in place in **Geblen** for a long time but not that much used in practice. The kebele leader believed that not more than 5% of women used pills. The HEW said that 22 of women were using implants and 12 of these had the consent of their husbands. Another 23 women used other means. This slow progress was mainly due to high resistance among men and mistaken beliefs according to tabia officials and the HEW, for example that contraception makes people sterile, or that injections give HIV/AIDS. As men are still reluctant only 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the women having adopted some contraception have done so with the knowledge of their partner. However, our interviews also suggested that beyond the reasons that they evoked, the women themselves may not always have been convinced. The kebele leader explained that the sign that family planning education had not succeeded was that the '*birth rate is still increasing in the kebele*'.

551. Some women continued to use traditional medicines to procure **abortions** in **Turufe** while others went to individuals in Shashemene who conducted abortions. In **Dinki** abortions may be disguised from men as miscarriages, though some men said they had heard of women going to Debre Birhan for an abortion. In **Yetmen** there had been cases where aborted infants were found but the mothers could not be traced. The modern health service would provide abortions but girls usually used traditional herbs. There had been a very few cases where girls had died trying to abort. In **Girar** abortion had been legalised under the new family law and the health centre in Imdibir offered safe abortion services for women who signed to confirm they wanted to have an abortion. The health centre head said that the service had begun to be used. But some women said that the health centre staff did not respect women's privacy – like in the case of a girl who went to ask for an abortion and the nurse went to discuss the case with the school dormitory head.

552. An increasing number of younger girls faced pre-marital pregnancy in **Turufe**. Young women who become pregnant were said often to want to have the child and live with their parents when the father denied the child. Pre-marital pregnancy seemed to be quite common in **Geblen**. In **Yetmen** extra-marital pregnancy was said to be not that common though it had been increasing among those aged 15 - 20. Young women may get pregnant while attending secondary school outside Yetmen and the numbers doing this have increased. Girls who were pregnant were not accepted for marriage. In **Korodegaga** three women without husbands said they used contraceptives when they needed to.

553. A study of 708 young women in Bishoftu town in 2009 found that around one-third of sexually active female respondents did not use contraceptives and about 20% of those who had ever experienced pregnancy had an abortion (Mosehe 2009). A similar study in Lalibela town found that 70 out of 400 randomly selected young women had experienced pregnancy and that 89% of these had been unwanted. Of those with unwanted pregnancy over two-thirds had an abortion (Mohammed, 2007). Younger females were more at risk. Most did not go to government health

organisations and those that did said they were inconvenient and not well-organised for the needs of youth.

554. Alwei (2010) studied 723 males and females aged 15-24 in rural and urban districts in an Oromia zone. The mean age of sexual debut was 17.2 for males and 16.5 for females. A considerable proportion exhibited high-risk sexual behaviour including multiple sexual partnership and inconsistent or non-use of condoms. Communications between parents and youth on sexual matters was very low.

555. Four hundred female university students and 40 service providers were asked about their knowledge and use of emergency contraception. Less than 10% of the students had used EC.

### ***Pregnancy and childbirth***

556. In **Korodegaga** when asked about health services neither wereda nor kebele officials mentioned **pregnancy** and **childbirth** services though the older female Youth Focus Group said they have been advised that when they become pregnant they should take a vaccination and have a blood test. A woman respondent said that because of distance pregnant mother follow-up may be interrupted. The HEWs did not mention pregnancy follow-up though a poor man said his wife had gone to the health clinic for pregnancy checks and follow-up after birth until the baby was 9 months old. They could not provide a delivery service as they had no equipment. In **Turufe** women tended to deliver at home or at the hospital; antenatal and postnatal care was not properly set up in the HP in 2010 and HEWs were not trained to deliver children, though some TBAs were provided with training.

557. In **Yetmen** it was estimated that around half of pregnant mothers went for monthly checks to the clinic. The wereda provided iodine supplements for pregnant women, breast-feeding mothers and children 6-23 months old. The number of pregnant women targeted was less than planned because there were fewer pregnant mothers than projected. Wereda officials said that better delivery service had started in a number of places, including Yetmen, with the addition of better equipment, though full delivery materials were not available. Yetmen's service was above average: there was access to electricity and it was on a main road. Many mothers delivered at home with the help of Traditional Birth Attendants though some said that their use was declining as many mothers gave birth in the clinic. Sometimes women with complications were referred to Bichena. The 15-19 female FG members said there were not enough delivery materials and not enough human power when there were complications during delivery.

558. The HEW in **Geblen** started follow-up of pregnant women and simple delivery services in 2008 as the health post received the necessary equipment from the wereda, including a bed, forceps, a blood pressure gauge, a stethoscope and iron tablets, and she had attended a three-month training programme for midwives in Edaga Hamus and Mekele. However, the distance to the health post was a disincentive for women and follow-up at home as suggested by some women was difficult: there was only one HEW in 2010 and distances between homesteads were considerable. The HEW said that 60% of women got some follow-up and 30% delivered with assistance and that Geblen was a model kebele in this respect. But she was concerned by her lack of skills in cases of complications and there were not enough drugs and ANC kits. She wanted more ANC skill training. Also delivery at night was impossible as there was not light and women still wanted to deliver at home as '*they are shy to deal with the HEW*'. There were cases of husbands not letting their wives see a health worker for anything.

559. Ante-natal care was available in **Girar** through the HEWs and trained volunteers who went house to house giving vaccinations and detecting risks of complications. Though UNICEF had provided safe delivery equipment to the Health Post there had been no training and the Health Post lacked water and electricity. Women assessed as at risk were referred to the Health Centre or hospital. The HEW would provide assistance to women delivering at home if called. UNICEF gave the

**Dinki** Health Post a delivery bed, steriliser and kerosene in 2009 and one HEW was given training in delivery

## **Changes affecting the setting up of new households**

### ***Changes affecting setting up an independent household***

560. Increasing numbers of young people, land shortage and un(der)employment increased the obstacles for young people desiring to set up independent households with reportedly more unmarried older youth and married couples, some with children, living in parental households or compounds. Distribution of 40 hectares of individual land to dependent youth in **Korodegaga** in 2008 enabled a number of young people to set up independently while this was assisted in **Geblen** by distribution of plots of land in the tabia centre to young married people with children. There no reports of action to assist young people to set up independent households by, for example, providing residential plots, in the other four sites.

### ***Changes to inheritance***

561. An added complication to the murky situation related to inheritance described in Section 3.5.6 was implementation of the right of daughters to inherit parental land and other property when the last parent died. This was said to have been practised in **Geblen** since the TPLF era but elsewhere it had the potential to disrupt the careful allocation of family property already undertaken as each child married. In one example in **Korodegaga** a daughter who had married out of the community presumably receiving her share of family property in the form of bridewealth returned on the death of her parent to claim land which the son who had been working the land and looking after the elderly parents had thought would be his. She took her claim and that of her four sisters to the wereda and won the case which left the son with a sixth of the family land. There was a similar case in **Turufe** when a married daughter came back from Assela when her father died and asked for her share of the land. The family refused by she went to the wereda court and won the case.

562. There were no reports of the implementation of daughters' inheritance rights in **Girar** or in the Amhara sites of **Yetmen** and **Dinki** though historically women in the Amhara culture have been able to inherit land.

## **Changes affecting divorce, death of spouse and re-marriage**

563. In all sites there was some implementation of Regional family laws giving land rights to widows, divorced and polygynously married women. This made them more attractive candidates for re-marriage although a number of our respondents in these positions expressed no desire for another husband, particularly given that their children would become 'step-children'.

564. In **Geblen** in 2008 44% of household were **female-headed** estimated as: 35% widows; 30% divorcees; and 35% abandoned by their partners. People in the community gave different explanations for this large proportion of female-headed households, which were all confirmed by one or several cases reported in the interviews: many men died during wars against the Derg or Eritrea more recently; unmarried young women had babies outside of wedlock and were abandoned by their partners; men (especially young) abandoned their families to migrate and seek better opportunities; men had several partners and only one was the official spouse. Some women also had a more than one partner.

## ***Rural youth: changes affecting community-related transitions since the mid-2000s***

### **Changes in repertoires and ideologies affecting community related transitions to adulthood**

565. There were no significant changes in local customary and modern repertoires relating to community management nor in *Wahabbi* Islamic and ethnically-based political ideologies. Though the basic government ideology relating to community governance did not change in most respects there was a recognition that efforts to make community members conform with government directives and legislation would have to be intensified if government development goals were to be met. This demanded a greater penetration of the bureaucracy and communities by the party whose members would constitute a 'vanguard' of motivated and disciplined change managers. They would change the way community members thought in the different development fields through regular 'awareness' raising in meetings at kebele, sub-kebele and cell levels. And they would change people's behaviour by offering incentives such as awarding conformers Model status and sometimes prizes and dishing out punishments for non-conformity including fines, vague threats and in some cases imprisonment.

566. With regard to youth transitions to community adulthood young people still had to be married and running independent households in order to be accepted as social adults by the community and to have land and pay taxes for the government to accept them as full citizens. Even if they were they would not be very powerful since in all sites wealthier adult men dominated political activities and positions in both formal and informal organisations.

567. However, one lesson from the 2005 election had been that youth exclusion and disaffection were a problem and to respond to this the government increased its efforts to involve young people in community affairs as a collectivity through revival and strengthening of Youth Associations. When the majority of young people showed little long-term interest in these Associations in 2009 the Youth League, a party-based organisation designed to act as a youth 'vanguard', was established

568. In this context the participation in the community of many young people was limited to economic activities within and beyond the household, community work representing their household [for some], school attendance [for some]<sup>22</sup>, socialising with networks of friends, religious participation [for some], possible participation in 'ethnic' activities beyond the community, participation in Youth Association meetings [for some]. Those who were household heads or heads' wives could join community-initiated organisations such as *iddir*.

### **Changes in participation in local networks and community-initiated organisations**

569. There was more social interaction among teenage males and females as a result of greater school attendance. The younger Korodegaga YFG said they '*feel free in the school compound and play in school with boys freely.*'

570. Young men in Korodegaga had customarily related in clan-based groups which occasionally acted as gangs. A respondent said that the increased activity of the Youth Association and youth co-operatives had increased youth networks where before there were few.

571. Urban linkages increased as a result of school and work migration.

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<sup>22</sup> These three areas have already been discussed.

## Changes in youth relations with the community

572. In all sites there was considerable **co-operation between youth and older generations**. For example in **Girar** parents commitment to their children's education was said to be increasing although there were concerns about Grade 10 failures and university drop-outs. The interviews also showed that young people supported their parents in various ways including in some cases being the main breadwinner. Others provided support in times of crises, brought gifts during visits, and/or sent remittances to help the family in its local undertakings. However, there were also many tensions revolving around struggles over cultural repertoires as well as struggles over the key resources of wealth, status and decision-making power.

573. In **Girar** some adult respondents were critical of some of changes affecting youth, including **girls wearing jeans** and sneakers, increased interactions between the sexes and chat addiction.

574. In **Turufe** some young people had been attracted to **Protestantism** creating tension in Oromo Muslim families. The trend worried Muslim leaders so much that they asked Protestant leaders to hold talks about it which the latter refused to agree to.

575. The older female YFG in Korodegaga said that if youth got the resources they would be better than the government Models. The older male YFG in Geblen claimed that the **prevailing pattern of land ownership was an obstacle to improved food security**. Most young people, who would be better able to get good production if they had land, don't have land. On the other hand, there are people with large land and access to water/irrigation facilities nearby who don't use the land they have effectively. The youth requested change many times, and there was a meeting at the zonal level where the administration informed them about a plan to redistribute land for the young, but so far there have been promises only. One of the youth said '*Our parents are our enemies*', and in this situation most lose hope and want to migrate.

576. Respondents from Dinki said that despite the norms of respect for elders tensions over inheritance and land shortage meant that the **youth were often frustrated**. This was compounded by the lack of other opportunities for young men and women for income-generating off-farm or non-farm activities. According to the former Kebele chairman this had resulted in a situation where **intra-household conflict** and even violence sometimes erupted including murders according to one respondent. In Yetmen there were quarrels with siblings and parents over land inheritance.

577. Relations between adolescents and parents in Yetmen were reported to be more open; children were **taught in school how to communicate with their parents**. Some young people were reported as respecting adults and the elderly and caring for them though there was also a view that most youth did not respect the elderly believing that they know everything '**Keep quiet I will speak**'.

578. In Turufe traditionally there has been a strong culture of respecting the elderly. Older men with control of resources were able to command the respect and allegiance of their children and other community members. In the mid-2000s Turufe was characterised by many large households in which older children remained within the parental household. Since then due to land shortages, limited employment opportunities and increased investment in education **many youths left the village**. In one case two daughters left to look for work without telling their family to avoid being stopped; later they began to send remittances. The independent incomes of those who migrated and sent remittances were much appreciated by their parents.

579. The only change reported from Korodegaga was the **increasing numbers of young women choosing their marriage partner**; one observer estimated at least half. Young men were said no longer to be willing to accept their parents' choice of marriage partner. In Dinki too young people were **questioning the authority of elders** for instance with regard to the choice of marriage partners.

580. In Turufe too there was reportedly a decline in respect for parents and authority. Those who frequented drinking houses risked addiction and others had become involved in **anti-social behaviour and theft**, working less hard and/or creating problems for their families. Couples were increasingly making their own decisions about getting married.

## **Changes in youth relations with government**

### ***Changes in youth organisations***

#### Youth associations

1. In **Dinki** the organisation of the Youth Association started at *got* level but was made at kebele level in 2008. There had been two activities: the failed youth co-operative described earlier and contribution of labour and money for the kebele health post. *'When promises were broken repeatedly the youth participation decreased from time to time. It was not addressed because of this even the leaders were dispersed.'* The wereda youth association sent letters and visited once or twice a year to call youths for a meeting *'But no work is done after all the promises they made .. It is better if the association start to work rather than having countless meetings.'*

2. In **Geblen** youth associations at sub-kebele level were introduced in later 2005. In 2010 it had 185 members. Since 2005 over the years 134 male members and 1 female member have migrated to Saudi Arabia; they transfer the list of migrants to the kebele and wereda administration and recruit new young members. The activities include collection of 300 birr to cover part of the medical expenses of a young man; organising 13 young people who were given 46 modern beehives by the wereda; preparing a study of land use near the kebele centre following which plots of land were given to 38 young people with many children for the construction of houses; gaining access to the school sports ground for all young people and participating in inter-kebele running and football competitions; distribution of condoms and raising awareness on HIV and latrines. Young women were reluctant to participate in the association *'because they are discouraged by men'*. They provided monthly reports to the wereda Youth Association. The Head of the YA had recently become vice speaker of the Council and could propose ideas and projects to benefit youth. *'For example as a result of their effort, the council has decided to cut matured eucalyptus trees, that were planted during the Derg regime, and to distribute the unoccupied land to the young people for the construction of residential house.'*

581. The non-government Youth Association in **Girar** was founded in 1995; there was a clan problem and to alleviate this a 'kebele unity association' was established. Currently there were 28 members. There was another youth association including some younger youth who would be able to join when they were older. There was a credit service for members with an interest rate of 5%. Recently involvement in community development activities had increased; they take part during weddings and funerals, road construction and other community work and helping the elderly and needy and poor people with their farms. They had no contact with the wereda youth office but there was a strong relationship with the kebele leadership who assigned work for them including collaboration with DAs in environmental protection and natural resource management. The officials periodically attended their meetings. There were some women members.

582. In 2008 the **Korodegaga** Youth Association was divided into 3 co-operative and its role became *'nil'*. The leader went to the wereda for training and brought youth ID cards from the wereda. Kebele officials gave him guidelines on how to help the youth and called him when they wanted youth to be called which was mainly for meetings. The kebele manager taught youth through cells (youth living closer) about peace, development and health. The DAs gave awareness on agricultural development for the youth during meetings. The wereda co-operative office had set a rule enforcing youth to contribute to registration fees to be a member. When they faced a shortage of money they blamed the YA leader for excluding them from membership.

583. In **Turufe** the 'federation of youth' was established in 2008. In 2010 it had about 600 registered members but the activity of the association '*was weak*'. There was considerable turnover among the leaders as most of them went to different zones in Oromiya to find jobs. The main purpose of the association was said to be to keep the youth together and make them available when the kebele or wereda needed them for development activities. Also jobless youth were organised and offered forest or farming land though only those who took forest land had done anything. The main challenge was that the youth didn't come to meetings and if they had come the office could only accommodate 50 rather than 600. The wereda youth association sent people when a '*new order comes from the above tiers*.' The relationship with the kebele leadership was good '*as we don't meet much*'. Earlier there was a dispute as the '*kebele hate the youth that comes to the kebele office and intervenes in some issues when the kebele got out of line*'. The leader said that though the wereda pushed a lot that youth should be organised and given recognition '*the kebele is not taking the association seriously*'.

584. The Youth Association in the kebele in which **Yetmen** was a sub-kebele from 2007 had a management committee consisting of chair, vice-chair, secretary, treasurer and 5 ordinary members. In 2010 there were 750 registered members. The main activities had been organising landless youth in groups with 10-16 members in order to obtain land and start group farm activities and mobilising youth to participate in kebele development activities. Nine groups were formed and one (not in Yetmen) had rented irrigated land from 2 farmers and planted crops. The Chairman said that young people participated in community development activities and meetings '*much better than adults*'. However, wereda officials had not been as co-operative as they promised in helping youth obtain land and credit and participation in the association had been declining as a result. In 2009 they had approached elders to help them to convince the community to provide land to youth but the community did not agree. In 2008 around 800 youth attended meetings but they had had to cancel their last meeting due to lack of a quorum. Most members had almost stopped responding to the leadership. The committee sent performance reports to the wereda which sent them forms and guidelines. They had visited to explain about the formation of the Youth League at Regional and Federal levels and the YA chair was also the Chair of the Youth League whose members were party supporters..

#### Youth league

585. The Youth League was only mentioned in Yetmen and Dinki; there was no description of activities.

### ***Changes in political participation***

#### Youth participation in local issues

1. In **Korodegaga** the older female YFG said that over the previous five years the government had encouraged youth to participate in local issues and make decisions. But it was not effective in practice, especially for females, and only a very few participate in meetings. '*The community does not accept young female interaction in reality*'.

#### The 2010 election

586. There were no opposition candidates in any of the six sites in the 2010 election and government parties won all the seats. Box 65 provides some opinions from within the communities

### **Box 65: Some rural views on the 2010 election**

This year's election is not considered to be an election by the people, as there is only one party that is involved. The previous election (1997) was hot and CUD won in the Wereda.

The young people are expressing their resentments upon the government while they are drinking alcohol. Members of the party discussed about the issue in their meeting.

Most women support the EPRDF and male and youths lean towards the opposite parties. What the people are saying in meetings and what they really think about the election are different i.e. from their heart people are supporting opposition parties but telling you they support the leading party. Women are really supporting the party in power owing to the privileges they got through gender laws and related advantages. The men assured that, they will never elect EPRDF, even if opposite party will not present there. Women have different idea from this, they are ready to elect it as before. They said it helps us to know our legal right and we are able to practise it. In this gov't women become powerful, economically, socially and politically

In the history of the wereda this is the first year in which there was no opposition party. In the election campaign, all members of the kebele cabinet were included. There was frequent meeting of the kebele cabinet including the school director, the kebele chair and vice chair, DAs and health post workers. However, later on, the DAs were sent back to work in the community. There was a circular from the woreda mentioning that development workers and health extension workers should not be involved in the election affairs.

### ***Changes to youth passages between the mid-2000s and 2010: conclusions***

#### **Changes in important features of actual transitions**

587. Improved second chances – e.g. ZH in Korodegaga who became pregnant though not married and then had an abortion. The family was unhappy about this and 'made her become abducted' which was facilitated by her brother. She was 18 when she became the third wife of a man in another community, living with his first wife who was unpleasant to her and suffering food shortage and a big workload doing daily labour. She became pregnant and returned to her mother's house but the child died as soon as he was born. In 2010 she was 22, doing domestic work and daily labour, but also attending Grade 7 at Sodere school. Her aim was to complete her education with a good result and get a better job

## Part III: Looking to the future

### Learning from the ELCS rural and urban communities

588. In this section I describe potential futures for the six research sites on the basis of current trajectories and describe features of the fourteen WIDE sites whose recent trajectories are not clear since they have yet to be re-visited in the WIDE3 programme. Speculation about the future trajectories of these communities assumes not significant changes in the macro economic or political context.

### Looking to the future in the WIDE3 sites

#### Possible future trajectories of the six Stage 1 communities and implications for youth

589. In the WIDE3 Stage 1 final report (Bevan, Dom and Pankhurst 2010) we speculated about the future trajectories of the six research communities; here we suggest some implications for current and future cohorts of young men and women.

590. Each rural community system in Ethiopia is on a trajectory dependent on its historical path and current context. A key parameter in determining its path is the community-based livelihood system. In considering the trajectories of the six Stage1 communities since the mid-1990s we first distinguished between those which showed signs of structural change and those reproducing the same structures. We then categorised the communities according to whether the livelihoods on the whole showed improvement, stasis or decline.

591. Matrix 1 shows where each of the six communities lies on these two dimensions. Speculating on the evidence for each community we suggest that all of the communities continued on much the same course between 1995 and 2003 and beyond to 2008 or so, with minor and cumulative changes which pushed them further from equilibrium but no important changes to the control parameters determining the direction of the community. However, by 2010 internal and external changes in three of the communities had pushed them to states of disequilibrium or 'chaos' (in the language of complexity social science) such that they are very unlikely to remain on their historic trajectories.

**Matrix 1: Possible Stage 1 community trajectories from 2010**


Community-based livelihoods	Structural Change	Structural Reproduction
<b>Notable improvement in community-based livelihoods</b>	<i>Turufe</i> – will become a Shashemene suburb fairly soon <i>Korodegaga</i> – (PSNP site) likely to institutionalise a community-wide mixed irrigation system which will reduce dependence on drought-prone rainfed agriculture	<i>Yetmen</i> – economic growth as a result of higher prices for grain sold and use of selected seeds and fertiliser; some irrigated vegetable growing <i>Girar</i> – economic growth as a result of investments in chat and eucalyptus and improved opportunities for Gurage urban migrants
<b>Relative stasis in community-based livelihoods</b>		<i>Dinki</i> – (emergency food aid site) small improvement for some as a result of an increase in use of irrigated land (still a minority)
<b>Decline in community-based livelihoods</b>	<i>Geblen</i> – (PSNP site), regular droughts, over 40% female-headed households; recent rapid youth exit	

592. The economic fortunes of Yetmen and Girar are likely to continue to improve. If the towns grow there will be a few more informal sector opportunities for youth but many of the landless will have to migrate. Dinki's future partly depends on the weather although food-for-work will provide a

backstop; few new opportunities for resident youth are likely unless there is development of tourism in the area. Turufe is on the way to becoming a suburb of Shashemene if the building boom continues; youth will have increased urban opportunities mostly in the informal sector. Irrigation in Korodegaga is likely to be consolidated though it is not clear whether the mix of institutional regimes (individual smallholders, co-operatives, investors) will be sustained. One possibility is a large commercial irrigation scheme in which case many young people would likely become employees. Unless tourism is developed in the Gebelen area it is likely that the youth exit will accelerate despite the presence of PSNP and a household asset-building programme.

### The other fourteen WIDE3 sites

. Map 2: The twenty WIDE3 research communities



593. The fourteen WIDE sites which have not been researched since 2003 provide exemplars of a number of other community livelihood types, local cultures and Regional policies (the four established Regions) with potentially different implications for young people's lives.

594.

595. Map 2 locates the sites. Eight of them are located in PSNP weredas and the WIDE3 team will be researching them in late 2011 and early 2012 and there is a plan to re-visit the remaining six sites in 2013. There are Stage 2 PSNP sites in all four Regions.

596. **Harresaw** is located in the Eastern zone of **Tigray Region** in *Atsbi wereda* and is a highland site on the eastern escarpment. In 2003 the main production was cereals notably barley. Livestock sales, migration and the salt trade were the major sources of additional income. The site used to produce a regular surplus but became vulnerable to famine

597. Located in **Amhara Region**, in the Lasta area, **Shumsheha** is a lowland site near the airport of Lalibela Town. In 2003 the main crops were cereals and pulses, with limited irrigation. The area is vulnerable to famine and many people migrated out in search of work.

598. Two sites from the **Oromiya Region** are in PSNP weredas. **Adele Keke** is a middle altitude site which produced a variety of cereals and vegetables and the cash crop chat. It is by the roadside near the town of Alemaya that provides a ready market and when it rains the site can be considered to be fairly rich; it has some wealthy inhabitants. However the site has regularly been affected by rain failure and in bad years is dependent on food aid. **Gelcha** is located in Oromia Region among the pastoral Kereyu. The site is in a lowland area which has been affected by the introduction of irrigated farms and the establishment of a park. In 2003 the Kereyu relied largely on their livestock although some sedentarisation and cultivation had been taking place. The Kereyu have found their livelihoods becoming more vulnerable in part owing to externally induced pressures.

599. The remaining four PSNP sites are in the SNNP Region. **Aze Debo'a** is located in the Kambata area, in the highly populated *enset* growing area. In 2003 cereals, pulses and vegetables were the main crops, and cash was obtained through sale of livestock and their products, eucalyptus, *chat* and coffee, and trade and migration. **Do'oma**, is in North Omo Zone within the Gamo area, is a lowland site set up initially as a voluntary resettlement project in 1985. In 2003 the main production was cereals notably maize and the main sources of cash were cotton production and weaving and trade in livestock products. The site relied on irrigation but was vulnerable to drought.

600. Located in the Southern Region, Wolayta Awraja, Bolosso Wereda, **Gara Godo** is a densely populated middle altitude site within the *enset* growing area. In 2003 the main other crops were maize, vegetables, and fruit. Trade and migration were the main sources of cash together with sale of coffee and livestock products. **Luqa**, a Tsamako site, is in South Omo Zone. It is an agro-pastoralist lowland site relying partly on traditional irrigation. In 2003 the main crops were sorghum and maize and livestock were an important source of cash.

601. There are six Stage 3 sites all in areas of agricultural potential: one in **Amhara Region**, one in the Southern Region and four in Oromiya. The four sub-sites near the town of **Debre Berhan** are in Amhara Region, in Basso and Worana and Debre Berhan Zuria *weredas*. The area is a highland cereal producing area that is generally self-supporting.

**Adado** is a community in the Gedeo Zone in the **Southern Region**. It is a middle altitude site within the *enset* growing area. In 2003 coffee was the major cash crop. Both hoe and ox-plough agriculture were practised to produce a wide variety of crops and livestock. The site was considered to be considered fairly rich, although it was hard hit by the drought of 2002.

602. **Sirbana Godeti**, located in **Oromia Region** in the fertile Ad'a plain 20 kms from Bishoftu/Debre Zeit,, are two mid-altitude road-side villages producing cereals, notably *tef* and pulses. In 2003 *tef* was the major cash crop and livestock and their products were also traded. The area was a surplus

producing area linked to nearby markets and was fairly prosperous. The site of **Odawata** is located in Arsi Zone. In 2003 cereals and pulses were produced as well as vegetables on irrigated land. The site was within a agricultural surplus producing area and fairly well off.

603. Located in Jimma Zone the village of **Somodo** was a mid altitude site producing cereals, pulses and *enset*. In 2003 coffee was the most important cash crop and some villagers were involved in trade, and the sale of livestock products. The area was fairly prosperous. **Oda Haro** in West Shewa Zone, was in a maize-producing area. In 2003 other crops included other cereals, pulses, oil seeds, and *chat* for cash crops. The areas was fairly psorperous.

### ***Potentially missing rural livelihood systems***

604. We do not know what economic changes have occurred in the vicinity of the remaining WIDE sites and we will not know what types of rural community are missing from our sample. None of our sites is in a Developing Regional State where some rural communities are likely to be affected by land-leasing and the Commune Programme for Developing Regional States. However the pastoralist sites in SNNP and eastern Oromia may have experienced some related changes.

### ***Prospects for young urban migrants?***

605. The analysis suggests that increasing numbers of young people will be living urban or peri-urban lives as time passes. In this section we briefly describe key aspects of youth transition in two urban DEEP sites.

606. Shashemene is in East Shewa Zone in the Oromia Region, approximately 250 km south of Addis Ababa. The town is economically important and in the mid-2000s was expanding quite rapidly compared with other towns probably because of its location as a junction for most towns in the southern part of the country. The road from Addis Ababa to Kenya runs through it. The market area (**Arada**) is in Kebele 08/09 which in the mid-2000s had a population of almost 15,000. The kebele served as the nerve centre of the town containing the bus station, the oldest and most popular church, the grand mosque and the biggest open air market. It was densely populated and predominantly a slum area with rich and middle class pockets.

607. In the mid-2000s the population of Addis Ababa was around 3.5 million constituting about 60 percent of Ethiopia's total urban population. **Kolfe** was located on the western edge of the capital and was considered one of the semi-peripheral parts of the city recognised for its informal business activities. The ring road, constructed in 2004, bisected Kolfe. The Kolfe area is sub-divided into a number of neighbourhoods or *Sefer*, four of which were selected for the ELCS urban study: *Birhan Chora Sefer* – relatively better off; *Soramba Sefer* – vegetable-growing; *Dorze Sefer* – mostly Gamo weavers; *Kuteba Sefer*: middle-wealth people most of whom had served in the army or police force.

608. Table 76 provides some information about youth passages in parts of Shashemene and Addis Ababa in 2004. The three measures used for normative adult status are for males – head of household, married, at least one child and for females – senior wife, married, at least one child.

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### **Table 76**

## Longer-term impacts on youth passages of government interventions 2003 - 2015

609. In this section we look back at the impact on youth passages of government policies and programmes introduced during the SDPRP and PASDEP periods and forward to potential impacts of those planned in the Growth and Transformation Plan. As described in Section 2.5 two perspectives are adopted. First, using a top-down view of policies under sectoral heads including Youth Policy, we describe how each affected (SDPRP/PASDEP) and might affect (GTP) male and female transitions looking at intended and unintended consequences including knock-on effects (Section 6.2). In Section 6.3, from a bottom-up perspective, we look at each of the gendered transitions experienced by young people and consider how the combination of development interventions affected them and might affect them in future. The Section concludes with a summary of the mental models and institutions relating to youth which are implicit in past and planned government policies.

### *A top-down perspective: tracing the impacts of each sets of interventions on youth transitions*

610. Some government interventions, such as early marriage legislation, have direct consequences for particular transitions with possible knock-on effects for other transitions. Others, such as access to TB treatment/land given to an investor improve/reduce the chances of a young person making a successful transition. In this section for each sector policy we consider direct effects on transitions, knock-on effects on other transitions, and positive and negative impacts on transition chances.

611. The period from the mid-2000s to 2010 is described below as the PASDEP period since these were the years when policies contained in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to Eradicate Poverty were pursued.

### **Health, water and sanitation**

612. As shown in Sections 3 and 4 improvements over the years in **contraceptive provision** have made it less likely in some rural communities that pre-marital sexual initiation will lead to pregnancy and possible for married girls to postpone birth and in some cases continue their education. However there were still problems which included irregularity of supply and lack of confidentiality deterring single girls in some places from seeking the contraceptives though the spread of injections and implants was reducing the visibility of using them. Freedom from fear of pregnancy on the part of single girls might put them at risk of contracting HIV also increasing risks for male partners.

613. Modern **Mother and Child services** had a greater take-up among young women although a number of sites lacked the necessary mix of equipment and HEWs trained to use it.

614. Many young people, particularly those who had attended school and, for example, had become accustomed to using latrines, were convinced of the need for improvements to **sanitation** to reduce diseases. On the other hand in four of the six research sites most people did not have access to **clean water**. Nationally access to potable water increased from 35% to 65.8% in rural areas during the PASDEP period.

615. It was reported in the GTP that health service coverage increased from 30% to 89% during PASDEP (GTP:17). Improvements in curative health service access generally would have affected young people although in the research sites distances were still considerable and household heads had to agree to the expenditure. Most of their Health Posts did not have regular supplies of basic medicines.

616. The highest priority areas in the GTP period will be maternal and newborn care, child health, and halting and reversing the spread of major communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB and

malaria (p92). There will be a National Children Health Strategy to expand family planning and ensure pre- and post- natal care and support. One aim is to provide affordable health services to improve the health of mothers .. adolescents and youth (p)

617. It was not clear how effective the government programme to prevent/reduce **HIV** infection in rural areas has been as studies are relatively scarce (Bishop-Sambrook 2008). Evidence from the research sites described in more detail earlier was that many people knew how the disease was transmitted and that there were cases of people who had died of or were living with AIDS in all sites but Korodegaga, although in this site women had been told by wereda officials that there were four men who had tested positive so that they should be careful. People with the disease were stigmatised making those who tested positive reluctant to admit this. Retrovirals were available though some people went to other areas to get them; their use made it harder for people to recognise that a person was infected.

618. National evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of young people engage in risky sexual behaviour; never-married, sexually active female have the highest risk of infection in the country. The 2008 Health Impact Evaluation found higher rates of high risk sexual behaviour than reported in the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey.

619. Plans related to future HIV prevention includes a focus on interrupting urban-to-rural transmission and containing the rural epidemic at its current low levels 'through social mobilisation' (FDRE 2010: 63). 'Community mobilisation and peer education programmes will be strengthened to better reach vulnerable and high-risk populations, such as youth and women' (*Ibid*). HIV will be mainstreamed into key strategic sectors including 'education, youth, women and the workplaces'.

## **Education**

### ***Primary education***

620. The number of primary schools increased from 16,513 to 25,217 between 2005 and 2010 and gross enrolment for grades 1-8 increased from 79.8% to 84.2% while the gender disparity narrowed from 0.75:1 to 0.93:1 (GTP:16). The impact of these changes was seen in all the research communities which meant that many more young people en route to adulthood experienced at least some formal education.

### ***Secondary education***

#### ***TVET***

621. The number of trainees undertaking TVET increased from 106,336 to 717,603 during the plan period. More than half of trainees during the period were female. In 2009/10 there were 253 TVET facilities. (GTP:16)

622. In the next five years a main objective of TVET is to support women and youth to gain working skills and competencies that ensure they are economically self sufficient' (p88)

### ***University education***

623. During the PASDEP period the number of public universities increased from 13 to 22. The number of students increased from 78,232 to 185,788 while the proportion of female to male students increased from 24% to 29%.

624. The target for enrolment in higher education institutions up to 2015 will be 70/30 enrolments in science and maths/rest. HEIs that enhance the competitiveness and competency of female students will be recognised.

### ***Education generally***

625. Education played different roles in youth transitions with the emergence of three kinds of passage to adulthood: one, which was increasingly rare, involved no involvement at all in formal education and one, which was also rare, included university education or TVET/private college and a formal job. The majority, many of whom were catching up and old for the grade they were in, dropped out along the way, most during the primary years, although an increasing number after completing Grade 10 with scores too low to qualify them for Grades 11/12 or government TVET. Richer parents paid for Grade 10 'failures' to attend private colleges.

626. A number of young respondents in the community research described themselves as 'failures' which was often related to not attending or dropping out of education.

627. Higher levels of education among females was associated with lower rates of circumcision, and later ages of marriage and childbirth. In the 2008 Health Impact Evaluation higher-risk sexual activity was observed among young women with secondary and above education: 21% among these compared with 1.8% with no education.

628. In the GTP period education is covered by ESDPIV which will focus on educating and training a workforce that meets industries' needs at all levels, including the growing manufacturing industry.

629. Youths and adults within the 15-60 age range will participate in the Functional Adult literacy Programme (p86).

### **Agriculture & rural development**

#### ***Land policy***

630. In 2005, the federal government issued a revised proclamation, the Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005. Not surprisingly, the revised proclamation follows the trajectory that "the right to land is exclusively vested in the state and in the people" and grants only "holding rights" to users. Holding rights include leasing rights and inheritance rights. The proclamation is designed to increase subjective tenure security of individual rights holders (peasants) and therefore emphasizes the importance of land measurement, registration, and certification of those holding rights, but the rights remain restricted. It defines certain obligations for the user, in particular restrictions of land use on highly sloped territories. It also opens up the possibility for the "government being the owner of rural land to change communal rural land holdings to private holdings" (paragraph 5.3)--for example, for private investors--, which weakens pastoral communal land tenure rights significantly. The regional states are now expected to revise their regional proclamations according to the revisions in the 2005 Proclamation, but Mohammed Abdulahi suggests that the new proclamation mirrors many provisions set out in the Amhara and Tigray regional policies, that were written before the proclamation - an observation that lets him conclude that "the land tenure laws of these two states ... are the foundations for the 2005 Proclamation" (Mohammed Abdulahi 2007, 123). The proclamation therefore appears to be a manifestation of deepening ideological commitments from within the Tigrayan political elite towards a universal prescription or tenure model for the whole of Ethiopia. (Crewett *et al* 2008: 19)

631. In the years following the 2005 Land Proclamation communal land in Korodegaga and Turufe was given to new investors (there were three long-standing investors in Korodegaga) and to a small number of youth co-operatives. In Turufe there were delays in use of the land by the investor as wereda permission was slow to come and by two youth co-operatives who could not organise themselves. In Korodegaga a piece of irrigable land given to a co-operative by kebele officials with agreement from the wereda was later re-allocated by the wereda to an investor from Australia. Yetmen community leaders were reluctant to give communal land to youth co-operatives as they suspected this would be a step towards its re-allocation to investors.

632. Under the GTP large-scale agricultural investment on leased land is expected to bring employment opportunities: '(l)abour supply will be mobilised from labour surplus areas'. Commercial horticulture involving intensive farming and extensive labour will be concentrated in highland areas and closer to the major cities; it will be integrated with surrounding smallholder farming.

633. In addition large scale extensive commercial farming is 'likely to be encouraged to grow' Private large-scale commercial farms will be promoted 'in areas that are not occupied or utilised by people'. Recent development suggest that many of these areas are or will not be occupied or utilised by people as a result of re-settlement. Large-scale movement of people into villages will have a huge impact on young males and females and their transitions to adulthood.

634. The target is to transfer nearly 3.3 million hectares of land to commercial farming investors 'in transparent and accountable manner'. (p49)

### ***Irrigation***

635. There was a growth in small, medium and large –scale irrigation schemes up to 2010. This was reflected in activities in Korodegaga which enabled the small number of young individual landholders to produce vegetables for the market or maize for home consumption and one or two youth co-operatives to do the same. However, the main impact on youth work transitions came via the opportunities for daily labour on irrigated land in or nearby the site.

636. Many teenagers used daily labour wages to cover the costs of education and to save for marriage. Some investors employed temporary migrant labour from Amhara region and some people suggested that some had had sexual relations with local women with attendant HIV risks.

637. During the GTP period land under small-scale irrigation should more than double.

### ***Extension advice and packages and credit***

638. In the period up to 2010 agricultural extension activities were mainly focused on Model Farmers which in most, though not all, sites did not include young men. Young people in Korodegaga and Geblen taking OFSP loans for livestock received some direct extension advice, while those working on parental or other land could learn by observing and doing. Packages that were not appropriate in contexts of drought and lack of veterinary services led a number of young people into debt when their outputs died.

639. Young people in debt would not be able to cover education costs or build up their resources for marriage. Interventions improving marketable economic surpluses increase opportunities for risky sexual activities

640. During the PASDEP period a number of model farmers registering very high levels of productivity and production emerged. The 'best practices' of these models have been analysed and documented for scaling up to the rest of the farmers during the GTP period which is expected to increase the productivity and production of most farmers.

641. In moisture deficit areas natural resource interventions will be extended and suitable technologies introduced, including water harvesting ponds. The aim is to augment underground and surface water to produce one harvest of crops per year. Small ruminants, honey bee and poultry development will be integrated with watershed development interventions. Production of feed for improved breeds and vaccine services will be introduced.

### ***Food-for-work***

642. This had contributed to the feeding of many young people in Geblen and Korodegaga, through PSNP, and Dinki through regular Emergency Food Aid in the years since the mid-2000s. Many young people did the work for the food leading to absence from school.

643. HIV/AIDS services were reportedly mainstreamed into the PSNP though with varied results across the Regions with SNNP found to be the most advanced (FDRE 2010:34). This presumably related to the special diets that people taking ART needed.

644. In the GTP period the safety net programme will be implemented jointly with the household asset building programme; efforts will be made to increase the programmes' effectiveness.

### ***Non-farm activities***

645. Roughly 1.5 million new job opportunities in micro and small scale enterprises were reportedly introduced during the PASDEP period. Substantial support was provided including credit, training, production and market facilities, technology services and small enterprise information services (GTP: 11).

646. The GTP mentions youth in relation to bee-keeping using modern beehives to be done through youth (and women's) associations. Also households with very small plots and landless youth and women will be encouraged to engage in non-farm income-generating activities. 'They will be provided with adequate support to ensure their good security by providing packages of skill and business management training, credit and access to markets'. There is also a suggestion that women and youth will benefit from the development of tourism (p117). There will be opportunities for 'clever' youth in science and technology.

### **Environment**

647. There seemed to be little enthusiasm among youth in the research sites for voluntary environmental activities.

648. In the GTP there is a suggestion that youth and women will be key actors in natural resource development and protection interventions. (p52)

### **Infrastructure**

#### ***Roads***

649. Total road length in Ethiopia increased from 36,400 km to 48,800 kms excluding wereda roads. The country-wide average time to reach an allweather road reduced from 5.7 hours to 3.7 hours. Geblen was the research site which benefitted most from this programme resulting in easier access to schools, health services, and work outside the community. Road networks will be expanded during the GTP period: the aim is that every rural kebele will be connected to an allweather road and thus to the main road network. This had been the case for some years in Yetmen, Turufe and Girar and had happened or was in process of happening Geblen and Dinki. If road access to Korodegaga were improved there would be more non-farm opportunities for youth. On the other hand it would make it more attractive to inward investors potentially reducing access to smallholder farming.

650. In addition to improvements such as those seen in Geblen increased urban connection brings greater risk of HIV infection to rural communities.

#### ***Kebele buildings***

651. New kebele buildings were constructed in the remote sites. However, in all sites Youth Association leaders had problems accessing office space and meeting rooms large enough to hold the large number of potential members (over 800 mentioned in one site) and many provided stationery etc from their own funds.

#### ***Electricity***

652. The number of towns and villages with access to electricity increased from 648 to 5,163 between 2004/5 and 2009/10. They included the centres of Geblen and Turufe

653. Electricity makes it easier for students to do homework and for people to work in the evenings and with electric tools. Lighting of thoroughfares reduces night attacks on women and theft.

### **Communications**

654. By 2010 there was full mobile phone access in Yetmen, Girar, Turufe and Korodegaga and one small area in Geblen which had reception. Reception had not yet reached Dinki although it could be found in its environs.

655. Young women in Girar were using mobile phones to fix migration to the Gulf via brokers in Addis Ababa. Farmers were using them to check prices of inputs and outputs and thieves to plan robberies along highways. An ambulance was called to Geblen after a man had an accident and arrived within 30 minutes.

### **Propaganda**

#### **Meetings**

656. During the period leading up to the 2005 election people were called to increasing numbers of meetings, often with threats of fines if they did not turn up. Following the election for a while the frequency of such meetings decreased and attendance in the Amhara sites became very low following the introduction of the Good Governance package in which it was stated that people had the democratic right not to attend meetings or community work.

#### **Box 66: Lack of enthusiasm for government meetings 2005**

##### **From Turufe Kecheme:**

On Tir 7, a meeting was called, but few dwellers appeared and it was postponed to another day. At this day way announced that they will be fined and many appeared. Some complained that they meeting place (Watera) is too far. But the meeting was held. And we discussed about the construction of school and the tax. *Turufe Kecheme, Community Diary*

**From Korodegaga:** There have been a number of meetings in October. Officials from the woreda organised people at least twice a week. They discussed about poverty, agricultural development programmes, expansion of irrigation projects, family planning and HIV/AIDS.<sup>23</sup> People really doubt about the benefits obtained from these meetings. ..they faded out not only by the number of meetings also by its length which takes the whole day without any rest. One informant told me that 'these people come here to create another problem to us rather than to solve our problems.'

657. In the lead up to the 2010 election calls to meetings once more increased, especially in Korodegaga. Party structures at cell level were also introduced in some of the site4s with meetings held twice a month in which leaders were to disseminate party propaganda from magazines and other party literature.

658. In the GTP there is a plan to introduce awareness creation workshops and training seminars using methodologies to encourage democratic cultures among pastoralists and women and youth groups.

#### **Media**

659. Many people, especially young ones, listened to radios, and watched TV when they went to towns. A few residents in Yetmen and Turufe had TVs of their own. Potentially information and advice relating to a number of transitions may have been transmitted but we did not ask about this in the research.

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<sup>23</sup> For information on HIV/AIDS from the 20 WIDE sites see Pankhurst 2004.

660. There was a suggestion from one source that reports of abduction and its frequent appearance in dramas had raised fear of it among adolescent girls to levels well beyond the actual local incidence.

## **Governance**

### ***Law enforcement and policy implementation***

661. Security in all the sites was reported to have improved as a result of the organisation of local militias which included some young men, although there were reports of partiality to relatives.

662. Gender laws described below were implemented in all sites, usually as a result of women going to the wereda to overturn decisions made at kebele level. While this worked for women it did not for youth who did not seem to have strong champions in wereda offices.

663. In general we came across numerous struggles between kebele and other community leaders and wereda officials.

664. The GTP contains plans to improve the effectiveness of the justice system and amend laws to ensure implementation and interpretation in conformity with the Constitution. Reliable and uniform vital statistics and an identification system of citizens will also be undertaken. (p25)

### ***Women and Youth Associations and Leagues***

665. Youth Associations were not visible in the research sites before the 2005 election. They were mobilised at slightly different times before 2010 to call youth to organise with a view to accessing packages to no effect in two sites and only a little in three. In Geblen members of a bee-keeping co-operative fell into debt to pay for the modern beehives provided since no honey was produced.

666. There did not seem to be much respect or attention paid to Youth Association leaders by kebele or wereda officials; mostly they were called upon to mobilise youth for meetings and community labour and write monthly reports on their activities. In one site they were the route for youth identity cards. Many of them felt let down following the failure of campaign which entered all the sites during which youth were promised land and resources if they organised themselves in co-operatives.

## **Gender equity**

### ***Land rights including inheritance***

667. The rights to land of wives, divorcees and wives replaced by a polygynous marriage were upheld in cases in all the sites, although we do not know how many potential cases these represented. These included a few young women.

### ***Livelihood interventions***

668. Goals for women in the GTP include small business expansion, training in management and entrepreneurship and credit and saving

### ***Political participation***

669. Women's participation and voice in kebele politics in all research sites was very low. Women Association leaders were active everywhere and connections to women's affairs offices in weredas were often good. During the lead-up to the election women in some sites were keen to re-elect the EPRDF because of the rights to land which they had acquired.

670. In the GTP there is a plan to increase female participation in decision-making processes through Women's Associations and organisation and the mainstreaming of women's affairs in all sectors.

### **Poverty and exclusion**

671. Poor young people did not have access to much help from the government except those in PSNP sites; although even here it was reported that not all poor households were included in the programme while some that were rich were. Exemption from paying health service charges stopped working when health centres became cost centres.

### **Youth policy**

#### ***National Youth Policies***

##### National Youth Policy 2004<sup>24</sup>

672. Box 67 sets out the government view of the historic roles which Ethiopian youth have played. In the rest of the section we take important sector proposals outlined in the plan and explore the extent to which they had been implemented in the WIDE3 Stage 1 sites by 2010.

#### **Box 67: Government view of historical roles of Ethiopian youth**

Ethiopian youth have carried out multi-faceted activities under the various political systems and during the country's various historic moments. Ethiopian youth had worked together in a spirit of unity whenever issues or problems of national interest cropped up. During the early days when opportunities for acquiring modern education were practically nonexistent, Ethiopian youth contributed towards accelerating the economic development of their country by engaging themselves in activities related to agriculture and handicrafts. They were also simultaneously engaged in the defence of their country against external aggressors. And following the introduction of modern education to Ethiopia, the youth have, by expressing protest against all forms of oppression mounted bitter and persistent struggles for economic and social development, justice, democracy and administrative reform

Young students, especially since the 1960s became pioneers in actively and widely mobilizing the community to struggle for their cause. Ethiopian young students, young workers and young farmers have played important roles in the country's political, economic, social, and cultural development efforts. [They] have participated in the country's development efforts through their own initiatives without government recognition and on the other hand, through being embraced by various associations, organizations and groupings that were supported by government, which in form and content had various objectives. They have conducted bitter struggles to bring about drastic positive change in the country by raising the land tenure question, stressing the removal of the decadent political system and other popular issues. Many youths sacrificed their lives for these noble causes. During the period 1974-1990, youth were organized in such a way that they were closely linked with the prevailing political outlook and interest and served the existing political system. As a result, it was a period during which the youth remained isolated from democratic practices. Even during that challenging period, a large number of youth sacrificed their lives in their struggle to ensure the protection of people's human and democratic rights. And their prolonged struggle and the sacrifice they have paid have brought our country to the present stage where the process of building a democratic system is underway.

Ministry of Youth Sports and Culture Youth Policy 2004

### **Youth, democracy and good governance**

673. Policy issues here were

- *Youth participation in planning and decision making processes at various administrative levels*
- Raising awareness of the principles of the Constitution and country's major policies
- Empowering youth to be good citizens who fight corruption and other malpractices

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<sup>24</sup> Ministry of Youth Sports and Culture Youth Policy 2004 <http://www.mysc.gov.et/youth.html> last updated July 2005

- Conditions to spread cultures of tolerance

674. WIDE3 Stage1 only produced some information relevant to the first of these at kebele level. By 2010 there were some young men and women (under 30) who held positions but not because they represented 'youth'. For example the social court leader in Korodegaga was a man of 27 while in Girar 7 of the 'Notable People' listed were allocated the social position of 'Youth' in contrast to 'Elder' and Chief of the Cheha Clan. They included 3 Model Farmers, 2 Health Extension Workers, and the Director of the Primary School; their ages were not provided. Geblen had a rich young businessman who was owner of a grinding mill, a tea room and a bar and was acting as a Model in the wereda and Yetmen had a young rich man. None of the leaders of the Youth Associations were described as Notable and most were not involved in planning or decision-making apart from the leader in Geblen who was also vice-speaker of the kebele Council.

### **Youth and economic development**

675. Two proposals set out here did not seem to reach the rural communities

- Youth participation in formulation, implementation and evaluation of sustainable development policies; Enable private sector to create more job opportunities
- There were some activities related to three other proposals '*Employment policy covering formal and informal opportunities*'; '*Study ways of expanding off-farm activities and use them to create conditions for youth to participate in them*' and '*Enable youth to create new jobs for themselves.*'

676. With regard to non-farm activities a few unemployed young men were given land in **Dinki's** kebele centre to set up kiosks, although there was no credit or business advice so those without access to independent resources (most) had done nothing and were told the land would soon be taken away. In **Yetmen** town 10 youth co-operatives were provided with credit for various non-farm activities but at the time of the research only one survived and that was a tea-house being run by an individual. Much of the credit had not been repaid; some youth had reportedly used it to migrate. In **Geblen** a few young people/women had used credit on an individual basis to set up successful teahouses and bars in the kebele town. Others had used individual credit to finance irregular migration to Saudi Arabia.

677. A couple of youth farming co-operatives and a lorry-loading co-operative in **Korodegaga** were successful, although stone-crushing and sand co-operatives could not find markets. A forestry co-operative in **Turufe** seemed to be doing quite well but two others which had received communal land (farming and seedlings) were not active. In **Geblen** a bee-keeping co-operative was in debt since no honey had been produced because of persistent droughts.

678. In **Girar** youth co-operatives were being piloted but kebele leaders described a number of problems which were also reported by wereda /kebele officials in other sites. They included that the 'performance of the Youth Association was not as expected', budget constraints, difficulties of repayment because the period was too short, that co-operatives were rarely established on the basis of shared interest/understanding, the potential of different activities was not clear, and there was a need for skill training.

679. A final proposal was '*Conditions to enable rural youth to acquire farming plots and grazing land*'. While the kebeles/communities in **Korodegaga**, **Turufe**, and **Girar** were willing to provide communal land for youth to use for a period this was not the case in **Yetmen**, **Dinki** or **Geblen**. In Yetmen a worry was expressed that young people would not perform efficiently and the wereda would give the land to investors instead. In Dinki the kebele leader allocated some hill land to a youth group but some individuals claimed it was theirs and won the case at the wereda.

### **Youth, education and training**

680. In the field of education and training there were 9 proposals.

681. *Participation in and benefit from the country's education and training policy; reduce rural-urban and male-female inequalities:* good progress on this was made in all sites.

- *Adult literacy services for out-of-school youth*: only in Geblen was an adult literacy programme introduced and it soon collapsed as the 100+ people who had signed up quickly dropped out.
- *Acquaint youth with new discoveries, inventions and innovations including ICT*: no evidence in the sites though probably some access by those few who attended universities
- *TVET programmes to conform with development policies and inculcate a spirit of self-confidence, creativity and hard work*: there seemed to be no access for students from Dinki and Korodegaga and limited access elsewhere as evidenced by the growing number of Grade 10 completers whose education as a result of great competition for the available places. We did not interview anyone who had attended a programme
- *Special conditions for exceptionally talented youth and those with special needs; for all access to technologies and services to help them develop their creative and research capacities*: no evidence that this was happening from the sites.
- *Assist school drop-outs*: not clear how – no evidence that this was happening from the sites.
- *Ethical and civic education for out-of-school youth to enable them to become good citizens*: no evidence that this was happening from the sites.
- *Counselling services for youth to help them identify potential capacities and put them into practical action*: no evidence that this was happening from the sites.
- *Make those in formal education participate in extra-curricular activities*: no evidence that this was happening from the sites – though it might have been in some schools.

### **Youth and health**

682. There was to be a focus on preventive and reproductive health and the eradication of HTPs.

683. *Conditions enabling youth to participate in implementation of preventive health policy*: young people seemed much more supportive of the work of the HEWs than their parents, particularly the attempt to increase the ownership and usage of latrines and the washing of hands, clothes, and bodies. This was related to the education that students received at school on sanitation. Young women appreciated the contraceptive services and young mothers the mother and child services.

684. *Access to information, education, counselling and leadership services in the area of reproductive health*: no evidence of this happening in the community; we did not ask in the schools.

685. *Conditions enabling youth to participate in efforts to eradicate HTPs which are detrimental to their health*: evidence on circumcision and early marriage was that many young women were under competing pressures from government and families with little chance to 'participate'. While the practice of youth female circumcision in the Oromia and SNNP sites was reduced it was still taking place secretly. Those in favour of the customary practice put pressure on uncircumcised girls often involving insults. Those against it frightened circumcised young women with stories of the problems it would cause during pregnancy and childbirth.

686. The definition of 'early marriage' as any marriage below the age of 18 was problematic for those young women who had stopped or never started education and were stuck at home burdened with domestic work or working long and boring hours of daily labour. They might not be allowed out much in case they became pregnant before marriage.

One chief rationale for early female marriage expressed by respondents is the danger of girls having sex before they marry. Marriage before or at puberty was said to safeguard their fidelity by ensuring that they are already spoken for when they reach sexual maturity. Concerns about sex outside marriage were mentioned very often and are very diverse, ranging from detriment to reproductive health, to reputational damage, unwanted pregnancy, social stigmatisation and exclusion from the family or clan. Thus, caregivers in Oromia saw early marriage as a means of preventing promiscuity and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDs. They also highlighted how girls who have sex outside marriage may be abandoned by their partners, this rendering them unmarriageable and how girls who become pregnant before

marriage risk being ostracised from the family and clan together with their babies. Boyden *et al* 2011.

In such circumstances getting married before reaching the age of 18 may be attractive, as it was to a 16 year-old in the Young Lives research.

'I got married last January (2011) to my husband who is my neighbour. I was willing to marry; nobody forced me to do so. I am happy with my marriage because it was arranged by my parents (mother). It also relieved me of the heavy wage labour which I have been suffering from. Before, I had no plan of marrying early. But when I stopped school and was engaged in a very tiresome job, I wanted to marry and take rest. (Boyden *et al* 2011: 17).

She went on to say that she would like to continue going to school, although she had in fact already stopped, but thought her husband would not allow it and that she would like to postpone having a child for five years but feared her husband and parents 'would force me to have one soon'.

### **Youth and HIV/AIDS**

687. Goals were prevention, education, support for Youth LWHA , and stigma fighting through four sets of activities.

688. *Create a youth movement in the multi-dimensional campaign to prevent HIV/AIDS*

689. *Co-ordinated information, education and counselling services*

690. *Conditions to provide care and support to youth living with HIV/AIDS and AIDS orphans with the aim of making themselves-supporting*

691. *Conditions for participation in the campaign against stigma and discrimination*

### **Youth and social evils**

692. Prevention, support, re-habilitation

693. *Action programmes for youth to engage in preventive measures:*

694. *Support and rehabilitation for the victims of social evils:*

695. *Youth to lead educational and preventive activities to discourage art and literature that could have negative psychological effects:*

696. *Youth to participate in efforts to reduce/eliminate the use of cigarettes, chat, alcohol, narcotic drugs etc:*

### **Youth, culture, sports and recreation**

697. Box 68 describes the gaps in provision for youth leisure activities

#### **Box 68: The role of sport and cultural activities**

As is well known, sports have made contributions towards our country's economic development efforts. It has also considerably promoted the country's image at international arena. It would however be difficult to say that all the necessary requirements for the development and expansion of sports in the country have been fully met. Lack of entertainment facilities such as sports centres, theatres and cultural centres in the vicinities of residential areas and in schools; scarcity of public library services where youth could broaden their scope of knowledge; and lack of physical education training institutions have all had negative impacts on the activity which is directed for inculcating ethical values in the minds of youth and creating healthy and productive citizens. As a result, in-school and out-of-school youth have been forced to spend their leisure in undesirable place and corners. Youth Policy 2004

698. Youth policy plans include

- Youth participation to provide them with a profound knowledge of their cultures and the history and heritage of the country
- Participation in expanding recreational, cultural and sports institutions and centres
- Development of the arts and physical education

#### **Youth, environmental protection and social services**

699. In this field youth issues were

700. *Youth to have access to education and information to enable them to participate in voluntary environmental, natural and cultural heritage protection and preservation:*

701. *Enabling conditions for youth to participate in voluntary environmental protection and social services thereby benefiting themselves and the community at large:*

#### **Youth and internationalism**

702. There were two aspects to this

703. *Enabling conditions for youth to have understanding and information about globalisation:*

704. *Enabling conditions for youth to establish relationships and partnerships with international counterparts so they can protect their interests in the globalisation process:*

#### **Youth that need special attention**

705. Box 69 sets out the problem as described in the policy

#### **Box 69: Youth in need of special attention**

'Youth that need special attention are exposed to various injustices, assaults, and abuses because of the physical injuries they have sustained, natural and manmade calamities, and loss of parents, poverty and their gender. Moreover, some segments of the society have distorted and negative attitudes towards such youth. This being the case, they do not have equal chance to participate in and benefit from education, training and employment opportunities (p18)' .

706. The list of youth needing political, economic, social and cultural support was 'females, pastoralists, those living with HIV/AIDS, the physically and mentally disabled, those victimised by social evils and orphaned youth'.

#### **The implementation plan**

707. *Professional, technical and leadership capacity-building to enable youth to get organised. Youth encouraged to develop and consolidate a culture of voluntary movement. Youth organisations initiated by youth to participate in environmental protection and community services*

708. *Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture and Regional Youth Bureaus to be responsible for co-ordinating, integrating and evaluating implementation. Youth Councils to co-ordinate youth associations, clubs, movements etc at federal and regional levels*

709. *Activities enhancing implementation to be mainstreamed in the strategic plans of various implementing ministries, organisations, regional bureaus, development institutions, civic society and the private sector.*

710. *A youth-focused database in sector and national data collection, sustained study and research activities and an integrated information system:*

### ***Youth elements in Ethiopia National Action Plan for Gender Equity 2006***

711. Enhance rapid economic growth: **women's and girls'** economic empowerment and enhance the role and benefits of women in environmental management and protection

712. Improved human development: equal access and success in education and training for **women and girls**; improve reproductive rights, health and HIV/AIDS status

713. Democratisation and governance: reduce violence against **women and girls** and improve their Human Rights; increase access to all levels of decision-making in particular in political and public spheres

### ***Youth Development Package***

714. The Youth Development Package was designed following the 2005 election while the pastoralist and semi-pastoralist youth development package was launched early in 2010. The first package had four sections

#### The problems youth face

715. These were said to include widespread unemployment and the need for the education sector to be geared towards creating entrepreneur youth. The question of land for rural youth had not been answered and there was no way of addressing this problem in the current land administration. Urban and rural youth were unable to get skill training as they wanted and there was a lack of credit to engage in different activities.

716. They suffered lack of social amenities especially for health, education and recreation; things were not being done for the physical and mental development of youth

717. They also lacked forums to voice their ideas on political, economic and social issues for planning and implementation and as a result 'have the feeling of discrimination' (Ethiopian Rural Youth Development Package p2).

#### The vision and strategy

718. The vision of the package was 'to see youth generation whose whole personality is fulfilled, that has active and organised participation, is also a beneficiary in the process of nation building, and who will receive the development started and ensure its continuity' (p2). Youth should be made to understand that they are the main problem-solving agent; government should play a supporting role.

#### Solutions for the economic, social and political problems of youth

719. These included distributing arable land that is not owned by other people and land on mountains to youth and supporting non-farm activities and action on education, health, recreational services, mass media entertainment programmes and participation in environmental protection. Conditions for youth to organise freely should be established and errors that indicate deficiency of good governance directly committed on youth should be eradicated.

#### Roles and responsibilities of youth and different government bodies in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the package

720. Youth were expected to lead, implement and have other implement the package by organising themselves at all government levels. Government bodies were responsible for

- Capacity building
- Conducting assessments and studies
- Mobilizing resources
- Organize forums for experience sharing
- Reporting
- Creating awareness

- Organizing stakeholders
- Setting standards

The government bodies whose roles and responsibilities are mentioned are as follows]:

1. Ministry of youth and sports
2. Regional youth and sports bureaus and offices below them hierarchically
3. Ministry of Agriculture and rural development
4. Nation-wide credit institutions
5. Ministry of Work and urban development
6. Ministry of Education
7. Ministry of Health.
8. Small scale industries development agency
9. Cooperatives agency.
10. Ministry of Information
11. Ministry of Women's Affairs.
12. Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs
13. Ministry of Justice
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
16. Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
17. Ministry of Trade and Industry
18. Ministry of Transport and communication
19. Ministry of Capacity Building
20. Ministry of Mining and energy
21. Ministry of Federal Affairs
22. Other Federal bureaus and agencies

### ***Ministry of Women's Children and Youth Affairs 2010***

721. The Ministry of Youth Affairs and the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs were merged into one Ministry in 2010 (Proclamation 691/2010). Part of the logic was that by mobilising youth in general female youth's problems could be solved through a well-organised youth movement. At the same time those problems faced by female youth as a result of their gender would be part of the remit of Women's Associations. The vision of the Ministry is an Ethiopia 'where women and youth enjoy equal participation and benefit from economic, social, political and cultural fields; the rights and well-being of children and gender equality ensured' (MOWCYA 2010: Slide 6)

The Ministry has a Directorate responsible for mainstreaming Women's and Youth issues. Proclamation 691/2010 of Oct 2010 on the "Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia" explicitly put some responsibilities on all Ministries with regard to "addressing women and youth affairs in the proclamation of policies, laws and development programmes and projects". There is also a Directorate for Women's and Youth's Mobilisation and Participation. One of the powers and duties linked with this core process is charged with designing strategies to follow up and evaluate the preparation of policies, legislation, development programmes and projects by Federal Government organs to ensure that they give due consideration to women and youth issues (MOWCYA 2010: Slide 10)

### ***Youth and women in the GTP 2010***

722. 'During the PASDEP period a total of 3,435,049 youths participated in various training sessions. More than 708,116 youths received training in management skills and 444,595 youth association organisers received training for the preparation and design of strategic plans, finance management and administration and related subjects.' (GTP:18)

723. A powerpoint from the Ministry identified the following thematic areas of the GTP relating to youth: economic empowerment; **youth issues mainstreamed**; capacity building (like constructing and equipping youth personality development centres); youth participation promotion. Strategic

initiatives included a support programme for youth organisation; youth personality development centres programme; HIV/AIDS prevention and control project and a Youth Voluntary Service Project.

724. Even though promoting 'gender and youth empowerment and equity' is the seventh strategic pillar of the GTP and the goal is to 'unleash the potential contribution of youth and women to national development' which 'will have a profound effect on the speed, equity and sustainability of the country's overall growth and development' (p27) only one page of the 135-page document is devoted to youth. There is a lot of emphasis on sport, particularly running and football. Capacities of sports associations and committees are to be strengthened and sports fields and training centre expanded. The number of private investors in sports development will be increased to enhance community participation. Numbers of managers, coaches, tournaments and participating athletes will be increased (p112).

725. Implementation of youth policy will focus on strengthening youth associations and organisations (probably a reference to the party's Youth League) and their 'all-rounded participation' and awareness creation including introducing youth to information and knowledge exchange activities. Youth entrepreneurship will be encouraged, databases relating to youth issues constructed and research pertaining to youth undertaken.

726. Proclamation 691/2010 of Oct 2010 on the "Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia" explicitly put some responsibilities on all Ministries with regard to "addressing women and youth affairs in the proclamation of policies, laws and development programs and projects"

### ***EPRDF – ruling party youth policy***

727. The EPRDF set up Youth and Women Leagues in 2008 following the Hawassa Party Congress. In August 2010 the ruling youth league was reported as having 1,250,445 members and the women's league 996,796. Together they made up one third of the 5.6 million EPRDF members at that time. They were represented at the Party Congress held in Adama in September 2010 and it were represented on the EPRDF executive committee (36 members) and the EPRDF Council (180 members).

### **Inter-sectoral collaboration**

728. The GTP proposes that there should be inter-sectoral collaboration in cross-cutting areas such as water supply, sanitation, education, gender, population and food supply.

### ***A bottom-up perspective: the impact of the mix of policies on each transition***

729. In this section I briefly illustrate how transitions are likely to be affected by a mix of policies classifying them as positive, negative, ambiguous, or missing.

### **Policies since the mid-2000s with some impact on personal transitions**

#### ***Puberty – policies with impact***

##### Positive

730. PSNP and emergency food aid preventing/reducing malnutrition during the growth spurt.

731. Toilets for girls at school helping them to deal with menstruation

##### Missing

732. Seems to be no sex education

***Physical and emotional development and social Identity formation- policies with impact***

Positive

- 733. Improved health services reducing risks of chronic illness
- 734. Improved cleanliness leading to feelings of self-worth
- 735. Gender policy has raised the status of women
- 736. Opportunities to earn income increase feelings of self-efficacy
- 737. Lack of access to land and employment prospects lead to anxiety

Negative

- 738. Educational failure
- 739. Getting into debt as a result of unsupported packages

Ambiguous

- 740. Labelling of youth and women as needing to be unleashed and in need
- 741. Early marriage definition of below 18 (see above)
- 742. Education – failing exams and dropping-out leading some to define themselves as failures; those who are successful get self-esteem
- 743. Circumcision policy producing two kinds of young women with different identities in the community

Missing

- 744. Mental health
- 745. Poverty and exclusion

***Circumcision***

- 746. Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting (FGM/C) is a violation of human rights under Ethiopian law (the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No.414/2004). (YSA p52)

Positive

- 747. No physical damage for those who are not circumcised

Negative

- 748. Conflicting pressures from family/community and government on girls

Missing

- 749. The voice of young women

***Sexual initiation and subsequent relations and practices***

Positive

- 750. Contraception
- 751. Penal code article 568 – a man who abducts a woman is punishable even if the woman agrees to marry him.
- 752. The Revised Penal Code, Article 627 penalises the sexual abuse of children with imprisonment from 13 to 25 years for a man guilty of sexual activity with a child below the age of 13 and 15 years

where the child is between the age of 13 and 18'. However, at least in Amhara region, the family law left an opening for the courts to reduce the age limit by two years

Negative

753. Sexual approaches by university teachers and sugar daddies around schools,

Missing

754. Effective rural anti-HIV/AIDS policies

***Informal work skill learning***

Negative

755. Child labour law banning work under the age of 14 does not fit with the accumulation of informal work skills in rural communities through contribution to the household economy. These skills are usually acquired before the age of 14.

756. Regular attempts to impose full school days in place of shifts are problematic for the same reasons

***Education and training***

Positive

757. Increased numbers of schools and teachers and regular introduction of higher grades in existing schools

758. Improved roads allowing easier access

759. Grinding mills and frequent drinking water points reducing domestic workloads giving young females greater chances of school attendance

760. Increased opportunities for secondary and post-secondary education

Negative

761. Food-for-work and daily labour opportunities encouraging absenteeism

Missing

762. Water in some schools; electricity in many

763. Assistance/incentives for poor families to allow young people to go to school.

764. Demand for secondary education out-stripping supply; absence of education opportunities after Grade 8 makes it difficult for youth to have entrepreneurial skills or find jobs.

765. Linkages between what is learned at school and local employment/business opportunities.

**Box 70: Young male opinions on training needs 2005**

**From Turufe:**

All agreed that the youth should attend vocational training so as to employ themselves in the constructions around Turufe and out side it. They agreed that there are many youngsters who spent their time chewing chat. One of the participants listed the appropriate trainings for the youth as, carpentry, pipe works, mission works, and all types of mechanic. Most of them agreed that these trainings should be given to the students at secondary school level.  
Male youth FGD

## **Policies since the mid-2000s with some impact on work transitions**

### ***Smallholder farming***

#### Positive

766. Allocation of communal land to youth on individual and group bases in some rural sites

767. Legalisation of renting of land for three-year periods with kebele agreement

#### Negative

768. Allocation of communal land to investors including legalisation of leasing of land for 25 year periods with wereda agreement

#### Missing

769. No allocation of communal land to youth in some rural sites

### ***Agricultural labour***

#### Positive

770. Small- and medium- scale irrigation increased daily labour opportunities for youth on a casual basis.

#### Missing

771. No monitoring of treatment of agricultural servants and herders and no official place for them to go for redress against refusal of payment.

### ***Agricultural youth co-operatives***

#### Positive

772. A few successes with the Youth Development Package

#### Negative

773. Many failures of the Youth Development Package introduced

774. Much fewer opportunities introduced than promised. Reported in the 2010 Youth Situation Analysis were several Focus Group discussions where youth said they felt neglected by the government and society at large with no-one to help them organise for business opportunities. Some said that Federal and Regional level officials seemed to have had good intentions but there was a problem with lower tier officials from whom came a lot of empty promises.

775. Several young persons shared their experience with “implementation problems in Kebeles” including the fact that government officials used the money allocated to youth job creation for themselves which exacerbated the problem (YSA)

#### Missing

776. Consultation with youth, training, mentoring, support

### ***Home-related work***

#### Missing

777. Recognition of the important contribution made though this work, particularly childcare and socialisation and domestic work, mostly done by females, to the country's economy.

### ***Non-farm local work***

#### Positive

778. A few successes with the Youth Development Package

#### Negative

779. Many failures of the Youth Development Package

780. Ruling party favoured individuals proved to be its supporters; in order to keep a job young people were under continuous pressure to participate in politics (Youth Situation Analysis: 97)

781. Large numbers of expatriate workers, for example Filipino's in the construction industry, that have been brought to the country taking jobs that could be done by locals (YSA)

782. Few or no role models were reported who have been successful after studying in TVET college. There was also a time when young people, especially graduates of TVETs, were told to register and organize in associations but after that nothing was done for them. (YSA)

783. Lack of environmentally acceptable sources of income in rural areas for those depending on natural resources – e.g charcoal sellers instructed to stop de-forestation.

#### Missing

784. Recognition of, and investment in, the rural informal sector as a potentially important engine of economic growth; consultation with youth, training, mentoring, support

785. Absence of institutions to provide micro-finance opportunities and land for youth in rural areas; where these do exist unrealistic criteria for accessing business support. YSA

#### ***Work in and for the community***

#### Positive

786. Food-for-work provides reliable incomes for youth and families

787. Some food-for-work outputs, particularly kebele buildings and roads were useful

#### Negative

788. Some food-for-work outputs of no use including a number of environmental projects

789. The view that youth should contribute voluntary work on sometimes ill-thought out environmental projects

#### Missing

790. Consultation with young people to find projects which they would be inspired to participate in.

#### ***Migration for work***

#### Positive

791. Rapid urban expansion

792. Land law allowing people who migrate for shorter periods to retain control of their land (up to 3 years through renting)

793. Employment as Health and Agricultural Extension Workers.

#### Negative

794. Insufficient linkage of TVET curricula and programmes with labour market income generation opportunities or specific work-study programmes. (Youth Situation Analysis – YSA)

#### Ambiguous

795. Inward investment in flower farms: e.g. young women migrating to Ziway from Turufe. Focus Groups in the 2010 Situation Analysis said that remuneration for factory work e.g. bottled water and flower farms was insufficient.

796. Legal migration to the Gulf for young women to do domestic work: how it works out depends on the employer

#### Missing

797. Official recognition of the extent and types of migration and the contribution made to the country's economy.

798. Control of irregular migration e.g. to the Gulf, Sudan and South Africa. In 2011 an estimated 10-80 people left the country illegally via Afar on a daily basis mostly from Amhara and Tigray. The majority were females aiming for Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Abu Dhabi using networks of brokers and guides. An estimated 100 children aged 18 and below left the country per day for the Sudan, Libya and to Italy (Sicily) as final destination. 90% were estimated to be school dropouts and 85% female. It cost 3-4,000 birr to traffickers and 3-5 months salary to brokers in Sudan. The journey took 5 days on foot and often involved physical and sexual harassment; some died of hardship (Jennings, 2011: 33).

799. Regulation of unfair and unethical employment practices

#### **Box 71: Exploitation and violation of domestic workers**

I have worked in 7 different homes where I have suffered painful memories. The worst was while living as a domestic worker in Hawassa. When I first moved into the house the homeowner was quite pleasant. However, before long the woman started abusing me in all kinds of ways. First she spilt boiling water on me, later she also spilt a whole pot of "wot" on me. One day she threw her axe at me. I couldn't even report her to the police because "eswa eraswa eko police nat" (she is a cop herself). After all of my horrible experiences as a live-in maid I did everything to escape life as a domestic worker. After trying many alternatives I was finally able to get help from the Women's Affairs Office, who provided me with the materials to become a listro (shoeshine). Now I am raising my two siblings and I have started going to school. (SNNPR, Girls Focus Group 15-18 years.)

#### ***Work role and economic independence***

800. There was little effective government action to assist young men to establish the kind of long-term work role they needed to be in a position to marry and start a family. There also seemed to be little interest in this area among NGOs whose focus was almost exclusively on youth and HIV with little interest in youth unemployment (YSA)

#### **Policies since the mid-2000s with some impact on family-related transitions**

##### ***Marriage***

##### Positive

801. Average age of marriage for girls is rising

802. Second chances were possible for girls forced to marry against their will

#### **Box 72: Gambella girl forced to marry against her will gets a second chance at education**

##### **From Gambella**

"I was forced to marry at the age of 15 because my brother had no money to pay dowry to marry a girl he liked, so they traded me for my 'current' sister -in- law". Before I got married, I used to go to school but once I got married I

had to drop out. After years of my husband abusing me I ran away and went to live with my uncle. Now that I am with my uncle, I have managed to go back to school and I am now in grade 9.” (Gambella, Girls Focus Group, 19-24 years.) YSA p61

803. The legal right to choice of marriage partner

#### Ambiguous

804. *'Changing the legal age of marriage without addressing the issue of sexuality is shifting the problem from having socio-culturally accepted teen pregnancy and birth to socially ostracized teen mothers and children with its own complicated social, cultural, psychological and economic problems, both for the mother and the child'*. Mekonnen and Aspen 2009: 1005

805. Mekonnen and Aspen, writing about some communities in Amhara Region, went on to suggest that the way the government has approached implementation of the law may be one of the causes for people not supporting it. They claimed the campaign lacked clarity with a number of objectives subsumed within it including the banning of marriage celebrations which has mainly been thought of as a food security measure. Also implementation has involved 'spying on the public' which is contrary to democratic values while the requirement that farmers and the potential bride and groom travel to the wereda for an age assessment requires considerable expenditure on transport and accommodation.

806. However, they concluded that *'despite the negative effects the campaign has had for many individuals in the Amhara region since it started in 2003, it has undoubtedly raised an awareness and debate in the peasant population about childhood, sexuality, individual rights and marital life. We may see this as a modernisation process, although forced and top-down. The sacrifices of the present youngsters and their parents may have effects for young girls and boys in the future.'* (ibid: 1010)

#### ***Setting up an independent household***

#### Positive

807. As part of the tabia urbanisation in Geblen residential plots of land were provided for married young people with children who were still living with their parents. The Head of the Youth Association claimed that this was a result of a suggestion from the committee which he managed to convince tabia officials to implement on presentation of a survey undertaken by the Youth Association.

#### Missing

808. Official concern at macro level about the housing problems facing rural youth who are past the usual marrying ages.

#### ***Having children***

#### Positive

809. Improved access to contraception including injections and implants

810. Legal grounds for abortion introduced in 2005 for pregnancies resulting from rape or incest, when the pregnancy risks the health or life of the woman and in the case of foetal abnormality.

811. Improving mother and child services

#### Missing

812. An accessible service to try to combat infertility.

813. Easy access to emergency contraception.

814. Legal abortion as an alternative to risky illegal ones.

## **Policies since the mid-2000s with some impact on community-related transitions**

### ***Participating in local networks and organisation***

#### Positive

815. The push to get youth to organise themselves in co-operatives provided some experiences of the problems involved in setting up organisations and led to denser and wider informal youth networks.

#### Missing

816. Delayed marriage on the part of young men postponed their ability to join organisations such as *iddir* which required members to be household heads.

817. Recreation places and facilities.

### ***Participating in NGO activities***

#### Positive

818. FGD participants across all regions described a high level of efforts of CSOs of all 3 kinds to involve young people in their communities in meaningful development initiatives. Visible and practical contributions to the lives of young people by Family Guidance Association Ethiopia (FGAE), Cheshire Foundation, Eyerusalem Community Centred Development Organization (JeCDO), Mary Joy, DKT, PACT, SOS Sahel, Green Ethiopia and Forum for Street Children. Examples of support included training youth to engage in micro finance schemes; mobilizing youth in infrastructural development; involvement of youth in environmental protection initiatives such as tree planting; assistance in forming anti-aids clubs; assistance to Orphans and children from low income families and engagement in sporting, visual and performing arts activities.

*“NGOs are efficient in their engagement with the community, particularly with the youth. They genuinely try to understand the gaps to be filled, collaborate with the community, and above all incorporate the views of all stakeholders mainly the youth.”* (Somalia, Boys, 19- 24)

### ***Participating in politics and development processes***

#### Ambiguous

819. Over 80% of respondents to a survey done as part the 2010 Youth Situation Analysis recognised an increase in Government commitment to children and youth, notably in the years 2007 and 2009. Over 80% of respondents also said the involvement of children and youth in service delivery was very high.

820. However respondents said that 'only very few and similar faces' participated in policy dialogues organised at National or Regional levels. The consensus seemed to be that suitable conditions were generally present only for youth active in Youth Associations and there were not many of these unless there were tangible benefits. In terms of awareness 52% of respondents had never heard of Ethiopia's National Youth Organisation (the National Youth Federation). When asked if positive efforts were being made to involve youth from rural areas 73% strongly disagreed.

821. School clubs were said to provide meaningful structures for participation. However, there were many problems including lack of resources, exclusion of younger age groups, low parental support for involvement in after-school clubs seeing them as having negative effects on school work and encouraging early sexual relationships and risk to reputation or safety. Girls did not want to be seen as *shermuta* – a term taken to mean prostitute – which is a common labelling of educated girls.

#### Negative

822. Responses from the Girls' Focus Groups across all the Regions highlighted society's negative attitude to girls' participation as a major concern.

**Box 73: Girls not taken seriously**

"The society has negative attitude towards girls that are articulate and active and even call such girls names." (Gambella, Girls Focus Group 19 – 24 years).

"The biggest challenge we face is that people don't take us seriously since we are girls".(Amhara, Girls 15 – 18)

"Most of the girls have tried to participate to get their voices heard. However our suggestions/recommendations are not implemented which discourages our participation."

Youth Situation Analysis 2010: 23

823. Respondents who had participated in government structures said that these opportunities were often characterised by tokenism although a Ministry of Youth representative said that not all youth views were practical.

824. Across all Regions, ages and gender groupings young people expressed 'a common desire to have more active participation in local, regional and national agendas without any political strings attached' (29). They said the Youth League and Youth Federation do not welcome people with different political orientations from the ruling political party, though the relatively new Youth Federation was said not to be politicised.

**Box 74: Political control of youth associations**

"We are not benefiting from the current processes of youth empowerment that is done through various forms of associations and organization such as the formation of youth leagues, micro-finance associations etc. The associational life and its membership is mainly driven with political sentiment rather than motivating the youth for civic engagement."(Amhara, Boys, 19-24)

"The politicized nature of the youth associations has made it difficult for many young people to participate in decision making and action who simply want to involve in affairs that are of concern to them." (Amhara, Boys, 19-24)

"Government officials tend to suppress the voice of the youth when they raise issues that challenge the government". (Oromia, Girls, 15-18)

"Most structures and platforms of participation are controlled by members of the ruling party. And hence, the space that engage the youth in a more inclusive and neutral way is limited."(Amhara, Boys, 19-24)

"It is unreasonable to expect us to have a meaningful participation while our objective voices are suppressed."(Amhara, Boys, 19-24)

"We have been pushed aside not to have active involvement on issues and concerns that affect our life. Oddly enough, this is done by the very body that claims to be youth's advocate."(SNNPR, Girls, 15-18)

***Key features of the evolving government ideology related to male and female youth transitions***

825. Table 77 summarises key features of the evolving government ideology of relevance to male and female youth transitions

**Table 77: Evolving government ideology related to male and female youth transitions**

		How to pursue mental model goals	
	Mental model	Institutions/organisations	Implementation 2010
<b>PERSONAL EMBODIED TRANSITIONS</b>			
Personal identity	Democratic outlook Professional competence Skills and ethics Actively, efficiently and widely participate in and benefit from the country's ongoing activities aimed at attaining a democratic system and accelerated development'.	Collective organisation for work Sports	Youth Associations Youth League
Circumcision	Harmful Traditional Practice Bad for women's and babies health Violation of Human Rights	Make circumcision illegal	Implement ban through wereda, kebele and Women's Associations
Sexual initiation	Sexual intercourse should not take place before the age of 18	Sexual intercourse with a minor of the opposite sex aged 13-18 is illegal punishable by imprisonment from 3-15 years and with those under 13 by 13-25 years Rape illegal	Implement bans at wereda level
Informal work skills	No recognition Child Labour Law Full day schooling No training	Schools to have full-day cycles	Keep on trying to overcome community resistance
Formal education	All children should complete primary school (Grade 8) Those who qualify should go on to secondary school Most successful should go to university or TVET and study areas to contribute to country's development	Schools, teachers, equipment, curricula, etc Teachers responsible for enrolment and attendance	Weredas PTAs Community contributions
<b>WORK-RELATED TRANSITIONS</b>			
Smallholder farming	Farmers have rights to pass land on to youth and duty to share with all children	Land registration Inheritance law – equal rights to sons and daughters	Appeals to weredas
Agricultural labour	Children under 14 should not work Those aged 14-18 should not do harmful work	Employment of persons under 14 is prohibited	?
Co-operative farming	Youth should access and use land collectively in co-operatives	Mobilise youth to organise themselves and design co-operative project Provide land and credit	Weredas? Kebeles?
Non-farm informal sector	Youth should access and use land collectively in co-operatives	Mobilise youth to organise themselves and design co-operative project Provide land and credit	Weredas? Kebeles?

		How to pursue mental model goals	
	Mental model	Institutions/organisations	Implementation 2010
Formal employment	Generally not a policy focus		
Work in the home	Generally not a policy focus	Women's Associations for women's work	
Community work			
Food-for-work	Minimum age 18	PSNP rules	Kebeles
<b>FAMILY-RELATED TRANSITIONS</b>			
Marriage	No marriage before 18 No abduction Couples choice  Responsible polygyny	Marriage < 18 illegal Abduction illegal Marriage without consent illegal Rights of existing wives to property if husband marries again	Weredas
Parenthood	Abortion not illegal Minimum age at first birth 18 ¼ Mother and child health is a government responsibility Illegitimate children acknowledged by the father have inheritance rights	Health Centres for modern abortions Health Posts for M&C services	Health Centres
Independent household	Generally not a policy focus		
Divorce and widowhood	Divorced, widowed, and polygynously replaced wives have rights to property	New Family Law	Weredas
<b>COMMUNITY-RELATED TRANSITIONS</b>			
Adult social networks	Youth participation in these not a policy focus		
Participation in community-initiated organisations	Youth participation in these not a policy focus Community-initiated organisations should be co-opted to pursue government development policies		
Participation in government organisations	Young men and women who become landowners have rights and duties associated with their tax-paying status. Duties include delivering work and cash contributions for 'public goods'; landowners can access agricultural extension advice and resources. All young men (and young women?) should join the kebele Youth Association and participate in its activities - or young women should join the Women's Association and do the same	Landowners and wives can hold (sub) kebele office Other youth should participate in the community via the Youth Association and Youth League	Youth Association and Youth League leaders

## A youth-focused role for donors?

826. In this concluding section we draw some rapid general conclusions about youth in the context of Ethiopia's development in recent years. We then discuss donor approaches to youth and their transitions and compare a constructed donor mental model with the local community and government models developed earlier.

### *Youth and development since the mid-2000s*

827. This section is rather speculative; it is an area which would benefit from more thinking and research. *N.B. this needs comments from AP and CD and a re-visit before finalisation.*

### Well/ill-being

828. In relation to personal efficacy for many young people there have been increases in **competence** via health improvements, the reduction of female circumcision, access to education and the chance to pick up new agricultural and domestic work techniques through observation and labour. Younger youth have benefited more.

829. There have also been increases in **autonomy** for young people of both sexes while their ability to **relate** to different kinds of people and experience has also improved as communities have opened up to external influences and urban linkages have thickened.

830. A major concern is the effect that the cultural chaos and government-community struggles over fundamental issues found in many communities is having on the **meaning** young people are making of their lives.

831. **Work-related transitions** have become increasingly problematic for young men as pressure on land has reduced smallholder farming opportunities and many youth have been forced to join the 'precarariat' (Standing, 2010) having to seek out irregular casual agricultural and non-farm work. A lack of policy interest in the informal sector has meant that there are no personnel (employers, trainers, mentors) to help young people into a non-farming informal sector which is almost non-existent. It is as if they were expected to create it themselves.

832. While in many respects young women are increasingly benefitting from changes affecting **family-related transitions** including the rising age of marriage and access to contraception there is also a downside as these are likely accompanied by rising rates of pre-marital pregnancy and HIV infection. Young men who are not on the smallholder farming route are finding it increasingly difficult to marry and set up an independent household due to difficulties in accessing work secure enough to support a family and lack of housing.

833. Full **community-related transitions** are only possible for those who are married. The increasing number of 'dependent' young men and unmarried young women have no community voice as patriarchal and gerontological structures in rural communities are still strong and government efforts to provide a collective voice through Youth Associations have not come to fruition.

### Economic development

834. Young people have **contributed** to economic development in recent years through their labour; the evidence suggests that many younger youth have exchanged some leisure for cash-earning work. However, given their lack of resources and opportunities and encouragement to experiment and be creative there is much scope for greater contributions to production and productivity.

835. Most young people living in richer and middle income rural households and some in poorer ones have **benefited** in terms of better living conditions and more access to cash for education,

clothes, and urban leisure activities. However there are considerable inequalities in the distribution of benefits.

836. **Investments** in education and health services have increased youth competence although there is a concern about a disconnect between what is taught in schools and the competences needed for the next stage in Ethiopia's development which is bound to involve a big expansion in the informal sector.

### Social cohesion

837. **Material conditions:** the main concerns here are un(der)employment and lack of housing

838. **Passive social relations:** security in rural communities has increased in recent years; there is concern that fear plays too large a role in the local governance and that the religious tolerance that has marked rural communities for many years may be under threat as a result of religious entrepreneurial activities.

839. **Active social relations:** inter-generational relations have generally become more conflictual; communities vary as to the extent of positive interactions and mutual support across different social groups.

840. **Social inclusion:** most young people are not well-integrated into local community institutions apart from schools.

841. **Social equality:** opportunities for young people are quite restricted and to seize the big ones, such as college education, it is much easier if the family is well-off. Lower-level opportunities often demand a lot of hard work and poor young people can be upwardly mobile as a result.

### Donor mental models relating to youth and development

842. As one contribution to this paper a selective literature review was conducted which focused on personal and family-related transitions for young women and work-related transitions for young men. Annex 2 contains a set of extract from relevant case studies and the tables below make use of summaries of various pieces of literature.

843. Female personal embodied transitions of particular concern to donors were circumcision and female sexual initiation; the former must be eradicated and the timing and quality of latter improve. The interest in the review comes from ideas about the ways in which these objectives might be successfully pursued. Two key messages are understanding socio-cultural contexts and carefully combined interventions aimed at different aspects of the complex systems which generate the problems.

**Table 78: Some donor models concerning personal embodied transitions**

	Mental model	Institutions/organisations
<b>PERSONAL EMBODIED TRANSITIONS</b>		
Circumcision	FGM/C must be abandoned	Understanding the socio-cultural context and rationale for the timing and type of cutting is essential. Interventions should match a community's readiness for social change. Embed interventions in community-based reproductive healthcare activities. Implementing laws can be effective. Engage key partners including religious leaders. (FRONTIERS) Programmatic approach including community empowerment activities, public pledge of decision to abandon the practice, supportive national environment (DWG) Advocacy, research, guidance for health systems (WHO)

	<b>Mental model</b>	<b>Institutions/organisations</b>
Sexual initiation	Rape and sexual abuse must be reduced	<p>Needed: recognition that majority of sexual abuse survivors are under 18 of both sexes; systematic data; a comprehensive response to address the health and criminal justice consequences of violence; evaluations of existing programmes (Rombold, 2008)</p> <p>Communication initiatives can bring change including 'edutainment' (GSDRC)</p> <p>Initiatives in schools and universities: educate staff; clear reporting mechanisms and sanctions; improve school infrastructure; school-based counselling and referrals (Bott)</p> <p>Recognise the public health implications – teach practitioners, institutional reforms to improve healthcare response, facilitate access to emergency contraception, prophylaxis for sexually transmitted infections, safe abortions, networks and coalitions devoted to referrals, research, advocacy, and education (Bott)</p> <p>Legislative reform is the first step in a long complex process. Promising initiatives: educating law enforcers and public; invest in strengthening law enforcement response; forensic nursing; reform of informal justice systems (Bott)</p>
	Sexual infections, including HIV/AIDS must be reduced. The proportion becoming sexually active before age 15 is increasing; less than half use condoms (World Bank). Use an HIV/AIDS lens. (L&G)	<p>Needed: effective programme strategies to prevent HIV infection among the highly vulnerable group of female adolescents in SSA (USAID 2008)</p> <p>Gap in HIV/AIDS policies for married adolescent (B&amp;C)</p> <p>HIV/AIDS may not primarily be an urban problem (UNAIDS)</p> <p>HIV/AIDS epidemics are dynamic. Need for combination prevention including biomedical interventions, behavioural interventions and structural interventions (USAID 2011)</p>

844. The main focus of policies concerning family-related transitions are early marriage, abortion, pregnancy and mother and baby welfare. For early marriage again multi-sectoral approaches are recommended including raising community awareness, education for girls, economic opportunities, law and policy initiatives, and engaging all stakeholders especially religious leaders, mothers, men and boys. It is odd that there is no mention of the main stakeholders - girls themselves. There is more mention of integrated packages to reduce maternal mortality and youth-friendly reproductive health services are seen as a way of addressing a number of problems facing teenage girls as a result of their sexuality.

**Table 79: Some donor models concerning family-related transitions**

	Mental model	Institutions/organisations
<b>FAMILY-RELATED TRANSITIONS</b>		
Marriage	Early marriage exposes millions of girls to risks associated with early sexual activity, pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, social exclusion, limited education and livelihood opportunities and gender-based violence (GSDRC 2011)	Educate families and communities Educate girls Law and policy initiatives Provide economic opportunities Protect rights – e.g create safe social spaces, keep official birth and marriage records Multi-sectoral approaches; involve community in all stages of project; raise awareness on age-gaps; support girls who have had marriages stopped Tailor programmes for young girls approaching 13 or 14 Engage all stakeholders especially religious leaders, mothers, men and boys Provide programmes for girls that focus on empowerment through information and skills (Das Gupta) Integrate reproductive health and livelihoods as there is grass-root demand but the field is still in its adolescence (Esim et al)
Parenthood	In SSA about 60% of women who have unsafe and illegal abortions are 15-24 years old; 1 in 10 maternal deaths are due to unsafe abortions (World Bank)	Need clear guidelines for legal abortion services Pre-pregnancy contraception and emergency contraceptive pills should be made more easily available.
	The MDG for maternal mortality should be pursued	Improve access to Family Planning, coverage and quality of pre-natal care, management of delivery, immediate post-delivery and neonatal complications, improve home deliveries and availability of health facilities providing emergency obstetric care, strengthen referral services. Create a bridge connecting family, community and referral services. Use birthing homes, private providers and maternity waiting centres Improve health systems in general, identify and target needy categories, develop equitable financial systems, enhance provider accountability and community participation (Lule et al) Gradual integration of integrated packages covering reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, results-based financing and conditional cash transfers
	Need for youth-friendly reproductive health services	Different strategies for different sub-categories varying by age, sex, employment, schooling and marital status Involve young people, appeal to youth, address multiple youth needs and the non-health factors affecting adolescent health including livelihoods and schooling Address gender inequality, include boys Address underlying risk/protective factors: feelings of self-efficacy; attitudes and behaviour of friends; connectedness with parents and other influential adults; involvement in the community (Rosen) Adolescent-only services- special sessions or special spaces (USAID 2008) Different special services for youth outside the mainstream: not attending school; living on the streets; using drugs; victims of sexual abuse;
	Target poor young people	De-link payment and use; link provider payment to use by poor bring services geographically closer; persuade/incentivise poor youth to use services; amplify the voice of poor young people (World Bank 2010)

845. There seems to be much less hand-on experience of trying to deal with youth un(der)employment in developing contexts though there are some cases in Annex 2 which show a history of effort particularly in Latin America. A DFID paper written in 2007 noted that in sub-

Saharan Africa the informal sector was responsible for 80-90% of employment which makes its neglect in the policy arena hard to comprehend.

**Table 80: Some donor models concerning work-related transitions**

	Mental model	Institutions/organisations
<b>WORK-RELATED TRANSITIONS</b>		
Smallholder farming	Youth employment	Youth Employment Network (UN, ILO, WB): benchmarks for successful youth employment policies; competitive grant scheme for innovative small-scale projects submitted by youth organisations with youth participation; employment generating projects.
Agricultural labour		Youth Employment Inventory: evidence from 289 studies in 84 countries (WB); 29 programmes in SSA but not properly evaluated (WB 2008)
Co-operative farming		OECD DAC Pro-Poor Growth guide: vocational training should respond to the needs of the informal economy; employment concerns should lead to strengthened links between education and vocational training; use informal training systems and professional organisations to structure training demand; use skilled workers from the informal economy as trainers; improve statistics and knowledge about the informal economy; improve informal apprenticeships gradually; develop pre-employment schemes; develop balanced funding mechanisms to make training systems sustainable; support move beyond training to job creation; intellectual, practical and/or financial support; continue focus on basic education.
Non-farm informal sector		
Formal employment		DFID paper 2007: informal sector responsible for 80-90% of employment in much of SSA; apprenticeship training allows for gradual build-up of informal business networks and dev of business skills including customer relations; missing inputs – credit, market access, security of tenure, business counselling - usually no ministry with overall responsibility for the informal sector

846. It has not been possible to undertake a proper analysis of donor strategies and interventions with direct or indirect consequences for youth transitions in Ethiopia. However it is clear that youth as a group has not been seen as requiring a particular focus such as is provided for women through, for example, the 'Gender Equality' theme on the DAG website. While the other themes and the multi-donor programmes (DIP, PBS, PSNP, PSCAP) are relevant for youth transitions in different ways the only one with a particular youth focus is Education where the current focus is on improving the quality of primary education.

847. In the next section Government, donor and local modern and customary mental models relating to each of the youth transitions are compared (Table 81). The donor model has been constructed intuitively and is open to correction from those with greater experience of the donor world.

### ***A comparison of ideal-type donor, government and local youth-related mental models***

848. The main differences between donor and government models come in the employment area with donors emphasising the importance of free markets and the private sector and government focusing on youth co-operatives. Where is the informal sector? Though it also does not figure in rural community repertoires. The main difference between top-down and community models relates to the roles of girls and women with the government emphasis being on their contribution to economic development<sup>25</sup> while donors emphasise gender equality<sup>26</sup>. Local repertoires prioritise marriage, children and home-related work<sup>27</sup> for most women.

<sup>25</sup> The old WID (Women in Development)

<sup>26</sup> The old GAD (Gender and Development)

<sup>27</sup> Nurturers in Development (NID) – this perspective on women's lives is the poor relation in the world of development policy

**Table 81: A comparison of ideal-type government, donor and local mental models relating to youth and development**

	<b>Government model (macro level)</b>	<b>Donor model (macro level)</b>	<b>Local modern model</b>	<b>Local customary model</b>
<b>[Puberty]</b>	X	X	Is associated with 'the fire age'	Is associated with 'the fire age'
<b>Identity formation male</b>	'citizens with democratic outlook, professional competence, skills and ethics so that they can actively, efficiently and widely participate in and benefit from the country' ongoing activities'	No apparent interest	There are farming adolescents and student adolescents	Boys should be aggressive to defend families and become farmers
<b>Identity formation female</b>		Female youths should be equal with male youths in all respects	Marriage adolescents and student adolescents	Girls should be submissive and become housewives
<b>Circumcision</b>	Female circumcision is illegal	Female genital cutting is harmful	Female circumcision is harmful and not necessary for marriage and adulthood	Female circumcision is a pre-requisite for marriage and social adulthood
<b>Sexual initiation and subsequent behaviour</b>	Sexual relations with a person under 18 is illegal Rape is illegal.	Should not happen to immature girls. Support for female marriage age of 18 = support for sexual initiation after 18? Having sex carries HIV risk for both males and females	Having sex carries HIV risk for both males and females Pregnancy can be avoided through contraception	Girls should be virgins on marriage. Consummation of early marriage should wait until the girl is 'big enough'. Boys can gain pre-marital experience
<b>Informal work skill learning</b>	No recognition; in favour of full school day	No recognition; in favour of full school day	The learning of farming and domestic skills should be fitted around attendance at school	These are the most important livelihood skills learned while contributing to the household economy
<b>Formal education</b>	All children should attend primary school. Secondary and post-secondary education are also very important to produce professional, administrative and technical experts	All young people should attend primary school	Males and females should pursue education for as long as possible with a view to formal employment	Schooling is not necessary; any attendance should fit round household work
<b>Productive work roles</b>	Wereda level agricultural services and kebele level Development Assistants should introduce new technologies motivated by targets to be met. Women should be encouraged and assisted to develop their own farming activities. Left to themselves people will not pursue the agricultural activities that are necessary for development or give up harmful traditional practices. Government must take the lead and force changes through persuasion, instruction, the use of models and sanctions	Economic development is held back by absence of markets and informality of activities	Farmers should use modern inputs and technologies. Women should be involved in cash-generating activities. Credit should be sought from NGOs, government, and collective savings groups. Religious holidays should be reduced. Education should take priority over farm and domestic work.. Goal of education is government employment or international migration although useful for other activities. Not all young men need live near their parents, although they should support them with remittances as should income-earning daughters.	Men should farm producing traditional crops and livestock using family labour and customary labour-sharing institutions. Religious rules governing working times should be followed by all in the community. Farming income can be supplemented with off-farm activities that fits with the agricultural calendar.


	<b>Government model (macro level)</b>	<b>Donor model (macro level)</b>	<b>Local modern model</b>	<b>Local customary model</b>
<b>Domestic and other household reproductive work roles</b>			Women should be responsible for home management, domestic work, etc. Men and boys can help with some tasks.	Wives have home management, domestic, child production, childcare, child socialising and training, other care, and hospitality responsibilities,
<b>Economic independence</b>	Young people can inherit parental land	Economic growth should be pro-poor	Alternative routes to economic independence include formal work via education, skilled non-farm work, trading, 'investing in anything that might be profitable'	Young men should gain economic independence by becoming smallholder farmers and young women by marrying them.
<b>Marriage</b>	Macro-level criminalisation of marriage below 18, abduction and (maybe) polygyny not effective at community level	Gender equality agenda against abduction and (recently) early marriage	Couples should have some choice In Muslim sites influence of attempt to establish Shari'a law by Islamist missionaries	Marriages arranged to link families/clans/communities – rules vary by culture, e.g: Gojjam Amhara: promissory, child, early adolescent, adolescent marriage, divorce OK Arssi Oromo: adolescent marriage, abduction, polygyny, divorce not OK
<b>Independent home</b>			As customary plus young people can migrate and set up independent homes outside the community	Son should set up independent farming household near parents Daughter should marry a farmer in a nearby community and set up an independent household there
<b>Child(ren)</b>	Minimum age of marriage at 18 suggests age of first birth of c 19	Support for minimum age of marriage at 18 suggests c19. Contraception advocated	Infertility male and female causes Reduce nos of children to 4-5 using contraception Women can choose age of first birth Serious delivery problems should go to the hospital	Infertility – woman's problem God gives children 1 <sup>st</sup> birth around 16 on average No pregnancy care Traditional Birth Attendants Illegitimate children unacceptable Contraception – ignorance or hostility Traditional abortion
<b>Adult roles in the community</b>	Full adult role depends on headship of a land-owning, tax-paying household. Other youth and women should play community roles through Youth and Women's Associations	Women should be well-represented in bodies monitoring government services	Adult role follows economic independence, marriage and independent household	Adult role follows economic independence, marriage and independent household

### Thinking about youth issues

849. The main problem with government and donor mental models relating to youth is that they are very thin. Government's view of youth seems rather unrealistic while donors do not seem to have one, though there is a growing international interest in adolescent girls. In both models most policies and programmes are meant to work for everyone with no or few distinctions among types of 'beneficiary'.

850. But youth are distinguished from adults in their lack of relative power while simultaneously females are distinguished from males along the same dimension. In the literature 'youth' often seems to mean young men while female youth part of the 'gender' category. A glance at Figure 32 suggests the need for a more complex understanding of gendered generational power relations along the six axes depicted. In exploring durable inequality it is useful to consider all the mechanisms which contribute to it described by Tilly (1999): exploitation and opportunity-hoarding are supported by emulation and adaptation.

**Figure 32: Gendered generational power relations along six axes**



851. The models are also patchy and disconnected in a number of ways, though the international literature relating to young women has started to emphasise the importance of multi-sector and combined approaches.

852. There are a number of ways in which thinking about youth and their transitions could become more joined up; which themselves should be joined up.

- Co-evolution of country, community, household and person – **joining up multi-level systems through the years**
- Recognition of informal community-level **institutional bricolage** through which incoming rules are **joined up** with existing norms in a process which has the capacity to transform both; followed by adoption of an intervention style which starts from where things are
- **Joined-up typing** of contextual differences to create socio-spatial meaningful community categories, for example Tigray, remote, aid-dependent, homogenous, Southern Region, integrated, self-sufficient, mixed religions...; a case-based approach to sub-systems
- **Joined-up typing** of people to create socially meaningful categories, for example poor, educated, female teenager, rich, uneducated, man in his late twenties...; a case-based approach to people
- A life-course perspective – **joining up lives through the years**
- A relational gendered approach: young males and young females follow different but related and interacting paths to adulthood – **joining up across the sexes**

- Personal, work-related, family-related and community-related **transitions are joined up** for males and females separately and across the genders; changes to any transition have knock-on effects.

853. Given that some transitions are joined up in a linked system there is the question of choice of entry point(s) considered here in relation to the early-marriage/no-education/immature-pregnancy syndrome. There are a number of questions to consider:

- What's the goal? Wellbeing now, wellbeing later, development later, social cohesion?
- What theories underlie the different approaches?
  - For example what mechanisms are expected to be activated in attempts to get rid of early marriage which (1) legislate and implement through fines and imprisonment; (2) bribe the families for a few years; (3) educate the girls; (4) improve income-generating work opportunities; (5) lecture community members, etc. What are the potential unintended consequences?
  - What are the theories about girls and education?
  - What are the theories relating to immature pregnancies?
- The consideration of potential unintended knock-on effects is very important. These are not traced in conventional monitoring and evaluation procedures with the consequence that all sorts of harms go unnoticed except by those who suffer from them. Consequence chains should be traced into other areas of life and into the future, and to other people who are not the target of the intervention. For example those involved in Girl Power interventions should anticipate and explore all consequence chains when a group of outsiders arrives in a community to try to change things for adolescent girls and after they have gone.

854. Another issue to consider is the prioritisation of goals in relation to pro-youth development. Is the concern current or future ill/well-being? current or future development? current or future social cohesion? Or a mix? What should be prioritised in particular contexts, for example the Developing Regions?

855. Finally it is useful to take a complexity perspective when thinking designing and implementing particular policies. In a recent book Room (2011) has suggested the following guidelines.

- Map the landscape
- Identify the protagonists
- Model the struggle
- Watch for tipping points
- Tune the landscape
- Energise the protagonists
- Civilise the struggle
- Monitor unintended consequences
- Beware of predators

### ***Aid strategies for youth in rural developing contexts***

856. In this section we describe four different types of pro-youth strategy for donors to consider which are not mutually exclusive:

- use existing interventions
- make all interventions more youth-friendly
- introduce new youth-focused programmes
- institutionalise successful approaches.

For each we recommend regular use of a cross-cutting strategy which is consulting the real experts – the young people and their families.

**Strategy 1: deal with youth issues through existing development interventions**

Do what is being done better

857. For example - make sure there is a regular supply of contraceptives in rural Health Posts

Spread the benefits – focus on laggards

858. Do more work in the Developing Regions

859. Strengthen services for girls who are hard to reach because of spatial or socio-cultural barriers

Focus on a hard-to-reach problem

860. MDG4 – the maternal mortality rate. While having children is not restricted to young women many of them are involved in the process. Evidence from WIDE2 showed that in 2003 many mothers and babies in rural Ethiopia experienced acute and/or chronic suffering as they moved through the Pregnancy/Infancy cycle.

861. Youth un(der)employment

Identify an area of priority for the government concerned

862. E.g. Youth Co-operatives

Work with new partners

863. Try to connect across the top-down/bottom-up disconnect. For example start conversations with religious leaders.

**Box 75: The power of Orthodox Christian priests**

**From Yetmen:**

Priests are very powerful and people listen to what they say, which is not the case with government officials. They can order people not to work for a week (*gizit*) for undeclared reasons. Priests are educated and people trust them.

**Strategy 2: make all development interventions more youth-friendly**

864. Youth as a cross-cutter in the same way that gender is; this also fits with government statements

865. Youth audits of all interventions

**Strategy 3: introduce new youth-focused programmes**

866. Help youth entrepreneurs (first movers)

867. Finance innovative interventions – e.g. energy efficient small technologies; IT

**Strategy 4: institutionalise successful approaches: deepen – widen – warp**

868. Use trial and error pilots to find things which seem to work; this is deepening

869. Use trial and error pilots to find the best ways to spread things which work through different contexts; this is widening

870. Monitor how the multiplying things are changing the larger system and to see what macro level interventions would accelerate change and 'civilise the struggle' to secure social well-being and self-development for all; this is warping

### ***Cross-cutting strategy***

871. Explore the perspectives of male and female teenagers and twenty-year-olds and listen to everything they say.

872. For example, in the recent Youth Situation Analysis when girls were asked to prioritise issues **violence against girls** was raised across all six Regions and all age groups consulted. Girls in Amhara, SNPP, Somali and Addis Ababa said it was the most significant issue (i.e. not Oromia or Gambella). It included rape, incest and other forms of sexual harassment in homes by brothers, husbands and uncles; also domestic workers (Kumela *et al* Youth Situation Analysis 2010).

873. The priority for many males was **youth unemployment** which was of uppermost concern for a significant number of young people in the 19-24 category in every region; for boys it was the most critical issue. In Oromia, SNPP and Addis Ababa boys in the 15-18 year old group also said unemployment was their top priority issue (Kumela *et al* Youth Situation Analysis 2010).

### ***How might donors contribute to youth-oriented policies in Ethiopia?***

874. In the current policy landscape which includes the Government's Growth and Transformation Plan and various ongoing donor programmes various decisions have already been made and there may not be much space for new initiatives. The first question donors should consider is whether there a need for a more integrated youth focus. One input to this could be a gendered-youth audit of all policies and programmes which traces linkages across programmes and the resultant impacts on young people's lives and choices in relation to personal transitions, and those that are work, family and community related and the likely consequences for their wellbeing, participation in economic development, and community and country social cohesion.

875. Were it to be decided that there is a need for a more integrated youth focus the next step would be to consider which if any of the strategies described above could be inserted in or added to what is already planned.

876. It is also important to remain aware of some longer-term potential macro issues which could change the landscape in which future youth transitions will take place. For example:

- Unintended macro-economic consequences of rapid and high GTP spending over the next few years.
- Potentially rising religious tensions
- A growing population of educated youth leading to pressure for change
- The political succession after 2015

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## Annex 1: Summaries of Theses Written at Addis Ababa University

### Agazi Tiumelissan

1. Reproductive health services for youth -----	196
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### *Reproductive health services for youth*

**Awol Mohammed 2007. *Youth Reproductive health problems and service preferences in Lalibela town, north Wollo administrative zone, Amhara region.* Addis Ababa University School of Graduates Study, Population studies and research centre for institute of development research.**

#### **Abstract**

- Poor socio-economic and environment, limited access to reproductive health information and services and lack of youth friendly reproductive health services aggravated the risk of youth reproductive health problems.
- A cross-sectional study on 400 randomly selected youth.
- 213 (53.3%) were females. 26 of them were married and all were married before reaching the age of 18.
- 199 (49.8%) were sexually active, out of which 95.5% exercise of first sexual intercourse was unsafe (no condom use).
- There were 70 youth who experienced pregnancy in the study and from those, 88.6 % exposed to unwanted pregnancy, of those, 31.4 % gave birth and 68.8% aborted.
- Logistic regression in the study indicates that being younger, living with friends, and getting pocket money were found to be the factors that resulted in youth reproductive health problems. On the contrary, attending the school youth RH and anti HIV/AIDS club that disseminate information regarding youth RH matters contributed a lot for not being affected by youth reproductive health problems.
- From this study it was concluded that youths in the study area were experiencing high youth reproductive health problems. Thus there is a need to collaborate different sectors and the community to facilitate youth friendly health services to promote youth health.

#### **Conclusion**

- Younger age group was found to be more at risk as compared to older age group
- Youth lack adequate information and knowledge about sexual and reproductive health and thus initiated to perform risky sexual practices that exposed them to reproductive health problem and they were not able to take action to protect themselves from various sexual risk exposures.
- Most of the youth were not served in the existing health institutions for their reproductive health need, even those who used to be served claimed that the existing health institutions were inconvenient and not well structured for the needs of the youth.

- Most of the youth preferred to rearrange the youth reproductive health institutions separately and to be served by young and the same sex health service providers.

#### **Study Area**

- Bugna Wereda, Lalibela town.
- According to CSA projections (2006), the total population of Lalibela town is estimated to be 17,022. Based on 2006 municipality information the total population of Lalibela town was 17,022, where 8286 are males and 8736 are females. Among the total population of the town, 30%, which is approximately 5,107 is youth (15-24 age)
- The study was conducted from April to May 2007.

#### ***Sexual behaviour and vulnerability to HIV infection***

**Sadi Alwei 2010. *Gender differentials in youth sexual behaviour and vulnerability to HIV infection in Burayu zone, Oromiya region.* Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Institute of Population Studies.**

#### **Abstract**

- Ethiopia is a developing country with a demographic profile dominated by a young population. Due to biological, socio-cultural, economic and gender inequality young people, particularly those aged 15-24 are generally at a high risk of contracting STDs including HIV/AIDS.
- This study is intended to examine gender differentials in youth sexual behaviour and vulnerability to HIV infection in Burayu zone of Oromia Regional State. A cross-sectional, study was conducted in both urban and rural areas of the zone. Both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used to gather the required information for the study.
- 723 youth in the age group 15-24 (367 males and 356 females) were involved in the quantitative part while four FGDs each involving 10 participants were conducted. 10 in-depth interviews were conducted.
- The major finding of the study shows that sexual initiation typically occurs at an early age for both sexes. However, females are more likely to start sex before reaching the age of 15. It is also found that the mean age at sexual debut was 17.2 for males and 16.5 for females. Although most youth have used condoms, its consistent use remained low. Considerable proportion of the youth in the area exhibited high-risk sexual behaviour including multiple sexual partnership, early sexual activity and inconsistent or non-use of condoms that predisposed them to sexually transmitted diseases including HIV infection. This implies that HIV/AIDS prevention and other reproductive health programmes need to target youth when they are very young, particularly for females in the study area.

#### **Conclusion**

- Considerable proportion of youth in the area exhibited high risk of sexual behaviour that predisposed them to HIV infection.
- Females were relatively more exposed to risky sexual behaviour as compared to males in the same age group due to early sexual initiation and inconsistent condom use.
- Open and free communications and discussion between parents and youth on matters of sexual issue was very low. So youth preferred to discuss with their peers that encourages early sexual initiation than postpone it to marriage.
- Young male are much more likely to have multiple sexual partners and engage in higher risk of sexual behaviour than females in the same age group.
- A significant number of sexual active youth reported ever experiencing symptoms of STIs (Sexually Transmitted Infections), which is the major indication for the youth as they are vulnerable to HIV and this may aggravate the problem in controlling and preventing the

diseases.

### **Study Area**

- The study was conducted in Burayu zone of Ormiya regional state. The zone has a total population of 63,873 and out of which about one-fifth are in age group 15-24 (CSA, 2007).
- Though the number of youth living in the zone is large there is only one youth centre, which provides services on basic outdoor recreational activities and information on Sexual and Reproductive health including HIV/AIDS for limited number of youth living in the area.
- The fieldwork was conducted from February to April 2010.

**Sebsib Belay 2002. *Socio-cultural and Behavioural Aspects of HIV/AIDS Among Young Adults in Bahir Dar Town, North Western Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Social Anthropology.**

### **Abstract**

- This thesis is a study of the socio-cultural and behavioural aspects of HIV/AIDS among young adults in the age bracket 20-29 in one Kebele in Bahir Dar.
- The thesis describes the daily lives of young adults in Bahir Dar as a basis for understanding the social context for youth behaviour and attitudes. The discussion shows that many youth live in a context of poverty, unemployment, high drug and alcohol abuse, male dominance and female submissiveness and vulnerability.

### **Conclusion**

- Young men and women in Bahir Dar are knowledgeable about the nature of the disease and its transmission. However, there is discrepancy between awareness of HIV/AIDS and behavioural change.
- Understanding the reality of HIV/AIDS among youth requires then need to incorporate a broader social and cultural perspective on the reality of HIV/AIDS among the youth, in addition to moral and behavioural perspectives. This is important because the reality or significance of HIV/AIDS among youth is comprised of the social context of their daily lives, their socio-cultural notions of HIV/AIDS, socio-cultural dimension and context of youth sexuality, and the psychosocial status of those who are HIV positive.

### ***Unsafe abortion***

**Tsegaye Mosehe 2009. *Female youth knowledge and attitude towards induced abortion in Bishoftu Town, Oromiya Region*. Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Institute of population studies.**

### **Abstract**

- Unsafe abortion is a preventable tragedy and is one of the neglected problems of health care in developing countries.
- Qualitative and quantitative methods were used. 708 female youth participated in the study.
- It is found that around one-third of sexually active respondents do not use contraceptives to protect themselves from unwanted/unplanned pregnancy and STDs including HIV/AIDS, whereas 91.9% of them were aware of contraceptives. About one-fifth (20%) of the respondents who ever experienced pregnancy reported induced abortion, of which students, unemployed youth, housemaids and daily labourers took the highest share.
- Of the respondents 73% supported induced abortion upon a woman's demand. Around 87% of the respondents were aware of health risks of unsafe abortion but only one-fifth of the respondents knew that abortion is illegal but allowed under certain circumstances in the

country.

- 67.7% of the respondents stated unsafe abortion as a major health problem and nearly half of the respondents 48.7% knew someone who suffered or died from unsafe abortion in the study area.
- There was significant association between female youth knowledge and attitude of induced abortion and some socio-economic and demographic variables. The multivariate result revealed that having positive attitude towards induced abortion was higher for those female youth who were less religious, in their twenties (20-24), had secondary educational level and above (grade 9-12) and above, had no monthly income, never married, had positive attitude of contraceptive.
- Similarly as the multivariate result revealed female youth knowledge of unsafe abortion was higher for those female youth who were in their twenties (20-24), had secondary educational level and above (grade 9-12 and above), live with friends and in universities, had knowledge of contraceptive and positive attitude of contraceptive use.
- Based on the above findings maximizing contraceptive use, increasing the public knowledge of legal rights regarding abortion, liberalizing the abortion laws, reducing the social stigma associated with sexuality and abortion and giving appropriate training for abortion care providers are recommended to reduce unsafe/illegal abortions in Ethiopia in general and in the study area in particular.

### **Conclusion**

- Though most of the respondents have knowledge of contraceptives, one-third of sexually active respondents do not use contraceptives to protect themselves from unwanted pregnancy and STDs including HIV/AIDS
- About three-fourth of the respondents believe that a woman should have the right to abortion, when she so chooses. Most of the participants in the study were aware of the health risks of unsafe abortion but only one-fifth knew that abortion is legal in Ethiopia under certain circumstances.

### **Study Area and Sample**

- Bishoftu Town [Debrezeit]
- According to the information from the town municipality (2007), the total number of population within the age range of 15-24 is 17,098 among which 8998 are females. Females aged 15-24 make up 6.3% of the total population of the town. The study was conducted in February 2009.
- There is one government hospital, two government health centres and more than ten private clinics in the town.

### ***Emergency contraception***

**Mayet Hailu 2008. *Users awareness and practice of emergency contraception among youth in Adama and Bahir Dar Universities, Ethiopia.* Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Regional and Local Development Studies.**

#### **Abstract**

- A sample of 400 female students of Adama and Bahir Dar Universities and 40 service providers in the two towns were selected for the study. Data were collected by a self administered, anonymous and pre-tested questionnaire; FDGs and KIIs were also conducted.
- The finding of the study indicates that from the total potential ECP users a slightly less than 50% were aware of the method and it was much lesser in Bahir Dar University.
- The majority of the health service providers who participated in the KII and the FGD reported that they had heard about the method. However, knowledge of the general features of emergency contraceptive pills was more strongly associated with prior sex practice.

- Users and providers generally had positive attitudes regarding emergency contraceptive pills. Those with adequate knowledge generally showed favourable attitudes towards emergency contraceptive pills. Few respondents (less than 10%) had used ECT. Prescription pattern of providers was very low. Media and friends were important sources of information of ECP for most of the respondents familiar with the method.
- The study recommends on urgent need to educate the youth about ECP including the correct timing of use. Health service providers need training about ECP. It is also recommended that training programs target the types of providers who are less knowledgeable about the method.

### **Conclusion**

- Potential user's and provider's awareness, basic knowledge and perception of ECP are crucial in the utilization of ECP and in clearing the misconceptions about the method. Yet, barriers such as inadequate knowledge and negative attitude of users and providers and inaccessibility of ECP prevent the youth from having easy access of ECP.
- University students would be expected to have greater knowledge of emergency contraception, but the findings suggest that accurate knowledge about ECP was rather low among female university students and health care providers in the two towns. This indicates that there is an urgent need to educate youth about emergency contraceptives, with emphasis on available methods and correct timing of use.
- Rates of users' utilization and providers' prescription of the method were low.

### **Study Area**

- Adama and Bahir Dar Universities.
- Adama and Bahir Dar, the capitals of Oromia and Amhara, the 3rd and 4th biggest towns of the country respectively. Both of the towns have referral hospitals, health posts and private clinics.
- Both universities have medical centres in their compound and sexual and reproductive health services are provided. They have also potential access to SRH services at the hospital and several nearby public and private health centres and pharmacies. Anti AIDS and Girls, clubs are among the functioning clubs in the two universities.

### ***Rural youth employment and natural resource use***

**Guta Olana 2009. *Rural Youth Employment and local natural resource use: nexus and issues. The case of Lume Wereda, Oromia regional national state, Ethiopia.* Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Institute of Rural Development.**

#### **Abstract**

- The objective of this research was to assess and understand the employment and economic situations of the rural youth in relation to the dynamics of local natural resources use in Lume Wereda of Oromia regional state.
- The findings indicated that the human capital, particularly, health and educational situations of the rural youth were constrained deterring labour productivity potential of the group. Moreover, rural infrastructure including road and social services such as rural power supply, and market are not sufficient to facilitate the economic activities of the rural youth.
- The great majority (75.5%) of rural youth in the sample were found to be landless. As such rural youth are either landless or own insufficient size of farmland; lack of productive asset likely implies the magnitude of rural youth underemployment and unemployment in the study area. Consequently, such constrained farm income has become the drive for opting from alternative livelihood sources in which case harvest of local natural resources is found to be the most apparent option to the vulnerable group.
- The number and proportion of rural youth participating in non-farm economic activities was

found generally low aggravating underemployment and unemployment of the group in the study Wereda. Low awareness and skill, shortage of capital and inadequate access to credit services were found among the primary constraints deterring the rural youth from engaging in non-farm economic activities. Consequently, this situation has become among the momentums for youths to opt for unviable livelihood sources.

- Opting for increased employment and reduction of pressure on local natural resources, rural youth access to land resources, enhanced skill, better credit supply, increased non-farm economic activities diversification, family planning and promotion of participatory forestry scheme and environmental conservation are among the major recommendations.

### **Conclusion**

- Rural youth of the Wereda have low level of education. Limited knowledge and skill constrain them to engage in diversified economic activities and livelihood sources. The health situation is also constrained due to diverse problems. Health and education being determinants of human capital have considerable impact on labour quality and productivity.
- Rural road infrastructure and market access is insufficient for the rural youth. Rural electrification is very low. This limited physical capital (inadequate access to power supply, social services, information) affects the expansion of non-farm activities. Hence aggravating underemployment and unemployment.
- Landlessness or insufficient land size contributes for underemployment and unemployment.
- Low access of livestock asset, feed shortage and inadequate access to extension services have markedly constrained livestock production and income of the rural youth from this source.
- Significant overlap prevails between the seasonal food shortage and time of engagement on harvest of local natural vegetation. This indicates that there is linkage between the problems and use of such resources by the vulnerable group.
- The number and proportion of rural youth participants in diversified non-farm economic activities was low in the study Wereda.
- Low awareness and skill, shortage of capital and inadequate access to credit services were understood as the primary constraints deterring the rural youth engagement in diversified economic activities.
- Primarily indigenous tree species are processed and utilized as income sources (charcoal, lumber) at the study area. Such vegetation demand long rotation years for maturity, it implies that abuse of such natural resources has a far reaching negative consequence on the environment.
- Rural youth have low awareness and knowledge towards environmental issues. This leads to unwise use of natural resources.
- Loss of high value indigenous vegetation, degradation of wild life habitat, reduced soil fertility, land degradation, and increased vulnerability were indicated among the impacts of longer year's negative consequences of natural resources misuse at the study area.

### **The study area**

- Lume Wereda is located in the rift valley escarpment of East Shoa.
- Four Kebeles were selected from 32 Kebeles in the Wereda (agro-ecologically)
- 200 HH were selected from the four Kebeles with PPS, that have youth members

### ***Youth entrepreneurship in urban contexts***

**Yordanos Mekonen 2006. *Youth entrepreneurship in Ethiopia: the case of Manufacturing micro and small enterprises in Addis Ababa*, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Institute of Regional and Local Development Studies.**

## **Abstract**

- The primary findings of the paper indicated that sex of the individual; birthplace of the youth; education level; psychological motives such as commitment, need for autonomy and need for achievement as well as family background have significant influence on enterprise formation of young people. Besides, the general entrepreneurial environment such as business situation, availability of business support, education and training facilities, business infrastructure have an impact on the performance of the young entrepreneurs.
- The potential of entrepreneurial development in the Micro and small-scale enterprise sector is not fully utilized because of various barriers, especially for those operated by young people. Lack of business infrastructures, financial problems, lack of demand or market and less encouraging societal attitude towards young entrepreneurs were identified to be the main challenges for entrepreneurs in the study. With all the challenges the self-motivated young entrepreneurs in this study have proven the desire towards enterprise, growth and achievement. They have relatively better operating results, business management skill and expansion concern in addition to the risk and initiative they took to establish their own enterprises. It is, however, paradoxical they are less favoured by government promotional activities.

## **Conclusion**

- The MSEs in the country are playing crucial role in the economic development of the country through employment creation, utilization of local skill, inputs, and transferring knowledge, etc.
- The self-motivated youth entrepreneurs in this study have proven the desire towards enterprise, growth, and achievement. They have relatively better operating results, business management skill and expansion concern in addition to the risk and initiative they took to establish their own enterprise.
- The binary logic regression result has revealed that sex of the individual, prior business experience, entrepreneurial background of family, education of the individual have significant role in the enterprise formation. When it comes to behaviour of the person's need for achievement, need for autonomy, need for innovations are found to be the qualities, which drive one to establish his/her own business.
- The research result revealed also that the general entrepreneurial environment such as business situations, the availability of business support, access to finance, education and training, infrastructure facilities, etc have impact on the performance of the youth entrepreneur.

## **Study area**

- Two sub-cities (one in centre of city Lideta and one far from centre, Bole) were selected.
- Then the experiment group (self initiated entrepreneurs) and control groups (government initiated entrepreneurs or member of cooperatives) were selected from the list of entrepreneurs of the sub-cities provided by the agencies.

**Mekeru Yitbarek 2010. Youth Employment in Small and Micro Enterprises; The Case of Jimma Town. Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Sociology.**

## **Abstract**

- Employment in small and micro enterprises is to young people with: little educational qualification and formal training; a prior livelihood source of informal sector employment; with source of skill and knowledge based on informal learning and experience; driven by lack of alternative options, the need to cover personal expenses and support families.
- Major problems regarding employment conditions in small and micro enterprises include lack of regular working and income earning period and managerial and control systems; lack of job security and conflict among co-workers.

- Young people faced problems of starting and expanding enterprises among which the major ones are lack of access to finance, raw material, market; lack of supportive administrative and regulatory frameworks and inadequate institutional and socio-cultural support.

### **Conclusion**

- Small and micro enterprises have potential contribution for youth employment opportunities.
- Challenges and prospects for youth employment in SME include assets, capabilities and interests of youth people: the employment and working conditions in small and micro enterprises; the enabling policy, institutional and administrative framework as well as the broader socio-cultural and economic context.

### ***Failure of urban youth participation in environmental protection***

**Yirgalem Tekla 2007. *Challenges of urban youth participation in Environmental protection: a case study of Dilla town, Gedeo zone, Southern nations, nationalities and people's regional state Ethiopia*, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate studies, college of Development Studies.**

### **Abstract**

- The research explores the constraints of urban youth participation in development activities particularly in environmental protection activities in Dilla town.
- The research was conducted in three Kebeles of the town.
- The major challenges that are identified by the study include: limited knowledge of the youth as well as the community on environmental problems and their solutions, absence of adult initiatives, lack of support from formal and informal institutions, absence of strong youth organizations to encourage participation of youth in environmental protection, lack of incentives, mismanagement of the youth organization, lack of policy advocacy (such as youth policy, environmental policy etc) to create awareness, lack of holistic approach and the weak relationship between the youth and the local administration.

### **Conclusion**

- The findings of this study indicated that there is lack of information, education and training for the young people to learn about the effect of environmental problems and their solutions. Young people are not involved in decisions that affect them both at individual and with systems that they are part. There is no trend of policy advocacy to create awareness about the policies of the country to the youth as well as to the society. There is lack of holistic approach involving all stakeholders, such as civic societies, teachers, NGOs, governmental institutions etc. The major problems for the weak participation and termination of the youth organization/club were lack of financial support and weak leadership.
- The findings indicated that the above challenges could be solved by giving due attention to this neglected part of the society in whom huge potential for sustainable development is available.
- Youth participation in environmental protection programs should assure individual gains, awareness of their environment and acquire and exchange the knowledge, values, and skills, experiences that will enable them to act individually and collectively to solve the present and future environmental problem.
- Communication strategies that are relevant to youth are necessary if young people are to remain motivated and initiated.
- There has to be a paradigm shift in terms of how adults think about youth. Plans should be shared openly with adult decision-makers in intergenerational discussions. Within this dialogue, young people must be allowed to design its format, and lead the discussions process and its development. Generally, from the programming and service points of view, the youth development frameworks need to move away from deficit models by valuing young people for

their potentials.

### **Study Area**

- Three Kebeles in Dilla town.
- 135 respondents (78 males and 57 females) were included in the survey
- 129 respondents (73 males and 56 females) completed the questionnaire

**Sidisse Buli 2005. *The challenges of urban youth participation in environmental protection and community service: the case of two Kebeles in Arada sub-city, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Regional and Local development studies.***

### **Abstract**

- Youth participation within the society, both as a beneficiary and as agents of development, is very crucial to solve their problems. Their participation in various developmental activities particularly in environmental protection and community services contributes for positive youth development and has a multiplier effect and benefits, which could extend to the whole society.
- This study used a cross-sectional data collected through a field survey in two Kebeles within Arada sub-city of Addis Ababa, while FGDs with the youth and key informant interviews were also employed. Both qualitative and quantitative research strategies have been used, which were collected from 207 randomly sampled youths and 73 FGD participants.
- The major youth participation challenges identified are: lack of awareness of the youth and the community on youth participation, lack of sufficient support and incentives for participation of youth in various development activities, the absence of a strong responsible body for the issues of the youth at school, at work places and at the local Kebele; and lack of resources for participation.

### **Conclusion**

- The reasons for the youth not to participate are: Lack of interest on the part of the youth and other wrong perceptions of the youth, lack of skill and resources, lack of support from local government, NGOs and CBOs, lack of information, absence of strong body facilitating youth participation, etc.

## ***Irregular migration to South Africa***

**Teshome Desta 2010. *Causes and Consequences of irregular migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to the republic of South Africa: The case of Kembata-Tembaro and Hadiya zones, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, College of Development Studies***

### **Abstract**

- This study investigates the socio-economic and demographic causes and consequences of irregular migration of young adults from Southern Ethiopia down to the Republic of South Africa. It is a cross-sectional study based on sample survey of 690 households with 658 eligible young adults aged 15-54 years belonging to three migrant categories in relation to migration status of South Africa, namely out migrants (226), return migrants (193) and non-migrants (239).
- The study was conducted in four randomly selected Weredas and then households from two zones of the SNNPR - Kembata-Tembaro and Hadiya - between February to May 2010.
- Data sources include questionnaires, key informant interviews, FGDs, administrative records
- The irregular migration to RSA is enormously dominated by males (over 80%) and adults of age between 20-34 (57%). It is also found that the majority of migrants' childhood residence is rural (73%) and 28% of the sampled migrants are first born. Moreover, the study showed the presence of non-linear relationship between household size and migration status.

- Highest percentages of migrants (95%) are literate and those having secondary education dominate this. It is also found that the movement of young adults from southern Ethiopia to RSA is facilitated by a network of human smugglers found in Addis Ababa, Hossana, Dilla and Nairobi. The main cause for the irregular movement of adults is not absolute poverty but relative poverty and 44% of them left their home land for reasons of perceived better opportunities in RSA, and only 8.5% cited poverty as the main cause.
- The multivariate analysis showed that sex, age, education status and birth order having significant impact on the youth to migrate or not while household size, place of childhood residence, zone, marital and employment status as well as religion found to have no significant impact.
- Most of the return migrants (58%) are unemployed before their movement to RSA but now over 92% of them are employed. The study also showed that the majority of the returnees are earning high income than before, and also more than that of non-migrants. On the other hand, highest proportions of smuggled migrants reported that their journeys were harsh with unexpected negative consequences. They also noted robbery and theft while they were in RSA.

### ***Youth and disability***

**Getnet Kebede 2001. *Coping with Disability: The social Relations of Disabled Children and Youths with Their Parents and the Larger Community, a Case Study in Selected Areas of Addis Ababa*, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies, Social Anthropology.**

#### **Abstract**

- The study is an attempt to make an anthropological analysis of the coping mechanism of children and youths with disabilities and their parents and the social relationship of children with disabilities living in Wededa 13, 25 and 8, with their parents and the larger community.
- The sample of the study consists of 39 children and youths with disabilities. The study focused only motor impaired children and youth.
- The type of injuries covered in the study were: only one leg, only hand, only back, only hand and leg, and both legs, both lets and back.

#### **Conclusion**

- The enabling environment for children with disabilities to lead an ordinary life is largely affected by the factors associated with community attitude to their disability and parents reaction to this.
- Factors, such as being geographically relocating to a new neighbourhood, being extremely poor in relation to the community in which they live in; the type and frequency of interaction of the children with disabilities and their parents with the community; whether the children with disabilities were exposed to the external environment or not gave an indication as to how parents and children adjusted and coped with their disability.
- Personal adjustment to disability requires not only the efforts of the children with disabilities of his/her parents. The disabled individuals' ability to function in every day life situations (coping), and the type and character of social and cultural fields of relations in which they operate, or to which they are confined (life space). And finally material and physical support of voluntary institutions matter.

## Annex 2: Learning from other countries - case studies relating to selected youth transitions

Rebecca Carter

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## **Introduction**

This annex is the product of desk research undertaken by Rebecca Carter (member of the WIDE team) in March–May 2010 into available literature on international case studies relating to selected youth transitions.

The case studies presented have been chosen as examples of interesting experiences to supplement the learning and evidence-base that development practitioners can draw upon to design, implement and assess potential approaches and interventions to support youth transitions in Ethiopia. Therefore the case studies are a selected sample and are not exhaustive of all experience or literature available.

The material is taken direct from the referenced resources: this is a compilation of material written by other researchers and is not original text. For full appreciation of the experience provided by these case studies, the original references need to be read. Care has been taken to cite all references and provide a full bibliography at the end of the annex, including available web-links for easy access of the source reports.

## **Circumcision**

### **International advocacy**

Since 2003 the UNG)ON has declared February 6 as "International Day of Zero Tolerance to Female Genital Mutilation".

United Nations interagency statement on Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation launched in early 2008 by the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General calls on governments, international and national organizations, civil society and communities to develop, strengthen and support specific and concrete action directed towards ending Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FM/C). (Donors Working Group, 2010)

### **UNFPA and UNICEF multi-country programme**

In 2008 the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) set up a joint initiative against FGM/C aimed at encouraging communities to collectively abandon the practice using a culturally sensitive approach, including dialogue and social networking. The goal of the Joint Programme is to contribute to the accelerated abandonment of female genital mutilation/cutting in 17 countries in Africa by creating a rapid shift in social norms.<sup>29</sup>

As described in detail in its 2008 Annual Report, the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme has initiated activities in eight countries, including lobbying for enactment and enforcement of laws, completion of baseline studies to facilitate monitoring of results, building media campaign, and training of health workers on management of the complications of FGM/C. The programme has enlisted religious leaders and scholars in several countries to speak out against the practice. It is also organising a technical consultation to address a relatively new trend – the medicalisation of the procedure by doctors or other trained health care providers in clinical settings.

One of the programme countries is Kenya. UNFPA and UNICEF report the following activities and achievements in implementation in Kenya:

- UNFPA and UNICEF lobbied key legislators to support FGM/C campaign. This led to a high level launch of the Joint Programme in September 2008 by the Minister of Gender, Children and

<sup>29</sup> UNFPA website <http://www.unfpa.org/public/publications/pid/2944> (accessed May 25 2011).

Social Development. During this launch, the Minister committed the Government to support the establishment of a Coordinating Committee with a Secretariat to bring together all partners working on FGM/C and to develop a National Strategy towards accelerated FGM/C abandonment. In addition the Government would amend the Children Act to ensure strengthened protection of children from this practice. In this respect the Minister categorically stated that the people who practice FGM/C should be jailed for life. The Minister called upon development partners to support scaling up of FGM/C interventions throughout the country.

- With the support of the Joint Programme, the government developed a FGM/C Joint National Workplan (2008-2012). Under the auspices of the Ministry for Gender, Children and Social Development, the Government established a National Coordinating Committee and a Secretariat with clear terms of reference to monitor and report progress on FGM/C abandonment. It also established a monitoring and evaluation mechanism which would ensure that results being achieved by different stakeholders are documented.
- Through the support of the Joint Programme, 69 Chiefs and District Officers from three regions of Northern Kenya were trained on Child Protection & Kenyan Laws and FGM/C. As a group of administration staff in charge of combating FGM/C and increasing enrolment of children in schools, the training was considered timely. The Chiefs and District Officers resolved to address FGM/C at community level based on information received on the Kenyan law and child protection, the adverse effects of FGM/C and the facts on religion and FGM/C. Community Forums providing communities with information and space to reach decisions with regards to FGM/C is one of the strategies that supports the abandonment process of FGM/C. The engagement and dialogue with religious leaders on FGM/C in Northern Kenya is bearing fruit as youthful religious scholars are now emerging, and endorsing the “nocutting” stand.
- Capacity was built for 240 community members from Tana River area in the Coast Province on FGM/C and its link to human rights and social and psychological effects of FGM/C. In addition, community dialogue was undertaken during the capacity building session to create an understanding that FGM/C is not linked to religion.

(UNFPA and UNICEF, 2009)

### **Kenya: UNFPA funded community-based organisation**

The project ‘Safety Net for Girls Escaping Female Genital Cutting and Early Marriage’ had a budget of \$60,000 for 2003-2006 and was implemented by the Tasaru Ntomonok Initiative (TNI), a community-based organization in the Southern Rift Valley. The organization operates within the Narok district, which has a population of more than 500,000 people, and was formed to support young girls escaping early marriage and FGM/C. (Tasaru ntomonok means ‘rescue the women’ in the local Maa language.) One objective of the project was to provide a ‘safe house’ for girls seeking refuge from genital cutting and early marriage—the Tasaru Rescue Centre. But it also seeks longer-term solutions to the problem, by reconciling runaway girls with their families and communities and discouraging the practices of early marriage and FGM/C, thereby reducing the number of girls needing help. (UNFPA, 2007).

In 2007 UNFPA reported the following results:

- All of the girls who have been rescued from forced early marriage or FGM/C have gone back to school.
- None of the rescued girls who have been reconciled with their families have undergone cutting or been forced into early marriage.
- Community understanding of the project’s benefits has contributed to its success. Community leaders, elders and members of the provincial administration support the project and regularly consult with project leaders on emerging cases.

- The project has supported construction of a girl's dormitory in Sakutiek Secondary School. The provincial administration, through the District Education Committee, has recommended the construction of dormitories in all primary schools to ensure that girls between the ages of 8 and 14, who are most vulnerable to early marriages and genital cutting, are protected.
- Women who perform FGM/C are developing alternative livelihoods, including operating a maize grinding mill purchased through the project. They are also training to become traditional birth attendants.

More than 1,000 women from various women's groups, as well as officials from the provincial administration and district law enforcement officers, have been sensitized to the dangers of early marriage and genital cutting. Some religious leaders, including those representing the African Inland and Full Gospel churches, have lent their support to the project through regular sermons and public-awareness initiatives.

The project has introduced new perspectives on cultural values and practices in a community that is deeply traditional.

(UNFPA, 2007)

## ***Rape and other gender-based violence***

### **Programme H - focus on male youth**

**Programme H** ("H" for hombres, or man in Spanish, and homens in Portuguese) aims to change gender norms and sexual behaviours in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru (Barker, 2003; White, Green and Murphy, 2003; Guedes, 2004). The initiative includes four components, namely: a) training professionals to work with young men in the area of health and gender-equity using a set of manuals and videos; b) social marketing of condoms; c) promoting health services; and d) evaluating changes in gender norms.

The group education is accompanied by a no-words cartoon video called "Once upon a Boy", which illustrates a young man through various stages of adolescence to young adulthood. The video enables participants in various cultural and linguistic settings to create dialogue and project personal stories into scenes about violence, social pressures, sexual experiences, and having a sexually transmitted infection (STI). Sample Video: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzG4re-Ja0I>

In 2002, PROMUNDO and Horizons began a 2-year evaluation to measure the effectiveness of two different approaches, compared to a control site. Researchers have developed a "Gender-Equitable Men" (Leichert) scale with 24 items for measuring attitudes. Methods include pre and post-tests as well as a six-month follow-up community-based survey. In addition, they are gathering qualitative information among men and their female partners. Preliminary results suggest that the programme has been successful at increasing gender equitable norms and reducing behaviour that puts men at increased risk of HIV/AIDS.

Programme H has been shown to positively influence attitudes related to gender equity. Some of the areas that have demonstrated improved gender sensitive attitudes include, gender based violence, condom use, partner negotiation skills, and a greater desire to be more involved as fathers.

Programme H has been adapted by more than 20 countries with diverse populations, cultures and socio-economic levels (Barker 2003).

(Bott *et al*, 2005; ICRW, 2010)

### **Programmes to prevent gender-based violence**

The most well known examples of using 'edutainment' for gender-based violence prevention are Sexto Sentido, carried out by Puntos de Encuentro in Nicaragua, and Soul City, carried out by the

Institute for Health and Development Community in South Africa and eight other Sub-Saharan countries in Africa. Both have used prime time television soap operas, radio programs, school-based work, and other media to address violence against women, gender, sexuality and rights.

Some research suggests that *Sexto Sentido* has had a positive impact (Abaunza, 2002; UNFPA, 2002; Berliner, 2002), but little quantitative evidence of effectiveness has been published or disseminated. However, an ambitious qualitative and quantitative evaluation is underway involving a three-year panel/cohort study among more than 4500 young respondents and at least three rounds of data collection – in 2003, 2004, and 2005 (Guedes, 2004). This study will measure the program's success in changing attitudes and behaviour around gender, stigma, HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence.

Soul City has already conducted extensive population-based impact studies of Series 4, which addressed gender-based violence for the first time in 1999 (Scheepers, 2001; Scheepers and Cristophides, 2001; Soul City, 2001; UNFPA, 2002; Singhal et al., 2004). That research found that the series reached 82% of the population in South Africa and had a positive impact on both awareness and knowledge about violence against women. The impact on attitudes appeared to be mixed:

- Certain attitudes about violence improved slightly (such as whether violence is a private affair), but some stayed the same or deteriorated. For example, there were no changes in the levels of those who believed that men have the right to beat their wives, or in the belief that such beatings are socially acceptable.
- The evaluation focused on intermediate outcomes such as knowledge, attitudes, and intentions, but not on how these related to outcomes such as levels of actual violence.
- The programme measured a greater impact on HIV/AIDS attitudes and behaviours compared to violence, but researchers pointed out that Soul City had addressed HIV/AIDS in multiple series over several years, while Series 4 was the first series to address violence against women

(Bott *et al*, 2005)

### **Ghana and Malawi: USAID 5-year Safe Schools Programme**

In Ghana and Malawi, USAID implemented a five-year Safe Schools Programme to reduce school-related gender-based violence and improve health and educational outcomes for students. Evaluation reports on changes in teacher and student attitudes, knowledge, and practices showed that teacher's awareness of sexual harassment of girls at school increased. Prior to the Safe Schools Program, 30 percent of surveyed teachers in Ghana agreed that sexual harassment of girls occurred in schools; after the programme that number increased to nearly 80 percent. Also, after participating in the program, students were more confident that they had the right not to be hurt or mistreated.

(Greene *et al*, 2009)

### **Nigeria: comprehensive reproductive health**

A three-year programme that trains adolescent girls in HIV prevention, sexual and reproductive health, sexuality, and life skills.

- A local organisation trains teachers to implement the curriculum at schools and local centres. The curriculum topics are personal empowerment, body image, and violence the first year; sexual and reproductive health and rights, gender-based violence, and HIV and AIDS the second year; and girls' and women's rights, political application of feminist theory, and women in society and culture the third year.
- Target audience: Adolescent girls, ages 10–18, in school and out of school, residing in areas with high prevalence of gender-based violence, harmful traditional practices, female genital cutting practices, HIV, etc. Programme graduates can then seek to qualify to work as peer educators.

- Evaluation results show that participants are better able to take on leadership roles and make informed decisions in their relationships, and that the programme has helped reduce harmful traditional practices and increase knowledge of sexuality issues among youth. The programme has benefited from its “training-of-trainers” model by building sufficient local capacity to implement the curriculum, thereby meeting demand and relieving the burden on the local organisation to conduct all trainings.

(USAID, 2009)

### **Zimbabwe: using hospitals to support young rape victims**

The Family Support Trust of Zimbabwe is an innovative model of a holistic, coordinated approach for young victims of sexual abuse, based out of urban hospitals. Of their approximately 3,000 cases per year, more than half are girls aged 12 to 16. The Trust aims to provide a comprehensive medical and rehabilitative service to sexually abused children and their families in a child-friendly environment in partnership with relevant government departments. Family Support Clinics in urban hospitals offer counselling, medical examinations, and treatment, as well as post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent HIV infection. Other services include STI treatment, emergency contraceptive, and abortion when relevant. Many stakeholders have praised this “one-stop model” as best suited for the management of child survivors of sexual abuse, and versions of this approach are being developed in other countries in the region. The initiative also provides psychosocial support for children, training for hospital staff and police, and advocacy to make courts child-friendly (Brakarsh 2003; J. Brakarsh, pers. comm.).

(Temin and Levine, 2009)

## ***Sexually transmitted infections and diseases***

### **India: scaling up rural HIV prevention, care and treatment services**

In 2009, Bhattacharjee reported that a project using a “Link Worker” model to reach at-risk individuals living in rural areas was successfully implemented from 2003 to 2006 as a demonstration project in Bagalkot, India. District-wide, 54,447 persons received HIV counselling and testing, of whom 13,416 tested HIV-positive, representing 77 percent of the district’s estimated HIV-positive population. Approximately 6 million condoms were distributed and increased access to services for sexually transmitted infections was provided to nearly 50,000 women. Female sex workers, pregnant women, and people living with HIV, were prioritized. The link worker model is not described in any detail in this presentation, but it provides a “supervisory structure for support, mentoring, microplans and supervision” to achieve results.

(Bhattacharjee, 2009)

### **South Africa: systematic review of youth HIV prevention interventions since 2005**

Common elements related to their impact on secondary outcomes can be discerned, as well as aspects of intervention delivery. These include:

- 1) a focus on at least one social/structural risk factor, as in the emphasis on gender, poverty and alcohol in these eight interventions;
- 2) using group-based delivery to change social norms;
- 3) within schools, demonstrating the need to use additional personnel, perhaps from outside the school setting, to deliver interventions, thus relieving a burden on teachers;
- 4) directing intervention efforts at the school, as well as individual, level.

In addition, several studies demonstrate the potential of structural interventions to bring about changes in HIV-related risk behaviours.

Lessons learned included:

- 1) Moving beyond individual-level measures of knowledge and psychosocial factors to address social and structural factors underlying HIV risk is the main success of these interventions
- 2) The need for interventions to adopt structural approaches that can alter the context of young people’s HIV risk. Although structural interventions are often critiqued as ‘social development’ rather than focused health interventions, in fact these studies offer several important examples of how targeted structural approaches can change individual behaviour.
- 3) Changing social norms related to HIV risk and protective behaviours is important
- 4) The need to engage schools differently in HIV prevention, including use of personnel other than teachers to deliver interventions. While peer education is popular among students, this review supports other findings that offer little evidence for its ability to increase intervention impact. One approach with certain advantages over teachers, who often resist teaching sexuality education, and same-age peers, who may sometimes have difficulty commanding the necessary authority to run a classroom, would be to use older youth as ‘mentors’. School mentors could work in partnership with teachers who request to teach sexuality education and HIV prevention, but would relieve the reliance on teachers who do not want this responsibility.

(Harrison *et al*, 2010)

### **Kenya and Uganda: voluntary counselling and testing for HIV**

Voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) for HIV a proven approach for promoting safe sex and increasing the use of care and support services for adults, is now also seen as a potentially powerful tool for youth. In Kenya and Uganda, research for youth ages 14 to 21 indicates that youth would seek VCT if the services were confidential and inexpensive (Horizons, 2001). In response, programme officials in Uganda are carrying out a number of enhancements to the VCT program, including the following:

- Training of health workers to counsel youth about HIV
- Use of a separate room and alternative locations to improve confidentiality
- Reduced prices
- Establishment of a referral system for young clients
- Improved outreach to schools and youth groups
- Introduction of VCT at youth reproductive health centres

(Rosen, 2004)

### **Côte d'Ivoire: media campaign programme**

International Rescue Committee (IRC) implemented a project, called Protection from Gender-Based Violence in Côte d'Ivoire, from May 2008 to the end of November 2009. The project aimed to prevent sexual violence against women and provide assistance to victims. As a part of prevention component, IRC launched media campaigns to broadcast awareness raising messages about gender-based violence (GBV) through local radio stations in Man, Côte d'Ivoire.

IRC created 10-15 minute short programmes on GBV and translated in the local languages. Topics were carefully chosen based on the community survey findings. The topics included intimate partner violence, sexual violence, female genital mutilation, mistreatment of widows, and services available for survivors. The radio station staff were also trained on basic concepts of GBV so that they can include GBV issues in their programming. In total, 53 programmes were created by IRC and broadcasted during the peak air-times in the evening when the most people listened to the radio.

The evaluation of the project indicated that the radio campaign had been successful as 77.5% of the 200 people interviewed had heard about GBV on the radio and 69% of them had listened to the GBV programmes at least twice. It also found that these GBV programmes were effective in changing people's opinions about GBV issues.

National radio stations also broadcasted three radio programmes on women's issues, such as GBV concepts and types, women's participation in decision-making process at the community, national level, and sexual abuse and exploitation of girls at school and in the community. There has not been evaluation reported the impact of media campaign through national radio stations.

(IRC, 2010 quoted in Willman and Makisaka, 2010)

### ***Problems associated with pregnancy and giving birth***

#### **Madhya Pradesh: women's reproductive choices and behaviours**

The study reports results from an innovative, large-scale, household-based study designed to explore the determinants of women's reproductive choices and behaviours in Madhya Pradesh, India. The study piloted a groundbreaking survey approach developed to more accurately capture a comprehensive picture of women's reproductive lives. In total, data were collected between 2000 and 2002 on 11,341 individual pregnancies from 2,444 women ages 15 to 39.

The study shows that the vast majority of Indian women have limited reproductive rights and choices despite the fact that abortion has been legal in India through the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act, passed in 1972. In India, the lack of safe, effective, accessible temporary

methods of contraception is as much a barrier to the realization of reproductive rights and choice for women as the ineffective and poor implementation of the abortion law.

The most significant policy message emerging from the findings of this study is clear: Temporary methods of contraception must be made a viable option for Indian women. The rhetoric for informed choice must be translated into a serious, committed, and energized effort to provide women safe and effective forms of temporary contraception.

Government providers of abortion services need to be more plentiful, better trained, and better equipped, especially in rural areas. Since the vast majority of abortions are currently provided through the private sector, the role of the private sector must be acknowledged and adequately addressed. A campaign to inform and educate women, their families, and service providers regarding the legal right to abortion must be a first step in ensuring the enactment of this right. Additionally, the MTP Act itself requires revision to make it more transparent and easily implemented.

(Malhotra *et al*, 2003)

### **Brazil: strengthening post abortion care**

Poor youth are more likely to resort to unsafe abortions than older women; less likely to seek early care; and thus, more likely to need post abortion care. Strengthening this kind of care should include special training for health personnel, particularly the nurses and nurse midwives who typically staff rural and marginally urban health facilities. In one of these programs, adolescents seeking post abortion care at a maternity hospital in Fortaleza, Brazil, are treated and then referred to the hospital's Adolescent Centre for group and individual counselling on reproductive health (Herrick, 2001).

(Rosen, 2004)

### ***Improving reproductive health services generally***

#### **Sri Lanka: maternal mortality reduction success story**

Sri Lanka's achievement in maternal mortality reduction is one of the spectacular success stories in human development. Multisectoral public sector investments led to a steep decline in maternal mortality ratios (MMR) (deaths per 100,000 live births) during the 1930s and early 1950s and a continuation of this decline to a current MMR level of 60 estimated for 1995. Several studies have attributed the early decline of MMR to Sri Lanka's focus on communicable disease reduction (malaria and hookworm), general improvements in sanitation, and the introduction of modern medical advances (antibiotics). General improvement also occurred in living standards, including food supplies, which improved women's nutrition. In addition, specific factors acted on improving MMR.

The initial scheme to expand delivery of maternal and child health services to the broader population started in 1926 with the health unit system. Each health unit is subdivided into public health midwife (PHM) areas. A PHM is responsible for all pregnant women in her jurisdiction—covering a population of 4,000–5,000. By 1948, the whole island was covered by the health unit system. This system remains the cornerstone of field health services in Sri Lanka today. With the increase in the number of health units, the number of health centres rose rapidly. These centres provided an integrated package of maternal and child health services with an emphasis on improving antenatal coverage, detection, and early referral of delivery complications. Access to these and other primary services was free.

During the 1950s, Sri Lanka increased investments in midwife training and expansion of PHM positions, increased the number of hospitals providing obstetric services, and increased investments

in an ambulance service throughout the country. The effect of these investments resulted in an increase in the percentage of births delivered by a skilled attendant. Before 1940, 30% of live births in Sri Lanka had skilled attendance, with most of these births taking place at the mother's home with a trained public health midwife. By the late 1950s, skilled attendance had increased to 50%, with PHMs conducting half of these deliveries at home. Today, 95% of births are attended by a skilled practitioner, with the majority taking place in a hospital.

The success of women's health promotion in Sri Lanka is attributable to other sectoral investments—including investments in girl's education, promotion of women's rights, and empowerment of women through the electoral process. These elements also provided an environment that sustained political and managerial commitment to improved maternal health.

With good access to basic health care established, Sri Lanka then focused during the 1960s and 1970s on family planning, improving quality of care, and introducing advances in obstetric care. Monitoring systems were continually strengthened, and maternal death investigations were used to fuel improved clinical and organizational management.

Although Sri Lanka faces many challenges today in maintaining its system of high quality, accessible maternal and child health services, its past efforts are commended for demonstrating that, when human development investments focus on improving women's health, maternal mortality can be reduced in a resource-poor setting.

*Source. Abstracted from information presented in Investing in Maternal Health: Learning From Malaysia and Sri Lanka (Health, Nutrition and Population Series), pages 112–151, by I. Pathmanathan, J. Liljestrand, J. M. Martins, L. C. Rajapaksa, C. Lissner.*

(Lule *et al*, 2008)

### **Sierra Leone: free mother and child healthcare**

Sierra Leone used to be the worst place in the world to give birth. On 28 April 2010, the government introduced free healthcare for pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers and children under the age of five. One year on, the policy has helped reduce maternal and child deaths. ...

In the first month after free healthcare was introduced, the number of women giving birth in hospitals and clinics increased from 6,733 to 28,239. Between September 2009 and August 2010, a 32% increase in the number of children under five being treated in public health facilities was also recorded. Prenatal consultations increased by 71% over this period.

*“Adama Sesay, who doesn't know her age, with her baby Albert, who was suffering from intestinal pain, at Makeni hospital. Sesay lost two of her four children, before healthcare was free. ‘Now healthcare is free I came to hospital as soon as my child fell ill. Before, when I had to pay, I'd have left it to my husband in the hope he had money to pay. A woman could not do this on her own’”*

(The Guardian, 2011)

### **Mexico: conditional cash transfer and improving birth outcomes**

In 1997, Mexico introduced Oportunidades, a large-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, aimed in part at improving birth outcomes by providing cash transfers to beneficiary households conditioned on pregnant women's completing at least four antenatal care visits, two post-partum care visits, and attending health and nutrition lectures. A key objective of both the educational sessions and the meetings with the elected beneficiary representatives was to inform beneficiary women of their right to social services and to empower women on how to make the best out of their interaction with health care providers. The payment mechanism is cash at program-specific payment points, and programme compliance is via certification at public clinics and schools. The programme's average cost per family beneficiary of \$4.67 was affordable given that the total programme budget

of US\$2.8 billion (by 2005 for a total of five million household beneficiaries) represented less than 1 percent of Mexico's GDP. Numerous evaluations of Mexico's Oportunidades programme have shown that this programme increased utilization of health services and improved maternal health outcomes.

(World Bank, 2010)

### **Tamil Nadu: extending secondary health services**

The Tamil Nadu Health Systems Project extended secondary health services in the rural areas through the establishment of 80 Comprehensive Emergency Obstetrics and Neonatal Centres (CEmONCs) and 385 ambulances. Rural women in the state of Tamil Nadu in India can now reach a comprehensive emergency obstetric and neonatal health facility within a half an hour from their homes.

- *Sensitizing communities:* Pregnant women and their family members were sensitized about the advantages of institutional delivery, the need for regular antenatal checkups and early admission in case of emergency.
- *Emergency transportation:* The National Rural Health Mission's ambulance service was geared up to take a woman in complicated labour anywhere in the state to the nearest CEmONC centre, within half an hour of her call. The ambulances were manned by trained technicians who informed the centre of the case details, blood group etc. to ensure immediate care upon arrival.
- *Extending and improving secondary level care:* At least two hospitals in each district were fully equipped to function as CEmONCs that were open 24 hours a day and fully staffed.
- *Reaching vulnerable communities:* A concerted effort was made to establish CEmONC centres near isolated and vulnerable communities. Private public partnerships also provided screening for sickle cell anaemia, counselling of patients, and a bed grant scheme offering inpatient care to tribal populations.
- *A computerized Hospital Management System (HMS) that streamlines hospital management by automating processes,* including the online entry of diagnosis and prescription as well as the maintenance of drug inventory in pharmacies is operational at 41 secondary level hospitals across five districts. This will now be extended to all 270 secondary hospitals in the state, as well as to 18 medical colleges.

Results:

- The state has successfully extended secondary health services in the rural areas through the establishment of 80 CEmONCs and 385 ambulances, leading to improved access and quality of care for expectant mothers and infants. The number of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women availing of ambulance services and opting for institutional delivery has also risen significantly. More than 99.5 percent of deliveries in the state now take place in medical institutions. Tamil Nadu will soon have one CEmONC centre for every 500,000 people.
- The Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) has reduced by 35 percent - from 48 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1998-99 (National Family Health Survey - NFHS-2) to 31 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2006 in the most recent survey (NFHS-3).
- The state's Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) has also decreased - from 167 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1999 to 111 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006.

(World Bank, 2010)

### **Burkina Faso: meeting the needs of young married mothers**

The Population Council joined the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Burkina Faso Ministry of Social Action, and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to conduct research to

better understand and address the needs of young married girls. The project targeted girls in rural areas with high rates of early marriage, maternal mortality, infant mortality, and with poor access to health services. Two rural provinces meeting these criteria were selected: Gourma and Bazèga.

Project partners worked with community leaders to identify 30 young mothers to be trained as 'mères-éducatrices,' or mother-educators. To qualify, the mères-éducatrices had to be 19 to 24 years old, currently married with at least one child, and well regarded in their respective communities. ... Their initial preparation—three weeks of training conducted over a two-month period—included reproductive health, prenatal care, excision, HIV/AIDS, and communication skills. Subsequent refresher courses were held periodically to reinforce skills and add new components ... .

The mères-éducatrices provided information and support to married adolescents during their first pregnancy and birth, and to provide Vitamin A and iron supplements to those who were pregnant. In light of the seclusion of married adolescents, the mères-éducatrices travelled in pairs (using bicycles provided by the project) to girls' homes in remote areas; one mère-éducatrice would engage the girl's gatekeepers by explaining the programme and providing information while the other would establish a dialogue with the married adolescent girl. After the initial visits and rapport-building, the married girls were permitted to leave their homes to meet with their peers for a weekly educational session. Over time, the girls began organizing themselves and built a simple structure that served as a permanent meeting space in which functional literacy classes were offered. This space has evolved into a club and an informal school for married adolescent girls.

To increase use of local health centres, the mères éducatrices began acting as liaisons between married adolescents and the health centre staff. In addition to escorting girls to the health centres for prenatal visits and educational sessions, the mères-éducatrices also helped sensitize health workers to the particular needs and vulnerabilities of young married girls. ...

Lessons learned: The project demonstrated that identifying, reaching, and supporting married adolescent girls living in traditional circumstances, even those in rural, remote, resource-poor communities, is feasible. The programme showed that recruiting and training local women—young mothers themselves— to serve as mères-éducatrices, to offer advice, information, and support to girls and their gatekeepers is possible. In resource-poor communities such as these, the mères-éducatrices are viewed as valuable assets (not as a cultural threat), serving as resource persons for the larger community. Finally, with proper training, and support from Ministry of Health agents, they are able to disseminate health information, lead community discussions, and to screen films on health topics such as sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, and female genital cutting, and to sensitize health workers to the vulnerabilities of these young women. In this way, they have become part of—and extended the reach of—the regular service and development cadre in the community.

(Brady and Saloucou, 2007)

### ***Towards a youth-friendly reproductive health service***

#### **Policies and laws to address adolescent reproductive health**

- In Albania, reproductive health education and services for adolescents are free.
- Kyrgyzstan protects the right of young people to reproductive health care.
- Benin's law calls for separate reproductive health services for adolescents.
- Panama recognizes the right of pregnant adolescents to health care, information on their rights and continued education.
- Colombia now specifically protects the right of adolescents-including for those displaced by internal conflict-to contraception.

- Many countries have established a minimum age for marriage, as called for by the 1962 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.
- Anti-trafficking and anti-violence policies and laws, such as those of Bangladesh, Niger and the Philippines, also prohibit child marriage and the forced marriage of women and girls in exchange for money or goods.

(UNFPA, 2005)

### **Mexico: school reproductive health and HIV/AIDS education**

Among the most important and best-studied programme interventions is school reproductive health and HIV/AIDS education. One of the many examples of well-designed and effective sex education efforts is the Planeando Tu Vida life-planning curriculum in Mexico. A study carried out in Mexico City found that students in the 6-week course improved their knowledge of sexuality and reproductive health and had significantly higher contraceptive use compared to students in traditional sex education courses and to those who had not attended any sex education course (FOCUS, 2001, citing Pick de Weiss & Palos, 1989).

(Rosen, 2004)

### **Kenya and Uganda: voluntary counselling and testing for HIV**

A proven approach for promoting safe sex and increasing the use of care and support services for adults is now also seen as a potentially powerful tool for youth. In Kenya and Uganda, research for youth ages 14 to 21 indicates that youth would seek VCT if the services were confidential and inexpensive (Horizons, 2001). In response, programme officials in Uganda are carrying out a number of enhancements to the Voluntary and Counselling (VCT) program, including the following:

- Training of health workers to counsel youth about HIV
- Use of a separate room and alternative locations to improve confidentiality
- Reduced prices
- Establishment of a referral system for young clients
- Improved outreach to schools and youth groups
- Introduction of VCT at youth reproductive health centres
- A multimedia campaign to inform youth about VCT.

(Rosen, 2004)

### **Peru: tackling anaemia**

Because anaemia is a critical health problem in many countries, many efforts have focused on improving the iron intake of adult women. **One programme in Peru addressed poor iron status of adolescent girls.** Despite other programmes to supply pregnant women with iron supplements through public sector health centres, the prevalence of anaemia remains high in Peru. This successful programme in Peru worked through the schools to reach adolescent girls with nutrition education and iron supplementation. Over a 17-week period, girls received iron tablets at school between meals. Researchers found that daily iron supplementation effectively lowers anaemia and iron deficiency. With adequate motivation and the support of their teachers, the girls had high compliance with the iron supplementation programme (Elder, 2002; MotherCare, 2000).

(Rosen, 2004)

### **Targeting out-of-school youth**

Out-of-school youth are likely to be more marginalized than those who are in school and are often the youth most in need of critical services such as pregnancy prevention and prevention of HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted infections (STIs). A number of countries, including Paraguay, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have launched effective programmes targeting out-of-school youth, which combine mass media, peer education, and community-based efforts. For instance, the Arte y Parte project targeted out-of school youth in three cities in Paraguay, using a booklet about adolescent sexuality, street drama, radio programming, newspaper columns, and distribution of promotional items (Magnani, Robinson, Seiber, & Avila, 2000).

(Rosen, 2004)

### **UNFPA – Reproductive Health Initiative**

UNFPA helped initiate the first-ever youth-friendly reproductive health services in countries from Bosnia- Herzegovina to Lao PDR. Its Reproductive Health Initiative for Youth in Asia, supported by the European Union, is empowering neglected groups in a region that is home to 70 per cent of the developing world's young people.

- Using theatre, comic books, peer education, games and talk shows, the initiative has reached out to young people in rural areas, commercial sex workers, street children and factory workers.
- Influential adults, such as parents, community leaders and health providers have been enlisted to strengthen the impact of messages. In Cambodia, the initiative reaches more than 250,000 young people directly and 1.2 million more through the radio programmes it sponsors.

The Y-PEER programme has coordinated and strengthened the efforts of nearly 200 peer education projects that reach some 1.7 million young people in 27 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Y-PEER uses Internet-based communications to share information, resources and lessons learned and has translated its peer education training manual into 15 regional languages.

(UNFPA, 2005)

### **Pharmacist training to improve adolescents' access**

In many countries, pharmacists are a key point of contact between adolescents and the health sector. In recognition of the opportunities this provides, PATH launched the RxGen Project in 2000 in Cambodia, Kenya, and Nicaragua, now expanded to Vietnam. The initiative includes training pharmacists and pharmacy staff, developing referral networks with nearby clinics, and providing educational materials to young clients. Participating pharmacies are labelled with a special logo flagging their “adolescent friendliness” to potential clients. Evaluation results are positive. More than 60% of participating pharmacies visited by mystery clients provided correct products and instructions for emergency contraception use, an increase of 50 percentage points from baseline to evaluation, as well as improvements in the provision of STI and contraception information for mystery shoppers who presented for emergency contraception (PATH, 2006).

(Temin and Levine, 2009)

### ***Targeting poor and vulnerable young women and men***

#### **Bolivia: reaching all women of reproductive age, including the poor**

Bolivia has aggressively implemented social insurance schemes which have ensured access to reproductive health services for all women of reproductive age, including the poor. This has been supported by a strong supply-chain system that ensures the arrival of products to remote service delivery points. As a result, births in health facilities have increased in the last decade and there have been marked decreases in inequality in use of family planning and antenatal care services.

(World Bank, 2010)

### **Programmes targeting adolescent orphans**

A key need for adolescent orphans is education on reproductive health and HIV prevention, as well as services for pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV. In Rwanda and Zambia, a study among adolescents ages 10 to 19 found that those orphaned experience earlier sexual initiation than non-orphans. In addition, orphanhood occurring closer to adolescent years is more likely to result in early sexual debut than orphanhood occurring in childhood.

Projects have begun to address reproductive health and HIV directly, but more emphasis is needed. In Zambia, the Tizenge Youth Orphans project educates orphans and vulnerable children while also raising awareness about HIV/AIDS and other STIs, along with information on care and support for those who are affected by these diseases. Operated by youth in Eastern Zambia, the community-based initiative works with children ages five to 24 and the communities where they live. Thus far, 13 villages have come together to build three schools, while nine teachers and 30 caregivers have been trained to teach literacy classes, reaching more than 100 students. Other educational activities such as dramas and dances on the topics of HIV/AIDS and STIs have reached more than 3,000 people.

A few projects have integrated reproductive health issues into education programs. A project in four African countries supports Junior Farmer Field and Life Schools, which teach agricultural knowledge, business skills, and life skills to orphans and vulnerable children ages 12 to 18. The schools also address HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, gender sensitivity, child protection, and sexual health, while providing a safe social space for students to develop self-esteem and confidence. The schools cover traditional and modern agriculture, including field preparation, sowing and transplanting, irrigation, pest control, conservation, harvesting, and marketing skills — knowledge that is commonly handed down within families through the generations. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization sponsors the project with the World Food Programme and other UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, and local institutions.

(Daileader Ruland *et al*, 2005)

### **Early marriage**

#### **India: engaging key stakeholders**

One of the greatest achievements of the Action Approach for Reduction of Early Marriage and Early Pregnancy (EMEP) programme is involving **religious leaders**, particularly the maulvis, or Muslim clerics. The programme motivated maulvis to preach messages on the issue to the community after the Friday prayer. A senior maulvi told the International Centre for Research on Women's (ICRW) team that the Quran forbids marriage of nabalik, or underage girls. Because the Quran does not specify an actual age, they defined it for their community as 18 years, in line with Indian and international laws. These messages had strong recall and acceptance in the community.

**Mothers** also can be strong allies. Across programmes, mothers supported their daughters by getting involved in programmes to access information and skills. In EMEP's programme, mothers came to realize the negative effects of child marriage. According to one mother, "We have suffered our whole lives because we did not know any better, because our mothers did not know any better. We don't want the same to happen to our daughters. They have a right to live." In the Development Initiative Supporting Healthy Adolescents (DISHA) program, mothers supported their daughters' participation in the programme as contraceptive depot holders designated to offer contraceptives and counselling to other youth. Some mothers in Bihar said that the only route to delaying childbearing (to ensure safe motherhood for their daughters) is by delaying age at marriage. These

women believed they could exercise some control over when their daughters marry, but could not influence the timing of childbearing once daughters marry and leave their natal family.

The results from programmes working with **men and boys** are more ambiguous. In some studies, fathers and brothers supported early marriage for girls as part of their duty to “protect the virtue” of their women. These reactions are typical in the more patriarchal states like Rajasthan, Haryana and Bihar. In the DISHA and RISHTA (Regional Initiative for Safe Sexual Health by Today’s Adolescents) projects, where girls and boys are trained as peer educators who advocate for later marriages, boys are strong supporters of delaying age at marriage for the sake of girls’ own preferences and well-being. In the Institute for Health Management Pachod’s (IHMP) life skills program, fathers are more actively involved in the curriculum than the mothers (Pande et al. 2006). Involving men and boys in programmes can be challenging and the full effect of that involvement on increasing age at marriage remains unclear. Still, the DISHA, RISHTA and IHMP programmes suggest that these efforts are worthwhile given men’s and boys’ strong influence over marriage decisions.

(Das Gupta, 2008)

### **Morocco: campaign to reduce early marriage**

In Morocco, the national government recently raised the age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18, the same age as boys. The government also organized a large-scale media campaign—involving Islamic law experts, intellectuals and political representatives—to raise awareness of the new law and encourage changes in behaviour.

(ICRW, 2007)

### **Uttar Pradesh: programme to reduce child marriage**

In India, the Supreme Court recently handed down a decision requiring married couples to register their consent to be married and their age with local authorities, to better enforce the law establishing 18 as the minimum age of marriage. In the state of Uttar Pradesh, the government has launched a programme to increase awareness about the legal age of marriage, change values and attitudes about child marriage, and deny eligibility for government jobs to people marrying before age 18.

(ICRW, 2007)

### ***Integrated programmes: reproductive health/education/livelihoods***

#### **India: Development Initiative Supporting Healthy Adolescents**

ICRW and local NGO partners, with support from the Packard Foundation, designed, implemented and evaluated the Development Initiative Supporting Health Adolescents (DISHA) in two Indian states: Bihar and Jharkhand. The two states, the Packard Foundation’s priority states in India, are among the country’s least developed. They are characterized by poorly functioning public health systems, persistently high fertility rates, poor reproductive health outcomes and conservative gender norms. ... The integrated programme was conducted from 2005 to 2007 in 176 villages. The DISHA activities stressed youth participation and focused on the following outcomes:

- Improve youth skills and capacity through peer education, youth groups and livelihoods training;
- Create an enabling environment for meeting youth sexual and reproductive health needs by building community support;
- Ensure youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health service delivery and access; and
- Build the technical and implementation capacity of the partner NGOs.

#### **Behaviour Change Highlights:**

- Age at marriage increased by nearly two years to just shy of 18. At baseline, the mean age at marriage was 15.9, and more than 50 percent of girls in the sample were married in the two years prior to the start of DISHA, nearly 60 percent before the age of 18. In contrast, only 40 percent of the 198 girls married during the two-year DISHA programme were younger than 18 at marriage. And by endline, the average age at marriage among girls surveyed had increased by nearly two years to 17.9.
- Contraceptive use increased among youth by nearly 60 percent. Married youth who were exposed to DISHA were nearly 60 percent more likely to report current use of a modern contraceptive method than similar youth who were not exposed to DISHA.

#### **Knowledge & Attitudinal Change Highlights:**

- Youth exposed to DISHA were 14 percent more likely to know the legal age at marriage for girls than non-exposed youth.
- Youth exposed to DISHA were 17 percent more likely to know where to access oral contraceptive pills than non-exposed youth.
- Adults exposed to DISHA were 7 percent more likely to feel girls should wait until they are 18 or older to marry than non-exposed adults not exposed to DISHA.
- DISHA also was somewhat successful in changing norms regarding certain dimensions of empowerment, mainly spousal communication, self-efficacy within the context of marriage, and mobility, but less so regarding communication with elders and self-efficacy prior to marriage. For example, girls exposed to DISHA were 60 percent more likely to be able to travel unaccompanied outside the village to seek health service than unexposed youth. However, no significant programme effect was seen around girls' ability to communicate with their parents about their marriage preferences.

#### **Lessons learned and recommendations**

- 1) Integrated programmes present significant implementation challenges.** Recommendation: Integrated programmes may be best implemented in settings with adequate infrastructure, economic opportunities and implementation capacity. In less ideal settings, it may be better to strategically select programme components.
- 2) Core intensive, individualized intervention activities generally yield better results.** That said, community-level activities can lead to improved sexual and reproductive health outcomes, and may be a cost-effective alternative. Recommendation: Where resources are available, activities that allow more intensive interaction with youth and communities are worth undertaking for more comprehensive change, while broader community activities may be a cost-effective alternative for large-scale integrated programmes when resources are limited.
- 3) The sequencing and duration of programme interventions affect the success of integrated programs.** Recommendation: Given the multiple components of integrated interventions, it is important to align capacity building and intervention roll out so as to allow sufficient time for all the integrated components to be operational in the field, and to ensure that "supply" is in place as "demand" is generated.
- 4) Youth are an important resource in defining and meeting their sexual and reproductive health needs.** Recommendation: Youth need to be recognized as crucial partners in implementing and sustaining sexual and reproductive health interventions, particularly in settings where other resources are limited.
- 5) Core set of technical capacities and organizational principles are essential for implementing and sustaining integrated programming over the long term.** Recommendation: Given the importance of local NGO partners for long-term sustainability of youth sexual and reproductive

health programs, lead partners and donors should invest in and help strengthen local NGO technical capacities and commitment to core organizational principles

(Kanesathasan *et al*, 2010)

### **Zimbabwe: SHAZ! Shaping Health of Adolescents**

Shaping the Health of Adolescents in Zimbabwe (SHAZ!), began in 2001 and immediately confronted the multiple challenges of girls' vulnerability in the face of a downward spiralling economy and political instability. It was one of the few programmes that targeted poor adolescent girls with the goal of mitigating the problem of transactional sex, particularly with older men known regionally as sugar daddies. The programme was set up to test the hypothesis that interventions that develop girls' economic power will enhance their decision-making ability by teaching them life skills around determination of when, where and how sexual initiations and relations occur. The larger goal was to reduce the risk of HIV infection, STI infection or unwanted pregnancy.

SHAZ! targeted 16-19 year old out-of-school orphaned and poor girls living in two poor communities outside of Harare, the capital. Part of the project's conceptual framework rested on the belief that providing individuals with life skills and business training would result in increased knowledge, leading to their generation of and control over economic resources, and in the long term reducing HIV infection through their increased ability to negotiate safer sex

The pilot intervention covered four components.

- Training in life skills and in business management were the most successful of the components, with attendance averaging 80%.
- Through the business training, however, the participants developed business plans and received a small loan for their own projects. This fourth microcredit component which was something of the king pin of the project, failed in terms of repayment rates. Only 20 per cent repaid their first instalment and 5 per cent paid their loan in full. This failure of the microcredit component may be attributable, in part, to the adverse economic conditions in Zimbabwe which placed an enormous deterrent on business opportunities.

This demonstrates the difficulty of setting up microfinance programmes as stand alone initiatives and in precarious economic environments—where most vulnerable girls live.

(Urdang, 2007)

## ***Youth employment***

### **Latin America and the Caribbean: employment programmes**

#### ***Evolving youth employment models***

What is interesting about the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is how the approaches to supporting young workers have changed over time. Three dominant models have been used in the region in the past few decades.

- **First, a state-managed training model prevailed during the 1970s.** This traditional supply-driven model offered specialized training and retraining to workers through centralized public providers. Some public institutions have survived and continue to provide vocational training services.
- **The second dominant LAC model emerged in the early 1990s with the Jóvenes Programmes** (see case studies). This is a demand-driven model that targets economically disadvantaged youth, fosters private-sector participation, and promotes competition among training providers. The model was first applied in Chile and soon after replicated in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. The programmes are financed and coordinated by the government. Training has a comprehensive scope – from technical to life

skills and from lectures to internships – accompanied by sound support services and financial incentives. The Jóvenes model has been successful in improving job placement and earnings, but became particularly expensive for some countries where it has been replaced by smaller and more focused interventions.

- The third and most recent model inherits the demand-driven orientation of the *Jóvenes*. It is a vocational training approach with on-the-job training and placement services. The *Entra 21* Programme (see case studies) is the most characteristic example of this model. This programme started in 2002, and aims to provide business with skilled information-and-communication-technology workers while improving the employability of disadvantaged youths (age 16-29).

(Betcherman *et al*, 2007)

### ***LAC Entra 21: skills training for young people***

Entra 21 is an initiative developed by the International Youth Foundation to prepare LAC youth, 16 to 29 years of age, for today's information-based economy. It has been widely implemented by local and central governments, NGOs, and local businesses to improve the employability of disadvantaged youths. The programme started in 2002 with the goal of providing skills training in information and communication technology to 12,000 young workers in a 3-year period and to place at least 40 per cent of them in employment.

Entra 21 programmes support youth through well-designed and coordinated lectures and internships. They offer life-skills training and continuous tutoring; these are central features of the intervention and key determinants of its success. There is also a financial scheme to provide an incentive for youth to register in the program. Programmes last two years on average, and target mainly unemployed and underemployed disadvantaged young people who have completed high school (or are in the process of doing so). Gender is equally represented, as well as some minority groups (indigenous youths are particularly targeted by Entra).

(Puerto, 2007b)

## **Africa: employment programmes**

### ***African programmes in the Youth Employment Inventory***

- Eleven out of the 29 programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa covered in the inventory have a comprehensive, multiple service approach. In most cases, these programmes depend almost entirely on external funding from international donor institutions, bilaterals and their national implementation agencies. Such programmes included elements targeted at helping young people to start their own businesses, combined with elements of skills development and training.
- Seven programmes focused exclusively at improving chances for young entrepreneurs. They typically encompassed modules such as supporting young people in starting their own business, including providing training on writing project proposals and business plans; conducting feasibility studies; counselling on legal requirements; and improving their access to credit/start-up loans. An example of this category of programmes is the Youth Dairy Farm Project in Uganda, which supports youth by training them in the management of husbandry and farm products, which the youth then sell. (see case studies)
- Six programmes focused mainly on skills training for young people and four programmes adopted the objective of making existing training systems work better for young people. The latter intended to improve highly fragmented, input-orientated training systems by upgrading training facilities; improving the quality of training centres; enhancing the quality of instruction; and upgrading the matching processes between labour demand and supply through better coordination and information systems.

- Finally, one programme was categorized as making the labour market better for young people: The public works programme in South Africa covers infrastructure projects, the environmental sector, and the social sector, and seeks to increase the labour intensity of government-funded programmes and to create work opportunities in public environmental programs.
- Interventions in the poorest countries have generally focused mainly on young entrepreneurs and followed a scheme of multiservice programs. This contrasts with the situation of middle-income countries such as South Africa and Namibia, where multiservice comprehensive approaches were used predominantly to integrate unemployed youth into the labour force, mainly through the provision of skills training programs.
- Young workers were the primary focus of most employment interventions included in the inventory. Twenty-two out of the 29 programmes (76%) targeted young workers exclusively, while seven programmes were open to unemployed workers of all age groups. Most of the programmes targeting youth workers aimed at improving employment prospects for young entrepreneurs, skills training, or implementing the multiple service approach. Eight programmes focused on urban areas, six on rural areas, and fifteen on both areas.
- Eleven out of the 29 programmes were directed towards young women, and three programmes targeted young workers with disabilities. Moreover, 12 programmes were aimed at young people with low-income, and 17 at youths with low levels of formal education.
- By contrast, ethnicity did not appear to be a selection criterion. In general, significant complementarities can be observed in programmes targets. For example, the majority of programmes that target low-income youth also target youth with low-levels of education. A similar trend is observable for programmes targeting women or disabled youth, which focus at the same time on young people from low-income families with no or only low levels of education
- However, evaluations of the impact of the programs—an invaluable element for guiding policy—have been very low in SubSaharan Africa, and lower than in any other developing region. This can be explained partially by the low number of youth employment programmes in the region, poor data availability, and the fact that evaluations rarely tracked post-programme outcomes. In general, programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa included in the inventory were not evaluated appropriately. For example, while 11 programmes included information on gross labour market outcomes, 16 programmes lacked any information on results or the level of evaluation was unknown. Only two had enough information to suggest a positive impact. In the case of 10 programs—including three entrepreneurship programs, three skills training programs, one “making training systems work better for young people” program, one public works program, and two multiple service programs—a tentative assessment based on limited available information would suggest a positive impact on labour market outcomes. However, it is not clear whether the benefits exceeded the costs associated with the programs’ implementation in all cases.

(World Bank, 2008)

### ***Traditional apprenticeship training***

While in many other countries, training in the informal sector can be very much less regulated or organised. Nor is all training in the informal sector in the apprenticeship mode.

*In support of traditional apprenticeship training:*

- Skills training in these systems is highly relevant to the real world of work.
- Youth become acquainted with actual work conditions and with the maintenance or production of tradable goods through appropriate technologies; this can result in employment in the same enterprise; and there is certainly some evidence of substantial changes in technology over a 20 year period.

- Even though skills training, by itself, is not sufficient to raise incomes in the informal sector, it can, along with other inputs, contribute to enhancing the productivity of the sector.
- Such systems are often more effective than the pre-employment training, as trainees are more mature and motivated than in formal pre-employment training; trainees can also enter without the formal qualifications needed for public Vocational Training Centres (VTCs).
- Training allows for a gradual build-up of informal business networks and for the development of general business skills, including customer-relations. These modes of training are of lower cost than VTCs and are financed directly by the beneficiaries. They are accessible to rural populations and the urban poor.
- They are the majority source of Technical and Vocational Skills Development (TVSD) in Africa, South Asia and even Latin America, and they are emerging in importance in countries in Central Asia; this is because the informal or unregistered sector is responsible for between 80% and 90% of employment in much of SSA and South Asia, and for over 50% of employment in Latin America.

*Challenges to traditional apprenticeship training or training in the informal sector:*

- The potential benefits of increased productivity and income are dependent on a range of additional inputs, such as credit, market access, security of tenure and business counselling. These tend not to be available since no ministry takes overall responsibility for the informal sector; nor is the formal banking system interested.
- These indigenous systems are frequently static; the introduction of new product designs and production technologies are excluded; traditional technologies are perpetuated except in dynamic industrial environments.
- There is no link with formal training systems. Hence there is no exposure to theoretical aspects or to more modern training approaches; master craftsmen and women often lack teaching skills.
- The few initiatives that have sought to formalise aspects of the informal sector have not proved either effective or sustainable.
- There is a great variety in the quality of both training and working conditions, with some close to exploitative; there is a lack of clear standards, monitoring and quality assurance.
- Portability of skills is limited, as there is often no accepted certification.
- There is still screening out of applicants from poorer families if up-front payment is required; and much apprenticeship is gender-biased.
- There is more evidence of the informalisation of the formal sector than the formalisation of the informal sector; in other words, many formal sector employees are routinely now obliged to have a second job in the informal sector, in order to survive.

**Comment:** The informal sector and the local apprenticeship system present a development paradox: they are crucially important to employment generation and to the transfer of skills across generations. Yet, government response has generally been more negative than positive. The few schemes to formalise the informal sector have not been effective. The most positive government influence on the informal sector and traditional apprenticeship thus far has been indirect, through popular access to primary and junior secondary education, and hence more educated trainees have entered the sector. A possible policy reaction to the new demands for the formalisation of the sector would be seriously to review the wider legal, credit and macroeconomic environment of the sector and the most appropriate ministerial responsibility for it.

(DFID, 2007)

***Kenya: Project Baobab***

Project Baobab is a non-profit organization that teaches youth skills for economic independence through six partner secondary schools since 2000. It targets low-income youth, mainly females, in

rural areas, and provides free business skills training (entrepreneurship training along with a life-skills training program) and small grants for business start-ups for some of those who are trained in secondary schools and vocational centres. The project's main components are:

- Life Skills: courses are introduced in the third year of secondary school, fostering self-confidence and openness to express ideas before a group.
- Entrepreneurial Skills: courses are introduced in the fourth year of secondary school, offering training in job readiness, business planning and development skills. Students are led to create individual business plans that focus on enterprises like selling second-hand clothes, raising bees or chickens, or tailoring.
- Start-up loans: students submit business plans to a committee from the local business community. The most promising enterprises are recommended to receive start-up loans from Project Baobab. Each year and in each partner school, approximately 3 to 4 grants of US\$100 each are awarded to students with outstanding business plans.

A gross impact evaluation shows that between 2000 and 2004 about 50 percent of the grantees were running businesses with good-to-marginal success. About 20 percent of the businesses were not operating (business failed or drop out of school).

(Puerto, 2007a)

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